Identity, Architecture, and Film: Mapping the impact of modernization on contemporary Chinese culture

Eve Gabereau BA., McGilI University, 1992

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

in the School of Communication

0 Eve Gabereau SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY August 1998

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The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or selI reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/^ de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantid extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othemise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Culture in contemporary China is being redefined through its changing landscape, ideology, economic syaem, and cultural production: post-Mao modemization and the development of the globalAocal nexus have meant more than political reform and economic liberalization. They have also meant cultural redefinition and reafignment that involve bot h the differentiation and assimilation of China fiomhith other nations. The emergent pluralisrn in the cultural sphere brought about by rnodemization has given rise to hybrid identities that can be mapped through visions, representations, and realities in intercultural production, architecture, and film. Within these three categories that each interpret the relationship between place and identity, specific areas best reveal the impact of modernization on contemporary Chinese culture and everyday life.

First, the intercomection of the local and global spheres and the intemationalization of cultural production can be linked to how cultural identity is expressed and has become eagmented. Second, the changing vernacular of recent urban architecture that is altering the landscape of the traditional Chinese city is the result of modemization and greatly impacts on cultural definition and identity. And finally, the impetus of Fifth Generation filmmakers to make films that reflect on the ideological complexity of China's post-Mao transitional period reconcile the country's new cultural and political situation by using the private sphere to shed light on how culture and ideology manifest themselves in daily life. The Iiterary 'post-new-era' with the Wang

Shophenornenon and the production of A Beijing Native in New York exemplify the first area; while the presence of three eras and regimes in the Beijing landscape (with the

Forbidden City, Tiananmen Square, and the Wangfbjing district) exemplifies the second. And, the deliberately biurred lines between the public and private spheres, the traditional

and the modern, as well as the rural and the urban in me Stmy of Qiu k project the third.

By mapping post-Mao modemization, and ultimately globalization, through

contemporary cultural identity, architecture, and film, a new spatial dialectic emerges

from the inherent tensions in the globalllocal nexus of how to maintain a distinct cultural

identity in an increasingly global environment. The cornmon bond of these three cultural representations, among others, is their qiiest to develop notions ofdemocracy andor civil

society. The Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 may have silenced the people momentarily, but now, alrnost a decade tater, they are talking, advocating, taking action, and making progress on this nont more than ever. Long-term planning, discussion, and international communication will be findamental to China's further growth and development in the 2 la century-that's a given. But, on a more humane and persona1 level, finding its place in the 'new global cultural space' is key to identity formation and cultural definition that ultimately reveal who people are as a nation and how they want to participate beyond national borindaries. Table of Contents

CFIAPTERONE Identity in the New Global Cultural Space 1. Introduction.. .. - - ...... 1O II. Personal identity and the lifeworld...... 12 III. Hybrid identities and cultural production ...... 17 N. National identity beyond the era of refom...... 22

V. Postnationalism in the 'posî-new-era'...... 25

VI. Words in closing...... 3 1

CWAPTER mo Beijing's Changing Landscape: Built Environment and Redefined Culture

1. Introduction...... 33 II. History for sale: a sign of the times?...... 38

1. The Forbidden City...... 40

.* il. Tiananmen Square...... 45

.S. III. Wangfijing...... 47 m. Consuming SpaceCà Spaces of Consumption: New places as definition of culture...... -49 N. Postmodemism in Beijing?.m...... 54 V. Conclusion: defining the Chinese city today...... -60 CHAPTERTHREE Projecting Modernization: Spatial consciousness in contemporary Chinese film through The Story of Qiu Ju

I . Preamble: the post-Mao film industry in context...... 66 XI . Mapping Modernization by Balancing Yin and Yang: Spatial Consciousness in neStory of Qiu Ju ...... 72

I. SpatiaVSocial Change...... 75 .. 11 . Political, Social, and Persona1 Space ...... 79 ... ru . Landscape Changes...... 82 III . Conclusion ...... 88

Cmmx~FOUR The Notion of Civil Society and The New Global Cultural Space

1. Introduction ...... -91 II . Notion($ of Civil Society in China today: finaions and limitations...... -93 III . Refom, Culture, and Identity ...... -97 ... N . Bnnging it al1 together ...... 103 IDENTITY, ARCHITECTURE, AND FILM: MAPPING THE IMPACT OF MODERNIZATION ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CULTURE

The geopolitics of global cdtural formations and local sites are shifting under the pressures of this new 'spatial dialectic' obtained between mobile processes of trm~~'oi~aZimtio~~and strategies of localinftionor regional coalition.

Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake GZobaLXocaI

The 'spatial dialectic' to which Wilson and Dissanayake refer concems the tensions between local and global forces in an increasingly 'global world.' The central predicament in the global/local nexus is how can a nation maintain its distinct cultural identity within a global environment. This calls to mind the two central questions of

UNESCO's cultural sector mandate: How cmwe preserve mr heri~age?And. how cm oirr mzdtiple ct~hvs[ive together in an interacfive world? To answer these questions in the context of contemporary China, I will analyze how culture is defined and redefined in both time and space through a niItural mapping of Deng Xiaoping's modernization and open-door policies that began in the late 1970s' marking the beginning of his career as Mao Zedong's successor and the second leader of the People's Republic of China

(PRC). By mapping how the first era of reforrn in poçt-Mao China (1979-89) and beyond

(1989-today) have simultaneously globalized and localized Chinese culture by way of the movement of capital, the creation of new spaces, and the projection of images, I will interweave the local and global processes that have transpired in the post-Mao, and now post-Deng, era. The emergent pluralisrn in the cultural sphere brought about by rnodemization has given rise to hybrid identities in contemporary China that can be mapped through visions, representations, and realities in (inter)cultural production, urban architecture, and (Fifth Generation) film.

Mapping China' s modernization(s), through examples of (local) literary movements, television programs, film production and cinematic expression, and architectural development, is best done by looking at the new (modem) landscape and the new (global) forms of consumption that are redefining China's national culture- beginning with an analysis of identity formation (personal, national, and international) in

Chapter One, and finishing in Chapter Four with the notion of civil society in China today. The other two chapters of this thesis are about China's changing landscape @oth physical and abstract) through modemizatiorz-affectednew and old Beijing architecture

(Chapter Two) and the spatio-temporal journey of one woman fiom the countryside to the city, and fiom the private sphere to the public sphere, in the film neStory of Qin Ju

(Chapter Three). The connections 1 make between local places and global information and commodity flows in my cultural mapping of China's modernization(s) will descnbe how China has made, and is quickiy defining, its place in what I cal1 the 'new global cultural space' .

This new giobal cultural space is an abstract, albeit strategic, space in which local and global elements subsia simultaneously, but not necessarily compatibly. The two need not be discussed as binaries, but rather as part of the plurality that defines contemporary (postmodem) social theory-calling attention to the culturally-specific articulations, constructions, and practices of everyday life in contemporary China. The Chinese concept of plurality, dt~oyanghta,in the cultural sphere renders modernization

(whether occurrent or not) expansive of personal freedorns because of its emphasis on the

accumulation of wealth, disposable income, leisure time, rnobility, access to new

technologies and mass communications, as well as on the popularization of culture. Yet,

at the same time, because China is an inherently self-reflexive nation, there is an added

tension between the former's adoption and the latter's constriction of global culture(s) in

the local. ne convergence and confliction of local and global forces are a nahiral part of

the ebb and flow that normally characterize late-capitalist, or post-industrial, societies.

Nonetheless, the fact that China expenences capitalistic ups and downs, and negotiates between local and global elements while maintaining a distinctly socialist regime, reveals that the geopolitics of cultural formation are increasingly global, regardless of a nation's stage of industrial growtbso long as it is participatory in the global market. China is certain1y that.

The reconciliation of local and global forces in China is directly linked to the

Marxist themes of alienation wha)and reification (w11hla). As Jing Wang points out, these two terms have become almost interchangeable in post-Mao China, but not cliché as they have in the West, ' because of their association with socialisrn and ewnomic growth respectively. Moreover, the expansion of opportunities for new modes of consumption, in addition to self-reflexivity as ideology, are not simply an endorsement of pluralism as a social good, but rather a product of govemental strategies aimed at emphesizing the local's prevalence over the global, even in the new global cultural space.

Like the relationship between local and global, the relationship between self-

1 Jing Wang High Culture Fwer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996): 12; hereafter HCF. introspection and modem consciousness (fansi and xiandaiyrshi) in contemporary China is highly complex and contradictory: the 1980s were a time ofboth utopian vision and emergent crisis between the cultural elite and their political counterpart, while the 1990s have become a decade of what Frednc Jameson calls 'root-searching' which is much more accessible to the masses. Current Chinese Communist Party (CCP)rhetoric promotes 'socialism with Chinese [capitalistic] characteristics' nationalistically as a necessary precondition for progress; yet, even though the people as a whole, the renmin, have accepted economic reform as the primary vimie of modernization and as the rational route for a prosperous China, the question of how can success be truly measured when it is mainly based on econornic activity looms in the background. The post-Mao era's transitional path can be well mapped through its concurrent espousal of modernization and the inherent problems in the political-economic system vis-à-vis society.

Consider what three radically different social theorias have said about transforming societies: One, John Calhoun said about political-economic transformation that ''the interval between the decay of the old and the formation and establishment of the new, constitutes a period of transition, which must always necessarily be one of uncertainty, confusion, error, and wild and fierce fanaticism." Two, in me 0rignt.s of

Tofahriunism(1951), Hannah Arendt said that if 'a people' feel stateless during a period of transformation, they will experience a loss of personal and national identity.

Although she was refemng to the between-war period in Europe, this idea is also applicable to the transition from Maoism to Dengisrn and beyond. And three, sinologist

Paul Pickowicz has written that "in [post-Mao] China, the economic, political, and cultural legacies of the traditional socialist era continue to have a profound influence on daily social Me." Hence China's distinct transition from planned to market economy that

has progressed over two decades without any major national political upheaval, unlike

the putative transitions 'from dictatorship to democracy' of the former Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe that ended the Cold War in the late 1980s. Instead, China undenvent its

own transition between its eras of reform in 1989dagically tainted by bloodshed at

Tiananmen Square.

Following the death of Hu Yaobang, the former Communist Party chief, and

coinciding with the 70' anniversary of the student-led May 4" Democracy ove ment,^

the protests that lead to the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989 (Apnl-June)

resuited fiom rnass dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the govemrnent and state

practice. These feelings ran particularly deep in 1989 because of the euphonc sense of

openness and reform felt arnong the people following Fang Lizhi and other leading

intellectuals' appeal to the state for democratic reform earlier that year. Despite the

crackdown, in the nine years since the Tiananmen Square massacre, or fi~cidentas it is

commonly called by the state and in the national media, China has experienced

tremendous economic growth and liberalization-while rnaintaining its firm adherence to

a highly regulated, socialist regime. This combination of a socialist regime and a market

economy, of3en referred to as economic democracy andlor red cqitaZism, is the basis of

rny mapping ofthe everyday life in contemporary China. The CCP's promotion of

economic development and personai prosperity as pragmatic socialism, or, again,

'socialism wit h Chinese charactekt ics ÿzym zhonggtro fese de shehizht~yi)i s now widely supported by the people (remin). This does not mean that everyone in China

The May 4h Movement of 19 19 began as a protest against Japanese colonization and qilickly developed into a campaign for democratic refom fully supports the CCP agenda andior government policies, but it does indicate that there

is a cornmon goal among the people and the state: the bettement of China as a whole. ' This cornmon goal, as 1 will discuss in detail in Chapter One, has brought about a nationalist movement that evolved fiom post-Tiananmen Square national self-reflexivity and the subsequent mass acceptance (or enIightement) of the new socialist route for a better China. Jing Wang furthers this point by saying that

insofar as the agenda of enlightenment is generated nom a nationalist sentiment that pursues the vision of China as a global power, the reform intellectuals will continue to rely on an interpretive scheme of the past that privileges the first term in such bipolar concepts as superiority and infenority, wealth and poverty, dominator and dominated, and inventor and ernulàt~r.~

In contra* the dynamics of detemtorialization and multinational economic developrnent under global capitalisrn represent, according to Arif Dirlik, a penetration of local society globally so that the local may lose its parochial connotations, and take on an invaluable, culturally-specific role in the global cultural sphere.' Mer a decade of stnving to 'catch- up' with the developed world namely the United States and Japan, China is now calling for a retum of its expatriates and the combination of industrialization and Confùcianism in its ideology and national culture. Thus, despite the infiux of global culture in such areas as fashion, music, architecture, film, and even ideology, a new nationalist movement, also dledpostnationalist (meaning late, not afier) has emerged. The

It is worth noting here that there are 56 ethnic groups (or nationaliries. as they are sometimes called) in China. The main one is of course, the Han who make up 92% of the population and the other 55, including the Zhuang (Iargest of them). the Ti'betans. the Mongolians. and the Uygurs, who make up the remaining 8%. Ahhough relativety srnaIl in mimbers. the latter three groups occupy a Iarge portion of Chinese territory. mostly in Tibet and Qinghai, Imer Mongolia and Xinjiang. Discussing each ethnic group individually and regionally is a very important consideration in anal-g 1-1 forces and identity within China's own national boundaries; but. it is. regrettably. beyond the scope of this paper. My work here, concerns the local as a collectivity. the impact of modernkation and economic reform on the Id,and Chinese cultural identity projected irûo the giobal. Wang. HCF: 126. See Arif Dirlik, "Global in the Local" in Wilson and Dissamyake G/obaI%Lom/(Durham: Duke Universiîy Press. 19%): 2145 @p. 28-29 specifically). transformation in the political economy of China's late 20~century socialism, also called postsociaIim, now demands the inclusion of the cultural sphere in its otherwise

economic-dominated anaiysis.

The paradigrnatic economic reforrn and politicaVsocial policy stagnation has brought China to a crossroads in its modemization process, meaning that the post-Mao government (narnely of Deng Xiaoping, and post-Tiananmen leaders Jiang Zemin and Li

Peng) has taken on a conservative, or traditional, approach to reform and modemization.

As White and Bowles explain, the CCP argues that "the rational aspects of Western capitalist economic practices can be incorporated within the Chinese system without changing its basic institutional and political feat~res."~White and Bowles conclude this thought by pointing out that "frorn this perspective, there is no incornpatibility between financial liberalization and a Chinese version of market so~ialism."~In daily Iife and interaction it seems that this Party line now contradicts itself, and that in 1998 there is indeed incompatibility between the adoption of capitalist elements within a socialist system. Accordingly, in the framework of po~sociaIimas used by Arif Dirlik and others to characterize post-Mao Party elites and ideology, and by Paul Pickowicz to evaluate the contemporary Chinese world as it looks from the bottom up, rather than from the conventional top dowrs8 I will evaluate the popular perception and impact of modemization in today's China. In other words, the emphasis of my mapping of China in the new global cultural space is on the political economy of cultural production as well

Gordon White and Paul Bowles, The Political Economy of Late Dweloprnent in East Asia" in Unger and McConnick China Afier Socialism (Arrnonk, NY:Sharpe, 1996): 154. ' ibid. 8 Paul Pickowicz., "Huang Jianxin and Postsocialism" in Nick Browne et al. (eds.) New Chinese Cinemas (Cambridge. MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 6û. as the arnbiguity and confusion of redefining culture within a period of transition.

Linking aesthetic representation and cultural expression of identity formation,

architecture, and film to social progress examines national cohesion and spatial

reorganization emerging in China today given the convergence of (inter)cultural

messages through modernization and participation in the globalization process.

Through various sources and conversations with people about giobahzation, I

have corne up with several definitions of the term: @ecting the whole world, total,

inchdi~zgeveryfhg, shnnking the world throtigh improved commrcl~icationtechnoZogy,

and mass commzinicaiion. Although somewhat simple andor obvious, 1think these

definitions reveal how globalization is tightly linked to the acceleration of time and is

very much a spatial process. It has been argued that the overall impact of globalization

weakens local culture and identity-that there is a loosening of a strong collective

identity and a strengthening of ties with other cultural ideals. However, in most cases, it

seems that national identities remain strong, and 'global' identifications alter, or are

translated, according to their cultural context. As Henri Lefebvre discusses in Re

Production of Space, the local and the global are constantly interacting in the shaping and

production ofspaces; thus, I cm Say again that globalization is very much a spatial

process. Because time and space are the basic coordinates of ail foms of representatrion

which adapt to their natural surroundings, I will now proceed to map the globaVloca1

nexus that coincides with, and has adapted to, modemization in contemporary China-

Today's development demands more than the heretofore accepted economic pragmatism used by the state as a uniehg force to stabilize and motivate the country. Ultimately, as

1 will show, it demands what Chinese intellechiais have called a ffhmodemization: democracy. But, democracy in the Western sense is not directly applicable to China today. By moving away nom the conventional top-down political analyses of China's modernization, 1 will show how there are signs of democratic principles on the streets of

China today, and that there are notions of civil society dive and growing in everyday life.

Thus, revealing (or mapping) how modernization and globalization are manifesting themselves for and by the people (rather than the state) in contemporary China through spatial representations in architecture and film that contribute to identity formation and cultural definition are the main challenges of my writing.

1 am interested in creating a social commentary on the impact of modemization and globalization on contemporary Chinese culture through identity formation, architectural development, and cinematic expression. I do not wish to take on a Chinese voice, nor do 1 hope to give the Chinese a voice as an other; but 1will comment on

Chinese culture in the Iate 1990s as someone who has lived in China and studied its culture, and as someone with an interest in how nationals see themselves, and project the space that surrounds them, in and out of the countxy. In a conversation I had with a

Chinese architect now living in Los Angeles, but designing buildings for Beijing, he told me that my study was 'very interesting but also very tough.' He said that studying the cultural impact of post-Mao changes is deeply cultural but inevitably ends up in the political arena. He hoped that 1, as someone free of al1 the cultural and political burdens and restraints of a Chinese national, could produce some fresh ideas in contrast to the tired (and complicated) old ones. I, too, hope I have done so with this thesis. IDENTITYIN THE NEW GLOBAL CULTURAL SPACE

In essence, the argument is that the old identities which stabilized the social world for so long are in decline, giving rise to new identities and fragmenting the modem individual as a unified subject.

Stuart Hall Modenzity and Its F~~tzires

Who a person is. being meself; and one 's personality are ail definitions of persona1 identity; and, instance of someness and shanng a common ideology define

national identity. Persona1 identity dwells on the selfand is rooted in the lifeworld,' whereas national identity is coltective and rooted in common experience. Today, a third Ievel of identity is emerging in conneaion with the globalization movernent: as the world becomes increasingly interconnected and interactive, global, or international, identities are forming. The three must be reconcifed to fit into the so-called mw world order, or what I cd1 the new global cz~lturdspace. The new global cultural space is a place for dialogue and cornpetition between local and global-stressing the interrelationship of politics econornics, and culture-and a place to look at the political economy2of the contemporary transition of industrial(izing) societies in a time of globalization. The new global cultural space is, as 1have said, a dialogic arena, yet its cornpetitiveness is what prevails at both state and social levels. In this chapter, 1will look at how identity is Iinked to cultural expression and representation, which fùnction as a unifjing force of national identity and play an integral role in asserting China's place in the new global cultural space. Also, I will analyze how global concepts are being adapted locally in

1 The lifeworld means the spatio-temporal setting of everyday Me-it is where we live, where Me takes place. andl or where identity forms. Thus the iifeworld is culturally defined and rooted in eqerienœ. Here 1 understand politicai economy through Vincent Mosco's definition which relates to production, distriiution, and consumption of communication. China by examining the ideology and structure of the new global cultural space in China, which is giving nse to new hybrïd identities resulting fiom the fkagmented and plural forces of globalization. Afler the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China began to undergo tremendous structural and econornic change. Its incredible economic growth through liberalization and marketization of the economy started by Deng Xiaoping's Four Modernkations (induary, culture, mil itary, science and technology) and open-door policy allowed China greater access to international markets, to establish a competitive domestic market, to expand its education syçtem, and to put a greater emphasis on technology, production, and exports. Deng's modemization and openness plans catapulted China into a new stage of economic growth and social development. But how have the processes of economic globalization affected the Chinese identity? How have they created new transnational, or hybrid, identities in China? What is the relationship between global capitalism and social justice and prosperity? To answer these questions, I will emphasize the importance of (re)discovering cultural roots and tradition to understand China's transition not exactly fi-om communism to capitalism, or from dictatorship to democracy as the 1980s seemed to go in Eastern European at the end of the Cold War, but from communism (although the mling party is still called the Chinese Communist Party) to red capitalism, and fiom dictatorship to econornic dernocracy. To keep up with the rapid changes in China over the past twenty years, a cultural approach is best for both a macro (global) and a micro (local) look into how modemization and globalization in contemporq China relate to the liberalization and market ascendancy that have proven highly successful economically, but that have been problematic socially and politicaliy. To understand the political economy of China, it is essential to contextualize contemporary China historically and culturally by reconciling its past, present, and, somehow, its fbture, instead of accepting the 'totalizing' goals of global capitalism that are to make the world smaller through virtual homogenization.

11 There is no denying the reorganization of time and space, or the time-space compression,' of globalization, but it is also essential to acknowledge that place (as part of space) remains the locale of the lived expenence. Even if globalization appears to favour tirne over space, it is still very much a spatial process; thus neither space nor place can be entirely eclipsed. Accordingly, we need to rethink and renew social values and therefore personal, national, and international identity formation. Identity, like culture, is constantly being redefined; thus, it is never stagnant-it is subject to both spatial and temporal influence. 1will now turn to how identity formation is linked to cultural definition and afinity in China today.

Persona1 identity and the lifeworld

The lifeworld, charactenzed by Anne Buttirner as 'the culturally defined spatio- temporal setting of everyday life,'4 is the starting point of persona1 identity formation, of interpersonal communication, and of the new global cultural space because it is here that meaning is given to environment and people's relationship with it. The lifeworld, then, is a phenomenological space based on the experience of everyday life and is part of the natural process of cultural development. Culture and the lifeworld are spatially based, and are constantly changing with tirne. In China, the most profound consideration in the lifeworld is the change in the rural/urban dichotomy and the rapid modemization process of the post-Mao era To understand where persona1 identity is rooted in contemporary China, it is essential to understand its lifeworld. In this section, 1hope to articulate a

. -- - -.. . For a comprehensive description and analysis of tirne-space compression see David Hmey The Condition ofPoshnodernity (Oxford, UK: Biackwell, 1990). %me Buttimer. "Grasping the dynamism of the Iiféworldn in The Annals of the Association ofAmeRcm Geogrnphers (1976): 278. in this article- she also says that in describing the human experience of world, space, and time. there tends to be an emphasis on human subjects as the primary initiators and determinants of eqerience. Yet, world and milieu have been construed by many as passive; whereas for geographers, they are highly active elements. Thug the lifeworld is highly phenomenological as it invites us to explore some of the uniyng conditions and forces in the human expenence of the world and it also differentiates us physically and culturally: 280. philosophy of the iived experience that will express where personal identity is rooted and on what it is founded in contemporary China. In essence, 1am looking for texture, as in Lefebvre's quesf' in everyday life to communicate Chinese culture and identity. Looking at the lifeworld to understand how people make sense of their environment also helps to understand how China is participating in global capitalism. A kind of cogr~ifïvemapping6 is useful here to focus on the local within a global fiamework and go beyond the unial dichotornization of 1ocaUglobal.' The totaiizing theory behind global capitalism does not correlate with the rhetonc of the state in China: how can the state maintain socialism and, at the same time, adopt elements of capitalism? This is indeed the case, but what does it mean to the fùture of Chinese culture and identity? Cm the two polar systerns be reconciled? Or are they really so polarized in practice over theory, as capitalism becomes prevalent in China? These are questions that cannot yet be answered because they are part of an on-going process-according to Frednc Jameson, "our task today as artists or critics or whatever is somehow to reach some way in which we recapture or reinvent a new form of representation of this new global totality."* For him, cognitive mapping refers to the need to map nations cognitively, or percephially, in order to alleviate the disorientating (and alienating) eEects of (global) capitalism on the

------In The Production of Space. Henri Lefebvre ~ritesabout how space should be experienced through ali five senses. and not through any kind of semiotic codification. He says that "what we are concemed with here is not texts. but texture." Hence my use of the term 'te-uture' in looking at identity formation in the Iifeworld. Cognitive mapping is a tam coined by geographer Kevin Lynch (The Image ofthe Ci@ 1x0)and has been developed by Fredric Jameson ("Cognitive Mapping " in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg, Mmism and the Interpretaiion of Culture, 1988: Postmodernism or, the Cultural hgic of Capitalim. 199 1; and The GeopoliticaiAesthetic. 1992). In the introduction to The Geopolirical Aesthetic, Jameson describes cognitive mapping as "the phenomenon by which pqIe make sense of their urtian surroundings.": xiv. 7 In the introduction to Wilson and Dissanapice's important new book on globatization Globa//Local (1996). th- say that 300 much cultural studies. in this era of uneven globdization and the Wo-tier information highway. can sound like a way of making the world safe and user-friendly for global capital and the cuIture of the commodity fom." Thus, luoking at the local to identifl social inequalities and uneven modemization is as much a part of globdization as its totaiizing goals. Globalization is transnational, but it is neither universal nor universaiizing because it is made up distinct regions with tbeir own politics, cultm$s). and value-system(s). From an inte~ewwith Jameson by Paik Nakdung in Seoul, October 28,1989. Printed in Wilson and Dissanayake. Global/loca/ (Durham:Duke University Press, 1996): 358. individual. Cognitive mapping, then, in the context of globalization, reveals national traditions and cultural identity, and is rooted in the lifeworld. Today, China is an important player in the global market. Modemization, and continuing with globalization, sparked a reconfiguration of time and space that has altered the Chinese cultural sphere. China is not alone in expenencing this change; but because of the land and economic reforms begun in the late 1970s and early 1980s' it has its own version of this altered sphere. In contrast to Mao's Communist regime of aate ownership of land and collective enterprise, China now thrives on private ownership, entrepreneurialism and persona1 management. The introduction of these capitalist elements aliows some people greater access to resources, greater access to 'outside' cultures, and greater opportunity for personal advancement; thus, these changes greatly conaibute to identity formation. Because capitalism depends on people to generate its growth, people are necessarily participatory (and possibly alienated) in global capitalism-that is, they must keep up with the changing forces of spath-tempord consciousness to address the inherent problems of globalization. For this reason, mapping the global locally (or, localizing global elements) is not de-globalizing; on the contrary, it is cornplementary to globalization because it renders the local essential and influemial to the global. This may seem paradoxical, but as Arif Dirlik points ouf there is much "incongmence with the world as we know and expenence it."' To put this in perspective, the rapid development of both urban and rural areas in China over the past twenty years has changed China from a predominantly closed, agrarian, collectively based society to an open, industrial, commercially dnven nation. People now have greater &dom of mobility, but they are also confronted with great hequality as to who can and who cannot be socially mobile-mostly due to financial reasons and their lack of important contacts-and with great cornpetition. The

ppppp 9 Anf Dirlik "hoking Backward in the Age of Global Capital" in Tang and Snyder in Pursuit of Contemporap East ~simCulture (London: W&ew Press, 19%~~):184 obstacles t O modernization are enormous, and for some, insurmountable. Because capitalism operates under the notion of self-determinism (whether a myth or not), in China where the date is ostensibly the ultimate regulator of the system, we can ask how self-detenninistic the average Chinese person really is-perhaps more than is permitteci in theory by the officia1 party line is practiced in the reality of everyday life. There are rnany rules in China, but many of them are obviated at street-level provided the overall harmony of the system is not disturbed. There is, of course, a fine line between where and when the harmony is bafanced and becomes unbalanceci, as weIl as an ambiguous area around who decides when the line has been crossed. In Chapter Two, 1 will further develop this notion of self-detemination and harmony in everyday life through spatial structure (the streets and architecture of the city); and in Chapter Three, 1 will further this notion of blumng the line between public and pnvate space through the epic (legal and personal) journey of Qiu Ju in Zhang Yimou's film The Sfory of Qiu JZI.For now, I will continue to look at the impact of modernization on identity formation in contemporary China. The lifeworld in China is closely Iinked to the natural six! built environment because finding a balance between the two is key to the Confician ethic, which continues to be a major component of identity formation in China, even today. The tenets of Confucianism, although greatly altered since the 5~ century B.C., still retain a strong influence on Chinese identity, stressing the love for humanity, ancestor worship, reverence for parents, and harmony in social thought and conduct. The concept of harmony, he, over losing face and creating confrontation is symbolic of the fundamental Chinese mindset. The idea of the whole being more important than the individual is the philosophical basis of Confucianism and/or holism," and thus the basic mode1 of group organization in China. But, how does this hold up in the cultural space of modemizing

'O Here, I refer to holism in the Mstsense that gants littie political authonty or significance to the de of the individual. It is also sometimes refend to as mUectivism, China? Post-structuralist theories on the reproduction of information generally refute metanarrative traditional writings, such as those of Confucius (or Neo-Confucianists) or Mao Zedong, as the main source of cultural subjectivism and dominant ideology- The same could be said of globalization and its quest to 'totalize' the globe. The modemizations and open-door policy at work in China today are contributing to the consmiction of a new identity, or perhaps even new identities-hybrd identities. As in the Hall quotation at the beginning of this chapter, cultural identity is now being (re)defined by the convergence of new fiagmented (or plural) identities. The increasing interconnection of different parts of the world through globalization has bfought elements nom diverse cultures together to the core of the new global cultural space. From there, hybrid identity(ies) can be formed. Just as the forces of globalization that are altering

cultural spheres around the world are interpreted specifically by individual cultures, so too is the notion of hybrid identity. The lifeworld is about balancing the natural and built environment and hybrid identity is about balancing intemal and external cultural forces within the lifeworld. The construction of a new persona1 identity base indubitably calls for a new social space (wherein tradition and history play an important role) that may subsequently transpire into a new social aesthetic and an altered hmonic unity. Nonetheless, in the case of China, the combined fundarnentds of he (in parailel to yin and yang") and of the new notion of 'econornic cornpetition' are integral to the Chinese social fabric and somehow synchronous with persona1 identity. Persona1 identity is Iinked to the self, but because the self in China, ji, originates in the Confucian notion of the collectivity being more complete than the individual, this traditional notion grounded in the local is eroding in the new global cultural space. People are becoming financially independent and

" The principles of Yin and Yang correspond with the 'Uandate of Heaven': peace. prosperity. and orderiy life on earth. Yang, which symboiizes heaven, ultirnatefymaintains power mer Yin, the earth; but a balance between the two is necessary for harmony on earth and in everyday We. entrepreneurial (a topic I will discuss in detail in Chapter Four dong with the notion of civil society in contemporary China). Also, because identity is so deeply cultural and phenomenologica1, it is also subjected to spatio-temporality-meariing where a person lives or expenences life, as well as when and for how long a person lives. As China, and the world, develops in relation to the globalization rnovement, the notion of the self or persona1 identity is changing at an unprecedented speed. Holism still prevails over personalism in Chinese society today; however, because identity is closely linked to spatial stnxcture and temporal flux, the new global cultural space is expanding the knowledge and activity base of everyday life. Identity formation is a localized process (subject to local spatial practices and temporal order) and remains rooted in the lifeworld, but a drastically changedkhanging (or modemizing/globalizing) one.

Hvbrid identities and cultural production

The Wang Shuo phenomenon ofthe late 1980s raises many questions about the path China wadis taking. The phenomenon sparked by the novels of Wang Shuo and the subsequent films made out of his work were considered 'hooligan' culture by literary critics and 'cool' and 'heroic' by its general readership because of the stories' defiance of intellectualism and glorification of alienation in the 'post-new-era.' l2 Not surprisingly, their appeal to the people has rendered them a marketable cultural phenomenon that has become hugely successfid in China-as Jianying Zha says, Wang Shuo has a "knack for tuming culture into a cornmodity."" In the noveilfilm fie Trar6leeShooters,the main characters set-up their own business mostly because they can, not because they are particularly skilled or driven: they are the antiheroes of modernization and the heroes of l2 The years following Mao's death are dedthe 'post-era' but it seems that because of China's rapid development and changes a new literary era dawned in the mid/late 1980-e 'post-new-era' (or houxinshiqz-). It also called the 'Age of Attitude' given the time's dimgad for traditional culture and conventional behaviour. '' Jianying Zha Chino Pop (New York: The New Press, 1995): 109 the 'post-new-era.' As a result of their nihilism, their company is senseless and bordedine fiaudulent: they started a business to participate in the open market, which favours money over intellect. Their 'just do it' approach has very littfe rationalism behind it, thus has been dubbed as 'hooligm~ismwithout a cause' by disapproving &tics. One scene in the film of an awards ceremony honounng great authors, none of whom actually attend so random impostors are forced to pose as them and accept their awards, reveals the decreasing power of intellectuals in Chinese society and the inconstancy of the rnodernization process. The most consuming part of the ceremony, for the audience and its organizers, is not the awards themselves but the surredistic fashion show mixing contemporary couture with Confician and Communist revolutionary iconography. The show is ironic because the organizers concocted the show for a fee from an obscure author who wanted to be recognized, and also because of the anachronistic references in a tirne of rapid change, development, and progress in China. The Trmble-Shooters opens with rock music containing lyrics about rzot h~auing whafym want and about everyone wemhg o mmk. It ends with lyrics about mmriage and not being able to do whcrtym wan~There is a sense of social consciousness raising, yet the 'system' (or modemization) is too powerful tu stray from. In the 'post-new-era' workers, peasants, and soldiers are the lowest class of people while cadres and entrepreneurs are the top; Wang Shuo focusses on the former group's struggle to transgress class levels through business and persona1 achievement. His characters are ofien said to belong to the pst-Mao young urbanite subculture of 'the lost generation' defined by little or no job secunty and lack of understanding or motivation to move ahead and jump into the modemization process. The film is very confusing, but this is done on purpose because of the purposeless nacure, or more importantly the identity crisis of the 'loa generation hooligans' and of the transitive nature of the era itself. It is, as in Wang Shuo's other works, plebeian in its depiction of the everyday life of everyday people in contemporary (urban) China-Jing Wang says that Wang Shuo's charm is in his

18 "penchant for telling [the] other half of the story-desire and tran~gression."'~The satirical nature of Wang Shuo's writings pinpoints the incompatibility of state policy and public participation. Ultimately, it seems that China's modernization process is now much larger than its instigator, the aate. In the television series A Beijing Native in New York (1 993). Central Chinese Television (CCTV)transporteci the conternporary Chinese lifeworld to the United States. Not only was it the first Chinese television series to go abroad and focus on the life of a Chinese expatriate, it was also the fint high-quality, big-budget Chinese television series? It projects a cosmopolitan image through affluence, mobility, and international

expenence; yet, at the same tirne, it projects the hardships of immigration and a transposeci life in the West. Its diasponc content blurs the line between local and global, showing that culture and cultural representation are increasingly global-it could be seen as a cognitive mapping of modemizing (and globalking) China. It is set in the 1980s, a time when educated Chinese had to go abroad to fiirther their sîudies because there were not enough resources or opportunities at home. Now, in the 1990s, it is used to reflect on the positive as well as the negative aspects of the mass (temporary) migration to the West, of the new relationship between China and the West, and of greater flexibility and persona1 freedom, but also greater cornpetition and hardship, in the expandedexpanding lifeworld. Its prevailing sentiment then evokes ultra-patriotism and national consciousness among viewers. The series is about a musician fiom Beijing who moves to New York in search of the ideal life, but finds quite the opposite. He experiences feelings of dislocation and alienation for the predictable linguistic and geographical reasons, but also for deeply cultural reasons. The show opens with shots of several Manhattan landmarks (the World l4 Wang HCF: 267. l5 The cast and CRW setdff 10 New York, after a nationally broadcast press confemœ at the Beijing airport. for six monihs of shooting. The financing of the US%1.5million production costs came hman unprecedented bank loan-using the senes' advertising potential 3s coilatd Trade Center, Times Square, and the Brooklyn Bridge) and with Chinese pop music blaring. In every episode, the 'Beijing Man,' played by the popular screen actor Jiang Wen, strives to find his niche in New York and is therefore constantly redefining his personal identity and cultural affinity. He experiences many ups and downs in his work- life, his love-life, and his personal space. In the final episode, when a fiend of his arrives in New York ftom China in search of his ideal life, the 'Beijing Native' puts him in the same situation as he was placed upon amival: he lends him $500 and leaves him in a grungy apartment to fend for himself. It seerns that expanding the lifeworld and reconstmcting your own identity is phenomenological and therefore part of a process of identity formation and making sense of your surroundings. These two examples of cultural and identity representation both show how the roots of personal identity and cultural definition have been uplifted in contemporaxy China, and that the new foundation of thc lifeworld is expanding as well as expansive, but is not yet wholly stable. They both leave the viewedreader to reconcile the mixed messages of a thriving industrial environment and an alienating persona1 one. It seems that the formation of a hybrid identity based in the new global cultural space is not particularly, but perhaps partially, based on nation, history, andor tradition; rather, it is based on a fusion of nations, histories, cultures and traditions. Lydia Liu has said that

the modem [Chinese] self is never quite reducible to national identity. On the contrary, it is the incongruities, tensions, and stmggles between selfhood and national identity, as we11 as their mutual implication and complicity, that give full meaning to the lived experience of Chinese modernity. l6 Although about language and personal identity construction with the use of language, this treatise is equally applicable to the gIobaVloca1 nexus and of identity formation in the lifeworld: finding a way to balance the universal and the particular, the old and the new, the familiar and the noveI.

l6 Lydia Liu, "Transhgual Practice" in Wunal Dissanayake (cd)Nhves ofAgency (Mi~€Zipolis:University of Minneso- 1996): 9. The Maoist metanarrative may no longer dictate national morality and knowledge in China; however, al1 knowledge of the past has not disappeared, and holism is still pervasive. In gened, the state still mns the counts, and maintains the aatus quo; yet, it is important to note that because social structure is more securely established than those in power, the latter is susceptible to popular uprise. Even in China, where the Communists are the ruling Party, people have a voice. Unfortunately though, they can be silenced, as the students were at Tiananmen Square in 1989. The door to trade with China was (and is) open, but fundamental human nghts and fieedoms remained (and remain) blocked. As a result, hybrid identities based on global cultural forces are forming in what Charles Jencks calls "cowboy capitalisdstate socialism." " China must tackle the repercussions of modemization, industrialization, and globalization: corruption, mass migration, overcrowding ecological damage, and, even, global telecornmunications. Social change cannot happen in China today without reconciling intemal forces with extemal influence fiom a variety of peoples, places, and ideologies- it is part of the global world where local and global necessarily CO-exist.Given the predilection for pluralism in our time, globalization and time-space compression are indeed upon us and it is now virtually impossible for any country to remain insular and self-contained as China was for centuries. In contemporary China, there is a sense of urgency to 'go global' that is becoming increasingly articulated through mass media, cultural production, and soaring commercialization. Indeed, global forces are altering local Chinese culture and identity, as well as contributing to the texture of everyday life; thus cognitive mapping of the worid is essential to China's effective global participation. Today's lifeworld continues to be phenomenological, but it is no longer based on immediate surroundings: it is based around the world in the new global cultural çpace.

'7 Charles Jencks, Kbat is Postrnodemism? (New York St. Mariin's Press, 1986: 67. National identity bevond the era of reform The PRC notion of the people, renmïn, is more than one of linguistic and geographical commonality, it is a group of people with a shared history, a shared ideology, and a shared vision for the future. By definition, it is not individualistic, but based on collective, mutual interests. The people, then, is Confician in that it favours the collective over the individual or the whole over the person. In the section on persona1 identity, 1spoke of the Chinese notion of the self,ji, and here I will expand it to the notion of the greater self, daji, which aims to harmonize and intenveave the people and the state to form a strong national identity-even if the two are incongruent. National identity, or a national collectivity, in Our tirne of globalization, can be socially beneficial provided that histov is included in its contemporary national discourse. In this section, 1 will look at how nationalism, national identity, and, now, postnationalism have manifested themselves in post-Mao China. Is nationalism in China a state instrument? On what criteria is national identity based in contemporary China? And, is postnationalism, refemng to the current nationalist movement, necessary as a cornmon bond for the bettement of China?

The first post-Mao era of reforms took place fiom 1979-1989, beginning with the

end of the Democracy Wall movement and ending with the Tiananmen Square massacre.

The decade began and ended with a public plea for a fifih rnodernization: democracy.

Because of the growing awareness among the people of human rights and fieedoms, or

lack thereof, in China, the 'post-era' became a time of public reflection and discussion about change. In the middle of the decade of reform, the intellectual 'Cultural Fever', wen hira re, hit China, opening up a discursive public sphere and revealing the increasing sensitivity of the people to the radical changes happening in China, as well as to their social, political, and economic implications. This public sphere was not bourgeois as in the Hegelian notion, but more interactive, participatory, and expressive as in the

Habermasian definition. '* The mid- 1980s can be defined as a time of public reflection on

Mao Zedong as Chairman and person, on Maoism, and, more specifically, on the atrocities of the Cultural Revolution, in order to move on and develop as a nation. The putative 'great cultural discussions' of the 'new-era' would supposedly be without the repercussions of the "Hundred Flowers Movement"; however in the end, too much discussion lead to too much defiance and queaioning of the state by CCP standards, and a crackdown was deemed necessary- On the evening of June 2, 1989, "Deng Xiaoping

[ordered] the army to take the square by using 'al1 necessary meas~res'."~~in contrast to a crackdown on Tiananmen Square in 1976, when China was still relatively closed off firom the outside world, this tirne there was no hiding the gunshots and tanks threatening and massacring the people. The foreign presence was strong enough to send a message around the world that China may be open for economic trade, but not to democracy. In a recent, comprehensive analysis of the first era of refonns by Xudong Zhang, he explains that

al1 these social and intellectual changes fbrther removed the national cultural life fiom the everyday sphere, although the two kept up a torturous dialogue through national politics that addressed (as well as distorted and oppressed) both spheres. For moa of the 1980s, the public was virtually deprived of any institutional channel for expressing its concems and sentiments... The intellectuai elite took on a political importance (sometimes self-importance) as the only players ... and, by extension, spokespenons for the people and the nation, its culture, and its histoq.

This deprivation of a voice and knowledge of the social injustices by the state towards the people became increasingly dismptive throughout the 1980s. By the end ofthe decade,

18 Habermas defines the pubIic sphere as the dmof communication and public participation. 19 Jan Wong, Red China Blues (Toronto: Doubleday/Anchor Books. 1996): 248. 20 Xudong Zhang. Chinese Modernism in the Era ofReforms (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997): 13. the disparities and contradiction between state rhetoric of reform and prosperity in the

name of the people and the reality of social life culminated in the student gathering and

protests at Tiananmen Square in Mayhne 1989, following the death of Hu Yaobang.

One interesting, and somewhat ironic, outcome of the era of reforrns, and the

pubiic verbalization of the Cultural Revolution as ten wastedyears or ien years of

calamity was that it paved the way for a nationalist movement. Nationalism naturally

forms out of collective experience and a pursuit for national advancement-it usually

emerges from a national crisis or as a post-revolutionary solution. After the collective

experience of the Cultural Revolution, the pursuit of reversing the past, ameliorating

China's domestic situation, and advancing its position in the global sphere were strong

enough to unite the nation. The post-Mao era is, then, definable as outward looking,

confidence building, and the entrance of China into the cornpetitive and fiee global

marketthe state has hooked into these definitions to secure national mobilization. In

Townsend's 'culturalisrn to nationalism' thesis, he looks at how nationalisrn has replaced

culturalism "as the dominant Chinese view of [finding] their identity and place in the

~orld."~'He contends that culturalism is the root of identity formation while nationalism

is its structure, and that post-Mao nationalism is Iinked to the "outward orientation of the

1980s and 1990s, producing what some observers have called an 'assertive' or

'confident' phase of Chinese nationalism? Thus the 'culturalisrn to nationalism' thesis links emotions and patriotism to national mobilization and identity formation. In this

sense, it could be seen in parallel to Mao's mobilization of the countryside in the 1950s to

2' James Toansend, "Chinese Nationalism" in J. Unger (ed.) Chinese Nationofism (Amonk, NY: ME. Sharpe, 1996): 1. Ibid.: 5. create a common bond amongst the people that formed the bais of the changing national identity of the tirne.

PostnationaIism in the bost-new-era'

AIthough prirnarily associated with literary movernents of the late 1980s and early

1990s, it seems apt to apply the term 'post-new-erz' to culhiral definition and identity in post-Mao, or more specifically post-Tiananmen, China. The 'post-new-era' arose out of a crisis, and set the scene for a resurgence of nationalism in China and a popuiar enlightenment of sorts. Following the massacre, the fuhire of the Communist Party and

China's role in the global market were put into question. Would the CCP further the crackdown by assuming greater wntrol over the people, or would the regime fa11 because of its loss of legitimacy? The result, as we now know, was quite the reverse: the further opening up of the country economically and a rise in nationalism. Much speculation now surrounds the state's focus on the economic sphere and loosening of the rules for private enterprise and international exchange. Were these conscious state decisions to diminish tension and anger in the social sphere? Probably, and it probably worked, given the

'enlightenment' that took place in the late 1980s. This 'enlightenment' is a national acceptance of economic development as the rational route for China to take in order to grow as a nation and becorne the largest econorny in the world. It is predicted that by

2020 China will have surpassed the United States as the world' s leading economic power.

Thus, it seems that the people have accepted, and continue to accept, the party rhetonc of socialist (or red) capitalism as the regime of contemporary China because of their wmrnon desire for China's growing importance in the world. But, World Bank economists assert that the liberalization and limits to persona1 freedoms and economic development found in China leave the country in an embryonic state. The rise in

nationalism seeks precisely to move out of this embryonic stage and participate in the

new global space. This new nationalist movement was accepted by the people as

necessary to recuperate from the negative effects of Tiananamen Square and to move

fonvard as a modernizing and globaiizing nation.

Xiaoping Li call s the nse in nationalism in the 'post-new-era' postnafionaIim

because it connects global and local forces? as well as advocates "local social cohe~ion."~

Using the concept, Li seeks to "capture the rich contradictions and nuances that .. .

nation-based maneuvres in the global capitalist system generate." The 'post' in

postnationalism, then, does not mean 'coming afler'-it means a furtherance of

nationalism. It refers to spatial changes and involves cognitive mapping because it can

apply global and transnational forces in the local by translating2' thern into cultural

practices that give rise to a hybrid national identity. This identity is no longer based on

the hegemony of Westem culture (as it was in the first era of reforms), but on an

convergence of local and global elements. The global landscape of the 'post-new-era' is

plural and condensed. in the first era ofrefoms in China, the West was used as a place to lem from and as the basis of new cultural development; whereas in the 1990s,

Chinese national identity bypasses Westem cultural hegemony by having grown introspective: the need to reconcile the local and the global is now part of the Chinese national consciousness. Li calls this need "essentially schi~ophrenic"~because postnationalism entails the CO-existenceof global and national forces together and, at the

23 Xiaoping Li(a), "The Incoherenî Nation" (forthcoming): 3. 24 Here, I mean translation in the sense of Homi Bhabha's notion of 'transIatingYcultures-taking elements from one culture and applying them to your own through a phenomenological process of assimilation. 2s Li(a), "The Incoherent Nation": 33. same time, it is based on popular loyalty to the state for global cornpetition. Today's

definition of world culture is fiagmented and plural-essentially, this also describes the

make-up of the new global cultural space.

The ernphasis of the second era of reforms @OS-1989) on science, wealth, and

commercial progress appeals to people's senses and has thus generated a neo-propaganda

of patriotism. Because postnationaiist practices are creating a new national identity that

is incompatible with the traditional codes and conventions, the ideology of progress

should not be taken at face-value. Early theories of globalization emphasize the

supercession of space over time, but now it seems that we must look at space as the locale

of time; thus, in recent globalization theories such as those of Wilson and Disçanayake,

Dirlik, Featherstone, and others, space is as important as tirne, perhaps even more. We

must understand the importance of both space and time as the primary divisions of human

organization and as the basic components of the new global space in which national

boundaries and distances are diminishing. Emphasis is on effective and competitive

participation in global capitalism and in China today, this requires national suppon of the

system and logistics of an econornically-driven regime.

The Party rhetoric of the 1990s promotes economic democracy on a national scale

as the necessary regime for a prosperous future. The rise of globalization has contributed to the diminishing sovereignty of the nation-state in general, but at the same time nationalism was (is) being promoted by the state to increase patriotism and dedication to nation building, not as resistant to globai forces. 'The New World Order' is a reality in contemporary China; therefore, the great challenge is keeping the local active in the global, as well as reconciling liberalization and identity in the global market. The late 1980s deviation from national allegiance toward the state and tradition to an acute awareness of outside cultures and the creation of a hybrfd national identity(ies), is rwted, as 1 described in the previous section, in the lifeworld. On both a personal and national level, the oId spatial paradigm of the local, zhong, versus the global, was replaced by the temporal paradigm of tradition versus modernity, giji~zzhi rhe,~g,~in the 1980s.

Moreover, the conceptual metaphor grgin zhong wai, meaning ancient and modem, as well as Chinese and foreign, is used to represent the universality of certain tmths andior practices. In contras to the state's wish to play the primary role in globaliziing China, global capitalism is dnven by market forces and interpersonal (and intercultural) communication, therein highlighting the paradox, or at Ieast the incompleteness, of an economic democracy as a regirne.

To entrench the economic democracy, Deng Xiaoping went on several officia1 visits to southern China cornmending and propagating China's economic growth, fomd movement, and participation in global capitalism. His 1988 visit was seen as an expression of the aate's cornmitment to China's advancement; but by 199 1, a popular expression heard on the streets was 'everything is hopeless': gzm bzt hao le. Deng came out of retirement in 1992 to uplifk national spirits and advocated "dive into the sea" action, meaning it was time China further its reforms by adopting more capitalist elements. The 'post-new-era' had more than begun. It began with Deng's own personal endorsement of China's union with the global market thereby leaping into the 'era of postmodernity.'" China's enlightenment of the 1990s (wherein tradition is being

26 Literaily. zhong means Chùiese and xi means Western t7 Wang HCF: 90. 28 l'id.:234. reassessed and reconciled within modemization) has created a new spatial consciousness

and configuration by discrediting the China vs. the West tension and expressing China's

role in the global cultural sphere as a player, not a dictator. Like other developedhng

Asian nations, China had decided to focus on production for export in the global market because it makes wealth and success more accessible. Consequently, much to the state's chagrin, modemization and openness weaken state control over the pnvate sector. In theory the people have become more self-deterministic in private enterprise, but how much influence do they really have in the larger, global scope? The main question surrounding China's place in the new global cultural space is: Can an economic democracy really fûnction efficiently and effectively, or is it an oxymoron?

Deng called the 'economic democracy' based on his modemizations and open- door policies the 'initial stage of socialism' and said that with diminishing poverty and increasing economic growth, it would lead to a 'dynamic system of socialist economics, politics, and culture.' Ironically, po.stsocialism precedes actual socialism, and China today is even more capitalistic than some capitalist nations; but, the conflicting political messages and economic signais have rendered China more cormpt and less coherent than most capitalist nations. China today is more cornplex, econornically developed, and politically open than ever before, but it is still reconciling what these changes mean to national identity, culture, and tradition. Because the reforms are understood as opening up new opportunities, nationalism (or collective action) helps people to make sense of the changes and growth and to gain a sense of place is the new global space. Even if the self

(ji) or the greater self (daji) are in flux and disarray, national harmony is preferred over confiict; thus nationalism is used to create a cornmon bond (in the local) and to project an international image of progress and stability (in the global). This is perhaps why the CCP continues to govem with little opposition-that is not to say that people fblly endorse it either. David Goodman points out that the "CCP is not particularly popular, and may even be actively unpopular among certain secton of the vocal and educated. However, the strongest argument for its continued hold on power is the lack of an organized alternative."" Along the same lines, the familiar binary of tradition and modemity, or the

Confucian binary of people and heaven, are reconcilable because, as Jing Wang explains,

"harrnony and repression go hand in hand"" much like the oxymoronic term 'economic democracy' seems to go hmd in hand in China today.

Even before the death of Deng Xiaoping last year, debates over the rneaning of

'Dengism' began to surface publicly in order to address the uncertainty of fuhire leadership and the need to maintain economic growth. China now deals with US$100 million a day in foreign investment and cannot afTord to make the mistakes it made

Qnng the first era ofreforms, namely of alienating the Chinese people as well as foreign investors and governments with the Tiananmen Square massacre. David Goodman says that the "CCP's response to its self-induced problems of social control has been an appeal to 'Chineseness' as a unifying and mobilisatory [sic] political myth, rather than to the class conflict that characterized the Mao-dorninated years of China's politics."" This could indeed aiso characterize the rationale of the postnationalist movement in the 'post- new-era. '

29 David S.G. Goodman, "China in the Year 2000" in Watters and McGee (eds.) Asia Pacflc (Vancouver: WCPress. 1997): 201. 30 wang HCF: 111. 31 Goodman in Asio Pacijc: 196. Words in ciosing

The line between local and global is becoming increasingly blurred as

globalization strives to homogenize and localization strives to assert regional identity.

Indeed, new identities are forming, not only in China but around the world, in the new

global cultural space. As Kevin Robins points ouf

whilst globalization may be the prevailing force of our times, this does not mean that localism is without significance... The particularity of place and culture can never be done away with, can never be absolutely transcended ... [Globalization] is about the achievement of a new global-local nexus, about new and intricate relations between global space and local space. '*

And, as 1 have shown in this chapter, both global and local forces are strong in

contemporary China and achieving a balance between the two is essential to the country's future growth and role in the new global space. The lifeworld is not only where personal identity is formed, but also where national allegiance is rooted; thus, reform in post-Mao/ post-Deng China means addressing social issues on a local Ievel, maintaining a strong sense of national history, and creating an overall trust between the state and the people.

The common bond between these two spheres is culture, and culture is traditionally both persona1 and national-now, it is becoming a global force that needs to be reconciled in the local.

China's development and place in the global cultural sphere cannot defined by clear and consistent spatial structures, mainly because of the local arnbiguities between state policy and personal fieedoms, and the confusion of how to reconcile, adopt, ancilor assimilate global forces. In a global world, time is superseding space in significance because, in the infonnarion age, speed is more important than location. Space, however,

32 Kevin Robins. "Global Cuituren in HaU, He14 and McGrew Modernity and Ifs Fuhrres (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992): 3 17. cannot be eclipsed by time because it is a necessary physical component of everyday life.

In looking at contemporary Chinese culture from within (locally), and then applying it to a wider (global) scope, the importance (and reality) of hybridiring personal, national, and international identity in globalization is revealed. Rudyard Kipling wrote a century ago that 'East is East, and West is West' but it seems that today this is erroneous: a new fusion is changing the world and has created a new global cultural space. And finally, to change the details of Ludwig Wittgenstein's statement that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language," 1 would say that "the meaning of a local culture is its relevance and effective integration in the new global cultural space." I think this is the way China is headed as it embarks on what seems like a third era of reform: perhaps the 'post-post- new-era' or an era of democratic development and cultural identity redefined by the pluralistic global/local nexus? CHAPTERTwo BEIJING'SCHANGING LANDSCAPE: BUILTENVIRONMENT AND REDEFINEDCULTURE

China today is a Society where everything seems to be for sale.

Arif Dirlik

In Chapter One, 1talked about the global/local forces in China and the implications they are having on cultural production and identity formation, as well as their contribution to China's position in the new global cultural space. But, how is the new global cultural space being built and communicated in contemporary China? In this chapter, 1 will look at the juxtaposed traditional and new urban (commercial) architecture of Beijing to visually communicate the relationship between the use of space, ideology and collective identity. The landscape of central Beijing has changed drastically in recent years in terms of architectural and commercial expansion, but also maintains its long- standing traditional aesthetic. The focus of the first section of this chapter is on the changing nature of traditional buildings given the emergence of a new cultural base, while the second is about the impact of the change on cultural definition. And finally, the third section questions the applicability of postmodemism on Beijing today as it is almost impossible to speak of architecture in the late 20~century without mentioning it. 1 will not make any daims here about the radical revolutionary changes in Beijing architecture or any apocalyptic statements about the decline of traditional Chinese society under modemization and capitalist development, nor will 1 embrace the changes as the bettement of Chinese society or equate them to Westernization. Rather, through a spatial and temporal mapping of the city centre, the impact of the post-Mao departure

fiom traditional architecture and land use on contemporary Chinese culture, ideology,

identity, and everyday life for residents and visitors alike can be determined.

When 1 picture China, 1 first think of Beijing, then I visualize the Forbidden City and Tiananmen Square: the former for its histoncal and structural imposition, and the latter for its monumental size, its status as a gathenng place, and the massacre of 1989.

Added to this lia of sites, images of shopping centres and skyscapers now conjure up in my mind. First and foremost, Beijing, as the capital city of China and home of the

Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is essentiall y the centre of national culture and identity; secondly, it is the national administrative, business, and cultural centre,' boasting the

Great Hall of the People, the Imperia1 Palace (or Forbidden City), the National History

Museum, Mao's Mausoleum, and the largest public space in the world, Tiananmen

Square. The basic ambiance of the city of Beijing stayed relatively untouched fiom its founding until the beginning of the 20" Century (which has brought about great change as 1 will discuss throughout this chapter) and is unequivocally the centnil force of

China-politically, economically, ndturally, and internationally. For this reason, 1will focus on three of the most symbolic sights of Beijing (and of China), past and present: the

Forbidden City, Tiananmen Square, and the Wangfûjing district. This two block radius

(see map below) spans over 600 and is highly representative of what is happening in China today.

l Although Shanghai is China's largest dty and port. and is considered the country's indumial and commercial centre. Beijing. king the capital. rernains the administrative, business. and cuitural centre. * 1 should note here that Beijing has over 2000 years of history. but because 1 am Iooking at the Forbidden City as a landmark 1 only derto the pst 600 years. The earfiest recordeci setiiernent in what is known as Beijing today was in the lzh oentury BC. but it was the Mongols. under Kublai Khan who built the foundation of the city in the 13~centuxy as God's Imperia1 capital. They called it the Du Du, or 'Great Capital.' In 1368. when the Ming Dynasîy was establisheb the first renamed the city Bei Ping, or Beijing is typically viewed as an 'ancient city' where conservative or Confucian values prevail, where life happens at a leisurely pace, and people live in neighbourly communities; but the new buildings that now dominate Beijing's landscape and increasingly rapid-paced lifestyle convey no hint of old China. Instead, gleaming office blocks and highrise hotels dominate the skyline with international business and commercial development reigning on the streets. Interfaced with traEc congestion and a complex transportation network, the architectural labyrinth of Beijing is still built along its original structural lay-out; however, its composition has greatly changed over the past two decades. With a population of 12.5 million, and an average annual growth of 2S%,

Beijing is quickly sprawling upward and outward. An estimated two million square metres of commercial and residential space were built in and around the city from 1994 to 1997-and, of course, that number is still growing. Beijing is a place, as Paul Virilio points out about the contemporary city in general, "where once an entire 'downtown' area indicated a long histoncal period, now only a few monuments will do?"'

'Nortiiem Peace' and eventualIy to Beijing, meaning 'Northern Capitai.' The Ming renovations of the city in the early lsLhcentury stiIl define its lay-out and structure today; yet, new architectural structures are now increasingly dorninating the cityscape. 3 Paul Virilio, Chapter 1: "The Overexposed City" in LdDimension (New York: Semiotest(e), 1991): 15. It was not until derMao's death, and Deng's sequential moderaization and open- door policies, that cities in China could begin to grow-Mao had been doggedly anti- urban and pro-rural development. Consequently, Beijing, once defined purely by its cosmic architecture, imperial force, and its walls, is now defined by western architecture, business, and tourism: it is emerging as an important global city, especially in tems of economic activity. Finding out why and how this is tnie is the focus ofthis chapter. In the pages to corne, I will contexhralize the changing Beijing landscape beyond its economic and political environment, and look at it from a cultural point of view because the city expresses and symbolizes a people's being and consciousness. By incorporating the unceriainty of a transitional period into a new society and its ensuing reorganization of Mieand space with modemization, China is not burgeoning on a new ideology like it was in 1949, but is developing its own place in the new global space and contribuhg to what Japanese architect Kisho Kurokawa calls "new currents of thought .. . arising around the world [that] will bave a greater impact on us than any ideology or systematic philosophy.'A Beijing's landscape is going through dramatic changes, as is everywhere in China; but change is inevitable given the dynamics and values of modemization.

Beijing architecture is subject to strong cultural-ideological controls over construction and design despite the outside appearance of modemity.

To understand the curent status of Chinese architecture, it is important to know that there have bentwo conflichg motions in Chinese culhire in general that have greatly iduenced its vernaculm. On the one hand, there is a strong conservatism of traditional values motivated by nationalism that is said to have been repiacing socialist

- -- - 4 Kisho Kurokawa, Intercultural Architecture (Washington, DC:The American Institute of Architects Press, 1991): 9. ideology as the binding force in the nation. On the other han& nihilisrn has been calling

for a radical breaking away from the burdensome tradition, and a birth of a new

civilkation aiming to the future. Although the laîter is probably necessary for the good

of China in the long-run, it causes problems as China struggles to fkd unifyùig social

forces that stabilize and motivate the country. Also important here is that China was in

an ideological vacuum for most of this centwy, and now exists as a fast-growing

economic system with declining cultural and ethnic standards. As a temporary solution,

with possibly severe side-affects, sticking to tradition provides a relatively easy way out

for pressing social and political problems. That said, as 1have discussed with

architectural designer Xiaoguang ~iu,'there has also been much societal and structural

change as refonns mder China's new leadership are beginning to link the country's

social, economic, and political infiastnicture, and these events are being recorded in

architecture.

China is articulating its own contemporary culture through the recognition of world cultures and its own intro/retrospection This can be seen through its new architecture because architecture is, as architectural critic Neil Leach points out, the product of a way of thinking6-thus it is a cultural product sihiated in tune and constnicted in space. It is made-up of spatio-temporal structures that reflect the time in which they are built but, more importantly, fom useable spaces. Approaching Beijing architecture as a social document is fundamentally spatial because using the centre of

Xiaoguang Liu is originally fiom China, but is now based in Los Angeles at RTKL (the firm that designed the new Dong An Market in Beijing that 1 will discuss later in this chapter) and is a member of the Architecturai Institute of America (MA). We have had ongoing email conversations about the changing face of Beijing through architecture that helped shape my arguments in this chapter. 6 Neil Leach (ed.), RefhinkingArchitecture. (London: Routledge, 1997): introduction. Beijing to explore the mgconditions of living in the city is indicative of how

everyday Me is changing ail over China. Space is being reorganized, time is being

reconceptualized, and national culture and identity are being redefined. It seems,

however, as Arif Dirlik has said, that China today is indeed a society where everythuig

seems to be for sale, even history.

Hitow for sale: a sien of the times?

There are enormous pressures for change in Beijing today as real estate becomes a

viable market. The local govemment is now caning up ciîy land, once al1 state-owned,

as a great source of state revenue. As a resdt of high demand and cornpetition, land

prices are cmently the highest in the region, as well as the fourth highest in Asia-afler

Hong Kong, Tolqo, and Shanghai. Still, the city of Beijing is made up of temples, parks

and squares, but also monolithic state buildings, and over the past twenty years, shopping centres and skyscrapers. The combination of spatial constraints, overcrowding, and rapid growth now mean, as 1will show in this section, a rationalkation of space, the crdonof multipurpose (workùi& living, educational, and entertainment) complexes, and the inevitable sacrifice of certain traditional places and areas. In tems of architecture, this translates into two veins of development and urban planning: to build and/or to restore, which then cornes domto what to restore and why? It seems that little is sacred architecturally, except for when its historkal value iç marketable or it is an administrative necessity. For example, the Forbidden City is China's greatest tourist attraction today, and the CCP maintains its hegemonic role in the buildings surrounding Tiananrnen

Square despite its role as public space. Land sales mean increased state revenue, and investment developrnent means greater returns; however, does this mean that development projects are given equal status by the govemment, or that pressing social problems, such as Beijing's senous housing shortage, are being solved? Not really, since development is more and more commercial and therefore driving up land pnces in central Beijing, catering to the wealthyyand forcing long-tirne residents out. Central Beijing is slowly becoming more and more business oriented and less and less residential. Housing had remained relatively stagnant since the 1950s when Soviet-style apartment blocks were built en masse in Beijingybut now that housing has become a private industry for both builders and buyers, building has recently recommence&but under an unprecedented dynarnic of suburban development and ferventfree enterprise. 1putfiee in italics because building and buying are still subject to tight govemment regulation and approval. It follows then that eviction notices for site redeveloprnent are govemmentally controlled; unfortunately, the process is undemocratic, not thaî land expropriation is ever very democratic. The domination of profit-driven development projects in Beijing was recently made evident when renovations were announced for the second ring road area, and tens of thousands of people were given notice. They were, in exchange, offered new housing in the suburbs, beyond the fourth ring road. For some, the dislocation means larger space and escape from the noise and air pollution of the city, but for others it rneans uplifting generations of family landroots. Clearly the increase in wealth and econornic development is transfomiing Beijing socialty and stnicturally.

1s the changing landscape of Beijing mostly cosmetic or is it tmly irnproving the living standard? It is hard to answer this question given that the changes are still in process. Nevertheless, in a recent China Dai& article discussing the debates surrcunding the issue of grazing or repairing Beijhg buildings, three architectural pro fessionals spo ke out on this very subject: one govemment ci@ plamer, one professor of architecture, and one of the few private architects in the city. Each one offered a different take on the nature of Beijing's new landscape. The fint one said that, designers should try to combine the modem with the traditional," the second disagreed by saying that "the ancient architecture [of Beijing] must be carefully protected, but its design and style is not applicable to modem buildings," while the thud compromised by saying that "a city must keep changing its face to show its vigour." Thus, the purpose of this section is to link the classical spatial construct of Beijing to its contemporary state by identifjmg how the Beijing landscape is changing and being redefined in tirne and space. Everyday, al1 over the city, history and tourisrn, civic and state space, commerce and business interests intermesh and reveal the changing way of life in China today. From the Forbidden City to Wangfbjing, the changing landscape and lifestyie are clearly visible with ever-present reminders of the past: early-morning Tai Chi in local parks happens in con- to the late-night life of Beijing's trendiest nightclubs, restaurants, and karaoke bars.

The Forbidden City

Completed in 1420, the Forbidden City, or Imperia1 Palace (Gugong), was home to over twenty-four Ming and Qing dynasty emperors until the fa11 of feudalism in 14 11 and the subsequent establishment of the Republic of china.' Accordingly, it is a reminder of China's feudal pst-but more importantly today, it stands as a great

7 Nonetheless, the last Imperia1 famiIy lead by Pu-Yi was permittecl to stay until 1924, after which the Paiace was converteci into a museum open to the pubIic. architectural achievernent, as the quintessential cuihiral simerof ancient China, and as

China's top tourist attraction. In the true Ming spirit of grand and monumental buildings,

it took over fourteen years and about 200 000 builders and artisans to build, is made up of over eighty million bricks and the finest marble, terracotta and glazed des, and contains over ten thousand rooms and spaces. Moreover, it was built according to the Chinese metaphysical tradition8with its go lden-colouseci, two-tiered, hipped roofs and vermilion walls combined with a symmetrical and horizontal design, as pictured here (photo 1).

Photo 1: Entrance to the Forbidden City, Beijing-Tiananmen Gate with portrait of Mao Zedong overhead The Forbidden City was built on a North-South axis that opens to the south, as an honourific gesture towards Heaven. Its emphasis on the horizontal over the vertical represents a link with the sky, and a humbling of life on earth. In classicai Chinese architecture, the status of a building is achieved in position, materials, and details, rather than in height. As Yi-Fu Tuan so aptly put it, "vertical elements in the landscape evoke a

' ''The concept of planning the city was based on 'zuo zhu you she' (having the ancestor worship hall on the left and the shrine for the god of earth on the right)." Evelyn Lip, Feng Shuk Emironrnents of power @andon: Academy Editions, 1996): 47. Also, the interior space follows the Confician desof symmetry sense of striving, a defiance of graviw, while the horizontal elements cdto mind acceptance and rest.'" Today, veaicaïty in the Chinese cityscape symbolizes progress and therefore evokes the sense of striving and defiance of gravity to which Tuan referred, as well as a sense of keeping up and moving forward in the global space. Through the metaphor of horizontal and vertical dimensions in Chinese landscape, the traditional and the modem (or local and global), paradigms are revealed. The photograph below (looking south fkom Cod Hill), in contrast to the Grst one of the Tianmen Gate and portrait of

Mao Zedong above, shows three eras of Chinese spatial structure and aesthetic: the

Forbidden City in foregtound (Ming, imperid), the Great Hall of The People (Mao, socîalist) to the right, and the smog and outfine of a vertically inclined urban landscape

(post-Mao, industrial) in the background. 1,1

Photo 2: Sonthern entrance to the Forbidden City, Situn Zhen Gaîe (1); Great Hall of the People (2); new Beijing landscape (3).

Colour scheme, too, is essential to the strong and harrnonious design of classical

Chinese =bitechire: each colour used represents a natural demeni, a cardinal point, and a state of human consciousness. Green represents wood, East, growth and longevity; red

and social ethicç-each room had its own function and hierarchical status that dictated the order of daily Ne within. Yi-Fu Tuan, Topophilia (New Jersey: Prentice-Hdl Inc. 1974). represents fire, South, warmth, good fortune, and happiness; yellow represents earth,

Centrality, royalty, power, and authority; black represents water, North, and darkness; and, finally, white represents goid, West, and mourning. All five colours can be found in the Forbidden City, strategically placed to enhance the hamiony, or cosmology, of the structure. For example, the roofs of the Forbidden City are imperialyellow while the building and surrounding walls are a warm, fiery re4 both personifying the stnicîure' s cultural, imperial, and religious symbolism.

The inception of Chinese cosmology in architecture was influenced by the

Confician tenets of benevolence, hierarchy, and enhancing the relationship between people, nahue, and heaven. Qi, the central orientation of the five elements discussed above, balances heaven and earth symmetrically and horizontally so that buildings do not overpower heaven on earth. The balance of earth and heaven, horizontal and vertical

(out of respect, not due to lack of skill), light and dark, negative space and positive space are the pnnciples of yin and yang. The notions of qi (energy flow), yin (earth), yang

(heaven) that altogether fonn the basis offeng shui, which translates into wind and water, are beyond the scope of this paper,'Obut what is important here is the Confucian notion that people play an integral role in a building, in gardens, and in mediating between god and nature. The Emperor, also called the 'Son of Heaven', was the ultimate purveyor of god and the voice of the people-a conviction that Mao tried to continue despite his supposed rejection of anytbg feudal.

The first break ficm traditional Chinese architectural style wss in the 19' century

-- --

'O See Evelyn Lip's Feng S.:Emi.onments of Pmer (London: Academy Gmup Lt4 1996) for an in- depth look at the characteristics of tradaiond Chinese architectur~pecificalIy,the Forbidden City, The Temple of Heaven, and Iandscape gardens. when China experienced much contact with the outside world, after centuries of self- imposed isolationism. Coincidentally, there was a downtum in Confucian ideals in many architectural design pnnciples. Architectural critic Lawrence Liu sees the subtle cultural influences of the outside world and subsequent discarding of pinciples as the end of the humane architecture that characterizes traditional Chinese structure, and as the creaîion of an unbalanced architechiral vocabulary in china.'' The changes in ideology, culture and therefore identity of this century have altered the political culture and role of the centre of the Forbidden City. It is no longer the central political arena, but it remains central in location to where political activiîy takes place: Zhongnanhai neighbours its surrounding walls. In the final yean of Imperid de,the Forbidden City had already becorne a micro-political sphere with a new China forrning outside its walls and independent of its de.

Despite the change in its role, The Forbidden City is central to Chinese history and remains central to the image of China around the world in photographs, on televisioq and in film Take Bertolucci's academy award-wùuiing The Lnst Emperor and Zhang

Yimou's latest epic project, staging Puccini's Turandot in its original setting and rehuning the role of the Forbidden City's central courtyard to audience hall,12 as examples of its powerful image and cultural meaning. Further evidence that the role of the Forbidden City has become highly commercial is that you cm now be guided through listening to Roger Moore and clanging cymbals on your rented 'audiotour~'headset.

Laurence L. Liu, Chinese Architecture (London: AdemyEditions, 1989): 24. 12 This monumental production wilI be performed several times in September 1998. Tiananmen Square

From under Mao's portrait in front of the Forbidden City gate (Tiananmen), you

cm just walk across the street, through endless trafic controlled by PLA officers, to

Tianamnen Square and experience it as a public space, gathering place, and now consumer market. Entreprenedism is alive and weil on the square with everythmg fiom cold drinks to Mao paraphemalia and snapshot photos available for sale. In the begiming stages of economic reform, the public sector prevaiied over the private sector, but in the 1990s the reverse seems to be true: the private sector is on the rise and creating a new social dynamic on the street. To cal1 someone an entrepreneur in China (qiye~ia)is to think of them as enterpriskg, innovative, and rkk-taking-but not necessarily self- employed. It is a term commonly associated with the new urban working class whose main objective is to make money on their own, outside of public control. White et al. explain it as a clifTise and ambiguous category that even Zhu Rongji has said is definable in various ways; but, its ovemding qudity is that it denotes a market-oriented 'mode1

~haracter'.'~The importance and ambiguity of enaepreneuidism in China today brings out the increasing pluralism and hybridity of its new (global) culhue. While the

Confucian ethic of changeiess crder and the Mandate of Heaven's strict enforcement of social hierarchy have dictated Chinese philosophy for centuries, there are now, and have been in the past, many hiatuses and political (or dynastie) upheaval that the city's centrai reality is revealed-such as the power of merchants and mercafltiiism, or the pursuit of social refom as seen in 1989 at Tiananmen Square. Located at the centre of Beijing,

Tiananmen Square is central to all public gatherings-political, social, and now even

13 White et aI. "The nature of the New Entrepreneurs" in In Seurch of Civil Soczey. (Mord: Clarendon Press, 1996): 187-188. economic.

Origindy built in the 17" century' Tiananmen Square is where Mao announced the birth of the People's Republic of China to half a million people in 1949. Ten years later, as part of Mao's self-aggrandizing 'Ten Big Projects' to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the PRC,the Square was expanded and paved over with granite to become the world's largest public space, as well as surrounded by monolithic public and state buildings. The oblong expanse, at once empty and monumental, is the stage of Chinese politics and of public gathering and expression. It begins (or ends dependhg on where you start) ficm the North at the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen), crosses the

Boulevard of Eternal Peace (Chungm Jie), on to the Monument of the People and Mao's

Mausoleum, and ends (or begins) at Qianmen, meaning the fiont gate. Mao's

Mausoleum behnreen Qianmen and Tiananmen, where the Chairman's body lies in state, intentionally disrupts the axiality of the city's cosmic desipMao had carefully planned to place himself, for etemi~,along the central axis to break the symmetry of its original design and, in a sense, equate himseifwith heaven.

Photo 3: Tiananmen Square todsy, paved public space visited by toarists and reaidents and symbol of Beijing's past and present. The two people at the forefront are Sitting in front of the Monument of the People which is in Une with Mao's portrait to the North above Tinanmen Gate and Mao's Mausoleum to the South. Considered the centre of modem Beijing, as well as ail of Chuia, the 1959 version

of Tiananmen Square and surroundhg buildings' nod to stolid Soviet Constructivist

architecture14are truly representative of the Mao era, the newly industrializing sociaIist

state, and the changing ideologyAandscape of Beijing in the 20" century. Its grandiose

scaie was a symboI of the dingpower and thus became a form of state propaganda

under Mao. Today, as 1have discussed, it stands more for public space, touisrn, and

commercial activity. The Square's changed representation fiom grassy field to urban

hub, and nom a place of struggle and turmoil to a commodity fair, demonstrates how

everythmg does indeed seem to be for sale in China today.

Wangfujing

Both Tiananmen Square and the Forbidden City maintain a strong message from

China's recent and distant pasts, but they bear little resemblance to today's developing,

capitalistic urban space. By moWig West dong the street that intersects the Forbidden

City and Tiananmen Square (ChanganJie) just two blocks to the commercial and shopping district of Wangfujing, it seems that a new centripetal symbol of contemporary

China is developing that reflects the country's changing cultural and ideological basis.

Along the way, you will move from an imperial enclave, to a shanty town of old alleys

(hutongs) and courtyard houses (siheyuan) without plumbing or ele~tricity,'~and ont0 one of the wealthiest areas in China within less than a hlometre. The change in

Wangfùjing, now nicknamed the Golden Mile, fiom street markets and residential area to

14 Constnrctivism is an architectural movement that began in the Soviet Union around the time of the Bols hevik Revolution (1 9I 7) and sternmed out of Functiodism and BnrzaZism. Combining Ba~1ks Functio~hmand LeCorbusier's BnrlaIism, it emphasized size and the use of new materials such as steel hesmd large glass planes or, contrarily, textured concrete stirfàces. l5 Note that these are slowly being tom-downfor two main raisons that have ken iterated by the nate: to 'cleau-up' the downtown area and to make room for 'rnodernization.' urban, commercial centre has not only changed Beijing's physical landscape but is also quickly becoming the central force of the city. Although I said in the previous section that Tiananmen Square is the centre ofBeijing, Wangfujing is becoming more focal to business relations and sociai interaction which are increasingiy defining Chinese culture and identity.

Changing spending patterns and attitudes seen in China in the late 1990s are the result of changing demographics and personal mobility given the country's urban and rural development, as well as increased leisure time and disposable income given the emergence of a private sector. This shift also corresponds to the changing landscape and reorganization of time and space of modefnization. A shopping revolution has hit China, and Wangfijing is just the place to find it: you can fmd everything fiom daily staples to top international designer items. In the early 1980~~The Frzendship Store was the only place to buy packaged or foreign goods, but by 1988 there were already four department stores in Beijing that offered an array of multinational consumer goods; today, there are over sixty department stores and many more being buiit. The increased competition of opening of so many stores in such a short time meant that price inflation could be controlled but it also meant that stores would close afmost as quickly as they were opening. As a result of an overall sense of 'too many stores' in Beijing, the city's

Commerce Cornmittee has now put a ban on any store over 10 000 square metres.

Doesn't this opening and closing of commercial outlets and the competition between them sound like the ebb and flow of capitalism? It does, but with the addition of tight govemmental regdation over permits, construction, and goods available that are unique to the Chinese regirne. Yet, the dramatic changes in Beijing's landscape can be compared to its irnpenal growth in the 15" century, albeit under a new, commerciaily

drive% system. Beijing is defmed by the many places of consumption found in its centre

and towe~gabove iîs traditional sbiine. The two moa significant such places are the

newiy restored Dong An Market and the mental Plaza which is still under construction.

It is to the latter place that 1 will now tum.

Consumine Spacet*Spaces of Consumption: New places as definition of culture

At the corner of Changan Boulevard and Wangfujing Street stands a huge

multipurpose complex, the Oriental Plaza. Owned and developed primarily by Hong

Kong billionaire Li ~a-shing,~~the Plaza is not only a shopping centre, but also an office

complex, a Luxury residence, a hotel, an entertainment centre, a museurn, and a multi-

level parking garage. In this sense, it could be considered the epitome of today's China.

It is urban, central, lavish, conçuming, consumptive, and panly compt: urban and central

because of its location, lavish for its size and design, consuming and consumptive by

nature (it is primarily a shopping centre), and partly compt because of how it came to be.

Since its hception in 1994, the cornpleq still under construction, has been faced with

much conflict (settùig back construction several times) and criticism for the developer

and the state's disregard for deof law (stimng up the business and political spheres).

Lawless land expropriation, illegal dealings to avoid building regdations and to obtain

permitsi, an ousting and a suicide, discovering 20 000 year old relics while digging six

storeys down, and devising new plans multiple times dl have to do with the development

16 Li Ka-shing's Cheung Kong (Holdings) and Hutchison Whampoa connoI64% of the Oriental Piaza, Orient Overseas (run by Hong Kong's Chief Executive, Tung Chee-Hwa)conmls 23%, and the rest is financed by Bank of China groupç-quite revelatory of the changing economic structure and investment strategy, intertwining governent and business with state banks lending and investing in private enterprise. of the Oriental Plaza, now schedded to open on October 1, 1999-appropriately the 50~

anniversary of the PRC. "

To begin, the corner of Chmgan and Wangfbjing is prime real estate in Beijing,

and in 1992, the world's biggest McDonaldasopened on the site-only to be given an

eviction notice just two years later, despite its twenty year lease, to make room for the

~n&ntalPlaza. McDonald's opening was more than just the arriva1 of a multinational

fast-food chain in Beijing, it was symbolic of China's increasingly liberal economic

clirnate and of the changing Chinese landscape in the post-Mao era-especially with the

Bagship store, and the enormous, notorious golden arches at the centre of the city. Its

forced closure signalled a lack of adherence to contractual agreements between state and

corporation, which subsequently sent a message around the world cautioning investon

about the unpredictable (and unreliable) nature of doing business in China. Nonetbeless,

upon eviction, McDonaldashad very littie defense because of its own desire to further

invest in China, not to mention the stronghold of state decisions. Called the 'ultimate

takeaway' in 1994, McDonald's seems to have bounced back: it now has 44 stores in

Beijing, having opened four new ones in the past year, including one in the newly

restored Dong An ~arket'~on Wangfujing Boulevard, just up the Street fiom the Oriental

l7 in fact, because of its timely opening, the city of Beijing has donated money to the Plaza as part of Beijing's plan to contribute to 67 projects for the 50" anniversary: 16 inf?asmicture, 14 housing, and 37 commercial and cultural (statistics: South Chma Morning Post, March 27, 1998). Even though it is rimarily a shopping centre, it falls under the categories of commercial, housing, and cultural projects. 1have chosen not to go into detail on the Dong An project here, but it is worth noting a few significant details: located in the centre of Beijing and originaily built in 1903, the historic market has been given a facelift through a ChineselHong Kong joint-venture. US$300 million Iater, it is now a retail, entertainment, and office cornplex, cornplne with parking. it includes huge restaurants, a nightclub, a cinema, a bowling dey, a cultural institute, a fitness centre, arnong other fgcilities. But, it dso incorporates elements of Chinese tradition through its architectural design (a contemporary take on tddionai architecture), as well as by housing the Beijing opera in the Ji Xing tfieatre. Plaza site.'' 1use the McDonald7s/On'entalPlaza example to illustrate how the

philosophy of architecture and landscape has changed in China in recent yean from traditional to modem forms, and also to discuss how state reforms should not be taken at face-value. A deep cultural understanding is needed of the land, ideology, and social fabric to understand business and modernization in China today.

1994 was indeed a year of scandal for McDonald's, but one of economic and commercial advancement for the 540 000 square metre ChinaHong Kong joint-venture project, the Oriental Plaza. It is a perfect example of the power of connections in Beijing:

Li's ties were strong enough to evict McDonald's. For Li, the Plaza means opening doors to future development and invesûnent in China and for the Chinese governent it symbolizes growth and power, but for McDonald's, it was an unseemly business blunder, and to Beijing's stronghold traditionalists, the Oriental Plaza is a monrter. "If Mi Li does not want to be the arch-enemy of al1 the Chinese people he should stop it now and redeem himself The Oriental Plaza continues to be built today and the results are changing the face of Beijing @hotos 3 & 4 on rhe followzng page).

The McDonaldS incident was just the first set-back for the Oriental Plaza-so far, there have been three other major ones. The original plans for the site development were approved by the municipal government in 1994, but just as construction was to begin, the approval was revoked because of design and legislative incongruencies. It was

l9 According to David 3. Brounan who is the managing director of the Los Angeles based RmAssociates that contributeci to the redesigned market, "ttiis landmark development project will serve as both a mode1 and catalyst for fùme devebpment in oId Beijing. Planning for the project therefore extended beyond the site itseE to encompass the needs of the wrounding ara" Thus. the Oriental Plaza became a major factor in the planning of the Dong An Market, and vice-versa. By the look of the Plaza, however, it seems to be less sensitive to its surroundings. It is truly a commercid endeavour. LUOZhewen, of the Communist Party's ancient architecture commission, quoted in Bruce GiHey's "Tower of Power: Beijing's Oriental Plaza nses from the ashes." Fw Easrern Economic Re*, February 15, 1996: 44. Photo 3: The corner of Changan Jie and Wangfujing in the earïy 19909 (sorace: Fodor's Qloring China) Photo 4: The same corner today, with the Oriental Plmza under construction (source: SCMP archhres) revealed that the Oriental Plaza tower was designed to be 50% higher than Beijing's zoning Laws permitted. While the design was being revised, a clandestine dealing that had allowed the Grst design to obtain approval despite its lack of cornpliance with the law was also revealed. This then disclosed the embezzlement of $US 2.2 million in the

Municipal Govemment and lead to the ousting of the then-CCP secretary and the suicide

of Beijing's then vice-mayor. Although not dkectly Linked to the Oriental Plaza project, this scanda1 became part of the on-going controversy around it. In the end though, the scaled-down design was approved in 1996 and building was set to really begin.

Just three months after work began on the project, delays retumed with the discovery of what are now known to be 20 000 year-old relics, six-storeys underground.

Construction came to a halt, and a nimour, which proved to be untme, that Li Ka-shing had pulled out of the projed began to circulate. Kis abandonment would have meant the

end of the project and a serious loss of face and substantial financiai loss for ail involved,

including Li himseff and his Cheung Kong Holdings/Hutchinson Whampoa, Tung Chee- Hwa's Onent Overseas, and the Bank of China. After much negotiation between the investors, the municipal government, and the Beijing Cultural Relics Research Institute an agreement was reached about how to proceed. A proposal headed by Yu Xwan, a professor at Beijing University, and nine other scholars, was submitted to Beijing mayor

Jia Qinglin that called for the inclusion of a museum within the Oriental Plaza complex to house the historical and archaeological relics of ash pi&, stone tools, and fossilized bones.

In the end, the Stone Age amfacts were moved off-site, in boxes, over twenty days, and stored to be sorted for their eventual remto their original setting in a permanent 4300 square foot museum within the Plaza. The acceptance of this proposai rneant that construction of the Plaza could resue.

Photo 5: February 1997 Photo 6: September 1997 (source: SCMP archives) (source: SCMP archives)

Although scaied down fiom its original design, the Oriental Plaza will still tower over the nearby sites of The Forbidden City, Tiananmen Square, the Great Hall of the People, Beihai Park, and its neighbour the Beijing ~otel." And, dthough afnicted with

scandal, it may well stand as a new national monument in the capital, especially with its

monumental opening date: October 1", 1999. It is a space built for consumption:

shopping, international business, luxury living, travel, and tourism. In tems of

architecture, it will be a useable and interactive place that draws on the changing social

fabnc found in China today. The analysis of the consumptive nature and impact on

Chinese culture of its changing national landscape should not dichotomize old and new,

traditional and modern, or even East and West. Instead, notions of national identity and

balancing the globalllocal nexus in an increasingly global cultural and social reality better

explain the local in what Jarneson calls ''the thick of postrnodernity as a global tendency"

of outhe?

Postmodernism in Beiiin~?

Do the changes in Beijing's landscape mean that the city is now, or becoming, a

postmodem space? As it is almost impossible to discuss architecture at the end of the

20" century without including postmodemism, it is essential to consider it in terms of

Beijing's latest architectural development, even if it is not wholly applicable. Jus-as

rnodemism is said to have ended with the implosion of the dilapidated Pruitt-Igoe

apartment settlernent in St. Louis, Missouri on July 15, 1972, at 3:32 pm, a mere twenty

years after its construction, the current dismantling of Beijing is restructwing and

redefimg its architectural aesthetic and structure. It is changing nom an ancient city to a

21 The Beijing Hotel is an architectural and historical Landmark of the changing landmpe in Beijing over this centuy: the main part of the hotel is defineci by its original 1917 French Art Deco design, then a second part nods to the Russian Constructivism that hlao had buiIt (1954 and 1974), and a third part buiIt in the 1980s by Hong Kong developers is part of the new building upward craze found in Beijing. a Jarneson 7ne GeopoZiticaZ Aesîhetic: 1 16. modem metropdis, very quickly. It may seem superficial to link the passing of architectural movements to one parîicular event, yet the Pnritt-Igoe event was a culmination of the ideas among North Arnerican architects to rethink architecture and society, stylistically and ideologically, which lead up to it. Seeing the failures of modemism's universalizing aims, postmodem architecture, whether a progression of modernism or a break from it altogether, seeks to (re)incorporate historicism and cultural sensitivities (essentially time and space) into its designs.

It is useful here to apply David Harvey's takes on postmodernism and postmodemists. As he says, postmodernism cultivates

a conception of the urban fabric as necessarily fragmenteci, a 'palimpsest' of past foxms superimposed upon each other, and a collage of curent uses, many of wtiich may be ephemeral.23

And, at the same tirne, he contends that posmiodemists aim to be

sensitive to vemcular traditions, local histories, pamlcular wants, needs, and fancies, thus generating specialized, even highly customized architectural forms that may range fiom intimate, personalized spaces, through traditional monumentaliq, to the gaiety of spectacle."

Both descriptions quite obviously match what is happening in Beijing today with its collage of architectural styles and land use, as well as its integration of local history and emergent global forces. But, Beijingers are divided on the subject of what the landscape and architectural value changes mean. Two examples given by Jianying Zha in her chapter on architecture in China Pop show this division well: a Beijing professor says that

23 David Harvey. île Condition of Posmodemity (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1990): 66. 24 Ibid. times have changed. Modern life demands modem architecture. Let' s face it: China's had a grand, beautifid architectural tradition, but it' s dead. For centuries it reproduced itself and made Little progress. Why pretend we cm revive it now or fit it into a new era? "

In contrast to this dystopian take on the changes, Shen Kening, a young, architectural

scholar who lives and works in Wisconsin but specializes in Chinese architecture, says

that

it's not a matter of West or East, right or left; tradition has deep, entangled mots in our national consciousness, it seeps through oupresent problems. Until we really understand our own heritage, there is no way we could even diagnose ouproblems, let alone propose any solutions.26

Both are pessimistic about the future of the Beijing landscape and the repercussions of losing sight of the city's traditional aesthetic, yet the changes are inevitable given the nahiral dynamics of modernization and of what Harvey may call, the condition of

Despite Jameson's Wgeof postmodem architecture to the cultural condition of late capitalist s~ciet~,~~postmodeniism seemç to be, at least in part, a condition of contemporary Chinese society, even though it is far from being 'late capitalist.' Accused at times of being more capitalistic than capitalist nations, China maintains a socialist syçtem that has adopted elements of capitalism mainly to irnprove its living standard and compte in the global market. Thus, capitalism in pst-Mao China codd be defined by the increase in multinational corporate activities and a burgeoning popular (global) culture-essentially by its modeetion and openness. New Chinese architecture is

25 Zha. "A City Without Wallsn China Pop: 70. 26 Ibid. 27 The younger scholar seems to accept this as a natural process of modernity, whereas the (traditionalist) professor sees the end of Chinese tradition in modernity. 8 Characteristics of postmodem architecture are its popuiarization, its iinkage of high modernist cuiture to mass (commercial) cultural production, and its emphasis on technological innovation. developing along the posmiodem themes of architectural popu~ariZation/commodification

and of implementing technological innovation, as evidenced in the new Beijing seline

dominated by towers and cranes. Thus, we can ask whether China is now in a

postmodeni rnovement, adopting elements of posmiodernism, or on a path of its own that

cannot be defined by poçtmodemism.

Jameson visited Beijing University in 1985 to give a series of lectures on

postmodemism, launching postmodemist debates in Chka and spking the intellectuals'

great cultural discussions (or High Cuhre Fever) of the late 1 980s.29 Intempted in

1989 by the Tiananmen Square demonstrations and massacre, the debateç eventually

returned to the (somewhat reshaùied) public fomin 1992-only to move in a new

direction. By the mid-1990s,intellectuals had moved away from Western texts to guide

their cultural discussions and becorne more introspective (fami) and self-reflexive.

Hence the rise in nationalisrn, or postnationalism, that I discussed in detail in Chapter

One. The 'catching up craze' of the 1980s has become a 'self&termination craze' in the

1990s. As Xudong Zhang explains China's root-searching engages in "global modemism

by restoring the anthropological, culhual, and symbolic stock of the Chinese tradition,"*

leading to a reconciliation of pst and present, old and new, ultimately, local and

global. Afkr 1989, China moved into a new cultural and political situation that changed

the initial rationale behind the pst-Mao movement to 'go global' to the inclusion of 'the

Iocai in the global.' 'ïhm to Say that China is postmodern is to use a Western framework on a non-Western foundation-and despite similarities between contemporary Chinese society and Western culture, to say that Chuia is now in a postmodern movement is an

29 For a comprehensive analysis of this era, see chapters 2,5, and 6 in Wang's High Culture Fever (1996). Zhang Chinese Modenim: 6.

5 7 incomplete andysis of China in the global cultural space.

In Zhang's reading, cuntemporary Chinese modemism "accounts for the radical

historicity entaileci in iîs radical conternporary character: its situatedness in the

postrevolutionary social world, its participation in the global cdturai and symbolic

interaction and, finally, its narrative e~~ter~rise."~'Moreover, he States that the meaning

of modemism, or postmodeniism, in China today is to facilitate a national integration

with the global culturai order." The declining aims of globalization to universalize, have

contributed to the increase in asserting the local. Even though China has a cornpetitive technological industry and greater access to outside information than ever before, the rapid growth and changes to the country are resulting in a suffering infrastructure and long-term planning.

Current debates among architects and urban plamers in Beijing revolve around the move tu demolish or renovate old buildings. The debates, inevitably with differing viewpoints, are about what to keep and why. Naturally, the two main reasons for keeping historical buildings in tact are their traditional and touristic values; however, it seems that when preservation conflicts with refoms, or when one project confiicts with a bigger one, the new, bigger development wins out. One particular area in southwestern Beij hg,

Liulichang, has been restored to resemble a Qing dynasty ambiance and attracts hundreds of thousands of tourists every year. Whereas central Beijing is a mixed architectural bag for spatial and financial reasons: traditional deys (hutongs) intersect the grand boulevards built under Mao, shopping centres dominate Street markets, and skyscrapers

3' fiid., 161. 32 Ibid., 162. overlook old courtyardS. This is not really a postmodern debate, but rather a contemporary debate of converging movements and landscapes.

For the most part, recent Chinese architecture, from Beijing to Lhasa, is fairly genenc for basic administrative buildings, offices, and public housing: the fint two dressed with white tifes and uniform windows, as well as red lettering over the main glas doors, and the third are either similar (minus the lettering and plus enclosed bdconies) or finished with grey concrete. In contrast, when high finance, commerce, and luxury corne into play, the designs change notably. Further east dong Changm Jie, past Wangfujing and beyond the Second Ring Road, are one of Beijing's embassy compounds, foreign- based shopping, entertainment, and residential area. and the city's Worid Trade Centre, which includes a srnalier version of Paris' famous Maxim 's, called Minh 'S. The area is part of the recent phenornenon in Beijing of building specialty areas in and around the city centre to cater to specific ne& and industries. Another such area is Beijing's newest financial district, Haidian, in the northwestern part of the city. This area has always been the academic distria of Beijing, where most of the major universities and institutes are located. Now, it is expanding into an ''Experimental Zone for the development of New Technology Industries" and has become associated with 'hi-tech' hnsdue to the centralization of so much technical howiedge around the universities. in terms of architecture and places of consumption, the new area includes the highly postmodern office-hotel-shopping-entertainment cornplex, the Lufthansa Centre which houses a Kentue& Fried ChicRetz and a Pizza Hut. The purpose of this centre is to accommodate the changing needs and demands of the Beijing business community

(Chinese and foreign)-it mers to the condition of postmodernity. 1mention eating establishments several times because they are the most obvious sign of economic Iiberalization and changing cultural finities. That is not to say that fast-food defines contemporary Chinese culture, but the cornpanies' global corporatism and pervasiveness reveal China's increasing place in the new global cultural space. Just as Jarneson asks when considering the constraints of postmodernism, 1 think 1can ask in terms of China's position in the new global cultural space, is global Dgerence the same today as global ~dentiîy?~~Spatially mapping the pluralistic new Beijing architecture that redefmes the country's landscape and the way in which land is consumed shows how

China's national culture, collective identity, and common ideology-r everyday lives- are being redehed and balanced in the globalllocal nem. Mer dl, modem architecture inscribesythrough complex relays of cultural displacement and construction, visioiis and representations of social change and cultural identity.

Conclusion: definine the Chinese citv todav

The Chinese city [today] .. . reflects the continuou layering of decisions made under different social and economic contexts, and the city is a patchwork of successive historical periods.

Barry Naughton Urban Spaces in Contemporary China

Walls are the fundamentai spatial organi7ation of the Chinese city. They bear centuries of battle and repair-whether they still physically exist or have been tom down so that they exist only in pieces or in memory. Beijing was once surrounded by temtorial walls designed to mark the city limits; but now, it is surrounded by four sets of ring roads, or motonvays. Like Chinese boxes (boxes within boxes), the pre-industrial

33 Fredric Jarneson, Be See& of me.(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Chinese city was definable by walls within walls, within walls; now, it seems to be definable b y buildings beside buildings, and roads crossing roads. Onginally, Beijing's grand central axis, with the Forbidden City at its core, was a spatial construction of the politicai hierarchy of imperial China, placing the highest person (the Emperor) within the inner walls. Also its geomantic design of feng shui demanded that the central axis be interrupted to distinguish between Heaven and Earth, on earth; thus Coal was created within the city's walls, and within the Imperid City's wall, using the earth dug- out to build the surrounding moat Balance in Chinese philosophy was achieved by creating honybetween heaven and earth, wind and water-perhaps in the context of pst-Mao China, it is between the countryside and city, and local and global forces/representation The former are spatial components that fom the lifeworld while the laîter are where collective identity is formed and culture is defined.

The glass skyscrapers and concrete overpasses that define the 'new' Beijing have replaced the 'old' city walls and monuments. Investment and development are winning out over conservation and restoration of historical sites, unless they are important tourist attractions or administrative centres such as the Forbidden City and Zhongnonhaz.

Despite the obvious changes in Beijing's landscape, the essence of the city still lies in the

Street. The Chinese city is traditionally defined by the human scale of its streets which

'735 In are, as Kenneth Treister points out, "narrow, cornfortable, and well-designed. central Beijing this is not always the case: traffic congested ring roads encircle the city and the Changan Jie metch is a multi-lane thoroughfare, widened from its original size

34 'Cod Hill ' is the comrnonly used English translation of Jing Shan Oit. 'Prospect Mountain'). 35 Kenneth Treister. Chinese Architecture. Urban Planning, catdhds

(photo 8). Finding the essence of the city in the street provides texture and character in the social fabric, as weil as reveals where and how co~ll~llunicationtakes place in everyday life. Streets are nIled with people, hedwith shops and food sus, &ed by trees, and strewn with parked and moving bicycles.36 Today, though, as Beijing develops, public transportation is replacing the bicycle as the main transport mode, and slowly taxis and private cars have rnoved in.

Photo 7: Changan Jie in the 1950s fhoto 8: Wangfujing in the 1990s (source: WLphoto archives) (source: Fodor 's Eqloring China)

The new spaces that are transforming the Beijing cityscape may si& the loss of tradition, but they also symbolize the new potential for personal advancement, wealth, and mobility found in China today. They are at once alienating and alluring. Urban growth in Beijing represents a break fiom the past in terms of scale and history, but it has also led to a better overall living standard and domestic sanitation levels. Although only

36 At least one in five people have and use a bicycle in China as their main source of transportation. 33% of the Chinese population live in cities, this represents 400 million peopl-a sizeable number with great impact on the world economy. Beijing is, as are most cities in general, characteristically commercial and a social place of gathering and exchange, and is always developing, growing upward, and expanding outward.

Beijing is in danger of overdeveloping and under-planning, as well as creating an over-supply of certain development projects, such as luxury housing and office towers, and an under-suppiy of necessary counterparts, such as low-to-middle incorne housing.

Over the next fifty years, China will likely become the world's largest market for commercial real estate and infrastructure developrnent, but if the tendency descnbed above continues, Beijing will face a major housing shortage and possible crisis. The growth and transfomation of China can be further attributed to scale, capitalism, regdation, disparity, demographic and cultural changes, but the most important social issues to address in the neld few yûan are long-term infI.astnictural planning and urban renewal.

Until the 1950s, the city had remained vimially untouched for centuries after its establishment under the Ming Dynasty in 142 1. Although Mao was anti-urban and pro- niral development, he saw the need to maintain important cities for administrative and patriotic reasons-but not for sentimental or nostalgie reasons. Mao's fxst moves to make a break fiom the past was to destroy Beijing's city walls and in sixteen gates, as well as to establish the 'Ten Great Monuments' campaign, which included the Great Hall of the People and Tiananmen square." When China re-opened its doors in the 1980s, postrnodernism was at its peak in Western architecture and China was able to by-pass

" Mao's projects signifïed a radical break From the past-they were, and stül are, ~typicalin size (huge/inhumaae scale) and non-traditionai in style (austere and Russian). modemism altogether and jump right into its own fom of postmodern construction-

There are, as a result of the pst-Mao surgence of skyscapers and commercial buildings,

mixed feelings about the changedhg built environment from admiration Wor

contentment to despair ador hopelessness. One Beijinger, quoted in the New York

Times, recently said that

everyday they are destroying the Beijing I loved.. .Now I hardly care. It's already gone, like a jar that's aiready broken. You can Save a fragment, but it's hardly worth it.'*

While a counterpart to this viewpoint argues that there is no room for nostdgia in the

'new China' and that the changes are necessary for a beîîer, brighter, more 'global'

future.39

Catalyzed by modemization, some people feel that Beijing's new landscape has

left the pst behind, even if there are nods to the traditional aesthetic in roof-shapes and

exterior design. The key to the changes, whether people like them or not, is that for the

first time in history, the primary concem in architecture shified from grand, lush, and

picturesque buildings for a select few, to mass production to meet the physical needs of

the Chinese populace. Architecture, in a sense, has become democraticdespite the

strong cultural-ideological controls and strict regdations that govern the construction

industry. Over and above the democratic aspect of architectural refom is that is

primarily commercial driven. This has inevitably led to the destruction of historical sites

for more lucrative development projects, as well as building code violations and

govemment kick-backs to speed-up the building process and benefit the parties involved.

38 in Erik Eckholm, "A Burst of Renewal Sweeps Away Old Beijing" The New York Times, March 1, 1998. 39 Henry A Kissinger, 'No Room for Nostalgia" in Nmmeek Spcial Report, June 29, i 998: 50-52. To understand the current state of Chinese architecture, and its impact on cultural definition and identity in China today, it is important to note that there are conflichg notions of culture in general. A strong conservatism of traditional values motivated by nationalism codicts with nihilism that calls for a radical break from the pst and building for the future. Thus, Beijing's ever-changing Iandscape is linked to both political and economic reforrn, but more importantly, it is part of how culture is defïned and where identity is formed. The pluralistic elements of new projects built with new technology and joint-venture expert designers and investors imply that culture is being redefined, identity has been fragmented or hybridîzed, and ideology is evolving through the adoption of late-capitalist elements within the socidist regime. Whether this is a move fomard in the context of globalization has yet to be determined. One thgthat is certain is that China has established its place in the global cultural, political, and economic spheres, and bas become an important international player in less than twenty years of modernization. The pluralistic cultural, political, and economic changes are, and will continue to be, recorded in architecture: as both aesthetic forrn and social document, architecture defines time and space in the local and projects them into the global. PROJECTINGMODERNIZATION AND SPATIALCONSCIOUSNESS: THESTOR P OF Qru Ju

Chinese cities today are at the forefiont of a new era in the history of China. People appear to be more and more busy and more and more humed than ever before. They al1 want to change their lives. Their heads are fidl of ideas. They are reaching out for al1 kinds of new opportunities. Life is a ferment of desires and womes, excitements and illusions. By favoring the mobility of a hand-held camera, close shots of the actors' faces, very dense and high-contrast lighting and a rapid, unconventional editing style, 1 set out to reflect my impressions of China today. But over and above the details of filmmaking technique, what I want to Say most is that no matter how people's Lives change, their greatest need will always be to talk to each other and understand one another.

Zhang Yimou

PreambIe: the oost-Mao film industrv in context

This may seem like a very long quotation to begin a chapter, but because Zhang

Yimou reveals his views on modemkation through the Chinese city today, the impact of changes in the city on daily life and persond identity, the theory behind his filmmaking, and the inclination of humans to communicate with each other to make sense of their surroundings, 1 thought it appropnate to include dl, and not just part, ofit. My interest in writing this chapter is to look into how lives are changing in China today, as both the city and the countryside develop, and to rnap the cultural impact of the refom era(s) on everyday life through cinematic representation. As Zhang States above, people everywhere want to change thei.lives and participate somehow in modernization as China enters a new era in its colossal history. The film 1 will discuss in this chapter, neStory of Qiu Jt4(1992), is cunsidered a

classic in post-Mao Chinese cinema and is deeply cultural. It is an exploration of the

changes in China in the early post-Mao era-the 1980s and early 1990s-and miculates the dilemmas and contradictions of modemization on a highly persona1 level. In an identifiable F$h Generation style (that 1 will define later), Zhang seeks to reflect on

Chinese 'culture' by rethinking its ongins and linking them tu the present situation. He does this through the confrontational narrative and fiaming of ritual and customs with modern elements, legal reforms, and new cultural forces throughout Qiu Ju's aory.

Spatiality and histoncism, which create a relationship between past and present, account for how identity is formed and where it is rooted.' But, by setting this story in the present,

Zhang reconceptudizes the notion of modernity in the private sphere and reconstnicts a personal and a national identity that is at once culturally-specifk and intercultural. The rise in critical interest over the past fifieen years in Chinese cinema has brought about discourse about its value as 'exotic spectacle' to the West andor an important world cinema that is subject to both national scrutiny and cross-cultural analysis. These two sides need not be dualized-indeed, as I have argued about hybrid identities and architectural growth in China today, film, too, must be mapped from a geopolitical perspective and be iinked to the new global cultural space. Film has become a modem signifier of culture by providing an aesthetic and cultural perspective, notivist criticism,

' Uniike Mao. who rejected history as an important tool of social formation and cultural definition, Filth Generation filmmaken look to the road fmm Feudalimi to Cornmunimi of the early part of the 20~ Centuv as a guide to how the PRC was founded and as a reference to hmthe country now operates. Working in the present, of course, has the advantage of hindsight and knowing the outcome of tumultuous tirnes, as weil as allows filmmakers to draw parallels beîween pst and present and between politicai and social thought of both eras. Thus, histoncism in film acts as a symbol of the cieavages in the globaVlocaI nesus in China today. and by (re)constructing identity and (re)defining cuitme. The Smof Qiu h documents the impact of modemization, the tensions of legal reform in the postMao era, or more significantly, the post-Tiananmen era, and ernerging pluralism in the cultural sphere- granting a greater voice to the individual in a traditionally co1Iective society.

As in the preceding chapter uçing architecture, 1wiU now tm to film to visually communicate everyday IXe and cultural identity in contemporary China. The everyday will act as a go-between for the individual and history, and by using film as a visual representation of the impact of modemization, my approach will be primarily spatial. As

David Harvey says, film is "an artform which intertwines themes of space and time in hstructive W~~S."~In this sense, film can be seen to reflect on cdture, redehe culture through representation(s), and communicate culture through projected images; and, in doing so, it is both a social document and an aesthetic fom. In Chapters One and Two, I explored components of globalkation and ofrecanciling the locai and the global in contemporary China, but here 1Nm to a persond reflection on these processes by a filmrnaker who has lived through them and has recreated them to reach people at home and abroad. Film is, as 1 have said, socidiy and aesthetically delineating, but I must also mention its importance as an industry and as part of the mass media: it cm bnng in high revenue and reach audiences far and vide.

As indicated in a recent article in China Today, ccyoungpeople would rather spend

30 yuan to see a popular film than a few yuan for an average Chinese film.. .This trend has helped many cinemas take advantage of market trends and has propelled Chinese filmmalcers to pay more attention to the quality of the work they are turning out." This

Harvey. Condition of Posîmoderni~308. applies primarily to maïnstream commercial films of the newly, expanded Chinese film

industry and of Hong Kong, not really to the Fifth Generation nor of the emergent so-

called Sixth Generati~n.~Despite the increasing commercialization of filmmaking in

general, and in China specifically, the Fifth Generation professes an undercurrent of

intellectualism by creating a hermeneutic environment for audiences, rendering audience

reflection an important consideration in the overall filmmaking process. Mao used film as

a propaganda tool to rnobilize the masses; now it continues to mobilize the masses, but

instead it seeks to provoke diverse social thought and sensitivity to cultural issues in

China's time of transition, rather than dictate it.

In tems of filmmaking, the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 following

Mao's death and the onset of Deng's modemization and open-door policies meant that the

forma1 education system could be reestablished, including the Beijing Film Academy in

1978. Four years later, the first post-Mao generation of film students graduated and

began almost immediately to make films, without going through the conventional, lengthy

apprenticeship process. The graduation class of 1982, now known as the Fifth

Generation, has been referred to as the lifeline back to urban society because they have

brought a modem perspective to fihrnaking in tems of technique, narrative, and attitude.

The Sixth Generation is made up of newcomers to the fiImrnaking scene in China (namely Zhang Yuan, Wang Xiaoshuai. He Yi, and Zhang Ming) who are primarily based in Beijing. Some are graduates of the BFA and some are not: what t)iqshare is their rejection of party control over personal expression and aesthetic form. Realism and urban alienation define them as a group-that is, they seek to e.vpose the social reality of a rapidly developing country and the contradiction between centralized Party politics and the decentralized reaiity of everyday Iife. Consequently. their films have ben labelleci amoral and emotionally manipulative by the state. For a comprehensive discussion of the ernergence and philosophy of the Sixth Generation. se Ian Johnson's "True Grit: You won't see China's Sixth Generation of film directors at Cannes" Far Eustem Economic Rmiew (July 11, 1996): 4647, as well as numerous entries in Xudong Zhang's Chinese Modernism in the Era of Refonns (Durham: Duke University Press. 1997) and the chapter on film in Jianying Zha's China Pop (New York: The New Press, 1995): 79-104- Because these filmmakers were bom after 1949, they did not expenence feudalism firsthand. They do, however, remember the Chaiman Mao and the Cultural Revolution vividly. They trained together at the BFA, then worked together at the Guangxi Film

Studio as instructed by the State, but eventually developed their own styles and went on to make separate films with different studio afnliations. The most fmous of the Fifth

Generation are indisputably Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou, but others worth mentioning are Tian Zhuangzhuang and Huang ~ianxin.~

The Fiflh Generation seeks to, as Asian film critic Tony Rayns has said, "move fkom ideological certainties towards moral, psycho!ogi~and politicai ~om~lexities."~As a young group, they wanted to create a distinct Chinese cinema, tmsting images over words to speak out. Director Zhang Yimou started as a cinematographer with YeIZuw

Earth, thus his emphasis on the visual alerts audiences to cultural sensitivities of living through the modemkation process and revives interest in traditionai Chinese cultural values through new, modem takes on culture and society. Zhang's films, and The Siory of

Qiu Ju in particular, can be used to determine the cultural identity and consciousness that prevails in China today, but must also be seen as an artistic medium that is subject to representation and personal beliefs of the filrnmaker and the viewer. As Zhang moves hto the domain of popuiar perception to expose everyday Me of everyday people in everyday situations, the key to appreciating his films cornes in understanding their cultural context,

4 These filmmakers are most known for the foIlowing films: Chen bige: Yellow Earth ('84), King of the Children ('87), Li$e on a String ('go), Farewell m-v Concubine ('93), Temptress Moon ('96). Zhang Yimou: Red Sorghum ('87), JuDou ('90). Raise the Red Lantern ('9 1). The Story of Qiu Ju ('92), Shanghai Triad ('95), Keep Cool ('97). Tian Zhuiangzhuan: On Hunting Ground ('85), Horse Thief ('86), Blue Kite ('93) Huang Jianxin: trilogy-The Black Cannon Incident ('$6). Dislocation ('87). Sàmsara ('89). In Chns Berry Perspectives in Chinese Cinema (London: British Film Mime, 199 1): 109. and not as Chinese exoticism and mysticism, even if they are set in Impwial or Maoist times. Zhang Yimou and The Story of Qiu Ai are the focus of this chapter because he and this film not only illustrate the quality and value of the contemporary Chinese film industry but also disclose the impact and struggle ofmodemization and reform in the iifeworld(s) of China todaye6

neSIO~ of Qizi Ju is a highiy visual film and the spatial surroundings truly communicate what is happening in China today on dl levels: individually, socidly, politically, and economically. The main question in the film revolves around how can socialism and capitalism, tradition and modemity, and the changing ruratlurban dichotomy be reconciled, giving rise to issues of dislocation, migration, as well as the (re)definition of culture and persona1 identity within changing environmental, technological, economic, political, and social structures. Zhang's primary goal is to tell a story and his greatest challenge is how to tell it. He has said that "You must have something good to Say to make a good film" but, judging from his work and the evolution of his stories, you must also have a tremendous amount of dedication, endurance, and vision. 7he Story of Qiu Ju is the story of one's woman quest for justice within a legal system in transitioq and through her explorative and confrontational joumey £Yom countryside to city, from traditional to modem lifestyle, and f?om an individual to social voice, the film evokes both the arbitrary nature of the Chinese legal system (even in a time of reform) and the dilernrna of participating in modeniization when your social context is restraining.

For a more detailed explanation of the origîns of the new Chinese cinema, ree Tony Rayns' article by the same name. and Chris Berry's "China's Fifih Generation Faces the Bottom Line" in Chris Berry (ed.) Perspectives in Chinese Cinema (London: British Film Institute, 1991). Ma~~ineModernization bv Balancinp Yin and Yan?:

Spatial Consciousness in The Storv of Oiu Ju

In China, the concept of Yin and Yang has a tradition of hidoncd importance-

Yang is symboiic of the male, the sun, fire, and aggression, whereas Yin is symbolic of the female, the moon, water, and passivity. They are defined dualistically, but they are

interrelated and nanirally interdependent. The pnnciple of Yin and Yang corresponds with the MandMe of Heaven for peace, prospenty, and orderly lie on earth; t herefore, Yang, which also symbolizes heaven, ultimately maintains power over Yin, the earth. In the

Zhang Ymou film, The Story of Qitr h,the main character (Qiu Ju), a peasant woman, travels from the countryside to the city in search of justice for her husband (Qinglai) who has been kicked in the groin by a local officia1 (Chief Wang). The Chief had denied

Qinglai and Qiu Ju a permit to built on their land for what Qinglai saw as arbitrary reasons: no tangible benefit to the community. Frustrated with the public system, Qinglai indirectly uisulted the Chiec who had only daughters and therefore no heir, by saying that the Chief was nothing but a fmer, with no vision of the future, and could "ody raise hens." More irnportantly, Qinglai touched a very culturally sensitive issue: the Chief did not have a son. The Chief considered the insult a breach of respect for authonty and reacted inappropriately for an officiai. The premise of the story is simple, but the challenge to authority that Qiu lu undertakes and her involvement in the modemization process are highly complex. Qiu Ju's journey takes her from familiar to foreign temto~, and dong the way, she mua reconstruct her identity based on experience in unfamiliar settings-much like how China mua reconsider its place within the global framework of today as it modemizes and opens up. The movement that Qiu Ju makes in order to achieve justice is what 1 will use to explore the changing spatiaVsocia1 consciousness

which happened in China in the 1980s and early 1990s' and continues today.

In Qiu Ju's movement from countryside to city, she moves fiom Yin to Yang by

chdlenging cultural codes and conventions: she defies tradition, abandons her gender role,

and asserts her own rights. In some ways, though, she is also bound by tradition: she lives

in the country, she is a peasant wuman and wife, and she has been wronged by an officia!

who is considered above the Iaw, or as the Chief himselfstates, "is the law." Awareness

of her landroots and where they fit in on a larger scale, traditional Confùcianist ideds

transcribed into a late 20" Century context, are essential to her transcendence of space,

from her attributed space in the country to a newiy acquired space in the city. 7he Story

of Qi24 Ji4 exemplifies how contemporary Chinese film seeks to redefine post-Mao

modemization through analyses of China's own transformations-and not as a reaction

against outside influences on open China-so it is important to understand changes in

China within their own context. In fact, a major characteristic of new Chinese cinema,

made by filmmakers known as the Fiflh Generation, is to reconcile the new cultural and

political situation in China with an equivocd power relationship between people and state,

as well as to ponder the relevance of China's revolutionary past on its current situation.

Qiu Ju's experience in the new era reveals the intemal diversity arnong the people in

contrast to national confomity by shunning the popular ambivalent attitude towards

authority and fighting for her own cause.

The shifting ideology of economic reform and modemization in China and its effect

on politics, economics, and society are the focus of cultural reflection in new, post-Mao

Chinese cinema. As a resuIt of economic refom and modeniization, urbanism cm be seen as a new social movernent that emerged in China fkom the redistribution of land and the market economy. Urbanisrn cm also be seen as a source of alienation, in the Mamian sense that workers are objectified under ~a~italism,~because of the surplus labour and population density that accompanies urban growth. In the urban space of contemporary

China, there continues to be a definite hierarchy with the Communist Party at the top of the social structure, and the masses at the bottom. Here, I would Say that the political sphere has power over the personal sphere and that holism is favoured over personalism; so political space is the nucleus of urbanism even though the majority reside outside of it.

W~thoutan expansion of the nucleus, there is a risk of spatial monopoly on behalf of the state; and most likely if the political space is overly hegemonic, those outside it will speak out andor try to break its seal. Again, the balance of the two sides, or spaces, is key to a balanced state,

The use of surrounding space in cinematic composition frames the main subjects

(here, they are Qiu Ju, Chef Wang, and the various Public Service Bureau oEcers) and defines the social structure (here, it is the country-village-district-city hierarchy), thereby creating cultural discourse and spatial consciousness. Because film is by nature hermeneutic, so too are filmmaking, film viewing, and film criticism. Thus, film is based on persona1 experience and interpretation of real situations and is phenornenological.8 1 will now look at how spatial experience and consciousness are phenomenological in the

7 Here. I use the Mamian sense of alienation as king the result of capitaiist sociaI relations. People are disconnecteci. or alienated, fmm the product of their labour and are commodified. Hoivever, because Marx's theory focusses on the workplaœ as the only source of alienation, it is not very applicable to an increasing global fiamework of power relations. * Here 1 use phenomenologv as the process of describing objects just as one experiences them. Phenonmenology is. therefore, the e-xiraction of philosophy fiom the process of experienœ and interpretation. way they render the world intelligible and expand one's lifeworld. Qiu lu, as an individuai

who is directly involved with her landroots (the countryside and her chili agriculture),

consciously embarks on a joumey that takes her beyond her personal space, to a political

one in which she has no sensibility, to give meaning to the injustice pressed upon her

husband. She adapts to foreign p1aces and environments without suppressing the self

because she is driven by her loyalty to her husband and her comection to her evevday

life, her lifeworld. Ultimately, her search for justice expands her lifeworld and signifies a

conscious process that allows her to define extemal phenornena through her relationship

with them and her own experiences. Her movement from Yin to Yang (from personal to

political space) is not an easy one, nor are the results wholly desirable as 1 will show in this

anaiysis of The Story of Qiu Ju.

In modem geography, space has become a tradition of inquiry into the comection between people and land. In the context of China in the late 1980s and early 1990s, inquiry into the conneaion between people and land began as a result of the changing spatiaVsocia1 structure in the post-Mao era. The dominant ideology began to shifi as a result of Mao Zedong's death and Deng Xiaoping's Four Modemizations and open-door policy. Urbanization, too, was a natural offspring of the changing Chinese economic, political, and social structure; but, with deveiopment and urbanization in China also came the need for a FiffhModemzation: democracy. Thisfiflh modemizution7 however, was not on the national agenda of reform. Instead, state leaders promoted the need to further develop socialism. The dominant ideology of post-Maoist China is characterized as 'postsocialist' or 'socialist with Chinese characteristics'; postsocialism, then, denotes the socialism of Deng Xiaoping that acknowledges the need to adopt certain capitalist eIernents in order to overcome the deficiencies of socialism experienced under Mao. At the same tirne, postsocialist CCP leaders reject capitalism as the future regirne of China (at least on the surface as party rhetoric); thus there is an inherent contradiction in adopting elements of capitalism but also rejecting it. In The S.of Qiu Ju. Zhang Yirnou questions this contradiction by approaching the social hierarchy in China fiom the bottom up, rather than the usuai paradigrn ffom the top down, and exposes the emergence of a new urban culture and social consciousness among the Chinese populace.

The new popular culture and changing cultural identity that emerged in China during the 1980s and early 1990s resulted in an ambiguous and confûsed (pluralistic andor hybrid) national identity. Centrai to this arnbiguity and confusion is that while the country was modemizing, the economic, political, and cultural legacies of traditional and

Maoist China continued to have a profound influence on daily social life. It was this massive disillusionment with socialism, as well as the new problems created by some of the legacies of Maoism under Deng, that culrninated in the demonstrations and crackdown at Tiananrnen Square in 1989.

The Story of Qirr Ju was made in 1992, in the aftennath of the crackdown and hardline party control, and much fike the students protesting at Tiananrnen Square, Qiu Ju is willing to lose face ifit means standing up for her beliefs. Although losing face is commonly associated with weakness and dishonour, here it is symbolic of strength and honour. For Qiu Ju, her disillusionment with the justice system, her rejection of her traditional gender role, as well as her anti-hierarchical perseverance are what allow her to move from the periphery to the centre of the political sphere, fiom powerlessness to powerfulness, or from Yin to Yang. Thus, the film continues the Fifth Generation tradition of looking into the pnvate sphere to shed light on how ideology manifests itself in daily life, but it aiso breaks Corn the tradition in its depiction of rural and urban life in a contemporary setting. By bringing the film up-to-date, Zhang Yimou took his filmmaking fiom the past to the present and fiom the country to the city-literally and metaphoncaliy.

It is important to understand the context in which me Story of Qitr Jzi was made in order to fuily appreciate the film itself. It was not only a spatio-temporal transition for Zhang, but also a kind of self-reinvention.

Pnor to The Story of Qiu h.he had had great international success with Red

Sorghim (1987). JuDoir (1990). and Raise the Red Lanienz (199 1); however, these films were al1 met with great disapprovd &om the Chinese authorities. They were considered sexually expository, disrespeaful of the Chinese moral code, and an inappropriate way of projecting contemporary China around the world. In addition, Zhang's off-screen relationship with his leading actress, Gong Li, and his estrangernent fiom his wife were subjea to moral censure by the aate and Chinese audiences. Zbang needed to make a film that would renew his reputation personally, morally, and politically-The SZOIY of Qiu Ju did this for him. In fact, the film had an unprecedented, and perhaps ironic, premiere in the Great Hall of the People, under the auspices of the state.

The film's portrayal of honest and helpful officiais and of the modernizations at work in China by exposing the constant bustle of the village, district, and city as visible signs of progress seemingly pleased the Chinese authorities. Qiu Ju's loyalty to her husband (dien) convinced Chinese officiais of Zhang's own loydty to the state (zhung). In the film, Zhang also downplayed the CCP paranoia cornmonly portrayed in the films of the 1980s' pleasing the state; yet, he still managed to make subtle references to govemrnental favouritism (g'iami) and the imbalance of power between state and people.

According to Tony Rayns, Zhang made a compromise between political acceptability and his own renewai, and in doing so, created a "fresh approach to the agesld challenge of constructing a 'reaIist7 aesthetic?"' In addition, to make this film, Zhang managed to overcome the constraints imposed on filmmaking after the Tiananmen Square incident.

He was permitted to shoot neStory of Qitr Jtr in China, but raise the money abroad (from

Hong Kong) to make it. But as Chinese film became popular outside of China, the state's main concem was losing control over film production and distribution. Even though the party did not fully fund the film, it retained al1 authonty on the film's circulation. This was considered crucial to the maintenance of (postsocialist) ideological confonnity in contemporary China, given its increasing participation in the multinational global economy. The state created an open China, but also insists on retaining control.

Qiu Ju's new mode1 for cultural identity and social structure express what Paul

Pickowicz might cal1 a 'post-socialist identity' in contrast to the Chinese state's portrayai of maintaining tradition over the "emerging culture of urban individ~alism"~~The Story of

Qiri Jir could be considered a precursor for the new urban cinema of the 1990s that addresses specific social issues such as urban dienation, population density, and cultural transformation. The spatial composition of Qiu lu's movement into denser, more developed territov mixes the traditional and modem elements found in post-Mao China

9 Tony Rayns. "Qiü JU da &minin Sight and Sound. May 1993:.55. 'O Paul Pickorricz, "Velvet Prisons" in Deborah Davis et al. eds. Udan Spuces in Contemporary China. New York: Woodrow Wilson Press and Cambridge University Press, 1995): 198; hereafter USCC. and signals the impact of Deng's modernizations and openness. The new city space is

defined by buildings (the bigger the city, the taller the buildings it seems), traffic lights and

congestion, department stores and shopping centres; and the new surrounding space is

defined by pop music, Chinese landscape paintings on mirrors for sale beside posters with

the characterftr (meaning good fortune), and posters of Chow Yun-Fat and Arnold

Schwarzeneggar side-by-side. Clearly, a changed spatial/social stnicture has emerged in

China.

Political, Social, and Personal Snace

We can divide the spatial structure of ïhe Story of Qizr Jtî into three major realms:

political, social, and personal. First 1 will explain what 1 mean by these divisions of space,

then 1will locate them within contemporary Chinese society and apply them to the film.

Political space is the capacity of a dominant group to exercise its control through popular

acceptance and not through visible coercion. Ideally, the dominant ideology is

disseminated and incorporated into everyday practice; but without due voice in the public

realm, there is an imbalance of power and a potential for popular uprise. As Louis

Althusser remarked about the ideological state apparatus (ISA), it is anti-humanistic but

acts according to cultural codes and conventions and is therefore deeply entrenched. This

is certainly the case in China In ?he Stmy of Qizr Jlr the political space is the state, the

status quo, and the Public Service Bureau; its dualist elements are the individual, opposition to the aatus quo, and Qiu Ju. Thus, the political space is Yang and personal space in Yin. Transition fiom one to the other happens in the social sphere which provides a balance between political and persona1 space. No matter what the surroundings, space is always defined and given meaning by the group who occupies it. Specifically though, social space, as the intermediary between political and personal space, is perceived and used in daily activity and is an integral part of community and environment. Personal space is temtoriality established by the individual-it could also be called social space at the individual level. Personal space is, in theory, controlled by political space due to the political sphere's ovemding infiastructure and rules; yet, as 1 have already discussed (and as in Tiananmen Square), if the persond sphere is not, in practice, satisfied with this control, it could lash out against it. Political space sets out to keep the system stable (holistic approach) whereas persona1 space seeks to have a voice in the system (individualistic approach). In China, friction between the two has been inevitable with the state-enforced Four Modernizations' strong drive for economic growth but little incorporation of the democratic process.

Zhang Yirnou creates the movement fkom persona1 to political space through a cinéma-vérité approach. Authenticity in The Story of Qizi h can be found in its Shanxi village setting," in its use of regional dialect, dress, and body language, and in the contrasting of the countryside and city through Qiu lu's travels. Moreover, Zhang's use of a hidden canera, long-range microphones, natural lighting, and tight editing keep the story rnoving to give a sense of daiiy life in contemporary China. ïhe Story of Qiu Jlr offers an alternative view to the state's national portrayal of contemporary culture in

China in its acknowledgement of the stniggle of developing a new national consciousness.

She personifies the traditional Chinese rural woman, yet at the same time she is an

" Zhang Yimou is known for his research of film locations, as he was a cinematographer before director. To make The Story oJQiu Ju, Zhang and his cmand actors spent eight months living in a Shanxi village. entrepreneur and symbol of progress and modemity by selling the chilies that she and her

husband cultivate in the market to finance moving beyond her defined space, identity, and

culture-

The film also reveals the changing legai tradition and the changing dynarnics of

social and political issues in post-Mao China. I have made a distinction between political

and personal space, and put social space in the middle, but where does the le@ system fit

in? The legal system is both political and personal: it exists to maintain order and to

represent people. It protects people's rights and can check state adherence to the law.

Contrary to this idea of legal protection of state and society, China has a tradition of

granting supreme power to the state and prohibiting any independent form of social

activity. Imperial China was based on a legalist system and Maoist China a nihilistic

system, or Zavless as it is commonly termed. Both traditions are Confucian in spirit in that

they are based on the concept of Li, or reason, over subjectivity, good moral conduct, and

adherence to hierarchy by putting the ultimate decision-making power in the hands of the

state.

Officially, Chinese legalism was based on a system of reward for good moral conduct, and punishment for deviation fiom the moral code. Unofficially, the procedure for rewards or punishments was not based on a set pend code, but rather on the deveiopment of civil or private matters over time. Thus, officiais, at al1 levels, served as litigators and decided on what was or was not reasonable behaviour. The Emperor reigned over both state and society. Mao's lawlessness did not include any concept of the division of power-he called it rezhi, or rule of persons. Modelled afker the Soviet legal system, the state was considered çupreme, and therefore above the law. This supremacy was justified as necessary for the maintenance of order. However, the injustice of this set- up was that the state could apply punishrnent to whomever it considered the 'enemy.'

Lawlessness, and legalism, are quite obviously arbitrary and biased.

After Mao's death, to deviate the horrors of the CuItural Revolution, the CCP irnplemented legal reforms. They were meant to correct the problerns of a mle over people, ren-hi, and establish a rule of law, fdi.Today, the laws may have changed, but the traditional structure still prevails because the same people are still in power. There is a legal system and a legal profession in China, but it is very new. For now, Li is still superceded by guami, therefore the Iaw remains corrupt. me Sfory of Qiit Jir is a gesture towards change, but how much does her case really affect the political structure? Qiu Ju upsets the Li at 2 time of legal reform so her unreasonable quest is pursuable. She has no concept of the legal system, nor the imbalance between econornic development and political reform, but her determination is enough to disrupt the Chief s immunity as an official. Despite her minimal legal consciousness, she becomes an active participant in legai reform, mostly due to luck and timing.

Landscape chanpes

There are three predominant landscape changes in Be Sfory of Qizt h:from countxyside to village, to district, and to city. Each change contnbutes to the formation of

Qiu Ju's spatial consciousness. In the opening scene, Zhang Yimou uses a non- perspectival, crowd shot with Chinese folk music setting the ton-more than two minutes go by before we even notice Qiu Ju in the crowd. Slowly the camera singles her out wearing a red jacket and a green scarf on her head (colours that evoke joy and anger respective^^).'^ She is noticeably pregnant (evocation of aniggle) and is with her sister- in-law Meizi who is pulling a cart carrying Qinglai (evocation of their socio-economic aatus). They are on their way to see the village doctor to find out the senousness of

Qinglai's injury. The doctor's office is an austere place with a wood-buming stove, so we can see that modemization has hardly altered daily life in rural areas. Qiu Ju's acute spatial consciousness is quickly revealed in her comical observation that the doctor looks more like a vet. At the same time, she is obviously quite naive and unaware of the dynamics of the village.

Upon retum home, Qiu lu takes Qinglai's medical report to Chief Wang as proof of his grave misconduct, but Wang brushes the note offand infuriates Qiu lu to the point where she decides to take the incident to the village Public Service Bureau. Mer a visit to Wang's home fiom the Public Service officer to whom Qiu Ju had pied her husband's case,13 the settlement is a cash payment of 200 yuan for medical fees and lost wages.

When Qiu Ju goes to see Wang with the medical bills and to receive the settlement, he throws the money (twenty 10 yuan bills) in the air and tells her to kneel down and bow to him (twenty tirnes) to pick it up-this way he is not losing face, she is. Qiu Ju refuses to succumb to his humiliation and demands an apology instead of the cash. When Wang refuses, Qiu lu decides to take the case to the district level. In response to this decision,

l2 Further to my outline of the principles of Yin and Yang, in Chinese aesthetia, Yin and Yang can each be divided into lesser and greater parts. Greenhnger are part of the Iesser Yang and red/joy are part of the greater Yang. Whitefsomw are pan of the lesser Yin and blacWfear are part of the greater Yin Yellow/desire balance the two. l3 An interesting aspect of Qiu Ju's meeting with the district Public Service Offiicer is that he pays particuIar attention to the case because 1) he knows Qinglai. 2) Qiu Ju is pregnant, and 3) she has corne such a Iong way in her condition. He is part of the 'new' China but his adherence to tradition is notable in his request that Qiu Ju do some "self-criticism" (Maoist) and in his respect to Wang who is a colleague and his elder (Confircianist). Qinglai says "Good idea. There must be justice somewhere." Qinglai, incapacitated by his injury, supports his wife completely.

On Qiu Ju's way to the village,14 the same music as the opening scene can be heard but this time the lwcs warn of the need to "in the village, be carefbl." To get to the district, she must pass through the village first, then take a truck from there. Along the way, signs of modemity prevail: built roads, motorized vehicles, and electrical towers. At the district PSB, she must supply the officials with a written complaint whereas at the village, an oral complaint had sufficed. She must buy the seMces of a man on the street to write the letter. When we hear the officials read it out, we understand that the facts are the same but the story has been embellished. The end result of the appealed case, however, is the same: money fiom the Chief for medicai fees and lost wages. Qiu Ju then decides to take the case fiom the district to the city.

To get to the city Qiu Ju must again pass through the village, take a tnick to the district, then take a bus ftom there. Qiu Ju's spatial consciousness is exemplified by her acquired familiarity with her surroundings in the village and district and her confidence to keep moving. The bus leaves the district and travels along newly built roads that wind down the mountainside to the city-this movement gives a sense of a reversed political hierarchy with the countryside at the top and the city at the bottom. Also, the weather changes from snowy to balmy denote the struggle of life in the country as compared to life in the city. The landscape evokes the Chinese aesthetic of landscape painting with prevailing mountains which are quickly replaced with multi-stoned buildings and

14 1 should note here that Qiu Ju is always accompanied by her sister-in-Iaw Meizi on her traveIs to the village. district. and city. and although she is an important character, for the purpose of this paper, 1will not refer to her specifically. department stores. Qiu Ju stands out irnrnediately in the city with her country clothing and

her puzzled look, but almost as quickiy, she begins to understand her surroundings. She

buys new clothes and finds the cheapest place in town to stay, both on the advice of a

woman who saw a bicycle-taxi driver blatantly cheat her on the fare. As she becomes

more farniliar with her surroundings, she is able to think about how to proceed. The

surrounding spatial organization and the seemingly chance meetings with people who

contributeto her quest for justice strengthen the narrative as weil as Qiu lu's character so

that she able to continue carry on-or, what 1 consider move fiom Yin to Yang.

Eventually Qiu Ju appears before the court to plead her case and aftenvards, she

retums home to await the verdict. In the meantirne, she goes into labour on a day when

eveiyone in the area is attending a concert. The only person around to help her is Chief

Wang. He gets her to the hospital safely and she gives birth to a healthy son. Qiu Ju and

Qinglai decide to make the Chief the man of honour at their son's 'first month party.'

Ironicaily, on the day of the Party, the verdict of the case is released and the Chief is sentenced to 15 days in prison. When Qiu lu hears the news she runs at length after him, calling his name, while the sirens of the car taking him away blare in front of her. AU she really wanted was an apology, not for the Chief to go to jail. It seerns that her movement fiom Yin to Yang upset the social structure and confuseci her own status within the structure. She may have won the case, but she appears lost in the end. The ending reinforces Zhang's humanistic approach to the changing economic, political, and social structure in China by showing that through spatio-temporal expenence, values change and identities are reconstructed. Qiu Ju develops her understanding of the space that surrounds her by moving

beyond it. Through her experience and movement into new temtory, her Iifeworld

expands. The lifeworld is a culturally defined spatio-temporal setting of everyday life that

is directly involved in place and directly afEected by experience. In this sense, the lifeworld

is phenomenological. The expenence of spa& affects everyday Iife, and rnovement in

space changes everyday life. As Qiu Ju moves fiom the countryside to the village and

eventually to the city, she develops her own personal geography and gives meaning to her

local surroundings. Her movement is at once alienating and reimg-just as China's

modemization process is settling-in with time, experience, and development. By being

aware of her own space as well as the changes in contemporary China, Qiu Ju engages in

the intellectual processes cornrnonly discussed in Chinese intellectual circles during the

"cultural fever" of the 1980s of self-introspection and modem consciousness Cfansi and

xiondai yishi). At first, Qiu Ju is estranged fiom the city space (modernization) but

through experiential movement within the city and the legal system, she forms a

connection (introspection) between her personal space (Yin) and the political space

(Yang) -

AIthough the 'open' 1980s ended with a govenunental crackdown at Tiananmen

Square in June 1989, by 1992 China had resumed its global 'fi-ee' market. And, despite the crackdown, the economy has continued to flourish both internally and intemationdly.

The political space has continued to be separate from social space and therefore the

'cultural fever' of the 1980s of modern consciousness and self-introspection has wntinued to occupy intellectud thought in China. The need for people to understand their surroundings and their place within it is exemplified by the existence of a national identity, but a national identity ca~ottnily exist without a stable identity in the personal space-

people must feel assured by their social role. This is particularly relevant in a time of

urbanization and massive stmctural overhaul in China China is increasingly participatory

in the world economy, so it must also expand its own lifeworld. Qiu Jzi is the story of an

expanding lifeworld. Her lifeworld is expanded through spatial consciousness, and her

spatial consciousness is formed by her rejection of the social structure placed upon her and

her opposition to the status quo.

The name Qiu lu literdy means autumn chrysanthemum, but with a slight change

in the intonation of Qiu (eom Qiu to Qiu), the name could also mean request, impnson, or

swim.IS The woman Qiu Ju requests an apology which ends in imprisonrnent, and her

movement from countryside to city could be symbolic of the struggle with water that is so

important in Chinese culture and aesthetics. Water is part of Yin and fire is part of Yang,

so it could be said that Qiu Ju's move fiom countryside to city is also a move from water to fire, or fiom yin to yang. Although Yin is characteristically fernale and passive, it also

draws its strength nom its qualities of wisdom and regeneration. Qiu Ju acquires wisdom, and redefines her identity, through the developrnent of her lifeworld. Her fearless and self- assured nature allow for her movement fiom personal space to foreign (political) space, a process through which she cm understand the (Chinese) social structure in general and her place within it. Throughout the film she is seeking justice, but ends up with more than she was seeking. The reality of modemization, as well as globdization, is to know your place and the limits to it; but this is easier said in theory than done in practice. * l5 The achial characters for Qiu Ju arefi j@ but the change in intonation io Qiii are: (request)* ; (prison) ;(swim) >@ In China today, western influence is inevitable, so a new culture of 'fusion' and

hybrid identity has emerged. The 1980s were a tirne of creating new relationships

between political and social space but as we know, the plan went awry. Now in the

1990s, a time of great commercial development and consumerkm in China and of a new

popular culture based on western influence and domestic transformation, political refom

is mandatory. nie Stmy of Qilr Jzi is in one sense sympathetic to the political system, legd reform, and the state-bound bureaucracy by making some of the officiais Qiu Ju encounters sympathetic characters and allowing Qiu lu to take her case to the highest level (and wi~);yet, in another sense, Zhang Yimou is pointing out the powerlessness of the individual in the Chinese system, and the counter-productive nature of strict adherence to state hierarchy and tradition. Qiu Ju cm only understand her local space by knowing what's beyond it.

Conclusion

The focus on everyday life and social issues in neSfory of Qizc h provides a realist discourse that reveals Qiu Ju as sspatially transgressive-meaning that she moves from one space to another, but even before the film begins, she has dready decided to seek out justice and disregards the conventions of Li. The film is about her movement, consciousness-building, and personal identity reconstniction. She breaks into the deeply- entrenched system, but she does not alter her overall way of life, nor the politicab'justice system. She moves fiom Yin to Yang, but she does not become Yang.

The film is highiy stylized to downplay the defiant nature of Qiu Ju's jot~ism~ce mer unconventionai/ individualistic actions) and even though she wins her case, she resumes her daily life as fmer, wife, and (now) mother. The ultimate recognition of her

quest is not the outcome of the case, but rather the birth of her son. Qinglai is not

seriously injured, Qiu lu gave birth to a healthy boy, and the battle with the Chief is over.

When Qiu Ju realizes that Chief Wang is being taken away to serve a 15 day prison

sentence, she is distraught by the outcome of her actions: imprisonment was not what she

was fighting for. Al1 she wanted was an apology. Qiu Ju is a victirn of injustice

throughout the film, and in the end, she is viaimized by her own actions. Morality,

reason, and justice play central roles in this film.

Zhang's non-manipulative camera work, his use of naturd lighting, colour, and

sound, as well as his tight editing create a realist aesthetic that strives to portray Zfe as if

reaZZy is. I put these words in italics because Zhang has said that he doesn't believe that

people tnily live in the way he presents them, but that his re-presentation of life in

contemporary China reveals his ideas toward society, toward marriage, and toward Iife in

China through one family. The realist narrative and shooting technique provide a dialectic

relationship between personai and political space with its centrifuga1 and limitless filmic

space. The backdrop naturalizes the storyline, fiames Qiu Ju's quest, and strengthens the

narrative. The film, based on a novel, is a fictitious countenance of real changes in China.

In neStoy ofQiu h,as in dl his films, Zhang uses physical contexts as metaphors to

open up ideological discourse among the people about the changing national

consciousness in China. Contextualking the film in a contemporary setting (unlike his

Fifih Generation colleagues) ailows the audience to reflect on the current political

situation in China and gives them an individual voice. Zhang creates a new dialectic relationship with the audience that is not propagandist (as in Maoia and CCP films) but didactic nonetheless.

There is both realism and melodrama in the centrality of the groin. The agony and repercussions of the injury are realistic (Qinglai may not be able to produce an heir should they not have had a son) and the metaphorid use of the groin injury to represent repression by the State is rnelodramatic (it weakens the male's prominent role and alters the traditional dynarnics of gender). Because Qiu lu is never seifkonscious, even in the city where she is obviously an outsider, she commands respect and achieves results against dl odds. nie film is a cornmentary on the social sphere, gender roles, individualism, democracy vs. bureauc~acy~and the dynamics of modernization and reform in contemporary China. Thus, it could also be seen as a cal1 for human rights-especidly as it was made in the wake of Tiananmen Square. By advocating personal space over political space, the self over the collectivity, or yin over yang, The Story of Qizî JU is tmly a story about the changing social structure in China and the profound effea of modemkation on Chinese culture today. It is a deeply cultural film, as is the Chinese film industry. CHAPTERFOUR THENOTION OF CIMLSOCIETY AND THENEW GLOBALCULTURAL SPACE

We are facing the mival of a new open, democratic and information-age era. What reason do we have to reject the will of the people, cling to the June @' probiem and block Our road to democratic politics?

Zhao Ziyang Former CCP Secretury General

In this founh and final chapter, I will give an overview of the notion of civil

society that is ernerging in China today and discuss the dilemrna of applying Western

democratic theory to this notion. The challenge of discussins civil society in the context

of contemporary China is that it is something that is nirrently emerging-it is on-going

and highly discursive, yet under degrees of surveillance by the aate. Its emergence is

having an unprecedented effect on both personal and national identity, and therefore

cultural definition. For this reason, I have chosen to conclude rny thesis with this topic: it

is the most important aspect of intellectual life and is directly applicable to the notions of

identity and spatio-temporal structure that have played key roles throughout my

discussion of China's changing landscape and its impact on contemporary culture. In

addition to forming the bais of the lifeworld, civil society elucidates the global/local

nexus fkorn within its own cultural context thereby creating a place of its own in China.

My principal concerns With the notion of civil society are in its development vis-à-vis

modernization and its influence on thinking about democracy in daily life.

The development of civil society in periods of transition ofien becomes the demise of authontarian regimes and is naturaily Iinked to democratization, but these ideas do not translate clearly into Chinese society or language-rather, they take on an ambiguous rneaning. In the context of contemporary China, civil society does not necessarily facilitate democracy nor does a lack of a democratic system necessarily weaken civil society. Instead, it has a chailenging dual dynamic with totalistic politicai institutions on the one hand and market socialism on the 0ther.l Along the same lines,

Baogang He argues that there is a semi-civil socieq in China today that plays a dual

(political and societal) role in the initial stage of democratization.' As a result of the poliiical role's strength, events like Tiananrnen Square can occur. As White, Howell, and

Xiaoyuan point out,

part of the aagedy of Tiananmen was that it marked a lost historical opportunity .. . to allow social organizations to operate as agents of gradual social and political democratization within a continued one-party hework?

In contrat to this negative effect, Tiananmen brought fonvard issues of repression, alienation, and infnngernent on personal fieedom to people across China and around the world. In this sense, the societaI role of Tiananmen has had a positive effect on the deveioprnent of civil society in China today in the way that it now ensures relative social stability. It not only sparked the beginning of a new era of reform (the second in the post-Mao era) but it has also helped justiSr, over nine years, the need for political refonn in addition to economic reform given the pluralist direction in which modemizing China is headed. Ironically this latter viewpoint was one advocated by Hu Yaobang, whose untimely death sparked the Tiananmen Square demonçtrations in 1989, and by Zhao

Ziyang who was dismissed fiom his position as CCP Secretary General and put under house arrest not long before the crackdown.

1 White et al. In Sarch ofCivil Socieg 7. Baogang He. The Demorratic Impkations of Civil Socieîy in China. (Landon: MacMillan Press, 1997). Md.: 215. Thus, 1 will begin rny ove~ewwith aphysical notion of civil society by giving several definitions and contrasting them with their place in China; then., 1 will look at the societal aspect of civil society through its functions and limitations in defining and redefining culture. Finally, 1 will bring al1 four chapters of this thesis together in a ~atial analysis of civil society that delineates life in China today-but with an admittedly uncertain outcome to the analysis. My purpose here is to gain a foothold, or basis for dialogue, necessary to grasp the inner subjective meanings of China's sociocultural heritage and contemporary culture with the amval of a 'new, open, democratic and information-age era.' Al1 in all, 1 seek to define China locally within the new global cultural space.

Notion(s) of Civil Societv in China todav: functions and limitations

Political Scientist B. Mîchael Frolic defines civil society under four notions: as polis, as citizenship, as political development, and as governance. To this Iist, he adds a fifih notion that is found in Asian societies, namely China: state-led.4 Indeed, China is a . state-led society with the CCP as its only potent political party and with its authoritarian political regime; however, there is more than just this one notion of civil society in China, particularly in light of post-Mao modemization and openness. The two main ways of defining civil society in China today are 'of the state' and 'of the populace'. International media and contemporary Chinese analyses tend to dwell on the first (political) one, even though the second (sociological) one is where daily life is reall y rooted. It is where and how 1.2 billion people live and interact on a regular basis and reveals that there are

4 For more deuils, see Frolic's chapter "State-Led Civil Society" in Brook and Frolic (eds.) Civil Sociev in China. (Armonk, NY and London: Sharpe, 1997): 4647. distinctive level(s) of autonomy from state power in personal life and endeavours. Thus the bea way to approach civil society in China is from the bottom up, even though the country's regime and ideology are characterized as state-led which are conventionally analyzed hierarchically from the top down: rules can be obviateci at street level even under a tightly controlled political system.

In 1949, the People' s Republic of China was founded under the principle of being a 'people's democratic dictatorship' under the leadership of the working class, but also under the absolute authority of the Communist Party. On October 1, 1949, raising the national flag, Mao proclaimed that "a drarna begins with a prologue, but the prologue is not the climax. The Chinese Revolution is great, but the road derthe revolution will be longer, the work more arduous .. . [and what is the most] worthy of pnde is yet to corne."

Frorn this day and speech developed a modem notion of civil society particular to China.

In theory, civil society pertains to voluntary participation in the public sphere and self- regdation in everyday activity. Within a civil society, the state and the people are both linked and independent: the state serves a role to represent the people, and the people act according to the law but in an autonomous manner. Although this notion differs in China because of its political structure, it does not mean that there are not elements of 'civil society' that exist today. People do have certain persona1 freedoms and opportunities for personal development; however the fundamental freedoms of speech and expression are highly reguiated, controlled, and limited. Human rights simply do not factor into the national agenda; yet, if approached from the bottom-up, or by looking at the people before the state, a diEerent situation can be found where human rights, civil society, and democracy do indeed exist, in a variety of ways. 1should point out here that I do not condone the absence of human rights fiom state legisiation, but 1 do think that it is

important to look at the rasons why this is so within its own context. As I discussed in

Chapter One and showed through exampies in architecture and film, the inteIlectuals' cal1

for afifth modernization of democracy is becoming part of China's popular culture and

expression. In terms of popular politics, direct election by secret ballot is practiced al1 over China today f?om the village to the county level, but does not extend to the higher administrative levels. This has been slow in coming, but there are definite levels and notions of civil society, democracy, persona1 tieedoms and human nghts functioning in everyday life, despite state-imposed limitations.

With over 180 000 registered social organizations (i-e. the Women's Federation, trade unions, youth leagues, writers' associations, entrepreneurial groupsj, the dissolution of the basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist thought that disapproved of such groupings becomes evident . Nonetheless, the postnationalist movement t hat arose afier 1989 reveals that both Confucian and Marxist thought continue to regulate state and society, even today. The repercussions of Tiananmen Square translated into state fear of losing control of the modemization process because of the strength of grass-roots movements.

Moreover, they translated into the creation and establishment of a law banning any

'social organization' that failed to 'protect the unity of the state and the solidarity of the nation' (State Council Order No. 43). The law's banning of any 'identical or similar social organization' from registering hardly promotes the pluralism that should accompany the opening up of the country. Instead, it sounds more like a project for nationalism (or public mobilization), especially with the state's espousal of legal reforms to build a strong legal system that would protect civil rights-as a necessary precursor for national posterity and prosperity. According to one women's-rights activist "the govemment wants us to be part of its system.. .we can just hope for more influence as the govemment tries to shed some of its responsibilities." To which Beijing correspondent

Matt Fomey added, "so far, that influence has been slow in c~rning."~It is this central contradiction in the vigilant regulation and supe~sionof modemization that has led to unease and diama about the future of the pnvate sphere and one's own role within it. 1s economic liberalization really possible in the long-term without a political and, ultimately, social counterpart?

The limitations to defining and applying civil society in China today are that it is slow in coming because of the ambiguous line between what is accepted and what is not in the private (or social) sphere. Given the serious repercussions attached to stepping over it7 as in Tiananmen Square, the limitations are stronger than its functions. In contras, the recent visit to China of US President Bill Clinton (lune 1998) and the unprecedented live television broadcasts of discussions between him and Jiang Zemin, as well as with students at Beijing University, show how China has changed in recent years

(on a local level), as well as how the geopolitics of global exchange are creating a new

'spatial dialectic' that correlates local conditions within a global context. This increased dialogue is creating an increasingly pluralistic private sphere and reveals that the notion, or notions, of civil society are indeed emerging in China, with or without a charter.

Approaching China's new route from the 'bottom-up' allows for a more open public forum than ever before, based on the plural privatefcultural sphere. This is the space in

5 Matt Forney. "Voice of the People" in Fur Eastern Economic Review. May 7, 1998: 12. which 1 sought to map identity formation, architecture, and film as articulations of civil

society and persona1 expression of culture and change.

Reform, Culture. and Identitv

The Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989 were about democracy, as were

the Democracy Wall Movernent in the late 1970s and the May 4~ Movement in 19 19. It

is beneficial, then, to take an historiographical approach to the debates and confrontations

around democracy at the end of the 20~century in China. From Mao's death in 1976 to

1989, China underwent a period of rapid growth alongside state regiment. The way in

which capitalism has confionted communism in the post-Mao era has brought about the

constraints and contradictions that exist today between state and society. Out of past

movernents for dernocracy, intellectual groups in the early post-Mao era began to develop

a discourse for civil society in the 'new' China. Fang Lizhi, Yan Jiaqi, and Jin Guantao, who formed the leading intellectual group of the time, looked to the West for inspiration; but in the process of studying Western democratic theory from Plato to Rousseau and ont0 Habermas, their discourse became deeply cultural, specific to Chinese society and identity. By the 1980s, civil society discourse was intermeshed with cultural discourse and, according to Baogang He, it "atiempted to transcend the debates over the values of tradition and modemity in an effort to formulate a modernity realizable in China.

[Because] for them, modemity must be placed on the emergence of civil ~ociety."~Just as the global/iocal nexus should not be dichotomized, nor should modernity and civil society. Modernization is ultimately a giobal process whereas civil society must root itself in the local.

6 He. The Dernocrutic Implications of Civil Society in China. (London: MacMillan Press, 1997): 40. 1976, Year of the Dragon, marked the year that both Zhou Enlai (January 8) and

Mao Zedong (September 9) died. The reason I group their deaths together goes beyond the coincidence of the year to the advent of a new era in China, full of political change and contradiction. Following Zhou's death, an impromptu gathering of several hundred thousand people forrned at Tiananmen Square to rnoum; but this gathering was considered by the CCP a "subversive activity against Chairman Mao Zedong and the party central cornmittee" as announced over a loudspeaker by Wu De, the then-CCP first secret- The gathering was deemed a counter-revolutionary political incident, and because Deng Xiaoping had had a close relationship with Zhou, he was automatically considered part of it and called an enerny of the party. Two years Iater, Deng became

Mao's successor. It was the end of an era and the dawn of a new one, with a period of transition ahead.

On the first of Deng's many highly publicized southern tours, he proclaimed that the Party's basic line would rernain unchanged for a hundred years. Evidently reform and rnarketization do not necessarily mean democracy. But, should civil society invariably lead to democracy? To a ceriain degree, 1 would Say yes because of the tyrannical aspect of instigating change and then subjugating it to regulation. The CCP is in favour of modemization, but also seizes and retains power at al1 levels. When the styrofoam statue, Ihe Goddess of Democracy, arrived on Tiananmen Square, the reigning ideology of the state was openly cnticized, and therefore put into question. The syrnbolic mixture of the Chinese goddess of mercy (Gron Yin) and the Statue of Liberty made a clear statement by the student protesters that China's modemization and openness was having a great impact on contemporary Chinese culture, social outlook, and persona1 identity. The incongniency of change and control had become evident. The party may

have chosen to remain unchanged for a hundred years, but the people had not and, of

course, could not,

In 1990, at a conference of the State Education Commission, Jiang Zemin called

for the strengthening of nationalist sentiment among the Chinese by asking educators to

teach patriotism, national integrity, and Chinese history. He made this statement with the

idea of mobilizing the people so that they would support the state-led system in the name

of the common good. Indeed, this translated into a mass acceptance of economic

liberafization as the first step towards persona1 liberalization. Just last year, Jiang

announced that Chinese workers should change their ideas about employment-meaning

that restnictunng the bureaucracy and state-owned businesses will greatly alter the dynamics of the workforce and that the state no longer assumes kll responsibility for the people. This, too, he proclaimed would be for the 'common good'. And this year, four million civil servants will lose their jobs with Iittle or no social welfare system to fa11 back on. In 1995, the state owned about 50% of enterprises in China, and played a role in another 40%, leaving about 10% to private or individual firms, including joint-ventures and foreign-findeci firms7-today, the state-owned number has decreased and the pnvate enterpnse figure has increased. Aithough the number of state-owned enterpnse is decreasing, who is taking over these businesses, and how? Deng's notorious "to get rich is glonousy'sounds good in theory, but in a country of 1.2 billion people facing a new work order, it is not so obvious. How to 'get rich' is a question on many people's

' World Bank statistics, 1995. minds-changing frorn the traditional is ofien a dificult, and fiuitless, choice, despite the

rhetoric-

The 50 to 70 million people who have moved from the countryside to cities8 in

search of a new, modern, and prosperous life are referred to as 'floating populations' in

Chinese cities: they uein search of the new China, and sorne are more successful than

others. The opposite of the Marxist belief that private enterprise and ownership of land

were alienating is now part of the mainstream party-line: the common bond of the renmzn

today seems to be for national prospenty and public participation. This represents the

developrnent of civil society, or at least notions of, starting nom bottom and working its

way up. Over the next decade, the state plans to sel1 or merge tens of thousands of state

enterprises for financial and efficiency reasons, as well as to intensie China's

participation in the global economy. With the changing attitude of the state towards civil

society and social welfare, people are now going to need to become more self-nificient

and entrepreneurial. But, again, as Elizabeth Perry has said, a simple state-suciety

dichotomy proves of littfe help in explaining the labor activism Chinese workers. Instead

we find a society (like the state) consists of disparateand often contradictory-

elernent~.''~

The workplace innovations of the ostensiblefivedollar. eighr-hmr day set-up by

Henry Ford in the United States in the 1920s redefined American labour practices and the

labouredmanager relationship in the alienating environment of assembly lines and factory

In general. the people who moved fiom the country to the city during the m of refom and beyond are part of a new urban grouping that no longer Iives in the place where they are officially tegiste- nor can they change this officiai registration-thus they are left with no 'offitiaI' fixed address. 9 Elizabeth Perry. "Urban Associations: Introductionn in Davis et aL USCC: 300. mass production [means] mass consumption, a new labour system of the reproduction of labour power, a new politics of labour control and management, a new aesthetics and psychology, in short, a new kind of rationalized, modemist, and populist democratic society."'*

Since the first half of this century, however, the worHorce and production means, levels, and scope have cornpletely changed; thus the tems and logic offordism have had to be updated (beginning in the 1970s) to confiont the increasing flexibility in production labour and expansion of the seMce sector and the professional economy. Since the mid-

1970s in North Arnenca, and now in the post-Deng era, postfordism is defined by the rise of transnational corporations-corporations with no national base and that trade openly on the world market-that could, by definition, potentially alleviate some of the major problems of economic and cultural hegemony in the global cultural space. However,

TNCs are also highly hegemonic; therefore, their emergence reveals the need for an educated and innovative woridorce thai is entrepreneunal as well as aware of international forces and the changing dynamics of time and space. Moreover, the existence of this knowledge base is a sign of levels of civil society developing in China, starting with people and moving up towards the state. Understanding these forces is key to reconciling the global in the local, and the local in the global, because as Masao

Miyoshi points out, "TNCs might raise GNP or even per capita income, but such a raise does not guarantee a better living for al1 citizens."" This raises the fundamental question of identity formation and nationalist movements (and of this thesis) that in a time of globalization, which is prirnarily econornically driven, how do we preserve national

'O Harvey. nte Condition of Posmtodernw 126. l' Masao Miyoshi. "A borderles World? From colonialism to nanSnationalism and the decline of the nation-state" in Wilson and Dissanayake, GlobafZocal.:94. identity locally and assume an international identiîy globally? Globalization is transnational, but should not be either universal or universalizing.

Today in China, modernization and participation in global capitalism mean consumerism and irnproved lifestyle. Moreover, because they place much value on the accumulation of wedth and goods, and on seeking pleasure and entertainment, people do have pater choice in recreation (leisure time was seen as bourgeois under Mao), in fashion, and in individual cornfort. Nonetheless, they are still constrained by aate hegemony, as well as the social forces of a competitive private sector and difficulty in mobility-therefore, there are limits to pro-active participation in the modernization process. The state implernented China's modernization and openness, but continues the rhetoric of socialisrn. In fa& Deng called the adoption of capitalist elements into the

Chinese system an early stage of socialism. Socialism, then, has not failed in China, at least according to the state; rather, it is still evolving. The comrnon good is still the ultimate goal of the Chinese people, at least as a aate instrument, and the current postnationalist movernent may be a sign that the people agree-at least in response to the increase in social problems such as overcrowding, urban poverty, violence, dmgs, crime, and prostitution with modemization. Conversely, another argument suggests that, "the unrevolutionary outcorne of the Chinese uprising is sometimes attributed to the weakness of civil society in contemporary China."" Thus, Western notions of capitalisrn should perhaps not be fully embraced in contemporary China; elements of capitalism should, however, be adopted and adapted to suit the Chinese situation and intemi@ its position the global economy. But how realistic is this rhetoric beyond the first and even second

- -- - l2 EIizabeth Peny. in Davis et al. USCC: 297. eras of refonn? Can socialism and capitalism really coexist? 1s a 'people's democratic

dictatorship' possible, or even desirable? To answer these questions, the landscape of the

new global cultural space is an ideal visual source of information and communication of

culture.

Brinpine it al1 topether

Civil society, film, architecture, and identity are the main themes of each chapter in this thesis-combined with the mnning themes of the impact of globalization, modemization, and changing fandscape on contemporary culture in China. The new global cultural space is a fomm for communication between cultures, access to information fiom around the world, domestic and foreign cultural production, multinational corporatism and joint-venturism. It is ultirnately a highly competitive space, both domestically and intemationaliy. Thus, it means a profound redefinition of culture, time, and space. I hope to have brought fonvard the important issues at aake in modemizing China in my mapping of the major changes in cultural production, in urban development and identity (re)formation through architecture and film and in the particdarities of civil society and democratic thought in post-Mao, and now post-Deng,

China. In the end, 1do not wish to make any judgements on the current state of Chinese affairs and society, but 1 do wish to reiterate some of my discussion and leave any potential conclusions up to the reader.

'EconomyYand 'Modemization' are concepts that must enter any analysis of

Chinese culture, including analyses of identity, architecture, and film and the fate of

China as a competitive and active nation in an increasingly global world. With the increase in people's mobility and expansion of the private sphere brought about by modemization and market liberalization, there is also greater cornpetition and greater

obstacles to persona1 choice, movement, and achievement. But, is the presence of market

socïalism, as it is called by the state, paving the way for a more homogeneized or a more

pluraiiaic and popularized culture in China? As 1have argued the greatest impact of

Chinese modemization has been the redefinition of its culture and the reformation of

persona1 and national identity based on reconciling global forces in the local and local

forces in the global. The praxis where the two meet is ultimateiy where culture and

identity form. Because of the pluralistic nature of the globalAoca1 nexus, we can ask

whether or not we are moving into what Michael Walzer calls an age of gZobuI civil

~ociety.'~In his argument, Walzer questions the usefulness of the state given the

universality of transnationalism or nationalism. 1 would disagree with his 'totalizing'

theory but not refbte it completely. There are global elements in al1 notions of civil

society today, especially developing ones; just as there are iocal elements in the 'world

order'. Essentially, my position resembles that of post-stmcturalists in that civil society

and cultural definition are fûelled by intercultural communication. And this may indeed

spell the end of spatially-bound cultures, but not homogeneized ones. Instead, they are

defined by the postmodem notion of hgmented, or hybrid, identities and cultures.

Identity formation and cultural definition involve both the differentiation of one's own

culture fiom others and its contextualization among others-it is the result of placing the local in the global and the global in the local. China is in the process of baiancing the two domesticaliy and internationaliy.

l3 In Bmok and Frolic. Civil Society in China: 15. As 1 discussed in the first two chapters of this thesis, the 1990s saw a kind of

'enlightenment' in China. It is/was a phenornenon that Jing Wang, among others, calls of

'instrumental reason7. But because the conflicting messages of modernization discussed above are due to the inconsistencies between content and form, or theory and practice, the feasibility of 'instrumental reason' is weakened. People in general, and somewhat ironically intellectuals, have accepted economic growth and marketization as the rational route for a better China. Personal freedoms, they now contend, will follow later. In chapter three, 1showed how legal refom and modemization manifest themseives in everyday Iife in China through Qiu Ju's travel fiom the countryside to the city and her confrontation with the conventions of the state. Her movernent fiom the rural to the urban, her entrepreneurialism, and the development of her persona1 voice within the legal system al1 point to a changing China-ideologically and structurally. In discussing the impact of modemization on cultural definition and social structure on a very persona1 level, 1hope that 1 have shown the 'inner subjective meaning' of living in China today, as well as the 'sociocultural heritage' of the peopie-frorn a non-Chinese point-of-view.

The notion and the development of civil society are directly Iinked to these two humanistic philosophies of understanding one's own culture fiom within and then being able to contextualize it among others, as well as linking the past and the present within a contemporary context.

The debate over how to define culture that is supported by the state and intellectuals in China is generally linked to morality and tradition-they also commonly associate it with beauty and mobility. The post-Mao popularization of culture challenges these definitions by allowing people's opinions and expressions to corne through publicly and by the fact that people can now profit from cultural production. Culture, then, has

become a viable commodity. In the process, culture has also become iess elitist, more

entrepreneurial, and more popularized. Thus, contemporary Chinese popular culture

provides a window into Chinese society on al1 levels: social, political, and economic.

The impact of modemization and openness on contemporary Chinese culture reveals the

extent to which China has changed since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. China has become a pluralistic society even though it continues to be run by an authoritarian, one- party govemment. Civil society, or at least notions of civil society, exists in a way that is characterized by the particular interrelationship between state and society found in China today. In the way that it is, according to White et al., "made up of a complex and rapidly changing social constellation with many layers and many different types of relationship between them and the state,"14 so too are identity, architecture, and film.

The emergence of pluralism of ideas and tastes in the private anaor cultural sphere and the arriva1 of a middle class in China translate into structural change and a relaxation of the rules of public discourse. Fifth (and Sixth) Generation filmrnakers are tackling and articulating critical social issues through visual representation, in a way that would have been inconceivable twenty years ago. It seems that despite the state censorship board, cultural production is becoming less controlled by the state and more responsive to the marketplace. Evidence of this cm be found in the establishment of private production studios, the permission of private financing for big budget projects, and even the odd independent production. New Chinese cinerna is now viewed, acknowledgeci, and studied around the world as an influential world cinema, even though a number of films continue to be officially banned every year. Architecture, too,

l4 White et al. In Seorch of Civil Society 30. articulates critical social issues, as well as records social and political change. Although

aesthetic effect is important in architecture, its primary purpose is rather pragmatic-that

is, it is built to serve a specific purpose or function. Moreover, it is an expression of time

and space because changing landscapes record changing ideology, economic status,

social structure, and culturai definition.

Persona! and national identity project an image of contemporary Chinese culture

into the global. And, because the circulation of information and exchange of ideas are

unavoidable in what Zhao has called the 'new, open democratic and information-age era',

it is essential that China open up to the global space as bath an active participant and

important cornpetitor. If indeed a third era of reforms is dawning, then the great

problematic found in China throughout this century of its own historical and cultural

subjectivity will need to be examined and reconciled socially and politically. It is best that China understands its own interna1 dynamics to facilitate and assimilate its place in the new cornpetitive and pluralistic global cultural space. There are, of course, Iimits to personal space in China, but knowing what they are and how to maximize the sevwithout disrupting the whole is key to forming a persona1 notion of civil society. Balancing the pnvate and public spheres, or personal expression with China's current concem with its international image and place, through various visions, representations, and realities, greatly contributes to the 'spatial dialectic' of the global/local nexus. And above dl, it reveals the impact of modernization on contemporary Chinese culture, as well as the impact of Chinese culture on the notion of modernization. References

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