Across the Reef: the Marine Assault of Tarawa by Colonel Joseph H

Across the Reef: The Marine Assault of Tarawa by Colonel Joseph H . Alexander, USMC (Ret)

n August 1943, to meet momentous . The Tarawa operatio n The Yogaki Plan was the Japanese in secret with Majo r became a tactical watershed: the first , strategy to defend eastern Microne- General Julian C . large-scale test of American amphibi- sia from an Allied invasion . Japanese I Smith and his principal ous doctrine against a strongly for - commanders agreed to counterattac k staff officers of the 2 d tified beachhead . The Marine assault with bombers, submarines, and th e Marine Division, Vice Admiral Ray- on Betio was particularly bloody. Te n main battle fleet . Admiral Chester W. mond A. Spruance, commanding th e days after the assault, Time magazine Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacif- Central Pacific Force, flew to New published the first of many post- ic Fleet/Commander in Chief, Pacifi c Zealand from Pearl Harbor . Spru- battle analyses : Ocean Areas (CinCPac/CinCPOA) , ance told the Marines to prepare fo r took these capabilities seriously. Last week some 2,000 o r an amphibious assault agains t Nimitz directed Spruance to "get th e 3,000 United States Marines, Japanese positions in the Gilbert Is - hell in and get the hell out!" Spruanc e most of them now dead o r lands in November. in turn warned his subordinates t o wounded, gave the nation a The Marines knew about the Gil - seize the target islands in the Gilbert s name to stand beside those o f berts. The 2d Raider Battalion under "with lightning speed ." This sense o f Concord Bridge, the Bon Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson urgency had a major influence on the Homme Richard, the Alamo, had attacked Makin Atoll a yea r Tarawa campaign . Little Big Horn and Bellea u earlier . Subsequent intelligenc e The Joint Chiefs of Staff assigne d Wood. The name was "Tarawa ." reports warned that the Japanese ha d the code name Galvanic to the cam- fortified Betio Island in Tarawa Atoll, Setting the Stage paign to capture Tarawa, Makin, and where elite forces guarded a ne w Apamama in the Gilberts . The 2 d bomber strip. Spruance said Beti o The Gilbert Islands consist of 1 6 Marine Division was assigned Tara- would be the prime target for the 2 d scattered atolls lying along the equa- wa and Apamama (a company-sized Marine Division . tor in the Central Pacific. Tarawa operation) ; the Army's 165t h General Smith's operations officer , Atoll is 2,085 miles southwest o f Regimental Combat Team of the 27t h Lieutenant Colonel David M. Shoup, Pearl Harbor and 540 miles southeas t Infantry Division would tackle studied the primitive chart of Beti o of Kwajalein in the Marshalls . Beti o Makin . and saw that the tiny island was sur - is the principal island in the atoll . By coincidence, each of the thre e rounded by a barrier reef . Shou p The Japanese seized Tarawa an d landing force commanders in Oper - asked Spruance if any of the Navy' s Makin from the British within the ation Galvanic was a major general experimental, shallow-draft, plasti c first three days after Pearl Harbor. named Smith . The senior of these boats could be provided . "Not avail- Carlson's brief raid in August 194 2 was a Marine, Holland M . "Howlin g able;" replied the admiral, "expec t caused the Japanese to realize thei r Mad" Smith, commanding V Am- only the usual wooden landing craft ." vulnerability in the Gilberts . Short- phibious Corps . Julian C. Smith Shoup frowned . General Smith could ly after the raid, the 6th Yokosuka commanded the 2d Marine Division . sense that Shoup's gifted mind was Special Naval Landing Force arrived Army Major General Ralph C . Smith already formulating a plan . in the islands . With them came Rea r commanded the 27th Infantry Di - The results of that plan wer e Admiral Tomanari Saichiro, a super b vision. engineer, who directed the construc- Spruance assigned Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly "Terrible" Turner, LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection tion of sophisticated defensive posi- On the cover : "Quiet Lagoon" is a classic tions on Betio . Saichiro 's primary veteran of the Guadalcanal cam- end-of-battle photograph of the consid- goal was to make Betio so formida- paign, to command all amphibiou s erable wreckage along Red Beach Two . ble that an American assault woul d forces for the operation . Turner, ac- - companied by Holland Smith, decid- U .S. Navy Combat Art Collectio n be stalled at the water's edge, allow ed to command the northern group, At left: Artist Kerr Eby, who landed a t ing time for the other elements of th e Tarawa as a participant, entitled this Yogaki ("Waylaying Attack") Plan to Task Force 52, for the assault o n sketch "Bullets and Barbed Wire ." destroy the landing force . Makin . Turner assigned Rear Ad-

1 Marine Corps Personal Papers, Boardman Collectio n Japanese Special Naval Landing Force troops mount a British- do before the battle. This film was developed from a Japanese made, Vickers eight-inch naval cannon into its turret on Be- camera found in the ruins while the battle was still on . miral Harry W. "Handsome Harry" Drewes liked the idea, but warned did not dispute the Marines' need fo r Hill to command the southern group , Shoup that many of his vehicles wer e a reef-crossing capability, he object- Task Force 53, for the assault o n in poor condition after the Guadal - ed to the fact that the new vehicle s Tarawa . Julian Smith would accom - canal campaign. At best, Drewes would have to be carried to Taraw a pany Hill on board the old battleship could provide a maximum of 75 ve- in tank landing ships (LSTs) . The USS Maryland (BB 46) . The two hicles, not nearly enough to carry the slow speed of the LSTs (8.5 knots officers were opposites—Hill, out- entire assault and following waves . max) would require a separate con - spoken and impetuous; Julian Smith , Further, the thin hulls of the vehicles voy, additional escorts, and an in - reserved and reflective—but the y were vulnerable to every enemy creased risk of losing the element o f worked together well . Spruance se t weapon and would require som e strategic surprise . Holland Smit h D-Day for 20 November 1943 . form of jury-rigged armor plating fo r reduced the debate to bare essentials : Colonel Shoup came up with a n minimal protection . Shoup en- "No LVTs, no operation ." Turner ac- idea of how to tackle Betio's barrie r couraged Drewes to modify the ve- quiesced, but it was not a complete reefs . He had observed the Marines' hicles with whatever armor plate h e victory for the Marines . Half of the new Landing Vehicle Tracked (LV T could scrounge . 100 new LVT-2s would go to the Army forces landing at Maki n or 'Alligator"), an amphibian tractor, General Julian Smith was aware against much lighter opposition . The in operation during Guadalcanal . that a number of LVT-2s were stock - 50 Marine vehicles would not arrive The Alligators were unarmored logis - piled in San Diego, and he submit- in time for either work-up trainin g tic vehicles, not assault craft, bu t ted an urgent request for 100 of th e or the rehearsal landings . The firs t they were true amphibians, capabl e newer models to the corps com- time the infantry would lay eyes o n of being launched at sea and swim- mander. Holland Smith endorsed the the LVT-2s would be in the pre-daw n ming ashore through moderate surf. request favorably, but Admiral Turn- hours of D-Day at Tarawa — if then . Shoup discussed the potential us e er disagreed . The two strong-wille d of LVTs as assault craft with Majo r officers were doctrinally equal dur- Assault Preparation s Henry C . Drewes, commanding th e ing the planning phase, and the ar - As replacement troops began t o 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion . gument was intense . While Turner pour into New Zealand, General

2 Smith requested the assignment o f contained no natural elevation higher where there were pillboxes, nearl y Colonel Merritt A . "Red Mike" Ed- than 10 feet above sea level . "Every 500 of them, most fully covered b y son as division chief of staff. The place on the island can be covered by logs, steel plates and sand . fiery Edson, already a legend in th e direct rifle and machine gun fire," ob - The Japanese on Betio wer e Corps for his heroic exploits in Cen- served Edson . equipped with eight-inch, turret- tral America and Guadalcanal , The elaborate defenses prepared mounted naval rifles (the so-called worked tirelessly to forge the amal - by Admiral Saichiro were impressive . "Singapore Guns"), as well as a larg e gam of veterans and newcomers into Concrete and steel tetrahedrons , number of heavy-caliber coas t an effective amphibious team . minefields, and long strings o f defense, antiaircraft, antiboat, an d Intelligence reports from Beti o double-apron barbed wire protecte d field artillery guns and howitzers . were sobering. The island, devoid o f beach approaches . The Japanese als o Dual-purpose 13mm heavy machin e natural defilade positions and nar - built a barrier wall of logs and cora l guns were prevalent . Light tanks row enough to limit maneuver room, around much of the island . Tank (mounting 37mm guns), 50mm "knee favored the defenders . Betio was les s traps protected heavily fortified com - mortars ;" and an abundance of than three miles long, no broade r mand bunkers and firing position s 7.7mm light machine guns com- than 800 yards at its widest point and inland from the beach . And every- plemented the defensive weaponry.

The 2d Marine Division at Tarawa

ajor General Julian C . Smith's utmost concer n 3/2; and First Lieutenant William D . Hawkins, command- when he assumed command of the 2d Marine ing the Scout Sniper Platoon in the 2d Marines . Altogether, M Division on 1 May 1943 was the physical con- 18,088 Marines and sailors of the division participated i n dition of the troops . The division had redeployed to New the assault on Tarawa Atoll . About 55 percent were com - Zealand from Guadalcanal with nearly 13,000 confirme d bat veterans. Unlike Guadalcanal, the Marines at Taraw a cases of malaria . Half the division would have to be carried modern infantry weapons, including Garand M-1 replaced before the next campaign . The infantry regiments semi-automatic rifles, Browning automatic rifles, and port - of the 2d Marine Division were the 2d, 6th, and 8th Ma- able flame throwers . Assault Marines landed with a com- rines; the artillery regiment was the 10th Marines; and the bat load consisting of knapsack, poncho, entrenching tool , engineers, pioneers, and Naval Construction Battalio n bayonet, field rations, and gas masks (quickly discarded) . ("Seabees") were consolidated into the 18th Marines . These Many of those carrying heavy weapons, ammunition, o r were the principal commanders as the division began its radios drowned during the hectic debarkation from land - intensified training program leading to Operation Galvanic : ing craft under fire at the reef's edge .

CO, 2d Marines : Col William M. Marshal l Troops of the 2d Marine Division debark down cargo net s CO, 1/2: Maj Wood B. Kyl e from a troop transport during amphibious training. CO, 2/2 : LtCol Herbert R . Amey, Jr . Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 63751 CO, 3/2: Maj John E Schoettel CO, 6th Marines: Col Maurice G . Holmes CO, 1/6 : Maj William K . Jones CO, 2/6 : LtCol Raymond L . Murray CO, 3/6 : LtCol Kenneth F. McLeo d CO, 8th Marines : Col Elmer E. Hall CO, 1/8: Maj Lawrence C . Hays, Jr. CO, 2/8: Maj Henry P. "Jim" Crow e CO, 3/8 : Maj Robert H . Ruud CO, 10th Marines : BGen Thomas E . Bourke CO, 18th Marines : Col Cyril W. Martyr Other officers who would emerge in key roles at Tarawa included Brigadier General Leo D. Hermle, Assistant Di - vision Commander; Lieutenant Colonel Presley M . Rixey, commanding 1/10, a pack-howitzer battalion supporting the 2d Marines ; Lieutenant Colonel Alexander B. Swen- ceski, commanding the composite 2d Tank Battalion ; Major Henry C. Drewes, commanding 2d Amphibian Tractor Bat- talion; Major Michael R Ryan, commanding Company L,

3 LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio n An LVT-1 is lowered from a troop transport during landing camouflage utilities while the others are in the usual herring - rehearsals . Some of the Marines shown here are wearing bone twill . Note that the sea appears unusually calm . The Japanese during Augus t that the LVTs could negotiate the reef bombardment, advance seizure of replaced Saichero with Rear Admira l at any tide, but he worried about th e neighboring Bairiki Island as an ar- Meichi Shibasaki, an officer repute d remainder of the assault troops , tillery fire base, and a decoy landing . to be more of a fighter than an en- tanks, artillery, and reserve force s General Smith took this proposal t o gineer. American intelligence source s that would have to come ashore in the planning conference in Pearl Har - estimated the total strength of the Be - Higgins boats (LCVPs) . The critica l bor with the principal officers in - tio garrison to be 4,800 men, o f water depth over the reef was fou r volved in Operation Galvanic : whom some 2,600 were considered feet, enough to float a laden LCVP. Admirals Nimitz, Spruance, Turner, first-rate naval troops . "Imperia l Anything less and the troops would and Hill, and Major General Hollan d Japanese Marines;" Edson told the have to wade ashore several hundre d Smith . war correspondents, "the best Tojo' s yards against that panoply o f The Marines were stunned to hear got ." Edson's 1st Raider Battalion had Japanese weapons . the restrictions imposed on their as - sustained 88 casualties in wresting Major Frank Holland, a Ne w sault by CinCPac . Nimitz declare d Tulagi from the 3d Kure Special Zealand reserve officer with 15 years' that the requirement for strategic sur- Naval Landing Force the previou s experience sailing the waters of Tara - prise limited preliminary bombard - August . wa, flatly predicted, "there won't b e ment of Betio to about three hour s Admiral Shibasaki boasted to hi s three feet of water on the reef! " on the morning of D-Day. The im - troops, "a million Americans couldn' t Shoup took Holland's warnings seri - perative to concentrate naval force s take Tarawa in 100 years ." His opti - ously and made sure the troops knew to defend against a Japanese fleet sor- mism was forgivable . The island wa s in advance that "there was a 50-5 0 tie also ruled out advance seizure o f the most heavily defended atoll tha t chance of having to wade ashore ." Bairiki and any decoy landings . Then ever would be invaded by Allie d In the face of the dauntin g Holland Smith announced his own forces in the Pacific. Japanese defenses and the physical bombshell : the 6th Marines would be Task Force 53 sorely needed constraints of the island, Shoup pro - withheld as corps reserve . detailed tidal information for Tara - posed a landing plan which includ- All of Julian Smith's tactical op- wa . Colonel Shoup was confident ed a sustained preliminary tions had been stripped away. The 2d

4 Major General Julian C . Smith, USMC

he epic battle of Tarawa was the pinnacle of Julia n Smith's life and career. Smith was 58 and had been T a Marine Corps officer for 34 years at the time o f Operation Galvanic. He was born in Elkton, Maryland, and graduated from the University of Delaware . Overseas service included expeditionary tours in Panama, Mexico, Hai - ti, Santo Domingo, Cuba, and Nicaragua . He graduated from the Naval War College in 1917 and, as did many other frustrated Marine officers, spent the duration of World Wa r I in Quantico . As were shipmates Colonel Merritt A . Ed- son and Major Henry P. Crowe, Smith was a distinguishe d marksman and former rifle team coach . Command ex - perience in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) was limited . He commanded the 5th Marines in 1938, and he was com - manding officer of the FMF Training School at New Rive r until being ordered to the 2d Marine Division in May 1943 . Smith's contemporaries had a high respect for him. Although unassuming and self-effacing, "there was nothing wrong with his fighting heart." Lieutenant Colonel Ra y Murray, one of his battalion commanders, described him

as "a fine old gentleman of high moral fiber; you'd fight Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 7072 9 for him:" Smith's troops perceived that their commanding MajGen Julian C . Smith, USMC, right, commanding gener- general had a genuine love for them . al, 2d Marine Division, escorts MajGen Holland M. Smith , Julian Smith knew what to expect from the neap tide s USMC, commander, V Amphibious Corps, on Betio . at Betio. "I'm an old railbird shooter up on the marshes o f acts in Nicaragua a decade earlier. The balance of his career s the Chesapeake Bay;" he said, "You push over the marshe was unremarkable . He retired as a lieutenant general in at high tide, and when you have a neap tide, you can't get 1946, and he died in 1975, age 90 . To the end of his life over the marshes:' His landing boats were similarly restrict- he valued his experience at Betio . As he communicated to ed as they went in toward Tarawa . the officers and men of the division after the battle : "It wil l Smith was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal fo r always be a source of supreme satisfaction and pride to b e Tarawa to go with the Navy Cross he received for heroic able to say, 'I was with the 2d Marine Division at Tarawa : "

Marine Division was compelled t o ed their defenses on the southern and landing beaches, each 600 yards i n make a frontal assault into the teet h western coasts, roughly the bird's length. From right to left these were : of Betio's defenses with an abbreviat- head and back (where they them- Red Beach One, from Betio's north- ed preparatory bombardment . selves had landed) . By contrast, th e western tip (the bird's beak) to a Worse, loss of the 6th Marines mean t northern beaches (the bird's breast ) point just east of the re-entrant ; Red he would be attacking the island for- had calmer waters in the lagoon and , Beach Two, from that juncture to th e tress with only a 2-to-1 superiorit y with one deadly exception (the "re - pier; Red Beach Three, from the pier in troops, well below the doctrina l entrant"), were convex. Defenses i n eastward. Other beaches were desig - minimum . Shaken, he insisted tha t this sector were being improved daily nated as contingencies, notabl y Holland Smith absolve him of an y but were not yet complete . A Green Beach along the western shor e responsibility for the consequences . 1,000-yard pier which jutted du e (the bird's head) . This was done . north over the fringing reef into deep - Julian Smith had intended to lan d David Shoup returned to New er lagoon waters (in effect, the bird' s with two regiments abreast and one Zealand to prepare a modified oper- legs) was an attractive logistics tar- in reserve. Loss of the 6th Marine s ations order and select the landing get . It was an easy decision to selec t forced a major change . Shoup's beaches. Betio, located on the south- the northern coast for landin g modified plan assigned the 2d Ma- western tip of Tarawa near the en- beaches, but there was no real saf e rines, reinforced by Landing Tea m trance to the lagoon, took the shap e avenue of approach . (LT) 2/8 (2d Battalion, 8th Marines), of a small bird, lying on its back , Looking at the north shore of Be - as the assault force . The rest of the with its breast facing north, into th e tio from the line of departure within 8th Marines would constitute the di - lagoon . The Japanese had concentrat - the lagoon, Shoup designated three vision reserve . The attack would be

5 INTELLIGENCE MAP BITITU (BETIO) ISLAN D TARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLANDS

5C' A00 300 200 100 0 1000 0 s

TAKEN FROM 2D MAR OI V SPECIAL ACTION REPORT preceded by advance seizure of th e headed north for Operation Galvan- away from the troops landing a t pier by the regimental scout snipe r ic. For once, "Tokyo Rose" had n o Mele Bay. platoon (Lieutenant William D . clue of the impending campaign. One overlooked aspect of the re - Hawkins). Landing abreast at H - hearsal paid subsequent dividend s Most of Task Force 53 assembled Hour would be LT 3/2 (3d Battalion, for the Marines in the coming as- in Efate, New Hebrides, on 7 Novem - 2d Marines) (Major John F. Schoet- sault. Major William K . "Willie K ." ber. Admiral Hill arrived on board tel) on Red One; LT 2/2 (2d Battal - Jones, commanding LT 1/6, took th e Maryland. The Marines, now keen- ion, 2d Marines) (Lieutenant Colonel opportunity to practice embarking ly aware that an operation was un- Herbert R . Amey, Jr .) on Red Two; his troops in rubber rafts . In the pre- derway, were more interested in th e and LT 2/8 (Major Henry P. Jim war Fleet Marine Force, the first bat- arrival from Noumea of 14 new Crowe) on Red Three . Major Wood talion in each regiment had bee n Sherman M4-A2 tanks on board th e B. Kyles LT 1/2 (1st Battalion, 2 d designated "the rubber boat battal - dock landing ship Ashland (LSD 1) . Marines) would be on call as the ion." The uncommon sight of this The division had never operated wit h regimental reserve . mini-flotilla inspired numerous cat - medium tanks before . General Smith scheduled a large- calls from the other Marines . Jones scale amphibious exercise in Hawke s The landing rehearsals at Efate di d himself was dubbed "The Admiral of Bay for the first of November an d little to prepare the Marines for Be - the Condom Fleet ." made arrangements for New Zealand tio. The fleet carriers and their em- The contentious issue during the trucks to haul the men back to Wel - barked air wings were off assaultin g post-rehearsal critique was the suita- lington at the conclusion in time fo r targets in the Solomons . The Sher- bility of the naval gunfire plan . The a large dance . Complacently, the en - man tanks had no place to offload . target island was scheduled to receive tire 2d Marine Division embarke d The new LVT-2s were presumabl y the greatest concentration of nava l aboard 16 amphibious ships for th e somewhere to the north, underway gunfire of the war to date . Many routine exercise . It was all an artful directly for Tarawa . Naval gun ships senior naval officers were optimisti c ruse. The ships weighed anchor and bombarded Erradaka Island, well of the outcome . "We do not inten d

6 to neutralize [the island], we do no t little armor. I want you to know th e decision, General Smith promote d intend to destroy it," boasted one ad - Marines are crossing the beach wit h David Shoup to colonel and ordere d miral, "Gentlemen, we will obliterate bayonets, and the only armor they'l l him to relieve Colonel Marshall . it ." But General Smith had heard have is a khaki shirt! " Shoup knew the 2d Marines, and h e enough of these boasts . In a voice While at Efate, Colonel Willia m certainly knew the plan . The ar- taut with anger he stood to addres s Marshall, commanding Comba t chitect was about to become the ex - the meeting : "Even though you nava l Team Two and scheduled for th e ecutor . officers do come in to about 1,000 major assault role at Betio, becam e Once underway from Efate, Ad- yards, I remind you that you have a too ill to continue . In a memorable miral Hill ordered the various com- The Japanese Special Naval Landing Force s

arawa was the first large-scale encounter betwee n U .S. Marines and the Japanese Special Naval Land- T ing Forces . The division intelligence staff had fore- warned that "naval units of this type are usually more high - ly trained and have a greater tenacity and fighting spiri t than the average Japanese Army unit," but the Marines were surprised at the ferocity of the defenders on Betio . The Japanese "Imperial Marines" earned the grudgin g respect of their American counterparts for their esprit, dis - cipline, marksmanship, proficiency with heavy weapons , small-unit leadership, manifest bravery, and a stoic will - Photo courtesy of 2d Marine Division Association ingness to die to the last man . Major William K . Jones , The Japanese garrison on Betio conducts pre-battle training. whose 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, engaged more of the enemy in hand-to-hand combat on Betio than any other unit , detachment provided fierce resistance to the 1st Marine Di - said "these [defenders] were pretty tough, and they wer e vision landings on Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo early i n big, six-foot, the biggest Japs that I ever saw :' Majo r the Guadalcanal campaign . A typical SNLF unit in a defen - Lawrence C . Hays reported that "their equipment was ex - sive role was commanded by a navy captain and consiste d cellent and there was plenty of surplus found, includin g of three rifle companies augmented by antiaircraft, coas t large amounts of ammo ." defense, antiboat, and field artillery units of several bat - The Japanese used Special Naval Landing Forces fre- teries each, plus service and labor troops . quently in the early years of the war . In December 1941 , The Japanese garrison on Betio on D-Day consisted o f a force of 5,000 landed on Guam, and another unit of 45 0 the 3d Special Base Force (formerly the 6th Yokosuka Spe- assaulted Wake Island . A small detachment of 113 men wa s cial Naval Landing Force), the 7th Sasebo Special Naval the first Japanese reinforcing unit to land on Guadalcanal , Landing Force (which included 200 NCOs and officers o f 10 days after the American landing . A 350-man SNLF the Tateyama Naval Gunnery School), the 111th Pioneers, 4th Construction Unit, an estimated grand tota l Japanese on Betio conduct field firing exercises before the and the of 4,856 men . battle . The film from which this picture was developed All crew-served weapons on Betio, from 7.7mm light came from a Japanese camera captured during the assault . machine guns to eight-inch naval rifles, were integrated int o Photo courtesy of 2d Marine Division Association the fortified defensive system that included 500 pillboxes , blockhouses, and other emplacements . The basic beach defense weapon faced by the Marines during their land - ings on the northern coast was the M93 13mm, dual purpose (antiair, antiboat) heavy machine gun . In many seawall emplacements, these lethal weapons were sited to provide flanking fire along wire entanglements and othe r boat obstacles . Flanking fire discipline was insured by sealing off the front embrasures . Admiral Shibasaki organized his troops on Betio for "a n overall decisive defense at the beach :' His men fought with great valor. After 76 hours of bitter fighting, 4,690 lay dead . Most of the 146 prisoners taken were conscripted Korea n laborers . Only 17 wounded Japanese surrendered .

7 weighed anchor . Matching the exac t LVTs with their assigned assaul t teams in the darkness becam e haphazard . Choppy seas made cross - deck transfers between the small craf t dangerous . Few tactical plans survive the opening rounds of execution, partic - ularly in amphibious operations . "The Plan" for D-Day at Betio established H-Hour for the assault wave s at 0830 . Strike aircraft from the fast carriers would initiate the action wit h a half-hour bombing raid at 0545 . Then the fire support ships woul d bombard the island from close range for the ensuing 130 minutes . The planes would return for a final strafing run at H-minus-five, then shift to inland targets as the Marines storme d ashore . None of this went accordin g Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 87675 to plan. Col David M. Shoup pictured in the field . The clenched cigar became a trademark . The Japanese initiated the battle . manders of Task Force 53 to brief th e one, it appeared that strategic sur- Alerted by the pre-dawn activities troops on their destination and mis - prise had indeed been attained . More offshore, the garrison opened fire on sion . Tarawa came as a surprise to good news came with the report tha t the task force with their big nava l most of the men . Many had wagere d the small convoy of LSTs bearing guns at 0507. The main batteries of they were heading for Wake Island . LVT-2s had arrived safely fro m the battleships Colorado (BB 45) and On the day before D-Day, Genera l Samoa and was joining the forma - Maryland commenced counterbat- Julian Smith sent a message "to th e tion. All the pieces seemed to be com- tery fire almost immediately. Sever- officers and men of the 2d Division ." ing together. al 16-inch shells found their mark ; a In it, the commanding general sough t ay at etio, huge fireball signalled destruction of to reassure his men that, unlike the i an ammunition bunker for one of th e Guadalcanal campaign, the Nav y 20 November 1943 Japanese gun positions . Other fir e would stay and provide support The crowded transports of Tas k support ships joined in . At 0542 Hill throughout. The troops listened at- Force 53 arrived off Tarawa Atol l ordered "cease fire ;" expecting the air tentively to these words coming ove r shortly after midnight on D-Day. De- attack to commence momentarily. the loudspeakers : barkation began at 0320 . The captai n There was a long silence . A great offensive to destro y of the Zeilin (APA 3) played the Ma- The carrier air group had change d the enemy in the Central Pacif - rines Hymn over the public address its plans, postponing the strike by 30 ic has begun . Our Navy screens system, and the sailors cheered as the minutes . Inexplicably, that unilater- our operation and will suppor t 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, crawled al modification was never transmit- our attack tomorrow with the over the side and down the cargo ted to Admiral Hill, the amphibiou s greatest concentration of aeria l nets . task force commander . Hill' s bombardment and naval gun- At this point, things started to g o problems were further compounde d fire in the history of warfare . It wrong . Admiral Hill discovered tha t by the sudden loss of communica- will remain with us until ou r the transports were in the wrong an- tions on his flagship Maryland with objective is secured . . . . Gar- chorage, masking some of the fir e the first crashing salvo of the ship's rison troops are already enroute support ships, and directed them t o main battery. The Japanese coasta l to relieve us as soon as we have shift immediately to the correct site . defense guns were damaged but stil l completed our job . . . . Good The landing craft bobbed along i n dangerous . The American mix-u p luck and God bless you all . the wake of the ships; some Marines provided the defenders a grace peri - As the sun began to set on Tas k had been halfway down the carg o od of 25 minutes to recover and ad - Force 53 on the evening of D-minus - nets when the ships abruptly just. Frustrated at every turn, Hil l

8 RIFLE PITS NMG UP TO'EO n

BARRICADE CONSTRUCTE D OF LOGS . SANDBAGS AN D POSITIONS BUILT OF SANG BAGS PROBABLY CEMENT ON TOP OF SEAWALL, 3-'I FT. HIG H

z (SAND BAGS --► CORAL B CN9'•'(SAAWAL L -sk TO 3 NIGH BREAC SO IN SEVERA PLACES DEFINITE COVERED POSITIONS

14Cm,RIFLES CAMOUFLAGED -Beach Beach Redl 4*1 Io5m,N A

N ES LA I / .

A .B . GUNS, HMG's / UP TO 40 mm EFINITE COVERED POSITIONS R55L9~ N

„ OFEP MOLES I

v..[RED'AB

ANTI BOAT GUN S HMGS UP T . *Om.R

D-2 SITUATI' N M FOR ANNEX "D" (INT LLIGE TO OPN. 0 NO. I.4 . 2.2 '0 .Znd Marine Div/sion

Marine Corps Personal Paper s A detailed view of Division D-2 situation map of western Be- and Red Beach One, especially those within the "re-entrant " do was prepared one month before the landing . Note the cove along the north shore . Intelligence projections prove d predicited position of Japanese defenses along Green Beach almost 90 percent accurate and heavy casualties resulted . ordered his ships to resume firing a t rives . Staff Sergeant Norman Hatch, of water 50 yards astern of the ship. 0605 . Suddenly, at 0610, the aircraf t a combat photographer, thought t o The Japanese had resumed fire an d appeared, bombing and strafing th e himself, "we just really didn't see ho w their targets were the vulnerabl e island for the next few minutes . we could do [anything] but go i n transports . The troop ships hastil y Amid all this, the sun rose, red an d there and bury the people . . . this got underway for the second tim e ominous through the thick smoke . wasn't going to be a fight ." Time cor- that morning. The battleships, cruisers, and des - respondent Robert Sherrod thought, For Admiral Hill and Genera l troyers of Task Force 53 began a satu- "surely, no mortal men could liv e Julian Smith on board Maryland, the ration bombardment of Betio for the through such destroying power . . . best source of information through - next several hours . The awesom e any Japs on the island would all b e out the long day would prove to b e shock and sounds of the shelling dead by now." Sherrod's thoughts the Vought-Sikorsky Type OS2U were experienced avidly by the Ma- were rudely interrupted by a geyser Kingfisher observation aircraf t

9 LVT-2 and LVT(A)2 Amphibian Tractors

he LVT-2, popularly known as the Water Buffalo , was built to improve upon shortcomings in th e T design of the Marine Corps' initial amphibian vehicle, the LVT-1. The new vehicle featured a redesigned sus- pension system with rubber-tired road wheels and torsio n springs for improved stability and a smoother ride . The power train was standardized with that of the M3A1 Stu - art light tank . This gave the LVT-2 greater power and relia - bility than its predecessor and, combined with ne w "W" shaped treads, gave it greater propulsion on land and

in the water. The new vehicle also could carry 1,500 pound s Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 6364 6 more cargo than the original LVT-1 . LVT-2 comes ashore on Green Beach on approximately D+ 2 The LVT-2 entered production in June 1942, but did no t vehicle in the lead waves of a landing . The armored am- see combat until Tarawa in November 1943 . The Marines phibian vehicle provided excellent service when it was in - used a combination of LVT-ls and LVT-2s in the assault o n troduced to Marine operations on New Britain . Betio . The 50 LVT-2s used at Tarawa were modified i n Samoa just before the battle with 3/8-inch boiler plates in - More than 3,000 LVT-2s and LVT(A)2s were manufac- stalled around the cab for greater protection from smal l tured during World War II . These combat vehicles proved arms fire and shell fragments . Despite the loss of 30 of thes e to be valuable assets to Marine Corps assault team s vehicles to enemy fire at Tarawa, the improvised armor wa s throughout the Pacific campaign, transporting thousand s considered promising and led to a call for truly armore d of troops and tons of equipment . The overall design , LVTs. however, left some operational deficiencies . For one thing, The LVT(A)2 ['A' for armored] requested by the U .S. the vehicles lacked a ramp. All troops and equipment had Army was a version which saw limited use with the Ma - to be loaded and unloaded over the gunwales . This caused rine Corps . The LVT(A)2 had factory-installed armor plat- problems in normal field use and was particularl y ing on the hull and cab to resist heavy machine gun fire . hazardous during an opposed landing . This factor would The new version appeared identical to the LVT-2 with th e lead to the further development of amphibian tractors i n exception of armored drivers' hatches. With legitimate ar- the LVT family during the war. mor protection, the LVT(A)2 could function as an assault Compiled by Second Lieutenant Wesley L . Feight, LISM C launched by the battleships . At 0648, provised armor plating, and thei r ward to provide the LVTs with a bea - Hill inquired of the pilot of one floa t overaged power plants . There was a con through the thick dust and plane, "Is reef covered with water? " psychological factor at work as well . smoke. Finally, at 0824, the first wave The answer was a cryptic "negative " "Red Mike" Edson had criticized th e of LVTs crossed the line, still 6,00 0 At that same time, the LVTs of Wav e LVT crews for landing five minutes yards away from the target beaches . One, with 700 infantrymen em - early during the rehearsal at Efate , A minute later the second grou p barked, left the assembly area an d saying, "early arrival inexcusable, late of carrier aircraft roared over Betio, headed for the line of departure . arrival preferable ." Admiral Hill and right on time for the original H - The crews and embarked troops i n General Smith soon realized that th e Hour, but totally unaware of the new the LVTs had already had a lon g three struggling columns of LVTs times . This was another blunder . Ad- morning, complete with hair-raisin g would never make the beach by miral Kelly Turner had specificall y cross-deck transfers in the choppy 0830 . H-Hour was postponed twice, provided all players in Operatio n sea and the unwelcome thrill of eight- to 0845, then to 0900. Here again, not Galvanic with this admonition: inch shells landing in their proximi - all hands received this word . "Times of strafing beaches with refer - ty. Now they were commencing an The destroyers Ringgold (DD 500) ence to H-Hour are approximate ; the extremely long run to the beach, a and Dashiell (DD 659) entered the la- distance of the boats from the beac h distance of nearly 10 miles . The craft goon in the wake of two minesweep - is the governing factor ." Admiral Hil l started on time but quickly fell be - ers to provide close-in fire support . had to call them off. The planes re- hind schedule . The LVT-1s of the firs t Once in the lagoon, the minesweep- mained on station, but with deplet- wave failed to maintain the planned er Pursuit (AM 108) became th e ed fuel and ammunition level s 4 .5-knot speed of advance due to a Primary Control Ship, taking posi- available . strong westerly current, decrease d tion directly on the line of departure . The LVTs struggled shoreward i n buoyancy from the weight of the im - Pursuit turned her searchlight sea- three long waves, each separated b y

10 machine gun emplacements along the pier with explosives and flam e throwers . Meanwhile, the LVTs o f Wave One struck the reef and crawled effortlessly over it, commencing their final run to the beach . These parts of Shoup's landing plan worked to perfection . But the preliminary bombardment, as awesome and unprecedent- ed as it had been, had failed significantly to soften the defenses . Very little ships' fire had been directed against the landing beaches them - selves, where Admiral Shibasak i vowed to defeat the assault units a t the water's edge . The well-protected defenders simply shook off the sand and manned their guns. Worse, the near-total curtailment of naval gun - fire for the final 25 minutes of the as - sault run was a fateful lapse . In LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection effect, the Americans gave their op - Troops of the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, 2d Marine Division, load magazines an d ponents time to shift forces from th e clean their weapons enroute to Betio on board the attack transport Zeilin (APA 3) . southern and western beaches t o a 300-yard interval : the 42 LVT-1s o f ed strenuously, but Hill considered reinforce northern positions . Th e Wave One, followed by 24 LVT-2s of the huge pillars of smoke unsafe fo r defenders were groggy from the Wave Two, and 21 LVT-2s of Wav e overhead fire support of the assaul t pounding and stunned at the sight o f Three . Behind the tracked vehicle s waves . The great noise abruptly LVTs crossing the barrier reef, bu t came Waves Four and Five of LCVPs . ceased . The LVTs making their final Shibasaki 's killing zone was stil l Each of the assault battalion com- approach soon began to receive long- largely intact. The assault waves were manders were in Wave Four . Further range machine gun fire and artiller y greeted by a steadily increasing astern, the Ashland ballasted dow n air-bursts . The latter could have bee n volume of combined arms fire . and launched 14 LCMs, each carry- fatal to the troops crowded int o For Wave One, the final 200 yard s ing a Sherman medium tank . Four open-topped LVTs, but the Japanes e to the beach were the roughest, es- other LCMs appeared carrying ligh t had overloaded the projectiles with pecially for those LVTs approachin g tanks (37mm guns) . high explosives . Instead of steel shel l Red Beaches One and Two . The ve- Shortly before 0800, Colone l fragments, the Marines were "douse d hicles were hammered by well-aime d Shoup and elements of his tactical with hot sand." It was the last tacti - fire from heavy and light machin e command post debarked into LCVPs cal mistake the Japanese would make guns and 40mm antiboat guns. The from Biddle (APA 8) and headed for that day. Marines fired back, expending 10,000 the line of departure . Close by Shoup The previously aborted air strik e rounds from the .50-caliber machine stood an enterprising sergeant, ener - returned at 0855 for five minutes of guns mounted forward on each getically shielding his bulky radi o noisy but ineffective strafing along LVT-1 . But the exposed gunners wer e from the salt spray. Of the myriad of the beaches, the pilots again heeding easy targets, and dozens were cu t communications blackouts an d their wristwatches instead of th e down . Major Drewes, the LVT bat- failures on D-Day, Shoup's radi o progress of the lead LVTs. talion commander who had worked would remain functional longer an d Two other events occurred at thi s so hard with Shoup to make this as- serve him better than the radios o f time. A pair of naval landing boat s sault possible, took over one machin e any other commander, American o r darted towards the end of the long gun from a fallen crewman and wa s Japanese, on the island . pier at the reef's edge . Out charged immediately killed by a bulle t Admiral Hill ordered a ceasefire a t First Lieutenant Hawkins with hi s through the brain. Captain Fenlon A . 0854, even though the waves wer e scout-sniper platoon and a squad of Durand, one of Drewes' company . still 4,000 yards off shore . Genera l combat engineers . These shock commanders, saw a Japanese office r Smith and "Red Mike" Edson object- troops made quick work of Japanese standing defiantly on the sea wall

11 waving a pistol, "just daring us t o Class Gilbert Ferguson, who recalled been a baseball prospect with the St . come ashore :' what happened next on board th e Louis Cardinals organization before LVT: "The sergeant stood up an d the war . Spillane caught tw o On they came . Initial touchdown yelled 'everybody out : At that ver y Japanese grenades barehanded i n times were staggered : 0910 on Re d instant, machine gun bullets ap - mid-air, tossing them back over the Beach One; 0917 on Red Beach peared to rip his head off . . ." Fer- wall . A third grenade exploded in hi s Three ; 0922 on Red Beach Two . The guson, Moore, and others escape d hand, grievously wounding him . first LVT ashore was vehicle number from the vehicle and dispatched tw o 4-9, nicknamed "My Deloris," drive n The second and third waves of machine gun positions only yard s by PFC Edward J . Moore . "My LVT 2s, protected only by 3/8-inc h away. All became casualties in short Deloris" was the right guide vehicl e boiler plate hurriedly installed i n order. in Wave One on Red Beach One, hit- Samoa, suffered even more intens e ting the beach squarely on "the bird's Very few of the LVTs could negoti- fire . Several were destroyed spectacu- beak." Moore tried his best to drive ate the seawall . Stalled on the beach , larly by large-caliber antiboat guns . his LVT over the five-foot seawall , the vehicles were vulnerable to Private First Class Newman M. but the vehicle stalled in a near- preregistered mortar and howitze r Baird, a machine gunner aboard on e vertical position while nearb y fire, as well as hand grenades tosse d embattled vehicle, recounted his or- machine guns riddled the cab . Moore into the open troop compartments b y deal : "We were 100 yards in now an d reached for his rifle only to find i t Japanese troops on the other side o f the enemy fire was awful damn in - shot in half . One of the embarke d the barrier. The crew chief of one ve - tense and getting worse . They wer e troops was 19-year-old Private First hicle, Corporal John Spillane, had knocking [LVTs] out left and right .

Marines and sailors traveling on board a troop transport receive their initial briefing on the landing plan for Betio . Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 101807

12 for emergency evacuation of wounded Marines . Communications, neve r good, deteriorated as more and more radio sets suffered water damage o r enemy fire . The surviving LVTs continued to serve, but after about 100 0 on D-Day, most troops had no othe r option but to wade ashore from the reef, covering distances from 500 t o 1,000 yards under well-aimed fire . Marines of Major Schoettel's LT 3/2 were particularly hard hit on Red Beach One. Company K suffered heavy casualties from the re-entran t strongpoint on the left . Company I made progress over the seawall alon g the "bird's beak;" but paid a high price, including the loss of the company commander, Captain Willia m E. Tatom, killed before he could even debark from his LVT. Both units los t half their men in the first two hours . Major Michael P. "Mike" Ryan's Company L, forced to wade ashor e when their boats grounded on th e reef, sustained 35 percent casualties . Ryan recalled the murderous enfilad - ing fire and the confusion . Sudden - ly, "one lone trooper was spotte d through the fire and smoke scram - bling over a parapet on the beach to the right ;" marking a new landin g point . As Ryan finally reached the beach, he looked back over his shoul- U .S. Navy Combat Art Collectio n der. 'All [I] could see was heads wit h "Down the Net," a sketch by Kerr Eby . rifles held over them," as his wadin g A tractor'd get hit, stop, and burst reaching deep water while seeking t o men tried to make as small a targe t into flames, with men jumping ou t shuttle more troops ashore) . Withi n as possible . Ryan began assemblin g like torches :' Baird's own vehicle wa s a span of 10 minutes, the LVTs land - the stragglers of various waves in a then hit by a shell, killing the crew ed more than 1,500 Marines on Be- relatively sheltered area along Green and many of the troops. "I grabbe d tio's north shore, a great start to the Beach . my carbine and an ammunition bo x operation . The critical problem la y Major Schoettel remained in his and stepped over a couple of fella s in sustaining the momentum of the boat with the remnants of his fourt h lying there and put my hand on th e assault . Major Holland's dire predic- g side so 's to roll over into the water . tions about the neap tide had prove n wave, convinced that his landin team had been shattered beyon d I didn't want to put my head up . The accurate . No landing craft would relief . No one had contact with Ryan . bullets were pouring at us like a shee t cross the reef throughout D-Day . The fragmented reports Schoettel of rain ." Shoup hoped enough LVTs woul d received from the survivors of th e On balance, the LVTs performed survive to permit wholesale transfer - e their assault mission fully withi n line operations with the boats along two other assault companies wer disheartening . Seventeen of his 3 7 Julian Smith's expectations . Onl y the edge of the reef . It rarely worked . eight of the 87 vehicles in the firs t The LVTs suffered increasing casual - officers were casualties. three waves were lost in the assaul t ties. Many vehicles, afloat for five In the center, Landing Team 2/ 2 (although 15 more were so riddle d hours already, simply ran of gas . was also hard hit coming ashore ove r with holes that they sank upon Others had to be used immediately Red Beach Two . The Japanese strong-

'The Singapore Guns'

fr— he firing on Betio had barely subsided befor e throughout D+1 . Colonel Shoup stated emphatically tha t apocryphal claims began to appear in print tha t the 2d Marine Division was fully aware of the presence o f

L, the four eight-inch naval rifles used as coasta l eight-inch guns on Betio as early as mid-August 1943 . By defense guns by the Japanese were the same ones capture d contrast, the division intelligence annex to Shoup's opera - from the British at the fall of Singapore . Many prominent tion order, updated nine days before the landing, discount s historians unwittingly perpetuated this story, among the m external reports that the main guns were likely to be as larg e the highly respected Samuel Eliot Morison. as eight-inch, insisting instead that "they are probably no t In 1977, however, British writer William H. Bartsch pub- more than 6-inch ." Prior knowledge notwithstanding, th e lished the results of a recent visit to Tarawa in the quarter - fact remains that many American officers were unpleasantl y ly magazine After the Battle . Bartsch personally examined surprised to experience major caliber near-misses bracket- each of the four guns and discovered markings indicatin g ing the amphibious task force early on D-Day. manufacture by Vickers, the British ordnance company . The Destruction of one of the four Japanese eight-inch Vickers Vickers company subsequently provided Bartsch record s guns on Betio was caused by naval gunfire and air strikes. indicating the four guns were part of a consignment of 12 eight-inch, quick-firing guns which were sold in 1905 to Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 63618 the Japanese during their war with Russia. Further investi - gation by Bartsch at the Imperial War Museum produce d the fact that there were no eight-inch guns captured by th e Japanese at Singapore . In short, the guns at Tarawa cam e from a far more legitimate, and older, transaction with th e British . The eight-inch guns fired the opening rounds in the bat - tle of Tarawa, but were not by themselves a factor in th e contest . Earlier bombing raids may have damaged their fire control systems. Rapid counterbattery fire from America n battleships took out the big guns in short order, althoug h one of them maintained an intermittent, if inaccurate, fire

point in the re-entrant between th e horted his men to follow him into the Beach Three to the left of the pier . two beaches played havoc among water. Closer to the beach, Amey Many historians have attributed this troops trying to scramble over th e turned to encourage his staff, "Com e good fortune to the continued direc t sides of their beached or stalled LVTs . on! Those bastards can't beat us!" A fire support 2/8 received throughou t Five of Company E's six officers wer e burst of machine gun fire hit him i n its run to the beach from the destroy- killed . Company F suffered 50 per - the throat, killing him instantly. His ers Ringgold and Dashiel in the la- cent casualties getting ashore an d executive office, Major Howard Rice , goon . The two ships indeed provided swarming over the seawall to seize a was in another LVT which was outstanding fire support to the land - precarious foothold . Company G forced to land far to the west, behind ing force, but their logbooks indicate could barely cling to a crowde d Major Ryan . The senior office r both ships honored Admiral Hill's stretch of beach along the seawall i n present with 2/2 was Lieutenant 0855 ceasefire; thereafter, neither shi p the middle . Two infantry platoon s Colonel Walter Jordan, one of severa l fired in support of LT 2/8 until a t and two machine gun platoons were observers from the 4th Marine Divi - least 0925 . Doubtlessly, the prelimi- driven away from the objective beac h sion and one of only a handful o f nary fire from such short rang e and forced to land on Red Beac h survivors from Amey's LVT. Jordan served to keep the Japanese defender s One, most joining "Ryan's Orphans ." did what any Marine would do un - on the eastern end of the island but - When Lieutenant Colonel Amey' s der the circumstances : he assumed toned up long after the ceasefire . As boat rammed to a sudden hal t command and tried to rebuild th e a result, Crowe's team suffered onl y against the reef, he hailed two pass - disjointed pieces of the landing tea m 25 casualties in the first three LV T ing LVTs for a transfer. Amey's LVT into a cohesive fighting force. The waves . Company E made a signifi- then became hung up on a barbe d task was enormous . cant penetration, crossing the barri- wire obstacle several hundred yard s The only assault unit to get ashor e cade and the near taxiway, but fiv e off Red Beach Two . The battalio n without significant casualties wa s of its six officers were shot down i n commander drew his pistol and ex - Major "Jim" Crowe's LT 2/8 on Red the first 10 minutes ashore . Crowe' s

14 LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio n Heywood (APA 6) lowers an LVT-1 by swinging boom in Marines, on D-Day at Betio . The LVT-1 then joined up with process of debarking assault troops of the 2d Battalion, 8th other amphibian tractors to form up an assault wave .

LT 2/8 was up against some of the qualities sorely needed on Betio tha t Hatch remembers being inspired b y most sophisticated defensive posi- long day. Crowe ordered the cox- Crowe, clenching a cigar in his teeth tions on the island; three fortifica - swain of his LCVP "put this god- and standing upright, growling at hi s tions to their left (eastern) flan k damned boat in!" The boat hit th e men, "Look, the sons of bitches can' t would effectively keep these Marine s reef at high speed, sending the Ma- hit me . Why do you think they ca n boxed in for the next 48 hours. rines sprawling . Quickly recovering, hit you? Get moving . Go!" Red Beac h Major "Jim" Crowe—former enlist - Crowe ordered his men over th e Three was in capable hands . ed man, Marine Gunner, distin- sides, then led them through several The situation on Betio by 0945 o n guished rifleman, star footbal l hundred yards of shallow water , D-Day was thus : Crowe, well - player—was a tower of strength reaching the shore intact only fou r established on the left with modes t throughout the battle . His trademark minutes behind his last wave of LVTs . penetration to the airfield; a distinct red mustache bristling, a comba t Accompanying Crowe during this gap between LT 2/8 and the sur- shotgun cradled in his arm, he exud - hazardous effort was Staff Sergeant vivors of LT 2/2 in small clusters ed confidence and professionalism, Hatch, the combat photographer . along Red Beach Two under the ten - LVT-ls follow wave guides from transport area towards Betio at first light on D-Day . tative command of Jordan; a danger- Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 63909 ous gap due to the Japanese fortifications at the re-entrant be - tween beaches Two and One, with a few members of 3/2 on the left flank and the growing collection of odd s and ends under Ryan past the "bird' s beak" on Green Beach ; Major Schoettel still afloat, hovering be - yond the reef; Colonel Shoup like- wise in an LCVP, but beginning hi s move towards the beach ; residua l

15 viving crewman got the stranded ve - hicle started again, but only in reverse . The stricken vehicle then backed wildly though the entire im - pact zone before breaking dow n again . Lillibridge and his men did no t get ashore until sunset . The transport Zeilin, which ha d launched its Marines with such fan - fare only a few hours earlier, receive d its first clear signal that things wer e going wrong on the beach when a derelict LVT chugged close aster n with no one at the controls . The ship dispatched a boat to retrieve the ve - hicle. The sailors discovered thre e Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 65978 dead men aboard the LVT: two Ma- LVT-ls in the first assault wave enter the lagoon and approach the line of departure . rines and a Navy doctor. The bod - LVT-2s of the second and third waves proceed on parallel courses in background . ies were brought on board, then members of the boated waves of th e which increasingly had the range buried with full honors at sea, th e assault teams still wading ashore un - down pat . At least five vehicles were first of hundreds who would be con - der increasing enemy fire ; the tanks driven away by the intense fire an d signed to the deep as a result of the being forced to unload from thei r landed west at Ryan's position, ad - maelstrom on Betio . LCMs at the reef's edge, trying to or- ding another 113 troops to Green Communications on board Mary- ganize recon teams to lead them Beach . What was left of Companie s land were gradually restored to ashore . A and B stormed ashore and working order in the hours follow- penetrated several hundred feet, ex - ing the battleship's early mornin g Communications were ragged. The panding the "perimeter." Other troops duel with Betio's coast defense bat- balky TBX radios of Shoup, Crowe , sought refuge along the pier or trie d teries . On board the flagship, General and Schoettel were still operational . to commandeer a passing LVT. Kyle Julian Smith tried to make sense ou t Otherwise, there was either dead si - got ashore in this fashion, but many of the intermittent and frequentl y lence or complete havoc on the com- of his troops did not complete th e conflicting messages coming in ove r mand nets . No one on the flagshi p landing until the following morning . the command net . At 1018 he or- knew of Ryan's relative success on the The experience of Lieutenant George dered Colonel Hall to "chop" Majo r western end, or of Amey's death an d D. Lillibridge of Company A, 1st Bat- Robert H . Ruud's LT 3/8 to Shoup's Jordan's assumption of command . talion, 2d Marines, was typical . His CT Two. Smith further directed Hall Several echelons heard this ominou s LVT driver and gunners were sho t to begin boating his regimental com - early report from an unknow n down by machine gun fire . The sur- mand group and LT 1/8 (Major source: "Have landed. Unusually heavy opposition . Casualties 70 per- Three hundred yards to go! LVT-1 45 churns toward Red Beach Three just east o f cent . Can't hold ." Shoup ordere d the long pier on D-Day . Heavy fighting is taking place on the other side of the beach . Kyle's LT 1/2, the regimental reserve, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 6405 0 to land on Red Beach Two and work west.

This would take time . Kyle's men were awaiting orders at the line o f departure, but all were embarked in boats. Shoup and others managed t o assemble enough LVTs to transpor t Kyle's companies A and B, but the third infantry company and th e weapons company would have to wade ashore . The ensuing assaul t was chaotic. Many of the LVTs were destroyed enroute by antiboat guns

16 LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection LVT-149 ("My Deloris'), the first vehicle to reach Betio's shore, what eastward from the original landing point on "the bird's lies in her final resting place amid death and destruction, in- beak," but she was too riddled with shell holes to operate . Af- cluding a disabled LVT-2 from a follow-on assault wave . Thi s ter the battle, "My Deloris " was sent to the United States a s photo was taken after D-Day . Maintenance crews attempted an exhibit for War Bond drives . The historic vehicle is no w to salvage "My Deloris " during the battle, moving her some- at the Tracked Vehicle Museum at Camp DelMar, California .

Lawrence C . Hays, Jr .), the divisio n When Shoup's LCVP was stoppe d debut of the Marine medium tanks , reserve. At 1036, Smith reported t o by the reef, he transferred to a pass- however, was inauspicious on D - V Amphibious Corps: "Successful ing LVT. His party included Lieu- Day. The tankers were valorous, bu t landing on Beaches Red Two and tenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson , the 2d Marine Division had no con- Three . Toe hold on Red One . Am already a media legend for his earli - cept of how to employ tanks agains t committing one LT from Divisio n er exploits at Makin and Guadal - fortified positions . When four Sher- reserve. Still encountering stron g canal, now serving as an observer, mans reached Red Beach Three lat e resistance throughout :' and Lieutenant Colonel Presley M. in the morning of D-Day, Major Colonel Shoup at this time was i n Rixey, commanding 1st Battalion , Crowe simply waved them forwar d the middle of a long odyssey tryin g 10th Marines, Shoup's artiller y with orders to "knock out all enem y to get ashore . He paused briefly fo r detachment . The LVT made three at- positions encountered :' The tank this memorable exchange of radi o tempts to land ; each time the enemy crews, buttoned up under fire, wer e messages with Major Schoettel . fire was too intense . On the third try, virtually blind . Without accompany- the vehicle was hit and disabled by ing infantry they were lost piecemeal, 0959 : (Schoettel to Shoup ) plunging fire. Shoup sustained a some knocked out by Japanese "Receiving heavy fire all alon g painful shell fragment wound in hi s 75mm guns, others damaged by beach . Unable to land all . Issu e leg, but led his small party out of th e American dive bombers . in doubt :' stricken vehicle and into the dubiou s Six Shermans tried to land on Re d shelter of the pier. From this position, 1007 : (Schoettel to Shoup ) Beach One, each preceded by a dis- standing waist-deep in water, sur- "Boats held up on reef of right mounted guide to warn of under- rounded by thousands of dead fis h flank Red 1 . Troops receiving water shell craters . The guides were and dozens of floating bodies, Shou p heavy fire in water:' shot down every few minutes b y manned his radio, trying desperate - Japanese marksmen; each time 1012 : (Shoup to Schoettel ) ly to get organized combat unit s another volunteer would step for - "Land Beach Red 2 and wor k ashore to sway the balance . ward to continue the movement . west." For awhile, Shoup had hopes tha t Combat engineers had blown a hol e 1018 : (Schoettel to Shoup) "We the new Sherman tanks would serv e in the seawall for the tanks to pas s have nothing left to land ." to break the gridlock . The combat inland, but the way was now blocked

17 Marine Corps Personal Paper s Aerial photograph of the northwestern tip of Betio (the "bird's water at left, seaward of the re-entrant strongpoints . A num- beak") taken from 1,400 feet at 1407 on D-Day from a King- ber of Marines from 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, were kille d fisher observation floatplane . Note the disabled LVTs in the while crossing the sand spit in the extreme lower left corner . with dead and wounded Marines . the battle fared no better . Japanes e situation was becoming critical . Rather than run over his fellow Ma- gunners sank all four LCMs lade n Amid the chaos along the exposed rines, the commander reversed hi s with light tanks before the boats even beachhead, individual examples o f column and proceeded around th e reached the reef . Shoup also ha d courage and initiative inspired th e "bird's beak" towards a second open - reports that the tank battalion com- scattered remnants . Staff Sergean t ing blasted in the seawall . Operating mander, Lieutenant Colonel Alex - William Bordelon, a combat enginee r in the turbid waters now withou t ander B . Swenceski, had been killed attached to LT 2/2, provided the firs t guides, four tanks foundered in shel l while wading ashore (Swenceski, and most dramatic example on D - holes in the detour. Inland from the badly wounded, survived by crawl - Day morning . When a Japanese shell beach, one of the surviving Sher - ing atop a pile of dead bodies to keep disabled his LVT and killed most o f mans engaged a plucky Japanese from drowning until he was finally the occupants enroute to the beach , light tank . The Marine tan k discovered on D+1) . Bordelon rallied the survivors an d demolished its smaller opponent, bu t Shoup's message to the flagship a t led them ashore on Red Beach Two . not before the doomed Japanese crew 1045 reflected his frustration : "Stif f Pausing only to prepare explosiv e released one final 37mm round, a resistance . Need halftracks. Our charges, Bordelon personall y phenomenal shot, right down th e tanks no good ." But the Regimental knocked out two Japanese position s barrel of the Sherman . Weapons Companys halftracks , which had been firing on the assaul t By day's end, only two of the 1 4 mounting 75mm guns, fared no bet- waves . Attacking a third emplace- Shermans were still operational , ter getting ashore than did any othe r ment, he was hit by machine gun fire, "Colorado" on Red Three and "Chi - combat unit that bloody morning . but declined medical assistance an d na Gal" on Red One/Green Beach . One was sunk in its LCM by long - continued the attack . Bordelon the n Maintenance crews worked throug h range artillery fire before it reached dashed back into the water to rescu e the night to retrieve a third tank, the reef . A second ran the entir e a wounded Marine calling for help. "Cecilia," on Green Beach for Majo r gauntlet but became stuck in th e As intense fire opened up from ye t Ryan. Attempts to get light tanks into loose sand at the water's edge . The another nearby enemy stronghold ,

18 the staff sergeant prepared one las t geant I had never seen before limp - wall . The gunners coolly loaded, demolition package and charged th e ing up to ask me where he was aimed, and fired, knocking out on e position frontally. Bordelon's luc k needed most." PFC Moore, wound- tank at close range, chasing off th e ran out. He was shot and killed, later ed and disarmed from his experience s other. There were hoarse cheers . to become the first of four men of the trying to drive "My Deloris" over th e Time correspondent Robert Sher- 2d Marine Division to be awarde d seawall, carried fresh ammunition u p rod was no stranger to combat, but the Medal of Honor. to machine gun crews the rest of th e the landing on D-Day at Betio wa s In another incident, Sergeant Roy day until having to be evacuated t o one of the most unnerving ex- W. Johnson attacked a Japanese tan k one of the transports . Other brave in- periences in his life . Sherrod accom - single-handedly, scrambling to th e dividuals retrieved a pair of 37mm panied Marines from the fourth wave turret, dropping a grenade inside, antitank guns from a sunken land - of LT 2/2 attempting to wade ashore then sitting on the hatch until th e ing craft, manhandled them severa l on Red Beach Two. In his words : detonation . Johnson survived this in - hundred yards ashore under night- No sooner had we hit the cident, but he was killed in subse- marish enemy fire, and hustled them water than the Japanese quent fighting on Betio, one of 21 7 across the beach to the seawall. The machine guns really opened u p Marine Corps sergeants to be kille d timing was critical . Two Japanes e on us . . . . It was painfully or wounded in the 76-hour battle . tanks were approaching the beach - slow, wading in such deep On Red Beach Three, a captain , head . The Marine guns were too lo w water . And we had seven shot through both arms and legs, to fire over the wall . "Lift them over;' hundred yards to walk slowly sent a message to Major Crowe , came the cry from a hundred throats, into that machine-gun fire, apologizing for "letting you down ." "LIFT THEM OVER!" Willing hand s looming into larger targets as Major Ryan recalled "a wounded ser - hoisted the 900-pound guns atop the we rose onto higher ground . I

"D-Day at Tarawa," a sketch by Kerr Eby . This drawing cap- through barbed wire obstacles and under constant machin e tures the desperation of troops wading ashore from the reef gun fire. The artist himself was with the invading troops .

U .S. Navy Combat Art Collectio n

19 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 63956 Maj Henry P. "Jim" Crowe (standing, using radio handset) ral- Three on D-Day. Carrying a shotgun, he went from foxhol e lies Landing Team 2/8 behind a disabled LVT on Red Beach to foxhole urging his troops forward against heavy enemy fire .

was scared, as I had never been zeroed in on the landing craft wit h dured by the first assault waves at H- scared before . . . . Those who frightful accuracy, often hitting just Hour. The slaughter among the firs t were not hit would always as the bow ramp dropped . Survivors wave of Companies K and L was ter- remember how the machin e reported the distinctive "clang" as a rible. Seventy percent fell attempting gun bullets hissed into the shell impacted, a split second before to reach the beach . water, inches to the right, inches the explosion . "It happened a doze n Seeing this, Shoup and his party to the left. times;" recalled Staff Sergeant Hatch , waved frantically to groups of Ma- watching from the beach, "the boat rines in the following waves to see k Colonel Shoup, moving slowl y blown completely out of the wate r protection of the pier. A great num- - towards the beach along the pier, or and smashed and bodies all over th e ber did this, but so many officers and d dered Major Ruud's LT 3/8 to lan place:' Robert Sherrod reported from noncommissioned officers had bee n on Red Beach Three, east of the pier . a different vantage point, "I watche d hit that the stragglers were shattered By this time in the morning there a Jap shell hit directly on a [landin g and disorganized . The pier itself wa s were no organized LVT units left to craft] that was bringing many Ma- a dubious shelter, receiving intermit- help transport the reserve battalio n rines ashore . The explosion was ter- tent machine-gun and sniper fir e ashore . Shoup ordered Ruud to ap- rific and parts of the boat flew in al l from both sides. Shoup himself wa s proach as closely as he could b y directions:' Some Navy coxswains, struck in nine places, including a landing boats, then wade the remain - seeing the slaughter just ahead , spent bullet which came close to ing distance . Ruud received his as- stopped their boats seaward of th e penetrating his bull neck . His runne r sault orders from Shoup at 1103 . For reef and ordered the troops off . The crouching beside him was drilled be- the next six hours the two officers Marines, many loaded with radios o r tween the eyes by a Japanese sniper . were never more than a mile apart, wire or extra ammunition, sank im- Captain Carl W. Hoffman, com- h yet neither could communicate wit mediately in deep water; most manding 3/8's Weapons Company, the other. drowned . The reward for those had no better luck getting ashore Ruud divided his landing team into troops whose boats made it intact to than the infantry companies ahead. seven waves, but once the boats ap - the reef was hardly less sanguinary : "My landing craft had a direct hi t proached the reef the distinctions a 600-yard wade through witherin g from a Japanese mortar . We lost six blurred . Japanese antiboat guns crossfire, heavier by far than that en- or eight people right there ." Hoff-

20 man's Marines veered toward th e others were used to help plug the ga p Shoup's reaching dry ground was t o pier, then worked their way ashore . between 2/8 and the combined seek updated reports from the land - troops of 2/2 and 1/2 . Major Ruud, frustrated at bein g ing team commanders . If anything, tactical communications were wors e unable to contact Shoup, radioed hi s Shoup finally reached Betio a t regimental commander, Colone l noon and established a comman d at noon than they had been durin g the morning Hall: "Third wave landed on Beac h post 50 yards in from the pier alon g . Shoup still had no contact with any troops ashore on Re d Red 3 were practically wiped out . the blind side of a large Japanese Beach One, and now he could n o Fourth wave landed . . . but only a bunker, still occupied . The colonel longer raise General Smith o few men got ashore :' Hall, himself in posted guards to keep the enem y n a small boat near the Iine of depar- from launching any unwelcome sor - Maryland . A dire message came fro m LT 2/2: ture, was unable to respond . ties, but the approaches to the site it - "We need help. Situatio n bad:' Later a messenger arrived from Brigadier General Leo D. ("Dutch") self were as exposed as any othe r that unit with this report Hermle, assistant division com- place on the flat island . At least tw o : "All communications out except runners . CO mander, interceded with the message, dozen messengers were shot whil e killed. No word from E Company" ""Stay where you are or retreat out of bearing dispatches to and fro m Shoup found Lieutenant Colonel Jor- gun range :' This added to the confu - Shoup. Sherrod crawled up to the sion . As a result, Ruud himself did grim-faced colonel, who admitted, dan, ordered him to keep comman d of 2/2, and sought to reinforce hi m not reach the pier until mid - "We're in a tight spot . We've got to with elements from 1/2 and afternoon . It was 1730 before h e have more men :' Sherrod looked ou t 3/8. Shoup gave Jordan an hour to or- could lead the remnants of his me n at the exposed waters on both sides ganize and rearm his assorted detach - ashore; some did not straggle in un - of the pier. Already he could coun t ments, then ordered him to attac k til the following day . Shoup dis - 50 disabled LVTs, tanks, and boats . inland to the airstrip and expand th e patched what was left of LT 3/8 in The prospects did not look good . beachhead . support of Crowe's embattled 2/8; The first order of business upon Shoup then directed Evans Carlso n Captain and crew of Zeilin (APA 3) pause on D-Day to commit casualties to the to hitch a ride out to the Marylan d deep. The three dead men (two Marines and a Navy surgeon), were found in a and give General Smith and Admiral derelict LVT drifting through the transport area, 10 miles away from the beaches .

LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection Hill a personal report of the situatio n ashore . Shoup's strength of charac - ter was beginning to show. ""You tell the general and the admiral ;' he ordered Carlson, "that we are going t o stick and fight it out ." Carlso n departed immediately, but such wer e the hazards and confusion betwee n the beach and the line of departur e that he did not reach the flagship until 1800 . Matters of critical resupply the n captured Shoups attention . Beyon d the pier he could see nearly a hundred small craft, circling aimless- ly. These, he knew, carried assorte d supplies from the transports and car - go ships, unloading as rapidly as they could in compliance with Admira l Nimitz's stricture to "get the hell in , then get the hell out :' The in - discriminate unloading was hindering prosecution of the fight ashore . Shoup had no idea which boat hel d which supplies . He sent word to th e Primary Control Officer to send onl y the most critical supplies to the pier -

21 Sherman Medium Tanks at Tarawa

ne company of M4-A2 Sherman medium tanks was assigned to the 2d Marine Division fo r Q Operation Galvanic from the I Marine Amphibi- ous Corps . The 14 tanks deployed from Noumea in earl y November 1943, on board the new dock landing ship Ash- land (LSD 1), joining Task Force 53 enroute to the Gilberts . Each 34-ton, diesel-powered Sherman was operated by a crew of five and featured a gyro-stabilized 75mm gun an d three machine guns . Regrettably, the Marines had no op - portunity to operate with their new offensive assets unti l the chaos of D-Day at Betio. The Shermans joined Wave 5 of the ship-to-shore assault . The tanks negotiated the gauntlet of Japanese fire withou t incident, but five were lost when they plunged into unsee n shell craters in the turbid water . Ashore, the Marines' lac k

of operating experience with medium tanks proved costly LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection to the survivors. Local commanders simply ordered the ve- M-4A2 Sherman tank ("Charlie') of 3d Platoon, Cornpa- hicles inland to attack targets of opportunity unsupport- ny C, Medium Tanks, was disabled inland from Red Beac h ed. All but two were soon knocked out of action . Three by mutually supporting Japanese antitank guns fir- Enterprising salvage crews worked throughout each nigh t ing from well-dug in positions not too far from the beaches . to cannibalize severely damaged vehicles in order to keep ashore. Time and again, Japanese emplacements of rein - other tanks operational . Meanwhile, the Marines learne d forced concrete, steel, and sand were reduced by direct fir e to employ the tanks within an integrated team of coverin g from the tanks' main guns, despite a "prohibitive ammuni - infantry and engineers. The Shermans then proved invalu- tion expenditure ." Shoup also reported that "the so-calle d able in Major Ryan's seizure of Green Beach on D+1, th e crushing effect of medium tanks, as a tactical measure, wa s attacks of Major Jones and Major Crowe on D+2, and th e practically negligible in this operation, and I believe no on e final assault by Lieutenant Colonel McLeod on D+3 . Ear- should place any faith in eliminating fortifications by run - ly in the battle, Japanese 75mm antitank guns were dead - ning over them with a tank ." ly against the Shermans, but once these weapons wer e The Marines agreed that the advent of the Shermans ren- destroyed, the defenders could do little more than shoo t dered their light tanks obsolete . "Medium tanks are jus t out the periscopes with sniper fire . as easy to get ashore, and they pack greater armor and fire - Colonel Shoup's opinion of the medium tanks was am - power;" concluded one battalion commander . By the war' s bivalent . His disappointment in the squandered deployment end, the American ordnance industry had manufacture d and heavy losses among the Shermans on D-Day was tem - 48,064 Sherman tanks for employment by the U .S. Army pered by subsequent admiration for their tactical role and Marine Corps in all theaters of combat . head: ammunition, water, bloo d ing seen from close at hand wha t would be close-in fire support avail - plasma, stretchers, LVT fuel, more happened when LT 3/8 had tried t o able at daybreak . radios. wade ashore from the reef, went af- Julian Smith knew little of thes e Shoup then conferred with Lieu - ter the last remaining LVTs . There events, and he continued striving t o tenant Colonel Rixey. While naval were enough operational vehicles fo r piece together the tactical situatio n gunfire support since the landing had just two sections of Batteries A and ashore . From observation report s been magnificent, it was time for th e B. In the confusion of transfer-lin e from staff officers aloft in the floa t Marines to bring their own artillery operations, three sections of Batter y planes, he concluded that the situa - ashore . The original plan to land th e C followed the LVTs shoreward i n tion in the early afternoon wa s 1st Battalion/10th Marines, on Re d their open boats . Luck was with the desperate . Although elements of five One was no longer practical . Shoup artillerymen . The LVTs landed thei r infantry battalions were ashore, their and Rixey agreed to try a landing o n guns intact by late afternoon . When toehold was at best precarious . As the left flank of Red Two, close to th e the trailing boats hung up on the reef , Smith later recalled, "the gap between pier. Rixey 's guns were 75mm pack the intrepid Marines humped th e Red 1 and Red 2 had not been close d howitzers, boated in LCVPs . The ex- heavy components through the and the left flank on Red 3 was by peditionary guns could be broke n bullet-swept waters to the pier an d no means secure :' down for manhandling . Rixey, hav- eventually ashore at twilight . There Smith assumed that Shoup wa s

22 good news . Smith now had four battalion landing teams (including 1/8) available . The question then becam e where to feed them into the figh t without getting them chewed t o pieces like Ruud's experience in try - ing to land 3/8. At this point, Julian Smith's com - munications failed him again . At Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 6414 2 1740, he received a faint message tha t U .S. Navy LCM-3 sinks seaward of the reef after receiving a direct hit by Japanes e Hermle had finally reached the pier gunners on D-Day . This craft may have been one of four carrying M-3 Stuart ligh t and was under fire . Ten minutes later, tanks, all of which were sunk by highly accurate coastal defense guns that morning . Smith ordered Hermle to take com - still alive and functioning, but h e staff promptly debarked from Mon - mand of all forces ashore . To his sub - could ill afford to gamble . For the rovia (APA 31) and headed toward s sequent chagrin, Hermle never next several hours the commanding the smoking island, but the trip too k received this word . Nor did Smith general did his best to influence th e four hours . know his message failed to ge t action ashore from the flagship . In the meantime, General Smit h through . Hermle stayed at the pier, Smith's first step was the most criti- intercepted a 1458 message fro m sending runners to Shoup (who un - cal . At 1331 he sent a radio message Major Schoettel, still afloat seaward ceremoniously told him to "get th e to General Holland Smith, reportin g of the reef : "CP located on back of hell out from under that pier!") an d "situation in doubt" and requestin g Red Beach 1 . Situation as before. trying with partial success to unscrew release of the 6th Marines to division Have lost contact with assault ele- the two-way movement of casualties control . In the meantime, having or - ments ." Smith answered in no uncer- out to sea and supplies to shore . dered his last remaining landing tea m tain terms : "Direct you land at any Throughout the long day Colonel (Hays' 1/8) to the line of departure , cost, regain control your battalio n Hall and his regimental staff had lan- Smith began reconstituting an emer - and continue the attack ." Schoette l guished in their LCVPs adjacent to gency division reserve comprised o f complied, reaching the beach around Hays' LT 1/8 at the line of departure, bits and pieces of the artillery, en - sunset . It would be well into the next "cramped, wet, hungry, tired and a gineer, and service troop units . day before he could work his wa y large number . . . seasick" In late af- west and consolidate his scattere d ternoon, Smith abruptly ordere d General Smith at 1343 ordered remnants . Hall to land his remaining units o n General Hermle to proceed to the en d Julian Smith received f of the pier, assess the situation an d At 1525, a new beach on the northeast tip o report back. Hermle and his smal l Holland Smith's authorization to take the island at 1745 and work wes t control of the 6th Marines . This was towards Shoup's ragged lines . This SSgt William J. Bordelon, USMC, was Getting ashore on D-Day took great courage and determination . Attacking inland awarded the Medal of Honor (posthu - beyond the relative safety of the seawall on D-Day required an even greater measure . mously) for his actions on D-Day . De partment of Defense Photo (USMC) 6345 7 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 12980

23 Marine Corps Historical Center Combat Art Collection "Tawara, H-Hour, D-Day, Beach Red ." Detail from a painting in acrylic colors by Col Charles H. Waterhouse, USMCR .

This aerial photograph, taken at 1406 on D-Day, shows the entanglements are visible off both beaches. A grounded long pier on the north side of the island which divided Red Japanese landing craft is tied to the west side of the pier . Faintly Beach Three, left, from Red Beach Two, where 'a man could visible in the right foreground, a few Marines wade from a lift his hand and get it shot off" in the intense fire . Barbed wire disabled LVT towards the pier's limited safety and shelter. Marine Corps Personal Paper s

24 carry the fight inland . For much of the day the fire coming across the top of those coconut logs was so intense it seemed "a man could lift his han d and get it shot off :' Late on D-Day, there were many too demoralized t o advance. When Major Rathvon McC. Tompkins, bearing messages from General Hermle to Colonel Shoup, first arrived on Red Beac h Two at the foot of the pier at dusk on D-Day, he was appalled at th e sight of so many stragglers . Tomp- kins wondered why the Japanese "didn't use mortars on the first night . People were lying on the beach s o thick you couldn't walk ." Conditions were congested on Re d Beach One, as well, but there was a

LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection difference . Major Crowe was every- Marines try to drag a wounded comrade to safety and medical treatment on D-Day . where, "as cool as ice box lettuce ." There were no stragglers . Crowe was a tremendous risk . Smith's over- news was doubly welcome because constantly fed small groups of Ma- riding concern that evening was Shoup, fearing the worst, had as - a rines into the lines to reinforce hi s Japanese counterattack from the sumed Schoettel's companies and th e precarious hold on the left flank . eastern tail of the island against his other strays who had veered in tha t Captain Hoffman of 3/8 was not dis- left flank (Crowe and Ruud) . Once direction had been wiped out . pleased to find his unit suddenly in- he had been given the 6th Marines , Shoup, however, was unable to con- tegrated within Crowe's 2/8 . An d Smith admitted he was "willing to vey the news to Smith . Crowe certainly needed help as dark - sacrifice a battalion landing team" if Ryan's composite troops had in - ness began to fall . "There we were ;" it meant saving the landing forc e deed been successful on the wester n Hoffman recalled, "toes in the water , from being overrun during darkness . end. Learning quickly how best to casualties everywhere, dead an d Fortunately, as it turned out, Hal l operate with the medium tanks, th e Col Michael P. Ryan, USMC, wears the never received this message fro m Marines carved out a substantia l Navy Cross awarded to him at Tarawa . Smith . Later in the afternoon, a floa t beachhead, overrunning many Ryan, the junior major in the Division , plane reported to Smith that a uni t Japanese turrets and pillboxes . But was instrumental in securing the wester n was crossing the line of departure aside from the tanks, Ryan's men ha d end of Betio, thereby enabling the firs t and heading for the left flank of Re d nothing but infantry weapons . Crit- substantial reinforcements to land intact . Beach Two. Smith and Edson as- ically, they had no flamethrowers o r Marine Corps Historical Collection sumed it was Hall and Hays going i n demolitions . Ryan had learned from on the wrong beach . The fog of war : earlier experience in the Solomons the movement reported was the be- that "positions reduced only wit h ginning of Rixey's artillerymen mov- grenades could come alive again :' By ing ashore . The 8th Marines spent late afternoon, he decided to pull the night in its boats, waiting for ord- back his thin lines and consolidate . ers. Smith did not discover this fac t "I was convinced that withou t until early the next morning . flamethrowers or explosives to clea n On Betio, Shoup was pleased to them out we had to pull back . . . receive at 1415 an unexpected repor t to a perimeter that could be defend- from Major Ryan that severa l ed against counterattack by Japanes e hundred Marines and a pair of tank s troops still hidden in the bunkers ." had penetrated 500 yards beyond Red The fundamental choice faced by Beach One on the western end of th e most other Marines on Betio that da y island. This was by far the most suc- was whether to stay put along th e cessful progress of the day, and the beach or crawl over the seawall and

25 Offshore, the level of confidenc e diminished . General Julian Smith o n Maryland was gravely concerned . "This was the crisis of the battle," h e recalled . "Three-fourths of the Islan d was in the enemy's hands, and eve n allowing for his losses he should have had as many troops left as we ha d ashore ." A concerted Japanese counterattack, Smith believed, woul d have driven most of his forces int o the sea . Smith and Hill reported up the chain of command to Turner , Spruance, and Nimitz : "Issue remains in doubt :' Spruance's staff began drafting plans for emergency evacu - ation of the landing force . The expected Japanese counterat - tack did not materialize . The principal dividend of all th e U.S . Navy Combat Art Collectio n bombardment turned out to be th e "The Hard Road to Triumph," a sketch by Kerr Eby . The action shows Maj Crowe's destruction of Admiral Shibasaki's LT 2/8 trying to expand its beachhead near the contested Burns-Philp pier . wire communications . The Japanes e wounded all around us . But finally in the best fighting positions the y commander could not muster hi s a few Marines started inching for- could secure, whether in shellhole s men to take the offensive . A few in - ward, a yard here, a yard there ." It inland or along the splintered sea - dividuals infiltrated through the Ma- was enough . Hoffman was soon abl e wall . Despite the crazy-quilt defen - rine lines to swim out to disabled to see well enough to call in nava l sive positions and scrambled units, tanks and LVTs in the lagoon, wher e gunfire support 50 yards ahead . His the Marines' fire discipline was su - they waited for the morning . Other - Marines dug in for the night . perb. The troops seemed to share a wise, all was quiet . West of Crowe's lines, and just in - certain grim confidence ; they ha d The main struggle throughout the land from Shoup's command post , faced the worst in getting ashore . night of D-Day was the attempt by Captain William T. Bray's Company They were quietly ready for any sud - Shoup and Hermle to advise Julia n den B, 1/2, settled in for the expected banzai charges in the dark . Smith of the best place to land th e counterattacks . The company ha d Marines of Landing Teams 2/8 and 3/8 advance forward beyond the beach . been scattered in Kyle's bloody land- LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio n ing at mid-day. Bray reported to Kyl e that he had men from 12 to 14 different units in his company, including several sailors who swam ashore from sinking boats . The men were well armed and no longer strangers to each other, and Kyle wa s reassured . Altogether, some 5,000 Marines had stormed the beaches of Betio o n D-Day. Fifteen hundred of these were dead, wounded, or missing by night- fall . The survivors held less than a quarter of a square mile of sand an d coral. Shoup later described the lo - cation of his beachhead lines th e night of D-Day as "a stock marke t graph ." His Marines went to ground

. . . ADVANCES DURING, DA Y "" POSITJONS AT SUNSE T

INTELLIGENCE MAP BITITU (BETIO) ISLAN D TARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLAND S SITUATION 1800D-DAY NOTE : LINES ARE GENERAL INDICATION ONLY . GAPS WERE COVERED BY SMALL GROUP S 500 400 300 200 100 0 1000 YD S AND BY FIRE . SECONDARY LINES WER E ESTABLISHED WHERE POSSIBLE BEHIND FRONT LINES . TAKEN FROM 2D MAR DI V SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

RD5890

reserves on D+1 . Smith was amazed landing on the eastern end of the is - sight, bodies drifting slowly in the to learn at 0200 that Hall and Hay s land would have been an unmitigat- water just off the beach, junked am- were in fact not ashore but still afloa t ed catastrophe . Reconnaissance after tracks:' The stench of dead bodies co - at the line of departure, awaiting ord- the battle discovered those beaches vered the embattled island like a ers. Again, he ordered Combat Tea m to be the most intensely mined on th e cloud. The smell drifted out to th e Eight (-) to land on the eastern tip o f island. line of departure, a bad omen for th e the island, this time at 0900 on D+1. troops of 1st Battalion, 8th Marines , 111 +1 t etio, Hermle finally caught a boat to on e getting ready to start their run to th e 21 November 194 3 of the destroyers in the lagoon to re- beach . lay Shoup's request to the command - The tactical situation on Betio re- Colonel Shoup, making the most ing general to land reinforcements on mained precarious for much of the of faulty communications and imper - Red Beach Two. Smith altered Hall's 2d day. Throughout the morning, th e fect knowledge of his scattered forces, orders accordingly, but he ordere d Marines paid dearly for every at- ordered each landing team com- Hermle back to the flagship, miffe d tempt to land reserves or advance mander to attack : Kyle and Jorda n at his assistant for not getting ashor e their ragged beachheads . to seize the south coast, Crowe an d and taking command . But Herml e The reef and beaches of Tarawa al - Ruud to reduce Japanese stronghold s had done Smith a good service i n ready looked like a charnel house . to their left and front, Ryan to seize relaying the advice from Shoup . As Lieutenant Lillibridge surveyed wha t all of Green Beach . Shoup's predawn much as the 8th Marines were going he could see of the beach at first ligh t request to General Smith, relaye d to bleed in the morning's assault, a and was appalled: " . . . a dreadful through Major Tompkins and Gener -

27 from the beached inter-islan d

schooner Niminoa at the reef's edge. Hays' men began to fall at every hand .

The Marines on the beach di d everything they could to stop th e slaughter. Shoup called for nava l gunfire support . Two of Lieutenan t Colonel Rixey's 75mm pack howitzers (protected by a sand berm erect- ed during the night by a Seabe e bulldozer) began firing at the block - houses at the Red 1/Red 2 border , 125 yards away, with delayed fuse s and high explosive shells . A flight of F4F Wildcats attacked the hulk of th e

Niminoa with bombs and machin e guns. These measures helped, but for the large part the Japanese caugh t Hays' lead waves in a withering

U.S . Navy Combat Art Collectio n crossfire . The Wave Breaks on the Beach," a sketch by Kerr Eby . The scene represents the un- Correspondent Robert Sherro d welcome greeting received by LT 1/8 off Red Beach Two on the morning of D+1 . watched the bloodbath in horror . al Hermle, specified the landing o f could have picked ;" said "Red Mike" "One boat blows up, then another . Hays' LT 1/8 on Red Beach Two Edson . Japanese gunners opened a n The survivors start swimming fo r

"close to the pier." That key compo - unrelenting fire . Enfilade fire cam e shore, but machine-gun bullets do t nent of Shoup's request did not sur- from snipers who had infiltrated t o the water all around them . . . . Thi s vive the tenuous communications the disabled LVTs offshore during th e is worse, far worse than it was yester- route to Smith . The commandin g night . At least one machine gu n day." Within an hour, Sherrod could general simply ordered Colonel Hal l opened up on the wading troops count "at least two hundred bodies and Major Hays to land on Red Tw o Readily disassembled and reassembled, the 75mm pack howitzers of 1st Battalion , at 0615 . Hall and Hays, oblivious o f 10th Marines, were ideal for Tarawa's restrictive hydrography . The battalion man - the situation ashore, assumed 1/ 8 handled its guns ashore under heavy fire late on D-Day. Thereafter, these Marines would be making a covered landing. provided outstanding fire support at exceptionally short ranges to the infantry . The Marines of LT 1/8 had spent LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection the past 18 hours embarked i n LCVPs. During one of the endless cir- cles that night, Chaplain W. Wyeth Willard passed Colonel Hall's boat and yelled, "What are they saving u s for, the Junior Prom?" The troop s cheered when the boats finall y turned for the beach . Things quickly went awry. The dodging tides again failed to provid e sufficient water for the boats to cros s the reef . Hays' men, surprised at th e obstacle, began the 500-yard trek t o shore, many of them dangerously far to the right flank, fully within the beaten zone of the multiple guns fir - ing from the re-entrant strongpoint . "It was the worst possible place they

28 them ashore under such a hellis h crossfire. Hays reported to Shoup a t 0800 with about half his landin g team . He had suffered more than 300 casualties; others were scattered all along the beach and the pier . Worse, the unit had lost all its flamethrow - ers, demolitions, and heav y weapons . Shoup directed Hays to attack westward, but both men kne w that small arms and courage alon e would not prevail against fortifie d positions . Shoup tried not to let his dis- couragement show, but admitted i n a message to General Smith "the situation does not look good ashore ." The combined forces of Major s Crowe and Ruud on Red Beac h Three were full of fight and ha d plenty of weapons . But their left LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio n flank was flush against three larg e Navy medical personnel evacuate the wounded from the beachhead on D-Day . This Japanese bunkers, each mutuall y was difficult because there were few places anywhere that Marines could walk up - supporting, and seemingly unassail - right. The shortage of stretchers compounded the problems of the landing force . able . The stubby Burns-Philp com- which do not move at all on the dr y Navy Wildcats aiming for the near- mercial pier, slightly to the east of th e flats." by Niminoa . The pilots were exuber- main pier, became a bloody "no - First Lieutenant Dean Ladd wa s ant but inconsistent : one bomb hit man's land" as the forces fought fo r shot in the stomach shortly afte r the hulk squarely ; others missed by its possession . Learning from th e jumping into the water from his boat . 200 yards . An angry David Shou p mistakes of D-Day, Crowe insure d Recalling the strict orders to th e came up on the radio : "Stop strafing ! that his one surviving Sherman tan k troops not to stop for the wounded , Bombing ship hitting own troops! " was always accompanied by infantry. Ladd expected to die on the spot . At the end, it was the shee r Crowe and Ruud benefitted fro m One of his riflemen, Private Firs t courage of the survivors that got intensive air support and naval gun - Class T. F. Sullivan, ignored the ord - Marines under fire along Red Beach Three near the Burns-Philp pier hug the groun d ers and saved his lieutenant's life . as Navy planes continually pound the enemy strongpoints in front of them . Ladd's rifle platoon suffered 12 killed LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection and 12 wounded during the ship-to- shore assault . First Lieutenant Frank Plant, th e battalion air liaison officer, accom - panied Major Hays in the comman d LCVP. As the craft slammed into th e reef, Plant recalled Hays shouting "Men, debark!" as he jumped into th e water. The troops that followed were greeted by a murderous fire . Plant helped pull the wounded back into the boat, noting that "the water al l around was colored purple wit h blood ." As Plant hurried to catch up with Major Hays, he was terrified a t the sudden appearance of what he took to be Japanese fighters roarin g right towards him . These were the

29 to reestablish command . Jordan di d wound. The division mourned his so at great hazard . By the time Kyl e death . Hawkins was awarded th e arrived, Jordan realized his own Medal of Honor posthumously. Said presence was superfluous . Only 5 0 Colonel Shoup, "It's not often tha t men could be accounted for of LT you can credit a first lieutenant with 2/2's rifle companies . Jordan or- winning a battle, but Hawkins cam e ganized and supplied these survivors as near to it as any man could ." to the best of his abilities, then—a t It was up to Major Mike Ryan and m Shoup's direction—merged the his makeshift battalion on th e k with Kyle's force and stepped bac western end of Betio to make the big- into his original role as an observer. gest contribution to winning the bat - The 2d Marines' Scout Sniper Pla- tle on D+1 . Ryan's fortunes had been toon had been spectacularly heroi c greatly enhanced by three develop- from the very start when they led th e ments during the night : the absence assault on the pier just before H - of a Japanese spoiling attack agains t Hour. Lieutenant Hawkins continu - his thin lines, the repair of the medi- n um tank "Cecilia;" and the arrival of Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 1244 8 ously set an example of cool disdai 1stLt William Deane Hawkins, USMC, for danger in every tactical situation . Lieutenant Thomas Greene, USN, a was awarded the Medal of Hono r His bravery was superhuman, but i t naval gunfire spotter with a full y posthumously for sustained bravery could not last in the maelstrom . He functional radio . Ryan took his time throughout the first 24 hours ashore a t was wounded by a Japanese morta r organizing a coordinated attack Betio . Hawkins commanded the 2d Ma- shell on D-Day, but shook off at - against the nest of gun emplace - rines' Scout-Sniper Platoon, which seized tempts to treat his injuries. At dawn ments, pillboxes, and rifle pits con - the long pier to begin the assault . on D+1 he led his men in attacking centrated on the southwest corner o f T the island . He was slowed by anothe r fire along their left flank . Crowe was a series of strongpoints firing on L d failure in communications. Rya n unimpressed with the accuracy an d 1/8 in the water . Hawkins crawle could talk to the fire support ship s effectiveness of the aviators ("our air- directly up to a major pillbox, fire d but not to Shoup . It seemed to Rya n craft never did us much good"), bu t his weapon point blank through th e that it took hours for his runners t o he was enthusiastic about the nava l gun ports, then threw grenades insid e . He was shot in negotiate the gauntlet of fire back to guns . "I had the Ringgold, the to complete the job , the beach, radio Shoup's CP, and Dashiell, and the Anderson in sup- the chest, but continued the attack - return with answers . Ryan's first mes- port of me . . . . Anything I asked personally taking out three more pill sage to Shoup announcing his attac k for I got from them . They wer e boxes. Then a Japanese shell nearl y plans received the eventual response , great!" On one occasion on D+1, tore him apart . It was a mortal Crowe authorized direct fire from a Working parties ignore sniper and artillery fire to unload 75mm ammunition deli- destroyer in the lagoon at a larg e vered by LCVPs from Biddle (APA 8) at the head of the long Burns-Philp pier. command bunker only 50 yard s LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection ahead of the Marines . "They slammed them in there and yo u could see arms and legs and everything just go up like that!" Inland from Red Beach Two, Kyl e and Jordan managed to get some o f their troops across the fire-swept air - strip and all the way to the sout h coast, a significant penetration . The toehold was precarious, however, and the Marines sustained heav y casualties . "You could not see th e Japanese," recalled Lieutenant Lil - libridge, "but fire seemed to com e from every direction ." When Jordan lost contact with his lead elements , Shoup ordered him across the island

30 land on Green Beach in support o f the 6th Marines . These tactical plans took much longer to execute than envisioned . Jones was ready to debark fro m Feland (APA 11) when the ship wa s suddenly ordered underway to avoi d a perceived submarine threat . Hours passed before the ship could retur n close enough to Betio to launch th e rubber boats and their LCVP tow craft . The light tanks were among th e few critical items not truly comba t loaded in their transports, being carried in the very bottom of the carg o holds. Indiscriminate unloading dur - ing the first 30 hours of the landin g had further scrambled supplies an d equipment in intervening decks . It took hours to get the tanks clear an d loaded on board lighters. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 6349 2 Shoup was bewildered by the lon g Navy hospital corpsmen attend a critically wounded Marine on Betio . The 2d Ma- delays. At 1345 he sent Jones a mes - rine Division's organic medical personnel paid a high price while administering ai d sage to fallen Marines: 30 Navy doctors and corpsmen were killed ; another 59 wounded . : "Bring in flamethrowers if pos - sible . . . . Doing our best ." At 1525 "Hold up — we are calling an ai r the fresh combat team ashore . In he queried division about the esti - view of the heavy casualties sus - strike." It took two more runners t o mated landing time of LT 1/6 . He tained by Hays' battalion on Re get the air strike cancelled . Ryan the n d wanted Jones ashore and on the at- Beach Two, Smith was reconsiderin g ordered Lieutenant Greene to call i n tack before dark . naval gunfire on the southwest tar - a landing on the unknown easter n Meanwhile, Shoup and his small gets. Two destroyers in the lagoo n end of the island . The good news staff were beset by logistic suppor t from Ryan quickly solved th e responded quickly and accurately . At problems . Already there were team s problem . Smith ordered Holmes t o 1120, Ryan launched a coordinate d organized to strip the dead of thei r tank-infantry assault . Within the land one battalion by rubber rafts o n ammunition, canteens, and first ai d hour his patchwork force had seize d Green Beach, with a second landin g pouches . Lieutenant Colonel Carlson all of Green Beach and was ready t o team boated in LCVPs prepared t o helped organize a "false beachhead " wade ashore in support . attack eastward toward the airfield . at the end of the pier . Most progres s At this time Smith received report s f Communications were still terri - came from the combined efforts o that Japanese troops were escaping Lieutenant Colonel Chester J . Sala- ble. For example, Ryan twice report - y ; ed the southern end of Green Beac h from the eastern end of Betio b zar, commanding the shore party wading across to Bairiki, the next is- . McGovern, , to be heavily mined, a message tha t Captain John B USN land. The Marines did not want to never reached any higher headquart- acting as primary control officer o n fight the same tenacious enemy board the minesweeper Pursuit (AM ers. But General Smith on board twice . Smith then ordered Holmes to 108) ; Major Ben K . Weatherwax, as - Maryland did receive direct word o f land one battalion on Bairiki to "sea l sistant division D-4 ; and Major Ge - Ryan's success and was overjoyed . For d the first time Smith had the oppor - the back door ." Holmes assigne orge L. H. Cooper, operations officer Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L . of 2d Battalion, 18th Marines . tunity to land reinforcements on a co- Murray to land 2/6 on Bairiki, Majo r Among them, these officers gradual - vered beach with their unit integrit y "Willie K ." Jones to land 1/6 by rub - ly brought some order out of chaos . intact . ber boat on Green Beach, and Lieu - They assumed strict control of sup - General Smith and "Red Mike" Ed- tenant Colonel Kenneth F. McLeod to plies unloaded and used the surviv- son had been conferring that morn- be prepared to land 3/6 at any as- ing LVTs judiciously to keep the ing with Colonel Maurice G . signed spot, probably Green Beach. shuttle of casualties moving seawar d Holmes, commanding the 6th Ma- Smith also ordered the light tanks o f and critical items from the pierhea d rines, as to the best means of getting Company B, 2d Tank Battalion, to to the beach. All of this was per -

31 with recent combat experience in th e Aleutians . In the next three days Oliver's team treated more than 55 0 severely wounded Marines . "We ran out of sodium pentathol and had t o use ether ;" said Oliver, "although a bomb hit would have blown Doye n off the face of the planet ." Navy chaplains were also hard a t work wherever Marines were fighting ashore . Theirs was particularl y heartbreaking work, consoling th e wounded, administering last rites to the dying, praying for the souls of th e dead before the bulldozer came to cover the bodies from the unforgiv - ing tropical sun . The tide of battle began to shif t perceptibly towards the Americans by mid-afternoon on D+1 . The fight- LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio n ing was still intense, the Japanese fir e This desperate scene hardly needs a caption . The Marine is badly hurt, but he's still murderous, but the survivin g in good hands as his buddies lead him to saftey and shelter just ahead for treatment . Marines were on the move, no longe r formed by sleepless men under cons- dozens of casualties and did her best . gridlocked in precarious toeholds o n tant fire. Admiral Hill then took the risk of the beach . Rixey's pack howitzer s Casualty handling was the most dispatching the troopship Doyen were adding a new definition fo r pressing logistic problem on D+1 . (APA 1) into the lagoon early o n close fire support . The supply of am- The 2d Marine Division was heroi - D+1 for service as primary receiv- munition and fresh water was great - cally served at Tarawa by its organ - ing ship for critical cases . Lieutenant ly improved . Morale was up, too . ic Navy doctors and hospita l Commander James Oliver, MC, The troops knew the 6th Marines corpsmen . Nearly 90 of these medi - USN, led a five-man surgical team was coming in soon . "I thought up cal specialists were themselves casual - Some seriously wounded Marines were evacuated from the beachhead by raft. ties in the fighting ashore . Lieutenan t Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 6392 6 Herman R . Brukhardt, Medica l Corps, USN, established an emergen - cy room in a freshly captured Japanese bunker (some of whose former occupants "came to life" wit h blazing rifles more than once) . In 3 6 hours, under brutal conditions , Brukhardt treated 126 casualties ; only four died . At first, casualties were evacuate d to troopships far out in the transport area . The long journey was dangerous to the wounded troops an d wasteful of the few available LVTs o r LCVPs . The Marines then began delivering casualties to the destroy - er Ringgold in the lagoon, even though her sickbay had bee n wrecked by a Japanese five-inch shel l on D-Day. The ship, still actively firing support missions, accepted

32 Colonel David M . Shoup, USMC

n excerpt from the field note- boiled, profane shouter of orders, h e book David Shoup carried would carry the biggest burden on Tara - during the battle of Taraw a wa:' Another contemporary describe d reveals a few aspects of the personality Shoup as "a Marine's Marine ;" a leader of its enigmatic author : "If you are quali- the troops "could go to the well with :' fied, fate has a way of getting you to the First Sergeant Edward G . Doughman , right place at the right time — tho' some - who served with Shoup in China and i n times it appears to be a long, long wait :' the Division Operations section , For Shoup, the former farm boy fro m described him as "the brainiest, nerviest, Battle Ground, Indiana, the combina - best soldiering Marine I ever met :" It i s tion of time and place worked to hi s no coincidence that Shoup also was con- benefit on two momentous occasions, a t sidered the most formidable poker play- Tarawa in 1943, and as President Dwigh t er in the division, a man with eyes "like D. Eisenhower's deep selection to become two burn holes in a blanket :" s 22d Commandant of the Marine Corp Part of Colonel Shoup's Medal o f in 1959 . Honor citation reflects his strength o f f Colonel Shoup was 38 at the time o character: Tarawa, and he had been a Marin e Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 31055 2 officer since 1926 . Unlike such colorful Upon arrival at the shore, he as - Col David M. Shoup, here as he ap- contemporaries as Merritt Edson an d sumed command of all landed peared after the battle, was the fourt h Evans Carlson, Shoup had limited pri - troops and, working without res t and only living Marine awarded a Me - or experience as a commander and onl y under constant withering enem y dal of Honor from the Tarawa fighting. brief exposure to combat . Then cam e fire during the next two days, con - realize that I am but a bit of chaff from Tarawa, where Shoup, the junior colone l ducted smashing attacks against the threshings of life blown into the in the 2d Marine Division, commande d unbelievably strong and fanatical- pages of history by the unknown wind s eight battalion landing teams in some o f ly defended Japanese position s of chance :' the most savage fighting of the war . despite innumerable obstacles an d Time correspondent Robert Sherro d heavy casualties. David Shoup died on 13 January 1983 recorded his first impression of Shoup at age 78 and was buried in Arlingto n enroute to Betio : "He was an interestin g Shoup was modest about his achieve- National Cemetery. "In his private life ;" character, this Colonel Shoup . A squat, ments. Another entry in his 1943 note- noted the Washington Post obituary, red-faced man with a bull neck, a hard - book contains this introspection, "I "General Shoup was a poet :" until 1300 today it was touch and go;" he was buoyed enough to send a 160 0 this earlier on New Zealand . Smith said Rixey, "then I knew we woul d situation report to Julian Smith , finally had artillery in place o n win:" which closed with these terse word s Bairiki. By contrast, a sense of despair that became a classic : "Casualties: Meanwhile, Major Jones and LT seemed to spread among th e many. Percentage dead : unknown . 1/6 were finally on the move . It ha d defenders . They had shot down th e Combat efficiency : We are winning:" been a day of many false starts . At Marines at every turn, but with ev - At 1655, Murray's 2/6 landed one point, Jones and his men ha d ery fallen Marine, another would ap - against light opposition on Bairiki . been debarking over the sides i n pear, rifle blazing, well supported by During the night and early mornin g preparation for an assault on the artillery and naval guns . The grea t hours, Lieutenant Colonel Georg e eastern end of the Betio when "The Yogaki plan seemed a bust . Only a Shell's 2d Battalion, 10th Marines , Word" changed their mission to few aircraft attacked the island each landed on the same island and bega n Green Beach . When Feland finally night; the transports were never seri- registering its howitzers . Rixey's fire returned to within reasonable rang e ously threatened . The Japanese fleet direction center on Betio helped thi s from the island, the Marines of LT never materialized . Increasingly, process, while the artillery forwar d 1/6 disembarked for real . Using tac- Japanese troops began committing observer attached to Crowe's LT 2/ 8 tics developed with the Navy during suicide rather than risk capture . on Red Beach One had the unusua l the Efate rehearsal, the Marines load- Shoup sensed this shift in momen- experience of adjusting the fire of th e ed on board LCVPs which towe d tum . Despite his frustration over th e Bairiki guns "while looking into their their rubber rafts to the reef. There day's delays and miscommunications, muzzles :" The Marines had practiced the Marines embarked on board thei r

33 Years later, General Julian Smit h looked back on the pivotal day of 2 1 November 1943 at Betio and admitted, "we were losing until we won! " Many things had gone wrong, an d the Japanese had inflicted sever e casualties on the attackers, but, fro m this point on, the issue was no longer in doubt at Tarawa .

The Third Pay : +2 at tetio, 22 November 1943

On D+2, Chicago Daily News war

LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio n correspondent Keith Wheele r Light tanks debark at the reef from LCMs launched by Harris (APA 2) and Virg o released this dispatch from Tarawa : (AKA 20) to begin the 1,000-yard trek towards Green Beach the evening of D+1 . "It looks as though the Marines are rafts, six to 10 troops per craft, and distance between the reef and th e winning on this blood-soaked , began the 1,000-yard paddle toward s beach greatly hindered landing ef- bomb-hammered, stinking littl e Green Beach. forts. Eventually, a platoon of si x abattoir of an island ." Major Jones remarked that he di d tanks managed to reach the beach ; Colonel Edson issued his attac k not feel like "The Admiral of th e the remainder of the company move d orders at 0400 . As recorded in the di- Condom Fleet" as he helped paddl e its boats toward the pier and worked vision's D-3 journal, Edson's plan for his raft shoreward . "Control was all night to get ashore on Red Beach D+2 was this : "1/6 attacks at 0800 nebulous at best . . . the battalion Two. McLeod's LT 3/6 remained to the east along south beach to es- was spread out over the ocean from afloat in LCVPs beyond the reef, fac- tablish contact with 1/2 and 2/2 . 1/ 8 horizon to horizon . We must hav e ing an uncomfortable night . attached to 2dMar attacks at dayligh t had 150 boats." Jones was alarmed a t That evening Shoup turned t o to the west along north beach t o the frequent appearance of antiboa t Robert Sherrod and stated, "Well, I eliminate Jap pockets of resistanc e mines moored to coralheads beneat h think we're winning, but the bastard s between Beaches Red 1 and 2 . the surface . The rubber rafts passed have got a lot of bullets left . I thin k SthMar (-LT 1/8) continues attack t o over the mines without incident, bu t we'll clean up tomorrow ." east ." Edson also arranged for naval Jones also had two LVTs accompany- After dark, General Smith sent hi s gunfire and air support to strike th e ing his ship-to-shore movement, eac h chief of staff, "Red Mike" Edson , eastern end of the island at 20-minute preloaded with ammo, rations, ashore to take command of all force s interludes throughout the morning , water, medical supplies, and spare ra- on Betio and Bairiki . Shoup ha d beginning at 0700 . McLeod's LT 3/6 , dio equipment . Guided by the rafts , done a magnificent job, but it wa s still embarked at the line of depar- one of the LVTs made it ashore, bu t time for the senior colonel to take ture, would land at Shoup's call o n the second drifted into a mine whic h charge . There were now eight rein- Green Beach. blew the heavy vehicle 10 feet int o forced infantry battalions and tw o The key to the entire plan was th e the air, killing most of the crew and artillery battalions deployed on th e eastward attack by the fresh troop s destroying the supplies . It was a seri - two islands . With LT 3/6 scheduled of Major Jones' landing team, but Ed - ous loss, but not critical . Well co - to land early on D+2, virtually all son was unable for hours to raise th e vered by Ryan's men, the landin g the combat and combat support ele - 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, on an y force suffered no other casualtie s ments of the 2d Marine Division radio net . The enterprising Majo r coming ashore . Jones' battalion be - would be deployed. Tompkins, assistant division opera - came the first to land on Betio essen- Edson reached Shoup's CP by 2030 tions officer, volunteered to deliver tially intact . and found the barrel-chested warri - the attack order personally to Majo r It was after dark by the time Jones' or still on his feet, grimy and hag - Jones. Tompkins' hair-raising odys - troops assumed defensive position s gard, but full of fight . Edson assumed sey from Edson's CP to Green Beach behind Ryan's lines . The light tank s command, allowing Shoup to con- took nearly three hours, durin g of Company B continued their at - centrate on his own reinforced com - which time he was nearly shot on tempt to come ashore on Gree n bat team, and began makin g several occasions by nervous Beach, but the high surf and great plans for the morning . Japanese and American sentries . By

--- INITIAL LANDIN G """"' POSITIONS AT SUNSE T

INTELLIGENCE MAP BITITU (BETIO) ISLAN D TARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLAND S SITUATION 1800 D+ I NOTE : LINES ARE GENERAL INDICATION ONLY . GAPS WERE COVERED BY SMALL GROUP S 500 400 300 200 100 0 1000 YD S AND BY FIRE . SECONDARY LINES WER E I i 1 E I I ESTABLISHED WHERE POSSIBLE BEHIN D FRONT LINES. TAKEN FROM 2D MAR DI V SPECIAL ACTION REPOR T

RD 5890

quirk, the radio nets started work - was lost to enemy fire, and the other made final preparations for the as- ing again just before Tompkins two were withdrawn . Hays called for sault of 1/6 to the east . Althoug h reached LT 1/6 . Jones had the goo d a section of 75mm halftracks . One there were several light tanks avail- grace not to admit to Tompkins tha t was lost almost immediately, but th e able from the platoon which came he already had the attack order whe n other used its heavier gun to con - ashore the previous evening, Jone s the exhausted messenger arrived . siderable advantage . The center an d preferred the insurance of medium On Red Beach Two, Major Hay s left flank companies managed to tanks . Majors "Willie K ." Jones and launched his attack promptly a t curve around behind the main com - "Mike" Ryan were good friends ; Jones 0700, attacking westward on a three- plexes, effectively cutting th e prevailed on their friendship to "bor- company front . Engineers with satch - Japanese off from the rest of the is - row" Ryan's two battle-scarred Sher- el charges and Bangalore torpedoes land. Along the beach, however, mans for the assault . Jones ordere d helped neutralize several inlan d progress was measured in yards . The the tanks to range no further than 50 Japanese positions, but the strong - bright spot of the day for 1/8 cam e yards ahead of his lead company, an d points along the re-entrant were still late in the afternoon when a small he personally maintained radio con- as dangerous as hornets' nests . Ma- party of Japanese tried a sortie fro m tact with the tank commander. Jones rine light tanks made brave fronta l the strongpoints against the Marin e also assigned a platoon of water - attacks against the fortifications , lines . Hays' men, finally given real cooled .30-caliber machine guns to even firing their 37mm guns point- targets in the open, cut down the at- each rifle company and attached hi s blank into the embrasures, but the y tackers in short order. combat engineers with their flame were inadequate for the task . One On Green Beach, Major Jones throwers and demolition squads t o

35 water and salt tablets for his men , but several troops had already become victims of heat prostration . Ac- cording to First Sergeant Lewis J . Michelony, Tarawa's sands were "a s white as snow and as hot as red- white ashes from a heated furnace ." Back on Green Beach, now 80 0 yards behind LT 1/6, McLeod's LT 3/6 began streaming ashore. The landing was uncontested bu t nevertheless took several hours to execute. It was not until 1100, the sam e time that Jones' leading element s linked up with the 2d Marines, be - fore 3/6 was fully established ashore. The attack order for the 8th Ma- rines was the same as the previou s day: assault the strongpoints to the east. The obstacles were just as daunting on D+2 . Three fortification s Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 63505 were especially formidable: a steel pill - CP scene, Betio, D+2 : Col Shoup, center, with map case, confers with Maj Thoma s box near the contested Burns-Phil p Culhane, 2d Marines R-3, while Col Merritt A . Edson, Division chief of staff, stand s pier; a coconut log emplacement wit h in left background (hands on hips) . Col Evans Carlson, an observer from the 4t h multiple machine guns ; and a large Marine Division used as high-priced courier by Shoup, rests in the foreground . bombproof shelter further inland . All the lead company. The nature of the Resistance was stiffening, the compa- three had been designed by Admira l terrain and the necessity for givin g ny commander had just been shot by Saichero, the master engineer, to b e Hays' battalion wide berth made a sniper, and the oppressive heat was mutually supported by fire and obser - Jones constrain his attack to a pla- beginning to take a toll . Beamer vation . And notwithstanding Majo r toon front in a zone of action onl y made superhuman efforts to get more Crowe's fighting spirit, these strong - 100 yards wide . "It was the most un- usual tactics that I ever heard of ;' "March Macabre," a sketch by combat artist Kerr Eby, reflects the familiar scen e recalled Jones . 'As I moved to the east of wounded or lifeless Marines being pulled to shelter under fire by their buddies . on one side of the airfield, Larr y U .S . Navy Combat Art Collectio n Hays moved to the west, exactly op - posite . . . . I was attacking towards Wood Kyle who had 1st Battalion , 2d Marines ." Jones' plan was sound and well ex - ecuted . The advantage of having i n place a fresh tactical unit with integrated supporting arms was immediately obvious. Landing Tea m 1/6 made rapid progress along th e south coast, killing about 25 0 Japanese defenders and reaching th e thin lines held by 2/2 and 1/2 within three hours . American casualties to this point were light . At 1100, Shoup called Jones to hi s CP to receive the afternoon plan o f action. Jones' executive officer, Majo r Francis X . Beamer, took the occasion to replace the lead rifle company.

36 points had effectively contained th e ment which penetrated the bunke r combined forces of 2/8 and 3/8 sinc e and detonated the ammunition stocks. the morning of D-Day. It was a stroke of immense good for - On the third day, Crowe reorganized tune for the Marines . At the same his tired forces for yet another assault . time, the medium tank "Colorado " First, the former marksmanship in- maneuvered close enough to the steel structor obtained cans of lubricatin g pillbox to penetrate it with direc t oil and made his troops field strip an d 75mm fire . Suddenly, two of the thre e clean their Garands before the attack . emplacements were overrun. Crowe placed his battalion executiv e The massive bombproof shelter , officer, Major William C. Chamberlin , however, was still lethal . Improvised in the center of the three attacking flanking attacks were shot to pieces be - companies . Chamberlin, a former col - fore they could gather momentum . lege economics professor, was no les s The only solution was to somehow gain dynamic than his red-mustached com - the top of the sand-covered moun d mander. Though nursing a painfu l and drop explosives or thermite Marine Corps Historical Collectio wound in his shoulder from D-Day, n grenades down the air vents to force Col William K . Jones, USMC, a majo r Chamberlin was a driving force in th e the defenders outside . This tough as - during the battle of Tarawa, commande d repetitive assaults against the thre e signment went to Major Chamberli n Landing Team 1/6, the first major uni t strongpoints . Staff Sergeant Hatch and a squad of combat engineers un - to land intact on Betio . The advance o f recalled that the executive officer wa s 1/6 eastward on der First Lieutenant Alexander Bonny - D+2 helped break th e "a wild man, a guy anybody would b e back of Japanese resistance, as did th e man. While riflemen and machine willing to follow." unit's repulse of the Japanese counterat- gunners opened a rain of fire agains t tack that night. Jones' sustained comba t At 0930, a mortar crew unde r the strongpoint's firing ports, thi s leadership on Betio resulted in a bat- Chamberlin's direction got a direct hi t small band raced across the sands and tlefield promotion to lieutenant colonel . on the top of the coconut log emplace- up the steep slope . The Japanese knew

Against the still potent and heavily defended, entrenched Japanese positions the 6th Marines advanced eastward on D+2 . LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection

n BETIO ,,m 22m 22 222r .222 22mn 2,22 x. .,2 : : . TARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLANDS U8 ,. +a?ie OMa232 ATTACK OF THE 1st BN.,6th MARINES(LT V6) 2222•2 1222 1,2 M 2221. NOV . 22,1943 1.2 .~a 112. .22 12.,o m .mom

they were in grave danger . Scores of ing to Second Lieutenant Beryl W. rines' zone—and unknown to th e them poured out of a rear entrance to Rentel, the survivors used "eight case s Marines—Admiral Shibasaki died in attack the Marines on top . Bonnyma n of TNT, eight cases of gelatin dyna- his blockhouse . The tenacious stepped forward, emptied hi s mite, and two 54-pound blocks o f Japanese commander's failure to pro- flamethrower into the onrushing TNT" to demolish Japanese fortifica- vide backup communications to th e Japanese, then charged them with a tions. Rentel reported that his en - above-ground wires destroyed dur- carbine . He was shot dead, his bod y gineers used both large blocks o f ing D-Day's preliminary bombard- rolling down the slope, but his me n TNT and an entire case of dynamite ment had effectively kept him fro m were inspired to overcome the Japanese on the large bombproof shelter influencing the battle. Japanese ar- counterattack. The surviving engineers alone. chives indicate Shibasaki was able t o rushed to place explosives against the At some point during the con - transmit one final message to Genera l rear entrances . Suddenly, several fused, violent fighting in the 8th Ma- Headquarters in Tokyo early o n hundred demoralized Japanese broke The 8th Marines makes its final assault on the large Japanese bombproof shelte r out of the shelter in panic, trying to near the Burns-Philp pier . These scenes were vividly recorded on 35mm motio n flee eastward . The Marines shot them picture film by Marine SSgt Norman Hatch, whose subsequent eyewitness docu- down by the dozens, and the tank cre w mentary of the Tarawa fighting won a Motion Picture Academy Award in 1944 . fired a single "dream shot" caniste r Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 6393 0 round which dispatched at least 2 0 more.

Lieutenant Bonnyman's gallantry resulted in a posthumous Medal o f Honor, the third to be awarded to Ma- rines on Betio . His sacrifice almost single-handedly ended the stalemat e on Red Beach Three . Nor is it coincidence that two of these highest awards were received by combat engineers . The performances of Staff Sergeant Bordelon on D-Day and Lieutenan t Bonnyman on D+2 were representa - tive of hundreds of other engineers on only a slightly less spectacular ba - sis. As an example, nearly a third o f the engineers who landed in suppor t of LT 2/8 became casualties . Accord -

38 waded through intermittent fire fo r The 8th Marines, having finall y half a mile to find an LVT for th e destroyed the three-bunker nemesis , general. Even this was not an al - made good progress at first, but the n together safe exchange . The LVT ran out of steam past the eastern en d drew further fire, which wounded the of the airfield . Shoup had been righ t driver and further alarmed the oc- the night before . The Japanes e cupants . General Smith did not reac h defenders may have been leaderless , Edson and Shoup's combined CP un- but they still had an abundance of til nearly 1400 . bullets and esprit left . Major Crowe "Red Mike" Edson in the meantim e pulled his leading elements back int o had assembled his major subordinat e defensive positions for the night . commanders and issued orders fo r Jones halted, too, and placed on e continuing the attack to the east that company north of the airfield for a afternoon . Major Jones' 1/6 woul d direct link with Crowe . The end o f continue along the narrowing sout h the airstrip was unmanned but co - coast, supported by the pack howit - vered by fire . zers of 1/10 and all available tanks . Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 31021 3 On nearby Bairiki, all of 2/10 wa s Colonel Hall's two battalions of th e lstLt Alexander Bonnyman, Jr., LISMC, now in position and firing artiller y 8th Marines would continue their ad- was awarded the Medal of Hono r missions in support of Crowe an d vance along the north coast . Jump - posthumously for extreme bravery dur- Jones. Company B of the 2d Medi - off time was 1330. Naval gunfire an d ing the assault on the Japanese bornb- cal Battalion established a fiel d air support would blast the areas for proof shelter on D+2. Two of the four hospital to handle the overflow of Marines awarded the Medal of Hono r an hour in advance . casualties from Doyen. Murray's 2/6 , for Tarawa were combat engineers: Colonel Hall spoke up on behal f eager to enter the fray, waited in vai n . Lt Bonnyman and SSgt Bordelon of his exhausted, decimated landing for boats to arrive to move them t o D+2: "Our weapons have been des - teams, ashore and in direct contact Green Beach . Very few landing craft troyed and from now on everyone is since D-Day morning . The two land- were available ; many were cramme d attempting a final charge . . . . May ing teams had enough strength fo r with miscellaneous supplies as th e Japan exist for 10,000 years! " one more assault, he told Edson, bu t transports and cargo ships continue d then they must get relief . Edso n e Admiral Shibasaki's counterpart , general unloading, regardless of th Be- General Julian Smith, landed o n promised to exchange the remnant s needs of the troops ashore . On Green Beach shortly before noon . of 2/8 and 3/8 with Murray's fres h tio, Navy Seabees were already a t 2/6 on Bairiki at the first opportu - work repairing the airstrip with bull- Smith observed the deployment o f . y McLeod's LT 3/6 inland and con- nity after the assault dozers and graders despite enem ferred with Major Ryan. But Smit h Jones returned to his troops in his fire. From time to time, the Marine s would call for help in sealing a soon realized he was far remove d borrowed tank and issued the neces- bothersome bunker, and a bulldoz- from the main action towards th e sary orders . Landing Team 1/6 con- . center of the island . He led his grou p tinued the attack at 1330, passin g er would arrive to do the job nicely back across the reef to its landin g through Kyle's lines in the process . Navy beachmasters and shore part y Marines on the pier continued t o craft and ordered the coxswain to Immediately it ran into heavy oppo- keep the supplies coming in, th e 'make for the pier. At this point th e sition. The deadliest fire came fro m wounded going out. At 1550, Edso n commanding general received a rud e heavy weapons mounted in a turret- requested a working party "to clear introduction to the facts of life on Be- type emplacement near the sout h bodies around pier . . . hindering tio. Although the Japanese strong - beach . This took 90 minutes to over- shore party operations ." Late in th e points at the re-entrant were bein g come. The light tanks were brave but day the first jeep got ashore, a wil d hotly besieged by Hays' 1/8, th e ineffective . Neutralization took sus - ride along the pier with every re- defenders still held mastery over th e tained 75mm fire from one of th e maining Japanese sniper trying to approaches to Red Beaches One and Sherman medium tanks . Resistanc e take out the driver . Sherrod com - Two. Well-aimed machine-gun fire was fierce throughout Jones' zone, mented, "If a sign of certain victor y disabled the boat and killed the cox - and his casualties began to mount . were needed, this is it . The jeeps have swain ; the other occupants had t o The team had conquered 800 yard s arrived " leap over the far gunwale into th e of enemy territory fairly easily in th e water. Major Tompkins, ever th e morning, but could attain barely hal f The strain of the prolonged battle right man in the right place, then that distance in the long afternoon . began to take effect . Colonel Hall

LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio n South side of RAdm Shibasaki's headquarters on Betio is ing blockhouse withstood direct hits by Navy 16-inch shell s guarded by a now-destroyed Japanese light tank . The impos- and 500-pound bombs . Fifty years later, the building stands .

reported that one of his Navajo In- Situation not favorable fo r time he had about 7,000 Marine s dian code-talkers had been mistaken rapid clean-up of Betio . Heavy ashore, struggling against perhap s for a Japanese and shot . A derelict, casualties among officers make 1,000 Japanese defenders . Update d blackened LVT drifted ashore, fille d leadership problems difficult . aerial photographs revealed many with dead Marines . At the bottom of Still strong resistance . . . . defensive positions still intac t the pile was one who was still breath- Many emplacements intact o n throughout much of Betio 's easter n ing, somehow, after two and a hal f eastern end of the island . . . . tail . Smith and Edson believed the y days of unrelenting hell . "Water;' h e In addition, many Japanes e would need the entire 6th Marines to gasped, "Pour some water on m y strong points to westward o f complete the job . When Colonel Hol- face, will you? " our front lines within our posi- mes landed with the 6th Marine s Smith, Edson, and Shoup were tion that have not been reduced. headquarters group, Smith told hi m near exhaustion themselves . Relative- Progress slow and extremely to take command of his three land- ly speaking, the third day on Beti o costly. Complete occupatio n ing teams by 2100 . Smith then calle d had been one of spectacular gains, will take at least 5 days more . a meeting of his commanders to as- but progress overall was maddening - Naval and air bombardment a sign orders for D+3. ly slow, nor was the end yet in sight. great help but does not take out Smith directed Holmes to have At 1600, General Smith sent this pes- emplacements . McLeod's 3/6 pass through the lines simistic report to General Hermle, of Jones' 1/6 in order to have a fresh who had taken his place on the General Smith assumed comman d battalion lead the assault eastward . flagship : of operations ashore at 1930 . By that Murray's 2/6 would land on Green

Beach and proceed east in support o f plans were overcome by events of th e ters, Jones arranged for field artiller y McLeod. All available tanks woul d evening . support starting 75 yards from his be assigned to McLeod (when Majo r The major catalyst that altere d front lines to a point 500 yards out , Jones protested that he had promised Smith's plans was a series of viciou s where naval gunfire would take over . to return the two Shermans loane d Japanese counterattacks during the He placed Company A on the left, by Major Ryan, Shoup told hi m night of D+2/D+3 . As Edson put it , next to the airstrip, and Company B "with crisp expletives" what he could the Japanese obligingly "gave us very on the right, next to the south shore . do with his promise) . Shoup's 2d Ma- able assistance by trying to counter - He worried about the 150-yard ga p rines, with 1/8 still attached, woul d attack :' The end result was a dramat- across the runway to Company C , continue to reduce the re-entran t ic change in the combat ratio but that could not be helped . Jones strongpoints . The balance of the 8t h between attackers and survivors th e used a tank to bring a stockpile o f Marines would be shuttled to Bairiki . next day. grenades, small arms ammunition , And the 4th Battalion, 10th Marine s Major Jones sensed his expose d and water to be positioned 50 yard s would land its "heavy" 105mm guns forces would be the likely target fo r behind the lines.

on Green Beach to augment the fire s any Banzai attack and took precau- The first counterattack came a t of the two pack howitzer battalion s tions. Gathering his artillery forward 1930. A force of 50 Japanese infiltrat- already in action . Many of these observers and naval fire control spot- ed past Jones' outposts in the thic k

LEGEND:

♦ Weapon, side notes describe typ e l Covered emplacements A Observation tower Searchlight a Radar vr> Open dispersed stores Fire a Communication trench-built above surfac e Fire a Communication trench-cut below surfac e Buildin g Damaged Building Earth covered structure O Ten t C=9 Excavation Tank tra p

Wooded area (Palms )

BETI O TARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLAND S ATTACK OF THE 2d BN., 8th MARINE S

qa 9 NO 22,19443 340 490 vas .

TAKEN FROM 2d ON 8th MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT. RD 5890

41 At 0400, a force of some 30 0 Japanese launched a frenzied attac k against the same two companies . The Marines met them with every avail - able weapon . Artillery fire from 10t h Marines howitzers on Red Beach Tw o and Bairiki Island rained a murder - ous crossfire . Two destroyers in th e lagoon, Schroeder (DD 301) an d Sigsbee (DD 502), opened up on the flanks. The wave of screaming attackers took hideous casualties bu t kept coming . Pockets of men locked together in bloody hand-to-han d fighting. Private Jack Stambaugh of B Company killed three screamin g Japanese with his bayonet ; an officer Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 6364 0 impaled him with his samurai sword ; Destruction along the eastern end of Red Beach Three leads toward the long pie r another Marine brained the office r in the distant background . Japanese gunners maintained a deadly antiboat fire i n with a rifle butt . First Lieutenant this direction, as witnessed by these two wrecked LVTs and the various sunken craft . Norman K . Thomas, acting com- vegetation and penetrated the borde r A third attack came at 0300 in th e mander of Company B, reache d between the two companies south of morning when the Japanese moved Major Jones on the field phone, ex - the airstrip. Jones' reserve force, com - several 7 .7mm machine guns into claiming "We're killing them as fas t prised of "my mortar platoon and my nearby wrecked trucks and opene d as they come at us, but we can't hol d headquarters cooks and bakers an d fire on the Marine automatic out much longer ; we need reinforcements!" Jones' reply was tough, "W admin people ;" contained the pene - weapons positions. Marine NCOs e haven't got them tration and killed the enemy in tw o volunteered to crawl forward agains t ; you've got to hold!" hours of close-in fighting under the this oncoming fire and lob grenades Jones' Marines lost 40 dead an d leadership of First Lieutenant Lyl e into the improvised machine gun 100 wounded in the wild fighting , "Spook" Specht . An intense fire from nests. This did the job, and the bat- but hold they did . In an hour it wa s the pack howitzers of 1/10 and 2/1 0 tlefield grew silent again . Jones called all over. The supporting arms neve r prevented the Japanese from reinforc- for star shell illumination from th e stopped shooting down the Japanese , ing the penetration . By 2130 the line s destroyers in the lagoon . attacking or retreating . Both destroy- were stabilized . Jones asked Majo r Marines use newly arrived jeeps to carry machine gun ammunition, demolitions, Kyle for a company to be positioned and other ordnance forward from the beach to troops fighting in the front lines . 100 yards to the rear of his lines . The LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio n best Kyle could provide was a composite force of 40 troops from the 2 d Marines .

The Japanese struck Jones' lines again at 2300 . One force made a noisy demonstration across fro m Company A's lines — taunting, clink - ing canteens against their helmets , yelling Banzai! — while a second force attacked Company B with a silen t rush. The Marines repulsed this attack, too, but were forced to use thei r machine guns, thereby revealing thei r positions . Jones asked McLeod for a full company from 3/6 to reinforce the 2d Marines to the rear of th e fighting .

-- - INITIAL LANDIN G ALMMWM POSITIONS AT SUNSE T

INTELLIGENCE MAP BITITU (BETIO) ISLAN D TARAWA ATOLL,GILBERT ISLAND S NOTE : LINES ARE GENERAL INDICATION ONLY . SITUATION 1800 D+ 2 GAPS WERE COVERED BY SMALL GROUP S 500 400 300 200 100 0 1000 YDS AND BY FIRE . SECONDARY LINES WER E ESTABLISHED WHERE POSSIBLE BEHIN D FRONT LINES .

TAKEN FROM 2D MAR DIV SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

RD 5890

ers emptied their magazines of 5-inch Colonel Carlson, "It was the dam - troyed bulk of hostil e shells. The 1st Battalion, 10th Ma- nedest fight I've seen in 30 years of resistance . Expect complete an- rines fired 1,300 rounds that long this business ." nihilation of enemy on Betio night, many shells being unloade d The costly counterattacks durin g this date. Strongly recommend over the pier while the fire missions the night of 22-23 November effec- that you and your chief of staf f were underway . At first light, the tively broke the back of the Japanes e come ashore this date to get in - Marines counted 200 dead Japanes e defense . Had they remained in their formation about the type o f within 50 yards of their lines, plus an bunkers until the bitter end, th e hostile resistance which will be additional 125 bodies beyond tha t defenders probably would have ex - encountered in future oper- range, badly mangled by artillery o r acted a higher toll in American lives. ations. naval gunfire . Other bodies lay scat- Facing inevitable defeat in detail , Meanwhile, following a systemati c tered throughout the Marine lines. however, nearly 600 Japanese chos e preliminary bombardment, the fres h Major Jones had to blink back tears to die by taking the offensive during troops of McLeod's LT 3/6 passe d of pride and grief as he walked hi s the night action . d lines that dawn . Several of his Ma- through Jones' lines and commence The 2d Marine Division still had . By now, Ma- rines grabbed his arm and muttered , their attack to the east five more hours of hard fighting o n rine assault tactics were well refined . "They told us we had to hold, and b y Betio the morning of D+3 before the Led by tanks and combat engineer s God, we held ." island could be conquered. Late in with flamethrowers and high explo- : Completing the Task the morning, General Smith sent thi s sives, the troops of 3/6 made rapid report to Admiral Hill on Maryland: 23—28 November 1943 progress. Only one bunker, a well - "This was not only worse tha n Decisive defeat of enemy armed complex along the north Guadalcanal," admitted Lieutenant counterattack last night des - shore, provided effective opposition .

43 U .S . Navy Combat Art Collectio n "Tarawa No . II," a sketch by combat artist Kerr Eby, reflects throughout the battle . As Gen Julian Smith personally learned , the difficulty in landing reinforcements over the long pier landing across Green Beach took longer but was much safer .

McLeod took advantage of the heav y The Japanese defenders in these po - thoroughly disrupted the landings o f brush along the south shore to sitions were clearly the mos t four different battalions, and the y bypass the obstacle, leaving one ri - disciplined—and the deadliest — o n had very nearly killed General Smit h fle company to encircle and eventu- the island . From these bunkers , the day before . The seaward ap- ally overrun it . Momentum was Japanese antiboat gunners had proaches to these strongpoints wer e maintained; the remaining Japanes e . seemed dispirited . By 1300, McLeo d Marines fire a M-1919A4 machine gun from an improvised "shelter" in the battlefield Department of Defense Photo 6349 5 reached the eastern tip of Betio, having inflicted more than 450 Japanes e casualties at the loss of 34 of his Ma- rines . McLeod's report summarized the general collapse of the Japanes e defensive system in the eastern zon e following the counterattacks : 'At no time was there any determined defen - sive . . . . We used flamethrowers and could have used more . Medium tanks were excellent . My light tanks didn' t fire a shot ." The toughest fight of the fourt h day occurred on the Red Beach One/Two border where Colone l Shoup directed the combined forces of Hays' 1/8 and Schoettel's 3/ 2 against the "re-entrant" strongpoints.

the end . Hays' Marines had been attacking this complex ever since thei r bloody landing on the morning o f D+l . In those 48 hours, 1/8 fire d 54,450 rounds of .30-caliber rifle ammunition . But the real damage was done by the special weapons of th e engineers and the direct fire of th e halftracks. Capture of the largest po - sition, a concrete pillbox near th e beach, enabled easier approaches t o the remaining bunkers . By 1300, i t was all over . At high noon, while the fightin g in both sectors was still underway, a Navy fighter plane landed on Betio' s airstrip, weaving around the Seabe e trucks and graders . Nearby Marine s Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 63455 swarmed over the plane to shake th e A Marine throws a hand grenade during the battle for the interior of the island . pilot's hand . A PB2Y also landed to littered with wrecked LVTs and bloat - ceived to be a lackluster effort on D- take out press reports and the hag- ed bodies . Day, pressed the assault of 3/2 fro m gard observers, including Evans Carl - son and Walter Jordan. Major Hays finally got som e the west and south . To complete th e flamethrowers (from Crowe's encircle, Shoup ordered a platoon of in- Admiral Hill and his staff cam e gineers when LT 2/8 was ordered to fantry and a pair of 75mm half tracks ashore at 1245 . The naval officers stand down), and the attack of 1/ 8 out to the reef to keep the defenders marveled at the great strength of th e from the east made steady, if pains - pinned down from the lagoon . Some Japanese bunker system, realizing im - taking, progress . Major Schoettel , of the Japanese committed hara-kari; mediately the need to reconsider their anxious to atone for what some per - the remainder, exhausted, fought to preliminary bombardment policies .

BETI O LEGEND: ♦ WeoDo . side .a.es descrnbe typ e TARAWA ATOLL, GILBERT ISLANDS • Caertd emDlocemme e ATTACK OF Ist BN, 8th MARINES an Obteccoi~an Ma, d ♦ Seommm m 3d BN, 2d MARINE S - Badd . Doe ' dime,,ed sore MORNING OF NOV. 23, 1943 Pne S Dmdmmscanm Lw Mom .,,me FM B Dommunranm irenc . .cWl bolo. eundc e Bwmmp

Damoped Bwid.,g • Earin +Doted +.ration o tee A Ercavorro n s . Ta pe ~mD

wooded ore. (MIAs)

45 Incident on D+ 3

small incident on the last day of the fighting o n Michelony, "The front bunker opened fire with a machin e Betio cost First Sergeant Lewis J . Michelony, Jr. gun, grenades hailed in from nowhere :' One Marine die d A his sense of smell. Michelony, a member of the instantly; the second escaped, leaving Michelony face dow n 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, was a former boxing champi - in the sand . In desperation, the first sergeant dove into th e on of the Atlantic Fleet and a combat veteran of Guadal - nearest bunker, tumbling through a rear entrance to lan d canal. Later in the Pacific War he would receive two Silve r in what he thought was a pool of water . In the bunker' s Star Medals for conspicuous bravery. On D+3 at Tarawa , dim light, he discovered it was a combination of water , however, he very nearly lost his life. urine, blood, and other material, "some of it from the bod - First Sergeant Michelony accompanied two other Ma- ies of the dead Japanese and some from the live ones ." As rines on a routine reconnaissance of an area east of Gree n he spat out the foul liquid from his mouth, Michelony real - Beach, looking for likely positions to assign the battalio n ized there were live Japanese in among the dead, decaying mortar platoon . The area had been "cleared" by the infan - ones . The smell, taste, and fear he experienced inside th e try companies of the battalion the previous morning . Other bunker were almost overpowering . "Somehow I manage d Marines had passed through the complex of seemingly emp - to get out . To this day, I don't know how . I crawled ou t ty Japanese bunkers without incident . The clearing was lit- of this cesspool dripping wet :' The scorching sun dried hi s tered with Japanese bodies and abandoned enem y utilities as though they had been heavily starched ; they still equipment . The three Marines threw grenades into the firs t stank. "For months after, I could taste and smell, as well bunker they encountered without response . All was quiet. as visualize, this scene:' Fifty years after the incident, re- "Suddenly, out of nowhere, all hell broke loose ;" recalled tired Sergeant Major Michelony still has no sense of smell .

Admiral Hill called Betio "a littl e accurate casualty lists . More casual - Shortly before General Julia n Gibraltar;' and observed that "only ties were expected in the mop-u p Smith's announcement of victory a t the Marines could have made such operations in the surrounding island s Betio, his Army counterpart, Genera l a landing :' and Apamama . Particularly distress- Ralph Smith, signalled "Maki n When Smith received the nearly ing was the report that nearly 100 en- taken!" In three days of sharp fight - simultaneous reports from Colonels listed Marines were missing an d ing on Butaritari Island, the Army Shoup and Holmes that both fina l presumed dead . The changing tide s wiped out the Japanese garrison a t objectives had been seized, he was had swept many bodies of the assaul t the cost of 200 American casualties . able to share the good news with Hill . troops out to sea . The first pilot Bad blood developed betwee n The two had worked together har- ashore reported seeing scores of float- "Howling Mad" Smith and Ralp h moniously to achieve this victory. Be- ing corpses, miles away, over th e Smith over the conduct of this oper- tween them, they drafted a message horizon . ation which would have unfortunat e to Admiral Turner and General Hol- The Japanese garrison was nearl y consequences in a later amphibiou s land Smith announcing the end o f annihilated in the fighting . The Ma- campaign . organized resistance on Betio . It was rines, supported by naval gunfire , The grimy Marines on Betio too k 1305, about 76 hours after PF C carrier aviation, and Army Air Forc e a deep breath and sank to th e Moore first rammed LVT 4-9 ("My units, killed 97 percent of the 4,83 6 ground . Many had been awake since Deloris") onto the seawall on Re d troops estimated to be on Betio dur- the night before the landing . As Cap- Beach One to begin the direct assault. ing the assault . Only 146 prisoners tain Carl Hoffman recalled, "Ther e The stench of death and decay wa s were taken, all but 17 of the m was just no way to rest ; there was vir- overwhelming . "Betio would be more Korean laborers . The Marines cap- tually no way to eat . Mostly it wa s habitable ;" reported Robert Sherrod, tured only one Japanese officer , close, hand-to-hand fighting and sur - "if the Marines could leave for a fe w 30-year-old Kiyoshi Ota fro m vival for three and a half days . It days and send a million buzzards in ." Nagasaki, a Special Duty Ensign i n seemed like the longest period of m y Working parties sought doggedly to the 7th Sasebo Special Landing Force. life:' Lieutenant Lillibridge had n o identify the dead ; often the bodies Ensign Ota told his captors the gar- nourishment at all until the after- were so badly shattered or burned a s rison expected the landings along the noon of D+3. "One of my me n to eliminate distinction betwee n south and southwest sectors instea d mixed up a canteen cup full of ho t friend and foe . Chaplains worke d of the northern beaches . He also water, chocolate, coffee, and sugar, alongside burial teams equipped wit h thought the reef would protect th e and gave it to me, saying he though t bulldozers. General Smith's adminis - defenders throughout periods of low I needed something . It was the best trative staff worked hard to prepare tide . meal I ever had :'

46 The Marines stared numbly at th e does not touch the coral flat a t At this time came the good new s desolation that surrounded them . all . Back of the 77mm gun are from Captain James Jones (brothe r Lieutenant Colonel Russell Lloyd, ex - many hundreds of rounds of to Major' Willie K" Jones) at Apama - ecutive officer of the 6th Marines , 77mm ammunition . ma. Jones' V Amphibious Corp s took a minute to scratch out a hast y Other Japanese forces in the Gil- Reconnaissance Company had land- note to his wife, saying "I'm on Tara- berts exacted a high toll among th e ed by rubber rafts from the transpor t wa in the midst of the worst destruc - invasion force . Six Japanese subma- submarine Nautilus during the night tion I've ever seen ." Chaplain Willard rines reached the area during D+2. of 20-21 November . The small walked along Red Beach One, final- One of these, the 1-175, torpedoe d Japanese garrison at first kept th e ly clear of enemy pillboxes . 'Along the escort carrier Liscome Bay just scouts at bay. The Nautilus then sur- the shore," he wrote, "I counted th e before sunrise on 24 November off faced and bombarded the Japanes e bodies of 76 Marines staring up at Makin . The explosion was terrific — positions with deck guns . This kille d me, half in, half out of the water." Admiral Hill saw the flash at Tara - some of the defenders ; the remainder Robert Sherrod also took the oppor - wa, 93 miles away—and the shi p committed hara-kiri. The island wa s tunity to walk about the island . sank quickly, taking 644 souls to the deemed secure by the 24th . General "What I saw on Betio was, I am cer - bottom. Julian Smith sent General Herml e tain, one of the greatest works of The Marines on Betio conducte d and McLeod's LT 3/6 to take com- devastation wrought by man ." Sher- a joint flag-raising ceremony late r mand of Apamama until bas e rod whistled at the proliferation o f that same morning . Two of the few defense forces could arrive . heavy machine guns and 77mm an- surviving palm trees were selected a s General Smith kept his promise to tiboat guns along the northwes t poles, but the Marines were hard pu t his assault troops at Tarawa . Am- shore. As he described one scene : to find a British flag. Finally, Majo r phibious transports entered the la - Amtrack Number 4-8 i s Holland, the New Zealand office r goon on 24 November an d jammed against the seawall bar- who had proved so prophetic abou t backloaded Combat Teams 2 and 8 . ricade. Three waterlogged Ma- the tides at Tarawa, produced a Un- To Lieutenant Lillibridge, going back rines lie beneath it . Four others ion Jack . A field musician played the on board ship after Betio was like go- are scattered nearby, and ther e appropriate bugle calls ; Marines al l ing to heaven . "The Navy personne l is one hanging on a two-foot- over the small island stood and salut- were unbelievably generous and kin d high strand of barbed wire who ed. Each could reckon the cost . . . . we were treated to a full-scale tur-

One of the few Japanese prisoners taken on Betio this man was captured late in the battle .

LtGen Julian C . Smith Collectio n

47 ny for the 2d Marine Division for th e Tarawa operation . Small elements of these scouts landed on Eita and Buo - ta Islands while the fighting on Be- tio still raged, discovering an d shadowing a sizeable Japanese force . On 23 November, Lieutenan t Colonel Manley Curry's 3d Battalion , 10th Marines, landed on Eita . Th e battalion's pack howitzers were ini- tially intended to augment fires o n Betio ; when that island finally fell , the artillerymen turned their guns t o support the 2d Battalion, 6th Ma- Marine Corps Personal Papers, LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection rines, in clearing the rest of the is- Navy Seabees managed to get their first bulldozer ashore on D-Day . With it, and lands in the atoll . the ones that followed, the Seabees built artillery revetments, smothered enemy Lieutenant Colonel Murray's LT positions, dug mass graves, and rebuilt the damaged runway —all while under fire . 2/6 boarded boats from Betio at 050 0 . . . The Navy officers moved all of them to tears . It was a key dinner . on 24 November and landed on Buo - helped serve the food :' But Lil- dead Marine, leaning forward ta . Murray set a fierce pace, the Ma- libridge, like many other survivin g against the seawall, "one arm stil l rines frequently wading across th e troop leaders, suffered from post- supported upright by the weight o f sandspits that joined the succeedin g his body. On top of the seawall, just combat trauma . The lieutenant ha d islands . Soon he was out of range o f lost over half the members of his pla- beyond his upraised hand, lies a blu e Curry's guns on Eita . Curry detached toon, and he was consumed wit h and white flag, a beach marker to tell Battery G to follow Murray in trace . guilt . succeeding waves where to land ." The Marines learned from friendly With the 2d Marines and 8th Ma- d Holland Smith cleared his throat an natives that a Japanese force of abou t rines off to Hawaii, McLeod's 3/6 en - said, "How can men like that ever b e 175 naval infantry was ahead on the route to Apamama, and Murray's defeated? " larger island of Buariki, near th e 2/6 beginning its long trek through Company D, 2d Tank Battalion , northwest point of the atoll. Murray's the other islands of the Tarawa Atoll, was designated as the scout compa - lead elements caught up with the ene - Major Jones' 1/6 became the last in - fantry unit on Betio. Its work wa s "Ebb Tide—Tarawa," a sketch by Kerr Eby, evokes the tragic view of the beachhead . tedious : burying the dead, flushing U.S . Navy Combat Art Collectio n out die-hard snipers, hosting visiting dignitaries . The first of these was Majo r General Holland Smith . The V Am- phibious Corps Commander flew t o Betio on 24 November and spent a n emotional afternoon viewing the car- nage with Julian Smith . "Howling Mad" Smith was shaken by the ex - perience. In his words : The sight of our dead floating in the waters of the lagoon and lying along the blood - soaked beaches is one I will neve r forget. Over the pitted, blasted island hung a miasma of coral dust an d death, nauseating and horrifying ." Major Jones recalled that Hollan d Smith had tears in his eyes as h e walked through the ruins . Robert Sherrod also accompanied the gener- als. They came upon one sight that

48 my at dusk on 26 November . There dearly bought : 32 officers and me n David Monroe Shoup received th e was a sharp exchange of fire in ver y killed, 59 others wounded . The fol- Medal of Honor. Major "Jim" Crow e thick vegetation before both side s lowing day, the Marines crossed t o and his executive officer, Major Bil l broke contact . Murray positioned his the last remaining islet . There were Chamberlin, received the Navy forces for an all-out assault in th e no more Japanese to be found . On Cross . So did Lieutenant Colonel morning . 28 November, Julian Smith an- Herb Amey (posthumously), Major The battle of Buariki on 27 nounced "remaining enemy forces o n Mike Ryan, and Corporal John Spil- November was the last engagemen t Tarawa wiped out ." lane, the LVT crewchief and prospec- in the Gilberts, and it was just a s Admirals Nimitz and Spruanc e tive baseball star who caught th e deadly as each preceding encounter came to Betio just before Julia n Japanese hand grenades in mid-air o n with the Special Naval Landing Smith's announcement . Nimitz D-Day before his luck ran out . Forces. Murray attacked the Japanes e quickly saw that the basic Japanes e Some of the senior officers in th e defensive positions at first light, get- defenses were still intact . He direct- division were jealous of Shoup's Me- ting one salvo of supporting fire fro m ed his staff to diagnose the exact con - dal of Honor, but Julian Smith knew Battery G before the lines become to o struction methods used ; within a full well whose strong shoulders ha d intermingled in the extended melee . month an identical set of bunkers an d borne the critical first 36 hours of the Here the fighting was similar to pillboxes was being built on the naval assault. Shoup was philosophical . As Guadalcanal : much hand-to-han d bombardment island of Kahoolawe he recorded in his combat notebook , brawling in tangled underbrush . The in the Hawaiian Islands . "With God and the U .S. Navy in Japanese had no elaborate defenses Admiral Nimitz paused to presen t direct support of the 2d MarDi v as on Betio, but the Imperial sea sold- the first of many combat awards t o there was never any doubt that we iers took advantage of cover and con - Marines of the 2d Marine Division . would get Betio . For several hours , cealment, made every shot count , In time, other recognition followed . however, there was considerable hag - and fought to the last man . All 175 The entire division was awarded th e gling over the exact price we were to were slain . Murray's victory was Presidential Unit Citation . Colonel pay for it ." MajGen Julian C . Smith, wearing helmet liner at center, Robert Richardson during their visit to the island on 2 7 describes the nature of the recently completed conquest of Beti o November 1943 . An exhausted Col Edson looks on at right. to Adm Chester Nimitz, facing camera, and Army LtGen While they talked, the smell of death pervaded over the island .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 65437

49 The Significance of Tarawa it was the headline writers for both rive Corps waited until 10 days af - papers who did the most damag e ter the battle to release casualty lists . The costs of the forcible seizure o f "Grim Tarawa Defens e Tarawa were two-fold: the loss o f (The Times: The atmosphere in both Washing - Marines in the assault itself, followe d a Surprise, Eyewitness of Battle Rev - ton and Pearl Harbor was particular- eals; Marines Went in Chuckling, To by the shock and despair of the na - ly tense during this period . Genera l Find Swift Death Instead of Easy tion upon hearing the reports of th e MacArthur, still bitter that the 2 d Conquest .") . battle. The gains at first seemed smal l Marine Division had been take n in return, the "stinking little island " Nor did extemporaneous remarks from his Southwest Pacific Com- of Betio, 8,000 miles from Tokyo . In to the media by some of the senio r mand, wrote the Secretary of Wa r time, the practical lessons learned in Marines involved in Operation Gal - complaining that "these frontal at - the complex art of amphibious as - vanic help soothe public concerns. tacks by the Navy, as at Tarawa, ar e sault began to outweigh the initial Holland Smith likened the D-Day as- a tragic and unnecessary massacre of adverse publicity. sault to Pickett's Charge at Gettys - American lives : A woman wrote Ad - e - The final casualty figures for th e burg . "Red Mike" Edson said th miral Nimitz accusing him of "mur e 2d Marine Division in Operatio n assault force "paid the stiffest pric dering my son ." Secretary of the in human life per square yard" a t Navy Frank Knox called a press con - Galvanic were 997 Marines and 3 0 t ference in which he blamed "a sud- sailors (organic medical personnel ) Tarawa than any other engagemen - g dead; 88 Marines missing and pre - in Marine Corps history. Evans Carl den shift in the wind" for exposin son talked graphically of seeing 100 the reef and preventing reinforce - sumed dead ; and 2,233 Marines and 59 sailors wounded . Total casualties: of Hays men gunned down in th e ments from landing . Congress pro - D+1, a con- posed a special investigation . The 3,407. The Guadalcanal campaig n water in five minutes on t Marines were fortunate to hav e had cost a comparable amount o f siderable exaggeration. It did no Marine casualties over six months; help matters when Headquarters Ma- General Alexander A . Vandegrift i n Tarawa 's losses occurred in a perio d A Marine combat correspondent assigned to the Tarawa operation interviews a Ma- of 76 hours . Moreover, the ratio o f rine from the 18th Engineers, 2d Marine Division, during the course of the fighting . killed to wounded at Tarawa was sig- LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection nificantly high, reflecting th e savagery of the fighting . The overall proportion of casualties among thos e Marines engaged in the assault was about 19 percent, a steep but "accept- able" price . But some battalions suffered much higher losses . The 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion los t over half the command . The battal - ion also lost all but 35 of the 12 5 LVT's employed at Betio . Lurid headlines ='The Bloody Beaches of Tarawa"— alarmed Ameri - can newspaper readers . Part of this was the Marines' own doing. Many of the combat correspondents invit- ed along for Operation Galvanic ha d shared the very worst of the hell o f Betio the first 36 hours, and they sim - ply reported what they observed . Such was the case of Marine Corp s Master Technical Sergeant James C. Lucas, whose accounts of the fighting received front-page coverage i n both The Washington Post and The New York Times on 4 December 1943 . Colonel Shoup was furiou s with Lucas for years thereafter, but

50 Tarawa Today

-- \1 arawa is one of the few Pacific battlefields that re- 6,000 Japanese and Americans died on the tiny island i n mained essentially unchanged for the half centur y 76 hours of fighting . that followed World War II . Visitors to Betio Is- Twenty years after Shoup's dedication ceremony, th e land can readily see wrecked American tanks and LVT s American memorial had fallen into disrepair; indeed, it was along the beaches, as well as the ruins of Japanese gun em - in danger of being torn down to make room for a cold - placements and pill boxes . Admiral Shibasaki's imposing storage plant for Japanese fishermen . A lengthy campaign concrete bunker still stands, seemingly as impervious t o by the 2d Marine Division Association and Long Beach - time as it was to the battleship guns of Task Force 53 . The journalist Tom Hennessy raised enough funds to obtain a "Singapore Guns" still rest in their turrets overlooking th e new, more durable monument, a nine-ton block of Geor - approaches to the island . A few years ago, natives un - gia granite inscribed "To our fellow Marines who gave earthed a buried LVT containing the skeletons of its Ma - their all :' The memorial was dedicated on 20 November . rine Corps crew, one still wearing dog tags. 1988. General David M . Shoup was recalled from retiremen t Betio is now part of the new Republic of Kiribati . Touris t to active duty for nine days in 1968 to represent the Unit- facilities are being developed to accommodate the larg e ed States at the dedication of a large monument on Betio , number of veterans who wish to return . For now, the smal l commemorating the 25th anniversary of the battle . As island probably resembles the way it appeared on D-Day , Shoup later told The National Observer, "My first reac- 50 years ago . American author James Ramsey Ullman visit- tion was that Betio had shrunk a great deal . It seems smaller ed Tarawa earlier and wrote a fitting eulogy : "It is a familiar in peace than in war:' As he toured the ruined fortifications, irony that old battlefields are often the quietest and gent- Shoup recalled the savage, desperate fighting and wondere d lest of places . It is true of Gettysburg . It is true of Cannae , "why two nations would spend so much for so little :' Nearly Chalons, Austerlitz, Verdun . And it is true of Tarawa :'

Washington as the newly appointed zure of Tarawa . Photo-reconnais - LVT-1s and LVT-2s employed in the 18th Commandant. Vandegrift, th e sance and attack aircraft from th e operation were marginal agains t widely respected and highly decorat- captured airfields at Betio an d heavy defensive fires . The Alligators ed veteran of Guadalcanal, quietl y Apamama provided invaluable sup - needed more armor, heavier arma - reassured Congress, pointing out tha t port . Of greater significance to suc - ment, more powerful engines, aux - "Tarawa was an assault from begin- cess in the Marshalls were the lessons iliary bilge pumps, self-sealing ga s ning to end :' The casualty report s learned and the confidence gleane d tanks — and wooden plugs the size o f proved to be less dramatic than ex - from the Tarawa experience . 13mm bullets to keep from being pected . A thoughtful editorial in th e Henry I . Shaw, Jr., for many years sunk by the Japanese M93 heavy 27 December 1943 issue of The New the Chief Historian of the Marine machine guns . Most of all, there York Times complimented the Ma- Corps, observed that Tarawa was th e needed to be many more LVTs, a t rines for overcoming Tarawa' s primer, the textbook on amphibiou s least 300 per division . Shoup want- sophisticated defenses and fanatica l assault that guided and influenced all ed to keep the use of LVTs as reef- garrison, warning that future assaults subsequent landings in the Central crossing assault vehicles a secret, bu t in the Marshalls might result in heav- Pacific. Shaw believed that the there had been too many reporters o n ier losses . "We must steel ourselve s prompt and selfless analyses which the scene . Hanson W. Baldwin broke now to pay that price:' immediately followed Tarawa were the story in The New York Times as The controversy was stirred agai n of great value : "From analytical early as 3 December . after the war when General Hollan d reports of the commanders and fro m Naval gunfire support got mixe d Smith claimed publicly that "Taraw a their critical evaluations of what reviews . While the Marines were en - was a mistake!" Significantly, Nimitz , went wrong, of what needed im- thusiastic about the response fro m Spruance, Turner, Hill, Julian Smith , provement, and of what technique s destroyers in the lagoon, they wer e and Shoup disagreed with that as - and equipment proved out in com - critical of the extent and accuracy of sessment . bat, came a tremendous outpourin g the preliminary bombardment, espe- Admiral Nimitz did not waver. of lessons learned " cially when it was terminated s o "The capture of Tarawa," he stated , All participants agreed that th e prematurely on D-Day. In Majo r "knocked down the front door to th e conversion of logistical LVTs to as - Ryan's evaluation, the significant Japanese defenses in the Central Pa - sault craft made the difference be- shortcoming in Operation Galvanic cific:' Nimitz launched the Marshalls tween victory and defeat at Betio . "lay in overestimating the damage campaign only 10 weeks after the sei - There was further consensus that the that could be inflicted on a heavil y

51 defended position by an intense bu t proper combined arms training, th e American amphibious doctrine wa s limited naval bombardment, and b y new medium tanks would be valua- valid, that even the strongest islan d not sending in the assault forces soo n ble assets . Future tank training woul d fortress could be seized ." enough after the shelling ." Majo r emphasize integrated tank, infantry , The subsequent landings in the Schoettel, recalling the pounding hi s engineer, and artillery operations . Marshalls employed this doctrine, as battalion had received from emplace - Tank-infantry communications need- modified by the Tarawa experience , ments within the seawall, recom - ed immediate improvement . Mos t to achieve objectives against simila r mended direct fire against the face of casualties among tank commanders targets with fewer casualties and i n the beach by 40mm guns from close - at Betio resulted from the individu - less time. The benefits of Operation in destroyers . The hasty, saturatio n als having to dismount from their ve - Galvanic quickly began to outweig h fires, deemed sufficient by planner s hicles to talk with the infantry in the the steep initial costs . in view of the requirement for stra - open . In time, Tarawa became a symbo l tegic surprise, proved essentially use - The backpack flamethrower wo n of raw courage and sacrifice on th e less. Amphibious assaults agains t universal acclaim from the Marine s part of attackers and defenders alike . fortified atolls would most of all nee d on Betio . Each battalion commander Ten years after the battle, Genera l sustained, deliberate, aimed fire . recommended increases in quantity, Julian Smith paid homage o both While no one questioned the brav- range, and mobility for these assaul t sides in an essay in Naval Institute ery of the aviators who supported th e weapons. Some suggested that larg - Proceedings . He saluted the heroism Betio assault, many questione d er versions be mounted on tanks an d of the Japanese who chose to di e whether they were armed and trained LVTs, presaging the appearance of almost to the last man . Then h e adequately for such a difficult target . "Zippo Tanks" in later campaigns i n turned to his beloved 2d Marine Di - The need for closer integration of all the Pacific. vision and their shipmates in Tas k supporting arms was evident . Julian Smith rather humbl y Force 53 at Betio: Communications throughout th e summed up the lessons learned a t For the officers and men, Ma- Betio assault were awful. Only th e Tarawa by commenting, "We mad e rines and sailors, who crossed ingenuity of a few radio operators fewer mistakes than the Japs did ." that reef, either as assaul t and the bravery of individual runners Military historians Jeter A . Isel y troops, or carrying supplies, or kept the assault reasonably coherent . and Philip A . Crowl used differen t evacuating wounded I can onl y The Marines needed waterproof ra - words of assessment : "The capture of say that I shall forever think o f dios . The Navy needed a dedicate d Tarawa, in spite of defects in execu - them with a feeling of reverence amphibious command ship, not a tion, conclusively demonstrated that and the greatest respect . major combatant whose big guns Themes underlying the enduring legacy of Tarawa are : the tide that failed; tactica l would knock out the radio nets wit h assault vehicles that succeeded; a high cost in men and material ; which in the end each salvo. Such command ships, the spelled out victory in the Central Pacific and a road that led to Tokyo . AGCs, began to appear during the Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 63843 Marshalls campaign . Other revisions to amphibiou s doctrine were immediately indicated . The nature and priority of unloading supplies should henceforth become the call of the tactica l commander ashore, not the amphibious task force commander . Betio showed the critical need fo r underwater swimmers who coul d stealthily assess and report reef, beach, and surf conditions to the task force before the landing . This con- cept, first envisioned by amphibiou s warfare prophet Major Earl "Pete" El - lis in the 1920s, came quickly to fru- ition . Admiral Turner had a fledgling Underwater Demolition Team o n hand for the Marshalls . The Marines believed that, with

52 Sources About the Autho r Much of this history is based on first-hand ac - counts as recorded by the surviving participants . olonel Joseph H . Alexander, USMC (Ret), One rich source is contained in the USMC archives maintained by the Washington National Record s C served 29 years on active duty as an assaul t Group in Suitland, Maryland . Of special value are amphibian officer, including two tours in Viet- the 2d Marine Division's Operations Order 1 4 nam . He earned an undergraduate degree in his- (25Oct43) and Special Action Report (6Jan44) . Other useful documents in the archives include th e tory from the University of North Carolina an d combat reports of 2d Tank Battalion and 2d Am- masters' degrees in history and government fro m phibian Tractor Battalion ; the Division D-3 Jour- Georgetown and Jacksonville . He is a distinguish- nal for 20-24Nov43; the D-2 POW Interrogatio n ed graduate of the Naval War College, a membe Reports; "comments on equipment and procedures " r by the battalion commanders ; and the exhaustive of the Society for Military History, and a lif e intelligence report, "Study of Japanese Defenses on member of the Marine Corps Historical Foun- Betio Island" (20Dec43) . The Marine Corps Histor- dation . ical Center's Personal Papers Collection contain s s Colonel Shoup's combat notebook, as well as hi Colonel Alexander, an independent historian, is the author of military essay s after-action report, comments during the Pear l Harbor conference on LVTs, comments on draft his- published in Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval History , tories in 1947 and 1963, and his remarks for th e Leatherneck, Amphibious Warfare Review, and Florida Historical Quarterly . He . A record at various anniversaries of the battle is co-author (with Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L . Bartlett) of " Sea Soldiers in th e lengthy account of the Betio assault is found in the transcript of Colonel Merritt Edson's briefing to th e Cold War" (Naval Institute Press, accepted) . staff officers of the Marine Corps Schools after the battle (6Jan44) . The Personal Papers Collection als o includes worthwhile Tarawa accounts by Genera l Julian C . Smith, 2dLt George D. Lillibridge, lstLt Frank Plant, and LtCol Russell Lloyd, used herein . Other useful Tarawa information can be gleane d from the MCHC 's Oral History Collection, whic h contains recollections by such participants a s General Smith ; Eugene Boardman; Major Henry P. Crowe ; Staff Sergeant Norman Hatch ; Brigadier General Leo Hermle; Admiral Harry Hill, USN ; Captain Carl Hoffman ; Major Wood Kyle ; Major William K . Jones ; and Lieutenant Colonel Ray - 1945 1991 mond L . Murray. Other contemporary accounts in - WORLD WAR II clude newspaper essays written by wa r correspondents on the scene, such as Robert Sher - rod, Richard Johnston, Keith Wheeler, and Ear l THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U .S . Marines in the Wilson . World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines b y The author also benefitted from direct cor - respondence with four retired Marines who served the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U .S . Marine Corps , with valor at Tarawa : Lieutenant General William Washington, D.C., as a part of the U .S . Department of Defense observanc e K . Jones ; Major General Michael P. Ryan ; Sergeant of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war . Major Lewis J . Michelony, Jr. ; and Master Sergeant Edward J . Moore . Further, the author gratefully Printing costs for this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by the Defens e acknowledges the donation of two rare photo - Department World War II Commemoration Committee . Editorial costs o f graphs of the Japanese garrison on Betio by the preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by a bequest from th e 2d Marine Division Association . estate of Emilie H . Watts, in memory of her late husband, Thomas M. Watts, Errata who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a Purple Heart . Please make the following changes in the Worl d WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES War II 50th anniversary commemorative mono- graph noted : DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUM S Opening Moves: Marines Gear Up For Wa r Brigadier General Edwin H . Simmons, USMC (Ret) Page 16, the correct armament for the Grumann F4F Wildcat is two .50-caliber machine gun s GENERAL EDITOR , mounted in each wing instead of four. WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES First Offensive: The Marine Campaign fo r Benis M . Fran k Guadalcanal CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTAN T Page 43, the correct hull number for the cruise r George C . MacGillivray Atlanta should be CL(AA) 51 instead of CL 104 . Outpost in the Atlantic: Marines in the Defens e EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIO N of Icelan d Robert E. Struder, Senior Editor ; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Informatio n Photographs accredited to the Col Chester M . Specialist ; Catherine A . Kerns, Composition Services Technician Craig Collection should be accredited instead t o r the Col Clifton M . Craig Collection . Marine Corps Historical Cente Page 5, sidebar on "Uniforms and Equipment"- Building 58, Washington Navy Yard the enlisted Marine wore an almost black cow-ski n Washington, D.C . 20374-0580 belt called a "fair leather belt" instead of " . . a wide cordovan leather 'Peter Bain' " belt . 1993 Page 8 and passim, the British division base d PCN 190 003120 0 0 on Iceland was the 49th Division, not the 79th Di - vision .