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JOI Volume 5 Issue 2 Cover and Front Matter
17441374_5-2.qxd 6/25/09 4:00 PM Page 1 Journal of ISSN 1744-1374 Economics Institutional of Journal Institutional Journal of Economics vol 5 • no 2 • AUGUST 2009 Institutional Economics Contents 137 Knowledge and the theory of institutional change vol 5 • no 2 • AUGUST 2009 Thráinn Eggertsson 151 Comparing theories of institutional change Chris Kingston and Gonzalo Caballero 181 Institutions and US regional development: a study of Massachusetts and Virginia Sukkoo Kim 207 Does institutional quality affect capital mobility? Evidence from developing countries Javed Younas 225 Comparative urban institutions and intertemporal externality: a revisit of the 5 • no 2 AUGUSTvol 2009 Coase conjecture Feng Deng Fragment 251 Self-deceit and self-serving bias: Adam Smith on ‘General Rules’ Elias L. Khalil Cambridge Journals Online For further information about this journal please go to the journal website at: journals.cambridge.org/joi Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.35.76, on 28 Sep 2021 at 20:26:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137409001258 17441374_5-2.qxd 6/25/09 4:00 PM Page 2 Journal of Institutional Economics Journal of Institutional Economics editors statement of aims submission of articles subscriptions copying issn Institutions are the stuff of social and institutions and organizations. The Journal of Institutional Economics ( Geoffrey M. Hodgson (Editor-in-Chief) Submission should be made electronically to This journal is registered with the Copyright economic life. The importance of The Journal of Institutional Economics is an 1744-1374) is published three times a year, The Business School the Editor-in-Chief, Geoffrey Hodgson, via Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, understanding the role of institutions in interdisciplinary journal that will be of interest April, August and December. -
The Public Option in Housing Finance
The Public Option in Housing Finance Adam J. Levitin†* and Susan M. Wachter** The U.S. housing finance system presents a conundrum for the scholar of regulation because it defies description using the traditional regulatory vocabulary of command-and-control, taxation, subsidies, cap-and-trade permits, and litigation. Instead, since the New Deal, the housing finance market has been regulated primarily by government participation in the market through a panoply of institutions. The government’s participation in the market has shaped the nature of the products offered in the market. We term this form of regulation “public option” regulation. This Article presents a case study of this “public option” as a regulatory mode. It explains the public option’s rise as a governmental gap-filling response to market failures. The public option, however, took on a life of its own as the federal government undertook financial innovations that the private market had eschewed, in particular the development of the “American mortgage” — a long-term, fixed-rate fully amortizing mortgage. These innovations were trend-setting and set the tone for entire housing finance market, serving as functional regulation. The public option was never understood as a regulatory system due to its ad hoc nature. As a result, its integrity was not protected. Key parts of the system were privatized without a substitution of alternative regulatory measures. The consequence was a return to the very market failures that led to the public option in the first place, followed by another round of ad hoc public options in housing finance. This history suggests that an † Copyright © 2013 Adam J. -
State Failure in Developing Countries and Strategies of Institutional Reform
State Failure in Developing Countries and Strategies of Institutional Reform Mushtaq H. Khan Department of Economics, SOAS, University of London. Abstract: The analysis of state failure and the policy debate have been driven by two very different underlying views of what the state does. The first, which we call the “service- delivery” view says the role of the state is to provide law and order, stable property rights, key public goods and welfarist redistributions. In failing to provide these, state failure contributes to economic under-performance and poverty. State failure of this type is in turn related to an inter-dependent constellation of governance failures including corruption and rent-seeking, distortions in markets and the absence of democracy. All of these need to be addressed to focus the state on its core service-delivery tasks. The second locates the developing country state in the context of “social transformation”: the dramatic transition these countries are going through as traditional production systems collapse and a capitalist economy begins to emerge. Dynamic transformation states have heavily intervened in property rights and devised rent-management systems to accelerate the capitalist transition and the acquisition of new technologies. State failure according to this view has been driven by the lack of institutional capacities in these respects, and more importantly, the incompatibility of institutional capacities with pre-existing distributions of power. An examination of the econometric data and historical evidence raises serious doubts as to whether the governance reforms suggested by the first view can improve growth, while the need for reforms identified by the second view are much better supported. -
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VOLUME 83 • NUMBER 12 • DECEMBER 1997 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, WASHINGTON, D.C. PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE Joseph R. Coyne, Chairman • S. David Frost • Griffith L. Garwood • Donald L. Kohn • J. Virgil Mattingly, Jr. • Michael J. Prell • Richard Spillenkothen • Edwin M. Truman The Federal Reserve Bulletin is issued monthly under the direction of the staff publications committee. This committee is responsible for opinions expressed except in official statements and signed articles. It is assisted by the Economic Editing Section headed by S. Ellen Dykes, the Graphics Center under the direction of Peter G. Thomas, and Publications Services supervised by Linda C. Kyles. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Table of Contents 947 TREASURY AND FEDERAL RESERVE OPEN formance can improve investor and counterparty MARKET OPERATIONS decisions, thus improving market discipline on banking organizations and other companies, During the third quarter of 1997, the dollar before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, appreciated 5.0 percent against the Japanese yen Securities and Government Sponsored Enter- and 0.8 percent against the German mark. On a prises of the House Committee on Banking and trade-weighted basis against other Group of Ten Financial Services, October 1, 1997. currencies, the dollar appreciated 1.4 percent. The U.S. monetary authorities did not undertake 96\ Theodore E. Allison, Assistant to the Board of any intervention in the foreign exchange mar- Governors for Federal Reserve System Affairs, kets during the quarter. reports on the Federal Reserve's plans for deal- ing with some new-design $50 notes that 953 STAFF STUDY SUMMARY were imperfectly printed, including the Federal Reserve's view of the quality and quantity of In The Cost of Implementing Consumer Finan- $50 notes currently being produced by the cial Regulations, the authors present results for Bureau of Engraving and Printing, the options U.S. -
Data Appendix
Data Appendix Figure A.1 Real Gross National Product During the Antebellum Era: 1834–1859 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1834 1836 1838 1840 1842 1844 1846 1848 1850 1852 1854 18561858 Source: Historical Statistics, Series Ca219. Figure A.2 Selected U.S. Male Occupations: Selected Years, 1800–1960 80000 70000 Total 60000 Agriculture 50000 40000 Mining 30000 Construction 20000 Manufacturing 10000 0 Trade 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 Source: Historical Statistics, Series Ba814, Ba817, Ba819, Ba820, BA821, Ba824, Ba825, Ba826. Note: In thousands. 248 Source Source Note Source Figure A.5 Figure A.4 Figure A.3 : ThisistheSchwert’sIndexofCommonStock. : HistoricalStatistics,SeriesAa36,Aa46, Aa56. : HistoricalStatistics,SeriesCh411. : HistoricalStatistics,SeriesCj979. 100000000 150000000 200000000 250000000 300000000 100000 120000 10 12 14 16 50000000 20000 40000 60000 80000 0 2 4 6 8 0 1802 0 U.S. PopulationforSelectedYears:1790–1990 Total NumberofU.S.BusinessFailures:1857–1997 1805 Stock IndexDuringtheAntebellumEra:1802–1870 1857 1790 1830 1860 1890 1920 1950 1990 1808 1863 1869 1811 1875 1814 1881 1817 1887 1820 1893 1823 1899 1826 1905 1829 1911 1832 1917 1835 1923 1838 1929 1841 1935 1941 1844 1947 1847 1953 1850 1959 1853 Total RuralPopulation Total UrbanPopulation Total Population Total 1965 1856 Data Appendix 1971 1859 1977 1862 1983 1865 1989 1995 1868 249 Note Source Note Source Figure A.8 up totheGreatDepression:1869–1929 Figure A.7 250 Source: Figure A.6 : ThisistheIndustrialsIndex. : ThisdataisfromGallman-Kuznetsestimationandin1929dollars. -
Masahiko Aoki
Masahiko Aoki (Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor Emeritus of Japanese Studies, Economics Department, and Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, Director of the Virtual Center for Advanced Studies in Institution, Tokyo Foundation). Remarks on “Liberté, Egalité and Fraternité” by Professor Kornai at the conference in honor of Professor Wu Jinglian In honor of the 80 th birthday of Professor Wu, Professor Janos Kornai aptly takes up the fundamental social values of “Liberté, Egalité and Fraternité”, the revolutionary motto of the French revolution, as the theme of his contribution. He examines the achievement of these values in the Eastern European countries after twenty years of the Fall of the Berlin Wall and offers his insight on this as a possible reference frame for China’s reform. I say he does so “aptly”, because Professor Wu, in his paper, China’s Economy: Sixty Years of Progress, authoritatively and insightfully traces the progress with respect to these societal values associated with the complex path of economic development of China, while passionately warning against possible regress that might be brought about by giving-up further reform. Doubtlessly, these two giants from the former planned economies, the West and the East, agree on the importance and relevance of those universal values to economic and societal transformation and development, while they are aware of many obstacles and challenges to realize them in the concrete context of each economy. While Professor Kornai notes remarkable achievements in Eastern European economies as regards Liberté, he points out that there seems to exist no simple political consensus about how to achieve the norm of Egalité and Fraternité. -
The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price Lauren E
Maryland Law Review Volume 65 | Issue 3 Article 3 Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price Lauren E. Willis Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr Part of the Banking and Finance Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons Recommended Citation Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 Md. L. Rev. 707 (2006) Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MARYLAND LAW REVIEW VOLUME 65 2006 NUMBER 3 © Copyright Maryland Law Review 2006 Articles DECISIONMAKING AND THE LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE: THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING: PRICE LAUREN E. WILLIS* INTRODUCTION ................................................. 709 I. PREDATORY LENDING AND THE HOME LOAN MARKET ...... 715 A. The Home Lending Revolution ........................ 715 1. The Twentieth Century Marketplace: Standardized Terms, Limited and Advertised Prices, and Low Risk. 715 2. The Brave New World of ProliferatingProducts, Price, and R isk ........................................ 718 3. Evidence of Predatory Home Lending ............... 729 B. A New Definition of Predatory Lending ................. 735 II. FEDERAL LAW REGULATING THE PRICING OF HOME- SECURED LOANS: DISCLOSURE AS PANACEA ................ 741 A. The Rational Actor Decisionmaker Model ............... 741 B. CurrentFederal Law .................................. 743 C. Even a Rational Actor Could Not Use the Federal Disclosures to Price Shop in Today's Marketplace ....... -
The Real Bills Views of the Founders of the Fed
Economic Quarterly— Volume 100, Number 2— Second Quarter 2014— Pages 159–181 The Real Bills Views of the Founders of the Fed Robert L. Hetzel ilton Friedman (1982, 103) wrote: “In our book on U.S. mon- etary history, Anna Schwartz and I found it possible to use M one sentence to describe the central principle followed by the Federal Reserve System from the time it began operations in 1914 to 1952. That principle, to quote from our book, is: ‘Ifthe ‘money market’ is properly managed so as to avoid the unproductive use of credit and to assure the availability of credit for productive use, then the money stock will take care of itself.’” For Friedman, the reference to “the money stock”was synonymous with “the price level.”1 How did American monetary experience and debate in the 19th century give rise to these “real bills” views as a guide to Fed policy in the pre-World War II period? As distilled in the real bills doctrine, the founders of the Fed under- stood the Federal Reserve System as a decentralized system of reserve depositories that would allow the expansion and contraction of currency and credit based on discounting member-bank paper that originated out of productive activity. By discounting these “real bills,”the short- term loans that …nanced trade and goods in the process of production, policymakers ful…lled their responsibilities as they understood them. That is, they would provide the reserves required to accommodate the “legitimate,” nonspeculative, demands for credit.2 In so doing, they The author acknowledges helpful comments from Huberto Ennis, Motoo Haruta, Gary Richardson, Robert Sharp, Kurt Schuler, Ellis Tallman, and Alexander Wolman. -
Introduction Masahiko Aoki
Introduction Masahiko Aoki This volume is a collection of 22 articles that I have written for professional journals and edited volumes in the past 45 years. Naturally there are variations in theme, focus, approach and style among these writings. The articles are therefore organized into four parts according to basic themes. Part I: Comparative Mechanism Design includes eight chapters dealing with economic and organizational processes as computation/information systems. Four chapters in section A deal with the design of resource allocation processes for non-neoclassical environments (that is, non-convexity, externalities) in the ‘price versus quantity’ framework and four chapters in section B analytically compare properties of vertical, horizontal and modular coordination mechanisms in organizations. Part II: The Diversity of Corporate Governance: A Cooperative Game Approach consists of four chapters that analyze the nature of corporate governance as multiple, equilibrium responses to varied information systems of the corporate firm as discussed in Part I, section B. In this approach, the universal validity of the orthodox shareholders’ sovereignty view of corporate governance is challenged. It does not hold as equilibrium for emergent information systems in which the rights of controlling physical assets needs to be complemented by cognitive assets of employees. Part III: Analysis of the Endogenous Nature of Institutions includes five chapters that provide a conceptual framework for understanding institutions as endogenous outcomes of the societal process in which individual beliefs and strategic actions are mediated by public representations of common knowledge. They provide a game-theoretic foundation for important notions in institutional studies such as institutional complementarities, enforcement, social embeddedness, customs, and path-dependence. -
Masahiko Aoki
Masahiko Aoki Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor of Japanese Studies, Department of Economics; Sr. Fellow, Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Stanford University President and Chief Research Officer (CRO), Research Institute of International Trade and Industry (RIETI), Government of Japan Ph.D. University of Minnesota (1967); A.B. and M.A., University of Tokyo (1962, 1964) Born in 1938 in Japan; Assistant professor (1968-71) and Fulbright Visiting Professor (1979-80) at Harvard University; Associate and Full Professor (1969-77, 1977-92) at Kyoto University. Teaching at Stanford University since 1984. Research Interests Comparative institutional analysis, corporate governance, the theory of the firm, the Japanese economy. Representative Books The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm, Oxford University Press, 1984. Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy, Cambridge University Press, 1988. Translated into French, Spanish, Italian, Chinese, Japanese and Russian. Information, Corporate Governance and Institutional Diversity, Toyo Keizai Shinposya, 1995, and Oxford university Press (2000) Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis, MIT Press, 2001. Translated into Japanese, Chinese and French Representative Edited Books The Japanese Firm: Its Sources of Competitiveness, (co-authored with Ronald Dore), Oxford University Press, 1994. The Japanese Main Bank System and its Relevancy for Developing and Transforming Economies, (co-edited with Hugh Patrick), Oxford University Press, 1994. Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Insider Control and Roles of Banks, World Bank, 1994. The Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis (co-edited with Hyung-ki Kim and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara), Oxford University Press, 1997. Communities and Markets in Economic Development (co-edited with Yujiro Hayami), Oxford University, 2000. -
A Modern Reader in Institutional and Evolutionary Economics : Key Concepts / Edited by Geoffrey M
A Modern Reader in Institutional and Evolutionary Economics EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION FOR EVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL ECONOMY Series Editor: Geoffrey M. Hodgson, University of Hertfordshire Business School, UK Mixed Economies in Europe: An Evolutionary Perspective on their Emergence, Transition and Regulation Edited by Wolfgang Blaas and John Foster The Political Economy of Diversity: Evolutionary Perspectives on Economic Order and Disorder Edited by Robert Delorme and Kurt Dopfer On Economic Institutions: Theory and Applications Edited by John Groenewegen, Christos Pitelis and Sven-Erik Sjöstrand Rethinking Economics: Markets, Technology and Economic Evolution Edited by Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Ernesto Screpanti Environment, Technology and Economic Growth: The Challenge to Sustainable Development Edited by Andrew Tylecote and Jan van der Straaten Institutions and Economic Change: New Perspectives on Markets, Firms and Technology Edited by Klaus Nielsen and Björn Johnson Pluralism in Economics: New Perspectives in History and Methodology Edited by Andrea Salanti and Ernesto Screpanti Beyond Market and Hierarchy: Interactive Governance and Social Complexity Edited by Ash Amin and Jerzy Hausner Employment, Technology and Economic Needs: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy Edited by Jonathan Michie and Angelo Reati Institutions and the Evolution of Capitalism: Implications of Evolutionary Economics Edited by John Groenewegen and Jack Vromen Is Economics an Evolutionary Science? The Legacy of Thorstein Veblen Edited by Francisco Louçã and Mark Perlman Technology and Knowledge: From the Firm to Innovation Systems Edited by Pier Paolo Saviotti and Bart Nooteboom Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas: Past and Present Edited by Pierre Garrouste and Stavros Ioannides A Modern Reader in Institutional and Evolutionary Economics: Key Concepts Edited by Geoffrey M. -
Where Do Transactions Come From? a Network Design Perspective on the Theory of the Firm
06-051 Where Do Transactions Come From? A Network Design Perspective on the Theory of the Firm Carliss Y. Baldwin* Kim B. Clark† Copyright © 2006 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author. Where Do Transactions Come From? A Network Design Perspective on the Theory of the Firm Carliss Y. Baldwin* Kim B. Clark† May 11, 2006 A very early version of this paper was presented at the Saint-Gobain Centre for Economic Research 5th Conference, Paris, FR, November 7-8, 2002. We thank Richard Langlois, Michael Jacobides, Jason Woodard, Masahiko Aoki, Ben Bensaou, Amar Bhide, Robert Boyer, Takahiro Fujimoto, Robert Gibbons, Nobuo Ikeda, Datta Kulkarni, Luigi Marengo, Sharon Novak, Mari Sako, David Scharfstein, David Sharman, Robert Solow, Robin Stevenson, and Daniel Whitney, as well as seminar participants at the MIT Design Structure Matrix Workshop, the NBER Conference on Organizational Economics, the London Business School Modularity Miniconference, Southern Methodist University, Columbia Law School, and the MIT Industrial Performance Center for thoughtful comments on previous drafts. We alone are responsible for errors, oversights and faulty reasoning. *Harvard Business School †Brigham Young University, Idaho WHERE DO TRANSACTIONS COME FROM? MAY 11, 2006 Direct correspondence to: Carliss Y. Baldwin [email protected] Copyright © Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, 2006 2 WHERE DO TRANSACTIONS COME FROM? MAY 11, 2006 Where Do Transactions Come From? A Network Design Perspective on the Theory of the Firm Carliss Y.