Across the Reef: The Marine Assault of Tarawa by Colonel Joseph H . Alexander, USMC (Ret) n August 1943, to meet momentous . The Tarawa operatio n The Yogaki Plan was the Japanese in secret with Majo r became a tactical watershed: the first , strategy to defend eastern Microne- General Julian C . large-scale test of American amphibi- sia from an Allied invasion . Japanese I Smith and his principal ous doctrine against a strongly for - commanders agreed to counterattac k staff officers of the 2 d tified beachhead . The Marine assault with bombers, submarines, and th e Marine Division, Vice Admiral Ray- on Betio was particularly bloody. Te n main battle fleet . Admiral Chester W. mond A. Spruance, commanding th e days after the assault, Time magazine Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacif- Central Pacific Force, flew to New published the first of many post- ic Fleet/Commander in Chief, Pacifi c Zealand from Pearl Harbor . Spru- battle analyses : Ocean Areas (CinCPac/CinCPOA) , ance told the Marines to prepare fo r took these capabilities seriously. Last week some 2,000 o r an amphibious assault agains t Nimitz directed Spruance to "get th e 3,000 United States Marines, Japanese positions in the Gilbert Is - hell in and get the hell out!" Spruanc e most of them now dead o r lands in November. in turn warned his subordinates t o wounded, gave the nation a The Marines knew about the Gil - seize the target islands in the Gilbert s name to stand beside those o f berts. The 2d Raider Battalion under "with lightning speed ." This sense o f Concord Bridge, the Bon Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson urgency had a major influence on the Homme Richard, the Alamo, had attacked Makin Atoll a yea r Tarawa campaign . Little Big Horn and Bellea u earlier . Subsequent intelligenc e The Joint Chiefs of Staff assigne d Wood. The name was "Tarawa ." reports warned that the Japanese ha d the code name Galvanic to the cam- fortified Betio Island in Tarawa Atoll, Setting the Stage paign to capture Tarawa, Makin, and where elite forces guarded a ne w Apamama in the Gilberts . The 2 d bomber strip. Spruance said Beti o The Gilbert Islands consist of 1 6 Marine Division was assigned Tara- would be the prime target for the 2 d scattered atolls lying along the equa- wa and Apamama (a company-sized Marine Division . tor in the Central Pacific. Tarawa operation) ; the Army's 165t h General Smith's operations officer , Atoll is 2,085 miles southwest o f Regimental Combat Team of the 27t h Lieutenant Colonel David M. Shoup, Pearl Harbor and 540 miles southeas t Infantry Division would tackle studied the primitive chart of Beti o of Kwajalein in the Marshalls . Beti o Makin . and saw that the tiny island was sur - is the principal island in the atoll . By coincidence, each of the thre e rounded by a barrier reef . Shou p The Japanese seized Tarawa an d landing force commanders in Oper - asked Spruance if any of the Navy' s Makin from the British within the ation Galvanic was a major general experimental, shallow-draft, plasti c first three days after Pearl Harbor. named Smith . The senior of these boats could be provided . "Not avail- Carlson's brief raid in August 194 2 was a Marine, Holland M . "Howlin g able;" replied the admiral, "expec t caused the Japanese to realize thei r Mad" Smith, commanding V Am- only the usual wooden landing craft ." vulnerability in the Gilberts . Short- phibious Corps . Julian C. Smith Shoup frowned . General Smith could ly after the raid, the 6th Yokosuka commanded the 2d Marine Division . sense that Shoup's gifted mind was Special Naval Landing Force arrived Army Major General Ralph C . Smith already formulating a plan . in the islands . With them came Rea r commanded the 27th Infantry Di - The results of that plan wer e Admiral Tomanari Saichiro, a super b vision. engineer, who directed the construc- Spruance assigned Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly "Terrible" Turner, LtGen Julian C . Smith Collection tion of sophisticated defensive posi- On the cover : "Quiet Lagoon" is a classic tions on Betio . Saichiro 's primary veteran of the Guadalcanal cam- end-of-battle photograph of the consid- goal was to make Betio so formida- paign, to command all amphibiou s erable wreckage along Red Beach Two . ble that an American assault woul d forces for the operation . Turner, ac- - companied by Holland Smith, decid- U .S. Navy Combat Art Collectio n be stalled at the water's edge, allow ed to command the northern group, At left: Artist Kerr Eby, who landed a t ing time for the other elements of th e Tarawa as a participant, entitled this Yogaki ("Waylaying Attack") Plan to Task Force 52, for the assault o n sketch "Bullets and Barbed Wire ." destroy the landing force . Makin . Turner assigned Rear Ad- 1 Marine Corps Personal Papers, Boardman Collectio n Japanese Special Naval Landing Force troops mount a British- do before the battle. This film was developed from a Japanese made, Vickers eight-inch naval cannon into its turret on Be- camera found in the ruins while the battle was still on . miral Harry W. "Handsome Harry" Drewes liked the idea, but warned did not dispute the Marines' need fo r Hill to command the southern group , Shoup that many of his vehicles wer e a reef-crossing capability, he object- Task Force 53, for the assault o n in poor condition after the Guadal - ed to the fact that the new vehicle s Tarawa . Julian Smith would accom - canal campaign. At best, Drewes would have to be carried to Taraw a pany Hill on board the old battleship could provide a maximum of 75 ve- in tank landing ships (LSTs) . The USS Maryland (BB 46) . The two hicles, not nearly enough to carry the slow speed of the LSTs (8.5 knots officers were opposites—Hill, out- entire assault and following waves . max) would require a separate con - spoken and impetuous; Julian Smith , Further, the thin hulls of the vehicles voy, additional escorts, and an in - reserved and reflective—but the y were vulnerable to every enemy creased risk of losing the element o f worked together well . Spruance se t weapon and would require som e strategic surprise . Holland Smit h D-Day for 20 November 1943 . form of jury-rigged armor plating fo r reduced the debate to bare essentials : Colonel Shoup came up with a n minimal protection . Shoup en- "No LVTs, no operation ." Turner ac- idea of how to tackle Betio's barrie r couraged Drewes to modify the ve- quiesced, but it was not a complete reefs . He had observed the Marines' hicles with whatever armor plate h e victory for the Marines . Half of the new Landing Vehicle Tracked (LV T could scrounge . 100 new LVT-2s would go to the Army forces landing at Maki n or 'Alligator"), an amphibian tractor, General Julian Smith was aware against much lighter opposition . The in operation during Guadalcanal . that a number of LVT-2s were stock - 50 Marine vehicles would not arrive The Alligators were unarmored logis - piled in San Diego, and he submit- in time for either work-up trainin g tic vehicles, not assault craft, bu t ted an urgent request for 100 of th e or the rehearsal landings . The firs t they were true amphibians, capabl e newer models to the corps com- time the infantry would lay eyes o n of being launched at sea and swim- mander. Holland Smith endorsed the the LVT-2s would be in the pre-daw n ming ashore through moderate surf. request favorably, but Admiral Turn- hours of D-Day at Tarawa — if then . Shoup discussed the potential us e er disagreed . The two strong-wille d of LVTs as assault craft with Majo r officers were doctrinally equal dur- Assault Preparation s Henry C . Drewes, commanding th e ing the planning phase, and the ar - As replacement troops began t o 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion . gument was intense . While Turner pour into New Zealand, General 2 Smith requested the assignment o f contained no natural elevation higher where there were pillboxes, nearl y Colonel Merritt A . "Red Mike" Ed- than 10 feet above sea level . "Every 500 of them, most fully covered b y son as division chief of staff. The place on the island can be covered by logs, steel plates and sand . fiery Edson, already a legend in th e direct rifle and machine gun fire," ob - The Japanese on Betio wer e Corps for his heroic exploits in Cen- served Edson . equipped with eight-inch, turret- tral America and Guadalcanal , The elaborate defenses prepared mounted naval rifles (the so-called worked tirelessly to forge the amal - by Admiral Saichiro were impressive . "Singapore Guns"), as well as a larg e gam of veterans and newcomers into Concrete and steel tetrahedrons , number of heavy-caliber coas t an effective amphibious team . minefields, and long strings o f defense, antiaircraft, antiboat, an d Intelligence reports from Beti o double-apron barbed wire protecte d field artillery guns and howitzers . were sobering. The island, devoid o f beach approaches . The Japanese als o Dual-purpose 13mm heavy machin e natural defilade positions and nar - built a barrier wall of logs and cora l guns were prevalent . Light tanks row enough to limit maneuver room, around much of the island . Tank (mounting 37mm guns), 50mm "knee favored the defenders . Betio was les s traps protected heavily fortified com - mortars ;" and an abundance of than three miles long, no broade r mand bunkers and firing position s 7.7mm light machine guns com- than 800 yards at its widest point and inland from the beach .