South African Festivals in the United States: an Expression of Policies

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South African Festivals in the United States: An Expression

of Policies, Power and Networks

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Akhona Ndzuta, MA

Graduate Program in Arts Administration, Education and Policy

The Ohio State University

2019

Dissertation Committee:

Karen E. Hutzel, Ph.D.

Wayne P. Lawson, Ph.D.

Margaret J. Wyszomirski, Ph.D., Advisor

Akhona Ndzuta

2019

Abstract

This research is a qualitative case study of two festivals that showcased South African music in the USA: the South African Arts Festival which took place in downtown Los Angeles in

2013, and the Ubuntu Festival which was staged at Carnegie Hall in New York in 2014. At both festivals, South African government entities such as the Department of Arts and Culture

(DAC), as well as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) were involved. Due to the cultural, economic and other mandates of these departments, broader

South African government policy interests were inadvertently represented on foreign soil. The other implication is that since South African culture was central to these events, it was also key to promoting these acultural policy interests. What this research sets out to do is to explore how these festivals promote the interests of South African musicians while furthering South African government interests, and how policy was an enabler of such an execution.

ii Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Oppenheimer Memorial Trust and the National Arts Council of South

Africa for their generous funding in the first two years of my studies. I am also grateful to the many South African mine laborers and creative workers whose hard work and sacrifice has made such benefits possible. I am indebted to the AAEP Department at OSU for making this entire experience possible and for the great teaching opportunities.

I’ve been lucky to have such an amazing committee. Thank you infinitely to Professors

Karen Hutzel (co-chair), Wayne Lawson, Sonia Manjon and Margaret Wyszomirski (co-chair), for their scholarship, guidance, empathy and patience. Prof Wyszomirski you’re a superhero!

To the institutions that participated in this study such as the South African Departments of Arts and Culture, the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation,

Grand Performances and the Carnegie Hall Corporation, thank you for the permission to grant interviews. I must also thank the organizations whose representatives acknowledged my communication, even when they could not participate in interviews. To the individuals who signed up to participate anonymously: thank you. I truly appreciate the contribution of individuals who participated in the study like Mr Michael Alexander, Mr Charles Baranowski,

Mr Jeremy Geffen, Mr Mitch Goldstein, Ms Jennifer Hempel, Mr Moeniel Jacobs, former

Deputy Consul General Mr Johan Klopper, Mrs Lindiwe Ndebele-Koka, Mr David Kramer,

Mr Glenn Masokoane, Mr Phillip Miller, Mr John Mogashoa, Consulate General George

Monyemangene, Ms Roshnie Moonsammy, Mr Kesivan Naidoo, Mr Dizu Plaatjies, Dr Sipho

Sithole, Mrs Velile Sithole, Ms Nombuso Tshabalala, former DAC Director General Sibusiso

Xaba. Thank you for your acknowledgement, time, insights, responding to my barrage of emails, calls and requests. Knowledge production is nothing without people like you who see the value of research in driving society’s progress. iii To the Art Administration, Education and Policy Department (AAEP) community of students and friends who made this PhD experience rewarding, revelatory and transformative.

This includes Professors/Doctors Joni Acuff, Christine Ballangee-Morris, Clayton Funk, James

Sanders, Sydney Walker, Deborah Smith-Shank, Candace Stout, Shari Savage and Shoshanah

Goldberg-Miller. To Kirsten Thomas and Lauren Pace, thank you for the super orientation.

Being part of the transdisciplinary Barnett Center Think Tank was a perspective- altering research opportunity which influenced this work. So glad I collaborated with and learnt so much from Chloe Greene, TC Thomason, Charlie Calhoun, Jacinda Walker and Dr Manjon.

Thanks to Kathleen and Dennis Goodyear, Ah Ran Koo and Yifan Xu for the good times in Columbus and letting sanity prevail during the dazzling moments.

To Thembela Vokwana, Prof Sylvia Bruinders and Prof Cynthia Kros, who encouraged me to pursue graduate studies at OSU, you rock!

AAEP introduced me to South African scholars in my discipline. I am grateful to Prof.

Mzo Sirayi and Dr L.L. Nawa for the intellectual engagement. To Tshakane Masemola for being a connector: Pula! To Dipolelo Seemela for taking risks with me over the years!

Thanks so much to the Jeffery family for their support over the years. To Chris and

Jean, for constantly enriching my life.

This is for Nomathamsanqa Maxam and Refiloe Ndzuta, with love, admiration and gratitude.

iv Vita

2000 ...... National Diploma (Human Resources Management) Wits Technikon (now the University of Johannesburg)

2005 ...... Performer’s Diploma in Music (Jazz Performance) University of Cape Town

2007 ...... BMus (Hons) Musicology University of Cape Town

2009-2013 ...... Business owner of JazzinJozi

2011-2013 ...... Junior Lecturer Department of Art History, Visual Arts and Musicology, University of South Africa

2013 ...... MA (Arts and Culture Management) University of the Witwatersrand

2013- 2017 ...... Graduate Teaching Assistant Department of Arts Administration, Education and Policy, The Ohio State University

2016-2018 ...... Curriculum Development Consultant Tshwane University of Technology

2018 ...... Barnett Fellow, Fall 2018

Fields of Study

Major Field: Arts Administration, Education and Policy

v Glossary of Terms (Abbreviations and Acronyms)

AMA American Music Abroad ANC African National Congress ASGISA Accelerated and Shared Growth-South Africa BET Black Entertainment Television CCI’s Cultural and Creative Industries CCNY Carnegie Corporation of New York CHC Carnegie Hall Corporation CIGS Creative Industries Growth Strategy CSA Creative South Africa: A Strategy for Realising the Potential of the Cultural Industries DAC Department of Arts and Culture DCA New York City Department of Cultural Affairs DIRCO Department of International Relations and Cooperation GEAR Growth, Employment, and Redistribution strategy LA Los Angeles MGE Mzansi Golden Economy NDP National Development Plan (Vision 2030) NY New York NYC New York City RDP Reconstruction and Development Plan SA South Africa SAAF SAAF--- South African Arts Festival USA/US United States of America USDS US Department of State WPACH White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage DTI Department of Trade and Industry SABC South African Broadcasting Corporation SXSW South by Southwest State The government of a country

vi Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgements ...... iii Vita ...... v Glossary of Terms (Abbreviations and Acronyms) ...... vi List of Tables ...... x List of Figures ...... xi Chapter 1 – Introduction ...... 1 Introduction to the Study ...... 1 Background to the Study ...... 2 Focus of the Study ...... 6 Introduction to the Festivals ...... 7 Research Question ...... 15 Rationale ...... 18 Scope and Limitations of Study ...... 22 Research Strategy ...... 22 Chapter Outline ...... 24 Chapter 2 – Literature Review ...... 26 Introduction ...... 26 Festivals ...... 26 The cultural and creative industries (CCI’s) ...... 44 International Relations, Hard Power and Soft Power ...... 47 International Cultural Relations ...... 55 The instrumentality of culture ...... 69 The creation of networks ...... 77 SA cultural policy and management ...... 89 Literature Findings ...... 96 Chapter 3 – Conceptual Framework ...... 102

vii Introduction ...... 102 Conceptual Framework ...... 102 Logic Map ...... 114 Chapter 4 – Methodology ...... 118 Introduction ...... 118 Defining the Case Study ...... 118 Applying the Case Study to the Study on Festivals ...... 121 Study Participants ...... 126 Data Collection ...... 128 Data Analysis ...... 137 Limitations of the Case Study ...... 142 Validity ...... 143 Chapter 5 – South African Cultural Policy and Its Powerbrokers ...... 145 Introduction ...... 145 South African Cultural Policy ...... 145 Cultural Policy Strategies ...... 162 Cultural Policy Timeline ...... 185 SA Cultural Diplomacy and the DAC ...... 186 Other Cultural Policy Powerbrokers at the Festivals ...... 195 Conclusion ...... 198 Chapter 6 – Unit of Analysis 1: The South African Arts Festival, Los Angeles 2013 ...... 201 Introduction ...... 201 Description of the Festival ...... 201 Organizer ...... 202 Objectives ...... 205 Location ...... 211 Programming ...... 213 Stakeholders ...... 218 Process ...... 230 Outputs ...... 241 Findings ...... 247 Chapter 7 – Unit of Analysis 2: Ubuntu Festival, New York 2014 ...... 252 Introduction ...... 252 Description of the Festival ...... 252 viii Organizer ...... 253 Objectives ...... 257 Location ...... 260 Programming ...... 261 Stakeholders ...... 269 Process ...... 283 Outputs ...... 300 Findings ...... 309 Chapter 8 – Analysis and Conclusion ...... 317 Introduction ...... 317 A Comparison of the Festivals ...... 318 The Case of SA Festivals in the USA ...... 321 Cultural Instrumentalism by DIRCO and the DAC ...... 340 Case Study Generalizability ...... 352 Research Question and Conclusion ...... 354 Opportunities for Further Research ...... 361 References ...... 364 Appendix: Supporting Documents ...... 393 Section 1a: SAAF Program ...... 393 Section 1b: Ubuntu Festival Program ...... 394 Section 2: DAC Strategic Planning ...... 396 Section 3: Data Collection Questionnaires ...... 397

ix List of Tables

Table 1. Unit Analysis themes ...... 140 Table 2: SAAF (2013) Outputs ...... 245 Table 3: Ubuntu Festival (2014) Outputs ...... 308 Table 4: A Comparison of the Two Festivals ...... 319

x List of Figures

Figure 1: Research focal points ...... 18 Figure 2: Conceptual Framework ...... 103 Figure 3: Logic Map ...... 115 Figure 4: Case study design [adapted from Yin (2014, p. 50)] ...... 124 Figure 5: White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage (WPACH) of 1996 Table of Contents ...... 149 Figure 6: Government levels at which SA cultural policy is developed ...... 156 Figure 7: The location of departmental 5-year strategic plans. Source: ‘The hierarchy of the relationship between planning concepts’ (National Treasury, 2010, p. 13)...... 168 Figure 8: MGE Objectives and Work streams (DAC, 2017, p. 6)...... 177 Figure 9: Cultural Policy and National Development Strategy Timeline ...... 186

xi Chapter 1 – Introduction

Introduction to the Study

The expansive area of arts1 administration connects one with, among other things, multiple realities within the ecology of a career in music performance. As a music researcher, and an occasional music performer interested in South Africa’s musical heritage, I should understand this ecology at the micro and macro levels not only because it generates career opportunities and a range of livelihoods, but because I inhabit it. Within arts management discourses I am interested in the sustainability of music performance careers. As such, I often consider the quality of management among musicians, the types of entrepreneurship styles that manifest in the working environments of musicians, the market opportunities and career possibilities for musicians within and outside of country borders.

I also think about the impact of music, its broader symbolic value, what it achieves beyond economic measure and the idea that music is one of the cultural elements that define any society’s identity (Agawu, 2000). I think of the ways in which governments and different types of institutions have the power to curate, structure and galvanize societies through their policies, thereby impacting culture for the short and long term. These thoughts culminated in the bedrock of this study encompassing music career sustainability, international cultural markets, cultural policy, work environments and relationships or networks that enable arts entrepreneurship, as well as the facilitation of infrastructure around the creative or arts-culture sector. This is the reason I have embarked on this study on South African festivals in the United

States. It is an attempt to further understand some of these issues, to explain some of the

1 Throughout this dissertation, I use the words ‘arts’ and ‘culture’, ‘cultural sector’ or cultural and creative industries (CCI’s) interchangeably or together as arts-culture to denote the arts and cultural sector. 1 working conditions of South African musicians and to better understand the story of South

African arts and culture, governance and its policies.

In this chapter, I introduce this study. I firstly provide background to how the study came to be and explain the relevance of the American Music Abroad program in the study context. I then outline the focus of the study. Subsequently, I introduce each of the two festivals and explain their significance. After that I detail the research question and sub-questions. I then explain the rationale for this undertaking and discuss the scope of the study. Lastly, I outline the research strategy and the contents of each dissertation chapter.

Background to the Study

I will first explain the catalyst to this study as a way of approaching the study context and components. The catalyst to this research on South African (SA) music in a foreign territory was on first learning about the American Music Abroad program (AMA) which takes USA bands to different pre-selected countries, and then discovering the South African Arts Festival in Los Angeles. At face value both events appeared to model cultural exchange, through their use of culture to disseminate specific messages to strategically selected countries. After closer inspection though I discovered that the events were not completely of common purpose.

What both events had in common was their function to generate positive public relations for one nation, while executing this outside in another nation. The other commonality between these events were the objectives of making direct or indirect economic impact on the home economy through activities at the chosen foreign country. When considering these dynamics, it became apparent that the effort involved in making the events possible implicates different types of policies and multiple policy drivers. This meant the involvement of different government departments because of the ricochet effect of such events on cultural policy matters, foreign policy matters, economic and trade policy agendas.

2 I first came across the AMA program while I was doing a course about the relationship between the arts and public policy. I learned that the AMA is a program regularly run by the

United States Department of State (USDS)2, but managed by an external organization. The program is an exercise in cultural diplomacy, or the employment of culture to communicate messages that counter estrangement and alienation between different countries (Pigman, 2010, p. 180). I found that the AMA involves carefully selecting musicians of the United States of

America (USA) that are sent abroad every other year to showcase US culture (USDS, 2013).

Learning about the aims of the program led me to seek information about similar initiatives by a government department in SA. Consequently, I came to know about the South African Arts

Festival (SAAF) and through later research on festivals that showcase SA music abroad I found out about the 2014 Ubuntu festival in New York which also showcased SA music and film.

What I also discovered from research on these events was that the involvement of one nation’s culture and the multiplicity of its function abroad at such events implies cultural diplomacy. According to Cummings (2003), cultural diplomacy is “the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understandings” (p. 1). Considering this, SAAF showcased SA culture to USA audiences, through music and film (Adamek, 2013). The Ubuntu festival also did the same

(Carnegie Hall, 2014). AMA, on the other hand, is primarily a music exchange program that regularly sends musicians abroad for diplomatic ends. What this meant was that like the AMA program, which is intended for cultural diplomacy, SAAF partly involved cultural diplomacy.

I explain the significance of cultural diplomacy in relation to the two SA festivals further on in the study, however, in the next few paragraphs I detail the characteristics of the

2 The USDS is “the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency within the Executive Branch and the lead institution for the conduct of American diplomacy”, the State Department operates within and outside of the United States of America (USDS, 2013a). At its head is the Secretary of State who “is the President’s principal foreign policy advisor [and] carries out the President’s foreign policies through the State Department and its employees” (ibid.). 3 AMA program. Even though the AMA program is not the focus of this study, I use the AMA as a point of reference in this chapter to discuss the connectedness between broader national policies, cultural events and the artists entangled in such contexts. As a point of reference, the

AMA is not used in this study as a best-practice comparison for SA festivals. Drawing such a comparison would be dismissive of the different trajectories and socio-political histories of SA and the USA.

American Music Abroad

The AMA program involves cultural expression through music, by US musicians travelling abroad to shape positive opinion about the USA. The program offers the representation of

American life in other countries through diverse music genres that reflect the US population’s traditions and values (USDS, 2013). Some of the program’s activities include “public concerts, interactive performances with local traditional musicians, lecture demonstrations, workshops, jam sessions and media interviews and performances” (ibid.). The program targets “younger and underserved audiences in over 40 countries around the world with little or no access to live

American musical performances” (ibid). This means that the AMA program utilizes culture deliberately to maintain a positive presence of the US internationally. Moreover, AMA is not aimed at paying audiences.

The AMA is also a good example for this research to outline how various government departments with dissimilar policy areas impact and subsume culture. In SA, where a cultural ministry exists in government, different government or independent appendages would work in conjunction with the cultural department to make a program like AMA work abroad. In the

USA, however, it is possible that the USDS has the responsibility to carry out such a program within the department’s broad scope of ambassadorial purpose, because a department of cultural resources does not exist in the US government in similar incarnations as those of other

4 countries (Cherbo, 1992). For instance, AMA only helps realize a portion of its mission, and therefore predominantly addresses the diplomatic aims of the USDS (Mulcahy, 2010). The program is directly tied to US foreign policy as it is only one of the many cultural and non- cultural programs of the USDS in the latter’s mission to advance and defend “the interests of

American citizens” (USDS, 2011). The mission of the USDS is “to bring people together and foster greater understanding” through

promoting peace and stability in regions of vital interest; creating jobs at home by opening markets abroad; helping developing nations establish investment and export opportunities; and bringing nations together and forging partnerships to address global problems, such as climate change and resource scarcity, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, the spread of communicable diseases, cross-border pollution, humanitarian crises, nuclear smuggling, and narcotics trafficking. (USDS, 2013b)

In accordance with the USDS mission, one of the aims of the AMA is to “communicate

America’s rich musical contributions to the global music scene” while fostering “cross-cultural communication” (American Voices, 2013). This means that the musicians undertake diplomacy, or ‘cross-cultural communication’, on behalf of the (USDS). Since diplomacy is meant to further foreign policy, which is also part of the mandate of the USDS, the musicians thus actively participate in the creation of cordial relations with other countries by the US

(Signitzer & Coombs, 1992). In this way, music enables diplomacy through the diverse music in the AMA context enabling the US to ‘explain itself to the world” (Schneider, 2006, p. 191).

Additionally, since the musicians undertake diplomacy within a cultural and political context, they are carrying out a mission of cultural diplomacy (Wyszomirski et al, 2003). This is mindful of the idea that even though cultural diplomacy is intimately intertwined with civil society, for cultural diplomacy to ‘take place’ it should be implemented by formal government deployees or “diplomats, serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural

5 flow to advance national interests” (Arndt, 2005, p. xviii). The type of diplomacy the AMA assumes also correlates with the idea that cultural diplomacy is one of the “primary tools of relational public diplomacy” (Wyszomirski, 2010, p. 2). It also correlates with the notion that cultural diplomacy “is much more controlled and linked to the policies and interests of a country” (ibid.). And so apart from music being located in cultural policy, in terms of who makes it, where they make it, how they make it, when they make it, the music of any country is, therefore also linked to its country’s broader national policies.

While considering the concept of cultural diplomacy as a form of public diplomacy utilizing “creative expression and exchanges of ideas, information, and people to increase mutual understanding”, soft power is implicated (Schneider, 2006, p.191). For example, according to Nye (2008), cultural diplomacy is a form of soft power that gently eases the engagement of countries “with foreign audiences” (Finn, 2003, p. 15). This suggests that utility is a key factor behind the significance of culture in the AMA program. Culture is thus an important useful aspect of soft power. This is unlike hard power, where one country coerces one or more countries through economic or military might, which could also be used by USDS to further US interests abroad. Culture can also be used to achieve and pursue hard power, and this becomes apparent in the context of SAAF and Ubuntu festivals later in this study. With hard power, however, culture is a means to an end. In contrast, culture is an inherent aspect of soft power. When context-relevant, however, soft power is used by the USDS as a way of

“instilling positive perceptions of the United States abroad” through gentle persuasion and information-sharing (Finn, 2003, p. 17; Melissen, 2005).

Focus of the Study

In this study, I focus on two South African arts festivals that took place in the United States of

America. The first festival was the South African Arts Festival in Los Angeles in 2013. The

6 second festival was the Ubuntu festival in New York in 2014. I investigate some of the macro level networks that made the staging of music performances possible. I explore the cultural and broader policy implications unique to the various stakeholders at each festival. Simultaneously,

I interrogate the soft and hard power implications that are part of the objectives to some of the policies that catalyzed the festivals. I, thus, focus on three underlying issues at the festivals, which are networks, policy and power.

Although both festivals happened in October, in consecutive years, this coincidence is not an indication of their relatedness or continuity. Each festival happened once and was not repeated the following year. The festivals were not connected. They were organized independently of each other and initiated by different entities. More so, each festival was initiated for different purposes. The focus of this study, therefore, is only on the 2013 SAAF in

LA, and the Ubuntu festival staged at Carnegie Hall in 2014. Irrespective of whether a similar

SA festival has happened elsewhere beyond these dates, this study investigates the wider implications of exclusively the 2013 and 2014 events in relation to the relevant policies and networks that enabled their enactment. I introduce the festivals below.

Introduction to the Festivals

South African Arts Festival (SAAF)

SAAF in Los Angeles (LA) was commissioned by the South African Department of Arts and

Culture (DAC). The festival occurred from October 4th to the 6th, 2013. Its launch reception took place at the SA consulate in Los Angeles, while its other activities were at various venues in downtown LA. The DAC collaborated with various South African departments to realize the festival. Particularly, the DAC organized the festival with the Department of International

7 Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). The festival programming3 included film screenings and music performances of various genres, which showcased South Africa’s cultural diversity. For this dissertation, I only engage with the festival’s music showcases, and not the film component.

The audience attended the festival for free because the event was planned so that it would be a showcase on a non-payment basis (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17,

2017). Artists of several strategically identified genres were selected to perform at the festival with the intention of developing new audiences in the USA for SA cultural practitioners (DAC,

2013). The other aim of the festival was to continue the trajectory of maintaining good relations between SA with the US, but to simultaneously reconnect with US audiences which were aware of US anti-apartheid movements4 (DAC, 2013). By virtue of the festival being staged abroad,

SAAF was tied to SA’s international relations policy.

Through its statements about the festival, the DAC suggested that SAAF was an exercise in cultural diplomacy. Consequently, the line-up included artists who were prominent during the apartheid era, some of whom were well-known in parts of the USA since the 1960’s, performing with younger SA artists (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28,

2017). Apart from the performance line-up, efforts towards achieving cultural diplomacy were also evident through how SA culture was used to explain SA values to the USA. Such efforts often serve the purpose of forging mutual understanding (Schneider, 2006). Soft power could not be achieved by the festival, however, because there were no consistently repeated follow- up messages from the DAC about SA culture communicated directly to US audiences after

SAAF, messages which are customary of soft power exercises (Nye, 2004).

3 The festival program is in Section 1a of the Appendix. 4 Anti-apartheid movements were all over the USA, represented by different entities including artists, institutions, as well as private and public organizations (Lulat, 2008). One of the movements with the most impact was the one which encouraged divestment from South Africa on the grounds of apartheid (ibid.). 8 The festival was staged mainly to promote SA creativity and to create new cultural markets for SA artists (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). The decision to host the festival in LA was based on the status of the city as a mecca for the creative industries (S.

Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). In a formal statement regarding the purpose of the festival, the then Director General of the DAC, Sibusiso Xaba, detailed that:

We want to use the US as a gateway to world markets for South African products. Los Angeles is leading the world in the creation of motion pictures, television and stage productions, video games, and recorded music. We are happy to be creating an opportunity for South Africans to showcase their skills, interact with and build mutually beneficial relationships with influential role players in this sector…There has been a shared history, especially during our country’s struggle for democracy, between South African and US artists. As we … celebrate 20 years of freedom in 2014, and work on making our creative industries more lucrative, and sustainable, we hope for new partnerships between our peoples. (CSR, 2013, p. 16-17)

SAAF is also linked with specific socio-economic goals associated with overarching state objectives regarding the economy (ibid; South African Government, 2011). Specifically,

SAAF was made possible through a DAC strategy called the Mzansi Golden Economy (MGE), intended to aid social cohesion5 and economic6 growth (ibid). SAAF, therefore, like the AMA, was a cultural tool utilized by the state to drive predetermined national imperatives for the public or social good (Matarasso & Landry, 1999; Pratt, 2005; Belfiore & Bennett, 2007;

Belfiore, 2009; Stevenson et al., 2010). In Chapter 5, I detail these imperatives and provide a policy context for the SA cultural sector.

5 Social cohesion has been high on the SA government’s list of priorities due to the long-term racially divisive effects of apartheid on SA society and colonialism before that (DAC, 2011). 6 The inadequate economic growth, and consequent gradual increase in unemployment figures, has been a problem that has plagued South Africa since the dawn of democracy in 1994. 9 Ubuntu7 Festival

The UBUNTU: Music and Arts of South Africa festival took place in New York (NY) from

October 8th through the 5th of November, 2014. The ‘leading funding’ for the Ubuntu festival was from the Carnegie Hall Corporation of New York and USA-based foundations8 such as the Ford Foundation, The Howard Gilman Foundation and The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation

(Carnegie Hall, 2014). The Carnegie Hall Corporation is an organization independent of the

Carnegie Foundation and not directly affiliated with the mission of the State Department. At the festival DIRCO and the DAC also acted in collaborative roles (DAC, 2013; Carnegie Hall,

2014; South African Consulate General New York, 2014).

The Ubuntu Festival was part of large-scale city-wide celebrations marking SA’s 20 years of freedom and democracy (Carnegie Hall, 2014; Apollo, 2014). The goal of the festival was to meaningfully immerse the residents of the city in a different culture (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017; J. Hempel, personal communication, August 9, 2017). Several venues hosted different SA music performance events, film screenings discussion panels and workshops (South African Consulate General New York, 2014; Carnegie, 2014). One of the other venues was the Apollo Theatre, which held a four-day festival called Africa Now! South

7 The word Ubuntu is generally understood to denote an African philosophy, of ‘I am because we are’ or ‘I am because you are,’ acknowledging the relationship one has with their community. Generally, the principle of Ubuntu also “has much more to do with moral topography, with how one positions, oneself vis-à-vis the other people on [the] continent” as well as strangers (Eze, 2014, p. 244). According to the White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy (WPSAFP), “Ubuntu [is used] as a way of defining who we are and how we relate to others. The philosophy of Ubuntu means ‘humanity’ and is reflected in the idea that we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others. It has played a major role in the forging of a South African national consciousness and in the process of its democratic transformation and nation-building” (WPSAFP, p. 4). To sum it up, the word refers to the spirit of community and humanity (Keylock, 2014). 8 According to Roelofs (2003), ‘great [US] foundations arose in the early twentieth century when the new millionaires sought a systematic way to dispose of their fortunes’ (p.7). This was for the sake of better administration since “handling voluminous charitable requests required a bureaucracy” (ibid., p. 7). There were other purposes for channeling funds in foundations, including that of positively changing public perception about the business ventures of the millionaires as socially beneficial (Roelofs, 2003). Foundations have donated funds to causes such as innovation in scientific research and the development of technology, education, the arts, health care, etc. Over time, foundations have become powerful and influence public discourse as well as the public agenda in the developed and the developing world through their contributions to social transformation (ibid; Cullather, 2010; Zunz, 2011; McGoey, 2015). 10 Africa featuring popular contemporary SA musicians (Apollo, 2014). For reasons of narrowing this study, I will focus only on the music showcases at Carnegie Hall.

Carnegie Hall hosted the Ubuntu festival as part of their global festival series, which presents a range of music from different countries (J. Geffen, personal communication, August

9, 2017). The world-famous concert hall had a long bill9 of SA acts. Some were well-known and established and others were not very well-known by NY audiences (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017; J. Hempel, personal communication, August 9, 2017). The festival presented a vast array of SA music traditions and visual art (Carnegie, 2014). Aside from performances, there were workshops led by SA musicians and collaborations between SA musicians and non-SA musicians. Tickets were sold to the public for a range of prices for different events that were part of the festival, as it was customary for a festival series which focused on music from different countries at Carnegie (J. Hempel, personal communication,

August 9, 2017). The Ubuntu festival, therefore, was not aimed at achieving soft power for SA because it was not a SA government initiative and it was a once-off event. This also means that

Carnegie Hall had different aims and stakeholders at the Ubuntu festival to those of the DAC at SAAF.

One of the interesting dynamics of the Ubuntu festival was the message communicated by the DAC. According to the Deputy Minister of Arts and Culture at the time, Rejoice

Mabudafhasi, who was invited to make a speech, one of the objectives of the festival was to bring information to the USA on existing post-apartheid artistic sensibilities (South African

Government, 2014). The Deputy Minister motivated for the recognition of a new brand of

South African artists, those of a post-apartheid generation. In this speech, the Deputy Minister invoked a similar speech for SAAF in the previous year which was delivered by erstwhile

9 See the festival program in Section 1b of the Appendix. 11 Director General of the DAC, Sibusiso Xaba. In his 2013 SAAF speech, Xaba spoke of the

USA as a perceived ‘gateway10’ to the world (South African Government, 2014; CSR, 2013).

In her 2014 speech, Mabudafhasi alluded to the collaboration between the DAC and Carnegie

Hall as a bridge to achieving hard power. She stated that

The Ubuntu festival is a strategic platform to promote South African arts and culture to international markets. The festival offers us an opportunity to enhance our cultural relations with the US while at the same time cultivating international markets11 for South African artists (ibid.).

Significance of the festivals

There are a few notable similarities about the two festivals. In terms of country-to-country communication, the festivals relay information about SA culture. Both festivals involve the use of culture to achieve predetermined ends. Each festival took place outside of South Africa (SA), and was staged for foreign audiences who may or may not know much about SA culture. Both festivals included programming on the diversity of SA music, which means that the identity of the country was implicated. The participation of the two government departments, DIRCO and

DAC, at both festivals meant the inadvertent representation of broader SA government interests on US soil. For instance, the DAC has a mandate to preserve, protect, promote and develop

South African culture domestically and abroad (DACST, 1996). DIRCO has a mandate to further SA’s multi-dimensional interests abroad to improve the country’s global positioning

10 The perspective of imagining NY as a gateway to the world reflects the understanding of the political and cultural power of NY. This view is considers the city “as a geopolitical space for the global governance of culture” (Sarikakis, 2012, p. 17). 11 The rationale here is to improve on the bilateral relations between SA and the USA, especially regarding trade, tourism, investments and other forms of interaction that have taken place between SA and the US since 1994 (DIRCO, n.d.). The country-to-country relations between the USA and SA, are seen here as an opportunity for SA to expand its connections with other international networks to which the USA belongs. Like Vickers (2012) suggests, relations between countries determine which allies each country will have access, and that often includes the markets of the allies. 12 (DIRCO, 2011). Acting on its own, the DAC would have limited capacity to advance domestic policy on foreign soil, which is why this strategic partnership with DIRCO is significant.

Focusing on SAAF first, the festival was a form of cultural exchange program in terms of its inherent activities and its conceptualization by the DAC (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017; N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017; S.

Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). The festival had a deliberate focus on US market penetration, and therefore a mid-to-long-term goal of commercial exchange (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017; DAC, 2013). SAAF also had discussion panel activities through which SA artists and their managers were meant to benefit from participant industry experts from the USA and from SA. The discussion panels were on the state of the SA music industry and on developing strategies to penetrate new cultural markets (S. Sithole, personal communication, March 25, 2017; N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February

28, 2017). The DAC intended for SA creative industry participants to also benefit from the technology-based entrepreneurship in California (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12,

2017). As such, the focus at SAAF was for the benefit of SA artists on skills, markets and audience expansion, as well as career strategy. The emphasis was less focused on reciprocal cultural exchange, where both parties gain broadly from the cultural collaboration. The main benefit for the US audience in attendance would be a view into SA culture for the sake of consuming it. The main advantage for the invited US-based industry specialist would be to see something different in the SA culture on display so that they could include it in domestic cultural programs – for consumption and possibly education.

Furthermore, SAAF is interwoven with national socio-economic development goals through being embedded in the Mzansi Golden Economy policy strategy. The festival was a project of the MGE policy strategy. The strategy seeks to further social cohesion, which the

DAC defines as “the degree of social interaction and inclusion in our communities and society 13 at large, and the extent to which mutual solidarity finds expression among individuals and communities” (DAC, 2016b, p. 35). MGE also seeks economic development, which has been permanently part of national growth and development plans since 1994. In this way, SAAF made at least three policy statements about the country. SAAF was linked to SA trade, cultural and international relations, or foreign policies.

Also, at closer inspection, the speeches at both festivals by the former DAC Director

General and former Deputy Minister indicate two pursuits by the DAC and its partners. The first pursuit is for soft power through the enhanced dissemination of information about SA culture. The second is the pursuit of hard power, in the form of economic gains from global market penetration. Hard and soft power are understood as ‘inextricably linked’ (Melissen,

2005, p. 4). That said, however, this study later unpacks how soft and hard power are pursued at the festivals.

Likewise, at the Ubuntu festival SA national development goals, cultural and international relations policies were implicated even though indirectly since the festival was not a venture of DIRCO and the DAC. For instance, both the DAC and DIRCO were also prominent in the publicly available list of stakeholders. Although this festival had a different purpose to SAAF, it had the cultural objectives of cultural immersion for NY city residents.

These objectives, however, would ultimately benefit SA and its aforementioned goals of soft power. From the cultivated soft power, hard power would also inadvertently be encouraged.

To invoke AMA further, even though the two SA festivals are not related to the AMA program, learning of how AMA is carried out encouraged different questions about other SA cultural exchange programs. For instance, there are showcases abroad for marketing SA music.

These showcases are undertaken, amongst others, by organizations like Moshito, the annual

SA music expo, and South African Music Exports (SAMEX), where SA musicians travel to

14 music markets and expos such as WOMEX12 (Womex, n.d. -a, -b). Even though it is important to point out that Moshito and SAMEX have sponsorship from the DAC, and have stimulated new markets to grow SA music, it is equally significant to note that the operations and aims of

SAMEX and Moshito are not premised on diplomacy. This research, therefore, engages with the direct involvement of the DAC and DIRCO at capturing US audiences and the US market for multi-faceted outputs.

Whether the ends are diplomatic or not, however, when SA music is showcased on foreign territory, there is a common thread at these festivals and expos. That is the value placed on the forms of partnerships that function as vehicles for the effective disseminating of SA cultural messages. Participants at such events varyingly invest in large or small-scale planning to explore collaborative possibilities to maximize on the growth opportunities such events can provide (S. Sithole, personal communication, March 25, 2017). During this study, therefore, questions come up about the benefits of relationships created within the country of origin, and those in the country of diffusion. What becomes clear is that access to different cultural markets is made easier by the establishment and nurturing of networks (V. Sithole, personal communication, July 5, 2017).

Research Question

When I initially collected data about these festivals I had assumed that the Ubuntu festival in

2014 was initiated by the DAC. This was later rectified during the interview process that in fact the Ubuntu festival was the product of the Carnegie Hall Corporation (CHC). Since then the research question has changed. It now incorporates the CHC, focuses on SA cultural policy articulated by the involvement of DAC and DIRCO, networks and power. The question is:

12 WOMEX is one of the largest world music expos, and an “international networking platform for the world music industry” consisting of a festival, conference, trade fair and more (Womex, n.d. -c).

15 How do South African music festivals held in the USA promote SA musicians, facilitate industry and government networks, and cultivate state policy goals of hard and soft power?

The research question was derived from questions about what was done to realize the festivals, how it was done, why it was done, where it was done, when it was done, who was involved, what their contribution was and how they benefitted from the festivals. To explore the research question, I also had to address the following questions:

• What were the objectives of each festival?

• What were the outputs of the festivals?

• Who were the stakeholders at the festivals?

• How were participant musicians selected for the festivals?

• How did each festival organizer engage with stakeholders before, after and at each

festival?

• What were the benefits of the festivals to the stakeholders?

• What did the stakeholders contribute to the festivals?

• Which networks were enabled by the festivals for the stakeholders?

• What was the composition of the networks involved?

• What kind of cooperation exists between the DAC and its identified MGE partners?

• Does the relationship between DIRCO and the DAC impact cultural programing at SA

consulates and embassies abroad?

• How did the DAC get involved at the Ubuntu festival?

• Which SA government policies were directly implicated in framing the festivals?

The research question and the sub-questions were the basis for the interviews I conducted with the stakeholders of each festival, and I detail these interviews in Chapter 4. The questions were formulated in relation to the speeches by DAC executive representatives at the 16 festivals, and were to determine what is involved in the process of creating markets for SA music abroad, whether driven by the department or initiated by other entities with whom the

DAC and DIRCO collaborate.

The research question helps put into perspective the SA state’s instrumental mission for

SA culture to create wealth and unite society. The question helps disentangle how organs of the state promote SA culture abroad to meet national developmental goals while representing the interests of sector participants, like musicians, and other stakeholders. Moreover, the research question sheds light on the mechanisms of how the DAC evaluates the impact of its efforts on sector growth. The sub-questions lead to five focal points through which the DAC, based on its statements at each festival and national cultural policy proclamations, goes about achieving the goal of creating new markets for SA music in the USA. The first point is on what the objectives to the festivals were and what the outputs of each festival were; the second is who the stakeholders were; the third is what the relationships between the stakeholders were based on and what kind of networks they enabled, and who is included in the networks; the fourth is which policy frameworks are involved in this context; and the fifth point speaks to the facilitative and promotional elements of the main research question and addresses how the process of organizing the festivals was approached.

The focal points directly address the research question. They are meant to identify the transnational, local and international networks the DAC taps into for fulfilling its mandate in the promotion of SA culture. The focal points put a spotlight on, among others, the effectiveness of existing networks between countries and organizations, access to prospective networks, the cultivation of new relationships for penetrating new markets for SA government strategies, and on the nature of organization of each festival. Since each stakeholder also has their own interests, the focal point on stakeholder relationships questions how empowered

17 stakeholders such as musicians are in navigating expansive transnational cultural networks.

Figure 1 below illustrates the five focal points.

Figure 1: Research focal points

Rationale

What is interesting about this research is that apart from the country-identity-focused content of both festivals and their geographical setting in the USA, the involvement of DIRCO and the

DAC at both festivals is what ties SAAF and the Ubuntu festival together. This entire research 18 endeavor is based on the involvement of both departments and what their partnership tries to achieve at both festivals. This study is from the perspective of what the DAC-DIRCO partnership could achieve at both festivals for the national mandate, even when they were not in control of the Ubuntu festival. The implication is that since these government departments were involved at both festivals, SA policy interests are represented at each festival.

By undertaking this study, I would like to understand and explain how the broader political, cultural, institutional, social and various stakeholder dynamics interact to make each festival possible. As such I consulted a cross section of this wide group of stakeholders at each festival to understand these dynamics. The stakeholders include industry experts invited to participate at the festivals’ discussion panels, the musicians and their representatives, the sponsors of each festival, Carnegie Hall representatives, as well as Grand Performances, the company that produced the festival in LA. Then, of course, I also consulted DIRCO and the

DAC as the other stakeholders.

In more detail, at SAAF, the DAC was in partnership with the Department of

International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), and another SA government department and a government agency due to MGE stipulations. The MGE partners were the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and BrandSA. The festival was a project of the MGE strategy which exists to drive job and wealth creation, and social cohesion in South Africa, thereby advancing South Africa's national development plans (DAC, 2017). Similarly, the DAC and

DIRCO played a collaborative role at the Ubuntu festival. This is even though the festival was initiated by the Carnegie Hall Corporation, with sponsorship from US foundations.

Nonetheless, at each festival, the DAC and DIRCO together act on their responsibility of promoting national culture in SA and abroad, and furthering SA’s wider interests globally

(DACST, 1996; DIRCO, 2011).

19 Likewise, all the stakeholders are individual entities with their own specific pool of interests. The convergence of these entities at the festivals, however, creates unique results and invites a hypothesis for why international festivals like these happen. As such, this research may contribute to theory building on why and how creating markets for South African music internationally could work better and address the interests of all stakeholders. The study could also contribute to theory on why South African culture is currently a utility in the government's pursuit of power in other countries, and how such pursuits could be more effective.

I undertake this research on South African cultural policy as a student in the US that is also a South African citizen, an occasional music performer and creative sector participant of

South Africa (SA). I am curious about the cultural policy mechanisms of the SA government as they affect me, and naturally my research interests for this dissertation gravitated towards the arts practice and cultural politics of SA. Through this study, and in my role as a product of the scholarship of both the US and SA in arts-culture management and policy, I also wanted to explore the cultural exchange between SA and US in relation to diplomacy. I, therefore, sought areas of comparison in general cultural policy, even though SA has an official state sanctioned cultural policy in contrast to the US that does not have formally state endorsed policy (Cherbo,

1992; Wyszomirski, 2008).

For instance, the cultural relations that affect music between the USA and SA have mainly been explored in ethnomusicological texts and on reports for government departments

(Coplan, 1985; Hamm, 1989; Erlmann, 1991; Allen, 2003; Ansell, 2004; Muller, 2004, 2008;

Joffe & Newton, 2008; Shaw & Rodell, 2009; Ballantine, 2012). Apart from the ontological analyses by Garnham (2015) and Nawa et al. (2017) of South Africa’s cultural diplomacy, or the SA cultural sector policy projection by Fisher (2014), the international cultural relations framework of SA has not been widely discussed in academic literature. It has also not been discussed much in relation to SA and the USA, or regarding particular forms of cultural 20 expression. There is an opportunity for this study to widen the scope of discussion and contribute to the limited literature in this area since the study discusses how music festivals further or constrain the range of SA-US policy aims and relations.

While I do not involve the full spectrum of policies between the two countries, I undertake this research with the cognizance that these two countries have unique histories influencing the trajectory of their development. Even though I refer to the American Music

Abroad program, for instance, my intention in this study is not to perpetuate a prevalent stigma on the lack in African society and governance in relation to the West (Mazrui, 2004; Richey &

Ponte, 2012). Even in this political and politicized context about the kind of cultural policy mechanisms the SA government has in place for citizens like me who have vested interests in the sector, avoiding this stigma is possible. I, therefore, avoid, as much as possible, the pessimism and skepticism afforded to African discourses on progress (Richey & Ponte, 2012).

In this research, I hope to narrate a South African story that is less linear or constrained by discourses on the development-poverty-policy spectrum which is often used to write about the non-West (Rahman, 2004). I hope this research portrays the complexities of the contexts of each festival without relegating SA to the usual monoliths of this spectrum. As such, I engage with what the DAC, the Carnegie Hall Corporation and other stakeholders in a manner that regards what is possible for the arts-culture sectors in SA and the USA.

This study is from an interdisciplinary perspective, part of a tradition that already exists in cultural policy studies. The research topics here include international relations due to the movement of cultural resources between countries, as well as the influence of social, economic and political systems that have an impact on the arts in these countries. Having an interdisciplinary lens enhances the portrayal of the connectedness between world events, broader national policies, cultural events, artists and other participants. Highlighting this inter-

21 connectedness of sectors, events and countries may add to the understanding of events of this nature, as well as the ecology and magnitude of transnational cultural networks.

Scope and Limitations of Study

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, SAAF and the Ubuntu festival take music from one country and present it in a specifically selected country. This means that the festivals are goal-oriented, and the goals at each festival are what makes each festival different. Due to their content in relation to their geographical setting, the festivals operate on an international plane, and within the realm of international cultural relations (Wyszomirski et al., 2003). The involvement of the

DAC and DIRCO at each festival, however, highlights the pursuit of SA-related policy goals of power on the global arena. These festivals are, therefore, explored here as international cultural festivals happening within the scope of goals of power and influence related to international cultural relations between SA and the USA. The study is thus limited to post- apartheid SA policies, implemented by 2018, and to these two events specifically.

Research Strategy

I use a case study research strategy to analyze the festivals. The case study helps explain why and how a phenomenon happens (Yin, 2014). Case studies research strategies are beneficial for explaining complex ‘real-life contexts’, and especially those where ‘the phenomenon and the context are not clear’ (Schwandt, 2007, p. 28). At these festivals, the event is the context.

With the case study it is, therefore, possible to describe each festival, to paint a picture of its context and characteristics, as well as to explain its processes.

I collected data and corroborated it using varied sources, and the case study allows for this eclectic approach (ibid.). The interdisciplinary nature of this study is therefore supported by the in-depth data management means possible of case study strategies. I also use the case study as a ‘genre of reporting’ for presenting the data in a more ‘eclectic’ fashion that 22 incorporates reporting on policy documents, music performances, observations from blogs, government reports, social media pages and online videos documenting the festivals, interview material, academic articles, etc. (Woolcot, 2009, p. 85; Yin, 2014). This is important as I treat each festival as a single unit of analysis, where the South African Arts Festival is Unit of

Analysis 1, and the Ubuntu festival is Unit of Analysis 2. Doing so simplifies the complex multiple source elements of each case by presenting the case as a unit (Stake, 1995; Cresswell,

2013). Each festival is, therefore, treated as a ‘bounded system’, ‘bounded by time and place’

(Cresswell, 2013, p. 97).

Additionally, each Unit of Analysis is treated as an intrinsic case, which means I am interested in studying it to ‘learn about that particular case’ as a unique occurrence (Stake,

1995, p. 3). At the same time each Unit of Analysis serves as an instrumental case study to explain something else (ibid.). The ‘something else’ being the how and why of the research question. Each festival is analyzed for understanding the event individually so that findings can be made on the international cultural relations between SA and the USA. Moreover, the case study is designed such that each festival is a unit of analysis embedded in the case of SA festivals occurring in the USA, and within the context of DIRCO and the DAC pursuing power.

As mentioned earlier, the data collection methods here are from multiple sources, including interviews. During the interviews I conducted with the cross-section of stakeholders at each festival, I used various sources of literature available on the festivals to guide me in identifying the stakeholders. I also relied on each stakeholder to suggest who else was involved at the festivals, so that I could engage with more festival participants. This means that I used snowball sampling (Cresswell, 2013).

23 Chapter Outline

Chapter 1 is the introduction to the study. In the chapter I provide some background to the study and why I embarked on it. I also explain the focus of the study. Thereafter, I introduce each of the festivals and outline their significance. I then state the research question and its sub- questions. I then explicate the rationale to the study. Next, I discuss the scope and limitations of the study. I then summarize the research strategy before I provide the outline the contents of every chapter to follow.

Chapter 2 is the literature review. I survey the literature around the core topics of the study.

These are topics that are determined by the focal points of the study. The topics are festivals; the cultural economy and creative industries; international relations; hard power and soft power; international cultural relations; the instrumentality of culture; the creation of networks; and SA cultural policy and management. I then summarize core findings from the chapter.

Chapter 3 outlines the conceptual framework of the study. I address the three main theories that frame the discussion, which include soft power, hard power and cultural instrumentalism.

I explain how they are relevant to the discussion. Lastly, in the chapter, I map the analytical framework of the study.

Chapter 4 details the methodological concerns of the study. The chapter is in seven sections.

It defines case study, then applies the case study methodology to the research context. It focuses on how the study participants were recruited and who they were. There is a section on data collection methods, data analysis, the limitations of the case study and the study’s validity.

Chapter 5 outlines the foundations and trajectory of post-apartheid SA cultural policy, as well as the role of the DAC. The first section discusses the contents, premise and the process of drafting the main state cultural policy document. Chapter 5 also outlines the DAC’s successive policy strategies and national development strategies that have informed the DAC. Section two

24 addresses the DAC’s cultural diplomacy. The third section addresses prominent government cultural policy powerbrokers at SAAF and Ubuntu.

Chapter 6 presents Unit of Analysis 1: South African Arts Festival, Los Angeles 2013. The chapter details seven themes related to the staging and culture of festivals (Hauptfleisch, 2007).

Each section in the chapter represents each theme. The themes are the organizer, location, objectives, programming, stakeholders, process and outputs. I then conclude with the findings.

Chapter 7 presents Unit of Analysis 2: Ubuntu Festival, New York 2014. The chapter discusses the festival in relation to same seven themes as Chapter 6. These are the organizer, location, objectives, programming, stakeholders, process and outputs. Thereafter, I present the findings.

Chapter 8 provides the research analysis and conclusion. It compares the festivals, discusses prominent themes and answers the research question.

25 Chapter 2 – Literature Review

Introduction

In this chapter, I review the literature on topics implicated in the scope of this research. The topics are in this order: festivals, the cultural economy and creative industries, international relations, hard power and soft power; international cultural relations, the instrumentality of culture, the creation of networks, as well as SA cultural policy and management. The literature review is by no means exhaustive or follows debates chronologically. This review, however, considers some of the arguments and counter arguments relevant to the research question of

‘how do South African music festivals held in the USA promote SA musicians, facilitate industry and government networks, and cultivate state policy goals of hard and soft power?’.

Therefore, the literature integrates the focal points of the research. These points are the cultural and power goals of each festival, stakeholder identities, relationship building and networks between the stakeholders, the government policies involved at the festivals, as well as the processes undertaken to organize the festival by each festival driver. This literature further helps to explain and contextualize the festivals, to get more perspective on them, formulate more questions, arguments and to expand on proposed ideas (Glesne, 2006). At the end of the chapter, I summarize the literature findings.

Festivals

Festivals have different characteristics, serve numerous purposes, and are of various origins

(Falassi, 1987; Newbold & Jordan, 2016). This is partly why so many different disciplines debate festivals in infinite ways, and why sometimes this literature overlaps. For instance, festivals are often discussed as policy tools, exhibits of cultural politics, the cultural public sphere, leisure and recreation, tradition, fetish of culture, map of culture, events, performative,

26 cosmopolitan spaces, educational spaces, for political statements, in urban regeneration, rural development, regional development, space repurposing, place reinvention, internationalization, localization, employment generation, economic development, identity formation, self- expression, lifestyle politics, community development, social transformation, social justice, measuring cultural value, demonstrations of cultural value, etc. (Yeoman et al., 2004; Picard

& Robinson, 2006; Hauptfleisch et al., 2007; Delanty et al., 2011; Gibson & Connell, 2012;

Wynn, 2015; Newbold & Jordan, 2016; Taylor et al., 2016). Below are some of the topics through which I consider the two festivals as socially, culturally, institutionally and globally political. The topics are of festivals within debates of identity and community, as policy tools for economic and social impact, as environment and process, as well as multicultural and international cultural festivals. Lastly, I engage with literature on the composition of festivals.

For Identity and Community

Vast literature, which cannot be fully covered here, concentrates on festivals as affirmations of identity and community (Falassi, 1987; Noyes, 2003; Crespi-Vallbona & Richards, 2007;

Ickes, 2013). Within this treatment of festivals, Falassi (1987) is one of the most cited texts.

Falassi (1987) defines festivals as social phenomena imbued with social meaning, and common to all ‘human cultures’ (p. 1-2). He characterizes festivals as the outpouring of collective group joy or commemoration, relating to the present or past (ibid.). As an experience, they engage active participants and observers, and offer a space where people can act in ways they would not ordinarily act. The most primary function of festivals is to ‘renounce and announce culture’, however, over time the activities with which festivals are associated have expanded to include

‘market and exposition of commercial produce’, and other forms of consumption (ibid.). What matters at SAAF and Ubuntu festivals in relation to the topic of identity is that cultural difference is on display, and SA national identity is consumed for several reasons.

27 Falassi (1987) also suggests that the ‘social function and symbolic meaning’ of festivals are embedded in community values such as ‘ideology and world view’, ‘social identity’,

‘historical continuity’ and ‘physical survival’, and these shared values affirm the belonging of community members (p. 2-5). He introduces several typologies for festivals, including one based on ‘power, class structure, and social roles’ (Falassi, 1987, p. 3). In this typology, a festival could be presented ‘by the people for the people’ or ‘by the establishment for itself’, ‘for the people by the establishment’, and vice versa, or ‘by the people against the establishment’

(ibid.). Both festivals in this dissertation are presented by powerful entities, for the people.

Crespi-Vallbona and Richards (2007) find that discourse on ‘the role of cultural identity in festivals is important in ensuring broad support for such events’, especially in relation to stakeholder buy in (p. 120). Therefore, ‘consensus building around the cultural and social meaning of events can be a successful strategy’ (ibid.). This is especially where identity is contested or involving stakeholders such as cultural producers and policy makers. Festivals become statements about ‘social inclusion’ and spaces where ‘traditional culture’ serves multiple roles (Crespi-Vallbona & Richards, 2007, p. 120). Exclusion is apparent in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, where some stakeholders at SAAF had a marginal role in the social and other meanings made from this festival.

Ickes (2013) explores festivals as transformative spaces. He finds that at festivals, marginalized communities can gain agency. This comes from the visibility of their traditions at the festivals, and what creates inclusion and shared agency. The agency of cultural producers at Ubuntu and SAAF depends on the intentions of the festival organizers as well as the different roles cultural producers take at each festival.

Jaeger and Mykletun (2013) also find that festivals ‘strengthen a sense of cohesiveness’ amongst stakeholders, resulting in various collaborations between ‘artists, management, and

28 other business’ that enable new employment opportunities (p. 223-225). They pose that the effect of festivals for individual identities are also ‘psychological, social and cultural’ (ibid.).

For instance, different people can refocus on their shared histories in festival spaces (ibid.).

More so, the exhibition of traditions at festivals encourages fellowship and belonging and creates a sense of community between participants (Jaeger and Mykletun, 2013). This sense of belonging and shared history is part of what the DAC intended to inspire by this event amongst SA citizens in the audience and to make a connection with US audience members who were aware of SA’s political history and the role of Americans in that history.

On a multi-cultural festival experience, d’Hauteserre (2011) says that it could be about cultural education for audiences that are not familiar with the culture presented on stage. There is an “opportunity to challenge modernist practices (e.g. of inferiorisation)” of regional traditions because it is a place of ‘identity formation’ for the showcased culture (d’Hauteserre,

2011, p. 275). Ideally such festivals are supposed to create ‘visibility and accessibility’ for the presented cultural traditions, enable ‘audiences to partake emotionally and cognitively’ in the experience (d’Hauteserre, 2011, p. 225). Both festivals benefited SA culture this way.

On the other hand, festivals are not always events that bestow something but also take away (Johansson & Kociatkiewicz, 2011). Johansson and Kociatkiewicz (2011) propose that festivals are customized experiences that sanitize the everyday dimension of the spaces in which they happen. Johansson and Kociatkiewicz (2011) speak of how spaces where festivals happen are purposely packaged to appeal to the desires of temporary visitors. Similarly,

Macleod (2006) posits that festivals are less about local identity, but celebrations of a global identity. Their setting is a simulated ‘placelessness’ driven by a culture of consumption. In some ways this was the case at SAAF, where for the sake of consumption, homogenous music genres that spoke more to the American experience were presented. Macleod (2006) also

29 speaks of ‘transnationalised festivity’ caused by the effects of super communication technologies and a growing ‘international tourism market’ (p. 235). Festivals are as such familiar homogeneous spectacles that could be found anywhere through replication (ibid.).

From these texts, a question that comes up is whether the SAAF and Ubuntu festivals become a fleeting familiar transnational festival experience or if they have an economic and creative industry growth impact for SA as desired by the DAC and DIRCO.

As Policy Tools for Economic and Social Impact

Policy tools or instruments are what the government uses to change the behavior of identified groups to ‘achieve policy goals’ (Schneider & Ingram, 1990, p. 527). In other words, policy tools are “techniques by which governmental authorities wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect or prevent social change” (Vedung, 1998, p. 21). Policy tools address identified problems related to policy by ‘providing authority, incentives or capacity; by using symbolic and hortatory proclamations to influence perceptions or values; or by promoting learning to reduce uncertainty’ (Schneider & Ingram, 1990, p. 514). Similarly, Salamon (2002) describes policy tools as traditionally containing “a type of good or activity”, “a delivery vehicle for this good” and organizations that are part of the “delivery system” and finds that governments have different options regarding the advancement of policy choices and tools than before (Salamon, 2002, p.1643). Of the diversity of available policy tools, however, Kassimm and Le Gales (2010) add that sometimes governments use instruments as “smokescreen to hide less respectable objectives, to depoliticize fundamentally political issues, or to create a minimum consensus on reform by relying on the apparent neutrality of instruments presented as modern” (ibid. p. 5).

Festivals are part of a broad scope of tools and have been used by policy makers as intervention methods to achieve particular desired results (Bianchini & Parkinson, 1993; Picard

30 & Robinson, 2006). Usually, contemplation around festivals as tools includes the economics of organizing the festivals or possible economic returns for identified groups (ibid.). Decisions on festivals also incorporate ‘socio-cultural impacts’, related benefits and developmental frameworks (Smith & Forest, 2006, p. 147). Accordingly, as clarified in Chapters 6 and 7, it becomes evident that the SAAF and Ubuntu festivals are also policy tools since they are “means used to address public problems” (Salamon, 2002, p. 12). They are policy tools for the MGE strategy and the City of NY. They are intended to further social cohesion, the SA and NYC economies, SA’s reputation abroad (soft power), and the well-being of NYC citizens. The festivals are also for the development of skills for the SA creative industries.

Nonetheless, later in the study it becomes apparent that there are other considerations to the chosen policy tools. For instance, how do the tools represent their many stakeholders, how are they measured, and how suitable are they for their ends? To consider this, I involve

Borrás and Edquist (2013), who address multiple interests and decisions on policy instruments.

Their view is that decision-making regarding which tools are best are not always systematic.

Borrás and Edquist (2013) admit that decisions on policy tools are not always “consciously chosen”, designed, selected “based on clearly defined overall governmental objectives”, or are

“always based on a clear identification of problems” (p. 1521). Instead, what they suggest happens are ad hoc decisions based on the interests of those participating in the policy process as well as schemes that have been successful in the past. They attribute the problem for this kind of decision-making to the lack of holistic understanding of the problem and the lack of measurement of the impact of the problem. In Chapter 6, I note that the policy players for

SAAF have an ad hoc relationship with each other but decide to use SAAF for objectives related to continuity even though the parties were not able to adequately evaluate the festival.

Borrás and Edquist (2013), like Smith and Ingram (2002) and Salamon (2002), also state that policy tools should be designed so that they are easy to evaluate. 31 To postulate on why festivals seemed the right tool, I first involve del Barrio et al.

(2012) who acknowledge that the popularity of festivals is due to what festivals achieve, which is “attracting intense expenditure” and “acting as a driving force behind cultural creativity and social cohesion” (ibid.). del Barrio et al. (2012) note that festivals are pivotal to local residents and visitors, who seek a leisure cultural experience that brings their sense of belonging into focus, as well as policy makers whose actions of governance are validated by the response of locals and visitors. For del Barrio et al. (2012), the intangible heritage at cultural festivals involves the expression of ‘artistic innovations’ which ‘draw on previous cultural background, perceived as accumulated cultural capital’ (p. 235). That said, they also argue that the showcased intangible heritage at festivals has ‘cost-benefit’ and ‘social and contextual indicators’ that should be included in evaluations (del Barrio et al., 2012, p. 243).

Crompton and Mackay (1994) also interrogate neo-liberal economic imperatives around the hosting of festivals. They argue against the economic returns basis for which many festivals are planned. Crompton and Mackay (1994) question the cultural instrumentalism involved in contemporary festivals. They suggest that policy makers tend to disguise the social function of festivals in order to create economic pathways for unrelated projects. This means that while festivals have noticeable social benefits, policy makers prize these events more for their economic benefits.

Visser (2005) has similar sentiments. He is cynical about the reported economic, social, environmental and cultural impact of festivals since research has shown no standardized methodology to make meaning of festivals. He finds it puzzling that government structures often choose the festival strategy as a policy tool, questioning their expectations, especially considering that research refutes the evenness of the economic impact of festivals. Visser

(2005) wonders if the desired cultural impact of arts festivals in policy-making is in fact about development or other goals because festivals are simply reproduced. 32 Likewise, Clifton et al. (2012) refute the benefits associated with festivals planned by public sector institutions. Clifton et al. (2012) allege that ‘while public sector festivals and special events may be making contributions to desired policy outcomes, there is little robust and reliable evidence to support the claim’ (p. 89). This is because of insufficient and unreliable evaluation mechanisms (ibid.). Clifton et al. (2012) find that public sector bodies deem evaluation as optional, but do not realize that this kind of outlook negatively impacts citizens.

Saayman and Saayman (2005) maintain that the economic returns of festivals cannot be secondary considerations. The location of a festival, for one, directly influences the economic impact of the event. For instance, the festival location determines who attends, and the amount of money spent at the festivals is also dependent on where each attendee is from.

Furthermore, Saayman and Saayman (2005) also observe that “festivals are good examples of how private sponsorships can be used to sustain and grow the arts” (p. 582).

Similarly, Saayman and Roussouw (2010) confirm the multiplier economic effect often attributed to festivals, highlighting that the business community where a festival happens benefits in multiple ways. For instance, “the sectors that benefit the most”, are “trade and accommodation, financial and business services, manufacturing, transport and commercial services and community services” (Saayman and Roussouw, 2010, p. 269). This means that the stakeholders of festivals are far more varied than the immediate target community that attends the festival or that resides in the vicinity of the festival setting, and that these stakeholders have varied interests.

Crompton and Mackay, Visser, Saayman and Saayman, and Saayman and Roussouw, thus, confirm that festivals are a policy tool through which to pursue economic resources, or hard power, and reach audiences beyond those targeted. This is the kind of impact DAC-

DIRCO would want to see for the SA cultural sector in the USA, as a measure of how much hard power the SA cultural sector could generate for the SA government. Moreover, these 33 authors confirm that festivals are a tool to bring economic benefits to varied festival stakeholders. How is this return also channeled to the SA CCI development cause?

Quinn (2005), for instance, cites the disconnect between festivals and public policy.

She relates this specifically to cultural policy and tourism policy. Quinn (2005) suggests that one of the problems in the city festival model is that the bigger agendas festivals pander to are not cultural in nature, and thwart artistic sustainability agendas because of the uneven integration in policies. She estimates that even though festivals are useful for giving cities attractive economic value, their impact is ephemeral since they are usually only annual.

Gibson et al. (2010) also find limitations with policy and festivals. They also argue, that even though economic opportunities from festivals may not be permanent, they are significant in scale, and due to this should be acknowledged in policy. Gibson et al. (2010) also note that festivals grow community skills like performance, organization, leadership and management skills due to their regional frequency. They say that policy should show that festivals improve economic cooperation amongst participants. It should also indicate that culture and the economy are meaningfully interwoven beyond quantifiable economic benefits. DAC objectives at SAAF involved the expansion of skills for SA CCI’s that would result in economic impact.

An equally important reason why festivals are a popular policy tool for policy makers is how economical they are, unless they regularly recur (Andersson & Andersson, 2006).

Festivals happen only during set periods of time and so do not have the permanent financial responsibilities of on-going projects (ibid.). This temporal-spatial quality renders them

‘economically viable’ because of their ‘low fixed costs’ bearing ‘high direct and indirect variable costs’ (ibid.). The high costs of staging festivals are often related to the talent and the staging facilities, and not the operations personnel (Andersson & Andersson, 2006, p. 81-82).

In addition, festival organizers use several strategies to increase the number of people in attendance, as well as to extend the economic and other benefits of festivals (Andersson & 34 Andersson, 2006). One such strategy is to add ‘complementary activities’ like ‘master courses, creative workshops, seminars’, etc. (Andersson & Andersson, 2006, p. 82). Activities like master classes and panel discussions were part of the add-on programming at the two festivals.

In addition, festivals have an internationalizing quality. They ‘forge’ relationships

‘between local councils, businesses, governments, and communities’ and ‘global networks of power and influence’ (Stringer, 2001, p. 141). Stringer (2001) perceives that festivals have the potential to tap into ‘global interests’ (p. 142). The events act as ‘gatekeepers’ of the industry, and do so while allowing public participation (Stringer, 2001, p. 142-143). This was the case at the Ubuntu festival, where global networks were actively involved through the sponsors and collaborators, CCI representatives and the transnational setting that is NYC which represents global interests and has unique professional possibilities for CCI representatives.

Also, Watkins and Herbert (2003) are concerned that cultural policy strategies are sometimes unstrategic and incoherent in relation to their instrumental objectives, as well as in relation to stakeholders. SA sector stakeholders have perceived of MGE this way (Van Graan,

2013b). Watkins and Herbert (2003) also remark on how projects, such as festivals, that are connected to a policy strategy are not always implemented but rely on the availability of perceived favorable conditions in order to be considered. They notice that the priority in policy is to advance cultural projects with economic benefit rather than other determined benefits.

As Environment and Process

Picard and Robinson (2006) reaffirm that festivals are transformative performances of lived experience, spaces of ‘transgression’, and places where identity is ‘reasserted’ (p. 2-11).

Festivals are also increasingly places where ‘transnational’ audiences, participants and activities meet (Picard & Robinson, 2006, p. 2-5). They are places that represent ‘ongoing change’ in their immediate environment and social change in general even as they are bound

35 by ‘space and time’ (ibid.). As ‘moments of social concentration and connectivity’, festivals enable groups to bond within ‘friendship or professional networks’ (Picard & Robinson, 2006, p. 10). That said, however, festivals are at times also escapist spectacles where the exhibited is commodified for consumption or the reaffirmation of some kind of ‘consciousness’ (p. 17).

These dimensions of the commodification of culture for the economic and social transformations are evident at the SAAF and Ubuntu festivals, although not so much as tensions than as compatible, where professional networks are reinforced at Ubuntu and broader socio- political statements are made about a changing SA at both festivals.

Regarding the professional benefits to musicians and their working conditions, Gibson

(2007) discovers that festivals are pivotal in ‘building audiences and incomes’ (p. 65). Due to the large numbers of people they attract from a wide area, they also advance the ‘diffusion of musical genres with specialist audiences’ in a wider physical geographical area than used to be possible (ibid.). Since festivals are more frequent, and usually happen in the same season, they create a ‘circuit’ from which musicians can gain an income (ibid.). Even though festivals don’t offer regular work, they ‘are a more successful outlet for the promotion of new recorded releases in cases where radio airplay is scant’ (Gibson, 2007, p. 75). Festivals, thus, have tangible and intangible benefits for musicians, and are environments of growth and transformation (Gibson, 2007). SAAF was similarly to create performance circuits for SA musicians.

Gibson and Connell (2005) view festivals as ‘spaces for expression, subversion and leisure’ (p. 259). As much as these events invoke a sense of ‘relaxation’, they also offer escapism when regarded as environments that ‘include or exclude’ and focus on a narrow scope that may involve music that is often ‘neglected’ or considered ‘exotic’ (Gibson & Connell,

2005, p. 210-211). Participants can, therefore, escape the everyday and sonically travel to other places. Otherwise, as part of tourism-generating strategies, Gibson and Connell (2005) 36 recognize that festivals have been ‘commercializing indigenous worlds’ (p. 213). Yet Gibson and Connell (2005) also suggest that festivals can also be environments of change in broadening consciousness about global and local political struggles. SAAF was intended as a connector. It can be seen as both a move away from the perception of SA culture as exotic because of its contemporary presentation and inclusion of cross-over genres. Simultaneously, the festival offers escapism from mainstream music, and is exoticized.

Jansson and Nilsson (2016) describe festivals as ‘temporary spaces’ that condense time for participants. Career processes that would have customarily taken the course of a career to achieve can in fact happen over the short duration of the festival. Therefore, instead of happening over years, the processes take a few days if the right steps are taken in the favourable national-international ‘temporary agglomeration’ of festival conditions which “constitute a microcosm” of the industry (Jansson & Nilsson, 2016, p. 4-6). This is because there is a concentration and presence of a wide range of industry powerbrokers. More so, access to industry knowledge and networks is also possible during the festival period. The process of networking and acquiring knowledge, therefore, gets fast-tracked at these events. Jansson and

Nilsson (2016) imply that festivals are also environments that encourage entrepreneurial thought and action from musicians because of the presence of resources. Festivals “should not be analysed as single events”, but should be “interpreted in relation to each other” due to their short- and long-term impact on careers, as well as the circuits they create as they mostly happen during specific seasons over different continents (Jansson & Nilsson, 2016, p. 13). Therefore, festivals can be perceived as temporary-permanent spaces due to how they happen over a short period in relation to their lasting career impact. They are “spaces for network capital, reputational capital, work opportunities, and inspiration” (ibid.). Therefore, musicians can build their artistic reputation through their attendance and networking, find creative inspiration from the presented innovative projects and be recruited for new core and ‘secondary jobs’ 37 projects at festivals (Jansson & Nilsson, 2016, p. 9). The SAAF and Ubuntu festivals were environments conducive for the generating of economic, creative and professional resources.

Multicultural and International Cultural Festivals

International cultural festivals have a multicultural quality to them in who attends and what is presented there, as they represent people of different nations. At the SAAF and Ubuntu festivals multiculturalism is reflected in the included multiple SA music genres and cultural groups, the fact that the festivals are about SA identity portrayed in the USA, and their setting in cities known for their cosmopolitan populations. Multiculturalism at international cultural festivals is also reflected in the involvement of factors such as national branding, cultural diplomacy, the management of transnational stakeholders and strategic partnerships (Sölter, 2015). Such festivals often operate on inter-cultural and ‘multicultural’ planes, and have multifaceted governance structures (ibid). Cultures, thus, interact by way of the populations and institutions present and represented. SAAF and the Ubuntu festival, as such, are planned to achieve results that impact more than a single country, geographical locale, institution or social group. More so, the two festivals are about presenting an ‘other’, in the form of a different nation and its cultures, in the USA. The literature that follows next engages with some of these dimensions.

Due to the growing diversity of countries and ‘multicultural societies’, multicultural festivals are a more regular occurrence (Lee et al., 2012, p. 93). Events of this nature are the glue to multicultural societies, and are celebrations of this diversity (Lee et al., 2012, p. 93-

100). According to Lee et al. (2012), multicultural festivals are cultural celebrations, where groups ‘reaffirm’ their ‘community and culture’, and where one group educates others about the ‘richness’ of their culture (p. 99). At SAAF, this is certainly the case since one country’s cultural forms are pitted against that of another. Secondly, Lee et al. (2012) go on to say that such festivals are expressions of culture and identity where groups are made to feel ‘secure’ in

38 ‘strengthening their identity’ in a multicultural context in a way that cultivates ‘acceptance’

(ibid.). In the DAC speeches, this speaks to the idea of reinvigorating cultural ties, etc. Thirdly, the festivals enable ‘social interaction’ amongst groups who bond over ‘nostalgia for their homeland’, thereby promoting ‘social harmony’ and ‘break prejudice’ (ibid.). Nostalgia is at

SAAF was inspired among SA expatriates.

Van der Horst (2010) problematizes multicultural festivals as bringing ‘ethnicity to the marketplace’ since festivals are orchestrated places of commercial activity (p. 1). On ethnic, community and multicultural festivals, she states that as much as they are said to propagate social cohesion, they are primarily places of consumption, and so whatever multicultural aspects are produced will be consumed. The consumption is ‘central to the creation of the festival’s meaning’ (Van der Horst, 2010, p. 14). This is because ‘ethnic identities’ are presented in a ‘seductive’ manner for the visitor, and with the exclusion of ‘undesirable’ aspects of that identity represented (Van der Horst, 2010, p. 1). The limited representations are ‘non- threatening’ and cheerful (Van der Horst, 2010, p. 15). Doing so entices the target market because of the forged ‘universality’ (ibid.). Furthermore, the performers are complicit in these portrayals since they perform their ‘ethnic singularity through the other’s eyes’ (Van der Horst,

2010, p. 16). At the festivals, the portrayed cultural diversity is integral to the consumption.

Phipps (2010) says that festivals where indigenous culture is presented are sometimes tainted as ‘inauthentic’ by scholars and others in contexts of ‘cultural interchange’ or ‘cross- cultural spaces’ (p. 234-236). He states, however, that they are in fact ‘urgent acts of cultural politics’ that should inform the formulation of cultural policy strategies (Phipps, 2010, p. 237).

Multicultural festivals like these can be opportunities for the ‘assertion of rights’, ‘a call to recognition’, and for the indigenous communities to portray themselves in a ‘more constructive view’ as a ‘distinct culture’, especially in the context of globalization (Phipps, 2010, p. 217).

This aspect is important in this case study as it relates to the focus of SA’s foreign policy, which 39 prioritizes unity in diversity in an environment of homogenizing globalization. Phipps (2010) also points out that such festivals are relegated as in ‘cultural revival and survival’ mode rather than ‘as a seriously political and ethical practice’ (ibid.). This cultural survival mode is the antithesis of what the DAC promotes at SAAF, instead portraying more US-friendly SA music.

Ferdinand and Williams (2013) are of the opinion that festivals ‘are influenced by wider business trends’ (p. 203-204). First, they are national institutions with ‘international actor’ networks (ibid.). These networks come with ‘resources’ such as ‘knowledge, finance and relationships’, which the national institutions can exploit (ibid.). Second, as ‘activities in a host market’, such as exporting, licensing, foreign joint venture, direct investment and franchising.

Third, through ‘the path a firm takes to international markets’ (Ferdinand & Williams, 2013, p. 204). This path may be from ‘outward internationalization’ where activities are performed

‘in foreign markets’, or ‘inward internationalization’, where ‘resources are brought from foreign markets or activities are performed by foreign providers in the home country’ (ibid.).

Ferdinand and Williams (2013) recognize that festivals get internationalized in various ways, through shared resources, but that this internationalization is effectively catalyzed by the

‘interconnected nature of cultural industries’ (p. 202). From this angle, SAAF’s activities in

LA are more cost-effective. They involve exporting since ‘production is carried out in the home country while sales and marketing activities are carried out in the foreign country, either directly by the firm, or indirectly, through agents’ (Ferdinand & Williams, 2013, p. 203).

Therefore, it is an ‘outward internationalization’ where home activities are performed in another country (Ferdinand & Williams, 2013, p. 204). The path to international markets at the

Ubuntu festival in NY on the other hand involves an ‘inward internationalization’, where

‘resources are brought from foreign markets or activities are performed by foreign providers in the home country’ (ibid.).

40 Duffy (2005) insists that the transnational platform of multicultural festivals is disruptive because on the one hand they ‘celebrate cultural plurality’, are simultaneously concerned with ‘maintaining an idea of an essential identity’ and thereby also ‘marginalizes’ the differences celebrated (p. 689-690). She says that these events ‘demonstrate the heterogeneous state of both identity and place’ (p. 677). Such events, therefore, cause

‘anxieties’ over ‘cultural authenticity’ because of the ‘hybrid identities’ on show which challenge established and ‘clearly demarcated identities’ (ibid.). Duffy (2005) finds that for instance performers appropriate music genres of cultures to which they do not necessarily belong, but manage to connect with others cross-culturally. Like Van Der Host (2010), her argument highlights the approach the DAC tool in selecting performers whose music was not too unfamiliar for SAAF target audiences.

Sölter (2015) reflects on balancing the private-public stakeholder partnerships that make a multicultural festival annually prosper. The event aims to shape and ‘change opinions and perceptions’ about Germany in Australia (Sölter, 2015, p. 198). To this, Sölter (2015) finds that ‘promoting the arts abroad as cultural diplomacy is useful to strengthen ties with other countries, and to showcase emerging artists on an international level which is often their first opportunity to gain attention’ (p. 198). At the same time, however, he thinks that cultural diplomacy should not be directed by government policy agendas that relate to politics or the economy because of potential ‘distrust’ the target audiences may have of the cultural messages that may come across as ‘propaganda’ (ibid.). He advises that festival organizers “need to listen and find out what matters to [this audience] and why, rather than selling a ‘national’ message abroad” so that they can make deeper connections with their audiences, and communicate authentic but relevant messages (Sölter, 2015, p. 199). The trick is three-fold. He says that first the organizer has to involve content from the home country, determined from local input acquired by local ‘scouts’ who are part of local networks. Secondly, there should be 41 collaboration between home-grown content and local talent, or vice versa for the sake of audience development. Thirdly, Sölter (2015) recommends partnering up with a local powerbroker to enable a semi-planned ‘open dialogue’ in the festival’s programming that relates to both partners’ institutional policies.

The Composition of Festivals

In this section I engage with literature that guided me in determining how to best analyze the make up and constitution of these festivals so that the main focal points of this study could be addressed. This is literature that suggests some of the key factors in the anatomy of a festival.

I incorporate some of the key factors in my analysis of the festivals as they fit into the study’s prime areas of focus of aims and ends, stakeholders, relationships and networks, policies involved, and processes undertaken.

A study by Getz (2010) on the nature and scope of festivals, for instance, conveys that the main discourse on festivals relates to “the roles, meanings and impacts of festivals in society and culture, festival tourism, and festival management” (p. 1). He outlines various themes from a large volume of cross-disciplinary academic literature on festivals and I narrowed some of these themes for my analysis, which I discuss in Chapter 4. Getz (2010) reports that some of the recurring themes in festival literature and analysis include long and short-term economic and social outcomes, the evaluation of outcomes, stakeholders like sponsors and the audience as part of the context in which the festival happens, the objective or role of the festival in the context in which it happens, the dynamics of the destination and geographical location of festival tourism, the benefits and motivations to why audiences attend festivals, the process of planning the festival including marketing and other logistics, the perspective of the “event practitioners” or festival organizer, the temporality of festivals, as well as how the festival’s themed program supports but does not necessarily fullfil a desired experience related to the

42 objectives of the event (Getz, 2010, p. 1-13). In relation to research on festival management,

Getz also finds that festival organizers “are particularly interested in knowing how their manipulation of setting, program and various human interactions affects the audience and/or participants, and whether or not the desired experiences and consequences are achieved” (Getz,

2010, p. 7). This implies that festivals are structured in a calculated manner, that their process is orchestrated but involves these components. For making sense of the festivals, therefore, I had to consider how these components and themes interact and look at the role of the festival organizers in this interaction.

Similarly, Hauptfleisch (2007), suggests that festivals are intentionally staged, complex and ideologically based ‘eventifying systems’ (p. 39-42). He posits that festivals also reveal a lot about the values of the place where they are hosted (ibid.). They have defining characteristics related to their purpose, inherent politics and common organization dynamics.

Yet, apart from their internal mechanisms, Hauptfleisch (2007) conveys that festivals are also affected by external machinations. All of these have an impact on the festival’s portrayal of cultural dentity (ibid.).

In relation to them as complex systems, Hauptfleisch (2007), proposes that festivals are particularly shaped by social, political, cultural and economic dynamics. To support this statement he illustrates a model, where the festival event is in the middle surrounded by ‘forces’ such as the organizers, sponsors, cultural politics, artists, facilities, commercial interests, local economy, local and national culture, community, media, national politics, audiences, geography, general public, and local politics (ibid.). These components also inform decisions made before, during and after the festivals, thereby shaping the event. The components also subject the festival to demands that cannot be entirely controlled by the event organizer. The implication then is that these components create multiple expectations around a festival

(Hauptfleisch, 2007). Due to all the interests involved then, some of the role players involved 43 within a festival, for instance, may have divergent and even competing interests. These components informed the analytical framework with which to interrogate each festival.

The cultural and creative industries (CCI’s)

One of the aims of MGE is to economically advance SA cultural and creative industries (CCI’s) so that their contribution to the national economy is more pronounced. In SA, these industries are defined similarly to those in countries like the UK (Newton in Mavhungu, 2014). In the

UK context, first, cultural activities were deemed an industry due to a political approach moving them from the patronage of the government to a sector in which the government invested public money so that the sector showed “measurable outputs against pre-defined targets” relating to the sector’s contribution to the economy (Garnham, 2005, p. 16). Second, in the UK context, concurrently cultural policy is “an artist-centred, supply-side cultural support policy” while it is cognizant of the profitability of creativity and innovation (Garnham,

2005, p. 18-27). Nonetheless, these industries consist of state institutions and other profit- making organizations that are focused on “the production of social meaning” through the

‘circulation of texts’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2013, p. 16). They are also understood to include television, film, radio, “newspaper, magazine and book publishing, the music recording and publishing industries, advertising and the performing arts”, as well as design, fashion, and information technologies (Hesmondhalgh, 2013, p. 16-20). They also include architecture,

‘antiques markets, crafts’, museums, gaming, libraries and the internet (Towse, 2011, p. 125).

This sector is now central to national economies worldwide (Hesmondhalgh, 2013).

The significance of the cultural industries includes “their ability to make and circulate products that influence our knowledge, understanding and experience”, as well as how they are increasingly perceived as “agents of economic, social and cultural change” (Hesmondhalgh,

2013, p. 4). This popularity is in spite of the skepticism of scholars and industry stakeholders

44 towards the concept of the creative industries, citing how the concept misunderstands the production of cultural meaning, is reductive of creative endeavors and amounts to the self- exploitation of those who are prime participants of the sector. Wide ranging literature shows that the term ‘cultural and creative industries’ is often viewed as economically focused and serves policy makers rather than it is representative of the practicalities of creative working conditions (Flew, 2012; Hesmondhalgh, 2013; Baldacchino, 2016). Particularly, Baldacchino

(2016) argues against this misleading “delineation of an ‘industry’” and insists that “the arts do not converge in an industry” but are linked to activities that “are couched in a wider economic structure” which reifies art for profit (p. 353). Nonetheless, the DAC and DIRCO at the festivals supported the growth of the SA film and music industries, which in SA are included as part of the CCI’s. Below I outline some of the prevailing arguments on the conditions of the creative industries to describe and delineate this sector of the economy so that the setting, role of the stakeholders, activities at the festivals and the political and policy investment of the SA government are better understood.

Flew (2012) traces the genesis of the concept of the creative industries from Adorno and Marcuse’s “ideological critique of art and culture under industrial capitalism” in relation to Marxism, to later ‘policy discourse’ in the United Kingdom and Australia (p. 160; 2). He says that the premise of this discourse has often been economic in nature, strategically including ‘heterogenous industries’ and developing them without necessarily incorporating the complexity of the ‘cultural ecology’ (Flew, 2012, p. 17-21). What happened was that the arts, culture, entertainment, creativity, digital media, traditional media were condensed into one sector, and the sector was brought in from the periphery to the center of the national economy

(ibid.). Thereafter, the cultural industries were made to resolve regional social problems (ibid.).

Similarly, Cowen (2011) says that the creative economy, is generally known to be a “concept based on creative assets potentially generating economic growth and development” (p. 120). 45 These developmental characteristics are partly why within public policy the cultural industries are often formulated as a public ‘social good’ (Flew, 2012, p. 160).

On the other hand, Cunningham (2003) and Bennett (1999) maintain that the arts are part of industry. Cunningham (2003) and Bennett (1999) advise that the arts should be assimilated into the mainstream economy, as well as cultural policy. This is what SA has done since the recent 2000’s, which I discuss in Chapter 5. Andersson and Andersson (2006) also pose that historically, ‘artists have always followed the routes opened up by trade and financial interaction’ (Andersson & Andersson, 2006, p. 192). Andersson and Andersson (2006) also convey that the concentration of wealth in geographical locations like cities has meant that the wealthy patronize culture, and that further attracts more artists and thus an ‘interacting cluster’

(p. 194). Andersson and Andersson (2006), thus, determine that cities, especially where the wealthy are densely settled, escalated ‘cultural development’ (ibid.). Cities offer mobility through transport and various technologies, and thus advance economic and cultural development (ibid.). In LA and NYC, where these festivals occurred, other authors also confirm this interdependence of wealth, cities, production and demand for the arts and entertainment (Currid & Williams, 2010; (Florida & Jackson, 2010).

Reflecting on the cultural sector in Africa, Nyamjoh (2008) confirms that culture is entangled in political and economic structures, in ideological cul-de-sacs and geographical barriers. He relates that “the race and geography of African cultural producers and products do not attract sufficient attention from global cultural entrepreneurs” who are based outside of the continent (p. 124). He suggests that these cultural entrepreneurs doubt the economic prospects of African cultures that are perceived as inferior outside the continent of Africa. Due to this,

African cultural industries become ‘invisible’ and are not sufficiently invested in (ibid.). At the same time, Nyamjoh (2008) states, when non-African investors do invest in the African cultural sector, they rarely avoid reinforcing stereotypes about the continent. Nyamjoh (2008), 46 however, also owes the inadequate investment to local attitudes which “undermine” local culture (Nyamjoh, 2008, p. 125). By not prioritizing the sector, there is a risk of being in survival mode, succumbing and conforming to global consumer markets and giving into the

“profitability expectations of global capital” (p. 126). The DAC at SAAF attempts to undo these perceptions of unattractiveness and lack of profitability in foreign markets by stimulating interest in SA CCI’s abroad and appealing to US consumer markets.

Cunningham (2009) reasons that “creative industries policy” could be thought of as

“being invested in for varying reasons and with varying emphases and outcomes” (p. 375).

Cunningham (2009) also implies that the idea of the creative industries is more malleable than before due to responsive policy interventions. He believes that creative industries policy is more inclusive of diverse forms of innovation. In fact, he claims, the meaning to the creative industries is that the industries “are engaged in the provision of coordination services that relate to the origination, adoption and retention of new technologies, commodities or ideas into the economic system” (p. 384). Therefore, he suggests that it makes sense for developing world countries to also get on this policy bandwagon so as to build their infrastructure and create development through the creative industries, and this is what the DAC pursues at SAAF.

International Relations, Hard Power and Soft Power

In the early 1990’s Joseph Nye presented the concept of soft power, countering the idea that the US was eroding its economic and military power post the Cold War. Nye (2008) clarified that “soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment [and that a] country’s soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies”, submitting that soft power is what hard power is not

(p. 94-95). In other words, coercion and payment are central to hard power because hard power

47 involves threatening or paying off others to get what you want (Nye, 2004). Hard power means the execution of military and economic force for coercion or command (Nye, 2008).

In contrast, the instruments of soft power “are not fully under the control of governments” but are “embedded in civil society” in the form of culture and values (Nye, 2011, p. 83). Other sources of soft power are policy-related in the form of the political values of a country, “when [the country] lives up to them at home and abroad” and foreign policies, “when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority” (Nye, 2011, p. 83-84). Notably, however, the success of soft power rests “in the control of the target” country (ibid.). The focus is on the agent of power rather than its subject (Nye, 2007). Although this is so, soft power is centrally about the potential for a country to “obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics” by setting an example that other countries admire and as such an example that shapes the

‘preferences’ of those other countries (Nye, 2008, p. 94-95). Soft power, then, is about using

“attraction” to convince others to want what you have, so that you can influence them to change

(Nye, 2008, p. 94-95; Hayden, 2012). Additionally, although soft power is “the outcome of how a state utilises its resources – both material and ideational”, “attractiveness in itself does not equal soft power [if it is not] harnessed effectively” but when used effectively, it “can be an important source of soft power” (Smith, 2012, p. 71). One of the major differences between soft and hard power, therefore, is that even though both soft and hard power are about influence, they differ through the forms of influence they apply to change the actions of others.

Nye (2002) suggests that as a form of influence, soft power demands minimal intervention in order to catalyze change in agendas that are political, economic or otherwise because it is driven by implied values. Soft power therefore appears more unassuming because it is carried out with the presentation of an idea, information or already existing intangible capital, instead of force (Hayden, 2012; Smith, 2012). As a resource perceived as cost-effective to generate, this is potentially one of the reasons why soft power has gained prominence in 48 international relations. Yet, at the same time, the results of soft power “often take a long time” and can frustrate intentions to measure “prompt return” on investment (Nye, 2011, p. 83).

Gallarotti (2011) similarly explains that soft power focuses on the intangible and is about carving out ‘a positive image in world affairs that endears nations to other nations in the world polity’ (p. 9). Sometimes the endearment is so strong that “other nations may even attempt to emulate the policies and/or actions of soft power nations” (ibid.). Soft power also ideally “conditions the target nations to voluntarily do what soft power nations would like them to do,” (Gallarotti, 2011, p. 11). Soft power drives “voluntary compliance” (Gallarotti, 2011, p. 24). He finds that soft power also sets the boundaries of formal bargaining (Gallarotti, 2011, p. 12). Gallarotti (2011) also corroborates that soft power is complex because its returns are

‘indirect and longer term’, and thus hard to determine and measure (p. 39).

He also confirms that hard power is coercive and encapsulates traditional ideas about power which address material and tangible resources as proof of a country’s global power.

Hard power, therefore, ‘extracts compliance through reliance on tangible power’ (Gallarotti,

2011, p. 10). Traditional forms of power include technological developments, military resources and ‘economic capability’ (Gallarotti, 2011, p. 6). Additionally, ‘tangible power resources, both in their manifest and symbolic (i.e., threat) use, can be employed to repel acts of force, and they can be used to compel actors into submission’ (p. 8). This can sometimes cause moral dilemmas (p. 38). In this dissertation, I am interested in economic resources as hard power, and in the generation of these resources.

According to Gallarotti (2011), hard power and soft power interact in a complex manner. They can diminish or increase, as well as enhance each other’s influence. They can also ‘reinforce one another’ because, for instance, “a strong positive image can garner many more allies, which in turn can bolster a nation’s defenses” (p. 24). Gallarotti (2011) points out that because the world has become so globalized and interdependent, nations’ “strategies for 49 optimizing national wealth and influence have shifted from force and coercion to cooperation”

(p. 33). This means that “the nexus of power” in contemporary times has been gradually shifting “from the territorial state to transnational networks” which include international organizations that have ‘raised the minimum level of civil behavior in international politics’

(Gallarotti, 2011, p. 34-36). Therefore, those who are actors within the space, especially of the exercise of economic hard power and soft power are not just governments, but are other transnational actors (ibid.). Also, because hard power alternatives such as war are so pricey to national resources, governments act within the realm of soft power even to advance their national economic objectives (ibid.).

From Gallarotti (2011) and Nye (2002, 2004, 2008, 2011), it may make sense why in this research context the DAC and DIRCO attempt to use cost-effective means, like festivals, to generate soft power and hard power in the USA. In their capacity as representatives of the

SA government, these departments cooperate with non-government institutions in SA and abroad. They do this using culture, in its civic manifestation and the attractiveness of the SA statutes, as discussed further by Smith (2012), to optimize national wealth and influence

(Gallarotti, 2011). The departments also act within soft power to grow the national economy.

There are some challenges to soft power. Lock (2010) addresses the problem that soft power simplifies the mechanisms of hard power, presenting it as uncomplicated. Melissen

(2005) also admits that soft power provides a country with more legitimacy than hard power does, but finds many areas of concern in its theory and practice. One such concern is that “the battle of values and ideas [or soft power] that dominated international relations in the second half of the twentieth century evolved into competition in the sphere of hard power” (Melissen,

2005, p. 4). He postulates that even though the term soft power was coined later in the same century, it confirmed already existing momentum towards such competitive practice. We see some of these challenges in this research through how the DAC and DIRCO grapple with SA 50 culture as the agent of power, but also with the feasibility of SA competing to be attractive in the soft-power-rich USA.

Hocking (2005) asserts that soft power is not always a visible form of public diplomacy13 because it does not clearly send out specifically and transparently projected messages by the government, and that this characteristic is important because public diplomacy is a “technique for achieving policy objectives” (p. 34-37). He argues that soft power has been exalted even though it essentially operates within the existing hierarchical framework where

“intergovernmental relations” preside over “the national diplomatic system” which in turn acts as a gatekeeper to “international policy environments”, which inadvertently limits the range of

“state and non-state” policy actors (Hocking, 2005, p. 35-37). He considers soft power unidirectional and requiring a more open, multidirectional and sophisticated formulation if it is to include all policy process actors and agendas (p. 38). Hocking (2005) supports a holistic network model diplomacy where “non-hierarchical” interdependent relationships formed by diverse actors with mutual policy interests can collaborate, share resources “to achieve common [policy] goals” (p. 37). Hocking is significant in thinking about these festivals because soft power in SA appears in limited terms in relation to culture and is pushed by the intergovernmental networks or government departments and agencies that want to meet national economic goals. As elaborated on later, soft power is not a direct SA government goal as such but helps government departments to pursue national goals set by the government. SA culture-based soft power also has no solid policy framework, meaning that its pursuits operate without set standards.

13 Public diplomacy is “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies” (Tuch, 1990, p. 3). The process is transparent because it is meant to appeal “to the public” (Tuch, 1990, p. 4). 51 Mattern (2005) resolves that ‘soft power is not so soft’ since it “promotes a ‘power politics of identity’ in which domination is played out through the representations that narrate

‘reality’” (Mattern, 2005, p. 611). It is also not soft because it “depends precisely upon a competition among actors over the terms of the ‘reality’ of attractiveness” (p. 610). Mattern

(2005) finds that soft power traps ‘leaders or decision makers with threats to their subjectivities since it is they whose submission translates into policy’, meaning that these leaders are the ones responsible for forcing the ‘collective to live the experience of attraction’ (Mattern, 2005, p.

610). This means the powerful may succumb to soft power, but that the results of soft power affect the everyday experience of ordinary people. In the case of these festivals, SA soft power pursuits affect the artists whose work is impacted by the outcomes of soft power pursuits.

Much the same, Hayden (2012) finds that soft power needs to be analyzed in its different formations and applicability to several contexts. He investigates different incarnations of soft power in various settings globally, “not as an essentialized universal aspect of power politics, but rather a reflection of particular historical and culturally situated reactions to the requirements of international influence” (Hayden, 2012, p. 30). This is because he regards the concept as misunderstood, misinterpreted, incorrectly implemented and misappropriated because it is insufficiently conceptualized for the challenges it comes up against in diverse contexts. Hayden (2012) and Hocking (2005) provide grounds for thinking about the applicability and complexities of the implementation of soft power in SA. Therefore, within the context of SA’s foreign policy framework of Ubuntu, what role does soft power really play?

Soft power also works towards giving others the illusion of being empowered while in fact succumbing to the allure of the dominant country, which has the actual power, and making the less powerful see this status as legitimate (Lewis, 2015, p. 22). If this is the case, how does SA make use of soft power in its relations with the USA?

52 Smith (2012) suggests that soft power has been central to SA foreign policy since the beginning of the democratic era even when not deliberately invoked by SA presidents of the time. Smith goes on to say that soft power was gained on the basis of SA’s “moral authority” consequent to SA’s perceived smooth14 transition, without a civil war breaking out, from apartheid to democracy in the early 1990’s, and therefore is about the image SA has been cultivating for itself since 1994 at state and non-state level (p. 70). She adds that as a result,

“this has enabled South Africa to play a much more important role in international relations than its material power would suggest” (Smith, 2012, p. 69). Despite its hard power, therefore,

SA has been able to tap into its soft power to broker a “global standing” in order to pursue “an

[ambitious] active foreign policy” (Smith, 2012, p. 81). Smith implies that, like other countries, the advantage to SA using and promoting its soft power is to gain recognition and prestige from its counterparts, especially those it regards as important to achieving certain goals (p.69-77).

Referencing Nye, Smith (2012) proposes that SA’s international interaction is true to the idea that “‘sometimes countries enjoy political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight would suggest because they define their national interest to include attractive causes such as economic aid or peacemaking’” (p. 69-70).

For this reason, since SA has played a role in peacemaking in several countries since

1994, it is revered for its open-minded Constitution, is perceived as a ‘model African state’ and has been “able to become an international norm entrepreneur” in multilateral agreements

(Smith, 2012, p. 70-73). From this perspective, it seems that SA relies on its moral authority as its soft power or intangible asset to further its interaction with other countries, and manages this reputation carefully and consciously for greater ends. More so, the SA government has

14 It has been widely documented that SA’s transition from apartheid was smooth and peaceful because a civil war did not break out (Kaufman, 2012). However, this was not accurate because the transition was not an entirely smooth or a peaceful process (Human Rights Watch, 1991). The process may have been smoother to negotiate at state level, but countless people died at local level (Kaufman, 2012). 53 recognized that its soft power is politically derived, and not through economic resources or means associated with hard power. This outlook correlates with the recommendation by

Gallarotti (2011), that in order to benefit from soft power, policy makers should be ‘constantly assessing and reassessing the effectiveness” of their country’s “principal sources of influence in world affairs” and should improve and capitalize on those sources of soft power that already

‘perform well’ (p. 37).

Regarding the interaction between soft and hard power, Anholt (2011) also considers that national reputation is a big part of nation branding15, as has been noted that nation branding

(hard power) is a tool of building soft power (Aronczyk, 2008). Anholt finds that by states

“helping people in other countries to get to know them” they can achieve a lot for nation branding as soft power, especially when this help is implemented through interventions of culture (p. 300). DIRCO is the face and engine to such international interactions and, for the festivals it relies on this soft power as a foundation from which to pursue economic hard power and reputational soft power in the USA. As Smith (2012) observes, DIRCO already has a track record for developing SA’s hard power through “economic diplomacy”, or “creating a positive image of South Africa as a trading partner, investor and investment destination” (p. 78). The challenge DIRCO has now is to build on the existing soft power before it erodes (Smith, 2012).

Anholt (2008), however, finds that improving country or place reputation, or its brand, has to be supported by strong policy that is ‘emblematic of the strategy’ (Anholt, 2008, p. 4).

He states ‘that communications are no substitute for policies, and that altering the image of a country or city may require something a little more substantial than graphic design, advertising or PR campaigns’, through which soft power is sometimes pursued (p. 1). He relates that for

15 Nation branding is the process of improving a nation’s reputation so that it is globally competitive, through “brand management with public diplomacy and with trade, investment, tourism, and export promotion” (Anholt in Song, 2010, p. 54). 54 places to influence the opinions of foreign publics, they have to ‘engage with the outside world in a clear coordinated and communicative way’, maintain an internally ‘robust and productive coalition between government, business and civil society’ and create ‘new institutions and structures to achieve and maintain this behaviour’ so that all these actors’ goals are in harmony with each other ‘in the long term’ (p. 3). Anholt (2008), therefore, suggests that achieving soft power is a long-term commitment with long-term implications. At these festivals, do DIRCO and the DAC run a coordinated campaign? Is their execution supported by strong policy? Do they nurture such robust multidirection coalitions?

From this section one deducts that although the pursuit of soft power in the USA by

DIRCO and the DAC may have its hiccups, it is economically-focused due to the kinds of soft resources, like culture, that are more commonly used to build soft power. The fact that soft power is difficult to measure may be an advantage for DIRCO and the DAC. This because in the short-term efforts to evaluate soft power could be motivated for even though in the long term they are not carried through. Outcomes could also be motivated for even when no tangible results manifest in the short term. The exercise alone is worth potential rewards. It also makes sense, as Smith (2012) explains, that SA wants to increase its limited hard power in a country like the US, with recognized hard power. Here SA relies on its soft power to predominantly generate hard power.

International Cultural Relations

The upkeep of cultural relations is a process often perceived to be non-political because of the lack of government intervention (Arndt, 2005). International cultural relations is different though. Wyszomirski et al. (2003) explain the reciprocity of public diplomacy as “a two-way communication process that includes both efforts to project a nation’s image and values to other countries and peoples as well as to receive information and try to understand the culture,

55 values and images of other countries and their peoples” (p. 1). They observe that gradually countries have recognized that to attain a positive image, they can use “cultural capital” “to generate social capital, and thus, foster international trust, cooperation, and collaboration”

(ibid.). Wyszomirski et al. (2003) notice that various countries have also expanded their ideas about the constitution of national security, involving “economic competitiveness” and as such, cultural diplomacy “has acquired trade-related aspects” which encourage the ‘development of markets and trade opportunities’ even for the export of cultural products (p. 2). Furthermore,

Wyszomirski et al (2003) discover that some countries equate cultural diplomacy with

‘international cultural policy’ and ‘international cultural relations’ (p. 9). This means that any country may have different nomenclature and configuration for similar processes, purposes and scope.

Cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange

When the DAC and DIRCO sent out public messages about SA culture to international audiences, the departments became engaged in cultural diplomacy. Even though no available literature on the two festivals overtly expressed this, however, from definitions of what cultural diplomacy constitutes, SAAF was partly an exercise in cultural diplomacy since culture was used as a vehicle to explain SA to audiences in the USA. The Ubuntu festival had similar dynamics in the sense that SA government actors were advancing SA policy objectives, but the element of cultural diplomacy was constrained by the fact that the festival organizer, which had its own aims, was Carnegie Hall and not the SA government. To recap on the explanation in Chapter 1, cultural diplomacy is the act of one country explaining itself to a foreign public using culture (Schneider, 2006). Lenczowski (2007) describes cultural diplomacy as

the use of various elements of culture to influence foreign publics, opinion makers, and even foreign leaders. These elements comprehend the entire range of characteristics within a culture: including the arts, education, ideas, history,

56 science, medicine, technology, religion, customs, manners, commerce, philanthropy, sports, language, professional vocations, hobbies, etc. and the various media by which these elements may be communicated. (p. 196).

This definition is similar to the previously stated explanation by Cummings (2003) that cultural diplomacy is the process of exchanging ‘ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding’ (p. 1). From these explanations, cultural diplomacy can be understood as when culture is designated to achieve ends associated with public diplomacy. Kidd (2012), for instance, interprets cultural diplomacy, as a matter of public interest, advancing national security interests and utilizing culture for “the purposes of peacebuilding”, etc. (p. 13). Therefore, because the DAC and

DIRCO were involved at both festivals as SA government departments furthering SA culture, they were engaged in cultural diplomacy. I base this understanding also on what Arndt (2005) establishes about cultural diplomacy, as authentic when culture is used to ‘advance national interests’, and when the exercise is the initiative of government deployees such as diplomats

(xviii). I also understand the purpose of cultural diplomacy here as what Schneider (2009) further illustrates that “cultural diplomacy and exchanges” have the potential “to increase understanding, shatter stereotypes, and change the way people view each other, which ultimately can lead to changes in the way governments interact” (p. 276). Therefore, I view cultural diplomacy as beneficial to public diplomacy, the government, and ultimately as a political tool, but that its benefits are also for the public or civil society.

From this vantage point, Arndt (2005), like Nisbett (2013b), confirms that essentially cultural diplomacy is to advance political interests, and is therefore political in its nature as a state tool. In fact, Nisbett (2013b) goes further to point out that cultural diplomacy has baggage since it ‘is often viewed negatively and understandably so, due to its connotations with colonialism, imperialism and propaganda, and the unethical and immoral practices associated 57 with such activity’ (p. 558). She says that ‘dominant states have always used culture to transmit political, social, cultural and economic values’, and that globalization has exacerbated this in a way where there is ‘forceful transmission of western culture’ to non-Western regions which could result in global homogeneity (ibid.). Nonetheless, even when cultural diplomacy is driven by artists to further understanding and respect between countries, it is ultimately a channel “to support foreign policy objectives” (DEMİR, 2017, p. 1236).

Apart from supporting foreign policy objectives, cultural policy has been observed to work because its processes and enactment, no matter who initiated the process, benefit multiple stakeholders (Mark, 2009; Fosler-Lussier, 2012; Nisbett, 2013; Hadley & Gray, 2017).

Additionally, it has the potential to reinforce government-derived “domestic objectives”, and to contribute to a country’s “national image, branding and social cohesion” (Mark, 2009, p. 1).

It works in the sense that it legitimizes political messages through a different lens, a cultural lens. It adds another layer to government messaging when governments present “a national image abroad” so that there is no “audience suspicion of official messages” (ibid.). Cultural diplomacy thus establishes trust between governments and foreign audiences, by providing proof or “substance to national reputation” statements from the government (ibid.).

It is now customary for this kind of peacekeeping to be carried out by various actors, however, and not solely by the state, and this is in aid of a range of ends. As Wyszomirski

(2010) suggests, activities related to cultural diplomacy are not ‘exclusively at the service of diplomacy’ since diplomacy no longer happens on a government-to-government basis (p. 1).

Wyszomirski (2010) discusses that unlike before, diverse institutions are now involved in activities related to cultural diplomacy, and these may be government, corporate, non- government as well as ‘private citizens’ (p. 1-3.). She says that the challenges in this sphere include how messages cannot be controlled by governments due to globalization, digitization, etc., as well as how national actions should match the distributed messages to reinforce 58 credibility when countries tell their stories (ibid.). The scope of cultural diplomacy activities is also wider (ibid.). The prime components of this new way of operating involves ‘facilitation’ in the achievement others’ goals, ‘network building’ for influence among target groups, and

‘cultural exchange’ of based on ‘reciprocity’ (p. 5).

The diversity of actors in cultural diplomacy also has to do with what Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010) state as a danger of propaganda in state commissioned cultural diplomacy operations. Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010) view state involvement in using culture to communicate abroad as the trappings of a political agenda and a vehicle for propaganda16, or intentional misinformation. They assert that “the more distance there is between the agent of a cultural diplomacy program and a political agenda, the more likely the program is to succeed”

(Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010, p. 4). They recommend that ‘cooperative efforts between’ civil-society and government should be the future approach to cultural diplomacy (Gienow-

Hecht & Donfried, 2010). Moreover, they advocate for a mutually beneficial, dual means of cultural diplomacy where “dialogue and exchange move in both directions between the agent and recipient of the cultural diplomacy program” (ibid., p. 23).

The element of associating government-led initiatives with propaganda or political agendas hints at a few things for these festivals. For instance, it hints at why the DAC and

DIRCO may not have publicly labelled their involvement at the festivals as exercises in cultural diplomacy. This is especially considering that the cultural diplomacy discernible at SAAF was similar to nation branding in that it “focused on the international use of culture as a territorial branding resource” (Zamorano, 2016, p. 178). This is also since “implementing cultural diplomacy through non-profits or non-governmental agencies allows for more freedom and less governmental control”, and so the collaboration between DAC-DIRCO-Carnegie Hall

16 According to Zaharna (2004), propaganda is a process of misinformation which involves “secrecy, deception and coercion” used to confuse, surprise and control the receiver of the information (p. 223). 59 Corporation at the Ubuntu festival seems to have been mutually beneficial so that the event would not technically be associated with cultural diplomacy (Lewis, 2015, p. 48). The government departments were in cultural diplomacy mode, however, and drove a government agenda even though the Carnegie Hall Corporation steered the festival with limited influence from them.

Kozymka (2014) also contemplates the shift in the way cultural diplomacy has been experienced in recent times, where “culture is a field of international relations in its own right as much as a tool for foreign policy” (p. 9). Kozymka also assesses that the diplomatic ends are at the root of cultural exchange, meaning that there is a move towards what she terms a

‘diplomacy for culture’ approach (ibid). The view that culture has moved to the center of diplomacy is also shared by Zaharna (2012), who conveys that awareness about culture in diplomacy encourages democracy and has the capacity to empower individuals. She reflects on a move “beyond the logic of political, economic and other tangible factors” and towards “a more concentrated focus on culture and cultural identity” so that a completely new “analytical lens” is developed (Zaharna, 2012, p. 47).

It is also difficult to dissociate culture from political agenda though, since culture is rarely used across borders not to aid political or economic goals (Doyle, 2010; Nisbett, 2013b).

Even though cultural practitioners and actors may have the agency to operate outside of the political mold, for instance, they are shaped by these political agendas (Wa Thiongo, 1998).

The actors are rooted in worlds shaped by political interests, systems and structures, and their experiences exist within these frameworks, and so the actors negotiate these to assert their own agency (Moore, 1997; Piot, 1999; Rosenstein, 2010). However, as much as politics and culture engineer citizens, citizens are also the government and engines of culture and politics. For instance, in cases where musicians are involved in cultural diplomacy projects, there may be

‘embeddedness of the political in the sonic’ because ‘the political becomes entangled in and 60 communicated through affective experience’ (Meintjes, 1990, p. 38). And so, benefits for individuals in cultural diplomacy are ultimately for the state or national interest.

The uneasy marriage between culture and politics in cultural diplomacy in the USA has also been highlighted by Schneider (2005). She scrutinizes the State Department, interrogating the department’s utilitarian approach to its cultural diplomacy programs. She advocates for the constant presence of a ‘culture for culture’s sake’ method of cultural diplomacy because she feels that such programs are key to building relationships of mutual understanding and trust with other countries. Schneider (2005) makes noteworthy points about what US culture has meant in different parts of the world through stating that “long before cultural diplomacy was employed by the US government, American cultural expression was influencing audiences throughout the world” (p. 149). Schneider (2005) also promotes the power of culture in building bridges without clumsy and aggressive political messages, which may also be the idea that there can be a separation of political messages in cultural diplomacy.

Schneider also recommended that for cultural diplomacy to be successful, it needs “a coherent strategy, interagency and public-private coordination, and increased funding from public and private sources” (Schneider, 2009, p. 276). Similarly, relating to the ethos of cultural diplomacy projects in practice, Banks (2011) recommends that cultural diplomacy should be viewed as a “process, not product”, and a process that involves “sensitive inter-group work”

(Banks, 2011, p. 119). He cites that it should be a process where participants “paradoxically celebrate the implicit humanity that connects all people, while learning about significant differences” (ibid.). Banks (2011) also recommends that the evaluation on the ‘deliverables’ of the cultural diplomacy process should report on the quantitative as well as well as “qualitative findings” such as “shifts in quality of life, joy, a sense of personal and creative freedoms, inspiration, ability to connect and communicate across cultural or other dividing lines, and ability to create together” (p.119). 61 Woolf (2010) also problematizes the role of US cultural diplomacy post 9/11 as transactional. He finds that when cultural diplomacy is enacted it is in the realm of culture ‘for security’, rather than the uneasy ‘bi-directional’ actualization of culture channeling ‘trust’ and

‘understanding’ between people (Woolf, 2010, p. 28-29). He points out that the utilitarian nature of such cultural diplomacy is a means to an end to national goals related to reversing marred global perceptions of the USA after the country’s wars in the Middle East. Woolf (2010) implies that in the Obama era, cultural diplomacy became a strategy involving ‘uni-directional language of the greatness, the rightness of American culture and a hawkish commitment to victory in the “war of ideas,” which could (or should) be read as synonymous with the “war on terror”’ (p. 28). In other words, cultural diplomacy was about the repositioning and continuity of America’s hegemony in the world (Woolf, 2010). Since SA has few examples of engaging in cultural diplomacy in the USA, it is important to consider what kind of cultural diplomacy model the DAC and DIRCO employ at the festivals. Is it transactional too?

Similarly, Mulcahy (2010) also emphasizes the facilitation of mutual understanding in cultural diplomacy exercises. He says that “exchange programs seek to facilitate a better understanding of American society by exposing people of other nationalities to the diversity of cultural activities in the United States” (p. 8). The American Music Abroad (AMA) program continues in this tradition as it is an ambassador of US innovation in the arts and represents some degree of nationhood. Even though the program was born of the State Department, and is to some degree part of a political agenda, it disperses information about the US without political messaging (Mulcahy, 2010). “The goal is not the Americanization of other nations but the internationalization of communications about education and culture” (ibid: 26).

Fosler-Lussier (2012) on the other hand recognizes the interwovenness of ‘political and personal desires’ in cultural diplomacy (p. 63). She speaks of cultural diplomacy within the scope of ‘cultural transfer’ (ibid.). She describes a pattern of relationships that were more 62 nuanced in US cultural diplomacy projects of the early twentieth century. She is of the opinion that cultural diplomacy is “not as a wholesale, unilateral cultural invasion” but incorporates

“several simultaneous forms of engagement: nurturing the desire for particular styles of

American music among subcultural groups abroad, building practical working relationships with people of local importance, and creating imagined connections across vast distances”

(ibid.). Fosler-Lussier (2012) highlights that there was more to the process of exchange, beyond actual US power and that the agency of those involved was manifest. For instance, even though there was a “naive quality of interactions between touring musicians and the public”, there was a “degree to which audience members differentiated among various parts of the U.S. message, accepting some parts and rejecting others” (ibid.). As such, Fosler-Lussier (2010) presents that cultural diplomacy happens beyond ‘the motivations of those who planned the tours’, implying that this is also why cultural diplomacy tours “presented many different and contradictory implications rather than a coherent ideological program” (p. 86).

This perspective raises some questions though. For instance, why were the foreign locals curious about the travelling US musicians and seeking them? Was this curiosity based on the reputation of US power as leader of the free world at all? Would it be different with a cultural diplomacy project involving a different nation? More so, even though the US musicians would have been naïve in their interactions with foreign publics, acting as individuals outside of the politically-determined mold of the cultural diplomacy project, they were still products and constructs of US ideologies through their embeddedness as citizens in the social and political systems and structures of the USA, and could have inadvertently expressed the ideals of their political system in their interactions with foreign publics. Also, as

Schneider (in Banks 2011) suggests, US citizens know less about foreign publics than foreign publics know about the USA. This is partly why foreign publics may be enthusiastic in engaging with US musicians, but can also discern what to accept and reject about US messages 63 in such a context (Hansen, 2017). SA is not a well-known country, in the USA, unless it is associated with apartheid or Nelson Mandela’s role in the fight for human rights. As such, I wonder how this reputation impacts the cultural diplomacy process of DAC and DIRCO.

Ang et al. (2015) shift the argument Woolf (2010) presents slightly in terms of the utility and commodification of culture but involve the uneasinesss of cultural diplomacy. They offer a nuanced dissection of cultural diplomacy as happening ‘in a space where nationalism and internationalism merge’ (p. 367). They contemplate that the ‘national interests embodied in cultural diplomacy are never simply guided by purely instrumental or calculative thinking’ but are “embedded in distinct ideas and affects about the nation and its place within an imagining of other nations” (p. 379). They state that “cultural diplomacy can move beyond the national interest only if this move itself can be understood as being in the national interest”

(ibid.). Ang et al. (2015) make several other points, including emphasizing that “cultural attractiveness per se is not soft power on its own”, but, similarly to Anholt (2008), suggest that it “can be a soft power resource” when guided by ‘clearly defined policy objectives under a thought-out strategy’ (Ang et al., 2015, p. 368).

Also, like Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010), their understanding of cultural diplomacy is that it is driven from multiple directions, and not a central point. Therefore, they acknowledge that the definition of cultural diplomacy by Cummings (2003) broadens Arndt’s

(2006) centralized treatment, which is constrained by content, process and protocols. They advocate for more ‘collaborative approaches to cultural diplomacy’ where meaning is co- produced heedlessly of the national interest, for somewhat rhizomatic ‘on-the-ground processes’ that are molded by the organic interactions of ‘projects and actors’ that create relationships at that level (Ang et al., 2015, p. 377). Ang et al. (2015) also point out that much of the multi-directional and multitudinous activity on the cultural diplomacy landscape suggests the conflation of international cultural relations with cultural diplomacy, but that even 64 under such circumstances if the venture fosters ‘mutual understanding’, which is of common interest, thus it goes beyond simply furthering national interests (p. 370). Much of this multi- directional and multitudinous activity happens because the ‘sovereign status’ of nation states

‘has been steadily eroded by globalising forces’ and as such governments try to carve out an identity for themselves in global participation by representing ‘the national interest’ (ibid.).

With regard to cultural bridges between the USA and SA, they have existed for centuries in different forms of music and other artistic formats (Erlmann, 1999; Lulat, 2008;

Jaji, 2014). In the mid 1800’s, for instance, an influential minstrelsy group called Orpheus

McAdoo’s troupe travelled SA for eight years and gave concerts throughout the country

(Erlmann, 1991). This troupe catapulted the evolution of a few SA musical styles. Some of these styles were jazz and precursors of isicathamiya which produced SA’s first music hit abroad Mbube, often referred to as Wimoweh17 or The Lion Sleeps Tonight (Erlmann, 1991;

Ballantine, 1993; Martin, 1999; Ansell, 2005; Galeta, 2005; Coplan, 2007). A more popular example of the SA-USA cultural relationship happened when black South African cultural expression18 came to the US in the 1960’s through the songs of Miriam Makeba, sung with

Harry Belafonte (Makeba & Hall, 1988; Masekela & Cheers, 2004; Ansell, 2005). Makeba also caused a diplomatic stir in the 1960’s when invited to speak about the oppressive system of apartheid at the United Nations19 (UN). In the post-apartheid era20 this is one of the most quoted cases in which SA culture was linked to political messages sent directly to the world.

17 This song was originally called Mbube in the 1940’s, but became a hit in the 1960’s through versions by The Tokens and then Peter Seeger. 18 The SA cultural expression of this era, involving artists such as Miriam Makeba and Hugh Masekela, is that which the DAC is basing its continuity with the US, that which evoked particular imagery of SA struggle during apartheid (DAC, 2013). These musicians were exiled in the USA at the time (Makeba & Hall 1988; Masekela & Cheers, 2004). 19 The UN has recognized cultural diplomacy as valuable for international peace and security since the organization’s inception, but allocated its role to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Graham, 2015, p.7). 20 During the peak of the apartheid era, an incident involving the South African singer Miriam Makeba’s use of her cultural capital to draw attention to the social injustices happening in her home country are widely documented (Academy for Cultural Diplomacy, n.d.). 65 The Paul Simon Graceland tour is another example of a moment of contestation in the cultural relations between SA and the USA, where culture transcended politics (Meintjes, 1990;

Greer, 2006). The tour, which was very popular, is a good example of non-political agents furthering cultural understanding between the people of different countries, but also working in the sense suggested by Zaharna (2012) and Ang et al. (2015). Paul Simon, a US folk and mainstream musician collaborated with several SA musicians of various music genres such as

Ray Phiri, Hugh Masekela, Miriam Makeba and Ladysmith Black Mambazo (Erlmann, 1994;

Hamm, 1989). The tour became highly politicized as it happened during a ‘UN proclaimed cultural boycott’ of SA which addresses the dire political and social conditions in the country, including considerations of ‘the economic plight of black musicians’ (Hamm, 1989; Erlmann,

1994, p. 175). Simon, as such had contravened these UN sanctions even as he distanced himself from the political connotations of apartheid depoliticized the album which had catapulted the tour, and styled the tour as politically correct (Meintjes, 1990). Nonetheless, Simon has been accused of not adhering to the UN ban on SA cultural products to further his commercial and career interests (Greer, 2006). These cases are proof that music is often internationally

“transferred and diversified by the people who make it”, of its use ‘as an instrument of bilateral and international diplomacy’, and its political role on an international level (Sibille, 2016, p.

255-256).

In terms of contemporary SA cultural diplomacy, Nawa et al. (2017) suggest that SA has had some cultural diplomacy successes, like being signatory to international conventions including UNESCO and the African Union. Irrespective of this, like Graham (2015), Nawa et al. (2017) caution that SA cultural diplomacy is not defined or structured holistically. They indicate that cultural diplomacy is more prominent in ministerial short-term strategic documents rather than in comprehensive legislation. Furthermore, they have concerns about

66 how it is inconsistently pronounced in different policy guidelines that do not speak to each other, and does not have the necessary operational structures to support its enactment (ibid.).

Nawa et al. (2017) do appreciate, however, that even within these unfavorable conditions new avenues have helped promote SA culture abroad. This is even though the avenues might not further goals that specifically address cultural diplomacy. They state that the Mzansi Golden Economy (MGE), a cultural industries strategy which was instated circa

2012 by the DAC, has managed to invest in and enact the promotion of SA cultural industries abroad (Nawa et al., 2017). The department also encouraged this ‘through partnerships with international bodies’ like ‘the EU, BRICS21, United Nations Conference on Trade and

Development (UNCTAD) and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)’ (Nawa et al., 2017, p. 126).

Also, in relation to SA cultural diplomacy, Graham (2015) finds that it was reported that there were plans in 2011 to station cultural attachés in SA missions, but that there was no follow through. She discovers that “cultural diplomacy practiced by missions is mostly ad hoc” and that “missions are managed by and report to DIRCO, also mostly uncoordinated with

DAC” (Graham, 2015, p. 113). More so, she states that SA has ‘been pursuing an active albeit informal international cultural programme in support of foreign policy objectives’ with strategic partners in Africa, the UK, BRICS and Europe (p. 64). She bases these operations on how countries tend to “concentrate resources on specific areas or elements aligned to their broader foreign policy objectives” when it comes to exercises in cultural diplomacy (p. 28).

Graham (2015) identifies two main foci of SA cultural diplomacy, as a result of SA’s foreign policy: ‘economic’ development and nurturing the national ‘identity’ (p. 74). On a different

21 BRICS is a multilateral economic partnership established between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Vickers, 2012).

67 note, Graham recommends that it is important to consider the process of cultural diplomacy apart from the message it conveys. She thinks that even though cultural diplomacy is political in intent, what is good about it is that it advances democratic principles through its non-political process. For example, during the process, “cultural activities and leaders [get] to speak for themselves”, therefore illustrating espousing free speech and autonomy in the ‘free exchange of ideas’, etc., directly between the people of different countries (Graham, 2015, p. 32).

Fisher (2014) further suggests that the direct people-to-people form of cultural diplomacy Graham (2015) recommends is already in practice in SA’s cultural and creative industries. He also owes this occurrence to SA not having a comprehensive vision or plan for cultural diplomacy, and having difficulty enacting cultural cooperation initiatives. Like Nawa et al. (2017), he says that different SA ministries have varying conceptualizations of cultural diplomacy. Consequently, Fisher (2014) finds that “rather than government, it is cultural actors, in tandem with international partners and the cultural institutes/embassies of EU Member

States and EEA countries, that are driving the international cultural agenda” (p. 3).

This prominence in the involvement of CCI participants in cultural diplomacy has been noted elsewhere. Like Wyszomirski et al (2003) earlier, Zamorano (2016) confirms that “arts and cultural industries have become designated by governments and academics as central instruments for the construction of power within the international system” (p. 166). He argues that cultural diplomacy is limited by how it is currently “commonly framed in terms of soft power: the capacity of persuasion and attraction that allows the state to construct hegemony without using coercive methods” (Zamorano, 2016, p. 166). He conveys that there are “two types of cultural diplomacy: culturalist and neo-propagandist”, and that soft power reinforces

‘neo-propaganda’ even though to a reduced extent amongst the culturalist cultural diplomacy approaches (Zamorano, 2016, p. 178-179). Zamorano (2016) says that there is diplomacy

‘centered in the value of culture’ and that which subjects culture “to political and economic 68 instrumentalization by various processes of government management of external cultural representation”, which include only portraying the ‘positive view of the political territory in question’, in order to benefit nation branding aims (ibid.). He considers cultural diplomacy in terms of the impact of globalization that has set “local logics and identities off-center”, proposing that cultural diplomacy “promotes emblems and cultural representations that seek to synthesize a specific way of “being” in the world” (p. 180). As such, Zamorano (2016) invokes

Woolf (2010) about the inadvertent hegemony sowed by the current configuration of US cultural diplomacy in its relation to soft power objectives. He implies that there is a danger that countries construct cultural diplomacy upon this standard of securing power, with the disempowering language it assumes to drive this hegemony, this understanding of standardized forms of cultural representations, and with propaganda-related aims (Zamorano, 2016). The aims are mainly the seemingly innocuous objectives ‘to increase the competitiveness of nations and cities through creativity and innovation” (Zamorano, 2016, p. 181). He proposes that soft- power legitimizes culture’s “political and economic instrumentalization” (ibid.) SAAF is an example of this diplomatic strategy towards the management of external cultural representations by the government for the perceived benefits of global competitiveness.

The instrumentality of culture

This section contextualizes the role of the multi-purpose cultural instrumentalism at the festivals. It also acknowledges counter arguments to this role and tries to make sense of cultural diplomacy as a form of cultural instrumentalism.

The Mzansi Golden Economy policy strategy (MGE) funded the SAAF and some of the Ubuntu festival activities, and it is a strategy based on the ideology of cultural instrumentalism or of the use of culture to achieve non-cultural goals. The implication of cultural instrumentalism is that the intrinsic value of culture is exploited for greater public gain

69 in usually social and economic development or to meet other bureaucratic goals rather than also benefiting creative workers (Bunting, 2008; Matarasso, 1997). For instance, Belfiore and

Bennett (2008) comment on how governments use the arts to ‘civilize’ and engineer society.

They paraphrase Tony Bennett’s idea that culture has been governmentalized to afford the government more authority and retain a social order among its citizens. Belfiore and Bennett

(2008), thus, state that ‘cultural activities’ have been ‘shaped in such a way that they could be used for political ends due to their power to shape public morals and behaviour’ (Belfiore &

Bennett, 2008, p. 153). Altering this behavior would prove socially beneficial.

It is partly due to some of these instrumentalisms that are said to be a beneficial public good that there has also been a surge in research on the ‘economic aspects of culture’, and especially the ‘re-evaluation of the role arts and culture may play in supporting economic growth’ or the breakthrough that culture also drives economies (Doyle, 2010, p. 256-257).

Scholars like Vuyk (2010) have found that the problem with these ‘creative economy policies’ and arguments is that culture and the arts are “treated as a means of production” rather than “as instruments of perception”, even when the shifts of perceptions about the world have generally meant great economic gains (p. 183). This may be why Pratt (2005) implies that when considered within the framework of public policy, then the concept of the creative industries could be denoted an oxymoron. MGE is such an economic driver strategy, dedicated to the creative industries. It funds projects that adhere to its main demands on job creation. It shifts perceptions on why culture is important to the SA government, and its funding makes statements on which activities of the cultural sector are prioritized by the government.

On the economic gains of cultural instrumentalism, McGuigan (2004) speaks of such cases as where neoliberalist ideology and culture collide. He examines different contexts where this is evident and argues against it as ‘naked capitalism’, disguised in the economic reasoning that has come to dominate and define our ‘social reality’ (McGuigan, 2004, p. 1-3). He insists 70 that cultural policy no longer caters to cultural interests as a result, but economic interests. He cites how the thinking that the arts are deemed fit for public support only if they are able to provide public, and mostly economic value (ibid.). Therefore, only a certain type of popular culture deserves funding, and thus economic instrumentalism gets imposed on culture.

Bunting (2008) has similar views and suggests that public funding complicates how the arts are perceived and this removes from the good the arts can do for communities. She explores how the arts are valued by communities and individuals, interrogating how the arts are used as a means to meet bureaucratic ends, and therefore undergo distortion in how they are valued.

Bunting (2008) shows how the bureaucratic ends tend to become the priority in the relationship between the state, the arts sector and the community, especially when cultural policy goals are narrow. This essentially indicates that where cultural instrumentalism is involved, there is often a perception that ‘in order to receive public money, artists and arts organizations [are] required to demonstrate that they could contribute to broad social and economic agendas, potentially at the expense of the “intrinsic” value of the arts in their own right’ (Bunting, 2008, p. 323).

Also concerned with the dichotomy in the use and perception of culture, Matarasso

(1997) implies that arts participation is part of a larger social contract because of the social impact of the arts. As much as he recognizes that there is a growing acceptance in public policy of the arts as significant contributors and to national economies, he also cautions that policy arguments with this approach “tend to focus on financial issues rather than on economics in its deeper sense as the management of society’s resources” (Matarasso, 1997, p. vi). Matarasso

(1997) denotes that policy arguments like this “miss the real purpose of the arts, which is not to create wealth but to contribute to a stable, confident and creative society” (ibid). Some of these contributions to society involve improving social cohesion, health and well-being, community empowerment and self-determination, local image awareness and identity, imagination and vision, economic impact due to participation, as well as personal development. 71 Therefore, Matarasso deduces that the arts are instrumentally and intrinsically beneficial for individuals, communities and society as a whole, and that these benefits are the inevitable byproducts of the existence of the arts.

Matarasso and Landry (1999) address the dichotomy of “culture as a self-justifying value or culture as development” (p. 15). They project that there has been an increased governmental recognition of the benefits of using culture for developmental ends. They weigh this approach against the “inescapable socio-economic impacts of all cultural activity” and “the cultural and the developmental benefits of public investment in culture” (Matarasso & Landry,

1999, p. 16). They also show, however, that no other area of public life is without political intervention and that the arts are part of public life. By illustrating this, Matarasso and Landry

(1999) highlight that effective integration of these factors into policy making is in fact the challenge to be addressed, and not the perceived dichotomy, especially when the arts are up against empirical judgement and rationale for the sake of funding. Matarasso and Landry

(1999) remind that it is the job of the government to intervene in national sectors, including culture, for the sake of a country’s development, and so the SA government intervenes as such at these festivals.

Regarding culture in public life, Schwartz (2000) believes that the arts should be publicly supported for many purposes, notwithstanding their ‘democratic commitment’ (p. 1).

He motivates for art as part of a democratic education, which should be treated as a public good in a democracy. Schwartz (2000) interrogates how this could be made clear in practice, to set a normative standard that all citizens would agree justifies state subsidy for the arts through their taxes. He advocates for a strategy that “must appeal to qualities inherent to art itself”

(Schwartz, 2000, p. 7). This argument is somewhat similar to Wyszomirski (2000), who finds that culture and the arts are important in fostering democracy since they build social capital and thus reinforce democratic principles. These statements reinvigorate arguments about the 72 instrumentality of culture being broad and of multi-purpose, therefore, beyond commercial imperatives. As we see, in Chapter 5, however, the SA cultural policy strategy behind these festivals is not broad.

Hicks (2007) is convinced that cultural instrumentalism kills prospects of future creativity for the nations and cultural producers who seek wealth through it. Hicks (2007) highlights that cultural diplomacy is also part of the problem as it has external ends that try to do too much. All at once, he says, the ends are to gain international partners, “to pursue relations with other cultures”, harness creativity to “assist the creators to benefit themselves, their economy and the internationalisation of their culture”, etc. (Hicks, 2007, p. 1224). Due to the cultural, economic and foreign policy objectives tied into the cultural instrumentalism at play at the festivals, Hicks (2007), raises an important point about cultural instrumentalism through cultural diplomacy sometimes being unfocused.

Snowball (2011) recognizes that instrumentality is transactional, and that culture has intrinsic and extrinsic value. She points out that it is easier to measure the extrinsic instrumental values of culture than its intrinsic attributes, but that the latter is not impossible to measure since economics offers “effective non-market valuation methods” (Snowball, 2011, p. 173).

Snowball (2011) proposes that “the danger of representing the value of culture using only instrumental values is that these same effects might be equally well provided by other, non- cultural industries” (p. 173). She states that ‘culture and the arts are not primarily about creating jobs or economic growth’ (ibid.). Although Snowball (2011) acknowledges that it would be enough to simply assert that the arts should be funded by governments because they are a public good, however, she also cites that national budgets are not limitless. Therefore, governments prioritize budgetary allocations. She adds that if culture were not funded the jobs created instrumentally from it would be lost, and the intrinsic values of culture would also dissipate.

73 In terms of thinking about cultural budgets and the DAC within cultural instrumentalism, Hadley and Gray (2017) are important. They discuss the premise that if culture continues to have a low profile on government agendas because the sector’s priorities of inwards advancement have no effect on “governments’ other policy ambitions”, then there may be no point in having a cultural policy (p. 96). They ask about the implications of “an increasing emphasis on non-cultural policy intentions” and if that may “lead to a loss of meaning for cultural policy in its own terms” (ibid.). Hadley and Gray (2017) make the distinction between instrumentalization and hyperinstrumentalization, explaining instrumentalization as a situation where cultural policy is “a means to a non-cultural end” but the policy’s meaning is derived from ‘cultural content’ (Hadley and Gray, 2017, p. 96). They warn against a ‘hyperinstrumentalisation for cultural policy where outcomes replace inputs, outputs and intentions as the basis upon which policy rests’, or “the meaning of cultural policy lies solely” on those ends (ibid.). The danger would be that “cultural policy in itself is only as important as the ends to which it is directed” (Hadley and Gray, 2017, p. 104). They also imply that ‘cultural policy actors are not as helpless in the face of exogenous policy demands’ (p. 96).

Nisbett (2013b) disputes the role of cultural producers within cultural instrumentalism as not always involving disempowerment, showing that cultural actors can ‘exploit’ instrumentalism (p. 572). She speaks of cultural institutions who use ‘sophisticated’ cultural diplomacy ‘rhetoric’, aligning themselves with ‘the government’s foreign policy agenda’

(Nisbett, 2013b, p. 572). These actors do so by lobbying for ‘a new policy, which was based on their organisational needs’ (ibid.). Nisbett (2013b) shows that by doing so, the actors take on the roles of ‘policy-makers, funders, implementers and recipients’ (ibid.). The actors therefore benefit from funding enabled by the policy they created and expanded roles in their operations and influential political status. The argument by Nisbett (2013b) highlights that cultural producers and actors are not simply dictated to or are instruments through which 74 politicians make policy gains, but are beneficiaries and can also be drivers of instrumental policy relating to their sector. This suggests that cultural actors in policy-making are not always apolitical, and that cultural output that results from this kind of instrumentalism is not of inferior quality. Nisbett (2013b), however, alleges that in these circumstances, only the rhetoric meets the political agenda, and the actors have no obligation to “engage with or contribute to political objectives in practical terms” (Nisbett, 2013b, p. 573). As valid as this argument is, however, it also brings to mind questions about who sets the political agendas before such actors can enter this platform and how the agenda is set.

Nisbett (2013a), still deliberating on the essence of cultural policy instrumentalism, poses that perhaps cultural policy is essentially “about reflecting other areas of policy” (p. 98).

She also resolves that our ‘formal expectations of policy’ are betrayed by how ambiguous cultural policy is, how “elusive” it is, and how it has an ‘ulterior purpose’ (Nisbett, 2013a, p.

99). She later ascribes this to how the making of cultural policy is “complex and not transparent” and that it exists “as verbal exchanges and social interactions between the cultural elite” (ibid.). The cultural elite she refers to include those who obfuscate rhetoric in academic literature, simplifying what in fact happens in practice (Nisbett, 2013b). She says this obfuscation is what creates discrepancies “between the concepts, their labels and usage” ‘by practitioners’ versus in policy (Nisbett, 2012, p 16-17). Her empirical research found that literature on the negative effects of instrumentality in cultural policy neglects the ‘wealth of benefits and opportunities offered by instrumental policies which the sector’ encourages for further benefits (ibid.).

Carter (2015) also recommends that it is helpful to support the national interest, because it is “state-sponsored deployments of culture and education for foreign audiences, deployments aimed expressly at producing publics more knowledgeable about and better disposed towards” a nation (Carter, 2015). It is, therefore, for the national interest that governments undertake 75 cultural diplomacy, and not for altruism (Carter, 2015). He recognizes that the national interest means “a positive commitment to the institutions, practices and policies of the nation that we want to explain, contextualise, advocate, defend, even celebrate” (Carter, 2015, p. 483). This is especially considering that culture is “‘purposed’” and “repurposed” by others as well as its producers (ibid.).

On the other hand, Stevenson et al. (2010) point to a “continuing absence of demonstrable evidence and appropriate scrutiny of claims to culture’s “transformative” potential” (p. 261). Instead they owe claims of culture’s powers to the impulses of cultural organizations who inadvertently help shape visions of humanizing capitalism. Although

Stevenson et al. (2010) see legitimacy in culture serving goals other than itself, they however allege that in the convergence of the social, cultural and economic principles in British cultural policy, there is no “cause-effect schema” (p. 261). More so, they suggest that this convergence muddies the cultural realm in terms of what ‘constitutes culture’ and limits culture (ibid.). They resolve that “the foregrounding of culture has often represented something of an image-driven policy” which creates “expectations of efficacy that cannot be realized” (p. 262).

O’Connor (2009) proposes different considerations regarding cultural instrumentalism.

Firstly, that “the creative industries exemplify a particular kind of market – a social network market – in which the false opposition of economic and cultural values is dissolved within highly complex, adaptive systems” (p. 387). The social network market is the innovation system through “which cultural values are created” (p. 388). As such, ‘produce new cultural and economic value’ (ibid.). Secondly, this means that culture is produced and consumed within the conditions of an economic system anyway. Thirdly, that it is difficult to distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental orientations in this sense. This reading sums up the idea that culture and the economy are in many ways interdependent rather than dichotomous and that cultural policy at times misses that when enhancing one over the other. 76 The creation of networks

This section helped to determine ways in which networks are established and function amongst different entities. It was useful to determine this since SA government entities and non- government entities were involved at these festivals. Each of these entities may operate differently within networks. This is also why I have categorized the discussion among musicians or other stakeholders.

When I speak of networks in this dissertation, I also mean partnerships and collaboration amongst stakeholders. I base my understanding of a network on what Bridgestock

(2005) refers to as “strategic personal and professional relationships with those who might provide opportunities and important resources” which can be exploited for “emerging strategic opportunities” (p. 15-17). I also understand networks to be a web of actors connected by an interest support structure in which they are interdependent and share some common values

(Hesmondhalgh, 2002; Jeffri, 2002; Currid, 2007a; Currid, 2007b; Andersson et al., 2011;

Comunian, 2015). Each network confers or exerts legitimacy upon those who belong to it through association, recognition and belonging (ibid.). Being in the network also offers members shared risk (ibid.).

A network, therefore, can also be a form of social organization of a group of people who are connected by their vested interest in the same cause and occasionally interact (Stalder,

2006). Networks happen at various levels of society, including national, community, international, business and family levels, otherwise referred to as nodes (ibid.). Members of a network may be tied together by a cause with a “shared set of values, standards, or functional rules” which undergo negotiation and as such perpetually redefine the identity of the network

(ibid., p. 180).

As established earlier, the purposes of a network are to influence the advancement of the cause, solve problems related to the cause and create opportunities for the cause of the 77 network (Gibson, 2007; Jansson & Nilsson, 2016). Individuals and organizations who are members of a network benefit from the resources they each bring to the network. Members can also capitalize on the amount of influence they have within the network and outside of the network because they belong to the network. The network provides them with social capital

(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Some of the appealing attributes of networks include the pooled resources contributed by members and the impact of implemented strategies in relation to the power in numbers of all the members of the network (Bourdieu, 1986). This means that the size of the network membership sometimes matters as well as a sense of belonging to a support structure of a particular size and with the available resources. Furthermore, the quality of the network, in who its members are, matters because networks confer legitimacy in various ways, including recognition (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Adherence to the network standards would make a network member recognizable in environments outside of the network.

Simultaneously, in this research networks are understood within the policy environment, where collaboration is a means to an end, but also happens between public and private collaborators (Sandfort & Stone, 2008). The latter government approach is collaboration that happens as a type of “public management” through interest groups that form interdependent networks with the government (Salamon, 2002; Ingram & Smith, 2002;

Sandfort & Stone, 2008, p. 1). This approach to handling national interests in public-private collaborations has been noted earlier in this study, especially in relation to non-government actors driving cultural diplomacy with either government or non-government actors in other countries (Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010; Nisbett, 2013b; Kozymka, 2014; Fisher, 2014).

Even as democratic as such structures may seem, there is cognizance here that collaboration in policy also makes networks problematic since they “enable the powerful to appear as just another participant” in circles of collaboration (Roelofs, 2003, p. 206).

78 Apart from this dynamic, sometimes even though interest groups, large or small, involved within the policy process are powerful, their involvement is viewed suspiciously because they are not fully transparent to the public, these groups are necessary (Jones, 1984).

Additionally, as an example of many possible dynamics in such collaborations, Jones (1984) observed that among the few private research institutes and organizations that tend to have inclusion in US policy related issues are the Brookings and Urban Institutes, the Ford22, Mellon,

Carnegie, Sloan, Russell Sage and Rockefeller Foundation (Jones, 1984, p. 81). He noticed that

“these organizations produce ideas, recommendations, data, analyses, and even personnel to assist” in policy formulation proposals (ibid.). It becomes apparent then that, for better or worse, these organizations bring to any table boundless resources. This means that these organizations have clout, and operate at the social, cultural and political levels, etc. Some of these organizations are involved at one of the festivals and have interests in SA.

Nonetheless, for this research context, Comunian (2015), quoting Gravonetter, outlines types of networks, those with ‘strong and weak ties’ (p. 55). She finds that “while strong ties are based on shared experiences and values developed over time, weak ties are more temporary, requiring less investment and commitment” (ibid.). Meanwhile, Ferraguto (2015), quoting

Vick, says that there are insider networks which are of ‘individuals connected by’ factors like

“collegiality, or common belief or purpose” ‘within a broader social context’, but are also

“delineated as much by whom they exclude as whom they include” in this clustering; and small- world networks which are composed of “connected individuals and small groups at a social or geographical remove from one another” (p. 16-17). The ‘insider networks’ are of individuals who are connected in more ways than one, and ‘small-world networks’ where ‘connected individuals and small groups at a social or geographical remove from one another’ (ibid.). I

22 The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations already have ties to research for the ANC cause in pre- democratic SA (Roelofs, 2003). 79 will not dwell on the technical aspects of how these types of networks behave, but I use these descriptions to inform how I distinguish between the composition of stakeholder networks in this research context. More so, in this section I underline how with actors in the music industry, networks and networking are more successfully enabled ‘face-to-face’ and informally (Rantisi

& Cummins-Russell, 2012, p. 85-87).

Apart from what kind of networks are involved in this research context, why these networks matter is that in the creative industries, networks “provide access to the market, but also support the exchange of ideas and social interaction that are vital for the development of their work”, but more so, networking in this industry is often propelled by informal social interactions (Comunian, 2011, p. 1171-1172). Therefore, the impact of SAAF and the Ubuntu festivals on their participants can also be considered through the involvement of national, international and transnational networks. The SA musicians who performed at the festivals were among networks of industry stakeholders, political and social institutions, and audiences.

Therefore, several factors play a role here. These include the agency of musicians and their representatives, as well as that of other participants in tapping into any of these networks. Other factors are the role of the festival organizers in enabling an environment for the networks to be cross-sectionally, formally and informally, accessible to participants as stakeholders. Also important are factors regarding what tangible and intangible opportunities the networks enable.

Among Musicians

It is well worth noting again that for the SA cultural sector practitioners at the festivals, the gatekeepers and networks brought to the events may give them legitimacy as belonging to a larger international artist community with established standards, aesthetics, and norms that tie the group together (Hesmondhalgh, 2002; Jeffri, 2002; Currid, 2007a; Currid, 2007b;

Comunian, 2015). Being at the festival may also mean exposure to emergent ideas, knowledge,

80 collaboration opportunities, and feeling connected to principles of the group (ibid.). Some solidarity as a result of the support offered within networks may develop, meaning that opportunities are not only based or reliant on the sector participant’s talents alone. The talents of others through things like mentorship, partnership and a circle of compassion and assistance in shared experiences and the generation of solutions exists (ibid.).

For instance, findings by Jeffri (2002) encapsulated the importance and meaning of personal networks among jazz musicians. These networks are non-static and are paths through which to channel knowledge and other resources for musicians who are similar to each other.

These findings corroborate what Comunian (2015) reported that networks of artists who have a similar focus and work in similar formats tend to group together temporarily in order to achieve growth and learn from each other. Comunian (2015) calls these groups of similar artists

‘communities of practice’. Her view is that festivals are ecosystems at which communities of musicians flourish because the space becomes an ideal environment for growth. Festivals are, as established previously, not a once-off employment environment for such networks. Instead, festivals are spaces which enable more future employment (Gibson, 2007; Comunian, 2015;

Jansson & Nilsson, 2016). Apart from macro level networks involving institutions, there is

‘peer-to-peer interconnections, through formal and informal networks’ in creative industry projects which happens at the micro level, where individual practitioners gain ‘support infrastructure’ they need in the creative industries (Comunian, 2011, p. 1170). Also because of the individuals and institutions represented in the networks at the festivals, and amongst other benefits, these events are ‘launching pads’ for the careers of the musicians, they encourage

‘entrepreneurialism’ in how work is produced and presented, increase the artists’ visibility among these representatives, provide ‘feedback from peers’, and are knowledge transfer opportunities on artistic and music careers (Comunian, 2015, p. 54).

81 Like Comunian (2015), Markusen and King (2005) had also conveyed that artists flourish within networks, due also to the presence of artistic and professional development opportunities boosted by companies who have some vested interests in the space or a common purpose. Markusen and King (2005) also noticed that networks were “often enhanced by new spaces for working and gathering” and that they helped “spread entrepreneurial ideas and practices” among its members (p. 3). Networks push artists to “think ‘out of the box’” regarding their approach to their careers (Markusen & King, 2005, p. 19). Currid (2007b) discovered that networks also provide industry actors with credibility among other creative industry actors, and this credibility is gaged by which actors one has collaborated with.

Among Multiple Stakeholders

Like the research cited above about the creative and cultural sector, Ostrower (2003) states that partnerships, used here synonymously with networks, strengthen cultural participation and when successful, they have emergent unforeseen opportunities. Among others, cultural collaborations and partnerships of large and small organizations, ‘between organizations in different cultural fields’ and ‘venture-related partnerships,’ expand what is usually possible in the cultural sector (Ostrower, 2003, p. 22-29). Although there may be some difficulties within the partnerships, however, each partner brings capital that mutually benefits the collaboration.

Some of the benefits include ‘administrative and financial resources’, more personnel, influence and ‘connections to a desired target audience’, marketing and ‘artistic resources’, extended and diversified programming, access to desired space and venues, as well as more

‘knowledge and experience’ (ibid.; p. 37). Ostrower (2003) advises that partners should review and “be very clear about their goals, their commitment, and the appropriateness of partnership for attaining those goals” because of challenges, such as partnerships tend to be “time- consuming, energy-absorbing”, financially costly, and “sometimes contentious” (p. 38). Short

82 term goals related to the partnership, therefore, should not impede each partner’s main priorities for existing (ibid.).

Walker (2004) suggests that it has become a more common occurrence for arts and non- arts organizations to partner up for the sake of meeting “artistic and community service goals that might otherwise be far more difficult” (p. 2). The non-arts organization usually comes from the “educational, religious, youth development, human services, and community development sectors” (p. 4). More so, he notes that when the engagement terms and conditions are clarified and the organizational goals are aligned, these collaborations can enrich cultural participation among various audiences and upskill the partners involved. He states that when going into such partnerships, organizations risk “reputations, constituent relations, organizational missions, and investments of time, money, and expertise” (Walker, 2004, p. 2).

Walker (2004) suggests that for arts organization the main rewards from these collaborations are ‘increasing the public value of their activities’ (p. 13). For non-arts agencies, such partnerships reinvigorate the ‘thought, activity and involvement’ of their constituencies (ibid.).

Addressing a multi-sector angle too, Ferraguto (2015) examines networks enabled by diplomats during the later 1700’s and early 1800’s, and how these networks advanced several interests. He states that resident diplomats ‘played a vital role in shaping a transnational

European musical culture’, because the diplomats wore several hats as ‘patrons and performers’, ‘musical agents, facilitating musical interactions within and between courts, among individuals and firms in their private salons’ (Ferraguto, 2015, p. 1). He admits that diplomats were not the only social group of people to move within these circles, but for many reasons had done so more “fluidly and consistently than any other” (Ferraguto, 2015, p. 16).

The diplomats who were from several countries, but were deployed in European cities, therefore, commissioned music, hosted entertainers and between each other transferred and exchanged ‘musical personnel’ and musical manuscripts “throughout Europe and beyond” 83 thereby building the music infrastructure ‘required for the performance and study of music’

(Ferraguto, 2015, p. 4-7). Therefore, they formed a network amongst each other. The diplomats also documented detailed accounts of their socio-cultural and political foreign activities as required by their governments, and they would occasionally share this information within their foreign network. The diplomats also “from personal conviction, national interests, or both”,

‘assisted musicians in the production and dissemination of their works, in the facilitation of their geographical mobility, and in the shaping of their careers and reputations’ (Ferraguto,

2015, p. 11). Diplomats fostered musical networks in their immediate surrounds or ‘salons’ through interactions in the circles of the ‘social, political, literary, and artistic elite of Europe’

(Ferraguto, 2015, p. 15). Therefore, regular events like these are important for building cultural networks.

Like Arndt (2005), Ferraguto (2015) positions political deployees in embassies as drivers of cultural diplomacy. Deployees were in this role for the sake of the national interest, and also created networks for the same reasons (Sikes et al., 2006). As Ferraguto (2015) has established, these deployees were sometimes also associated with spying for their countries

(Mitchell, 2016). Nonetheless, cultural attachés have traditionally taken on the cultural function at embassies and have been the cultural network creators in foreign lands for diplomatic missions (Mitchell, 2016). Arndt (2005) also implies that the roles of cultural attachés came at great financial cost to the administration and individuals, but have been held by diversely qualified personnel, including those with extensive language skills, no higher education, university education, academics, businessmen, and later those with diplomatic training, etc.

These personnel had to have a commitment to the job’s persistent personality-related demands,

‘point of contact’ cultural diplomacy demands, research and administrative duties (Arndt,

2005, p. 120-133). This means that cultural attachés ideally have diverse training.

84 On the other hand, Mitchell (2016) has stated that having a cultural attaché has also been considered more economical by some countries than running a building, operations, personnel and a different set of infrastructures dedicated only to culture outside of the embassy, as in the case of a cultural center. Thus, the role of a cultural attaché, or a close equivalent, has been configured differently from country to country. Cultural attachés, however, mainly function in the promotion of education, through exchanges, the arts, culture and heritage of the country of origin in the new country. The attaché would find connections between the two countries and enact symbolic gestures in material expression or values, tying these focal areas holistically to the social, political, economic domains in both countries (ibid.). Activities in this role should generate funds for its own operations, but also through sponsorships and other forms of collaboration (Mitchell, 2016, p. 61-62). For some countries, the cultural attaché would report to the minister of foreign affairs or the ambassador, or sometimes both (Mitchell,

2016, p. 75). In other countries, the cultural attaché would report to the Minister of Culture as well as one of the former functions (ibid.).

Ryan (1989) also affords cultural attachés the role of cultural diplomacy and recommends that they are cultural affairs officers who are amenable and constantly feed knowledge of the country of their origin into the country to which they are deployed. He implies that attachés do not do this on the grounds of country-to-country discussion or in anticipation of such negotiation, but prior to it and perpetually. In other words, cultural attachés should assume that “greater knowledge [about their country] will lead to sympathetic understanding, reducing the tensions that stem from misapprehension and bias, and creating an atmosphere more conducive to cooperation between their own country and the host country” (Ryan, 1989, p. 2). According to Ryan (1989), cultural attachés work in projects such as relief aid, art exhibitions, educational and non-educational exchange programs, and in the management of their countries’ material cultural infrastructure abroad. The attachés participate in these projects 85 only “for the good of” their own country (Ryan, 1989, p. 2-6). For the types of programs that send culture abroad, the attaché only usually contributes to such ventures due to budgetary limits (ibid.). They also consult with the cultural attaches of other countries, especially those in countries where culture is being ‘sent’ abroad (ibid.).

Keith (2009) finds that the role of cultural attaché has evolved. He suggests that cultural attachés, or their evolved moniker as US cultural affairs officers abroad, are ‘supported’ by

‘civil service employees’ who provide information from the home country of the attaché and have financial, training and other resources (p. 289-291). The support would be advice and information for cultural groups travelling from the home country as well as attaches deployed at different foreign missions (Keith, 2009, p. 289). He advises that cultural attaches are thus cultural facilitators who, along with the civil service employees of their home country know

“the cultural environment and locally available resources” (ibid.). Cultural attachés fundamentally “made contacts, overcame customs glitches, found the occasional sound system, and helped with negotiations along the way”, fundraised locally, but also capitalized on artists from their home country who were travelling “independently” (ibid.). As such, the attaches should have ‘bureaucratic clout’ and ‘overseas experience’ in networking and understanding different cultural needs and the nuances of locales, as well as the knowledge of structuring cultural programs related to their country of origin (Keith, 2009, p. 290).

Sikes et al. (2006) value cultural attachés and have used them as key informants in the development of international cultural exchange programs. For Sikes et al. (2006), cultural attachés have been helpful with their quick insights on the cultural and community landscape of where they are stationed (ibid.). Sikes et al. (2006) suggest that ‘cultural attaches and public affairs officers’ can assist to “locate partners and funders” (p. 26). The implication is that in this context, where a US arts council initiated international cultural exchange programs abroad, one of their first contacts would be a US state official at a US embassy who has created cultural 86 and other diverse networks in the country of their deployment to channel US interests. The attaché would help create in roads to that country, including building friendships and other interpersonal ‘relationships’ for negotiating for a common purpose (Sikes et al., 2006, p. 29).

In the SA diplomatic framework, however, other networks have come into effect to advance the SA cultural sector (Nawa et al., 2017). Van Der Westhuizen (2003) also observes that the SA government has been trying to get SA cultural industries recognized by European and North America audiences for the purpose of enhancing the SA national brand. In these efforts, the SA government was also guided by recommendations in the 1998 Creative South

Africa strategy (CSA), a cultural policy strategy that is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

The CSA, among other suggestions, advocated for partnerships between DAC, DIRCO, the

Department of South African Tourism, and the Department of Trade and Industry for the sake of soft and hard power (ibid.). These government-led networks are reminiscent of traditional diplomacy, but also indicate that government-led international cultural relations reflect the marginality of cultural diplomacy within DIRCO structures (Nawa et al., 2017).

It is also worth noting that in recent years cultural diplomacy has also been approached informally and flexibly to its bureaucratic origins (Sölter, 2008). According to Sölter (2008) this change has affected how cultural diplomacy actors create transnational networks. For instance, companies and cultural organizers no longer solely rely on attachés (ibid.). Instead, cultural actors create and use their own networks and “call embassies and consulates for fine receptions, but no longer for artistic support or any cultural, content-related input” (Sölter,

2008, p. 3). He cites that cultural workers, creatives, “visiting professors, foreign correspondents, exchange students, interns” are the ones who have taken on the role of diplomats in cultural diplomacy (Sölter, 2008, p. 4). Sölter (2008) finds protocol is so different that “governments call each other directly” now “should they wish to talk to each other” (ibid.).

At the same time, however, Sölter (2008) suggests that when travelling across countries, this 87 group of national representatives still need “insiders who know the scene well enough to quickly connect them locally upon arrival so that they can hit the ground running” (ibid., p. 4).

The insiders, he recommends, ideally come in the form of “facilitators and translators, operating as NGOs independent of government”, because those have more credibility than government deployees (ibid.).

Müller (2010) also attests to more adaptable forms of cultural exchange, where as a native of Chile she worked as the cultural affairs specialist for the US embassy in Chile. She was, therefore, not a US citizen but worked within its embassy for US interests. Müller (2010) also noticed how partnerships in transnational cultural exchange develop for the long-term, are flexible and are based on sharing resources. From her experience, she evaluates that partners should be aware of each other’s strengths, and what they each bring to the table. Due to constant negotiating, assessing mutual aims, adjusting agendas, compromise and keeping with individual “institutional missions”, the actual terms of the partnership may keep changing

(Müller, 2010, p. 102-103). Collaborations are, thus, furthered by shared “interests and objectives” (Müller, 2010, p. 101). She asserts that budgetary concerns may also dictate the terms of engagement. More importantly, Müller (2010) reflects that “leadership no longer lies in individuals”, but in the “sum of persons and organizations with an area of talents who put their passions, efforts and abilities together in the wake of a common objective” (p. 102).

88 SA cultural policy23 and management

Before surveying some of the growing SA cultural policy and management literature, establishing some context is necessary on the voices in the literature and the quantity of literature. The White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage (WPACH) is the main document in

SA that dominates cultural policy initiatives by the state, and I address it in Chapter 5. Most consideration on SA policy references or addresses this document and the different strategies that were set up to support it. An example of the latter is the Cultural Industries Growth Strategy

(CIGS) of 1998. Otherwise, there is an emerging but fragmented body of research projects that addresses SA arts-culture management or its policies at local and national level in post- apartheid SA. The researchers who are responsible for this literature come from diverse disciplines24, and most of them have in some capacity worked in a consultative, advisory, project-management or researcher role25 amongst policy or program initiatives at the DAC or other state cultural organs, and as such have both insider and outsider views of the DAC’s machinations. They contribute to this growing body of SA cultural policy literature. The small

23 While this literature is pivotal to my research, I should state that my aim for this study is not to dwell on the stereotypical lack of good governance often associated with African governments, and specifically prevalent in discussions on SA cultural sector policy development, governance and its inherent discourses of power. This stereotype is sometimes executed by us South African researchers, posturing our arguments on neutrality, but in fact reinforcing the stereotype through our representations in accessible literature. Policy discourse is never neutral or innocent (Bacchi, 2000). As such, I take responsibility for inadvertently perpetuating this stereotype in previous research by not factoring in the political nature of policy discourse. Similarly, in SA policy takes place within a political and politicized space also complicated by discourses of decolonialization, those mired in apartheid discourses of power and not challenging them, and other complex genealogies which affect the policy-making context. There are those who hold power, and can speak for those who cannot (ibid.) Therefore in the arguments raised and policy analysis I conduct here, I try as much to be cognizant of the “conditions of [policy discourse] production and the manner of their deployment” as these conditions are ideological, subjective, historical, entrenched in power dynamics, (Hunt in Bacchi, 200, p. 51). Also, rather than point out that policy is enacted or conceptualized erroneously, by using language that conjures up ideologically derived notions of incompetence, I try to look into why and how the policy approach espoused is considered apt. 24 The two disciplines that have enjoyed documentation at community level practice and administration are theatre and the visual arts. This was mainly for the political causes these disciplines were entangled in during the apartheid era. See Sirayi (2012), Coplan (2007), Gaylard (2004) and others on this topic. 25 For evidence of this cross-pollination of roles in cultural policy research and analysis, see reports and articles by Maree (2005), Hagg et al. (2006), Meersman (2007), Newton and Joffe (2008), Deacon (2010), Hagg (2010), Nawa (2017). 89 size of this literature, which is publicly available, is due to several factors including the limited amount of implemented policies post-1994 and, until recently, the rarity of formal education in arts-culture management, or the almost non-existent focus given to cultural policy study at institutions of higher education (Sirayi & Nawa, 2014a).

Additionally, until 2010, SA research culture on these topics was affected by the limited pace and impact of the developing knowledge in the field of arts-culture policy worldwide

(Wyszomirski, 2008, p. 52-56). This is no longer the case though since internationally, over at least the past decade, there have been accelerated research developments in this area of study which have increased the knowledge base. This impacts SA research too. As such SA literature consulted here in this area is varied, consisting of government reports, students’ theses, blogs and current affairs articles by different stakeholders, commissioned surveys of the cultural sector, and some academic journal articles. The literature is growing26, even though the DAC provided no “existing data relevant to policy-making in the sector” in complete or draft policy form or reports until after 2010 (Deacon, 2010, p. 24). Among other factors, if such data were available on the DAC website or its public archive prior to that, “critical reflection on policy- making within the sector” would have been encouraged earlier (ibid.).

One of the publicly available reports on the arts-culture sector is a chronological account by Deacon (2010). It surveys the relationship between research and policy development at the DAC between 1992 and 2010, as well as its ends. Deacon offers a comprehensive consideration of some of the issues in the policy-making context and process at the department, the difficulties the department has faced within its operations and in relation to its reduced status in Cabinet, the major programs the DAC has undertaken over this period,

26 Literature on the creative economy is growing due to the DAC’s investment in research since 2016, contracted to the Cultural Observatory which was formed by a consortium of three SA public universities.

90 the policy and research structures within the department, the different policy directions and their discourses. The report also engages several sector stakeholders about the politics in this context such as the fractured researcher-consultant-policy-maker relationships, how department hierarchies impact the continuity of projects as well as the quality of policy- development. Foremost, Deacon (2010) explains that even though policy is supposed to happen internally at the DAC, “most policy-related research has been conducted by external research consultants’ and that the actual writing of ‘policy documents has too often been left to researchers” (p. 23). Deacon (2010) finds that cultural policy in SA is not developed on its own terms, and that its direction and tone has been ‘articulated primarily within the broader political framework of projects for reconciliation (now social cohesion), development, and redress’ (p.

24). She concludes that cultural policy has focused on ‘managing the consultative process and generating a specific policy document rather than engaging in longer-term policy planning across various sectors of arts and culture’ (p. 24). Deacon thus suggests insufficient capacity and power for comprehensive cultural policy development at the DAC.

Meersman (2007) also reviews cultural policy, but in relation to the economic concerns of the cultural community. He contextualizes these concerns on the impact of national development economic strategies. Meersman considers cultural infrastructure which was in some ways healthy during apartheid, and infrastructure which was sidelined during apartheid, and suggests the cultural budget is insufficient to incorporate the needs of this sector. His review puts across the dashed hopes for culture in the new South Africa. Meersman (2007) scrutinizes the National Arts Council (NAC) and DAC’s seeming inadequate management styles of the sector. He expresses that “perhaps the most serious problem is the great distance between the Department of Arts and Culture and the South African artists”, indicating what he believes to be the decline in the well-being and potential of the sector (p. 302). On the amount of transformation in SA, he concludes that within the cultural sector “economic muscle lies 91 with the whites, and European culture is consequently still dominant” and that the sector is in fact ‘still trapped in the architecture of apartheid’ in a literal and metaphorical sense

(Meersman, 2007, p. 303-304).

Maree (2005) has similar findings when she evaluates the state of the arts in SA when the country’s democracy is a decade old. She bases her evaluation on specific pronouncements of the 1996 WPACH. She finds that outcomes in the cultural sector over this time have not been completely faithful to the vision stated in the WPACH. Maree reveals that the DAC has had “high staff turnover in the department, understaffing, lack of capacity, a desire to do too much and to delegate too little,” that ‘bureaucracy’ is a difficulty within the department (Maree,

2005, p. 293). She also finds that the DAC is aware of the perception27 that it is not doing enough for the sector (ibid.). She points out that the DAC has been signatory to many agreements with countries and other international organizations, including the “International

Network for Cultural Policy (INCP)” in a ‘a bid to protect local cultures from the cultural hegemony of America’ (ibid, p. 302). Maree asserts that transformation in the arts-culture sector happens at a staggeringly slow pace, leading to other forms of stratification. She points out that education in the arts, especially in areas that address new skills, has suffered a stalemate. Other problems are the ‘connection between national, provincial and local government’ which have not sufficiently responded to the needs of community arts centers and infrastructure at provincial level (Maree, 2005, p. 292-293).

At the same time, Maree finds that interventions in radio, film and television have reaped more monetary gains and progress towards solidifying a national identity through enabling a diversity of voices. As a ricochet effect, there have been more music opportunities for musicians since new radio stations are flourishing, even amid debates on local music quotas.

27 This perception has not changed much, as the DAC is not perceived positively by the cultural organizations it often collaborates with (Fischer, 2014). It is viewed as unsteady, non-committal and under-skilled (ibid.). 92 Likewise, the number of organizations representing the interests of those active in the creative and cultural sector has grown since 1994. Organizations that fund the sector have also increased, as have the number of festivals for most art forms. Maree resolves that “cultural values are more open to choice, and there is a sense of a democratic nationhood struggling to be born” (Maree, 2005, p. 303).

Rogerson (2006), on the other hand, recognizes the potential of the creative industries and their impact in the tourist industry in SA’s urban areas. He traces the concept of the creative industries and interrogates their incarnation in SA in terms of its developmental advantages.

Rogerson applauds the government’s strides in supportive policy-making for the advancement of the creative industries at national cultural, provincial and municipal governance levels, as well as at national government level. He discusses the impact of these policies in cities like

Cape Town and Johannesburg and considers how much more these industries could be supported to drive economic growth, especially in a coherent relationship between “creative industries, tourism and economic regeneration” (Rogerson, 2006, p. 162).

Also, in relation to regional cultural development that also affects the economy at the national scale, Ansell et al. (2007) highlight the economic significance of local jazz festivals within the scope of musicians’ livelihoods, the SA creative industries and cultural policy.

Ansell et al. (2007) suggest that musicians already feed regional growth but could be supported more holistically to realize a larger impact and contribution to the economy. Ansell et al. (2007) state that for music to be ‘export ready’, there needs to be national and regional government support “of the industry at the entry level” and for musicians to “progress through to the higher levels of professionalism” (p. 4). Therefore, what Ansell et al (2007) recommend is that for government to see economic rewards produced by the music sector, the government should address the “human, social and community development” concerns of this sector, especially in relation to how apartheid policy left it underdeveloped (p. 5-8). They also recommend digital 93 inclusion to drive the rate at which music export happens (ibid.). Years later, Ansell and

Barnard (2013a) also reported that SA has a limited live music performance circuit.

Nonetheless, there were more opportunities within national and international touring circuits

(Ansell & Barnard, 2013a). Furthermore, Ansell and Barnard (2013b) found that government interventions in the music sector so far have been directed at organizing the sector instead of addressing the peculiar characteristics of the sector like the ‘relational networks’, ‘adaptivity’ and ‘volatility’ and ‘communities of practice’ that exist (p. 27-29).

Joffe and Newton (2008) surveyed the SA cultural and creative industries (CCI’s) and found that freelance work is customary in this sector and that “the bulk of opportunities in the sector are one-off, isolated or commissioned projects or contracts that have a set duration and price” (p. 111). Joffe and Newton (2008) also found that there are organizations whose operations are significantly dependent on “government and international grant funding to survive” (ibid.). They owed the low profit margins of the sector to the inadequate business skills, which stand in contrast to its highly educated creative workforce and entrepreneurs. Due to low economic margins, sector participants had to find other jobs to support their income.

This negatively impacts the sector’s capacity development. Additionally, Joffe and Newton

(2008) discovered that “there is little connection between the tertiary sector and the arts industry regarding employment” (p. 113). Fundamentally, they found that the CCI’s are very minimally regulated and that there is as such little “co-ordination between government departments” regarding this industry (ibid.).

Mavhungu28 (2014) also confirms the need for cooperation between various state departments, as well as the public and private sectors in order to achieve creative sector growth.

28 Mavhungu’s research comes from a body of scholarship by the Wits School of Arts at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits). This is the only university department in SA offering courses in heritage studies, arts administration and cultural policy. The Arts, Culture and Heritage Management program at Wits University was developed as a result of the research needs of a provincial government agency in the Gauteng province. As Ansell 94 Her research paints a picture of role players in policy and governance systems of culture in SA.

It also outlines the timeline of SA policy and explains why some policy decisions were made.

Mavhungu (2014) points out weak aspects of current policy and how these affect the SA creative sector.

Sirayi and Nawa (2014), like Joffe and Newton (2008), also report on a tenuous link between the education sector, arts management and business skills in the SA creative industries.

Sirayi and Nawa (2014) provide historical background and analysis to the cultural sector and policies related to it. They propose a curriculum inclusive of cultural policy and arts management in the SA education system. Sirayi and Nawa (2014a, 2014b, 2014c), who are widely quoted in this research, also reflect on inclusivity and the peculiarities of SA society in relation to the sector internationally.

Regarding the CCI’s, Van Graan (2005) is concerned that they are an attractive export commodity for developing world countries (p. 12). He is also uneasy about the ‘culturalisation of the economy’ and the CCI’s. Van Graan is skeptical about the SA government’s commitment to the CCI’s, especially since the sector is a “relatively new area of production” that still has not been fully understood by the developing world or developed world, and the fact that resources are generally limited in SA (p. 16). He supports this view by quoting UNCTAD29, which alleges that ‘“developing countries lack the domestic enterprises and business skills to bring musical products to global markets”’ (Van Graan, 2005, p. 17). He hopes for a more balanced ‘economic and cultural’ emphasis by the government (ibid.). Van Graan is also of the view that SA CCI workers will self-sabotage when they use this framework because it will lead them to be more dependent on government subsidy instead of the autonomy associated with

et al. (2007) suggest, the “Gauteng Economic Development Agency … commissioned Wits University to do provincial cultural industries mapping” (p. 14). 29 UNCTAD is the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development. 95 entrepreneurship. He further points out that many countries have to contend with the USA’s dominance in “the creative industries’ world markets” and “the impact of American cultural products on the identity and cultures of societies across the globe”, and that there is evidence that the USA creative industries have already captured the imagination of the world (Van

Graan, 2005, p. 17). When Van Graan (2005) wrote this critique, he worried that there were insufficient skills development, ‘entrepreneurial experience’, and export know-how to engage this form of production (ibid.).

Literature Findings

One of the important takeaways from this literature review is that in spite of the body of research on festivals in SA, there is still scope for more research on SA festivals which showcase SA culture outside of the country. This dissertation contributes to the latter research.

Otherwise, there is growing literature on festivals from disparate disciplines which indicates a number of things. For starters, that festivals are shaped by social, political, cultural and economic dynamics. Festivals are intended to be spectacular but homogenized spaces where cultures interact, identity is negotiated, and experience is customized for locals and visitors.

These events are important in the expression of culture and identity, even when both are commodified, but also express power dynamics in terms of who organizes them and why.

Those who organize festivals have the potential to create transformative experiences by affording agency and inclusion. When festivals include audiences outside of the culture presented, they can serve as a platform for cultural education for outside audiences.

It is also customary for festivals to incorporate different forms of consumption related to their location in their activities. Doing so partly serves the role of festivals as policy tools for economic and social impact in identified communities. As cost-effective policy tools in cultural instrumentalism, festivals sometimes fall short of their determined aims and this may

96 be due to often inadequate evaluation systems used to measure their impact. Festivals also involve multiple stakeholders who have individual interests but are instrumental in the growth capacity of culture. As multifaceted environments, a few processes are possible at festivals.

For stakeholders like musicians, for instance, festivals enable the widening of professional networks and economic growth for the long term in a short space of time. Even so, festivals are often designed to prioritize tangible economic benefits above intangible rewards.

Festivals also have an internationalizing quality. For example, they transport cultural resources between local and foreign markets. They facilitate the creation of relationships between local and global networks. Some of them are international cultural events with multicultural attributes that serve multiple distinctive purposes such as creating consciousness and recognition of international issues and identities. Additionally, when inclusive, festivals can be effective in cultural diplomacy and thus strengthen ties between countries.

The literature also confirms that cultural activity, like festivals, configured as the creative and cultural industries, is pivotal to national economies. At the same time, policies for these industries are often viewed as more economically focused than addressing the conditions of creative work and its producers. The literature also confirms that even so, there is constant interaction between culture and the economy, and this realization may mean that policy styled on the cultural and creative industries is more inclusive of diverse forms of innovation.

The creative industries have also come to play a major role in international diplomacy, whether initiated by government or non-government actors. This is because nations now accept that there is qualitative and quantitative value in using their cultural capital to maintain a positive international image and to nurture mutual understanding and trust. Different countries tailor these processes they use to explain themselves to the international community through culture in individual ways to suit their priorities. Sometimes these culture-diplomacy processes are transactional and are not solely intended for the sake of creating understanding of 97 nationhood but are for the achievement of specifically set goals. At other times these messages are merely to corroborate other official messages. Such processes have a multiplier impact that goes beyond their set objectives though because of the different types of engagement they enable. The directional flow of the processes is also not necessarily government-to-government and can be devoid of political messages depending on whether the initiator furthering cultural understanding between the people of different countries is a political or non-political agent.

When governments involve culture in diplomatic exchanges, they often do so to reinforce their soft or hard power or do so as a way of seeking either or both. Soft power is the use of attraction or magnetism to convince others to want what you have so that you can influence them to change. Hard power in this context is coercing others to pay you or having the capacity to pay them. These forms of power can successfully fortify each other when they are supported by strong policy and have coordinated strategies executed by diverse stakeholders. Soft power has been noted for its potential to homogenize forms of cultural representations through its accepted standards of what works in exercises towards its pursuit.

Exercises in generating soft power are popular with governments because they are perceived as economical, even though their return on investment is difficult to quantify and manifests only in the long-term. Countries that have soft power tend to have their policies emulated by nations seeking soft power. What this chapter shows is that governments are still competitive when it comes to maximizing the wealth and resources of their countries through soft and hard power exercise, but do so using strategies of cooperation which are powered by transnational networks. These networks are composed of diverse government and non- government actors who share resources because they have similar policy interests. This may explain the SA government’s collaboration with Carnegie Hall and its sponsors. Such collaborations in cultural diplomacy benefit both governments and individual citizens but are fundamentally for the national interest. 98 For the SA government, however, exercises in soft power only help government departments to pursue set national goals related to SA’s reputation and economy-centered foreign policy. So, the use of music in bilateral relations between SA and the USA may be for government goals beyond diplomacy. This idea is supported by what the literature submits that

SA’s DIRCO missions abroad engage in informal and ad hoc cultural diplomacy that is not coordinated with the DAC. Therefore, because DIRCO’s cultural diplomacy only supports its foreign policy goals, and foreign policy priorities are the economy and SA’s identity-based reputation, SA’s cultural diplomacy reflects this.

Since SA’s cultural diplomacy is also not comprehensive, it flows in different directions, even though policy recommended that it be undertaken by government networks.

For example, apart from DIRCO, the DAC also engages in cultural diplomacy. Concurrently, non-government actors actively pursue SA cultural diplomacy in various countries. These cultural diplomacy efforts are also not coordinated, implying a diversity of objectives. The literature also suggests that cultural diplomacy is instrumental but can be unfocused when it is implemented with too many objectives. Nonetheless, the DAC has managed to promote SA culture abroad more regularly since the Mzansi Golden Economy (MGE) cultural policy strategy. MGE, supported the SAAF and Ubuntu festivals, is a strategy based on cultural instrumentalism. This is due to its bureaucratic agenda and funding mechanisms that prioritize job creation and predetermined social impact, and support initiatives aligned to this agenda.

The literature proposes that it is natural for governments to intervene in all areas of public life for the sake of national development. MGE is an example of such intervention. The literature also indicates that when governments intervene in arts-culture sectors, they often do so using a rationale that favors their budgets, that relies on an out-of-context measure of efficacy and ignores that culture is already produced and consumed within the conditions of an economic system. Such an approach has the potential to homogenize the sector’s output, 99 neglect sector priorities, peculiarities, stakeholders as drivers of policy and the inward self- prescribed advancement of the sector. Subsequently, when governments apply economic reasoning to the arts and culture, tension tends to arise between the government and the arts- culture community.

Additionally, even though cultural diplomacy is now taken up by government and non- government actors, the literature shows that there is still a role for a function in embassies which supports all the actors in such activities. This role would have a similar facilitator function to a traditional cultural attaché. The role would ideally enable the constant disseminating of information about the culture of the mission’s country origin and would enable the mission to be knowledgeable about the culture of the country of their deployment.

As such, the role should be up-to-date on the cultural needs of the country of origin, the cultural nuances of the country of deployment, stakeholders and funding mechanisms in both countries.

Regular or occasional events at missions are also important to support such a role. These events would be where arts-culture stakeholders can interact in order to build and reinforce transnational networks. Such networks create access to opportunities, knowledge and development. They confer legitimacy to members because of the standards the network adheres to, help members tap into the pool of influence and resources in the network, encourage collaboration, exchange peer support and further cultural participation.

Hosting regular events is also valuable for understanding the behavior and dynamics of networks. In music networks, for instance, successful network interaction is possible through informal in-person interactions. Networks have differing dynamics, with big and small actors and formed on the basis of shared values and interests among members. At the same time, networks are not necessarily centrally coordinated, have temporary configurations, and thus often have no strict cohesion among network members. The next chapters detail how DIRCO hosted once-off events for such networking at SAAF and Ubuntu. 100 On SA cultural policy and management, the literature revealed that SA operates within a cultural and creative industries (CCI’s) framework, and that the DAC has also recognized the potential economic rewards of the CCI’s. The department, however, has regulated the CCI’s very minimally. The DAC also has not supported the sector at every structural level to realize these rewards, and this has the potential to thwart progress in this sector. For example, skills development and transformation are yet to be achieved in the CCI’s. The literature also showed that the DAC has challenges relating to its capacity for comprehensive cultural policy development and the ability of its budget to address the sector’s development needs.

Furthermore, there is no coordinated cooperation between various government departments, or between the public and private sectors to grow the CCI’s. The literature has also suggested there is concern in the CCI community that the policy strategies that prioritize economic value embraced by the DAC may not be suitable for the SA context. Some of these problems may have created the fissures between the SA CCI community and the DAC. The literature also shows that the DAC tackles its deficiencies through manifold means, including being signatory to international treatise which aim to protect local cultures from cultural hegemony.

By supporting SA festivals that explain SA to audiences in the USA, DIRCO and the

DAC would appear to recognize how cost-effective generating soft power in the USA would be when implemented through cost-effective tools like festivals. They would have also recognized that generating and multiplying SA’s soft power has the potential to also increase the country’s economic hard power in the long term. This theory is further supported by what the literature suggests that the DAC and DIRCO do not have the legislative framework, infrastructure or resource capacity to drive cultural diplomacy abroad. My suggestion is that due to having a deficiently defined and structured cultural diplomacy framework, these departments have found a way to exercise cultural diplomacy in the USA directly through festivals so as to build the country’s hard power and diversify its current soft power. 101 Chapter 3 – Conceptual Framework

Introduction

In this chapter I present the overarching conceptual framework for this study. I address the three main theories that frame the discussion. These are the concepts of soft power, hard power, and cultural instrumentalism. I explain how they are relevant to the discussion. Lastly, in the chapter, I map out the analytical framework of the study.

Conceptual Framework

Mapping out the conceptual framework for this study means that I explain the concepts upon which I analyze these festivals from the perspective of the involvement of the DAC and

DIRCO. The concepts are soft power, hard power and cultural instrumentalism. These concepts provide the lens through which I analyze the significance of the DAC-DIRCO partnership at the festivals, the partnership’s pursuits and the tools used in this pursuit. From the discussion so far, I have determined that the festivals were chosen by the DAC and DIRCO to play a role in the maintenance of international relations between the USA and SA for predetermined goals.

I have also determined that even though the Ubuntu festival was not a venture of the DAC and

DIRCO, its results would contribute to the goals of the two departments. This means that culture was central to the upkeep of these relations and was utilized in the mission to achieve the now-identified goals of soft power and hard power. These deductions are based on the DAC speeches at both festivals and implications in the reviewed literature in the previous chapter.

The choice of three concepts is informed by what Wolcott (2009) observes, that assessing human behavior in a research environment is complex, because human behavior is complex. He recommends “proposing multiple plausible interpretations [and] to guard against the temptation to offer satisfying, simple, single-cause explanations that too facilely appear to

102 solve the problems we pose” for why things happen (p. 70). When used simultaneously, these concepts are meant to unpack the focal points of the study, which are derived from asking what was done to realize the festivals, how it was done, why it was done, where it was done, when it was done, who was involved, what their contribution was and what they benefitted from the festivals. The study’s focal points are: the cultural and power goals of each festival, stakeholder identities, relationship building and networks between the stakeholders, the government policies involved at the festivals, as well as the processes undertaken to organize the festival by each festival driver. These concepts, therefore, frame what is happening in the context of these festivals and thereby also address the research question, which is:

How do South African music festivals held in the USA promote SA musicians, facilitate industry and government networks, and cultivate state policy goals of hard and soft power?

Figure 2: Conceptual Framework

103 Figure 2 above illustrates this conceptual framework. In the illustration, the DAC and

DIRCO pursue the goals of soft and hard power through cultural instrumentalism. The festivals are the policy tool for implementing cultural instrumentalism. In other words, the festivals are the ‘culture’ or cultural element of cultural instrumentalism. Therefore, the DAC and DIRCO are in a partnership and use culture, in the form of festivals, to pursue two strands of power. As stated in the literature review, in chapter 2, hard power and soft power have a relationship where they reinforce each other, hence the perforated line in the diagram to indicate this interdependency.

Soft Power

In this section I address the relevance of soft power in this study. The concept involves the ability and intervention of a nation to draw other nations to itself through non-forceful communicative means, directly or by diffusion, and it is based on a historical trajectory of what it means to have international influence (Hayden, 2012). Soft power is often advocated as a complementary tool to other hard forms of power that a nation has, like the military, the economy, etc. (ibid; Van Ham, 2005, p. 52). As a process, soft power operates through “agenda- setting, persuasion, and attraction” (Hayden, 2012, p. 29). Although soft power has been widely adopted by many countries, the concept is often considered malleable and as covering large terrain (Hayden, 2012; Metzgar, 2012). It is often also thought of as difficult to identify (ibid).

With these factors in mind, I attempt to narrow my interpretation of it to its capacity for strategic but gentle persuasion using intangible resources, its ability to assist countries in the achievement of positive international relations, and its ability to affect change (Hayden, 2012).

To properly consider soft power, I first involve Nye who coined the term. Nye (2008) suggests that soft power is “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (p. 94). Nye (ibid) also proposes that “a country’s

104 soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies” (p. 94). As established in the previous chapter, many scholars find soft power difficult to quantify or that its outcomes are not always accurately measurable (McClory, 2010; Metzgar, 2012). Nye, however, finds that it is possible to realize the outcomes of soft power “post hoc through careful process tracing”

(in Hayden 2012, p, 34). This interpretation makes it possible to use this concept to explain the aims and results from the DAC-DIRCO partnership’s pursuits using festivals, and whether the outcomes were accidental or intended.

Since it already has been established that the aims of the DAC-DIRCO partnership pursues soft power, however, at this juncture, it is prudent to consider that at the core of soft power, for instance, is continued communication with different countries. This communication is through means including cultural messages, action and other information to create friendly relations between nations (Hayden, 2012). As a tool, soft power is economical and therefore justifiable when compared to the monetary costs of military action (ibid). These are the more discernable advantages which may explain why DAC-DIRCO pursued this mission. At the same time, however, even though the exercise of soft power may help create favorable impressions of a country, it does not always successfully determine or address other issues of power in how influential one country will be, or becomes, over another (Fan, 2008; Lock,

2010). For these reasons, my argument encompasses the limits and results related to the pursuit of soft power. This is because it later transpires in the study that the festivals alone could not have achieved soft power for SA, but built upon SA’s established moral-based soft power.

More so, that SA only pursued soft power through culture in the USA to build SA’s hard power in the USA, and thus diversify its traditional form of relating with the USA.

In relation to influence, Hayden (2012) interprets Nye’s idea of soft power as being about ‘co-optation- where objectives are achieved by getting others to want what you want’ (p.

5). Hayden (ibid) highlights the three elements of soft power: 105 ‘(a) influence, (b) the force of an actor’s argument [and] (c) the “attractiveness” of an actor’s culture and institutions- the supposed “intangible assets” that draw other actors toward wanting the same objectives’. (p. 5)

From Hayden (2012), I draw on the elements of influence, attractiveness and intangible assets in soft power to consider the outputs and process of the festivals. These elements are relevant in making sense of DIRCO’s policy of Ubuntu, which is SA’s policy on international relations or foreign policy. I consider the festival outputs and process to discuss the context of the USA giving attention to SA’s musical heritage, SA’s relationship with the USA, in relation to DIRCO’s policy of Ubuntu. Soft power and hard power help unpack the range of influence

SA hopes to achieve in the USA, based on SA’s foreign policy, cultural and trade policies.

I also engage with all three steps in the implementation of soft power. These steps are agenda-setting, persuasion and attraction. Agenda-setting “operates at the level of perception- influencing how actors, events, or controversies [can or] should be understood from a range of possible interpretations” (Hayden, 2012, p. 43). Persuasion is a “means by which agents use arguments to move the beliefs of subjects in some direction” (ibid). The outcomes of soft power are the last step, the attraction stage, where the desired results of persuasion are evident and were recognized in the agenda-setting phase (Hayden, 2012, p. 60-61). These steps are relevant in examining the DAC-DIRCO partnerships with other stakeholders and festival organization processes on an international platform.

To elaborate on the third element by Hayden (2012), he posits that in the exercise of soft power the receiver has some observational engagement with the policies of the country being presented to them, or the latter country’s nation-branding. This means that the country on the receiving end of the culture being presented has the opportunity to judge how the country presenting its culture is run (Freeman, 1997, p. 41). This is when there are perceptions formed of the presenting country. For the observational engagement of the US audiences, these 106 festivals are thus an opportunity for US audiences to engage with SA’s policies, and judge the attractiveness of SA’s presented identity. There is also the opportunity, therefore, to gauge the perceptions of US audiences and other US stakeholders on how attractive SA is abroad.

Hard Power

For the sake of consistency and highlighting contradiction in concepts, I will start by defining hard power through Joseph Nye once more. He observes that hard power is “the ability to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial preferences and strategies” (Nye, 2011, p.

14). The resources used in this form of swaying are sanctions, economic might and military force (Nye, 2008). This concept applies to the study context because there was a sense from these festivals that the organizers were trying to make the US audience experience SA music, which would have not readily been the first preference of this audience. In fact, there was evidence of DAC strategies to persuade US audiences about changing their perceptions about

SA culture through, for instance, the choice of music genres in the festival programming (N.

Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017; S. Xaba, personal communication,

April 12, 2017). US audiences were thereby persuaded to consume SA culture in the future.

Through considering what the concept of hard power involves, I can establish that SA was pursuing hard power through culture at SAAF, for instance.

Moreover, as discussed in chapter 5, the relations between the USA and SA are traditionally based on hard power through trade and economic development. This is apparent in SA foreign policy (DIRCO, 2011). Smith (2012) also outlines that SA does not have significant hard power resources and has instead been a global player due to the country’s moral-authority-based soft power. The involvement and interaction of soft power and hard power at the festivals also has various meanings apart from the pursuit of these powers through

107 the festivals. The ramifications of both concepts of power in this context reveals more about the long-term intentions of the DAC-DIRCO partnership.

For instance, a few interpretations come about. One interpretation is that SA is using established US hard power (its economy or buying power) to boost SA’s fledgling cultural- industries-based soft power and to pursue soft power in the USA. The second interpretation is that the speeches by DAC representatives at both festivals also indicate that SA is looking to build and solidify its cultural reputation in the USA, a trusted gateway to the world, to convince the rest of the world about SA’s rising culture-based soft power. At the same time, when the rest of the world is convinced of SA’s culture-based soft power, then SA gains more hard power

(economic growth) in the long term if this soft power is successfully established. This goal correlates with the intentions of MGE to grow the SA cultural sector and the SA economy. The interpretations also verify what Gallarotti (2011) says about soft power and hard power reinforcing each other. A third interpretation is conjecture, but is about whether SA is intentionally and consciously moving into the realm of smart power because of the prominence of soft and hard forms of power in action here. Wilson (2008) defines smart power as “the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently”

(p. 110).

Cultural Instrumentalism

Culture is often exploited for many different agendas by policy makers and others in order to attain specific non-cultural goals (Freeman, 1997; Holden, 2004; Chong, 2010; Mapadimeng,

2012). As established in the previous chapter, this action is associated with the concept of cultural instrumentalism or of the instrumentality of culture. Through the concept of cultural instrumentalism, I question how SA culture, or these festivals, is employed for causes apart

108 from culture itself. In essence, debates around this concept allow for thinking about the SA policy foundations of cultural instrumentalism. I also determine how the returns of this approach are measured, and if they are measured through the customary usage of out-of- context30 performance indicators that sometimes have counteractive consequences on culture

(Belfiore, 2002; Chong, 2010, p. 54-56). Often, these measurements happen for the purpose of utilizing culture so that funding it and extraction from budgets is justifiable (Holden, 2004;

Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005; Hesmondhalgh et al, 2015). This is the conundrum of the value of culture, where the public social impact of culture is weighed against its economic potential

(ibid; Moore & Williams-Moore, 2005; Frey, 2011). For this study, using this concept is suitable to think about whether DIRCO and the DAC, and other stakeholders thought the festivals were worth it, and how they determined the exercise was worth it. What was the measurement used in determining the outputs and outcomes of the festivals for the goals set?

Measurement as a result of cultural instrumentalist approaches in SA cultural policy are currently more prominent than before. As alluded to in chapters 1 and 2, there was a paradigm shift in SA’s cultural policy outlook between 2011 and 2013. This was the implementation of the aggressive Mzansi Golden Economy strategy (MGE), with an instrumentalist focus suggesting how lucrative culture is to achieve economic growth so much so the DAC made statements about the strategy positioning SA’s cultural and creative industries as ‘the new

“gold” of the economy’ (DAC, 2013). The strategy gave the DAC the mandate to invest in certain cultural initiatives, like these festivals, in SA and abroad to grow the local arts-culture sector (DAC, 2013). This means that growth would be evidenced by measuring tools. Since

MGE is predicated on the ideology of the instrumentality of culture, its motivations, therefore,

30 Guetzkow (2002) assesses that most arts in community impact studies, up to 2002, had methodological and contextual problems. He asks “whether impact can be measured solely or largely on the basis” of subjective marginal populations that are self-appointed (Guetzkow, 2002, p. 19-21). He contends that these are the focus of the majority of such studies, and are more descriptive but statistically unsound. 109 are that there is intrinsic value in the arts, and that this value should be exploited for greater public gain, socio-economic development and to meet bureaucratic goals (Matarasso, 1997;

Holden, 2004; Bunting, 2008; Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015). MGE’s utilitarian outlook implies that the arts in SA do not already contribute to socio-economic growth, countering established research that the arts holistically contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of society

(Americans for the Arts, n. d.; Lee, 2013). MGE implies an assumption by the SA government that culture and the arts should be controlled, disciplined to fall within its production line of reformation, or do more (Bennett, 1998; Belfiore & Bennett, 2008). In this light, MGE needs to be discussed within the perimeters of cultural instrumentalism as culture in this context is a tool for various reformative goals.

As a reformative tool, for instance, culture is used as an apparatus for the advancement of the national development goals of the SA state. It is also employed as a device for the overall promotion of SA as an attractive country to the world through the influence of partnerships between DAC, DIRCO, DTI and Brand SA. The attractiveness of SA as a country is highlighted here because the festivals take place outside of the nation’s geographical boundaries. This means the festivals take on the responsibility for representing the nation’s cultural values, brand and identity outside of where this identity is understood.

That said, however, there are other purposes too for which culture is used as an instrument here. Culture is used at the festivals as an instrument to further cultural objectives such as advancing the interests of SA musicians abroad, to expand the influence of the DAC since its mandate is to preserve, protect, promote and develop SA culture, and for cultural immersion which is for the sake of culture, soft and hard power (political), and as well as cultural immersion (apolitical). Therefore, what also makes cultural instrumentalism an appropriate lens to view the two festivals is that cultural diplomacy is an instrument to achieve diplomatic ends through culture (Wyszomirski et al, 2003; Schneider, 2005). Also, as explained 110 in Chapter 2, the DAC-DIRCO partnership at the festivals has a cultural diplomacy dimension because of a ‘cross-cultural encounter’ made possible by the people of one nation travelling to another nation to (re)present their culture and come into contact with the host nation (Gienow-

Hecht & Donfried, 2010, p. 12-15). This means that there is a correlation between the concepts of soft power and cultural instrumentalism, since the latter explains the former.

Instrumentality here also manifests amongst the stakeholders, as some of the stakeholders are instrumental to the aims of the festival. This is why I explore the agency of the participant musicians who are the agents and beneficiaries of cultural diplomacy. The agency of musicians is tied to the relationship the musicians had with the DAC in the department’s engagement at the festivals, and is not necessarily transactional. Using the concept of cultural instrumentalism, therefore helps navigate perceptions about the usefulness of the musicians in maintaining good country-to-country relations. It brings up the following questions related to the role of musicians in agenda-setting. For example, how much were the musicians role players at the festivals, and how much were they consulted or included in not only the cultural policy interventions to aid their career growth, but in the organization of the festivals?

On the other hand, and to get back to the meaning and impact of cultural instrumentalism on the creative industries, I should mention that research has shown that it is not only policy makers who are responsible for this utilitarian approach to culture (Matarasso,

1997; Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015). Much the same, however, arts advocates and others have tried to counter the bureaucratic use of culture (Chong, 2010; McGuigan, 2011). For a long time, stakeholders in different countries have argued that arts and culture possess the necessary preconditions to human development (Matarasso, 1997; Bunting, 2008; Dissanayake, 2008;

Chong, 2010; Bode, 2013). Others have also contended that culture has both utilitarian and other benefits, inherently (Matarraso, 1997). Some of these arguments illuminate that cultural 111 and arts participation are already part of a larger social contract because of their social impact

(Matarasso, 1997; Goss, 2000). It is for this reason that the lens of cultural instrumentalism becomes even more critical to this discussion in, among other issues, viewing the veracity of the outcomes for which culture is used.

For instance, as much as the outlook of the MGE model could be viewed as noble and attempts to reverse the inequity created by the socio-economic impact of apartheid, as well as colonialism31, it also means that arts organizations extend their main focus and conform to the predetermined goals in order to get funded. The pressure to align with aims of job creation and social cohesion, in order to get funding, pushes arts organizations to create programs that aggressively involve these government goals so that the organizations continue to exist, irrespective of how much they ultimately carry out their fundamental artistic focus. Cultural instrumentalism is, therefore, a relevant way to gaze at MGE, and enable a vocabulary with which to question whether or not the strategy encourages “defensive measure(s) by the arts sector to provide evidence of impact in some form” instead of achieving artistic goals specific to the raison d’etre of each organization (Bunting, 2008, pg. 324). In essence, these organizations put their creative focus on the line for the sake of funding to ensure they continue being operational. They then begin producing projects that have a similar focus to other cultural organizations who are also trying to stay afloat by appeasing their funders. Such practices alter the cultural landscape, making it a monolith of instrumental programs developed often at the expense of creativity.

31 As Mulcahy (2008) states, “the issues associated with culture and identity are most pressing when there has been a legacy of coloniality [or] a cultural dominance that creates an asymmetrical relationship between the center, and the periphery, between the cultural hegemony and the marginalized other” (p. 197-201). This is true for SA society. Thus, the redressive stance of the SA government in relation to cultural policy tackles the effects of (structural) residues of colonization and the destruction of cultural forms by apartheid. The WPACH also reclaims the uniqueness of SA culture in preserving indigenous forms, as well as emphasizes the diversity of national identity. 112 This perspective may have been helpful in interrogating the programming at the festivals. This kind of interrogation is not possible, however, since determining which of the musicians were funded by MGE for other projects in the past was impossible. Furthermore, the festivals were for different purposes, initiated by different institutions and were targeted at different constituents. Rather than the programming at SAAF being determined based on MGE directives, decisions on which musicians would be on the program were based on the dynamics of the host city, the vision and purpose of the festival as a unique event meant to bridge a gap between the old and the new while also reinvigorating cultural bonds (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017; S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017).

Likewise, at the Ubuntu festival the programming was determined by the vision and purpose of the event, which was traversing the diverse musical expression of a nation for the cultural immersion of the residents of the city of NYC, and therefore within the scope of Carnegie

Hall’s geographically-themed festivals mandate (J. Geffen, personal communication, August

9, 2017).

Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the MGE strategic goals, of advancing social cohesion and economic development while growing the cultural sector, are legitimate, are for the benefit of all citizens and are necessary32. Understanding this is imperative in a country that tries to create equity to redress apartheid policies and its legacy. If the policy strategy was successful in achieving these goals, social cohesion and economic development would be the direct impact of the policy. However, I wonder if the arts should take this direct responsibility compared to other active and purposely economy-driving sectors, as the cultural

32 Economic development is necessary, but there have been successful projects that approach it from a different end, through fostering what (initiatives) already exists. In terms of revitalizing urban areas and cultural forms, for instance, what other projects have done has been to “harness the power of cultural resources to stimulate economic development and community revitalization” (National Assembly of State Arts Agencies, 2008). This implies that these projects are approached with the pre-existing recognition of the inherent power of culture, and to tap into it, but not necessarily with the intention to bend and mutate cultural activities in order to make them work for bureaucratic imperatives. 113 sector already takes on the social responsibility of fueling national culture and already contributes to the economy in that manner anyway. Another factor is that there is a small pool of arts funders in the country since no formal incentives, such as tax breaks or a tradition of philanthropy, are in place to drive cultural patronage. As a result, this scarcity of patrons might give impetus to the homogenization of cultural output and the cultural landscape of the country.

Moreover, as Van Graan (2005) predicted, the creative industries approach might lead to welfarism, or state dependency, in the cultural sector because of this scarcity of funders.

Logic Map

From the conceptual framework, two questions arise. The first is, bearing in mind that cultural instrumentalism happens, how exactly is culture used at the festivals to pursue goals of hard and soft power? The second is what are the desired dividends of soft power and hard power for

SA? To answer these questions, I have to revert back to the questions mentioned at the beginning of the chapter from which the research focal points were derived in order to address the main research question. The questions were: what was done to realize the festivals, how it was done, why it was done, where it was done, when it was done, who was involved, what their contribution was and what they benefitted from the festivals. The questions help link the concepts of cultural instrumentalism and soft power by deconstructing what happens at each festival so that meaning is made from the festivals.

From these questions, I have formulated a logic map to make sense of the festivals. This map is illustrated in Figure 3 below, with key and independent variables included, key actors, allusion to concepts, and how they fit into the research context. In the diagram, the questions are arranged in such a way that they enable a description, analysis and lead to an interpretation.

The diagram shows the questions above in seven categories. The categories are the phenomenon, or what the case and its context are; the location where the phenomenon

114 happened; when or the date of the phenomenon; who the stakeholders are; why the festival happened, and therefore its purpose; how they were approached, or the process of the festival; and what the outputs mean. In the following chapter on the research methodology, I involve this categorization in more detail.

Figure 3: Logic Map

Overall, Figure 3 explains that what is under investigation is the phenomenon of SA festivals in the USA. Through various questions, the two festivals are described, analyzed and their findings are interpreted. One of the festivals happened in LA in October 2013. The diagram explains that at the festival in LA, the DAC and DIRCO were the key stakeholders among others who also represented certain interests and networks. These stakeholders hosted

115 the festivals to meet MGE and National Development Plan (NDP) and DAC goals. The process of driving these goals involved the use of culture (cultural instrumentalism) to showcase selected SA music genres to penetrate the US market and to nurture cultural ties. Therefore, the festival was the cultural format with which to build the desired soft power and hard power for SA and its cultural and creative industries (CCI’s).

The other festival took place in NY in October 2014. At that festival, the Carnegie Hall

Corporation (CHC) collaborated with DIRCO, the DAC, US Foundations and other stakeholders who also represented certain interests and networks. This collaboration was to achieve the cultural mandate of Carnegie Hall Corporation as an organization that accounts to the city of New York. Culture was used (cultural instrumentalism) in the form of a global festival series that showcases diverse music traditions of selected nations. This festival was part of this series and its outcomes were the cultural immersion of New York City (NYC) residents. For the DAC and DIRCO, the by-product of a focus on SA music tradition in NYC would be contributions to SA’s soft and hard power.

From the logic map I also formulated a more economical analytical framework to present and make sense of each individual festival. The analytical framework, detailed in the section on Data Analysis in Chapter 4, is made up of themes derived from Hauptfleisch (2007) and Getz (2010). Hauptfleisch (2007) suggests that festivals have common defining characteristics related to their purpose, inherent politics and common organization dynamics.

These dynamics subject the festival to being beyond the control of only its organizer (ibid.).

Getz (2010) profiles a wide range of themes that appear in research on festivals. These are themes similar to the characterizing attributes of festivals noted by Hauptfleisch (2007). The themes include the festival organizer, the objectives, location, programming, stakeholders, process and outputs of the festival.

116 The organizer is the not-so apolitical identity of the presenter of the festival, and the organization(s) that initiated and championed the event for the sake of countering an existing or perceived phenomenon. The objectives are about what the festival wanted to achieve, and therefore its purpose and aims. The location is the geographical setting of the festival. It is where the event happens, and it impacts the objectives of the festival through the kinds of messages the festival can communicate there. The programming involves what was showcased at the event, which artists performed, the music-related activities that were included on the festival’s schedule, and why these artists were included on the bill in relation to the goals of the festival. The stakeholders are those entities with vested interests in the festival proceedings, and those whose interests affect the outputs of the festival. The interests of the stakeholders matter before, during and after the festival, whether the stakeholders participate at the festival or not (Falassi, 1987). The process refers to how the organizer or presenter plans and organizes the festival. This is the process of how each entity that organized the festival was engaged in, based on and informed by the institutional policies that govern the actions of each entity. For instance, is the process direct or indirect, through facilitation or authority, and what values the presenter prioritizes. Lastly, the outputs speak to what the results that were achieved at the festival were, whether these results were intended or not. As such, the outputs are not always reflective of the set-out objectives by the organizer.

117 Chapter 4 – Methodology

Introduction

This chapter details the methodological concerns of the study. The chapter is in seven sections.

The first section defines the case study. The second section is about applying the case study to the research context, explaining the case study design and the dynamics of the research situation. Section three focuses on the study participants, and details how the recruitment and sampling were carried out. Section four is on data collection. This section contains topics on types of data, data collection protocol, collecting data outside of the USA, confidentiality of the data, interviews and archival data. Section five is on data analysis, while section six is on the limitations of the case study. The last section is on validity.

Defining the Case Study

In Chapter 1, I established that the research methodology for investigating the SAAF and

Ubuntu festivals is the case study. The case study is a rigorous evidence-based form of inquiry that uses data from various sources, including archives, interviews, documents, observation, etc. (Yin, 2013). It involves “systematic inquiry into an event or a set of related events which aims to describe and explain the phenomenon of interest” (Bromley, 1991, p. 302). This form of inquiry is thus suitable to research that intends on explaining why and how phenomena happen in given situations (Yin, 2013). Fundamentally, therefore, the case study unearths the cause and effect of a phenomenon (Cohen et al., 2011). It does this by focusing on the nature of the case, its historical background, physical settings, the contexts to which it is connected and its definitive participants (Stake, 2000). A case study, therefore, presents the investigation of a particular event, action, individual, case or phenomenon in context, even though the phenomenon and its context are blurred (Yin, 2013; Cohen et al., 2011).

118 The “case itself is at the center stage, not the variables” (Schwandt, 2007, p. 28). The case is also the unit of analysis (Yin, 2013). Case studies are not generalizable, and cannot always be used to explain phenomena widely because the case is “one among others” even though it may exist in a complex ecology (Stake, 2000, p. 436). Case studies can “be used for theoretical elaboration,” however, rich descriptions and the understanding of the particular

(Stake, 2000; Schwandt, 2007, p. 28; Yin, 2013). The context of the phenomenon of the study is as such bounded by time and location (ibid.).

The mainstay characteristics of case studies are description and analysis, the provision of a chronology of the elements of the case, a focus on all involved entities, making connections related to the case, a report presenting a rich synthesis of the phenomenon an interpretation molded by the researcher’s outlook (ibid.). In fact, Zucker (2009) states that a case study emphasizes “the participant’s perspective as central to the process” (p. 14). Furthermore, in a case study, the role of the researcher is to record, construct, present, and produce “a chronicle, a profile or facts” while also “construing, synthesizing and clarifying, and producing a history, meanings and understandings” (Zucker, 2009, p. 4). Quoting Mariano, Zucker (2009) sums up that case studies simultaneously explore, describe, interpret and explain.

In terms of philosophical underpinnings, case studies have not often been associated with many (Wolcott, 2009). There have been interpretations, however, that case studies are based on the premise that each research situation has different variables. For instance, without full knowledge of the uniqueness of a research context, it is difficult to “define the object of study in a way that will explain a social issue or a phenomenon” (Hammel et al, 1993, p. 41).

It is for this reason that for case studies, in order to be able to determine as many of the variables in a case as possible, mixed methods of data collection and analysis are used. The methodology therefore favors thorough descriptions of complexity through using multiple forms of evidence

(Cohen et al., 2011). 119 Moreover, case studies have fundamental components. These are a research question, propositions, units of analysis, ‘a determination of how the data are linked to the propositions and criteria to interpret the findings’ (Zucker, 2009, p. 3). Chapter 1 of this dissertation addressed the units of analysis and the research question, which is restated in this chapter as well. Chapter 3 addressed the conceptual and analytical frameworks, which speak to the study propositions. This chapter involves the units of analysis in the discussion on applying the case study to the study on festivals. This chapter also shows how data is linked to the propositions, and provides the interpretation criteria of the study in the section on data analysis.

Before moving on to the next section, however, I should briefly restate the research question and the study propositions. The research question is: How do South African music festivals held in the USA promote SA musicians, facilitate industry and government networks, and cultivate state policy goals of hard and soft power? This research question is aimed at explaining the phenomenon of two SA festivals in the USA that are supported by two SA government departments with the intention of pursuing power in the USA. The departments, mainly DIRCO and the DAC, support the festivals as means to achieve the primary goals of a cultural policy strategy, MGE. These goals are economic development and social cohesion, but happen to also improve the reputation of SA and its cultural industry in the USA. Consequently, culture is used to achieve these goals within an international relations framework. Cultural instrumentalism is thus the concept proposed here as a means through which to achieve soft and hard power for SA.

It is also important to note that I undertook this study with the hopes that it would have a few benefits for SA sector stakeholders like myself. First, it would bring a post- anthropological awareness of the processes and values involved in the participation of South

African musicians in festivals on foreign soil. So, the discussion of the interaction of the political, social and economic values that drive such events would benefit all stakeholders in 120 the creative and cultural industries, including the political sector. Secondly, the research product may encourage stakeholders to reaffirm or review their strategies for such festivals.

Issues such as cooperative governance in policy goals, its synchronization, etc. are amongst those that prove to be difficult and may need reconsideration in order to garner more rewards for SA and its cultural and creative industries sector, for instance. Thirdly, the study may provide more reflection on policies that nurture transnational frameworks, especially in relation to how such events benefit SA creative and cultural industries stakeholders.

Applying the Case Study to the Study on Festivals

A case study research strategy helps reveal a significant amount about the festivals through descriptions of each event, exploration of what happened at the festivals, and beyond the immediate context of each festival. Therefore, through this strategy, among other uses, I am able to describe, compare, capture, analyze and present what the two festivals were meant to achieve, the networks at play and the policies involved in the research environment. The case study is, thus, an appropriate form of inquiry for this study because the conditions and context of the phenomenon are not separate from the phenomenon (Yin, 2014). Case study research encompasses various methods in deconstructing a “contemporary phenomenon…in depth and within its real world context” (ibid, p. 16). Moreover, case study inquiry is suitable here since it is for studies that answer how and why things happen or decisions are made (Yin, 2014). My research question, for instance is, How do South African music festivals held in the USA promote SA musicians, facilitate industry and government networks, and cultivate state policy goals of hard and soft power?

Choosing this form of inquiry to understand and present these events is also appropriate because the festivals have already taken place and as the investigator I have limited agency and means of intervention, and thus no control over the immediate research environment

121 (Schwandt, 2007). The research environment is in some ways, except for the possibly varying retrospective perspectives, static and archived in history. Understanding the environment in- depth requires employing different types of data and evidence, which the case study affords

(Yin, 2014). Fittingly, multiple data formats and forms of evidence have been consulted to understand how the SA government hosts these festivals in pursuit of hard power and soft power through cultural instrumentalism as well as to understand the context of networks in which the pursuit is rooted.

Using this form of inquiry does yield some generalizable findings about the promotion of SA musicians, the facilitation of networks and cultivation of state goals. Since the topic of the management of SA musical performance abroad and its networks is also rarely explored, this research contributes to theory building on how the SA government approaches creating markets for SA music internationally. The research also contributes to understanding how SA culture is a utility in the pursuit of power in particular countries. As Yin (2014) explains, “case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions” (p. 21).

Case Study Design

This case study is designed in such a way that the two festivals are ‘embedded’ in the larger study about the SA government’s cultural instrumentalism (Yin, 2014, p. 50). In other words, and as Figure 4 below illustrates, the festivals are each a unit of analysis within a cultural instrumentalist context of the DAC and DIRCO implementing cultural instrumentalism by supporting SA festivals in the USA to gain soft and hard power. Approaching the research in a way where each festival is a single unit of analysis allows for equal comparison of the criteria at each festival, criteria which I present each festival with and through which I interpret each festival. As units, the two festivals are treated in chronological order according to the dates they happened (ibid.). Moreover, for the sake of finding diverse forms of evidence, I focus on

122 various forms of data including histories, press coverage, documents of purpose and policies of the entities concerned. I was thus able to involve ‘dominant issues’ around the festivals, issues that are recorded and those related to the festivals, but not necessarily associated with public narratives on the festivals (Yin, 2014, p. 54).

Additionally, as established in Chapter 1, each unit of analysis, or festival, is treated as an intrinsic case study. This means that I am interested in studying it to ‘learn about that particular case’ as a unique occurrence (Stake, 1995, p. 3). At the same time each festival serves as an instrumental case. This means that the case is used to explain the context of cultural instrumentalism by DIRCO and the DAC, which also addresses the how and why of the research question. Each festival is studied individually for understanding its role in findings made on the overall SA government’s instrumentalist approach to international cultural relations with the USA.

123

Figure 4: Case study design [adapted from Yin (2014, p. 50)]

Research Situation33

This research situation also warrants the use of the case study because the conditions and context of the phenomenon under study are practically synonymous with the case, as Figure 4 above demonstrates. To paraphrase Yin in Schwandt (2007), in case study research situations there are sometimes complications in distinguishing between the context of the event and the event itself. Yin (ibid.) further suggests that “the context and phenomenon are not clear” (p.

28). For instance, the planning involved for each festival as well as what happened at each event is part of the SA festivals in the USA phenomenon under study. Additionally, factors

33 In the research situation I complied with Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocol and procedures expected of researchers at The Ohio State University regarding the protection of human subjects, and I explain this later in the chapter. 124 such as when and where the festivals took place, the participants and the networks involved, the process and results of the festivals are also important to the phenomenon. These factors, as represented in Figure 3, constitute the focus and therefore also set up the parameters of the case, research situation and context.

Just to clarify a point discussed earlier about control of the research environment, the festivals have already taken place. My observations and experience of the events, as the researcher, are as such limited. I can only experience the festivals through documentation about them, the descriptions and narratives in various formats of evidence from those who participated in making the events a reality. I had no control of the research environment, therefore, since I did not attend the festivals or witnessed what happened at each event first- hand. That said, however, I could still get a sense of the process of planning for the festivals, their organization, etc. through engaging with the evidence and stakeholders concerned. The events were related to me in the interviews I conducted. I could also make sense of the festivals and experience them in several ways, including limited online video footage from press coverage of the events. Some of the footage incorporated interviews with various festival participants. For the Ubuntu festival, I also watched in-depth video material of some of the musicians and the host organization representatives speaking about the festival. This material was available online and was produced by Carnegie Hall for educational purposes.

Conducting this research as a case study also made it possible to unravel how networks exist in the research context and case. As Yin (in Schwandt, 2007) elaborates that in case studies it is possible to “generate knowledge of the particular” and extract “issues intrinsic to the case itself” (p. 28). So, even though there is a primary aim of discovering how the networks are established and fostered in the process of the DAC and DIRCO supporting SA festivals in the USA, other information is inadvertently summoned to the surface. I am referring here to how the research situation is a multidimensional mixture of social, political, economic, national 125 and international collaborations and networks. The networks drive the festivals. For example, some of the networks at the Ubuntu and SAAF festivals include cultural power brokers who are also gatekeepers of culture in the US (Roelofs, 2015). The US foundations that sponsored the Ubuntu festival, especially, fund creative ventures beyond their own national contexts.

These organizations, like the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the Ford Foundation, help aid the flow of national and international culture, by sometimes bringing other cultures to the

USA (ibid.; Yúdice, 1999). The foundations do this through their reputation, financial sponsorship and a myriad of other resources. Below I detail the study participants.

Study Participants

Recruitment

The participants were first identified through publicly available documents on the festivals.

Such documents included the online marketing undertaken for the festivals on different websites. This means I first used purposive, or selective sampling, to target the specific participants (Davies & Mosdell, 2006; O’Leary, 2005). I contacted potential participants by email, individually or through the organizations that were documented online as participant at the festivals.

To recruit more participants, I also followed up on word of mouth from creative industry workers and experts, government representatives and the personnel of other participant organizations, regarding other individuals known to them who were part of the festivals. Requesting study participants to recommend more people who were involved in a study in order to enlarge the pool of research participants is employing snowball sampling

(ibid). I used this strategy throughout the interviews to enlarge the pool of study participants.

Nonetheless, in this capacity, the research participants also helped corroborate documented evidence on the participants and other events of the festivals.

126 Sample

In all, for this study I communicated with more than ninety people who were closely involved with the festivals or the organizers of the events. Eventually, I consulted festival participants who constituted a cross-section of stakeholders. These were, first, government personnel and officials from the involved SA government departments, whom I refer to as government representatives here. The second group of participants is of the creative industry workers, including musicians and their representatives, as well as industry experts invited by the DAC or Carnegie Hall. The third group is of different stakeholders: Carnegie Hall representatives,

Grand Performances representatives, and representatives of the sponsors. It was difficult to find people who were part of the audience at the festivals, but I managed to find online videos of audience members who gave feedback on the festivals.

The pool of participants was based in cities between the USA and SA such as New

York and Los Angeles, Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town. For SAAF in LA, I interviewed five government representatives, two creative industry experts and the representative of one music band. I also interviewed a representative of Grand Performances, the organization that hosted and produced the festival. For the Ubuntu festival in NY, I interviewed two SA government representatives, three Carnegie Hall representatives, six musicians and one representative for a music ensemble. I also conducted an anonymous interview with a participant who did not wish to be identified in the study, and so that they cannot be identified

I have not revealed or categorized their role at the festivals.

127 Data Collection

Types of Data

Data was gathered, as Cohen et al. (2011) and Yin (2013) suggest happens in the case study, through involving a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Data collection was also mainly through library and archival resources, scholarly and non-scholarly sources. I referred to journal articles, policy documents, festival programs, online videos of the festivals, publicly available government reports, press coverage and other records. As indicated above, I also conducted open-ended interviews with twenty-two respondents. The interviews were through personal communication, face-to-face or in person and by email. The interviews were with seven SA government representatives from the involved government departments, five musicians, two music managers or representatives of musicians, two industry experts invited by the festival organizers or hosts, four representatives from the organizations which hosted the festivals, and two anonymous participants. One of the anonymous interviewees was a musician and wanted to be identified as such. I cannot reveal the role of the other anonymous interview participant since they may be identifiable if I do, and I explain protocol regarding respondent identity in the section below. Since one of the participants was involved at both festivals, I addressed both festivals simultaneously when I interviewed the individual.

Data Collection Protocol

I gained permission to interview the government representatives and officials at all locations, from them in their individual capacity. Further than that I notified two of the superiors at the

DAC about the research so that they were formally informed about the study. I also contacted representatives of Carnegie Hall and the organizations that sponsored the festivals directly by email. For Grand Performances, however, I sent an email to an administrative contact who

128 connected me with a relevant representative. I informed the research participants that our conversation would be about the aims, organizational process and outcomes of the festivals.

There were a few times where I called potential participants first to get their email address if I only had their phone details. Generally, however, I emailed them first. When I sent out emails to recruit potential participants, I attached a consent form. The consent form explained what the research was about and that the research would adhere to protocol adhered to by researchers at The Ohio State University. On the email, I also included my in-depth academic CV with details about myself and background. These steps were taken to show proof of the legitimacy of my research and my affiliation to The Ohio State University as a doctoral candidate. The consent form informed potential participants of the purpose of my research. It explained the interview procedures and what the expectation were towards participants.

Since the interviews had the potential to be long, there was also the advantage of using a recorder to document the information. As such the consent form also asked for permission for the interview to be recorded from each individual participant. The form also discussed the confidentiality of participants and informed them of their right to withdraw from the research at any time without penalty. There was also an offer for anonymity if the participants required it, and so their names would not be used in this research if this applied. Moreover, I informed them that they did not have to answer questions that they found uncomfortable and could opt not to divulge information they were uncomfortable with.

On the form, I gave an approximation of how long each interview might be. I also pointed out that the participants could contact me any time and ask me questions regarding the study. I let them know that they could also ask questions even during the interview. Keeping the channels of communication with the participants would help them be better informed about the study, their involvement and so that they would find it easier to comply with the needs of the research. Making the data collection and interview procedure explicit before conducting 129 the interviews afforded the process transparency and was so that the respondent understood that they were volunteering.

The consent form further explained that I would be open to the availability of the participants, be flexible to their needs rather than be prescriptive of when interviews would take place. I informed them that their de-identified data would be maintained for a period of at least 5 years after the completion of the study. I also had to advise them that if they had concerns or complaints regarding their rights to participation I would do my best to try and generate solutions with them. If that failed, they also had the option to contact my committee chairperson, and an employee at The Ohio State University’s Independent Review Board's

(IRB) Office of Responsible Research Practices. I provided the contact details to my committee chairperson and IRB staff member on the consent form. These procedures are in accordance with The Ohio State University’s Research Data policy. Also, before each interview began, the participant would then have the option to formally consent to the interview by signing the form and confirming whether they wanted to be identified or not. Only a few participants opted for anonymity.

After sending the emails, I waited for a few weeks for a response regarding the request.

I would then follow up on the email with a reminder email after two weeks if there was no response the first time around. I considered the lack of response to the follow up email a show of no interest unless the potential recruit made non-committal communication, which I would also follow up on by confirming details on the consent form. When the potential respondents explicitly declined to participate in the study within the two weeks, I would no longer contact them. If the recruits responded within the two weeks, or after the follow up email, and agreed to participate in the study, I would confirm whether they were ready to schedule an interview at a time suitable to them or not. Scheduling an interview more than a day after they agreed allowed time for the participants to reflect on their experience of the festival. I would then keep 130 open communication with them until the interview date was set or took place. For the interviews done by email, however, I would send the questionnaire immediately after the respondent agreed to participate in the study so that they could complete the questionnaire in their own time. Similarly, but depending on the schedule of the participant I had in-person interviews with, I would often send the questionnaire to the respondent prior the interview meeting. Lastly, I would send a thank you email to the participant after each interview.

Collecting Data Outside the USA

Since SA is a democratic society and allows for a diversity of views, transparency and other democratic values, the dynamics of conducting research in a different social and cultural context to the USA did not alter the research methods of collecting and processing data. The interviews were conducted within the confines of business culture, and without coercion.

Political, religious and cultural dynamics, therefore, did not significantly influence the conduct of the research. There was no climate of fear or restriction imposed on the research participants or the research process. Also, all of the participants were adults above the age of 21 years, which is consistent with South African law on legal consent, similar to the USA (HSRC, 2012).

There were thus no concerns over a legally informed age of participation for the informants for the study.

More so, collecting data in SA was not difficult to navigate since I am a South African citizen, and as such familiar with social and legal norms there. I have also been educated within the SA cultural industries, and so I am conversant with the creative sector there. While conducting interviews, I made great efforts to be sensitive to the sector's peculiarities and its participants as I travelled to speak to them in different cities and provinces. I also adhered to ethical research standards and stipulations required by OSU while in SA. This is also partly

131 why I had to gain interview permission from participants in advance and inform the participants about the research protocol when requesting their participation.

At the end of the data collection process it became apparent that it was significant that

I was in SA for over a year, doing what I perceived to be conducting fieldwork for which I have to produce a text (Clifford et al., 2011). I was immersed in an environment of SA’s cultural actors and networks, where I interacted with expressed ideas, ideals, sentiments and discourse

(Geertz, 1974). From May 2016 to October 2017, I was able to partake in key debates about

SA culture and its cultural industries by attending three local conferences on the topics and a national cultural policy review gathering. The gatherings had presentations by government representatives, non-governmental organizations, creative and cultural industry experts, cultural practitioners and researchers. This fieldwork was also part of the period during which

I conducted interviews for this study. During this time, I also worked at a local university doing curriculum development and administrative tasks related to cultural policy management, and so I engaged with scholars who were part of these debates and collected articles that informed my framing of this topic. These activities dynamically shaped my thinking around how the SA cultural industries operate, the inherent debates and my resultant subjective-objective-reflexive representation of this scene as an insider South African researcher and creative practitioner presenting this text to South Africans and non-South Africans (Labaree, 2002; Leigh, 2014).

Confidentiality of the Data

Since the participants could potentially change their minds prior to the interview process or require anonymity at a later stage due to the kind of in-depth information they provided, on the consent form, I offered to provide them with pseudonyms in the dissertation. Participants could have changed their minds about participating in the study for any number of reasons, including the information they provided. Some of the participants did in fact withdraw from the study

132 due to fears of potential future discrimination, putting their sponsorship at stake and limiting their future chances of employment once their opinions were made public in the dissertation.

The protection of their identity for them was not enough. Nonetheless, providing the pseudonym as an option for anonymity was important. It helped in establishing trust between myself and the study participants, and afforded the participants who were reluctant to participate privacy and confidentiality. In case of complications such as regrets about statements at a later stage, keeping their identities confidential, would help not affect the social reputation or financial standing of the participants.

Another way to protect the identity of the respondents was to structure the questions so that the information the participants provided would not be about their perceptions of the festivals, or identifiers. This was mainly because the pool of participants for this study was small. The questions were for gaining factual information and about what actually happened before, after and during the festivals. The questions, therefore, were structured in a way not to create room for accusatory statements. This means that there was no room for inflammatory material.

During the data collection process, I was the only person who recruited participants and conducted interviews with them. As such, I was the only person with access to the raw data collected. Throughout the data collection process, I used a password-enabled computer (laptop) to process and store data. I stored the files in several categories, according to participant groupings and the festival locations. The stored raw and processed data was coded and had no personal identifiers.

Even in instances where I corresponded with my advisor and research chairperson to discuss my progress, I used safety precautions to avoid data leaks. For instance, I used a code- protected Wi-Fi home network with access restricted only to approved MAC addresses. I also

133 restricted the information in the correspondence to synopses of the collected data rather than raw data of participants. This was so that those who opted for confidentiality were not at risk.

Interviews

I approached the interviews I conducted with the view that the participants were contributors of observations I could not make and afforded ‘multiple views of the case’ (Stake, 1995, p. 64-

66). The interviewees, as such, were important in what they observed and shared about the festivals in every way. Study participants became my metaphorical eyes and ears too in this scenario, even though I could not control their observations (ibid.). Therefore, I used interviews that were open-ended and conversational, ‘in-depth’ but ‘fluid’, and gave room for specific information as well as motivating explanations for other related issues for the provided questions (Yin, 2014, p. 110). This is also important because I could not attend the festivals.

As such, I treated the respondents here as authorities of what they experienced (Semali &

Kincheloe, 1999). The respondents thus spoke authoritatively about the events and I quoted them extensively throughout the text.

As established earlier, the interviews were in person and on email, and all employed core questions of the same questionnaires depending on who was being interviewed in terms of the categorization of stakeholders. Before each one-on-one interview I restated the terms of the interview on the consent form. For the interviews prepared on email, I simply attached the consent form for the interviewee to sign. If they forgot to attach it after they completed the questionnaire, I would send them a reminder email to consider signing it.

Research participants had to answer questions derived from the study’s main research question of How do South African music festivals held in the USA promote SA musicians, facilitate industry and government networks, and cultivate state policy goals of hard and soft

134 power?, and the sub-questions below. As Creswell (2013) reminds, “the questions are often the subquestions in the research study, phrased in a way that interviewees can understand” (p. 164).

Research Sub-questions:

• What were the objectives of each festival?

• What were the outcomes of the festivals?

• Who were the stakeholders at the festivals?

• How were participant musicians selected for the festivals?

• How did each festival organizer engage with stakeholders before, after and at each

festival?

• What was the benefit of the festivals to the stakeholders?

• What did the stakeholders contribute to the festivals?

• Which networks were enabled by the festivals for the stakeholders?

• What was the constitution of the networks?

• What kind of cooperation exists between the DAC and its identified MGE partners?

• Does the relationship between DIRCO and the DAC impact cultural programing at SA

consulates and embassies abroad?

• How did the DAC get involved at the Ubuntu festival?

• Which SA government policies were directly implicated in framing the festivals?

The interview questions for the various categories of stakeholders involved here are in the appendix. As an example of the main questions posed to the respondents, below is a list of the questions for the DAC representatives. There were core standard questions for government representatives, but some of them differed according to their level of responsibility, or whether they were bureaucrats or personnel. The questions were also slightly different from those of

SA representatives at the consulates in NY and LA.

135 1. What was your role in the planning of the SAAF festival in LA, 2013?

2. What were the aims of the festival?

3. How were the aims determined?

4. Why was the festival held in the USA?

5. What were the goals behind the choice of musicians performing at the festival?

6. What was the purpose of timing the festival in October?

7. Which other institutions/individuals were invited to the festival?

8. What was the process followed in organizing and planning for the festival?

9. What kind of relationship exists between DAC and DIRCO?

10. What kind of relationship exists between DAC and SAA?

11. What kind of relationship exists between DAC and SABC?

12. What kind of relationship exists between DAC and BrandSA?

13. What kind of relationship exists between DAC and DTI?

14. Which relationships or networks were enabled by the festivals for the musicians who

performed at the festival?

15. Which international or national departments, institutions and organizations did the

DAC partner up with for SAAF?

16. What was your involvement at the Ubuntu festival in 2014?

17. Does DAC influence the regular cultural programing at SA embassies or consulates in

the USA?

18. Are there any public documents available to share on the festivals? (e.g.: festival and

conference program, planning, outcomes reports).

136 Archival Data

I used data collected from library and archival resources, scholarly and non-scholarly sources such as blogs. I referred to journal articles, government policy documents, festival programs, online videos about the festivals available on YouTube, publicly available government reports, press coverage and social media records on Facebook. I could not source documents that were not publicly available. Even though during interviews with representatives from various entities I enquired about festival planning documents that were not online but were for public consumption, and therefore could be shared, my requests were not acquiesced. The inaccessibility of some of this data disadvantaged the ‘in-depth picture of the case’ and richness of description characteristic of case studies (Creswell, 2013, p. 162).

All the same, several community news organizations in the LA area covered SAAF.

The media coverage included interviews with various key stakeholders and allowed for me to observe some of the activities at the festivals, the turn out and the constitution of the audience or participants. The live interviews helped fill in gaps on information that interviews I conducted could not. The videos also helped get the perspective of some of the musicians I could not gain access to when I did interviews, and captured feedback from the audience. For the Ubuntu festival as well, Carnegie Hall had a series of interviews on its YouTube channel.

The interviews were mainly with performers and a few Carnegie Hall representatives.

Data Analysis

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, this research is designed in three layers. The first and exterior most layer is the context of cultural instrumentalism by DIRCO and the DAC. The second and middle layer of the case of SA festivals in the USA. The third layer embedded in the middle layer is made up of two separate units of analysis that are each focused on a singular festival. I employed two different types of thematic analysis in the data analysis for the layers.

137 I chose to use prominent and emergent themes to analyze data for the first two layers of the study, and then I used themes formulated on a model by Hauptfleisch (2007) and Getz (2010) to analyze data and present the inner embedded layer with the two units of analysis.

Data Analysis for Units of Analysis

Each unit of analysis, or festival, is analyzed using themes based on perspectives by

Hauptfleisch (2007) and Getz (2010) about the commonalities amongst festivals and how researchers have made sense of such events. Hauptfleisch (2007) suggests that festivals have defining characteristics related to their purpose, inherent politics and common organization dynamics, and reveal a lot about the values of the place where they are hosted. He says that the festival event is at the center of domains that are ‘overlapping and/or interlinked’, and managed

“for the good of the event” (Hauptfleisch, 2007, p. 43-44). These domains are “organizers, sponsors and media, cultural politics and national politics, artists and audiences, facilities and geography, commercial interests and the general public, local economy and local politics, playing culture (local) and playing culture (national), town and/or community” (ibid.). This perspective is corroborated by Getz (2010), that “to fully understand and create knowledge about festivals, it is also necessary to consider who produces them and why, how they are planned and managed, why people who attend (or do not), their outcomes on multiple levels, and their dynamic forces shaping individual festivals and festival populations” (p. 20).

As indicated in Chapter 2, Getz (2010) looks at numerous themes from across academic literature and evaluate how others make sense of the significance of festivals. The themes include long and short-term economic and social outcomes, the evaluation of outcomes, stakeholders like sponsors and the audience as part of the context in which the festival happens, the objective or role of the festival in the context in which it happens, the dynamics of the destination and geographical location of the festival, the benefits and motivations to why

138 audiences attend festivals, the process of planning the festival including marketing and other logistics, the perspective of the “event practitioners” or festival organizer, the temporality of festivals, as well as how the festival’s themed program supports but does not necessarily fullfil a desired experience related to the objectives of the event (Getz, 2010, p. 1-13). Some of these themes are related to each other and can be narrowed down so that I do not cover each theme here by Getz. An example of this relation is that when analyzing the economic, social or cultural outcomes of a festival I could also address how the outcomes were evaluated.

Between Hauptfleisch (2007) and Getz (2010) similar themes stand out. For instance, both scholars agree that festival programming is not only common to festivals, but also tells a story about the purpose of a festival. The themes most common between them are social and economic outcomes, processes that are affected by local and organizational politics, how organization and planning take place, who the festival organizers are, the sum of stakeholders

(sponsors-organizer-media-audience-performers) who help realize the festival and their interests, the conditions and infrastructure of the location of the festival, and what the festival is meant to achieve or why it is deemed necessary. I have adopted these themes and aligned them with my research focal points. These points are aims and ends, stakeholders, relationships and networks, policies involved, and processes undertaken. Focusing on these points makes sense to better present and understand the festivals as well as their immediate and broader contexts. As such, each festival here is analyzed through a streamlined version of the themes common in both Hauptfleisch (2007) and Getz (2010). They are the organizer, location, objectives, programming, stakeholders, process and outputs. Instead of outcomes, I will focus on festival outputs because outcomes are longer-term results that go beyond the scope of this research and which I therefore cannot evaluate. Nonetheless, since these themes are common to many festival environments, they are used here because they ‘transcend’ each unit of analysis

(Yin in Creswell, 2013, p 101). Table 1 below explains the unit analysis themes. 139 Theme Description

Organizer The identity of the festival presenter or the organization that initiated the festival and championed it to counter an existing or perceived phenomenon. Location The geographical setting of the festival. Objectives What the festival wanted to achieve. Its purpose or aims. Programming What was showcased at the event. Stakeholders Entities with vested interests in the festival proceedings. Entities whose interests affect the outputs of the festival. Process How the festival was organized. Reflects the institutional policies of the festival organizer. Outputs The results that were achieved at the festivals were, intended or not.

Table 1. Unit Analysis themes

Each festival is presented with its own description. In the conclusion on each festival, the themes are then used to make meaning of the environment of that individual festival, as an intrinsic case. After that I conduct an analysis of the themes across both festivals to assess their implications, like an instrumental case to make sense of both festivals in relation to the SA government (Cresswell, 2013). These implications make meaning of the two festivals (ibid.).

For this, I formulate a table to illustrate data from the corresponding themes across the individual units of analysis. I survey the similarities and differences between the festivals within the context of the in-depth discussion given in the intrinsic case, and I then deduce meaning and seek implications (Cresswell, 2013, p. 199-200). That said, however, I cannot entirely generalize some of the findings from this study, like how networks operate, since these two festivals were not a regular occurrence and were each unique. I can, however, generalize some of the theoretical propositions I make, like how the SA government approaches creating

140 markets for SA music internationally or how SA culture may be a utility in the pursuit of power in certain countries.

Data Analysis for Case and Context

I deduce meaning and seek implications for the context of cultural instrumentalism by DIRCO and the DAC and the case of SA festivals in the USA. I do so by exploring prominent and emergent themes in the conclusion of each individual festival generated from the seven themes, the overall collected data from multiple sources to ‘construct a clearer reality’ of how SA culture is utilized to pursue power (Stake, 1995, p. 101; O’Leary, 2005). The thematic analysis, therefore, involves the central foci of the research, which are policies, power and networks; the research question, the emerging data from literature and interviews, and incorporates the theoretical framework. Selecting prominent themes from all the data is the criteria for interpreting the research findings (Cohen et al., 2011). Incorporating data from all these steps in the generation of meaning for this study is aligned to what Stake (1995) suggests, that analysis is an ongoing and ever-present process (p. 71).

In the data analysis I also took on the advice of Richards (2009). He recommends that the analyzed data should primarily answer the research question while remaining transparent in all its steps during the analysis. As such, to effectively undertake triangulation during analysis, I also compared data in the research situation with data from multiple sources and with the interviewees. This is so that the participants would also validate the findings of the festivals (Cohen et al, 2011). Disputed points, especially by participants, are included and negotiated in the dissertation’s interpretation (ibid., p. 299). From all these steps, I conclude by addressing and answering the research question.

141 Limitations of the Case Study

The case study benefits this research in describing ‘what it is like’ to participate at the festivals

(Cohen et al., 2011, p. 290). The case study also only answers some of what is possible here even with a full spectrum of questions of what, where, how, when, why, around the festivals.

For this research milieu, the case study expands on already existing theory around a specific context (Yin, 2014). For instance, my interpretation of any area of SA policy in this study is only one of many and contributes to existing theories and research on the policies.

As Wolcott (2009), quoting Kenneth Burke, states, for example, “a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing” (p. 83-84). My interpretation of this statement is that I only offer my perspective in this study and not a universal generalizable truth. As such I should also constantly be conscious of the fact that although the study uncovers a lot about its focus, only a limited scope of the variables within the research situation will ultimately be visible.

Inevitably, therefore, only those variables within view will appear in the research however much I discover. For instance, as much as I involve a number of viewpoints in my analysis, the policy analysis I offer is not absolute. This study is also limited by the fact that it only incorporates viewpoints by some stakeholders’, but not viewpoints from all stakeholders.

Moreover, the perspective I offer as the researcher is inflected with personal subjectivities of the research context. This is because as much as I consciously try to distance myself from being implicated in the policies under discussion here, there are things I can and cannot say because of my positionality. There may be subconsious biases ended in what I do say. For instance, I am still a South African citizen. Therefore, I am cautious of speaking with pessimism about South Africa, since our democracy is an imperfect work in progress. I am also cognizant of stereotypes about Africa and wary of speaking with pessimism about the ability of governments on the continent to construct functional institutions, infrastructure and legacies.

As I will endeavor not to be, I may at times seem like an apologist for some emergent situations 142 described in the course of my writing. I am also a South African cultural and creative industries stakeholder and so I have further subjectivities which may interfere with my ability to draw critically conclusions. Since “knowing is not passive”, my perspective is also socially constructed because “human beings do not find or discover knowledge so much as construct or make it” and interpretation is never in isolation but “against a backdrop of shared understandings, practices, language,” etc. (Schwandt, 2007, p. 38). Similarly, some of the limitations of policy are that it is socially constructed, and in this research, it is constructed in the world I inhabit. Even though policy is often presented as factual, it is constructed and inflected by the exercise of power (Scheurich, 1995; Schneider & Ingram, 2008). I may not directly participate in that exercise of power, but I take cognizance of my perspective and how it can subconsciously leak into the interpretation.

Likewise, during interviews, I tried to deter respondents from providing only what they thought I was ready to hear or am already familiar with (see Yin, p. 106.). I also had to distance myself as a participant of the sector while conducting the interviews. Another limitation was that due to the length of time that had passed since the festivals, the interviewees’ memories were sometimes unclear. For instance, only the DAC festival frontline personnel could answer some of the questions clearly compared to the DAC executive representatives. To curb this limitation, the follow up questions answered by frontline representatives were based on the questions that were originally meant for the executive representatives.

Validity

To test the validity of evidence and assumption for this study, I used the ‘construct validity’ test (Yin, 2014, p. 45). I involved tactics such as using “multiple sources of evidence”, establishing “a chain of evidence” and through the questions, verified data with research participants (ibid.). There were also some participants who were worried about their

143 representation in the study, who requested to review the final draft of the case study report. I agreed to let them read their contribution to see if I represented them with faithfulness to their intentions. After they reviewed the final draft, the participants clarified some of their statements and presented them better. From the onset of the study, I also followed recommendations to

‘classify raw data’ so that the interpretation is based on comprehensive categorization of collected data (Stake, 1995, p. 53). As such, I corroborated all data and evidence at each step of the research (ibid).

Any meaning made from this study also does not exist on its own, but is entangled in various factors. For instance, even though the aims of the research are to discover the intricacies of the festivals, I also have to explore each festival beyond each event. The background of the study incorporating the stakeholders, their networks, policies concerned, etc., matter in the investigation. This is why the next chapter provides this pre and post-festival context before the actual depiction of each festival.

144 Chapter 5 – South African Cultural Policy and Its

Powerbrokers

Introduction

This chapter positions the SAAF and Ubuntu festivals within broader SA government policy.

Positioning the festivals this way is the basis for arguing that the festivals were an expression of SA’s cultural and broader national government development policy, and the result of that vision. In the first section of the chapter, I detail the trajectory of post-apartheid state- sanctioned SA cultural policy. I establish the conditions of the cultural sector at the beginning of the democratic era and the role of the DAC. After that I discuss the drafting and contents of the main state cultural policy document and explain its premise. I then explore the process taken by the DAC to refine national policy. Afterwards, I outline the successive cultural policy strategies that have informed DAC actions and illustrate the cultural policy timeline. In the second section of Chapter 5, I address other cultural policy powerbrokers at SAAF and Ubuntu.

These are government-based powerbrokers.

South African Cultural Policy

Beginning of the democratic era

Contemporary SA cultural policy is part of a trajectory of pre-democracy norms. It speaks to the region’s colonial period, apartheid SA, as well as SA in democracy (Nawa, 2016). Like other sectors, the arts-culture sector has not experienced smooth change and still has unresolved issues (Dubin, 2013). For instance, long after SA became a republic independent from Britain in 1931, the country still uses and relies on Dutch and English colonial institutions (Nawa,

2016; Schmidt, 1996). After 1994, not all these colonial institutions are, however, deliberately

145 transposed onto the SA context. Instead, they are said to be ‘refined’ and not altogether

‘overhauled’ from their different European ‘prototypes’ (Steinberg, 1995, p. 251).

Before democracy in 1994, the apartheid government maintained good foreign relations with some countries in the West including the USA (Nixon, 2015). While doing so, the apartheid state was carrying out an oppressive regime over its indigenous citizens, where culture was political and politicized (Steinberg, 1995, p. 245-6; Schmidt, 1996; Coombes,

2004). Part of this involved the institutionalized persecution of indigenous forms of culture and creativity, marginalizing them, not permitting them or making them illegal, and censoring any hybrid forms they engendered (Grundy, 1996, p. 4; Coplan, 2007; Olwage, 2008).

Predominantly Western art forms were governed through political ideology and were patronized by the state and private companies that catered to ‘paying clientele’ (Grundy, 1996, p. 4; Van Graan, 1999; Maree, 2005). Western art forms were privileged and were exclusively preserved for the minority white society (ibid.). Theatre in black townships or about black experience in racially-designated residential areas, which was an exception, thrived but not due to government support (ibid; Peterson, 1990; Hauptfleisch & Steadman, 1991; Steinberg,

1995). The few black cultural organizations that managed to drive their creative missions were mostly funded by international bodies and governments who tried to counteract the social impact of apartheid (Maree, 2005).

The legislation formulated earlier in the democratic era tried to redress this uneven distribution of cultural resources, skewed recognition of heritage, ideologically biased channeling of financial resources in the arts, etc. (Steinberg, 1995; Sirayi & Nawa, 2014a, p.

1647-8). As Mulcahy (2017) has pointed out of the policies of post-colonial nations, which

“have been used to valorize the cultural identities of the previously subjugated” and “attempt to define a sense of identity that can reestablish national culture”, SA cultural policy has done the same post-democracy in various ways (p. 250). The state also reduced the level of its 146 “interference in arts and culture [as] a way of representing the transformation of the state, from apartheid to democracy” (Deacon, 2010, p. 4). Other areas of redress during the dawn of democracy included the 1996 drafting of the national Constitution, which became the supreme law of the country (South Africa, 1996).

Since then, the Constitution has become the “principal source of governance across all levels of the government and the state” and impacts all national policy (Sirayi & Nawa, 2014a, p. 1650). The document stipulates that “in the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated” (South Africa, 1996). All three spheres have legal autonomy even though they are obligated to comply with the constitution. The commitment of South African governance to the Constitution goes beyond the development and enactment of policy in the government sphere alone. It affects other spheres of society, hence researchers like Gamiet (2009) suggest that even for the cultural sector “programs need to be in place, and funded; so that the basic rights tabled in the Constitution can be exercised” (Gamiet, 2009, p. 40).

At the beginning of the democratic era in 1994, several government ministries were formed. One of these ministries was the DAC34, operating at the national sphere of government.

This department would make pronouncements on cultural and heritage policies that complied with the Constitution’s stipulations. Its focus has been on six programs. These are the

Administration of the department; Arts and Culture in Society, which is to “develop and promote arts and culture in South Africa and mainstream its role in social development”; the

National Language Service, which is to “develop and promote the social languages of South

Africa and enhance the linguistic diversity of the country”; Cultural Development and

International Cooperation, for improving “economic and other development opportunities for

34 The Department of Arts and Culture has only been referred to as such since 2004. From 1994 to 2002 it was known as the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST) (Maree, 2005). 147 South African arts and culture, nationally and globally, through mutually beneficial partnerships, thereby ensuring the sustainability of the sector”; Heritage Promotion, which is to “develop and monitor the implementation of policy, legislation and strategic direction for identifying, conserving and promoting cultural heritage”; National Archives, Records,

Libraries and Heraldic Services to “guide, sustain and develop the archival, heraldic and information resources of South Africa to empower citizens through full and open access to these resources” (DAC, 2009, p. 7).

According to Kgositsile (in European Commission, 2009), the DAC had “a vital role not only in chronicling South African collective memory but also in redefining the soul of the nation” (p. 2). Some of the early DAC-enacted legislation pertinent to this discussion includes the White Paper35 on Arts, Culture and Heritage, the National Arts Council Act (No. 56 of

1997), as well as DAC-developed policy drawn up to make interventions in the music sphere of the cultural sector. In the White Paper, I am interested in Chapter 4, which addresses the arts and culture specifically, and Chapter 6, which is on international cultural co-operation.

Drafting and Contents of Main National Cultural Policy Document

The White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage (WPACH) became and, as yet, is still the main cultural policy map of how the government of the new dispensation planned to promote, fund and support national creativity and culture. More notably, the WPACH was the first inclusive

35 Deacon (2010) explains that “as in the British system, White Papers are issued by the South African government as statements of policy, and often set out proposals for legislative changes, which may be debated before a Bill is introduced. The Bill can then be formalized as an Act of Parliament. Green Papers are preliminary policy documents made available for focused discussion” (p. 2). Mavhungu (2014) confirms this in her interview with Monica Newton, the former DAC deputy director general, that “the process of policy development starts with a policy position, it is caucused and a policy position paper called a Green Paper is created. The Green Paper is the official draft policy that is approved by Cabinet and put to wide consultation, once approved, it becomes a White Paper and the White Paper is legislation” (p. 33). This has ordinarily been the process of policy making in SA, especially since 1994. The immediate aftermath of the first democratic elections in 1994, however, was an exception. Consequently, other mechanisms of consultation had to happen to precede agenda-setting. For the SA arts-culture sector, the Arts and Culture Task Group (ACTAG) process was such a consultation endeavor, and prior liberation movements conferences. The process involved broad consultation across various stakeholders in the SA cultural sector (Grundy, 1995, 1996; Steinberg, 1995; Maree, 2005; Meersman, 2007; Mavhungu, 2014). 148 form of legislation addressing all cultures, arts and traditions in SA (DAC, 1996; Joffe &

Newton, 2008; Sirayi & Nawa, 2014a). Due to the political transition of the country, the document was created through the conducive social and sector conditions that aligned for the articulation of existent problems in the sector and due recognition of proposals in an environment that allowed for a unique policy window (Kingdon, 1995). As yet, subsequent

WPACH revisions have not been successful, and its original incarnation remains.

Figure 5: White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage (WPACH) of 1996 Table of Contents 149 Figure 5 above is of the Table of Contents of the WPACH. On its first pages, the then

Minister of Arts and Culture, Science and Technology clarifies that

The aim of this document is to promote the arts, culture, heritage and literature in their own right, as significant and valuable areas of social and human endeavour in themselves. It spells out the institutional arrangements required to implement a new vision in which they are developed, practised and celebrated among all our people, and it indicates the changes required of existing institutions to assist this. It also deals with the rights of practitioners within these domains. Other issues relating to areas such as cultural industries will be dealt with through Departmental policy development… We must be attuned to our own particular situation, and wish to develop exactly that "arm’s length" relationship which is fundamental to freedom of expression. At the same time, all funding from the public purse carries certain obligations with it, and these obligations of accountability must be applied with due responsibility and creativity. Promotion without undue promulgation would be our ideal. (Ngubane in DAC, 1996)

The legislation had set objectives such as the “[defense] of human rights, access to arts and cultural events, affirmative action with regard to race, class, gender, construction of a cultural national identity, recognition of aesthetic diversity and pluralism, etc.” (Kgositsile in

European Commission, 2009, p. 2). One of the notable points of the WPACH is that it committed the DAC to “strive towards the development of cultural industries ‘organised around the production and consumption of culture and related services’” (DAC quoted in Sirayi

& Nawa, 2014a, p. 1648). The incorporation of the term ‘cultural industries’ in the document has been a bone of contention, exposing the document to varied forms of critique.

For instance, around 1996 it is arguable whether the SA government had yet, or fully, embraced a framework for the ‘creative’ or ‘cultural industries’ conception of the cultural sector (Joffe & Newton, 2008). In fact, even though this concept was widely used at the time of its inclusion in the WPACH, suggesting that this was now the DAC approach to culture going forward, the concept was still taking shape and getting scrutiny in other parts of the globe at the time (Matarraso, 1999; Pratt, 2005; Hartley, 2006; Hesmondhalgh, 2007). In the 1996

150 WPACH, the concept of the cultural or creative industries had not been defined until the later

Cultural Industries Growth Strategy (CIGS) in 1998 (Deacon, 2010). That said, however,

Newton (in Mavhungu, 2014, p. 25-27), the former Deputy Director General at the DAC, acknowledges that the United Kingdom’s Department of Culture, Media and Sports’ conception of the creative industries was what the SA policy framework was based on when the terminology appeared in the South African WPACH.

Some sector observers have argued that this inclusion of the concept of the ‘creative industries’ reflects the inclusion of contradictory and contextually incompatible ideologies encompassed in the WPACH as well as a conflicted stakeholder consultation process (Grundy,

1995, 1996; Meersman, 2007). About the latter, for instance, Meersman (2007), an arts journalist, noted the inherent power and identity politics of the drafting and consultative process of the WPACH as that “theoretically anybody could make a submission, but in practice those who were already empowered were the ones to influence, run and lead the process” (p.

293). He also says that some sector stakeholders noted the process as “the product of white liberals, black intelligentsia and overseas consultants, deliberately excluding the ‘ordinary people’ and ‘married to the old and rapidly discredited paradigm that African cultures are inferior to European cultures’” (Meersman, 2007, p. 294).

On the significance of a policy approach more suitable to the social and geographic context of SA during the WPACH drafting process, Meersman (2007) reflects that “it is regrettable that more attention was not paid to the cultural policies of other developing countries, for instance, Cuba and Mozambique. With hindsight, it seemed to have [focused] too narrowly on the cultural models of Western Europe” (p. 293). This contrast in approaches and seeming policy transposition also raises questions of policy context compatibility. For instance, have the SA ‘creative industries’ been explored and understood in the partial socio- political-economic-historical-geographic-ideological-industrial-semiotic spectrum of the 151 complete connotations and configurations of the concept for the implementation of such policy? (Flew, 2012). Do the SA ‘creative industries’ really fit into this mold and pre-packaged conceptualization of culture? Nevertheless, in contrast to the contested current-day appropriation of the creative industries’ commercially utilitarian and quantitative approach to culture, some sector observers suggest that the predominant tone of the WPACH and outlook of the new post-apartheid state contained a more politically driven kind of instrumentalism aimed at reconstruction, redistribution and social development (Meersman, 2007). The new

WPACH was also part of the “national transformation project by the post-colonial ANC government” at this point (Deacon, 2010, p. 1). This was in line with the approach that “arts policy should be an integral part of government and social policy—the [Reconstruction and

Development Programme national growth strategy] in this case” (Steinberg, 1995, p. 251).

Premise of National Cultural Policy Document

It is apparent that like any other policy document, the WPACH is not without its flaws. Still, a few of its significant snares should be confronted and unpacked. This is notwithstanding that numerous interpretations by stakeholders have rendered the document unclear and not sufficiently relevant to the sector (Sirayi & Nawa, 2014a; Joffe & Newton, 2008). For instance, some of the issues raised have also been that although the document projects to the future, it largely concentrates on the rectification and redress of apartheid practices. More explicitly, instead of being more forward-looking on the sector, the legislation predominantly addresses previously marginalized artistic and cultural practices and highlights the significance of their preservation (Joffe & Newton, 2008). Additionally, even though ideologically contradictory and manifold in parts, the fundamental approach of the WPACH has also been viewed as

152 bordering on a socialist kind of instrumentality36 (Meersman, 2007; Ndzuta, 2013). This is because the document pushes the agenda of a planned economy based on socialist values, which, in a different national context, Gillespie and Nicholson (2005) define centrally as ‘Party leadership and state economic ownership’, through which to drive social reforms, including cultural reforms (p. 2-3). In the document, culture is used to further goals for the greater social good as determined by the bureaucratic ideological order garnered towards wealth redistribution (Meersman, 2007, p. 297). For instance, ‘the ANC [government] was swept to power in 1994 in the first democratic election based on the Reconstruction and Development

Programme (RDP)’, a socialist leftist national growth strategy (ibid.). The party steadily moved away from the RDP towards

macroeconomic Neo-Liberal Capitalism, very much the type of capitalism as expressed by the United States [and economic policy] firmly in line with the Washington consensus, that is: strict fiscal discipline, inflation targeting, downsizing government, lower tax rates, liberalised trade tariffs, and steady privatisation. (ibid.)

About the RDP, Deacon (2010) reveals that ‘in developing a new vision for arts and culture’,

‘the White Paper took its terms of reference from the RDP mandate (e.g. community involvement, representivity and access) and highlighted the consultative nature of the process that informed it (e.g. regional workshops and submissions’ (p. 14). This socialist battery of the new government was therefore not apolitical. It was also evidenced by how culture was viewed as ‘formative to national identity and values, and potentially contributory to economic development’ (Deacon, 2010, p. 6). Furthermore, even though the government would not interfere with cultural funding mechanisms, the state recognized that it had to intervene in the

36 See Campschreur and Divendal (1989), Grundy (1995, 1996), Steinberg (1995) and Nawa (2016), for treatment of the African National Congress’s approach to cultural policy, a party which eventually came to power in 1994, as well as the contribution of different civic and political organizations towards the current legislation. 153 cultural sector “to ensure transformation in institutional arrangements…and to ensure that arts and culture promoted by the state was in line with values of the new Constitution” (ibid). As such, the post-1994 approach also encompassed a conceptually more architect approach to culture in terms of its determined public intervention, was planned despite a fundamental declaration in the new WPACH about the government playing the role of facilitator in managing national cultural resources, arts and heritage. This facilitator role was alluded to in the WPACH through a declared ‘arms-length’ funding structure for culture, for the sake of ensuring freedom of creativity and expression in the sector, and as such an implication of neutrality to cultural patronage (Deacon, 2010).

The roles of architect and facilitator are, however, dichotomous. As Matarasso and

Landry (1999) suggest, when referring to the European cultural policy implementation debates of the time, the question is “whether services should be provided directly by the state or whether they should be bought in from other suppliers” (p. 50). The direct provision of cultural services existing within and entwined in all other social aspects, is an architect type of approach, where the state intervenes “with policy programs, political and administrative infrastructures and financial support via the yearly state budget, actively supports cultural and artistic production, distribution and reception” (Vestheim, 2016, p. 5). On the other hand, the outsourcing approach is that of a facilitator, where a retained state “leaves culture and the arts to [market forces] and private and ideal charity” to take ‘care of cultural policy’ (ibid.). This situation further confirms the conflicting views embodied in the WPACH’s socialist intrinsic-extrinsic stance to culture which simultaneously stands side-by-side with the expression of arts-culture as an extrinsically valuable economic stimulus (Ndzuta, 2013, p.33-36). It also further confirms that the state, through this legislation, may have espoused these two ideologies with the intention that they would complement each other to advance all cultural modes of expression as well as reconstruct national culture and its infrastructure. Such an approach is not entirely unusual as 154 ‘since the 1980’s’ countries that have in the past followed the architect model to cultural policy have shifted towards a ‘mixture of the facilitator and the architect models’ (Vestheim, 2016, p.

5). These two approaches have become evident in effectively working simultaneously since around 2010, irrespective of their complimentary nature to one another. This evidence suggests a seemingly mixed approach to cultural policy in practice through the state directly funding culture through one of its agencies, its investment in cultural infrastructure, involvement of culture in other social policy and outsourcing other cultural services through decentralized funding mechanisms.

Another point of SA cultural policy ambiguity affects the arts-cultural sector beyond the WPACH, but also within the scope of document’s mandate. Deacon (2010) explains the policy-making spheres of the state, that

Policy documents are formulated at different levels of government. Arts and Culture policy, for example, can be formulated by the DAC, or by provincial or local departments responsible for arts and culture, as provincial and national government have a concurrent mandate to deal with the area of arts and culture. Framework policy documents are thus developed at national level to guide provincial policy and legislation. (p. 2).

Figure 6 below contains a diagram that illustrates the three parallel levels at which cultural policy is concurrently developed, how at all levels of policy development it is informed by the national constitution, and how (through a porous outline) national cultural policy guides, but is not prescriptive to cultural policy development at provincial and municipal levels.

155

Figure 6: Government levels at which SA cultural policy is developed

Owing to the three separate spheres of governance in SA, there is the perception that there is an ‘ambivalence’ and ambiguity in the roles of responsibility towards arts and culture at the three spheres of governance, especially since “the provision of culture” has been made ‘a concurrent function between the provincial and national spheres’ in the Constitution (Sirayi &

Nawa, 2014a, p. 1650). Some SA cultural policy scholars have attributed the ‘marginalization’ of culture to the Constitution’s lack of clarity on the role of culture in the developmental

‘framework’ of the country, and the limited lucidity in the functions of each of the three spheres of governance in advancing national culture (ibid.). This perception may explain what is at the root of sentiments about a disconnect in SA cultural governance by various stakeholders

(Fisher, 2014). It may also partly explain the judgment that “the policy environment guiding

156 [government] investment [in the sector] is weak, and as such, government activity in the creative industries is unfocused, inconsistent (except with regards to statutory institutions)”

(Joffe & Newton, 2008, p. 114).

Refining National Cultural Policy

To remedy this weak cultural policy environment there have been steps towards change “that supports the growth and development of the creative industries and ensure[s] effective implementation” (ibid). This progress has also involved sporadic improvements on the budget allocated to the department, moving from “0.02% of [the] national budget” allocated to culture to figures proportional to the current contributions of cultural strategies (Meersman, 2007, p.

300; SACO, 2017a). Apart from that policies have been formulated within the DAC to address and further growth in different parts of the cultural sector (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017; S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). In this role, the DAC is an administrator guiding policy from the vantage point of the ‘decision space’ where it adapts to new developments, problems are identified for resolution, and in order “to smooth out, if not over, the protests of citizens” (Dimock in Bacchi, 2000, p. 49).

That said, however, it becomes apparent further on in this chapter, in the discussion on new policy strategies, and based on the WPACH communication by the original Minister of

Culture in 1996, that some of these remedial steps by the DAC expose an ‘incremental’ policy change, or a ‘muddling through’ approach to cultural policy development which involves the comparison and refinement of existing policy to address interlinked objectives rather than strictly follow a ‘rational-comprehensive’ policy cycle (Lindblom, 1959, p. 81-88). Lindblom

(1959) finds that ‘democracies change their policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments’, and in accordance with social relevance (ibid.). He justifies that non-incremental policy is ‘unpredictable in its consequences’ (ibid.). In his observation of policy-change norms,

157 ‘policy is not made once and for all’ but is ‘remade endlessly’ as a ‘process of approximation to some desired objectives in which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration’ (Lindblom, 1959, p 86). This policy-change outlook may sum up the DAC’s operations since 1994 in how the department has intentionally and circumstantially avoided drastic changes to cultural policy (Deacon, 2010).

WPACH Review 1

Some of the remedial steps taken to national cultural policy involve efforts to review the

WPACH on at least three occasions. The first review was underway between 2005 and 2007, but it was incomplete since its recommendations were not soundly implemented (Deacon,

2010; Mavhungu, 2014). This review was “part of the broader Ten Year [Legislative] Review” process (Deacon, 2010, p. 1). Due to the rapid transformation of staff after 1994 in the department, the DAC had “new recruits – [many of which] had been activists or arts and culture practitioners”, and as such the department did not have the capacity for internal archive management, research, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (Deacon, 2010, p. 7-11). As a result, the review was outsourced to project-specific external researchers who had a track record with the department (ibid.; p 20).

During the review, there was broad and comprehensive cross-sectional consultation in different institutional spheres of the sector and regions of the country (DAC, 2006; Deacon,

2010; Nawa, 2017). Although the review was ‘evaluative rather than prognostic’, among its benefits were a ‘better-informed discourse about policy issues’ (Deacon, 2010, p. 20). It identified that although the DAC had taken some steps to build its capacity and form internal policy-making structures that were aligned to international conventions South Africa is signatory to, “policy was generally commissioned by the DAC officials within specific sectors at deputy director-general or chief director level [and that] policy development [was] not easily

158 coordinated across units” (Deacon, 2010, p. 10). Furthermore, the review addressed “problems and gaps in the DAC policy and legislation, but also of issues relating to arts and culture in policy and legislation managed by other [government] Departments” (ibid., p. 10-15). The review recommended that the WPACH be revised to address ‘problems of governance and sustainability’ regarding ‘the arts, culture and heritage legislative framework’; ‘the arm’s length approach’; ‘contribution of the arts, culture and heritage to the economy’; ‘the role of arts, culture and heritage continentally and internationally (cultural diplomacy)’; ‘human resources, research and development needs of the arts, culture and heritage sector’; ‘the role of arts, culture and heritage in social development’; ‘the arts, culture and heritage funding and financing model’ (Wakashe in Deacon, 2010, p. 19).

WPACH Review 2

The second review was for a brief period between 2013 and 2015 which ended with an updated version of the document (Sirayi & Nawa, 2014a, p. 1648). This updated WPACH version was received with contention by stakeholders in 2013 (Van Graan, 2013). The document was eventually rescinded, for further review, after a Creative and Cultural Industries Federation of

South Africa (CCIFSA) conference37 in 2015 where collaboration and thorough consultation between the government and sector stakeholders was agreed upon for future progress (Thamm,

2015a). This resolution was after much of the conference marked by disagreements over policy fundamentals such as due process, disagreements on how much the sector was given agency, disagreements between sector representatives as well as sector representatives and the state

37 The first CCIFSA conference took place in 2015 to unite the SA creative industries sector. This was possible through the intervention of the state and stakeholder consultation over some years. ‘The idea for CCIFSA was born after a 2009 meeting between [the state president] and members of the cultural and creative industries. Afterwards the Department of Arts and Culture formed two task teams which developed a framework for a federation that [would] represent 12 identified sectors and 45-sub sectors in the industry. The federation [would] eventually consist of several elected board members, including a president, and that [would] represent the creative community “at a governmental, economic and societal level”’ (Thamm, 2015b). 159 (Thamm, 2015b). As such, the revision of “the original White Paper of 1996 was started afresh in March 2015 given the criticism levelled at [its] content and for the manner in which it came about (with limited consultation with the arts, culture and heritage sector)” (Van Graan, 2016).

WPACH Review 3

A third WPACH review then took place in Johannesburg, in November 2016, where I was also in attendance. The event was proof of the messiness of policy-making (Lindblom, 1959;

Kingdon, 2003). It was also proof of the multiple levels at which conflict exists in the policy- making process, as Jann and Wegrich (2007) suggest of policy cycles, citing Lindblom (1968) and Wilavsky (1979), that “decision-making comprises not only information gathering and processing (analysis), but foremost consists of conflict resolution within and between public and private actors and government departments (interaction)” (p. 49). At this WPACH review indaba38, an updated version of the document was available for critique and input, and was touted as incorporating most of the grievances raised at the CCIFSA conference in 2015.

The document included topics such as an assessment of progress since 1994, an overview of new policies for arts, culture and heritage, a section with a more nuanced discussion on the cultural and creative industries which also proposed a policy direction on the industries, a section on the rights of practitioners, a section on the development of human resources, deliberations on cooperative governance, a section on a new national arts, culture and heritage dispensation, as well as a section on funding and financing arts, culture and heritage. The edited version was insufficiently debated though, due to the short notice39 given

38 ‘Indaba’ is a meeting, or an issue, in the isiZulu language. 39 Concerns regarding the lack of sufficient notice in advance were voiced at the indaba by the arts journalist and community arts activist Vukile Pokwana, among others, who stated that he only found out about the indaba on Twitter, a couple of days before it was to take place. The DAC gave stakeholders a notice period of less than a week for the stakeholders to avail themselves for the review. As such, some of the delegates were worried that they had not sufficiently read the document or process its implications. In response, one of the panelists reassured the delegates that there was no cause for concern because there would be more public engagement on the review process and that this was only the second draft of at least four. Furthermore, the review was presented as a 160 to the sector stakeholders to attend the event, the limited channels through which the notice was available, and due to the out-of-the-way venue40 at which the review was being debated.

The updated WPACH was presented to the stakeholders by a panel reduced from an original nine to three members41 who worked on the 2013 WPACH review redraft. Some of these factors and more point to how the process of this review was also noted as fundamentally

‘flawed’ in how issues of infrastructure to further goals are ignored in the later draft, how long research for its development has taken, the weak nature of its consultative processes and hence resulted in ‘uneven contributions’, in how in the drafted some of the concepts are ontologically problematic like the use of the terms ‘creative industries’ and ‘creative economy’ interchangeably with one another, and how some of the tenets of the draft reveal an overarching diminished political commitment to culture (Nawa, 2017, p. 12-14). On the latter issue, Nawa

(ibid) makes a case pertinent to the discussion in this dissertation, that of the inability to advance cultural diplomacy and international cooperation due to lack of political will despite declarations on paper of the good of diplomacy with other countries and intergovernmental cooperation to further diplomacy through culture (Nawa, 2014).

Additionally, Van Graan (2016) suggests a different set of problems42 with the WPACH

Review and its Indaba in 2016. He observes that when the DAC briefed the ‘Parliamentary

representative consultative process by an announcement from the same panelist that at a later stage parliament would also allow the public to have input over two weeks when the house analyzes it for approval. 40 The chosen venue for the event was not centrally located, and it was not easily accessible on public transport. The review was held at the Cedarwood of Sandton hotel next to a major highway on the border of the affluent northern Johannesburg suburbs of Sandton and Woodmead. A venue like that, excludes a substantial number of sector stakeholders from participating. 41 The three panelists were Ms Avril Joffe, a cultural sector consultant and lecturer at Wits University, Professor Muxe Nkondo, a social policy scholar and former university vice-chancellor, and Professor Andries Oliphant who was one of the original ACTAG participants and formulators. The original nine members of the 2013 WPACH review included public intellectuals and political commentators, experts on public policy-making, sector consultants and practitioners. 42 Mike Van Graan’s blog quotes a parliamentary portfolio debrief by the DAC, which states that a ‘provisional draft for internal discussion was due in March 2016, followed by subsector public consultations in April, resulting in a revised draft in May which would then be circulated for public comment in June, after which it would be revised based on feedback received before being submitted to the Minister at the end of July 2016. Consultations were held in all the provinces from May to June, but “compilation of the first draft (of the revision of the Revised 161 Portfolio Committee on Arts and culture on the 30th August 2016’ it became evident that the process would be delayed due to the panel tasked with the review not meeting deadlines for several reasons. One reason for this incapacitation was that feedback from the sector could not be assessed on schedule (ibid.). Another important reason was a “lack of contribution from the

Reference Panel appointed to revise the White Paper” since of the original nine appointees,

“only a third of the panel remained or actively contributed” (ibid.). Furthermore, Van Graan points out that the policy review processed has been compromised by the direct “unilateral, ministerial appointment of the Reference Group” and that this untoward influence from the minister has happened on more than one occasion (ibid.). This indication of a top-down stimulus of projects, including the speed at which the 1996 WPACH is reviewed post 2010, is suggested in Deacon (2010) as that decisions to move a particular direction at the department are based on approval at the higher echelons of the DAC’s hierarchy (2010). Using this perspective, it is as such no coincidence that by February 2017, an updated version based on the November 2016 indaba submissions was already available on the DAC website. By early

2018 a fourth draft of the White Paper was available for public comment since the policy review process began.

Cultural Policy Strategies

Creative Industries Growth Strategy

Apart from WPACH reviews, other ongoing initiatives by the DAC to remedy the weak cultural policy environment have been the creation of strategies towards more focused growth of the sector. One such initiative was the influential Creative Industries Growth Strategy (CIGS),

White Paper) was delayed since only three Reference Panel Members have contributed”. “The first draft of the White Paper was due on July 30, 2016. However, due to the lack of capacity within the Reference Panel as a result of several members dropping out, the three remaining members were over-stretched. A request was granted by the ADG (Acting Director General) to extend the deadline for the first draft to 31 August 2016’ (Van Graan, 2016). 162 developed after over a two-year period of research from 1996 to 1998 by the Cultural Strategy

Group for the cultural ministry, and implemented in 2002. This was a strategy for the “early development of government policy on the nature and value of cultural industries” since the industries were not defined in the WPACH (Deacon, 2010, p. 17). According to Joffe and

Newton (2008), the “CIGS process was to advocate for government to focus on the creative industries as [an economic] growth area” (p. 114). The CIGS Report, which was the result of the research, described the creative industries as ‘knowledge-intensive’ small-to-medium enterprises that generate large scale employment and are “linked with close, interlocking but flexible networks of production and service systems” (DACST, 1998, p. 4). The industries incorporated are ‘music, film and television, publishing, craft, visual arts, multimedia, heritage, design and the performing arts’ (Joffe & Newton, 2008b, p. 235). These were recognized as the for-profit part of the cultural sector that would grow the Gross Domestic Product (Deacon,

2010). The CIGS ‘based on an analysis of each sector, made suggestions for [creative industries] development’ which would include the ‘DAC Investing in Culture Programme that invested over R100 million per year in the cultural industries, particularly in small and medium enterprises’ (Deacon, 2010, p. 17). The Investing in Culture Programme was a strategy “for the sustainable development of the cultural industries through support measures such as incentives by the DTI and instruments of investment within the DAC” (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). As such, the CIGS process was fundamentally to find a way for the creative industries to contribute towards employment generation for the sake of alleviating poverty (Maree, 2005, p. 292). Essentially, the CIGS process was for “integrating arts and culture into all aspects of socio-economic development” (Newton in Rogerson, 2006, p. 155). The CIGS report also explicitly stated the importance of its study as a way to find

“linkages between the cultural industries and the macroeconomic policies of government”

(CIGS, 1998, p. 7). These would be the first steps towards tying ‘arts, culture and fiscal growth’ 163 in a way that directly involved cultural workers in the creation of the country’s economy

(Nawa, 2011).

Of relevance to the study on festivals in the CIGS report, among its list of recommendations, were proposals for the development of the music industry. One was that the

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) could ‘accommodate’ the music industry through its existing ‘Export Marketing and Investment Scheme’ to “support international showcases of

South Africa talent” (DACTS, 1998, p. 17). Some of the recommendations for music projects were that “synergy is developed between the music and tourism industry” and that the “level of international exposure is developed [through] partnerships between the different Arts

Councils of the two territories” (DACTS, 1998, p. 19-20). Additionally, in direct relation to this research on festivals, the CIGS Report proposed music industry initiatives including the development of human resource to curb ‘shortages [in the] critical area of music business skills’, the “joint export promotion through initiatives such as a South African stand at MIDEM

(an international music exposition)” (DACTS, 1998, p. 19). Since then, most of these recommendations have been realized in various ways through several programs43.

Progressively such initiatives led to small successive policy shifts, bringing recognition to the arts-culture sector as an instrument for achieving goals that are more directly linked to national development goals (Van Graan, 2013). Despite this, there have been observations that by 2006, “South Africa [had] seen very little research on the precise ways in which culture and development interact’ (Bernstein, 2006, p. 40). Equally, there is recognition that even in SA different forms of creativity, and thus culture, ‘and economy are inextricably woven together” in relation to tourism and especially in urban areas (Rogerson, 2006). Nonetheless, policy

43 For example, an annual Music Expo called Moshito, which is now over a decade old, is a direct result of CIGS recommendations, along with those by the Music Industry Task Team (DAC, 2005; Shaw & Rodell, 2009). Additionally, each year South African musicians are selected through a process to travel to world music markets in Europe such as WOMEX and MIDEM (Womex, n.d.-b). The latter is also part of the recommendations. 164 implication of the CIGS meant that the SA government was gradually moving away from leftist ideology and socialist instrumentality to culture, to a form of market-driven instrumentality where culture would be used by the state not to advance social goals but used to achieve economic goals. This may not seem like a policy shift since culture was determined instrumentally in the WPACH and the creative industries were suggested for economic growth, but with the CIGS culture was still working for the citizenry, except it would be recognized by the government mainly in terms of its economic contribution. The government could then justify the budget allocated to the cultural ministry in terms of its economic contribution

(Deacon, 2010).

At the same time, this shift in ideological outlook to culture was also due to external factors. One such event was the ‘Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies in 1982’, which set a path for the international cultural sector to advance the ‘intertwined’ nature of the relationship between culture and economic development (Deacon, 2010, p. 17). Another event which cemented this relationship between culture and development was the 1998 UNESCO

World Conference on Cultural Policies in Stockholm (ibid). Similarly, SA cultural advocates also tie the South African cultural policy shift to relationships with organizations like the powerful United Nations44 of which UNESCO is a part, and the former Organization of the

African Union45 (Mapadimeng, 2012; Van Graan, 2013a). Deacon (2010) confirms that “by the 2000s the DAC also began to highlight the importance of arts and culture in economic

44 The United Nations’ (UN) Millennial Development Goals have contributed to the approach global governments have taken on the value of culture and its capacity to be the driver of economies, especially in the developing world (UNESCO, 2012; p. 3-6; Mapadimeng, 2012). Culture was not always part of the 2000 UN developmental agenda, but “it has been increasingly acknowledged that culture is a driver for both, better socio-economic opportunities and social cohesion. “The connection between culture and development was made explicit in the Outcome Document of the MDG Review Summit held at the UN General Assembly in September 2010, as well as two other recent resolutions” (MDG Achievement Fund, 2013, p. 6). 45 In 1969 the Pan-African Cultural Manifesto formulated at the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) Conference in Algeria put culture at the center of ‘reconstruction’ of the continent in the post-colonial era (Mapadimeng, 2012). This manifesto has since evolved into different incarnations (ibid). 165 development within South Africa” (p. 6). Of this conception, some cultural activists occasionally point out that this culture-economy46 approach, especially in relation to funding, adopted by international governments towards the end of the 20th century, is borne out of neoliberal economic principles imposed on culture (McGuigan, 2011).

Creative South Africa

In 1998, the same year as the CIGS report was published, the Creative South Africa: A Strategy for Realising The Potential of The Cultural Industries (CSA) was published. The was also a report commissioned by the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST).

According to Newton and Joffe (2008), the report was the “first major study to use a value chain analysis for creative industries in South Africa” (p. 4). Among its proposals, the report recommended intergovernmental collaboration to send SA culture abroad (Shaw & Rodell,

2009). The CSA endorsed that the SA creative industries target “global circuits of entertainment and consumption” in “key economies in North America, Europe and Asia” for economic rewards, and for improving the influence of the SA national brand (Van Der

Westhuizen, 2003, p. 29). This is evidence that hard and soft power were determined by this report to be important to the growth of the cultural sector as well as the economic growth of the country. Moreover, the report also determined that the DAC, the Department of South

African Tourism, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the equivalent of DIRCO at the time to partner up and rebrand SA as more than a tourist destination (Van Der Westhuizen,

2003). As such, SA would be rebranded a multidimensional cultural product that provides “a host of other goods, services and high-tech industries in wine, mining, equipment, advertising, fruit, financial services and retail opportunities” (ibid., p. 30)”. The CSA essentially advocated

46 As much as this culture-economy approach is widespread, there are other alternatives. One is, for instance, what Mapadimeng (2012) argues for is a Development Studies based kind of advancement to benefit society and culture. He advocates for the building human potential. 166 for government not to ‘Wait for the World to Come’ to South Africa, but for SA to ‘Go to the

World’ in order to benefit SA at multiple societal levels, strata and structures (ibid.).

Other policy strategies were developed by the DAC (Newton & Joffe, 2008). According to Masokoane, the period from 2006 to 2009 was the golden era of policy-making at the department (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). What Masokoane refers to are departmental strategic plans that span five years, and interim strategies, to the frequency of which sector stakeholders have expressed ‘fatigue’ over (Deacon, 2010; Mavhungu, 2014, p. 40). As Newton confirms in Mavhungu (2014) ‘changing policy is more challenging than strategic plans’ (p. 38). Policy strategies come about through Treasury prescribing ‘a strategic planning template for a five-year plan [where government] agencies and departments then develop consecutive annual plans and those plans are budgeted for’ (ibid., p. 39).

Figure 7 below shows where the five-year strategy is positioned for government departments in terms of the state’s strategic planning framework which is pronounced by the department of Treasury (Muller, 2014). The diagram helps make sense of where the short to medium term planning of DAC programs and projects falls into place within government-wide plans. The departmental short- to medium-term planning is represented by the yellow portion of the diagram.

167

Figure 7: The location of departmental 5-year strategic plans. Source: ‘The hierarchy of the

relationship between planning concepts’ (National Treasury, 2010, p. 13).

Some of the strategies have involved mapping and creating directories and a database of the CCI’s. Below I list strategies that pertain to the DAC’s mission to target new music markets abroad, which are publicly available in DAC reports on its website. The strategies include

• the Taking South African Music to the World (International Music Market) strategy

which ‘increases the image of [the] country in the global music business’, is aimed at

generating ‘extra income through exports of South African music products’, skills

transfers, and SA music export (DAC, 2008, p. 12-15)

168 • the Promoting arts and culture for social cohesion strategy that funded several unique

musical projects and events for skills development (DAC, 2008)

• the Promotion of Social Cohesion strategy where various cultural-exchange-focused

festivals were sponsored (DAC, 2008)

• International Relations strategies that involve undertaking projects in government

determined regions where SA has specific bilateral and multilateral agreements and key

interests (DAC, 2008)

• the Moshito conference as a strategy to develop the music industry value chain and to

increase the international exposure of the local music value chain, its participants and

music (DAC, 2008, p. 12-22)

• The National Strategy on Performing Arts, which develops the capacity of chorale

music traditions (DAC, 2009)

• Arts and Culture Festival Strategy, which is “to support and promote Arts and Culture

Festivals (ACF) for social cohesion, poverty alleviation, job creation, cultural

development and preservation” (DAC, 2009, p. 24)

• Development of Markets, a strategy to develop local markets for national CCI’s and for

the participation of local culture in ‘regional and international markets’ (DAC, 2009, p.

31; DAC, 2014b)

• Skills Development and Transfer, a strategy to develop and transfer skills within the

national creative industries (DAC, 2014b, p. 38)

• Social Cohesion Strategy, a strategy to ‘ensure the successful integration of social

cohesion across all spheres of government’ (DAC, 2016, p. 32)

169 • Promote the Arts, Culture and Heritage of South Africa Internationally, a strategy to

promote SA’s CCI’s and heritage at international events globally, as well as to develop

cultural diplomacy policy and a working framework (DAC, 2014b, p. 40)

Other continued strategies by the DAC relating to cultural diplomacy have been to improve existing bilateral, trilateral, South-to-South relations. They have also included improving on relations with already foreign-policy-defined areas such as countries on the

African continent, regionally, the Middle East, Americas, China, India and Russia. Cultural diplomacy strategies have also been to “contribute to the Global Dialogue on Culture in

Multilateral Forums” such as the EU, UN, etc., as well as to adhere to international treaties

(DAC, 2014b, p. 40-41). Some of these ‘global commitments’ have included the formation of a cultural exchange and collaboration program called ‘South African Seasons’, where, since

2012, the DAC has taken academics, artists and sports people to predetermined countries like

France, the UK and designated African countries, “as part of the on-going programme to strengthen people-to-people relations between the countries” (DAC, 2014c, p. 44; DAC,

2017b). With the UK, specifically, the DAC’s memorandum of understanding involved

“sharing experiences that are intended to promote and develop the creative industries in both countries, establish links between arts festivals, promote collaboration between artists and arts institutions, facilitate artistic exchanges and joint publications, and foster collaboration on the development of arts policy through appropriate policy forums” (ibid.). The USA is not explicitly included in the DAC’s culturally driven strategic international engagement framework. The country’s exclusion correlates with SA foreign policy indicating that the USA and SA have relations based on hard power rather than culture or soft power attributes (DIRCO,

2011; Graham, 2015).

170 From the DAC’s 2011-2016 Strategic Plan report, it is evident that the festival strategy integrates a few significant aspects in the raison d’etre of the department on the political and cultural landscape. For instance, in the document, the Director General at the time pointed out that the DAC’s “continued support for national festivals also serves the purpose of bringing people together in order to experience the cultural wealth that our artists have to offer and to experience the diversity of our cultural heritage” (DAC, 2016, p. 12). Festivals are also associated with ‘promoting a national cultural identity’ and encouraging ‘intergenerational social dialogues’ (ibid.). More so, in the same document, the festival strategy suggests that festivals supported by the DAC are part of events that should be “demographically inclusive, and contribute to national reconciliation, nation building and social cohesion” (DAC, 2016, p.

17). Among other things, festivals are part of the DAC’s mission to promote “local cultural industries by facilitating access to international networks and platforms at global markets, festivals and exhibitions” (DAC, 2016, p. 19).

Cultural Policy and National Development Strategies

The government has had at least four national growth strategies, between 1994 and 2012, which were the backdrop to cultural policy shifts that ultimately inspired the realization of MGE.

There were the RDP, GEAR, ASGISA and the NDP, which I detail below. As mentioned earlier, in 1994 the new democratic government implemented the Reconstruction and

Development Plan (RDP) to transform the social and economic impact of apartheid (Roux,

2017). The strategy sought to mobilize the citizenry and the “country's resources toward the final eradication of the results of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future” (South African Government, 1994, p. 7). Its aims were to develop the capacity for South Africa’s human resources through investing in it, transform and balance the economy, create enforceable protections against discrimination, and democratize the state and

171 SA’s society (ibid). The RDP was generally received positively by the cultural sector, except that it also “experienced some delivery problems and was duly criticized for being bureaucratically unwieldly” (Coombes, 2004, p. 322). Some of its flaws were that the new government did not have adequately experienced managers to carry out implementation, the strategy ‘ignored the gathering of new taxes’ and ‘focused ‘too narrowly on fiscal prudence and the reallocation of existing revenues’ (DOE, 2014, p. 4). The RDP was more about SA’s long term vision for itself rather than practicable goals to be achieved in five years, and thus was not entirely successful in its ambitions (Roux, 2017).

Two years later in 1996 the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) was implemented, and branded as a ‘strategy for rebuilding and restructuring the economy’ in line ‘the goals set in the Reconstruction and Development Programme’ (South African

Government, 1996b, p. 1). The strategy was mainly to reduce government debt, improve SA’s global competitiveness, to allow ‘the forces of supply and demand to determine prices (rather than relying on state involvement)’ (Roux, 2017, p. 196). GEAR was perceived as the ANC doing an ‘ideological volte-face’ and yielding to the demands of the corporate sector due to encountering unforeseen adverse economic and dire social conditions (Meersman, 2007, p.

296; Mbatha, 2017). GEAR was “designed to encourage economic development and fiscal reform to promote foreign investment” (Coombes, 2004, p. 322). As such the strategy involved the government signing a number of free trade deals, and adhered to the prescriptions of “the

IMF, World Bank and the World Trade Organisation” with ‘disastrous’ implications for the funding of the cultural sector since the tradition of arts philanthropy from the private sector was not part of SA culture (Meersman, 2007, p. 298). For others, the program was unpopular because it meant “that performers and technicians from elsewhere” could “obtain employment easily in South Africa” while local artists would not have ‘protection’ (Maree, 2005, p. 302).

Advocates for the strategies commented that ‘the policy saw South Africa’s macro-economic 172 fundamentals become the envy of its peers’ even though labor movements and unions were opposed to the strategy especially due to the apparent significant job losses (Jeffery, 2010, p.

246-247). The economic changes the strategy sought to effect, as well as the investment it promoted, however, were slow and at times not realized due several factors (Jeffery, 2010;

Roux, 2017). Other causes included the clash of the policy with SA’s unique industrial context and the government-corporate sector capacity to implement it (Roux, 2017). Fundamentally, the GEAR strategy failed to distribute wealth more evenly (DOE, 2014).

In 2006, the Accelerated and Shared Growth-South Africa (AsgiSA) strategy was implemented. Its aims were ‘to boost national growth rate for the period 2004–2014 to at least

6 percent as well as to enhance “the environment and opportunities for more labour-absorbing economic activities”’ (Mlambo-Ngcuka in Rogerson, 2006, p.156). The strategy planned to achieve these goals through wide-ranging ‘infrastructure investment’, ‘sector strategies’ to empower previously disadvantaged groups and promoting ‘private sector investment’,

‘education and skills development’, the promotion of ‘small business development’, ‘strategies to reduce the volatility and overvaluation of the currency’, ‘governance and institutional interventions’ (Roux, 2017, p.198). Some of the interventions for the skills deficit were ‘special training programmes, bringing retirees back into work, encouraging South Africans working outside the country to return, or drawing in immigrants’, as well as fast-tracking the development of trainees in different programs (Jeffery, 2010, p 256). Three of the creative industries sectors were included as medium-term priorities in AsgiSA. They were film, tourism and crafts (Rogerson, 2006, ibid., p 157; Roux, 2017). These three sectors were viewed as

‘sectors in which the country “has a range of comparative economic advantages which, if fully exploited, would lend themselves to higher rates of economic growth”’ (DTI in Rogerson,

2006, p. 157). AsgiSA caused tensions between treasury, DTI and the labor movement (Jeffery,

2010). Treasury wanted to ‘liberalise the economy’, while the DTI needed ‘protective tariffs, 173 quotas and industrial incentives’ (Jeffery, 2010, p. 257). The strategy had minimal benefits in its first year and was said to be too ‘timid’ in its intentions for ‘labour market reform and deregulation’ (ibid, p. 263). It was also unprepared for and was hampered by the sudden ‘global economic slowdown’ in 2007-8 (SA Government, 2008, p. 73).

From 2012, the National Development Plan47 (NDP) was implemented, after two other short-term strategies48. The NDP had a more holistic partnership driven approach to achieving its objectives because it revolves around stakeholders sharing responsibility to find solutions

(NPC, 2012; Masilela, 2013; DOE, 2014). Its vision spans 20 years and it is less anchored in ideology (Roux, 2017). The plan was intended “for the country to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030 through uniting South Africans, unleashing the energies of its citizens, growing an inclusive economy, building capabilities, enhancing the capability of the state and leaders working together to solve complex problems” (DOE, 2014, p. 21). More specifically the NDP depends on ‘citizens being active in development, a capable and developmental state able to intervene to correct our historical inequities, and strong leadership throughout society working together’ (NDP, 2012, p 1). The strategy is also built around addressing two critical areas in SA since 1994, those of curbing poverty and high unemployment levels by creating employment and stimulating economic growth. Some of the key points, relevant to this study on festivals, were to upskill the citizenry (especially the youth) in ways that would also ‘redress historical inequities’ and ‘penetrate global markets’ (DOE, 2014, p. 21). Overall, the strategy

47 In 2010 the office of the Presidency formed the National Planning Commisiion(NPC), made up of 25 appointed commissioners (Muller, 2014, p. 217). The NPC’s purpose was to develop a ‘a long term vision and strategic plan for South Africa’ (ibid). By 2011, the NPC had consulted widely across sectors and drafted a report on the key challenges facing SA. In 2012, the NPC produced the National Development Plan 2030: Our Future- Make It Work. The process of developing the NDC has been labelled as ‘outsourcing government thinking, as these unelected ‘eminent persons’ may wish to push their own agenda’ (Makhanya in Masilela, 2013, p.40). This is similar criticism to reviews of the development of the new WPACH, notwithstanding perceptions that the latter review has had a limited consultation process. 48 After AsgiSA, interim strategies were put in place, but were short lived. They were the Medium Term Strategic Frame which was assumed from 2009, and the New growth path (NGP) in 2010. 174 targets ‘higher fixed investment’, ‘gaining global market share’, ‘stimulating domestically oriented activity’, ‘regional growth’, ‘innovation and learning’, the expansion of small-to- medium enterprises, ‘a stable and enabling macro-economic platform’ and a responsiveness to the labor market (Roux, 2017, p. 202-203). There are political and economic observers who find the NDP is self-contradictory, and possibly self-defeating in its mandate and characterization of the state. The nub of the matter is that the NDP advocates for a capable state that makes effective interventions, when in fact ‘yes, states should do things that the market cannot, but only if they have the “capability” to perform these “roles” – thus states must

“match” capability and role’ (Moore in Masilela, 2013, p 35-36). As such, these observe doubt that the state has these qualities. Other opinions have been that the strategy has a neoliberal agenda (Masilela, 2013, p. 40).

As a new addition, the cultural sector was included more prominently in the NDP as one of the economic drivers. This time, all the cultural industries were incorporated, with some of the pronouncements being to provide ‘financial and ICT support to artists to enable the creation of works expressing national creativity, while opening space for vibrant debate’ and to incentivize ‘commercial distribution networks to distribute and/or host art’ (NPC, 2012, p.

26). In its executive summary, the NDP states that

Arts and culture open powerful spaces for debate about where a society finds itself and where it is going. Promoted effectively, the creative and cultural industries can contribute substantially to small business development, job creation, and urban development and renewal… The country’s rich cultural legacy and the creativity of its people mean that South Africa can offer unique stories, voices and products to the world. In addition, artistic endeavour and expression can foster values, facilitate healing and restore national pride. (NPC, 2012, p. 26)

175 The Mzansi Golden Economy

As alluded to previously, MGE is a strategy “to reposition the arts, culture and heritage sector as key players in government’s programme of action for social cohesion, creation of sustainable jobs and ensuring social and economic development” (DAC, 2017c, p. 5). To do this, MGE is supposed to make “strategic investments [in key areas of the creative economy] to optimize the economic benefit of the Arts in South Africa”, and this is so that for the arts-culture-heritage sector, “job creation and productivity will be enhanced” and “the sector’s global competitiveness will be increased” (ibid.). The strategy’s objectives are to ‘stimulate demand’,

‘develop audiences for the creative and cultural industries’ and increase their consumption, build heritage resources, ‘information gathering’ to capture data related to the CCI’s and heritage, foster ‘human capacity development’, and to develop cultural entrepreneurs (DAC,

2017c, p. 5-6). The objectives are related to ten work streams, which are Cultural Events,

Touring Ventures, Cultural Precincts, Artists in Schools, Public Art, Art Bank, Mzansi Golden

Market, Identified Legacy Projects, the Cultural Industries National Academy of South Africa and the Cultural Observatory. Figure 8 below illustrates the relationship between the objectives and work streams.

176

Figure 8: MGE Objectives and Work streams (DAC, 2017, p. 6).

Through MGE, the DAC finances projects that meet these objectives and complement these work streams, as well as and affords grants directly to entities that have relevant programs using an open-call-and-application process (DAC, 2017c). Therefore, MGE was implemented in 2012 with a funding model to drive projects that were aligned with its objectives (IFACCA,

2012). Both SAAF and the Ubuntu festival relate to the Cultural Events and the Touring

Ventures/Market Access work streams. The cultural event stream “supports large and small scale local, regional and national events that promote the arts, culture and heritage and that contribute to local economic development, job creation and the development of audiences”, as well as promotes social cohesion and skills development within the sector (ibid., p. 9). The

Touring Ventures/Market Access work streams are about supporting “broader, cost-effective

177 opportunities for the nation’s cultural output to be viewed, participated in and enjoyed within

South Africa and abroad” (DAC, 2017c, p. 10).

MGE was initially planned to span ‘five years’ (S. Xaba, personal communication,

April 12, 2017). It was informed by prior national and cultural policy strategies, although it was around the inception of the NDP that the strategy was launched. The department initiated the MGE from the top. As the former Director General of Arts and Culture recalled,

When Minister Mashatile became Minister [of Arts Culture], he had strong views of where he wanted to take the unit and his view was that arts should be generating jobs and growing the economy [and] got a team to develop a strategy that was going to do that…I think we had about four or five thematic areas… These thematic areas, all of them were supported by specific programs in order to develop skills, audiences, the eventing industry, which is the lifeline of the performance industry. (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017)

MGE illustrates a slight but distinct cultural policy shift in SA’s recent history in that even though it is based on existing policy strategies and goals, it also addresses more contemporary cultural sector activities. It is also more bullish about tapping into commercial capital for and in the cultural sector through means including creating global market access, as well as focusing on ‘programs that respond to supply and demand’ in the sector (L. Ndebele-

Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017).

In this way, MGE has advantages and disadvantages. It may be the antidote to dated policy that is narrow in scope (Joffe & Newton, 2008; Ndzuta, 2013). The policy strategy is also in line with the general recognition by the SA government that instead of a sole focus on mineral resources to grow the economy, the government should rely more on the knowledge economy in service industries (Joffe & Newton, 2008b). Even so, however, the strategy’s reductive quality is notable, as its enhanced focus on job creation and social cohesion makes its evaluation of the benefits of culture to society narrow.

178 For instance, the instrumental application of MGE to the SA cultural sector is not in full recognition of the ability for the arts or culture to widely “contribute to a stable, confident and creative society” (Matarasso, 1997, p vi). Instead, MGE has the potential to create a monolithic cultural landscape due to pushing cultural entities to prioritize instrumentalist output that aligns with the selective intrinsic value dictates of the strategy rather than output related to their core focus, in order for these entities to stay afloat. The impact of such funding erodes the diversity of cultural expression whether the expression is from former privileged groups or former underprivileged groups. In essence, MGE may have reverse consequences on the diversity of SA’s CCI’s and general cultural expression. The strategy’s funding practices that favor projects which address the agenda of job creation and social cohesion may lead to operational capital constraints, where cultural organizations modify their programs in order to meet funding requirements that sustain their organizations and potentially neglect other programming. Cultural funding often affects organizations in this way, when planned outside of artistic interests (Bunting, 2008).

In relation to socio-economic development MGE has been said to be problematic. It furthers and is based on a trajectory of economic policies that have been described as dismissive of their socio-political and cultural context, and those that are neoliberal in nature

(Mapadimeng, 2012; Whittaker, 2014). It is rooted in economic policies that adhere to global economic agency standards, such as the International Monetary Fund, that have floundered

(ibid). As a result of these policies, and the end of the gold mining era which drove the SA economy, the status of the SA economy has been in decline and the gap between the rich and poor has been widening (ibid; Fisher, 2014). Even with such a foundation, however, MGE is envisaged by the DAC to directly contribute to the national economy and meet socio-economic development ends.

179 MGE principles, as well as those of the NDP strategy, however, have supported the role of the DAC as a facilitator within the sector. This on-paper compatibility is based more on the fact that these two strategies at national and departmental level rely on the self-appointed roles of stakeholders, in partnership, to drive solutions to problems. As such this opens up the DAC’s potential as an effective facilitator in a creative sector that is empowered to identify its own problems and find its own solutions. At the same time, the NDP puts the leadership role of the

DAC as a mandated entity to promote national culture in the spotlight.

That said, however, arms-length facilitation is not always the approach of DAC administrations. The manner in which the MGE strategy was implemented brings into focus the seemingly authoritarian approach or politics of power that the DAC sometimes engages in to drive changing policy positions. The strategy’s inception was given impetus by a consultative state-sector conference that took place in 2011 in Johannesburg (Ansell &

Barnard, 2013b, p. 19). This conference was not the foundation of MGE but gave the strategy legitimacy. At the conference, the DAC brought a proposal with a preconceived policy perspective, and an envisaged strategic direction for SA arts-culture and heritage. This fleshed- out proposal stemmed from another Indaba in 2009 in Cape Town, which was convened at the behest of the then Deputy Arts and Culture Deputy Minister Paul Mashatile (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). The conference in Cape Town produced a declaration from which the MGE proposal presented at the 2011 conference was based (ibid.). At both consultative conferences the sector was steered towards MGE, an idea conceived before sector consultation. After the 2009 conference, Mashatile then “commissioned Dr. Trish Hanekom to do the review, gather all the information” before the 2011 Indaba Johannesburg, (L. Ndebele-

Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017).

Even on the department’s vision, mission, values website page, it is suggested that

MGE did not come directly from the sector. The page reads that 180 The Department of Arts and Culture re-engineered its strategic focus during 2009-20014 term of government. Such re-engineering was informed by the government-wide strategic re-orientation that put job creation and economic development at the centre of government priorities together with other eleven priorities. It was then imperative for the Department of Arts and Culture to clearly articulate its contribution to job creation and economic development agenda of government. This resulted to the development and adoption of the Mzansi Golden Economy strategy whose primary objective is to chart the role of arts and culture sector in job creation and economic development. (DAC, 2017)

The DAC, therefore, steered sector role players in the direction of the desired policy strategy outlook at the 2011 conference since the goals of social cohesion, job creation and economic growth had already been set by the national government (South African Government,

2011; DAC, 2011). In this case, the 2011 conference seems not to have been a genuine consultation process, but a formal announcement of the department’s policy direction. This proposition is aligned with what Deacon (2010) also suggests of a “history of cultural policy being imposed from above” where “government was particularly eager to justify new policy positions in arts and culture through appeals for public consultation rather than through research” (p. 8). The conference also seems like it was convenient to get a larger body of sector stakeholders to contribute to it so that the policy strategy would be broader in scope, and for the sector’s approval. Moreover, other stakeholders have also suggested that MGE was structured to address only goals set by the NDP (Van Graan, 2013).

Furthermore, some sector observers noted that the MGE inaugural conference produced no innovative terms of how the arts would be approached, but the event laid foundations for future state programs aimed at promoting South African creativity (DAC, 2011; Ansell &

Barnard, 2013b). The strategy still primarily focused on driving economic growth, contributing to the GDP, and social cohesion. As such, MGE could be evidence of propositions by Duncan

(2010), alluding to AsgiSA’s objectives to blur out uneven economic access, that DAC policy- making is more “reactive to Cabinet decisions on social cohesion, and the second economy into 181 the 2000s, rather than being driven by a technical programme from within” (p. 8-9; Mavhungu,

2014). The implementation of MGE was, thus, more about what the sector could do for the government than what the government could do for holistic sector development.

Duncan (2010) further explains that “proactive policy-making has been limited by the real and perceived strictures of the arm’s length approach and fear of the political consequences of radical change in the sector” (p. 8-9). This view is also brought into focus by statements made by the former Minister of Culture, Paul Mashatile, in 2013 that ‘as part of implementing

[the NDP] Vision 2030, we are now revising the policy framework governing arts, culture and heritage’ and ‘in order to maximise’ the role of culture ‘we have included this sector in our industrial policy action plan and in our national development plan’ (CSR, 2013a, p. 6). In the same interview, Mashatile also emphasized that ‘culture should be located firmly at the center of the Post 2015 global development agenda’ (ibid.).

Furthermore, Ndebele-Koka, a senior strategist at the DAC who supervised the SAAF organizing team, stated that “MGE was a response from [the DAC] to the IPAP, the Industrial

Policy Action Plan, by the Department of Trade and Industry, which all government departments needed to contribute to” because of the NDP (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). In this way, Ndebele-Koka illustrates a connectedness among national policy, or what Nisbett (2013a) suggests about cultural policy as reflecting “other areas of policy” (p. 98). Ndebele-Koka went on to say that “various industries were identified to contribute to job creation, the GDP [and] that’s how MGE is a strategy” (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). She also confirmed that MGE was Paul Mashatile’s brainchild but became a focused umbrella strategy that incorporated previous DAC strategies.

As she put it,

[MGE] took into consideration everything that DAC had done… the strategies that we’ve had. It consolidated just about everything we had done before and it 182 came up with a focused strategy towards economic development, job creation and using the tools of audience development, opening up markets for the Cultural and Creative Industries. So, it was really a consolidation of what DAC has been doing since ’96 basically. If you look at all the things we’ve done, Cultural Industries Growth Strategy, it looked at the Film Strategy development, it looked at all the policies in Heritage. So, it consolidated everything. The institutions we had established, the work that was done within various industries, within creative sectors and consolidated them and came up with one strategy which contained about a gambit of strategies: cultural events, touring ventures, artists in schools, public art, establishment of the art bank, establishment of the Mzansi Golden Market Portal. So, it outlined all those strategies into one for various sectors…I can’t say it’s anything new, but it was visionary. (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017).

Masokoane, a retired, and thus former, DAC representative, also points out that prior to MGE the DAC was already “interfacing with the global music industries by providing export possibilities of SA content, on platforms such as MIDEM, South by Southwest (SXSW), etc., and through projects like Taking South Africa to the World” (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). More so, he emphasizes that international treaties49, like WIPO and UNESCO, also bound the DAC and the strategies it produced. He suggests that it was

“difficult to put the South African position within the realm of negotiating treaties”, but the

DAC still had to act within treaty boundaries when developing strategies (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). MGE was, therefore, definitely a product of

“discourse already taking place” at the DAC even though it was later found to have its own formulation deficiencies like that it was structurally not connecting to existing DTI or South

African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) policies and had policy cohesion problems (G.

49 MGE’s cultural instrumentalist framework is an approach that has captured developed and developing nations (Mapadimeng, 2012; Chidester et al., 2003). Some observers have said that the approach has been given momentum by United Nation development goals (Van Graan, 2015). Thus, nations who conform to regulatory organizations such as the World Trade Organization, are part of UN agencies are noted to be more likely to take such an approach, and adhere to UNESCO approved imperatives to cultural policy (Chidester et al., 2003; Wiesand, 2002). Van Graan (2015) and in Art Africa (2014), without disputing the implicated goals of cultural diversity and social cohesion contributing to development, finds that the culturally instrumentalist MGE places too much emphasis on national culture driving economic development, and does so from the standpoint of SA being a developing country that stands to benefit from global political recognition if it is signatory to UN treaties.

183 Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). Nonetheless, the strategy was presented as an-old-something-new with several projects were planned around it.

Through implementing MGE, the DAC has found another type of alignment with the

NDP. The DAC acknowledges the points of alignment with the NDP in its vision, mission and values. For now, I will mention only the department’s emphasis of Chapter 15 of the NDP, on transforming society and uniting the country, as the basis for its mission for social cohesion through consulting with the National Planning Commission that developed the NDP (DAC,

2017). This is only one of the reasons MGE strategy no longer seems a case of the “tendency within government to start new projects, rather than bringing coherence between policies and projects” (Deacon, 2010, p. 10). As established in this chapter, MGE is a rebranding of older policy strategies. MGE is a more focused umbrella strategy of existing big and small DAC strategies created to drive the economy in a more concentrated fashion (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017; G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26,

2017). MGE is not only a way to make older DAC strategies more relevant and attractive, but it is also an attempt to align them and make them more comprehensive. The limited role of stakeholders in the conceptualization and implementation of MGE though is also an example of how cultural policy strategies like MGE are sometimes unstrategic and incoherent in relation to their instrumental objectives and in relation to stakeholders (Watkins & Herbert, 2003). I discuss some of the marks of this disjuncture in later chapters.

Nevertheless, later in this study it also becomes clearer that MGE has allowed for better recognition and exploitation of SA creativity for events abroad like SAAF. Through MGE and its pronouncements on access to new markets, skills development and the creation of commercial opportunities using partnerships, the DAC can act to foster networks between SA arts-culture practitioners and those of the USA using various tools. For instance, according to the DAC’s announcement of SAAF, 184 In addition to cultivating audiences for South African films and music, a primary objective of [SAAF] is to offer participating South African artists and entertainment industry professionals the opportunity to meet with members of the Los Angeles area creative film and music communities. (DAC, 2013)

SAAF was thus about country-to-country cooperation and kept with part of what transpired at the 2011 MGE inaugural conference where importance was placed on networks of cooperation. The DAC announced that it was in partnership with very specific institutions in order to position the arts-culture sector as an integrated industry. Some of these partners were represented at the conference. They were the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Brand South Africa, which was referred to as the International Marketing Council, and SA Tourism. These partnerships reinforce and implement recommendations on cooperation in strategic reports like CIGS and CSA discussed earlier. On cooperation when implementing MGE outside of SA, Mogashoa expressed that

International relations is an extension of [SA’s] domestic mandate internationally…and MGE is a domestic policy [and therefore we consider] what kind of resources and expertise and platforms are available outside there in the world [to] attract [and] to support the implementation of South African policy…and then you have to bring in various partners. People who may like South African music, people who want to support it. (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017).

Cultural Policy Timeline

Figure 9 below illustrates the timeline of SA cultural policy in relation to the four national development strategies put in place since 1994, the policy discourses that drove the strategies, and points where the Cultural and Creative Industries (CCI’s) were eventually included as economic drivers. The diagram shows the RDP from 1994, which was about transformation,

GEAR in 1996, which focused on free trade agreements, ASGISA in 2006, which addressed economic growth, and the NDP in 2012, which is more long term and about inclusive economic

185 growth. Between the CIGS report and the establishment of MGE is a perforated line showing cultural policy strategy continuity, where incremental changes are made using five-year strategies set by the DAC. The diagram also shows public discourses that were part of and were affecting the cultural sector. These are discourses that were prevalent at particular points in time since 1994. The pronouncement of each discourse was dependent on the discretion and/or style of administration of each minister of culture.

Figure 9: Cultural Policy and National Development Strategy Timeline

SA Cultural Diplomacy and the DAC

Based on the 1996 WPACH, the DAC also has a mission to preserve, protect, promote and develop SA culture abroad through cultural diplomacy or cultural exchange (DACST, 1996).

186 Cultural diplomacy is conceptualized as ‘International Cultural Co-operation’ in Chapter 6 of the WPACH (DACST, 1996, p. 29). Emphasis is placed on SA joining the global community by being signatory to international cultural conventions, and on SA learning from the world as an act of redress in relation to isolatory apartheid policies. The DAC is also stated as the facilitator of cultural exchange for SA artists so that they benefit from ‘international experience, exposure and expertise’ (ibid., p. 29). This approach to cultural exchange is thus apprenticeship-based, providing that SA cultural workers collaborate with international artists in SA or abroad for the sake of skills development.

Furthermore, the WPACH draws on SA’s multicultural and cosmopolitan50 roots as a condition with which ‘to maximise opportunities for South African arts’ abroad (DACST,

1996, p. 30). Other cultural diplomacy clauses note objectives like the need to form South-to-

South relationships, internationally and regionally, for cultural market access, skills and infrastructure development (ibid.). With regards to the rest of the Commonwealth, Chapter 6 of the WPACH makes statements on a shared history and the basis for the development of new bilateral and multilateral agreements. The relationship with North America and Europe is pronounced as a reset based on the condition of their acceptance of SA’s embrace of its newfound multiculturalism (ibid.).

Commentary on SA cultural diplomacy suggests that the concept is not fully developed though, or has the infrastructure to support it at all the levels of governance it manifests and may seem unconventional when compared to other prevailing cultural diplomacy traditions.

Nawa et al (2017), for example, suggest that SA cultural diplomacy is not defined or structured comprehensively. They find it problematic that cultural diplomacy is inconsistently

50 Cosmopolitanism in SA involves colonial and other historical settlements to SA added to the diverse precolonial indigenous groups already inhabiting the region (Worden et al., 1998). Populations from Europe, various parts of Africa, Far East Asia and the Indian Ocean region are included here. 187 pronounced in different policy guidelines. For instance, in the Constitution, it is conceptualized as International Agreements. In the Constitution it is encouraged within cooperative intergovernmental governance and allocated to cabinet, but approved by another parliamentary arm (ibid.). In foreign policy documents, cultural diplomacy is informed by domestic policy which puts emphasis on SA’s unity in diversity. By the White Paper of Arts Culture and

Heritage, which is the overarching document for national cultural policy, cultural diplomacy is configured as international cultural cooperation. In the Cultural Promotions Act of 1998, functions of cultural diplomacy are relegated ‘exclusively to the Arts and Culture Minister’

(Nawa et al., 2017, p. 125). Both the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act of 2005 and the National Policy on South African Living Heritage’, by 2016, furthered cultural diplomacy within cooperative governance based on the definitions in the Constitution (ibid.). An example of the scattered nature of decision-making on cultural diplomacy was highlighted by one of the

DAC’s international relations (IR) directors, who mulled on where decisions on which countries to send and promote SA musicians are taken and his role therein. He said that such decisions happen

At various levels. Every year the president will decide which countries we’re going to engage, during the State of the Nation Address… and in terms of the strategy of the country, which countries we focus on. Then as an IR person [responsible for arts and culture and hired by the DAC] I take my cue from that because I need to go where government wants to go… Then there is DIRCO [who are in charge of leading the international relations mandate], and then you have the Minister of Arts and Culture… I simply support the DIRCO mandate [as much as the budget allows], and I am a conduit between DIRCO and the [DAC], and [between DAC] and embassies…and the outside world…So, for example, if the Minister is in Spain, I will talk to the DIRCO person in Spain [about] deliverables, money transfers…and the kind of support they can give me, and I work through DIRCO in Spain and the Spanish embassy here …about programs and what we want to do…but I will also write to DIRCO here and the embassy [about these plans]. DIRCO focus more on political relations [but have representatives of SA government departments at SA embassies] … but [the DAC] runs its own thing, and DIRCO runs its own thing…There is no central planning for government to say internationally this

188 is what you’re going to do…Sometimes I might suggest something [that might benefit the DAC], but the Minister has to approve it. (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017).

From this picture Mogashoa paints, the suggestion is that all these levels where cultural diplomacy happens are isolated from each other even though they all work to benefit the country. More so, he paints a picture of a less traditional approach to cultural diplomacy. For instance, Mogashoa’s role means that he liaises between various bodies of different governments and cultural stakeholders. His duties look very much like those of one in the role of a traditional cultural attaché. The difference is that he executes his duties from within SA.

He also reports to the Minister of Culture rather than an ambassador.

Nawa et al. (2017) also discovered other alignment problems while reviewing the SA cultural diplomacy framework. One is that the DAC has internal structures that focus on regions like Africa and the Middle East, and these structures are meant to engage in cultural diplomacy with these regions. They say the department, however, ‘does not have a cultural diplomacy policy and international relations strategy (IRS)’, which is why it collaborates with other government appendages to further specific goals (Nawa et al., 2017, p. 126). In this regard, the

DAC collaborates with departments like the Department of Trade and Industry to advance the export of cultural goods (ibid.). Another framework problem detected by Nawa et al. (2017) is that of ambiguity. They suggest that even at DIRCO, cultural diplomacy is incorporated in the public diplomacy directorate functions. These functions address ‘relationship building’ through exchange with ‘unmediated “people-to-people” contact’, ‘profile raising’ and ‘advocacy’ where the government sends controlled messages (Nawa et al., 2017, p. 126). The directorate’s purpose is to ‘“communicate South Africa’s international relations and cooperation policy and its implementation as well as to project a positive image of South Africa both at home and

189 abroad”’ (Molobi in Nawa et al., 2017, p. 126). Therefore, cultural diplomacy at DIRCO is not driven by those appointed as cultural attachés (Nawa et al., 2017).

Graham (2015) has also commented on the DAC’s unfulfilled51 plans and need for cultural attachés at SA missions. She noted that in spite of legislation for cultural diplomacy, there is inadequate coordination between DIRCO and the DAC, meaning that foreign policy objectives trump cultural objectives. As such, SA has ‘been pursuing an active albeit informal international cultural programme in support of foreign policy objectives’ with strategic partners in Africa, the UK, BRICS and Europe (Graham, 2015, p. 113, p. 64). Her assessment was that countries tend to “concentrate resources on specific areas or elements aligned to their broader foreign policy objectives” when it comes to exercises in cultural diplomacy (Graham, 2015, p.

28). She subsequently identified the main foci of SA cultural diplomacy as ‘economic’ development and nurturing the national ‘identity’ (Graham, 2015, p. 74).

Graham (2015) finds that the explicit omission and underdevelopment of the concept of cultural diplomacy in SA institutional documents at government level, like those of the DAC and DIRCO, indicates that “a sustainable and cooperative relationship between DAC and

DIRCO on cultural diplomacy has not been institutionalised” (p. 89). This she finds motivates for the distance she observes between the political agenda and the cultural agenda in the DAC’s cultural diplomacy efforts (p. 106). Furthermore, Graham (2015) noticed that non-state cultural actors are more prominent in SA’s cultural diplomacy exercises because of this DAC-DIRCO

51 The former DAC Director General confirmed that around 2013, and during his tenure at the DAC, a separate strategic process involving DIRCO ensued to realize the department’s aims “to go international” with SA culture by showcasing it and driving its exports and supporting existing programs with similar goals. This process involved a way “of thinking about cultural diplomacy” that the department had “hoped was going to result in us having cultural attaches in the different embassies who would promote SA arts and culture in those jurisdictions, but we didn’t quite get there” (Xaba, 2017). The strategy was supposed to be presented to Cabinet (ibid.). Cabinet was not in favor of this approach possibly also because “cultural diplomacy has perhaps never quite overcome the bad reputation it accrued through its deployment during the Cold War” (Carter, 2015, p. 479; Mitchell, 2016). Nonetheless, Xaba pointed out that towards the end of his tenure, DIRCO gradually began to see the significance of the DAC’s cultural diplomacy proposals “from an economic growth point of view, the identity of the country and expanding South Africa’s influence in the world” (Xaba, 2017). 190 distance. Fisher (2014) also confirms that “rather than government, it is cultural actors, in tandem with international partners and the cultural institutes/embassies of EU Member States and EEA countries, that are driving the international cultural agenda” (p. 3).

This view invokes Salamon (2002) who suggests that more actors outside of the traditional government sphere act to or solve public problems, and also form “complex networks” for their causes (ibid). Salamon finds that the implications of the policy environment on policy programs is that suitable policy instruments would need to be complex and consider the attributes of actors in the networks. For instance, “actors have their own perspectives, ethos, standard operating procedures, skills, and incentives”, and so they affect what kind of tools are possible to meet all of their interests or political positions (Salamon, 2002, p. 1627). Also, the network of actors is plural and interdependent even if the relationships are asymmetrical (ibid).

Tools from these networks, therefore, challenge norms ascribed to political tools such as definition, attributes, categorization, evaluation methods, dimensions, etc. Simultaneously, the nebulous nature of these tools means that issues of management, legitimacy and accountability linger over programs from such governance structures.

Non-government actors have realized that it is unnecessary and may in fact be better for the government not to be involved in taking SA culture abroad. For instance, Roshnie

Moonsammy is concerned that when cultural diplomacy exercises are run by the government, they might “be very partisan” (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). She suggests that government should rather “make connections with South African promoters and programmers and institutions” (ibid.). She finds that working this way would ensure that presented programs are suitable, and that “what we get out is equal for both the country where the music is performed and the musicians or people there” for the sake of integrity (ibid.).

Mogashoa of the DAC differs with this opinion, submitting that the government always has a role and is always present in cultural diplomacy. He says that “when [SA] artists are successful 191 and are able to perform overseas, it means that government has done its job” and that “when the government does its job well it is invisible” (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July

17, 2017). He implies that this invisibility of the state in cultural diplomacy or in the cultural sector gives the impression that artists are acting independently, and without the aid or interference of the government whereas in fact the conditions to act independently are enabled by the government. He says the independence of artists and non-government bodies to act within cultural diplomacy or other cultural initiatives means that trust exists between them and the government.

Nevertheless, encouraged by existing WPACH statements, the DAC persistently pursues cultural diplomacy. For instance, by 2002, the SA ministry of culture had already seen the results in increasing ‘music exports to foreign markets’ enabled by a project ‘initiated early in 2001 in collaboration with the organizers of Celebrate South Africa at the High Commission in London’ (DACST, 2001, p. 5). The project had ‘generated increased awareness’ of the music industry and ‘created a platform for project-based industry/government partnerships” (ibid.).

Other early DAC-supported examples of cultural exchange related to music, include sending musicians to the MIDEM music expo in 2005, and annually or biannually to spaces like SXSW,

Reunion Islands, PanaFest (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). Another is “the World Dance Music Conference in Miami every year in March” (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017).

At MIDEM “SA music professionals [had] the opportunity to make vital international business contacts”, participate in “trade related meetings” on “international music licensing, export of recorded music products, music publishing, digital distribution, content management, synchronization and music production” (DAC, 2008, p. 15). At MIDEM, “in 2010, South

Africa was the country of focus”, for instance, and in the climate of economic decline that was affecting MIDEM at the time, that showcase “proved that a focus on a country can draw 192 interest” (ibid.). The event was centered on a retrospective of Miriam Makeba’s music and various artists performed (ibid.). The post-performance dinner attracted important players in the music industry, and it was extremely well-attended compared to other MIDEM events in recent history (ibid.).

As Nawa et al (2017) and Graham (2016) have revealed, the international cultural relations at the DAC are carried out by an internal international relations division. This unit communicates with embassies and consulates (N. Tshabalala, personal communication,

February 28, 2017). Through the unit, the DAC is able to ‘coordinate and facilitate with [SA] embassies across various countries”, where embassies are ‘usually short-staffed’ and work on limited budgets for culture (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017).

Particular divisions of the DAC then support the internal international relations division in terms of the needs at these missions (ibid.). The internal international cultural relations division drafts cultural bilateral agreements, where they “identify areas of interest” and “cultural aspects where they could partner” (ibid.). Sometimes, for instance, “we have industry leaders who go over to other countries” for exchange programs or to share knowledge on the industries in which SA has some strength (ibid.).

Furthermore, in recent years cultural diplomacy has been getting a different treatment by the DAC since the implementation of MGE. One initiative allows individual musicians to approach the DAC with proposals “under the Mzansi Golden Economy projects called Touring

Ventures” for funding (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). The fund supports artists to go abroad. That said, however, each project is “analyzed on return on investment” (ibid.). Another MGE first is the hiring of frontline overseas-based consultants.

This is despite the existence of the aforementioned internal international relations unit at the

DAC. The objectives of MGE, such as attaining market access for SA culture, have been addressed in ways including the outsourcing of services that would have been part of the role 193 of cultural attachés. For instance, with the recognition of the need to support DAC programs abroad, and therefore for cultural attachés at SA missions, and to counteract failed attempts to satisfy that need, consultants were hired during former Minister Arts and Culture Paul

Mashatile’s tenure (Anonymous 2, personal communication, July 14, 2017; S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). The consultants were international relations managers to assist with global market access (Anonymous 2, personal communication, July 14, 2017). The consultants were based in Beijing, London, New York (NY) (Anonymous 2, personal communication, July 14, 2017). They were, however, not assigned to SA embassies

(Anonymous 2, personal communication, July 14, 2017; L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017; S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). There was a consultant who was based at the embassy in France though (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). In NY, Kim Jawanda was the DAC consultant contracted for three years in this role (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). Her role was essentially to “identify opportunities for SA” arts and culture in the region (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017). To support much of what MGE aimed to do, Jawanda was also tasked with creating and monitoring international market projects,

Utilizing international platforms, [which] was part of the [MGE] market access[component], part of creating audience development, creating demand for our Cultural and Creative Industries products. And Kim was brought in as an international stakeholder relations manager to then identify platforms, but also initiate projects internationally that can create spaces and platforms and audience development for South African artists… So, she would create partnerships with various stakeholders, with sponsors (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017).

194 Other Cultural Policy Powerbrokers at the Festivals

Government Powerbrokers

In this research context, powerbrokers are understood to be influential entities that have powers to impact the decisions of others in a particular arena (Caro, 2006; Iaryczower & Oliveros,

2016). A powerbroker is able to negotiate on behalf of a group whose interests the powerbroker represents, and in a way that garners the powerbroker more power after achieving the desired negotiation goals (ibid.). In this section, I will only discuss SA cultural policy powerbrokers at the festivals. These are DIRCO, which was at both festivals, and the DTI, whose representatives were only at SAAF.

DIRCO

DIRCO has a mandate to further SA’s multi-dimensional interests abroad to improve the country’s global positioning (DIRCO, 2011). The department privileges public diplomacy in actively projecting SA’s ‘image, values and culture both domestically and abroad’ (ibid., p.

36). DIRCO bases its diplomatic operations on the philosophy of Ubuntu, which is an approach to diplomacy articulated in the White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy as

‘Humanity’ and is reflected in the idea that we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others. [The philosophy] recognises that it is in our national interest to promote and support the positive development of others. Similarly, national security would therefore depend on the centrality of human security as a universal goal, based on the principle of Batho Pele (putting people first). In the modern world of globalisation, a constant element is and has to be our common humanity. We therefore champion collaboration, cooperation and building partnerships over conflict. This recognition of our interconnectedness and interdependency, and the infusion of Ubuntu into the South African identity, shapes our foreign policy. (DIRCO, 2011, p. 4).

From this synopsis of the principles of SA foreign policy are evidently people-centered.

Due to the multiple SA interests DIRCO has to address, however, culture is one among many

195 goals to meet for SA. Culture, therefore, only plays a small role in the people-to-people approach of improving relations between SA and other countries. As Smith (2012) noted, SA’s soft power is predominantly based on the country’s moral authority. Furthermore, as also noted in the literature review, there are no cultural attaches or formal cultural programs at SA embassies around the world (Graham, 2015; Nawa et al., 2017). DAC representatives have attested to this, and to the fact that the relationship between the DAC and DIRCO is on an ad hoc basis (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017; L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). This means that the DAC only works with DIRCO, and vice- versa on specific occasions or on a project-to-project basis. There is no on-going strategy for the promotion of SA culture abroad, by DIRCO or by DIRCO with the DAC. So, in its role as a powerbroker for SA culture, DIRCO is weak.

The occasions where SA culture has been more prominently at SA consulates and embassies abroad have been when SA consulates or embassies mark SA public holidays (J.

Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017; L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). Key national days are part of the “Celebrate South Africa

Calendar at embassies”, at which the DAC participates per the invitation of the embassy or consulate (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). The participation of the

DAC on the calendar is also based on “annual strategic plans and annual performance indicators which provide a list of places where South African music should be exported to or performed”, where the DAC would suggest to the external mission which artists should be showcased there (ibid.). On an occasion where the DAC is invited by DIRCO to participate at embassies, DIRCO would liaise with the DAC on requested cultural industries practitioners and other representatives of SA’s CCI’s for the event. These representatives of the SA CCI’s would not be chosen as part of an ongoing strategy, or to strategically position SA arts and

196 culture in a particular light. They are merely entertainment for the event and benefit the invited dignitaries and embassy personnel.

DTI

The Department of Trade and Industry focuses on economic empowerment; industrial development; trade, export and investment; financial assistance; legislation and business regulations (DTI, 2017). Its mission is to

Promote structural transformation, towards a dynamic industrial and globally competitive economy; provide a predictable, competitive, equitable and socially responsible environment, conducive to investment, trade and enterprise development; broaden participation in the economy to strengthen economic development; and continually improve the skills and capabilities of the DTI to effectively deliver on its mandate and respond to the needs of South Africa's economic citizens. (ibid.)

For the creative sector, the department “aligns creative-industry development to formal industrial policy” through the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) (Joffe & Newton, 2008b, p. 237). Essentially, the department includes the arts in industry policy as a way of diversifying the economy from its predominant reliance on traditional commodities to participation in the knowledge economy (Masoga, 2014). IPAP facilitates this inclusive and integrated diversification and brings structural changes to the economy (ibid.). Furthermore, the cultural industries offer “non-traditional tradable goods and services that are competitive in both export markets and the domestic economy” to this diversification (ibid.). Among other things, the

DTI, therefore, supports the innovation, cultural branding and the creation of standards the country’s CCI’s (Masoga, 2014).

As such, the DTI sponsors ventures of export in the SA CCI’s. For example, the DTI sometimes invites the DAC on trade fairs and expos so that the DAC can represent SA’s cultural products and the business of arts and culture in terms of export and import promotion

197 (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017). Accordingly, the DTI was at SAAF to catalyze the role of SA cultural products as tradeable commodities for the SA economy by providing information on SA economic, industrial and financial conditions and regulations, arts and culture prices, import duties and quality control. The DTI’s role at SAAF would be to attract and inform potential investors about SA’s film and music products.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I introduced SA’s government-sanctioned national cultural policy as contained in the 1996 White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage (WPACH), but that it is under review.

I explained that cultural policy-making occurs simultaneously at national, provincial and municipal levels of governance. The DAC is the main developer of such policy at the national level, even though other government departments like DIRCO and DTI have interests in the state of SA culture and can act on its trade and diplomatic aspects.

I discussed that since 1994, there have been disagreements on who makes policy, how consultation takes place, when stakeholders get to participate, due process and the legitimacy of the activity in the policy-making process, how problems are defined, spoken about and resolved. These disagreements have been due to the economically unequal and multicultural nature of SA society. Moreover, like in other places in the world, SA cultural policy discourse has similarly been steeped in politics about who can create topics about cultural policy, “with what authority”, how the limitations of those topics are set or ‘what can be said’, what the need or policy problem is, which group is suggested as a policy problem, what is the timing of what is said about the policy problem, and where what is said happens (Bacchi, 2000, p. 51-52). And this speaks to how much of a voice some stakeholders have in the sector and what the priorities are, which is evident in the next chapter. More so, the possibilities for how discussion takes place and its intended solutions around cultural policy-making has been fixed within policy

198 discourse parameters that have restricted progress for new policy approaches and developments, beyond matters around who controls the debate. This arrested development is also shaped and complicated by entities outside of the DAC, such as Cabinet and global institutions that embrace the culture-development framework, and those like DIRCO who view

SA’s soft power in narrow terms relating it mostly to SA’s moral authority.

As in other social policy spheres, and again due to the economically unequal and multicultural nature of SA society, cultural policy is often marked by debates on transformation, equality, reconstruction and development. Later in the democratic era, there have been more fervent debates on the contribution of culture to the economy. The debates on the economy and culture are due to a more aggressive instrumentalist approach by the government. I thus showed how cultural policy has been based on broader national government development policy since 1994. I discussed how this instrumental approach is the result of the pressure the government has been under to provide jobs, reduce unemployment and stimulate greater economic growth, while the other imperative has been to create social unity.

I explained that the 1996 WPACH is informed by socialist ideology, which includes its principles of direct engagement with culture and consultation with its stakeholders, as well as the provision of equal access to culture. Simultaneously, it espouses neo-liberal principles such as allowing markets to make determinations on national culture and conceptualizes the sector as an industry. So as much as the legislation also puts emphasis on cultural access, government involvement, representativity, etc., it also declares the government as a facilitator involved at arms-length in relation to service provision to the socialist objectives inherently stated. As evident in Chapter 6, these architect-facilitator model circumstances can be complementary, but they are sometimes open to broad interpretation and lead to conflict on the role of the government in the sector. This is so, even with later economy-oriented policy directions driven

199 by influential strategies such as CIGS, CSA and MGE, which were implemented by the DAC to meet national development goals more incisively.

In the chapter, I also established that the DAC actively pursues cultural diplomacy, even though the legislative framework it uses has inconsistencies. Furthermore, that cultural diplomacy is driven by foreign policy imperatives, focuses on economic development and prioritizes SA’s brand identity more than the growth of the cultural sector. In this framework, personnel who hold the role recognizably closest to traditional cultural attachés at embassies, in fact work within the DAC, in SA and not at SA embassies. These are the DAC’s International

Relations directors for arts and culture who liaise with DIRCO from SA, and those who often initiate the temporary projects that the DAC runs with DIRCO.

Providing the background to the cultural policy environment was important to explain how and why festivals like SAAF and Ubuntu are role players in the national cultural, diplomatic economic policy agenda. This chapter, therefore, set the foundation for chapters 6 and 7. It confirms that the festivals are more than about the role the DAC, the DTI and DIRCO have in promoting SA culture. That said, however, this chapter is the basis for showing that

SAAF was a DAC project founded on national development goals. It was the basis for discussing the difference between SAAF and the Ubuntu festival, which was based on different aims and principles.

200 Chapter 6 – Unit of Analysis 1: The South African Arts

Festival, Los Angeles 2013

Introduction

This chapter presents unit of analysis 1 of the case study, which is the 2013 South African Arts

Festival (SAAF). The festival is first described and presented here as part of as an exercise in international cultural relations by the SA government in the USA. Thereafter, the festival is framed through seven themes, derived from Hauptfleisch (2007) and Getz (2010), who suggest that the defining characteristics and common constituents of festivals relate to their purpose, inherent politics, outcomes and common organization dynamics. The themes are organizer, location, objectives, programming, stakeholders, process and outputs. I then conclude with the findings.

Description of the Festival

SAAF took place in Los Angeles in 2013. It was held at venues including the SA consulate in

Los Angeles (LA), and Grand Performances, a live music venue in downtown LA, and the

Omni Hotel. Over three days, from October 4-6, the festival showcased seven South African films and eight musical acts. The festival was initiated by the South African Department of

Arts and Culture (DAC) with aims of market penetration, technology upskilling and fraternity.

On October 4, guests were invited to a reception to launch the festival. The guests were entertained by one of the bands on the festival bill, the Mahotela Queens. On October 5, the music showcases happened, and on October 6, SA films were screened. Although the event was commissioned by the DAC, it was organized mainly in partnership with the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). Other collaborators were the official agency for marketing the country, BrandSA, as well as the Department of Trade and Industry 201 (DTI). The public could attend the festival for free, even though for some of the venues making a reservation prior to attendance was necessary. The festival was a once-off event, and was not repeated in the US after 2013 even though it was planned as an annual event (Kings, 2014).

SAAF had three characteristics. It was hosted in the USA, on foreign soil. As such, it had a predominantly foreign audience that was not necessarily au fair with the cultural identity of SA. In this way, SAAF is a festival that was influenced by business trends because it took

‘to international markets’ through ‘outward internationalization’ where its activities were performed ‘in foreign markets’ (Ferdinand & Williams, 2013, p. 204). Second, as the content of the festival was focused on the diversity of SA culture, the event was an implicit commentary on the national identity of SA. The third characteristic is that more than one SA government department was involved at the festival. This means that broader SA government policy interests were represented at the event.

Organizer

The two organizers at SAAF are the characteristically different DAC and DIRCO who collaborated only to make the festival happen. DIRCO and the DAC are each defined and governed by politically derived policies individual to them in terms of how they act at SAAF.

In fact, each department had a complimentary but different set of objectives at SAAF (J.

Klopper, personal communication, July 13, 2017). The festival was initiated by the DAC, and its aims were also determined by the DAC (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February

28, 2017; J. Klopper, personal communication, July 13, 2017; L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017).

The DAC is the SA cultural ministry mandated by national cultural policy to promote, preserve and develop SA culture in its diversity nationally and abroad (DACST, 1996). The responsibilities and jurisdiction of the department are outlined in the 1996 WPACH. In this

202 way, the DAC is also responsible for cultural diplomacy, or cultural exchange, to expose the expertise of creative industries participants who would benefit from collaborations with cultural industries participants from other countries (DACST, 1996). Through its MGE policy strategy, the DAC at this festival aims to pursue and attain politically defined goals of economic development and social cohesion, as well as objectives specific to its mandate.

In the 1996 WPACH, the DAC is declared a facilitator in the sector. The DAC, therefore, does not act for sector stakeholders directly, but opens doors for the cultural sector.

The DAC gives the sector agency to act on the latter’s own best interests. As such, SAAF could only be an environment of opportunity for the cultural sector to further its own interests. As part of the government, the DAC created SAAF for other government stakeholders to drive the larger economic growth interests of the national government.

Considering that SAAF is based on the terms of the 1996 WPACH upon which the

DAC acts, it could be said that the festival as a cultural diplomacy program of the DAC is constrained by national cultural policy. For instance, possibly because the conceptualization of cultural diplomacy is ambiguous and not comprehensive, the DAC could not overtly announce this festival as an exercise in cultural diplomacy or as a new foray in engaging in relations of soft power and generating hard power through culture with the USA. The dated national cultural policy outlook on cultural diplomacy also constrains the actions of the DAC in relation to the role of SA cultural sector participants in cultural exchange initiatives such as SAAF.

According to the 1996 WPACH, for instance, SA artists are designated a more subordinate apprenticeship role to their international counterparts, where the international counterparts are supposed to expose and introduce SA artists to international creative practices.

As such, international artists are put in a position of authority to provide SA artists with sector skills. This is because the 1996 WPACH terms on cultural exchange fundamentally respond to the effects of SA’s political isolation during the apartheid era, where very few SA artists 203 interacted with those of other countries and the apartheid government supported and disseminated only Eurocentric SA cultural formats to other parts of the world. As the 1996

WPACH does not reflect the full dynamism of contemporary SA cultural expression, but rectifies apartheid wrongs, DAC cultural exchange programs are mostly formulated to counteract apartheid-generated perceptions of SA culture, and to reposition SA culture in relation to SA’s reputation during apartheid. This policy is problematic in that even though its goal is capacity building, it also undermines the talents of at least a generation of post-apartheid

SA cultural sector participants before MGE. The policy represents such talent as unable to offer something unique to the world within cultural exchange, postures SA artists as under-skilled and does so in response to reconstructing apartheid damage. The 1996 WPACH governing the

DAC and its programs is, as such, still in post-apartheid damage-control mode even though

MGE is supposed to act to complement the policy.

DIRCO, on the other hand, is the SA ministry for international relations and cooperation. It was previously known as the department of foreign affairs. Its function is to advance the country’s multiple interests abroad and to improve the global positioning of SA

(DIRCO, 2011). The department uses various means to do this, including public diplomacy, to project the image of the country, its ‘values and culture both domestically and abroad’ (ibid., p. 36). The operations of DIRCO are based on the foreign policy of SA, which is centered on the recognition of humanity’s “interconnectedness and interdependency” (DIRCO, 2011, p. 4).

As such, DIRCO champions collaboration and cooperation globally (ibid.). This is why DIRCO was advancing fraternity with the USA through the display of SA culture at SAAF.

At the same time though, DIRCO does not commonly use culture in its relations with the USA, outside of SA consulates and embassies. As SA foreign policy delineates, engagement in arts and culture is customarily with other global regions rather than the USA

(DIRCO, 2011). SAAF was thus a foray into new territory for DIRCO in terms of its 204 mechanisms of direct people-to-people contact between SA and the USA. So, even though

DIRCO customarily positions SA as united in its cultural diversity globally, the department has not initiated many cultural programs in the USA since hard power has defined bilateral relations between SA and the USA. Even though DIRCO may not directly engage the US through culture, however, the department may have the rationale that including cultural goals is justifiably part of its mandate in the USA since, for instance, cultural diplomacy can be expressed through non-cultural means that represent the culture of a country. As Lenczowski

(2007) suggests, cultural diplomacy involves the “use of various elements of culture to influence foreign publics…including the arts, education, ideas, history, science, medicine, technology, religion, customs, manners, commerce, philanthropy, sports, language, professional vocations, hobbies, etc.” (p. 196).

Another anomaly is the impact of cultural diplomacy, implied at this festival by the collaboration between the DAC and DIRCO. Such a collaboration for an event like SAAF is not common. The relationship between DIRCO and the DAC is only on an ad hoc basis and not formal or ongoing (Graham, 2015; L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8,

2017). Due to this ad hoc relationship, as well as both departments acting within a limited foreign and cultural policy scope for cultural diplomacy, no DAC-led long-term cultural goals are cultivated between SA and the USA after SAAF.

Objectives

SAAF was planned as a platform for promoting and marketing SA music and culture annually in the USA by the DAC (Xaba in Kings, 2014; S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12,

2017). It was meant to introduce new SA talent to the USA, for SA artists “to establish a footprint in the US” for market growth tied to the economy and established in MGE, as a

“springboard to other states” over “four or five years” because the USA consumes a lot of

205 cultural products, and to profile SA as “a country [culturally] at par with other developing world countries” (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017). Decisions on SAAF were related to a DAC strategy, which the former DAC Director General explains in these terms

Part of our strategy as the department at that time was to increase the commercial value of the arts, and by so doing also increase the export of South African artistic expressions to markets that would be interested in working with what the country has to offer. So, taking South African artists to LA was part of increasing their exposure, access to markets, their brand value…in that market…The second thing was to create exposure from a skills point of view. LA is a big hub for entertainment, not just for the States, but for the world. So, exposing South African artists to what happens in LA, to the different studios…We wanted to expose them to how their craft [could be impacted by] where technology is going and opportunities for music…in order to grow the market for South African music. (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017)

The DAC’s John Mogashoa explained some of the considerations made for SAAF aims, that

Culture works on a level where it has to be projected. It has to be showcased... because you can’t buy a product you don’t know. So, you need to expose it…Much of what we do internationally is showcasing52 culture. It’s not really about selling, because you can’t go and sell when people don’t know…Also, the arts doesn’t work well in transactional relationships… People want to have a relationship with you… You need to do three, four, five [events] until people begin to realize that South Africa is there… [We wanted to] grow the market of cultural goods in SA, to profile young and upcoming artists and to project the country’s image positively. The fourth element is really about cultural tourism, because when people begin to see the art and the culture, [they think] it’s not just about the music... So, [for] people to realize that South Africa has a lot to

52 Likewise, Xaba also pointed that SAAF happened at a time when the DAC was extensively showcasing SA culture internationally. The department had embarked on a program called ‘Cultural Seasons’ in France, the UK and China, as “part of a bigger drive to expose our arts internationally” and “in dominant markets across the globe” (Xaba, 2017). The Cultural Seasons were “a year-long joint bilateral multifaceted and multidisciplinary exchange programme involving two partner countries” where the countries reciprocally present “numerous projects and events” on each other’s territory based on their existing agreements, and with the aim of advancing the developmental and national agendas of the involved nation states (Mogashoa, 2017b, p. 1). The DAC embarked on Cultural Seasons following in-house research it had conducted on “the consumption of arts products” and ‘the export potential of different arts products in different markets’, where, for instance, it transpired that different SA cultural forms of expression were more likely to be consumed by specific cultures or countries, and that “you don’t advertise in a market where you don’t sell” because if you “advertise there, you’ve got to have channels to sell there, and cultural diplomacy becomes that [sustainable advertising] channel” (ibid.). 206 offer in terms of tourism [and realize that] you have the infrastructure, you have WIFI and lions are not roaming the streets [and that] Africa is not homogenous. (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017).

What Mogashoa invokes here is Schneider (2009), who suggests that cultural diplomacy has the capacity to do away with stereotypes about a nation, group or place by reinventing perceptions in cultural exchange. SA, therefore, is packaged at SAAF to be reimagined. Here, Mogashoa also invokes Falassi (1987), who positions that some of the most primary functions of festivals involve renouncing and announcing culture, even when over time the activities of festivals expand to include different forms of market-focused consumption. In other words, the DAC intends to showcase SA culture so that it is ultimately consumed for its familiarity, and the DAC intends to do that through festivals in the USA which could generate other commercial interests for SA. Nonetheless, other formal statements on the objectives of the festival have confirmed that SAAF was mainly a market penetration exercise for SA culture

(Riegle, 2013; DAC, 2013). The festival was thus intended for audience development, to create awareness about SA’s CCI’s and to increase their export value (CSR, 2013; DAC, 2013; S.

Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017).

SAAF was also a way for technological skills development, to enable skills transfer and networking between SA and USA industry specialists (DAC, 2013; CSR, 2013a; Kings, 2014;

S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). Skills development relates to Human

Capital Development, one of the four main MGE goals. According to an interview with the

Director General of Arts and Culture at the time of the festival, Sibusiso Xaba, SAAF was supposed to enable collaboration and partnerships between participants who operate at different levels of the cultural sector in both the USA and SA (Kings, 2014). This would enable forms of skills development in the sector. This rationale follows a suggestion by Comunian (2015) that artists who work in similar formats, or communities of practice, tend to group together

207 temporarily in order to achieve growth and learn from each other. She has also stated that although festivals are temporary, they are ecosystems in which peers flourish because they gain visibility, transfer knowledge amongst each other, set standards and develop formal and informal networks that support their work infrastructure (Comunian, 2011). Another objective for SAAF was for the strengthening of cultural bonds with US audiences that were already familiar with SA’s music of the apartheid era (DAC, 2013; CSR, 2013a; Kings, 2014). In this way SAAF was supposed to encourage fraternity by reinvigorating the connection ‘between the people of the US and South Africa’ because of a shared political history of cultural and political movements between SA artists and artists in the USA who were active in the struggle against apartheid (CSR, 2013a, p. 16).

DAC personnel and management also confirmed that the festival aims were to promote the SA CCI’s, for audience development and creating jobs for local artists by raising their profiles abroad and giving them diverse platforms (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication,

June 8, 2017). Providing such an “enabling environment” is based on the department’s mandate, policy and strategy (ibid.). The aims were specifically “located in DAC policy on

South African music exports, taking South African music to the world, breaking new avenues and cultural diplomacy”, new markets, and “to create [business] opportunities for South

African music business managers to interact with their counterparts in the USA” (G.

Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). Apart from business opportunities, the point of the exercise was also to “create co-productions” among SA and USA musicians as well as managers, based on international treatise on cultural diversity to which DAC is signatory (ibid.). Fundamentally, the DAC wanted to “penetrate the American market”, since the country is the “capital of entertainment…we wanted to see if there is mileage” to the idea

(N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). So, the DAC wanted to test and create an interest there for SA artists (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 208 2017). Furthermore, the DAC wanted to “tell a South African story to the American audience”, to “celebrate South Africa, with South Africans in America so that they would remember the sound from home”, and to “showcase the constant diversity we always speak about, the inclusivity related to the rainbow nation” (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February

28, 2017). The DAC wanted to present the festival as a unit highlighting all these aspects, and to show the world what SA has to offer (ibid.). The benefit for artists was that they could network, create relationships, capitalize on the opportunity of being at such a festival and create other opportunities for themselves (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017;

N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017).

The objective of promoting SA culture and improving the country’s reputation is a pursuit of soft power. So is forging skills transfer between SA-USA industry specialists and strengthening cultural bonds. Market penetration and audience development are economic pursuits relating to the generation of hard power. The DAC’s goal of market penetration for

SA musicians also means market diversification since there are various music festival circuits in the USA. Additionally, due to North-South hemisphere seasonal differences, summer festivals in the USA happen at different times to SA, and so musicians could have access to both circuits (Jansson & Nilsson, 2016). SA musicians could have access to an array of US festivals that happen at a different time to those in SA, expanding their existing sources of revenue in SA.

As mentioned previously, SAAF was also a project of the DAC’s MGE policy strategy, which was implemented to reposition SA’s CCI’s to become the new “gold” of the SA economy (DAC, 2013; CSR, 2013b, p. 17). The main aims of MGE are ‘to place [South

African] arts, culture and heritage at the center of efforts to create sustainable livelihoods, skills development and economic growth’ (CSR, 2013, p. 16). This implies that MGE does not regard culture as produced and consumed within the conditions of an economic system anyway 209 (O’Connor, 2009). Instead, the strategy is structured in a way that allocates funds to various projects to drive its objectives, one of which is to contribute to social cohesion in SA society

(CSR, 2013b; DAC, 2011a, 2011b, 2013). These aims explain some of the motivations to

SAAF being “reflective of the country’s colorful diversity” and representing “contemporary artistic movements” (DAC, 2013). As such, the DAC’s MGE objectives align with DIRCO’s

Ubuntu unity-in-diversity-centered foreign policy objectives and economic pursuits. So, as a project of MGE, the festival projects SA’s social cohesion ideal for diplomatic purposes, commodifies SA’s cultural diversity for a cultural consumer and tourist market, and positions culture as an economic generator. The latter motive is a recurring theme in this unit of analysis.

Additionally, by strengthening cultural ties with the USA, SA could generate wealth and grow its economy (hard power) and pursue a different reputation as having globally significant cultural output (soft power) for itself among US allies also in order to grow the SA economy.

In this way, the festival would serve as an intervention by the SA government for national development using culture (Matarasso & Landry, 1999).

The SA government statements here reveal too many objectives. They also render the cultural diplomacy implemented here broad in its focus. The objectives are testament to what

Hicks (2007) has observed about cultural diplomacy, that it often tries to do too much. He has observed that cultural diplomacy simultaneously tries to gain international partners, “to pursue relations with other cultures”, harness creativity to “assist the creators to benefit themselves, their economy and the internationalisation of their culture”, etc. (Hicks, 2007, p. 1224). Some of the objectives he states are similar in this context and make this exercise ambitious in all it tries to achieve at once.

210 Location

It is uncommon for the DAC and DIRCO to undertake initiatives directly targeted at cultural diplomacy in the USA since SA-USA relations are predominantly based on hard-power-related developmental goals. The decision to initiate the annual SA festival event in LA was because the festival would not be isolated from other SA activities in the city. The festival would create continuity by building on the existing exposure of the LA community to SA culture, therefore capitalize on SA’s “institutional infrastructure” in LA (S. Xaba, personal communication, April

12, 2017). For instance, “South Africa has done quite a few other things in the LA area”, where

SA “film-related entities participate in a lot of festivities and film festivals in the LA area” (S.

Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). LA53 was thus selected as the city best suited for SAAF as an MGE-based project also because LA is a center for the creative industries on a large scale (CSR, 2013). The city was chosen by the DAC for its vibrant music and film sectors, its established reputation as a leading center of music and film production, and due to its proximity to technological innovation hubs (DAC, 2013; Los Angeles Mission, 2013; G.

Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017; S. Xaba, personal communication, April

12, 2017). Having the festival in LA was a way to take advantage of the infrastructure in LA, where arts economies support each other, because they are co-dependent and tend to cluster around each other (Currid & Williams, 2010). For instance, the LA “neighborhoods identified as highly concentrated for music were also high for film” (ibid., p. 326). This means that access to one industry network might mean automatic access to another discipline’s network. In terms of proximity and convenience, SAAF would have been more cost effective to host in LA. The

53 Florida and Jackson (2010) place LA only second to New York for the agglomeration or concentration of music infrastructure (business), ‘agents, gate-keepers’, audiences and music talent throughout the USA (p. 312). They attribute this to the ‘emergence of television and the modern entertainment industry that shaped the rise of Los Angeles as a major musical center’ (Florida & Jackson, 2010, 319). They also explain that the city is supported by ‘more affluent, higher-human capital populations, location-specific assets, and technological changes that have lowered the costs for producing, distributing, and consuming music’ (Florida & Jackson, 2010, p. 310). 211 choice of LA as the location of SAAF is thus an example of how projects such as festivals, that are connected to policy strategies like MGE, are implemented on the availability of perceived favorable conditions and are prioritized for their economic benefit more than other determined policy benefits (Watkins & Herbert, 2003). A different and less CCI saturated city in the USA could have met the policy goals of promoting SA culture in the USA while enabling audience development, for instance.

The cultural palate of LA has other supportive dynamics for festivals though. As Currid and Williams (2010) have observed, in LA other types of clustering happen. One is the clustering of infrastructure that enables the creative industries. The other type of clustering is due to the historical development of the city, which means that demand and supply co-exist in the same spatial environment. They suggest that “cultural industries require an immediate consumer base, which means that they tend to locate where demand is concentrated”, and that

“cultural production and consumption often occur simultaneously” (p. 327). SAAF would therefore be an opportunity for participants to simultaneously tap directly into the market consumers, producers, networks and other industry infrastructure. These factors support the notion that the DAC targeted LA for its multiple benefits related to infrastructure, networks and a cultural market for the career growth of SA participants. At the same time, however, considering the diverse motivations for the objectives as well as motivations for the location of the festival, SAAF highlights that decisions on policy tools are not always selected “based on clearly defined overall governmental objectives”, or “on a clear identification of problems”

(Borrás and Edquist, 2013, p. 1521). Such decisions are ad hoc and based on the interests of those participating in the policy process, like the DAC and DIRCO, as well as schemes that have been successful in the past (ibid.).

For the previous DAC Director General, the development of skills was a high priority at SAAF (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). These were technology-related 212 skills that would take “South African talent to the next level”, particularly in “the recording of music, engineering and mastering” (ibid.). So, it mattered for skills development that music production and Hollywood film companies are both based in LA, especially because the sectors that co-exist in LA often have interchangeable skills sets (Currid and Williams, 2010). LA had the potential to enable objectives of upskilling SA music and film industry stakeholders. The

DAC, thus, considered it ‘good business’ to ‘bring South African artists to the attention of the

LA industry leaders’ to hone such skills (Riegle, 2013). The skills transfer, however, would be possible only with the participation of LA’s music and film talent and business representatives, which was I highlight later in this chapter as ultimately unsuccessful.

The event was staged mostly at Grand Performances, in downtown LA. This was also strategic decision to access diverse audiences (Kings, 2014). For instance, festival participants were residents of the greater LA area, SA expatriates, the film and music industry community

(Grand Performance, 2013; Kim, 2014). So, overall, since the DAC was focused on improving the production and distribution of SA culture, LA and Grand Performances had the live multicultural event credentials and capacity to help the DAC do that.

Programming

The music program, attached in Section 1a of the Appendix, included genre variety and cross- generational artists. It involved SA musicians that are established in the USA and those that were unknown there. The program also featured collaborations specifically curated for the occasion. Moreover, the festival program made diplomatic and cultural statements about SA.

To launch the festival, a reception was held on October 4 for invited guests, where the

Mahotella Queens performed (Kings, 2014). The launch reception was the first informal networking occasion for SA CCI and SA political stakeholders and other invited local and international guests. From 3:30pm to 10pm the next day, music performances took place at the

213 Grand Performances stage (Grand Performances, 2013). The lineup consisted of six genres of music performed by artists of different generations. The genres were rock, rap, jazz, SA urban- traditional music, Afro-soul, and popular African contemporary music, including the a Capella style of singing. Each band performed for between half-an-hour to an hour (ibid.). There were also cross-generational collaborations between some of the musicians inspired by the DAC’s aims for the festival to show SA musical heritage and its continuity. SAAF was, thus, a connector between SA culture projected during the apartheid era and what SA offers in contemporary culture (Riegle, 2013; Kings, 2014). By these performances, the festival was a way of “representing the diversity of the South African experience” and a way for the DAC to introduce the music of emerging SA artists to US audiences (Adamek, 2013). The program also predominantly featured artists and music genres that would have been marginalized during apartheid, reinforcing the DAC’s focus on traditional culture and heritage (Shaw & Rodell,

2009). This gesture may be one of the many ways the DAC is prioritizing transformation in the sector, since it has been observed that transformation in the SA CCI’s has been happening at a slow pace (Maree, 2005).

On the line up, musicians whose popularity began during apartheid times were Hugh

Masekela and the Mahotela Queens. Hugh Masekela was a revered afro-jazz trumpeter who had music hits in the USA since the 1960’s (Coplan, 2007; Mojapelo, 2008). Masekela regularly toured the USA and other parts of the world until close to his death in 2018. The

Mahotella Queens are a female vocal group which performs a vibrant cross-over type of urban- rural Zulu dance music called mgqashiyo. They have been performing this style of music since the 1960’s and regularly tour internationally (Molefe & Mzileni, 1997; Coplan, 2007;

Mojapelo, 2008).

The younger generation of artists were Wouter Kellerman, Simphiwe Dana, The

Parlotones, Jozi, iFani and The Soil. Kellerman is a Grammy-Award winning classically 214 trained flautist whose music traverses ‘world music’, new age music and contemporary popular

African music (Mkhwanazi, 2016b). Simphiwe Dana is a vocalist whose church hymnody approach and Xhosa balladeering is categorized as Afro-soul (Coplan, 2007; Mojapelo, 2008).

The Parlotones are a hugely popular rock band that is frequently on tour. Jozi is a hip-hop outfit that samples from a variety of traditional and non-traditional SA musical styles. iFani is a rap artist signed by Sony Music who raps in the isiXhosa language communicating socio-political messages using humor. The Soil is a very popular a Capella and beat-box trio who draw on the experiences of black SA culture and iconic 1950’s SA imagery (Grand Performances, 2013).

In sequence, the line-up was of Wouter Kellerman, then The Soil. After that were iFani, then the Mahotella Queens. Following that group were Simphiwe Dana, The Parlotones, and then Hugh Masekela. Wouter Kellerman and Hugh Masekela collaborated on stage. Jozi and the Mahotella Queens also did a collaboration. The Soil and Simphiwe Dana then partnered up on a song on stage. This choice of artists represented some of SA’s broad repertoire (G.

Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). Some of these collaborations served a function common at festivals, where among the stakeholders a culturally-derived sense of solidarity is inspired (Jaeger & Mykletun, 2013).

The seven genres of music included on the festival line-up signaled a focus on palatability, and this idea drives the prominent theme of the implications of power in this case study. The choice of music at SAAF catered to mainstream US audience tastes. For instance, rap and hip-hop, rock, soul music and a Capella are familiar music to US audiences. This aspect of palatability in the music for US audiences confirms the DAC’s intention for building fraternity with the USA since soft power by its nature works when the commonalities between nations are emphasized for building a relationship. At the same time, presenting US music genres is also a sign of emulating the USA, which has proven soft power, and thus the DAC conforms with the US’ benchmarks and actions for pursuing soft power (Gallarotti, 2011; 215 Lewis, 2015). Furthermore, the cultural diversity of the music genres on the programming speaks to DIRCO’s Ubuntu policy. The latter policy puts emphasis on SA’s unity in diversity, for driving soft power. Another way the festival programming was related to DIRCO’s diplomatic objectives was that since the festival had free admission, and was held at a publicly accessible venue, it enabled people-to-people contact between the people of different nations.

In this way, SAAF was an enactment of public diplomacy by the SA government.

According to the DAC, the festival was “performance orientated” and “business orientated” (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). Thus, apart from the performances, there were also discussion panels that engaged music sector stakeholders about the SA music marketplace. It is common for festival organizers to include workshops, master classes and seminars to festival programs as a strategy for increasing the number of people in attendance and for other benefits of festivals (Andersson & Andersson, 2006). The sessions were free and could be attended by anyone. The panels were hosted at the LA Omni Hotel from

10m to 4pm. Topics included “licensing and royalties, online media players, live music venues, nuts and bolts information for international artists touring the US” (Adamek, 2013; Tejada,

2013). SA music industry experts were invited and flown in by the DAC to participate at the panels (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017; S. Sithole, personal communication, March 25, 2017). For instance, one of the panelists, a representative of The

Southern African Music Exchange, Roshnie Moonsammy, delivered “her personal recommendations as to how the South African government could assist in their homegrown acts' success abroad” (Toporek, 2013).

The music discussion panels were also a space formally intended for networking, dialogue and skills transfer between SA-USA industry experts (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017; L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017; N.

Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017; S. Xaba, personal communication, 216 April 12, 2017). For this purpose, some LA-based industry experts were in attendance. Some of them had some connection to SA music through being based in the USA but were either the managers or lawyers of SA musicians (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28,

2017). The seminar moderator was also a California-based arts administrator, Mr. Jordan

Peimer (Grand Performances, 2013).

Overall, the program was focused on portraying SA’s cultural diversity to advance the social cohesion project run by the DAC, derived in national cultural policy. The program also reflected DIRCO’s Ubuntu policy which puts emphasis on SA’s unity in diversity for driving the country’s moral-authority-based and politically-defined soft power around the globe.

Cultural diversity in the festival programming was also a strategy to appeal to mainstream US audience sensibilities in that the program showcased diverse music genres that were palatable to the US market. The SA music presented, however, sanitized SA music traditions, offering a homogenous experience to the festival packaged to appeal to the desires of the temporary audience (Macleod, 2006; Johansson & Kociatkiewicz, 2011). In keeping with the set objectives for the festival, the form of cultural diversity represented on the program was therefore to make SA culture relatable, attractive and to generate a reputation for SA as culturally significant (soft power). The rationale was that such a representation would lead to the consumption of SA culture, and thus the generation of economic profits (hard power) for

SA. The projection of SA’s cultural diversity on the program, and on foreign territory, was also a diplomatic statement. It was proof that SA was striving for social cohesion, and therefore a way of SA to affirm its democratic credentials in the USA, a country built on social diversity and democratic values. The business-oriented aspects of the festival program addressed the skills development objective which was also diplomatic in that it was about people-to-people dialogue.

217 Stakeholders

Five groups of stakeholders had vested interests in the festival and its mission. Most of these stakeholders were interviewed to share their experience of this festival and are cited here accordingly as authorities in this phenomenon. Government departments and agencies make up the first group of stakeholders. They are the DAC, DIRCO, BrandSA and the DTI. Grand

Performances, the musicians who performed at SAAF, the SA industry experts invited by the

DAC and the audience made up the other groups of stakeholders. The government group invested human, financial and other resources to realize SAAF. Among the government network, only the DTI and BrandSA are the DAC’s MGE partners. The government stakeholders engaged with multiple entities and the other festival stakeholders to meet national and institutional goals that serve SA government priorities.

The DAC promoted SA culture, while DIRCO’s interests were to foster diplomatic relations and advancing SA’s social, cultural, political, economic and other interests through its complex infrastructure. The interests of these departments in the economy of SA arts and culture are complimentary with each other as well as with the DTI, which was at SAAF to further SA market penetration interests, since the event was partly “an export-focused mission”

(S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). The DTI invests in the development of SA business, and its role at the festival was to encourage and pursue country-to-country trade and economic development for SA (DTI, 2017). Moreover, the DTI is a stakeholder in the arts and culture sector due to its policy (IPAP), and because of its role in the creative industries related to its “incentives and supportive measures” for the sector (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). As such, the DTI is a point of reference for information about conditions of trade with SA, the country’s industries, commodities and economy (ibid.).

Meanwhile, BrandSA is the “official marketing agency of South Africa” and has ‘a mandate to build the country’s brand reputation, in order to improve its global competitiveness abroad’ 218 (DAC, 2013). The agency has offices around the world, including LA, and uses the manpower from its locality who ‘understand that market better…and are consistently present’ even when

SA embassy deployees have ‘served their four-year term and left’ (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017). BrandSA does not concentrate on SA culture, but on anything that is of SA (ibid.). The interests of the agency are in the positive representation of the SA national brand, to instill national pride within and outside of SA through working with various stakeholders and using any medium, including SA culture (Lozada, 2015). When the DAC hosts an event that attracts a large crowd in the USA “it is also in the interests of BrandSA to participate [so that it] achieves its targets”, and so collaborating with the DAC is mutually beneficial for both parties (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017). The interests of all four departments converge at the festival, therefore, because BrandSA also has a reputation management role over SA’s arts and culture globally.

The participation of BrandSA at the festival expands the focus of SAAF into the arena of telling a new post-apartheid story about SA using its current and former citizens abroad.

This is because the agency is about positioning SA ‘as a key player in the [global] market place’ and SA reaching out to expatriates (Lozada, 2015, p. 5). Therefore, apart from the aims of

BrandSA to manage the national brand, the role of the agency at the festival was ‘to build pride and patriotism among South Africans, in order to contribute to social cohesion and nation brand ambassadorship’ (Tejada, 2013). From the time the agency was referred to as SA’s Marketing

Council to its moniker since 2010 as BrandSA, the agency has had strategies focused on recruiting SA expatriates to return54 home (Van Der Westhuizen, 2003; BrandSA, 2009;

Lozada, 2015; BrandSA, 2016). Such strategies are based on regaining the critical skills that

54 BrandSA’s strategies have been informed by national development policy shifts. This includes the Accelerated and Shared Growth-South Africa (AsgiSA) in 2006, which encouraged ‘South Africans working outside the country to return’ to reverse critical skills shortages (Jeffery, 2010, p 256). For example, BrandSA has consistently had a relationship with a company called ‘Home Coming Revolution’ to achieve this (BrandSA, 2009, 2006). 219 have been lost to emigration since 1994, or what is often referred to as the ‘SA brain drain’ where highly skilled citizens left SA for greener pastures in other parts of the world (ibid).

BrandSA, as such, often communicates to SA expatriates about contemporary SA, also encouraging them to be the ambassadors of SA abroad (BrandSA, 2002; Lozada, 2015; TMG

Digital, 2017). SAAF was another opportunity for BrandSA to communicate these messages to the SA expat community. BrandSA’s interests are, therefore, in the upkeep of the good reputation of SA.

BrandSA was also formed to reverse SA’s marred reputation caused by apartheid-to- democracy transition politics. The agency was instead meant to promote a positive “new image of the newborn democratic South Africa” within and outside of the country (Lozada, 2015, p.

1). This was for the sake of encouraging tourism and international investment in the country in a way that positioned SA as a “business destination” and as such the “the gateway to Africa”

(Lozada, 2015, p. 3). It is therefore no coincidence that at SAAF, when BrandSA works in partnership with the DAC, SA music associated with apartheid activism or the sound of that era is reintroduced and implicated during the process of rebranding of SA culture to the LA community. The DAC, DIRCO and BrandSA found continuities between a dark era, of a country ravaged ‘by the legacies of hard power’, and a projected soft power centered on a SA’s unity in its cultural diversity (Aronczyk in Lozada, 2015, p. 2). This message is communicated to a varied audience of cultural consumers and business investors.

At the same time, however, BrandSA was not meant to be a platform for cultural diplomacy in its functions of ‘telling South Africa’s good story” (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). Additionally, BrandSA has no formal partnership with the

DAC, but works with the department on an ad hoc basis, when the DAC has a project for which it needs support (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017). This ad hoc arrangement implies lack of policy and thus limits tangible results in this partnership because 220 improving a country’s brand, has to be supported by strong policy that is representative of the chosen clear and coordinated strategy (Anholt, 2008). More so, such coordination lends the strategy credibility. As Wyszomirski (2010) states, due to globalization, digitization and more, it is difficult for governments to control messages they send out, and so national actions should match the distributed messages to reinforce credibility when countries tell their stories. At

SAAF the, the government stakeholders are not coordinated by policies or a singular strategy on how to send messages about SA to the world.

The government stakeholders at SAAF were also driven by a broader set of policy interests relating to the ability of SA’s cultural industries to generate hard power from the US and other ‘North American’ economies (Van Der Westhuizen, 2003, p. 29). Policy and power in relation to these departments are recurring themes in this unit of analysis. The stakeholders were also keen to generate a different brand of soft power for SA in the USA, beyond the one based on SA’s global moral authority. This diversified soft power would instead be built on the influence of the SA national brand through its cultural resources. The centrality of hard and soft power as a benefit at events like SAAF stems from recommendations in the 1998 CSA policy strategy. The strategy advocated for partnerships between government departments like the Department of South African Tourism, the DTI, the DAC and DIRCO. The partnerships would be to rebrand SA as a tourist destination with multidimensional appeal, and to position the country as a producer of cultural products and services that can be accessed globally (ibid.).

All four government appendages, therefore, wanted to reap tangible economic goals (hard power) and intangible reputational benefits (soft power/reputation) for the SA government, but only the DAC wanted such benefits specifically for the cultural sector. The impacts of the CSA recommended collaboration between these government appendages, or the implementation of the collaboration at all, have yet to be measured. In fact, the current ad hoc nature of the relations between the departments suggests that the implementation of this recommendation 221 was not formalized. Nonetheless, MGE has incorporated principles in the CSA strategy. The role of policy in how the departments act is another recurrent theme in this unit of analysis.

The second stakeholder is Grand Performances, an events company based in LA. This is the company to which the DAC outsourced the production of the festival. Grand

Performances is also the company which owns the Water Court outdoor stage at which the music performances took place (broadwayworld, 2013). The company is in the service of the needs of the LA community, and often stages free culturally diverse public events, and SAAF was not a departure from this mold (Grand Performances, n. d. - a). Grand Performances has a mission to deliver “the best of global culture to inspire community among the diverse peoples of Los Angeles, reflective of the many cultural interests across the region” (Broadway World,

2013; Grand Performances, n. d. -a). The organization had the capacity the DAC was looking for in that it has an historical “commitment to presenting contemporary artists from Africa,

Latin America and Central/East Asia” to its diverse audience, which is “multigenerational, multicultural, multi-ethnic and comes from every socio-economic group and geographic area of L.A. County” (Grand Performances, n. d. -b). Grand Performances finds that its space is ripe for “cultural exchange and community building” (ibid.).

SAAF was also a marketing exercise for Grand Performances and proof that the company was competent at hosting cultural diplomacy-related international events (Robinson,

2013). For instance, Michael Alexander, the organization’s executive director, explained that

“working with a foreign government and helping them introduce the depth and wealth of their culture to a Los Angeles audience is an opportunity for [Grand Performances] to demonstrate to a lot of other countries that there’s a value in using culture as part of international affairs”

(ibid.). As such, Grand Performances was interested in getting involved in the event for a profit motive, and within SAAF’s scope as an exercise in cultural diplomacy due to the company’s philosophy of embracing cultural diversity and engagement in the LA community. 222 In fact, even though Grand Performances was not responsible for the press and marketing of the event, the company invited other LA business community members. The company produced “a mailing piece and sent it to the nearly 40,000 people on [its] mailing list” (M. Alexander, personal communication, August 30, 2017). Grand Performances also distributed packs “to various outlets (e.g. music stores [and] arts centers” (ibid.). Furthermore, the organization reached out “to many of the ex-pats who [it] knew through a variety of circles” so that they could “get the word out” (ibid.). Grand Performances received positive feedback from this exercise, with many “requests to be invited to the invitational receptions” (ibid.). The company was thus carrying out what BrandSA was also trying to achieve, to market the event and reach out to SA expats. This duplication of roles makes sense as a convergence of interests to maximize festival impact.

The third group of stakeholders was made up of the musicians who performed at the event as well as their representatives. For this group, the presentation, success or failure of the festival had implications on the impact they would make on the US cultural market, and so they were primary stakeholders with similar interests to the DAC of SA CCI impact in the

USA. SAAF offered them an opportunity for unfiltered representation of SA culture (Riegle,

2013; Kings, 2014). There were other tangible and intangible benefits to such an event, like a potential for creative and economic growth. For example, in personal communication with

Velile Sithole, she noticed an intangible benefit that leads to tangible benefits. She explained that such festivals “cement the relationship between the artist, the management and the DAC, when the artist delivers a good performance” and proves that the artist and management can be relied upon to do the same in future (V. Sithole, personal communication, July 5, 2017). Some of the cited benefits, for instance, are that festivals can introduce musicians to new audiences, expand the touring and performance prospects of musicians, open-up income-generating options, increase professional networks and potential business collaborators, create shared 223 temporary spaces with gatekeepers, and allow for knowledge transfer about the industry between industry participants (Gibson, 2007; Jaeger and Mykletun 2013; Jansson & Nilsson,

2016). It is surprising, therefore, that after the informal networking opportunity at the festival launch reception, there was no other chance for SA musicians to network with USA CCI counterparts. For instance, Rantisi and Cummins-Russell (2012), like Comunian (2011), have reported that with actors in the music industry, networks and networking are more successfully enabled by informal in-person contact. Thus, there should have been more informal networking opportunities. This section establishes networks as another prominent theme in this study.

The collaborations that took place for the musicians, however, were mainly on stage with other SA artists (Kings, 2014). No collaborations or skills transfer happened between SA musicians and musicians based in LA, or with SA musicians and those based in the USA (V.

Sithole, personal communication, July 5, 2017). According to Sölter (2015), multicultural international festivals that aim for cultural diplomacy should involve local talent collaborating with talent from the home country for the sake of audience development. Neglecting this may indicate that such an exercise in cultural diplomacy is mostly transactional because it is not a

‘bi-directional’ actualization of culture channeling ‘trust’ and ‘understanding’ between people and is instead a means to an end (Woolf, 2010, p. 28-29). Furthermore, there was also no input by artists or their representatives about the goals and activities of the festival (V. Sithole, personal communication, July 5, 2017). What this scenario reveals about SAAF is that the musicians were not consulted before, during and after the festival for their input towards realizing the festival for their interests. This is even though the event directly affects the trajectory of their careers as primary stakeholders. The musicians were solely invited to perform music at the festival by the DAC (V. Sithole, personal communication, July 5, 2017).

This element in the organization of the festival and stakeholder management by the organizer also affects the fourth group of stakeholders and indicates a divergence from stated DAC and 224 DIRCO policy interests. This is notwithstanding the principle of Batho Pele (putting people first), in relation to prime stakeholders.

The fourth group of stakeholders consists of SA and US-based music industry experts, apart from the musicians. The SA experts were representatives of various music industry companies. The experts attended the event to paint a picture of the SA music industry and to take advantage of opportunities created by SAAF for the growth of the industry. The group included popular music company dynamos like the then chief executive officer of the South

African Music Rights Organization (SAMRO), Sipho Dlamini and Sipho Sithole, president of the music recording and production company Native Rhythms as well as Moshito. South

African Music Exports (SAMEX) was represented by Roshnie Moonsammy, who also sits on the board of ConcertsSA which promotes live music in SA. Lance Stehr was there on behalf of the record company Mutha Land Entertainment, and Dodo Monamodi of the Association of

Independent Record Companies of South Africa (AIRCO) was in attendance (Toporek, 2013;

N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). This delegation was invited by the DAC to be part of discussion panels focused on the SA music industry (DAC, 2013; Tejada,

2013; N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). They were invited as

“thought leaders of the industry” (S. Sithole, personal communication, March 25, 2017). As such, they shared their insights on the potential and growth of the SA music industry, discussed topics like the “economy of SA’s live performance circuit”, and were there to network (S.

Sithole, personal communication, March 25, 2017).

While in LA for SAAF, for instance, Moonsamy reconnected with old business contacts, who are based in LA and with whom she had worked on various projects in a number of countries (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). In fact, Moomsamy also invited people from other organizations in LA to SAAF (ibid.). This is how she had the chance to explore new and ongoing business opportunities for SA music in LA with music 225 business representatives from there who were in attendance, and outside of the event. SAAF was also an environment where USA-SA industry counterparts could network not only with each other, but with the musicians, SA political representatives and other guests, as well as the general audience. This is one of the advantages of spaces like festivals, where delegates get unparalleled access to prominent industry stakeholders who they would not necessarily gain access to easily or within a short space of time during their careers (Jansson & Nilsson, 2016).

The industry experts were, however, not provided an opportunity to contribute to topics that would be discussed at the festival (S. Sithole, personal communication, March 25, 2017;

R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). Some of them understood their role as being only “in the conferencing part of the event, after the showcasing part of the event” (S.

Sithole, personal communication, March 25, 2017). They understood that they were expected to “give anyone who has never been to South Africa an idea on how the music sector is organized, what is the value chain, what are the ups and downs of it, and whether there is business in the business of music” (ibid.). For instance, Roshnie Moonsammy “did quite a bit of research on the statistics of music, live or recorded” in South Africa (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). As such, at the panels they shared the kind of insider information about the SA music industry that the DTI could not provide.

It is important then to highlight that it was problematic that these expert stakeholders had no opportunity to choose more incisive topics that would speak to the goals and environment of the festival, or that the consultation between the DAC and SA CCI stakeholders did not include festival activities and goals. As Falassi (1987) recommends, the interests of stakeholders should be included in every aspect of the process of organizing a festival, or that these interests matter before, during and after the festival. The panels, however, did not resemble holistic engagement with the SA CCI’s since the chosen topics of discussion were arrived at entirely by the DAC without input from the stakeholder panelists or musicians who 226 are game changers in the industry. Their interests were not prioritized. So, decisions regarding the festival program participants and content were made from the top-down, by the festival organizers, prioritizing government interests and authority. The CCI stakeholders were thus in a service role, and not used as complementary to government interests and goals. The lack of consultation with these stakeholders also means that whatever goals were set by the organizers, related to building the capacity of the SA arts-culture sector, apart from instrumentally

‘exogenous policy demands’ to cultural policy, could not be achieved (Hadley & Gray, 2017, p. 96). This is because even in contexts that further instrumentalist cultural policy key arts- culture stakeholders are policy drivers and enablers, can be beneficiaries and have the agency to advance the interests of their sector in a way that does not interrupt set bureaucratic goals

(Hadley & Gray, 2017; Nisbett, 2013b).

This approach to exclude primary stakeholders creates tension and conflict in the sector.

It also veers from the facilitator approach of the DAC to a more authoritarian method, or architectural mode of management, and reflects part of a culture observed as a top-down approach to the DAC’s operations and change management (Deacon, 2010). With an architectural approach at an event like this, especially at implementation phase, the DAC would not be able to act adequately and more knowledgably on the interests of the sector as the department’s choices would not be CCI conscious, informed or driven. Also, this absence of the voice of key stakeholders at the festival reveals a purpose to the festival that typologies by

Falassi (1987) suggest, that of a festival presented ‘by the establishment for itself’ and ‘for the people by the establishment’ (p. 3). It also establishes the festivals as a site of social exclusion

(Crespi-Vallbona & Richards, 2007). The organizers thus make decisions for the sector and not with the sector, for the sake of the organizers’ greater plan.

Furthermore, the discussion panels were also not well-attended and consisted of very few USA industry specialists that could create more meaningful SA-USA exchange (S. Sithole, 227 personal communication, March 25, 2017; R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13,

2017). US music industry representatives should have been treated as stakeholders here rather than invitees, especially since they were assumed to possess the skills that the SA CCI participants lacked or would push the human capital development goal of MGE. Sithole noted that major US music labels like Sony Music or Universal, or independent labels, could have been invited to discuss “how to break a foreign artist in the American music market” or “festival curators speak on what makes interesting artists in live performance in the US” (S. Sithole, personal communication, March 25, 2017). Moonsamy also observed that “there was no range to receive the South African contingency” and that the panels were “minimally representative” of the LA music market (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). She states that “it was more us than anyone from outside” (ibid.). Similarly, Sölter (2015) recommends that partnering up with local powerbrokers to enable a semi-planned ‘open dialogue’ is essential if cultural diplomacy is key in a multicultural festival. Moonsamy, however, found some benefit to spending time with her SA music industry counterparts. She pointed out that schedules rarely allow that they all gather in one place, and she saw this as a different networking opportunity (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). The kind of networking she refers to here happens when the distance between key industry thought leaders is removed at festivals, which allows for knowledge exchange and expansion (Jansson &

Nilsson, 2016).

Some of the industry leaders also saw value in being invited to the event. For instance,

Sithole suggests that “as an individual I become part of the industry practitioners that the country, or the US, can tap into” and that there’s a potential to be recognized in this capacity and be called back for something similar in the future (S. Sithole, personal communication,

March 25, 2017). He also saw another benefit to participating at SAAF, and that is on an organizational level. He gave the example that artists that he represents through his 228 organization get more exposure from his presence at events like SAAF (ibid.). He viewed the festival as a business opportunity, as such he created a relationship with Grand Performances.

The artists his company represents, The Soil, were offered a US college tour at the festival, which his company resolved was not practicable (ibid.).

The fifth group of stakeholders at the festival consisted of the audience in attendance.

An event’s audience affects the results of the event in that it has the power to make or break the event. For instance, audience size and audience response of the performances are usually used to evaluate the impact of an event or to gauge how the event is received (Abercrombie &

Longhurst, 1998; Snowball, 2004a & 2004b; Frith, 2007; Williams & Bowdin, 2007; Sölter,

2015). Furthermore, the audience is the recipient entity with whom events like festivals communicate, and to whom performers at such events transfer knowledge about their cultures

(Gibson, 2007).

The audience at SAAF was made up of the foreign publics in LA and the SA expats that the SA government was trying to reach, reach out to, and with whom they wanted to create rapport. To create this connection, the DAC catered to audiences that appreciated or had familiarity with one or more of the showcased SA music genres (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). The DAC also created a space that allowed for new audiences to be introduced to SA music (ibid.). According to online video footage of interviews with some of the audience members while the festival was in progress, they attended the festival with openness to this new experience (Kim, 2014). The video interviews suggested that some of the audience members were happy to experience a different culture on familiar territory

(ibid.).

To attract audiences, Grand Performances had to create visibility for SAAF. The company attracted audiences on its online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and blogs. This is customary for festivals in recent years to create event visibility ‘through social media, festival 229 bloggers, word of mouth, and through partners and sponsors’ and for competing with other cultural events happening around the same time (Sölter, 2015, p. 191-195). The purpose of creating event visibility is not only to attract audiences. For the festival presenter, it is also to attract potential partners to help reduce future operating costs and expand business collaborations with the artists (ibid.). This leads us to the theme of processes undertaken.

Process

According to Salem et al. (2004), events management takes on a sequence of four stages. This involves the decision-making stage, the detailed planning stage, the implementation stage and the evaluation stage. In the decision-making stage a catalyst or an individual starts the process by setting the objectives of an event in relation to the organization’s aims, puts together a multi- skilled organizing team to manage the project and assess the feasibility of the project in terms of the resources it requires to achieve its goals. A collective decision is then taken on whether to proceed with the project (ibid.). Salem et al (2004) say that at the detailed planning stage is where the event product is defined, allocated an image theme and a more comprehensive financial strategy to inform the choice of venue, operations management, marketing, human resources and the scheduling. At the implementation stage, the progress of activities planned in the detailed planning stage is monitored and contingency plans are put in place if necessary

(ibid.). During the evaluation stage, the organization or individual tries to determine how they could have better managed the event and make sense of the financial outcomes of the event

(ibid). The team consults all stakeholders, including the organizing team, all its staff, sponsors, audience/customers (ibid.). The cumulative data collected from this phase determines whether the event will be repeated or not (ibid.).

The DAC followed much of the four-stage process and ultimately decided that the festival was a feasible project (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017;

230 Mogashoa, 2017; L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017; N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). According to Mogashoa, the DAC’s director of international relations in the bilateral cooperation unit of cultural affairs, SAAF was the brainchild of the consultant international relations manager for the Americas, Kim Jawanda (J.

Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017). After the project proposal was drawn up, the department undertook internal “desk top” research on the concept of the festival in relation to existing policy, and it conducted a feasibility study of the festival in relation to financial and other resources (ibid.) Considerations of what would work or would not work in LA were factored in after the concept was developed (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12,

2017). Thereafter, a business plan was drawn up, there was a submission to the Minister of

Culture at the time, the minister approved the plan, and then there was a budget allocation (G.

Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). After that there was an interface with the destination, the internal DAC team sent logistics people to LA to meet with DIRCO to set up plans and meet potential service providers and to engage them, then a tender was out for the selection of the service provider, which was then approved (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017; J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017; L.

Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). In fact, Mogashoa stated that before he took on “an advisory role” or “liaised with the embassy [in LA] at the implementation phase” for money transfers and visas and “coordinate with the American embassy [in SA]” in his capacity as “a government employee who could unlock challenges”, he was “involved at the beginning of the project and in terms of the development of the concept” and he also went to the USA and “met with some of the service providers there [along with the Minister in January] less than a year before the event, but after the [DAC Director General] went there” to scout venues (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017). He said that the DAC team consulted with the SA embassy in Washington D.C., met with service providers “to understand 231 how the market works and to look at issues of legality, contracts, accommodation, logistics” and other important issues to put the event together (ibid.). The Director General also scouted the ‘right partners’ before and on this trip (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017).

Kim Jawanda, the DAC’s Strategic Partnerships and Regional Director for North America consultant was also part of coordinating, facilitating and planning this process (ibid.). The final team chosen to work on the project was then approved and there was execution of the plan and procurement of goods and services according to the aims of the festival and the regulations of the Public Finance Management Act (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017;

L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017; S. Xaba, personal communication,

April 12, 2017). Thereafter, the invitations were sent out (S. Xaba, personal communication,

April 12, 2017).

October was chosen as the month SAAF would take place because it is “not a busy month in the arts in SA”, so SA artists are available at that time (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). Peak time for SA artists starts in November, so it was best to “contract them for October” (ibid.). The month is the “end of summer in LA” (ibid.). The festival would also coincide with the US “festival market” and catch LA “at a time when there are a lot of festivals going on” so that unknown SA artists could make a recognizable live performance imprint on American soil (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017).

This scheduling was not the original plan, however. Mogashoa confirmed that the event was

“postponed” from its original schedule earlier in the summer, “after meeting with service providers” (ibid.). Sibusiso Xaba elaborated on this as such,

When we initially started planning the festival, there is a concept which the City of LA had done called the African Market Place. It had been done a few years previously, [but had] kind of died down. We started working with the City to try and revive this because we thought it’s a good platform not just for South Africa but for art and artists…. So, we started planning around that. I mean there were all sorts of difficulties in trying to make that happen, but from our point of view, 232 we had already planned around October to do this Market Place. So, when the Market Place idea didn’t seem to work, we then just continued to do a South African arts festival around October, but also the place we used… Grand Performances, it was [selected because of] the availability of the space…they helped us out with some of the logistical planning. (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017)

Over time “the whole concept changed quite a bit” (ibid.). According to other accounts, when the festival was originally conceptualized and presented to DIRCO, its main purpose was to “raise awareness on the burgeoning film industry in South Africa” in LA (J. Klopper, personal communication, July 13, 2017). DIRCO in LA then became central to the concept since the consulate in LA already highlights “the available locations, talent and skills sets available [in South Africa]” as one of its “key priority areas” (ibid.). The music was, as such, not included in the original idea for LA. Instead, the intention was to take artists of the SA diaspora in the USA and what became the music component of SAAF to SXSW in the summer of 2013, and this was based on annual strategic plans and performance indicators (G.

Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). The DAC has supported SA musicians at SXSW in the past (ibid.). Later, the SAAF concept expanded “to include a concert to feature musical talents from various genres in South Africa that have become immensely popular and were deemed to have an international appeal” (ibid.). DIRCO then “obtained quotations, based on DAC specifications, to organise the event”, but the “DAC decided on Grand Performances” as a suitable venue and collaborator (J. Klopper, personal communication, July 13, 2017). The decision to hire Grand Performances was based on maximizing on the venue because “through one provider, we got to hire the venue, we got somebody who was going to do the running around for us… the invites [and] a whole lot of things for us” (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017).

The management of the festival at DAC level worked in such a way that there were

“three centers of power”, which detrimentally affected managerial decision-making (G. 233 Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). The internal DAC team had a project manager who oversaw SAAF activities and reported to the executive (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). The team itself comprised of two content and creative talent managers, the marketing and events manager who liaised with other DAC personnel, as well as the MGE project manager because MGE funded the project (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). Along with the DAC’s internal organizing team, there was the Minister and Director General’s office, as well as the DAC’s Strategic Partnerships and Regional Director for North America consultant (G. Masokoane, personal communication,

July 26, 2017). The consultant and the DAC internal team went to LA to see the site of the festival and weigh the logistics (ibid.). While in LA, the consulate, the consultant and the DAC internal team also engaged in negotiations on which SA emerging artists would perform at the festival and those that would appeal to USA audience preferences because Americans were already familiar with them, and this was after consultation with the SA embassy in Washington

D.C. as well as on which talent would be ideal for the festival (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017; J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017; N.

Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). This team also shared the responsibility of selecting the diverse musicians who performed at the festival with Grand

Performances (Grand Performances, 2013; N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February

28, 2017; L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017; M. Alexander, personal communication, August 30, 2017). According to Sölter (2015), the organizer of a cultural diplomacy focused festival has to involve content from their country of origin, determined from input by local scouts who are part of local networks and are attuned to local audience tastes. In this case, these would be scouts from LA. Grand Performances played that role by co- determining the SAAF line up. Input from Grand Performances was that along with “the desire

234 to show off the diversity of contemporary, popular music being produced in SA”, other considerations had to be included because

Los Angeles is a city of festivals with many ethnic groups, national groups, music enthusiasts, clubs, promoters (including non-profits like the Hollywood Bowl) etc., bringing in artists from throughout the world to venues year-round. There needed to be some familiar names to draw out the audience… Having the well-known Hugh Masekela and the Mahotello Queens helped attract community attention to the Festival (M. Alexander, personal communication, August 30, 2017).

There were subsequent follow up “tele-conferences” to drive the festival management process along. Moreover, Masokoane notes that DAC programs and their planning are speeded up by how much support they have from the Director General and the Minister’s office, and this is why SAAF took a shorter time than usual to plan (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). This aspect of executive support to DAC programs that become successful or are speedily implemented, has been previously noted by Deacon (2010) and others.

Considering that the DAC’s designated policy role is as a facilitator in the cultural sector, it is unsurprising that the department did not tackle all organizational details directly.

The DAC delegated as much as possible to other entities. As mentioned before, the festival venue and the production of the event were outsourced to Grand Performances. DIRCO hosted the launch reception on its premises. The marketing of the event, for example, was not carried out by the DAC or Grand Performances (M. Alexander, personal communication, August 30,

2017). It was executed by IMC, or BrandSA (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February

28, 2017). In parts of the organization phase, and a stakeholder in the music industry, therefore, the DAC managed SAAF like a facilitator, at arm’s length, indirectly and through outsourcing.

On the other hand, MGE also determines how the DAC executes programs like SAAF.

The strategy allows the DAC to cooperate with DIRCO on a project-to-project basis (L.

235 Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). The departments do not have comprehensive continual projects that run to advance soft power, but DIRCO still has to know what the DAC does in any country outside of SA and how the DAC represents the country

(ibid.). DIRCO, thus, plays a facilitator role for the DAC abroad. For instance, the funds for

SAAF, were “wired through DIRCO’s systems to pay the service provider” in the USA (ibid.).

Regarding the activities that were part of the festival, the DAC only facilitated the engagement of SA music industry experts at the music discussion panels (Toporek, 2013; L.

Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017; N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). As a stakeholder in the cultural sector the DAC acted in absentia at the panels and did not actively participate in the discussions. Musicians and music industry specialists engaged one another instead, using a program with topics predetermined by the DAC and not shaped by consultation with the parties in engagement (DAC, 2013; S.

Sithole, personal communication, March 25, 2017; N. Tshabalala, personal communication,

February 28, 2017). Also, as a policy-designated facilitator, the way the DAC designed the discussion panels was architectural in management style. This is due to the department affording the invited SA industry experts and musicians no input regarding chosen topics for the panels or consulting stakeholders on their interests and regarding which LA-based music industry representatives to invite. In fact, participants made the observation that the panel sessions seemed more of SA industry participants speaking to themselves or speaking amongst each other rather than speaking to their counterparts in the USA music industry (V. Sithole, personal communication, July 5, 2017). Therefore, as a policy-designated facilitator in the arts and culture sector, the DAC changed its terms of engagement with the music industry at SAAF.

The department moved from facilitator to architect in how it provided no opportunities for other stakeholders to contribute to the goals and organization of the festival.

236 There was also no clarity on exactly which or how many USA-based or LA-based music industry professionals were scouted and formally invited specifically by the DAC or Grand

Performances to interact with the SA musicians and SA industry experts. The USA music industry group was therefore not treated as a stakeholder. DIRCO on the other hand stated that they were involved in compiling invitation lists, which “consisted of local government officials, the Los Angeles diplomatic community, prominent South Africans, prominent business and academic contacts and film industry contacts” (J. Klopper, personal communication, July 13, 2017). The consulate also provided evidence of some of the invited music industry guests on their lists, including organizations like Gaslamp Killer Music,

Performing Arts Live, Musical Shapes, Smooth Jazz Magazine, Amoeba Music, One Earth

Music, and The Music Center. A representative of the Black Entertainment Television (BET) executive board was also invited to the discussion panels, but could not participate (N.

Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). The City of LA was also invited to the festival (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). The press releases of the event, however, cited that the USA CCI role players were only ‘encouraged to participate’ at the panels (Tejada, 2013). The indication is not of formal invitations, but the encouragement of volunteerism.

As mentioned earlier, the audience could attend the festival for free, but at the discussion panels reservations were necessary (Grand Performances, 2013). This implies that the general LA community was welcome to attend in its broadest sense, beyond the target audience of US publics and SA expats. From watching video footage of some of the music performances of the festival, the audience was large in the evening performances but did not fill out the venues earlier in the afternoon (Riegle, 2013; Robinson, 2013; Kim, 2014).

The DAC commissioned the festival and had no other external sponsors. When there are sponsors at events like these, the sponsors usually host or insist on a festival launch 237 reception with ‘local movers and shakers’, powerbrokers and decision-makers in the sector to create an environment for them to network (Sölter, 2015, p. 192). This networking environment is also usually a ‘product placement’ opportunity for the sponsor, where the media and guests are invited to listen to speeches and meet the ‘talent’ (ibid.). Likewise, the DAC hosted a reception for VIP’s, where the Mahotella Queens gave a lively performance of mbhaqanga in their beaded traditional Zulu hats. The launch was a product placement opportunity for the

DAC. It was an announcement of the uniqueness of SA cultural products to the USA.

Sponsors also usually want a return on investment (Sölter, 2015). They undertake evaluation methods to gauge this value, and especially through the festival’s marketing means

(ibid.). If a festival has a high return on investment, then the sponsor is associated with success and growth (ibid.). For investors, determining an event’s return on investment matters even if the event is for free. Since SAAF had no sponsor to demand an evaluation of the event, apart from the DAC, the festival’s return on investment remained an internal DAC matter and thus unknown by the public. For instance, apart from three paragraphs that summarize what happened at SAAF in the 2013-14 DAC annual report, there is no detailed publicly available report about the festival. There is no document that assesses the DAC’s return on investment or whether the department met the objectives it set for the festival. Since a detailed impact of the festival is not publicly known, this also means that the festival process was not fully transparent. The DAC also could not share or publicize a report on SAAF since the report would have budgetary and expenditure information and is submitted to the Director General

(L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). Even so, as Clifton et al. (2012) find, when public sector bodies deem evaluation as optional, they do not realize that this kind of outlook negatively impacts citizens in terms of knowing when to support programs and for informing the value of cultural activity. Thus, it is important to evaluate both qualitative and quantitative ‘deliverables’ of an event in the cultural diplomacy process (Banks, 2011, p.119). 238 That said, however, some DAC representatives and festival stakeholders did notice some problem areas with the festival process. For instance, the festival marketing and publicity was ultimately found to have been inadequate (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July

26, 2017). The venue did not cater enough to the youth who are big consumers of new music

(ibid.). The location of the venue may have not been accessible enough since it did not absorb or bring together the diversity of LA, as such the audience was not really representative of the demographic black, Chicano and other numerous LA communities (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017; R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017; V.

Sithole, personal communication, July 5, 2017). Performances could have happened in different areas of LA, and US artists who are in some ways connected to SA could have performed at the festival (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). For instance, there are various markets for events like this, commercial and non-commercial (ibid.).

In addition, the production missed the mark on some acts, which were not suitable for the LA market (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017; R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). The festival’s “biggest short coming” was insufficient attendance by leaders of industry (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). On principle, the DAC takes SA industry leaders on its international programs so that they can

“interface with other industry leaders” (ibid.). Due to these short comings, there could not be a full publicly available record, on various platforms like online videos of the festival and its activities to further publicize SA’s cultural offering (ibid.). The DAC’s evaluation of these and other shortcomings, like a change in administration, may have hindered repeating a similar event as originally planned. DAC officials and interviewee could not verify this.

According to the co-owner and manager of Native Rhythms, who represents The Soil,

Velile Sithole, the artists were very happy with the “excellent” hospitality provided by the DAC as soon as they arrived in LA (V. Sithole, personal communication, July 5, 2017). Sithole 239 considered the venue “beautiful” and she liked that the event showcased many high caliber and established SA artists, but feels that the event did not entirely cater to them (ibid.). For one, she found that the discussion panels had no real impact for SA musicians since “it was basically us talking to ourselves” (ibid.). So, SA artists did not get to meet artists from the USA to “share information with them” (ibid.). This limited networking “with people from different markets”, and therefore an environment where artists could create opportunities for themselves (ibid.).

Sithole, for example, attended a panel session on “composition rights” where recommendations were made on how artists could better manage their intellectual property when their songs got airplay abroad. At that session, she noticed that there was no one from the USA who reinforced messages on “how it works” (ibid.). She underlines that such conversations, between SA musicians and industry experts, could have happened on the phone or in person within SA borders rather than on an international platform.

Another example she makes is that there are usually “booking agents who scout for talent” at festivals, and that they may come from any part of the world. She wonders if there were any at SAAF. As such, she wonders if the event “benefited the DAC considering the

[probably large amounts of] money” the department used to get SA artists to LA (ibid.). She hopes the DAC uses a different strategy in future because she finds that the goal of such an event should be more than about solely “taking artists overseas”, and that artists need to feel they benefited something (ibid.). Even so, however, Sithole saw advantages in performing for an international crowd, but has also noticed that the SA government acts mostly on private ambassadorial territory and SA holidays when sending locals artists abroad. She suggests that the DAC focus on public rather than private events that only entertain invited diplomats or guests. As much as she acknowledges what the department currently does to participate in international platforms and support festivals, she recommends that the DAC should push artists out of embassies and into international markets more. 240 From this process and the section on stakeholders, it is evident that not all stakeholders were involved at all stages of managing the event. Most of the interests of the non-government stakeholder groups are in fact relegated to one or two stages. This means that the festival process did not have the capacity to always address or accommodate the needs of all the stakeholder groups. The stages Salem et al. (2004) reference are the decision-making stage, the detailed planning stage, the implementation stage and the evaluation stage. In the decision- making stage, the DAC initiated the process by setting the objectives of the envisioned festival in relation to its mandate and aims. At this stage the DAC also established collaboration with

DIRCO and assessed the feasibility of the festival with DIRCO before both departments decided to proceed with the festival. The DAC and DIRCO had input from Grand Performances regarding programming at the detailed planning stage, where the event product was defined and had resources allocated to it. During the implementation stage, the DAC, DIRCO, DTI,

BrandSA and Grand Performances were prominently involved, with marginal participation from the invited SA CCI representatives and the audience. Throughout this stage the progress of planned activities was monitored, and contingency plans were put in place where necessary

(ibid.). The evaluation stage involved the DAC determining how it could have better managed the event and make sense of the financial outcomes of the event so that it could determine whether to repeat the event or not (Salem et al., 2004). The department had some input from

Grand Performances, but no other stakeholders were consulted about the festival outputs.

Outputs

The festival organizers observed that “more than 2500 people participated” on one evening of the festival, which was “double the number anticipated” (Riegle, 2013). The DAC’s 2013-2014 annual report stated that the festival was ‘attended by a crowd of over 3000 people’ (DAC,

2014c, p. 34). That said, however, Grand Performances concluded that they “had decent

241 audiences for everything but could have handled more” (M. Alexander, personal communication, August 30, 2017). From these comments, the greater-than-expected size of the audience created the impression that the event met one of its goals regarding weighing the amount of interest there is in LA for SA CCI products. This means that the event bore some success in that because of its exceeded audience goals, the DAC could confirm that there is interest in SA CCI products. The only problem with this kind of rationale, however, is that the audience capacity of the Grand Performance Plaza is more than five thousand people (Grand

Performances, n. d. -c). This means that the showcase was not a success considering the size of the venue hired for it. Of course, circumstantial audience responses are another way in which policy makers validate their choice of policy tools like festivals (del Barrio et al., 2012). Data about audience responses was not formally collected, however, and so the reports on audience response are in this context a vague measurement of impact.

Without providing information on what its evaluation tools were for the festival, the

DAC also reported that the ‘music showcase drew crowds and positive feedback from the business districts to the neighbourhoods of the city’ (DAC, 2014c, p. 34). The department also noted that some SA musicians found US-based collaborators because of appearing at the festival (ibid.). For instance, there were “collaborative ventures between Jozi and Scoop

Deville (who has produced the likes of Snoop Dog), and Jozi and Kat Dahlia [while the]

Mahotella Queens received a request to tour Europe” (ibid.). Da Les, a member of the group

Jozi, capitalized on SAAF to further an existing arrangement with Scoop Deville (N.

Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). Simphiwe Dana, also stayed for more performances and projects in the USA after SAAF (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017; N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017).

On the Grand Performance Facebook page, there was indeed positive feedback from SA expatriates who attended the event as well as feedback from expats who were simply excited 242 that the festival was taking place at all (Grand Performances, 2013). The multicultural festival managed to appeal to their nostalgia (Lee et al., 2012). The DAC also reported on the discussion panels, suggesting that

The music business seminars provided South African artists with much-needed information on touring opportunities in the United States, US Government immigration policies, federal taxes on income gained in the US, and music licensing issues both in South Africa and in the United States. The topics of discussion included contractual obligations for a touring artist and implications of the laws in the US for touring artists, picking lucrative venues for live performances for touring artists, and US processes and procedures for music publishing and royalty collections. (DAC, 2014, p. 34)

According to interviews conducted by the press with musicians on the day of the festival, the occasion was a window to SA creativity, and it introduced SA’s cultural product to the world via LA (Kim, 2014). The musicians stated that they welcomed the opportunity for the DAC to showcase their music abroad in spaces such as SAAF (Kim, 2014; Kings, 2014).

For them, the festival was a chance to tell SA stories on a firsthand basis without the mediation of external elements (ibid). The festival was also a stepping stone for Wouter Kellerman’s

Grammy publicity tour, which he ultimately won after the event (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017; J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017; N.

Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). For some of the audience members, also interviewed by the press, the festival was a new experience where SA was brought closer to them in a manner and space that was familiar to them (Kim, 2014; Robin, 2013; Riegle,

2013). Some of the festival goers particularly enjoyed the diversity of the SA music experience there (Kim, 2014; Kings, 2014). The festival was thus an experience in cultural education for the audience, where aspects of SA culture were made visible for the engagement of the audience (d’Hauteserre, 2011).

243 There were other lessons for the DAC, too. For example, some of the feedback at the event suggested that the DAC should not limit the festival to only the two showcased disciplines (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). There were requests to expand the festival to include the visual arts, crafts and design (ibid.). There were people who “were interested in seeing South African merchandise” (ibid.). A suggestion was also made that such a festival would benefit more from being closer to the time the BET Awards happened, or even overlap with the awards ceremony, as the awards ceremony has fringe events, and this would matter as SA artists have been nominees at the awards in the past (ibid.).

SAAF was ultimately a once off event that set a new, and possibly different, narrative about SA culture and its cultural industries (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017).

The event presented and promoted the SA cultural product (ibid.). As a show of post-apartheid social cohesion, the festival disseminated information about SA culture through its inclusion of artistic and cultural diversity. The implication is also that all artists in SA have equal opportunity to legitimately express their culture in a way that is not disruptive to the identity of SA in contrast to the apartheid era where there were institutionalized racial divisions. The festival “was the first of its kind that took place in Los Angeles for a period of several days, with all the events fully packed and well attended” (J. Klopper, personal communication, July

13, 2017). It “also had a tremendous impact on the local community since many people associated the festival with the Consulate and to this day, people still remember the events and have been asking when we are holding the next one” (J. Klopper, personal communication,

July 13, 2017). SAAF, thus, set the foundation in the cultivation of SA’s soft power. The festival could not achieve soft power because it was transanctional since it was not implemented more than once (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017).

The factors in this section highlight the festival, as an MGE policy tool, which may not have been appropriate for the long-term objectives set. There were no tools to properly evaluate 244 the festival and its impact, for instance. The festival, if intended for culturally-derived soft power was also organized by entities in a short-term collaboration which had not means to measure the long-term impact of the festival or to use results from impact studies. Therefore, the festival organizers may have either applied the festival as a policy tool to solve the problems diagnosed inappropriately, or misdiagnosed the identified cultural problems that were meant to be solved by SAAF as a policy tool (Borrás & Edquist, 2013).

Table 2 below shows the correlation between SAAF inputs relative to its outputs.

What did the organizers want? What actions were taken to realize What did the actions achieve? (Projected Benefits, Objectives) this? (Actual Benefits, Outputs)

(Inputs, Process) Promote and market SA music in • Hosted SAAF in LA • Post-festival performances by the USA (audience development) • BrandSA marketed a large part SA artists in the USA resulted of the festival

Introduce new SA talent to the • Presented US-friendly • A new generation of SA USA (increase awareness) contemporary SA music musicians performed • Exposure of younger SA musicians to an American audience

Grow market for SA music • Selected US-friendly music • Impact unknown (market expansion) genres for SAAF • Showcased culturally diverse SA music • Held discussion panels • Hosted SAAF in LA where LA community is already exposed to SA culture • DAC, DIRCO, BrandSA and DTI collaborated for SAAF Expose SA music for export • Hosted festival in LA • Festival attended by audience (market penetration) • Hired Grand Performances for of 2500-3000 5000+ capacity venue Table 2: SAAF (2013) Outputs

245 Positively project SA’s image in • Selected US-friendly music • Positive audience feedback the USA (rebrand SA) genres for SAAF • Showcased culturally diverse SA music Encourage cultural tourism • Showcased SA music and film • Disseminated information to USA about post-democracy SA culture

Skills development • Held discussion panels • Post-festival SA-USA music • Hosted festival in LA for the collaborations resulted concentration of CCI industry role players and infrastructure Enable SA-USA CCI • Held discussion panels • Only SA CCI representatives collaborations (new business • Hosted a reception presented material at opportunities) discussion panels • Number of USA CCI representatives in attendance uncertain

Reinvigorate SA-USA cultural • Presented SA musicians from • Impact unknown bonds apartheid era and post- democracy SA musicians • Selected US-friendly music genres for SAAF • Hosted a festival reception to announce the festival and invited SA, USA and international guests • Showcased culturally diverse music to a culturally diverse LA audience • DAC hired Grand Performances to produce the festival to a diverse LA audience Connect with SA expatriates • Showcased culturally diverse • Received positive feedback old and new SA music from SA expatriates • BrandSA marketed a large part of the festival Table 2 cont.: SAAF (2013) Outputs

246 Findings

This unit of analysis reveals three prominent themes of policy, power and networks, which I discuss below.

Policy and Power

Government stakeholders defined SAAF and represented government interests. The festival was not shaped by CCI interests although its objectives were to grow SA CCI’s. Government stakeholders hosted the festivals to meet MGE and National Development Plan (NDP) goals regarding growing the economy and boosting SA’s reputation for further investment in its economy. As such, the government appendages used culture (cultural instrumentalism), by showcasing diverse SA music genres that make a statement about SA’s social cohesion, an ideal associated with the democratic values of the culturally diverse USA. The government stakeholders, thus, used culture to highlight and nurture country-to-country cultural ties by portraying SA as a developing world country that also has democratic values.

The diverse music genres chosen were also a statement about SA’s unique musical cultures that were still relatable for US audiences, thereby invoking country-to-country ties.

SA music was also exploited in this way to penetrate the US market since the festival was a platform to draw attention to itself as a tourist destination and investor market, and create an interest for SA’s CCI’s so that they would be consumed by US publics. Such consumption, investment and tourism would grow the SA economy, and thus generate hard power for SA.

SAAF was, therefore, primarily a cultural format with which to build on the desired country- to-country ties that would generate hard and soft power for SA by appealing directly to US society through emphasizing the commonality between SA and US music cultures and democratic ideals associated with culturally diverse societies. Since culture is used here mainly in the pursuit of goals like economic development (hard power), social cohesion and to

247 establish a positive national reputation (soft power), culture is in fact on the periphery of national development goals and the cultivation of SA’s global standing at SAAF. This further invokes arguments that the often-supposed linear efficacy within cultural policy of culture serving goals other than itself in the convergence of social, cultural and economic principles, does not always have “cause-effect schema” (Stevenson et al., 2010, p. 261). Rather, one of these principles becomes the priority even when the others are involved.

Therefore, instead of culture being used at SAAF as a part of national development, in that CCI participants inform the shape of their own development because it stimulates economic growth anyway, rather, culture is used only for national development that is achieved by the growth of the economy. An example of this positioning of culture within national interests is that at SAAF skills development, which is a mechanism to build sector capacity, is stated as a priority. USA-to-SA skills development, however, does not in fact happen since

USA CCI participants do not take part on the panels about SA music. From these points, it becomes apparent that state involvement at SAAF and its use of culture to communicate messages about SA abroad are for a political agenda (Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, 2010).

In the policies that set SAAF in motion, especially MGE and the Ubuntu foreign policy, the economic agenda also comes before the cultural agenda. Culture is a means to achieve other objectives. It is therefore no wonder that at SAAF consultation with CCI stakeholders about their own interests did not happen, even though the latter were primary stakeholders in the festival context. If culture was recognized holistically, as already central to SA development, by government stakeholders, and within SAAF as an international cultural exchange exercise, then CCI stakeholders should have contributed a greater degree towards the implementation of the festival and help shape a new narrative about the SA music industry. Such active participation of the stakeholders would directly inform the development of the sector, the objectives of the festival and the government. Furthermore, if culture had been prioritized, 248 between the planning and implementation phases, the DAC should have also established multiple partnerships directly with LA CCI institutions that would contribute to the long-term skills development recognized as key for the SA CCI’s. Therefore, it was not enough that by participating at SAAF, SA CCI participants had a chance to travel to the USA and create opportunities for themselves in LA or the USA. Their agency should have been central throughout the process of planning and implementing the festival. At the same time, the DAC could argue that it approached the festival in a way that exploits culture but encourages musicians to further their own interests in the USA because cultural producers are not always disempowered by cultural instrumentalism, and can in fact take advantage of it and create their own opportunities (Nisbett, 2013b; Hadley & Gray, 2017).

Another takeaway from SAAF on power is that it is evident that SA government stakeholders have not yet found ways of effectively cultivating soft power in the USA. As established earlier, the relations between SA and the USA have been driven by hard power.

Government-led attempts at generating soft power in the USA, especially through the intervention of culture, are still within the framework of traditional diplomacy and are new territory. SAAF was thus a test of the possible ways through which SA government-led cultural diplomacy efforts could be approached in the USA. SAAF was also an unrepeated once off project that could only set the foundations for future soft power cultivation and pursuits by SA.

More so, from the activities at SAAF, or SA strengthening cultural ties with the USA, there is no evidence to suggest that SA is pursuing a reputation as a cultural powerhouse (soft power).

Instead, the power cultivated seems to be directed at the rebranding of SA in the global market and political domain.

From the discussion in this chapter it also becomes clear that the festival is an expression of policy in various ways. First, through the priorities set at SAAF of generating hard power from a strategically identified global region that would positively affect the 249 objectives of multiple industries, articulated by tenets in MGE, CSA and the 1996 WPACH.

Second, by how MGE programs enable the festival through its programs. Third, networks are used and enabled to further government objectives stated in the policies of the different state appendages. Fourth, on how the DAC deviates from its traditional 1996 WPACH role as sector facilitator to that of an architect taking direct intervention enabled by MGE, where the DAC is mandated to act directly for MGE objectives through strategic partnerships. Fifth, through how the DAC by-passes the incomprehensive 1996 WPACH conceptualization of cultural diplomacy and acts on it without overtly stating that it is in fact embarking on cultural diplomacy at SAAF. Sixth, is how the DAC still acts within the post-apartheid damage-control mode of the 1996 WPACH in its approach to using cultural exchange for developing the skills of SA’s CCI participants. Seventh, the festival program also reveals the impact of policy. The program reflects policy through how it pushed the idea of cultural diversity into the spotlight.

This policy position is derived from MGE objectives of encouraging social cohesion within SA society as well as encouraging its portrayal at cultural events. Diversity in this sense becomes a commodity (Van der Horst, 2010). Cultural diversity is also a commodity prioritized and capitalized on by DIRCO’s Ubuntu foreign policy for advancing SA’s soft power. So, by trading the commodity of SA’s cultural diversity, the SA government in turn receives a different currency of soft power. Lastly, the combination of the expression of all these policy directives at SAAF created ‘three centers of power’ in the festival organization process (G.

Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017).

Networks

The other theme is that the festival was the expression of networks. Government networks dominated SAAF. SA expats were used as an extension of these government networks by being coaxed to spread a good message about SA through what they experienced at SAAF. No other

250 networks played a major role and in fact due to the DAC’s singular sponsorship for SAAF, there was no pressure from an external sponsor or network for the department to produce a document that assesses the festival’s return on investment. Also, even though the festival was about the CCI’s, no CCI institutions from the USA participated prominently apart from Grand

Performances who were hired to do so. This glaring absence of active CCI networks leads to an emergent theme throughout this study, that of the absence of cultural attachés at DIRCO’s international missions whose role it would be to develop networks for SA culture abroad.

251 Chapter 7 – Unit of Analysis 2: Ubuntu Festival, New

York 2014

Introduction

Chapter seven presents Unit of Analysis 2 of the case study on South African Festivals in the

USA. Unit of Analysis 2 is the 2014 Ubuntu Festival. I first describe the festival, presented here as part of an exercise in international cultural relations by the SA government in the USA, and then I apply seven themes derived from Hauptfleisch (2007) and Getz (2010) with which to frame the festival. The themes are organizer, location, objectives, programming, stakeholders, process and outputs. I then conclude with the findings.

Description of the Festival

The UBUNTU: Music and Arts of South Africa Festival took place at various venues55 in New

York City (NYC), including Carnegie Hall, the Apollo Theatre, Jazz at Lincoln Center,

Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, The New Victory Theatre, the Marian

Goodman Gallery, Flushing Hall, The Julliard School, African Film Festival Inc, The New

York Public Library and Queens College. The festival spanned five weeks, from the 8th of

October to the 5th of November 2014. It was organized by the Carnegie Hall Corporation

(CHC), and it was an homage to the former SA president Nelson Mandela’s legacy of

‘reconciliation and cultural inclusion’ on the anniversary of twenty years of SA’s freedom and democracy (Carnegie Hall, 2014). The festival was comprised of music performances, film screenings, art exhibitions of the SA cultural product (ibid.). At Carnegie Hall, where this discussion is focused, the festival featured a wide scope of musical traditions from SA in

55 These venues had exhibitions, live music, theatre, workshops and panel discussions on SA culture. 252 concert performances and workshops. In order to attend these events, audiences could pay for tickets at a range of prices.

Several organizations from the USA and SA sponsored the festival. These were US foundations, and other public and private sponsors. The Ubuntu festival was also hosted in collaboration with SA government appendages such as the DAC, DIRCO and SA Tourism.

The event had been planned as part of a themed festival series, which the CHC has been regularly carrying out for the residents of NYC since the late 2000’s. Such festivals are often not repeated by the CHC, and the Ubuntu festival or a similar event has also not been repeated.

There are three notable characteristics to the Ubuntu festival. One is that the festival was about SA and was hosted on foreign soil, in the USA. This means that the festival had a predominantly foreign audience, which may or may not have been familiar with the cultural identity of SA. In this way, the festival became internationalized like businesses do, when they take ‘to international markets’ through ‘inward internationalization’, where ‘resources are brought from foreign markets or activities are performed by foreign providers in the home country’ (Ferdinand & Williams, 2013, p. 204). The festival thus represented international interests. The second characteristic is that the content of the festival was focused on the diversity of SA culture, and was thus implicit commentary on the national identity of SA. The third characteristic is that since SA government appendages and agencies played a role at the festival, broader SA government policy interests were inadvertently represented at the event.

Organizer

The CHC initiated the festival, organized it, championed and marketed it, and hosted some of the festival concerts and workshops on its premises in the Carnegie Hall (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017). The CHC was also the core funder of the event (ibid.;

Carnegie Hall, 2014). Other leading funders were The Ford Foundation, The Howard Gilman

253 Foundation and The Andrew Mellon Foundation. The latter funders provided the CHC with grants, from 2007, to initiate and support the city-wide themed festival series in accordance with the interests they represent. Sponsorship was also listed by Carnegie Hall as from the Mai

Family Foundation, South African Tourism and South African Airways. Regular CHC sponsors were also supporters of the festivals, including United Airline, Bank of America,

MasterCard and Breguet. The CHC also collaborated with the DAC and the South African

Consulate General in New York (DIRCO) (ibid.). This collaboration was to drive the SA national interest using SA culture abroad and was of private-public entities, where the SA government got to exercise public management with non-government US interest groups

(Salamon, 2002; Ingram & Smith, 2002; Sandfort & Stone, 2008; Gienow-Hecht & Donfried,

2010; Nisbett, 2013b). Even with these collaborations, the CHC was only compelled to host this festival because of its mandate and mission.

The mission of the CHC is “to present extraordinary music and musicians on the three stages of this legendary hall, to bring the transformative power of music to the widest possible audience, to provide visionary education programs, and to foster the future of music through the cultivation of new works, artists and audiences” (Carnegie Hall, n.d. - b). This is no coincidence since arts organizations have long realized that they are in competition for audiences with a wide variety of mushrooming art forms and cultural events, and thus have to appeal to a wider market by diversifying their audiences, expanding their program content so that they generate new audiences (Wallace Foundation, 1997; Musical America, 2016).

Attempts at audience diversification also involve including educational programs, free concerts, adjusting ticket prices, encouraging collaboration, conducting research, using sophisticated forms of marketing and funding mechanisms, and using other community development tools (ibid.). As such, there is a thread of the power of culture to transform society

254 or communities in this unit of analysis, and it is apparent that the CHC applies some of these audience development strategies at this festival.

The organization considers the Carnegie Hall to have “set the international standard for musical excellence” and “as the aspirational destination for the world’s finest artists” (ibid.).

The CHC runs the programs of the Carnegie Hall, and as such

owns and operates auditoriums and stages that present concerts ranging from orchestral performances, chamber music, recitals, and choral music to folk, world, musical theater, and jazz in the United States. It also conducts films, lectures, readings, museum exhibitions, and others; and provides facilities for business meetings, school, community and family, and professional programs. In addition, the company offers music education programs; and auditoriums and stages on rental basis for various events. (Bloomberg, n.d.)

It is important at this juncture to note that although the founding and construction of

Carnegie Hall in the late 1800’s was funded by Mr. Andrew Carnegie, the famous philanthropist, and named after his family, the building is no longer owned by his descendants

(Carnegie Hall, n.d. - c). In the 1960’s, Carnegie Hall was bought by the New York City Council

(ibid.). The CHC was later established as the non-profit organization to run the building and its artistic ventures (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017; ibid.). In fact,

after acquiring Carnegie Hall (CH), the City of New York entered into a lease agreement with the Carnegie Hall Corporation (the Corporation) to operate the CH Premises consisting of the land, together with all buildings and improvements and other rights… City public funds allocated to assist in CH‘s operations are provided through the New York City Department of Cultural Affairs (DCA). Under the lease agreement, the Corporation is required to submit proposed programs and an annual budget to DCA for approval.… (Liu, 2013, p. 1)

Carnegie Hall was thus “reborn as a public trust … free to serve its owners— the people of New York City—in new and unique ways” (Carnegie Hall, n.d-c, p. 6). Since the CHC is intended to represent the culturally diverse community of the city of NYC, and in efforts to

255 make itself “financially viable”, its programming includes many genres of music (ibid.). The

CHC is meant to distribute “neighborhood concerts equitably within the five boroughs” (Liu,

2013). The CHC is, therefore, a separate entity unrelated to assets and philanthropic ventures associated with the Carnegie family and its foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York

(CCNY) (ibid.). On occasion, however, The CHC has received funding from CCNY. As Geffen explained,

The Carnegie Corporation [of New York] … is not affiliated with the Carnegie Hall Corporation [.] We do receive some support from the Carnegie Corporation, but on a per-proposal basis …it’s a separate entity…we work with them in the same way we would with any other foundation. We submit proposals in areas which align with their institutional mission programs that will be of mutual benefit. (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017)

Furthermore, it is important to separate the CHC from the activities of the US

Department of State (USDS). The CHC is independent from USDS cultural diplomacy efforts.

As the CHC government relations associate situates it from the USDS, he explains that

We currently do not have a formal relationship with the U.S. Department of State related to our cultural programming. However, as opportunities arise, we do engage the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and appropriate U.S. diplomatic posts relating to our festivals, our youth orchestra’s tour destinations [the National Youth Orchestra of the United States of America] and other cultural exchange matters. (C. Baranowski, personal communication, August 16, 2017).

In relation to SA, CHC has a long relationship to the arts in the country. According to

Jeremy Geffen, who is the Senior Director and Artistic Adviser at CHC,

We engage South African artists. Looking back, we’ve done distance learning projects with South Africa, actually with Hugh [Masekela], one of our first distance learning events. Distance learning was before Skype. It was basically connecting an audience full of students in Zankel Hall, our six-hundred seat auditorium, with a similarly-sized audience in South Africa live…it wasn’t easily accessible technology [then]… distance learning is no longer an outlier but is rather part of the norm. We’ve had post-graduate fellowship for the finest 256 American performers, called Ensemble Connect. Ensemble Connect and its alumni group have gone to South Africa for residencies…The alumni group, which is called Decoda, has just had a five-week residency in South Africa in 2017…From a presentation point of view, Carnegie engages the most excellent artists from around the world. From an educational perspective, we’ve had special projects like this residency. But it’s not consistent from year to year. We get approached by groups in South Africa who are prepared to present residencies like this. (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017)

Objectives

The festival had a few goals. It was intended “to take audiences on journeys of discovery within a defined period of time”, and such an event would be a “saturation event” for audiences “to examine the subject from as many angles as possible” (J. Geffen, personal communication,

August 9, 2017). Central to this endeavor is showcasing the “diversity and excellence of South

African arts today…and to show that this is still a culture in transition” (ibid.). The festival was, thus, for the cultural immersion of NYC residents and its visitors, and to fulfill the cultural mandate of the CHC. As such, the festival was ‘for the people by the establishment’ (Falassi,

1987, p. 3). Geffen explained that,

We have been presenting city-wide, multi-disciplinary festivals, since 2007. And in that time, we focused on geographic areas, countries or cities, people or ethnic groups. Like we did a festival of African American culture in March of 2009. We realized that we had not focused at all on the continent of Africa…In looking at different African countries, the two that made sense in an in-depth exploration, in terms of musical and cultural variety were Mali and South Africa. And given that it was the twentieth anniversary of the first open election in 2014, we decided in favor of South Africa [also because of] the international influence that South Africa has had…We knew we would be able to craft a substantive and surprising festival by examining the different elements of South African culture. (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017)

Not only was the Ubuntu festival, therefore, scheduled to coincide with the anniversary of SA’s 20 years of democracy in 2014, and to celebrate this anniversary, but it was also part of a series of themed, culturally and geographically-specific festivals annually hosted by the

257 CHC. One such festival was the massive city-wide celebration of Chinese culture in October

2009 called Ancient Paths, Modern Voices. Making such festivals city-wide was important and strategic for the CHC, above and beyond its mandate to reach all five of its boroughs. As Geffen elaborates, festivals like this

are much more powerful, when …multiple entities work together [because] there’s so much that happens in New York City... But also, we’re much more powerful when we’re working together. The message is stronger. New York City has some of the greatest cultural institutions in the world. Why shouldn’t we work together?” (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017).

What Geffen here highlights is what Ostrower (2003) has conveyed about partnerships, or networks, amongst cultural organizations. She has stated that they have the potential to strengthen cultural participation and have unforeseen opportunities. Ostrower (2003) has also shown that when successful, collaboration between cultural organizations of different sizes and missions, thus, expands what is usually possible in the cultural sector. This is because the organizations bring capital that is mutually beneficial to all parties (ibid.). Gibson et al. (2010) have also observed that collaboration in environments like festivals has the potential to grow community skills in areas of organization, leadership and management among cultural entities.

Since the Ubuntu festival was about celebrating the diversity of SA culture and its musical traditions, the CHC crafted “musical content that would be varied, of general interest and also allow our audience to discover less obvious elements of the culture” (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017). The festival was further named Ubuntu, to embody one of the core principles of SA’s democracy. Ubuntu means “I am because you are” and is a philosophy that ‘emphasizes the importance of community’ or recognizes the interdependence and humanity of people irrespective of their culture or ethnicity (Carnegie Hall, 2014a). The philosophy influenced ‘recent moves of reconciliation and inclusion’ that came with the new

258 democratic era in SA (ibid.). In CHC interviews done for the festival program, some of the performers confirmed that Ubuntu is a concept of recognizing someone’s humanity ‘beyond borders’ and is the glue to the cultural diversity of SA (Ibrahim and Plaatjies in Carnegie Hall,

2014c).

This ideological commentary in the interviews is significant, since the SA population is made up of various cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, and the country currently recognizes eleven official languages even though English maintains prominence in national education and the world of business (Webb, 2002). Much more than this, the ideal of unity in diversity stems from the driving principles of non-racialism and ethnic unity, under which the country’s current ruling party, the African National Congress, operates (Anciano, 2014). The country is often referred to as the rainbow nation in recognition of a government-determined ideal of ‘unity in diversity’ amongst SA’s more than thirteen ethnic and linguistic groups

(Rassool, 2000; Chidester et al., 2003; Fisher, 2014). The Ubuntu festival programming, therefore, placed emphasis on cultural inclusion and diversity, and showcased some of the scope of SA’s musical and artistic diversity. Through showcasing vibrant SA music traditions that have become part of SA heritage and its contemporary trajectory, the Ubuntu festival was also a platform for commentary on how cultures from various continents met in SA over centuries (Carnegie Hall, 2014d).

Moreover, none of the festival objectives related to engaging the city were linked to a cultural diplomacy agenda. As Geffen elucidated, “the cultural diplomacy that came out of it was a nice byproduct” (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017). Cultural diplomacy, was therefore, not the immediate priority. Geffen mentioned that even though government priorities were not central to the festival mission, the CHC “had extremely good relations with the [SA] embassy and the Consulate” (ibid.).

259 Location

Carnegie Hall, the venue where the Ubuntu festival took place, is in NYC. The significance of the festival venue is not only because of the legacy of Carnegie Hall. It is also not because this is the city where the organizer of the festival is located. The geographical setting of the festival is also important because of the type of city NY is for interdependent industries.

NY is often described as a ‘global city’ due to a number of attributes, including the diversity of its population, the various forms of capital it possesses and the transnational interests it represents (Sarikakis, 2012; Sassen, 2013). The city is associated with financial muscle due to the agglomeration of the financial service industry in NY, and thus its influence on global trade patterns (Sassen, 2013). NY is also the city with the densest concentration of the entertainment industry’s “infrastructure, ‘agents, gate-keepers’, audiences and music talent” in the entire USA (Florida & Jackson, 2010, p. 312). Similarly, NY is unique in the whole world in terms of the scale of cultural industry role players based there and the clustered

‘interdependence’ between gatekeepers, suppliers, producers and other industry participants

(Currid, 2007b; Hesmondhalgh, 2002, p. 151). Apart from NY being one of the global cities that possess ‘transcultural communities’ that consume culture in unique ways relative to their cultural heritages and workforce skills, the city is one of the “geopolitical spaces configured to produce global cultural policy” (Sarikakis, 2012, p. 17-18). Therefore, whatever cultural product works in NYC is more likely to be embraced by other parts of the world.

Moreover, since the cultural industries “require an immediate consumer base”, in NY, like LA, “cultural production and consumption often occur simultaneously” (Currid &

Williams, 2010, p 327). So, NY has clustering and sector co-dependency traits which propel the growth of cultural industries (ibid.). NY is one of the major global cities where creatives network, socialize, inside and out of these clusters, creating more opportunities for self and career improvement (Currid, 2007b, 2010; Karlsson, 2011). Social and other networks, 260 therefore, drive growth in the creative industries in this city, and as such the city offers potential growth for creatives who participate and interact with others in these networks (Currid, 2007a).

As a location, therefore, NYC offers unparalleled opportunity for the SA government and SA

CCI stakeholders because of its dense concentration of interdependent creative industry infrastructure, gatekeepers and participants, its influence on the world and more.

Needless to say, it is particularly significant that the Ubuntu festival occurred at

Carnegie Hall. The latter is one of the most well-known, readily recognized and well-respected music performance venues in the world. The prestigious legacy of the venue, its acoustics and design, its place in history and in the national imagination have been widely noted (DeVeaux,

1993; Beranek, 2012; Carnegie Hall, 2014; Schmitz, 2015; Binkowski, 2016). Due to this reputation, Carnegie Hall is often a marker of artistic status for those who get to perform or present educational material there (Carnegie, 2014; Binkowski, 2016; J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017).

Programming

Musicians of different generations performed multiple genres of music over the course of the festival, and two of the performers also gave master classes. The program notes stated that

Carnegie Hall was celebrating “the many threads that make up South Africa’s vibrant musical culture” (Carnegie, 2014). As such, the program, attached in the Appendix Section 1b, featured

SA jazz, opera, indigenous and traditional music, film music, musical theatre and other forms of western art derived music. Most of the music showcased also involved vocal music traditions, which SA has in abundance56, and which mark SA as distinctive from other

56 Some of the more well-researched SA vocal music traditions include African choralism, isicathamiya, Kloppse, Gumboot dance, Cape Malay choirs, jazz vocals, protest music, Maskandi, Mbhaqanga, Nguni vocal music, religious music of the Shembe, musical theatre, Karoo musics, Rap, etc. For further treatment see Andersson (1981), Ansell (2005), Coplan (2007), Mojapelo (2008), Olwage (2008), Jorritsma (2011), Ballantyne (2012), Martin (2013). 261 percussion-reliant African music traditions (Coplan, 1985; Erlmann, 1991; Muller, 2004, 2008;

Lucia, 2005). Vocal music in SA manifests prominently in various of SA’s social contexts, be they religious, political, festivities involving ethnic and linguistic groups, or other identities

(ibid.; Bruinders, 2017; Carnegie, 2014a, 2014e). Even though the Carnegie Hall portion of the festival program excluded more mainstream popular forms of SA music, which were showcased at the other festival venues around NYC, like the Apollo Theatre57, Carnegie Hall’s program still retained the apparent theme of SA cultural diversity. This diversity is an element used to emphasize and invoke the values of Ubuntu and social cohesion underpinning SA democracy, and which is central to SA’s foreign policy. Therefore, the program had a political texture to it because it represented the national identity of SA, and the festival was as such also part of a broadening of consciousness about the political struggles of SA for those who were unfamiliar with the SA story (Gibson & Connell, 2005).

The majority of the performances were by SA musicians, but some also included collaborations with musicians who were not of SA heritage, and so the music also incorporated cultural intersections. The program thus celebrated ‘cultural plurality’, even though it made statements about SA’s distinctive cultural identities (Duffy, 2005, p. 677). The selected music genres were also those USA audiences were somewhat familiar with, such as SA jazz and isicathamiya. These genres are widely performed in the USA and had the largest audience attendance at the festival, and I address this correlation later in this chapter. Equally, the program also featured Cape-Dutch Creole music, which US audiences are not broadly exposed to since the music is hardly performed in the USA. In this way, the program also expressed SA cultural marginality in that it also showcased music that is not part of the SA mainstream

(Gibson & Connell, 2005). The program presented this marginalized music for US audiences

57 The Apollo Theatre’s festival leg was called Africa Now! Its line-up featured SA popular music artists like Tumi, Simphiwe Dana and The Soil. 262 in the familiar landscape of NYC. At the same time, the program allowed for escapist sonic travel to a different space within a commercial environment built for consumption, and thus was an experience without the complication of an in-context cultural encounter.

The first show was 90 minutes long on the evening of October 10. The trumpeter and activist Hugh Masekela and the SA guitarist, singer, poet and song-writer Vusi Mahlasela were on the Stern Auditorium/Perelman Stage. The venue presents multi-disciplinary shows and is the largest of Carnegie’s concert halls, with a capacity of nearly three thousand seats. Both musicians have toured the USA frequently. Masekela in particular has often been a headliner at US festivals and on US performance circuits and so US audiences are familiar with his music.

Both musicians performed freedom songs with guest artists Dave Matthews, a renowned guitarist who lived in SA in his youth and found fame with the Dave Matthews Band in the

USA (ibid.). Somi a jazz-pop crossover US vocalist who is of East African heritage also performed on the same stage that night.

The night of October 11 was dedicated to “Zulu culture” and its “modernity”, where the concert showcased “the source and the evolution in one evening, as much as that’s possible”

(J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017). The focus was of contemporary maskanda music, or Zulu guitar-based, composer-singer led story-telling and praise music

‘often dubbed the “Zulu blues”’ (Muller, 2004; Carnegie Hall, 2014). The Zulu are the largest ethnic and linguistic group in SA. The concert featured Madala Kunene, whose reflective music focuses on Zulu folklore. Also on the bill was Phuzekhemisi, who was accompanied by traditional dancers. His music contains social commentary and political satire and has a more upbeat sound (Muller, 2004; Carnegie Hall, 2014). Their concert lasted two and a half hours in the Zankel Hall, the almost six hundred capacity concert venue. The concert was part of the

Late Nights at Zankel Hall Series which is usually associated as much with non-mainstream

World Music acts as with recitals and contemporary classical music (Carnegie Hall, n. d.- e). 263 This series is based on a ‘social club’ experience, where audiences members tête-à-tête at the bar over a complimentary drink before a concert begins (ibid.). The extra drink is an incentive for audiences to attend late night shows in the quiet business district (J. Hempel, personal communication, August 9, 2017). Since the concerts were presented as part of ongoing

Carnegie Hall series, this may have been an effort to counteract the alienation of traditional

Carnegie Hall clientele who are accustomed to classical music programming, while being inclusive of a new audience who appreciate some of the music genres at the festival.

On October 13, SA opera was on the program. The SA soprano Pretty Yende, who won acclaim in Europe, Russia and the USA, was accompanied by US pianist Kamal Khan. They performed at the Weil Recital Hall, which has a capacity of over two-hundred-and-sixty seats.

Yende is one of a new generation of numerous prominent SA opera singers who “can now be seen and heard performing at the highest professional levels on opera stages across the globe”

(André, et al., 2016, p. 2; Carnegie Hall, 2014e). She is also part of a new post-apartheid phenomenon of black composers and singers in opera, which was not historically58 associated with black ventures (André, et al., 2016). Yende and Khan performed Western Art Music and

SA folk songs. These included works by Gioachino Rossini, Vincenzo Bellini, Gaetano

Donizetti, Claude Debussy, Giacomo Meyerbeer, Franz Liszt, Jeronimo Gimene, Giacomo

Puccini, Victor Herbert and the isiZulu traditional called Thula Mntwana (hush little baby).

Yende’s mother tongue is Zulu-speaking, and so Thula Mntwana also related to her ethnicity and SA linguistic group. The recital was part of the Salon Encores Series. This series is normally held in the Weill Recital Hall’s Jacobs Room, with its “intimate setting”, and includes

58 Although Western art music has been present on SA’s musical landscape since colonial times, it was during the apartheid era that such music was financially supported only in white communities by the government. This was to reinforce the idea of separate development amongst SA’s different ethnicities. Supporting excellence in the pursuit of European traditions amongst the white population was also a way to encourage perceptions of how European SA was in the global imagination. (Grundy, 1996; Van Graan, 1999; Maree, 2005; André, et al., 2016). 264 an after-concert complimentary drink for audience members and an occasional discussion between the audience and showcased musicians (Carnegie Hall, n.d.- d).

The next concert was on the night of October 17. It was of Abdullah Ibrahim, the SA jazz pianist who was exiled in the USA during apartheid and still frequently has concerts in the

USA. His concert was in the Zankel Hall, and he played solo, then with a trio and a septet

(Carnegie, 2014). Ibrahim is a well-known figure on the US jazz scene, he regularly tours world-wide and is a significant figure in the jazz diaspora (Giddins & DeVeaux, 2009). His performance was two hours long. Customarily his repertoire focuses on African traditionals and is associated with a style called Cape Jazz (Ansell, 2005; Ndzuta, 2007; Martin, 2013).

The next day at five in the afternoon, Ibrahim gave a master class in the Resnick Education

Wing of Carnegie Hall.

On October 18, Ladysmith Black Mambazo (LBM), the isicathamiya choir which has won Grammy Awards and has collaborated with a myriad of artists from different countries, was on stage in the Stern Auditorium/Perelman Stage. The group are exponents of

Isicathamiya, which is an a Capella style of singing unique to SA. The genre was introduced to wider American audiences by US musician Paul Simon’s Graceland album in the late 1980’s, on which he collaborated with SA musicians including LBM. They constantly tour and draw big crowds all over the world. They were joined on stage by the Thokoza band, the Bakithi

Khumalo band, Shabalala Rhythm, and the maskandi musician Maqhinga Radebe. After this concert, Ladysmith Black Mambazo performed again on the 19th October. This time the concert was in the afternoon for a family concert in the Zankel Hall.

Another evening of opera was on the night of October 24. The dramatic soprano, Elza van den Heever was featured, accompanied on the pianist by Vlad Iftinca in the Weill Recital

Hall. This was part of the Salon Encores Series of concerts. They performed works by Robert

Schumann, Gabriel Faure, George Frideric Handel, Johannes Brahms, John K. Pescod and 265 Charles Ives. Van den Heever and Iftinca also rendered works by the SA composers Stephanus

Le Roux Marais, Petrus Johannes Lemmer, and Pieter De Villiers (Carnegie Hall, 2014). Two of the pieces of music were Afrikaans59 art song from SA. Since Van den Heever is of Afrikaans heritage, she also sang music in Afrikaans, which relates to her ethnic and SA linguistic roots.

Similarly, Yende had sung music in Zulu almost two weeks before in the same venue. This substantiates what Duffy (2005) points out about multicultural festivals on a transnational platform. She states that they ‘celebrate cultural plurality’ yet are simultaneously concerned with ‘maintaining an idea of an essential identity’ and thereby marginalize the differences celebrated (ibid., p. 689-690).

In the Zankel Hall, as part of the Off the Beaten Track Series, and Ubuntu Music

Traditional series, David Kramer and the Young Cape Malay Stars performed on October 25.

The show was two and a half hours long, and its focus was on the folk music traditions of the

Western Cape Province of SA. First on stage that night was the group The Young Cape Malay

Stars. They are a fifteen-voice harmony-based male choir that draws on Muslim, South East

Asian and Dutch folk traditions, and is commonly performed by the SA ‘Creole community’

(Bruinders, 2017, p. xvi). Such male choirs are part of the musical heritage of the city of Cape

Town that was shaped by colonial, Indian Ocean basin slaves and precolonial settlements in the region (Martin, 2013; Bruinders, 2017; Kramer in Carnegie Hall, 2014b). Next was David

Kramer, who is a multi-instrumentalist and satirist. He traverses some of the marginalized music traditions of SA’s Karoo and Cape regions like ghoema music, which is music found in the Western Cape region of SA and characterized by “a syncopated underlying rhythm” played on a ‘single-headed barrel drum’ with banjos and guitars (Bruinders, 2017, p. 53). Kramer has led bands and musicals that have performed this music and other styles for decades, to

59 Afrikaans is a South African language derived from Dutch, indigenous South African languages, Arabic, French, Melayu (Malay), German and Portuguese (Worden et al, 2008). It is widely spoken in SA and in Namibia. 266 challenge identity politics of separation of the apartheid era (Kramer in Carnegie Hall, 2014b).

For this performance, he chose music in Afrikaans and English that celebrated “the rhythms of the Cape: ghoema, vastrap, and township kwela” (ibid.).

William Kentridge and Phillip Miller presented Paper Music: A Ciné Concert on

October 27. This was in the Zankel Hall. The concept involved a short film of images rooted in aspects of SA history, by the famous visual artist William Kentridge. Kentridge is a globally renowned SA multi-media artist who often headlines events. He collaborated with the renowned SA film music composer Phillip Miller who produced the music component

(Carnegie Hall, 2014). Phillip Miller mentioned that the he and Kentridge were invited to do this project “in association with the US producer, Rachel Chanoff60” (P. Miller, personal communication, May 12, 2017). The work featured electronic music and live voice by the singers Ann Masina and Joanna Dudley, accompanied by Miller on Foley Sampler and Idith

Meshulam on piano (Carnegie Hall, 2014).

On the night of October 28 in the Zankel Hall, ‘A Distant Drum’ was showcased. This was a musical theatre production custom made for the festival (Carnegie Hall, 2014). It was a collaboration between the violinist Daniel Hope and his father, the writer Christopher Hope.

Its focus was the life of Nat Nakasa, a writer from SA who died in exile during the apartheid era who was also part of Drum Magazine, a culturally influential publication in the racially and culturally segregated 1950’s. The production featured SA musicians like Themba Mkhize, who composes and performs a kind of jazz-traditional music cross over, Andrew Tracey who is an ethnomusicologist and performer, and Daniel Hope. They played alongside non-South African

60 Rachel Chanoff is the director of the “New York City-based programming, consulting, and production company” The Office, which focuses on special types of cultural programming, performing arts and film (theofficearts.com). 267 musicians like percussionist Jason Marsalis, bassist Michael Olatuja, cellist Vincent Segal and keyboardist Ralf Schmid.

Kesivan and The Lights performed at Zankel Hall on October 30 and their music also contained references to SA political history. The band was led by Kesivan Naidoo, who is a multi-award-winning composer, cultural entrepreneur, drummer and percussionist from SA.

Naidoo has been based in the USA since 2015. He mainly performs jazz. His band featured SA jazz musicians: Reza Khota on guitar, Shane Cooper on double bass, Kyle Shepherd on piano and Justin Bellairs on alto saxophone. The concept of ‘The Lights’ involved

South African musicians using Indian and American and African music all fused into one. One of the tracks, almost a free-ish composition, but it was still structured, called ‘Freedom Dance’, where I sampled the first speech of Nelson Mandela as he was released from prison... When played that we got a standing ovation… (K. Naidoo, personal communication, April 7, 2017).

On November 1, Dizu Plaatjies and Ibuyambo performed in the Zankel Hall. Dizu

Plaatjies is a successful SA traditional music performer and educator. He has led a number of ensembles over three decades (Martin, 2013; D. Plaatjies, personal communication, May 5,

2017). He frequently tours around the globe with his ensembles and mainly plays pan-African traditional music (ibid.). As he puts it, Plaatjies finds that his music “promotes the whole of

South Africa in different genres of music, especially traditional music” and that his music

“represents many South African cultures” (D. Plaatjies, personal communication, May 5,

2017). His ensemble, Ibuyambo, at Carnegie Hall attracted a lot of attention from some of his former students in the USA (ibid.). Of Plaatjies and what he contributed to the festival, Geffen stated that

[Dizu] is a professor of ethnomusicology at the University of Cape Town…and is able to speak very knowledgeably about the many different ethnic groups in South Africa and how the musics of Southern Africa interplay. What he was able

268 to cover in his concert was basically a survey of Southern African musical traditions…of Nguni music (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017).

The last performance of the festival at Carnegie was on November 5 and it featured SA and non-SA musicians. The show was dedicated to the music of the singer and cultural activist

Miriam Makeba, arguably the most globally celebrated artist from SA. The show was led by the multi-award-winning singer Angelique Kidjo from Benin, who performed with Makeba and was mentored by her (Carnegie Hall, 2014e; J. Geffen, personal communication, August

9, 2017). Kidjo has lived in NYC for over a decade and has regular tours and performances around the USA and other parts of the world, and so she is one of the musicians on the festival line-up whose music is familiar to US audiences due to her presence on US performance circuits. The concert also included Makeba’s supporting singers Zamokuhle Mbutho, Faith

Kekana and Stella Khumalo. Vusi Mahlasela, rock musician Ezra Koenig and British singer

Laura Mvula were part of this collaboration as guest performers (Carnegie Hall, 2014; R.

Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017).

Stakeholders

As the organizer and main funder, the CHC was a major stakeholder at the festival. Its interests were to meet its cultural mandate for the NY City Council and meet its organizational mission by providing diverse cultural programming (J. Hempel, personal communication, August 9,

2017; J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017). For this goal, the CHC partially collaborated only with cultural entities in organizing the festival. At festivals, however, as

Hauptfleisch (2007) has suggested, multiple interests are represented and sometimes they vye for prominence. True to this fashion, there were other stakeholders who were non-cultural entities but represented their own interests, and who were also exemplary of how “private sponsorships can be used to sustain and grow the arts” by supporting festivals (Saayman and

269 Saayman, 2005, p. 582). These were the leading funders like The Ford Foundation, The

Howard Gilman Foundation and The Andrew Mellon Foundation. Apart from the featured artists, SA stakeholders were the government and non-government individuals and institutions involved at the festival. The Mai Family Foundation is one of the non-government organizations that sponsored the festival. SA government stakeholders were South African

Tourism, South African Airways, the DAC and the South African Consulate General in New

York (DIRCO). USA organizations which regularly sponsor the CHC were also supporters of the festival. These sponsors were United Airline, Bank of America, MasterCard and Breguet.

For this discussion, I will not include the latter US sponsors who are regular CHC sponsors, since their interests are not directly tied to the Ubuntu festival. The individuals from

SA who sponsored the festival will also not be included in the discussion. It is worth noting that some of the US foundations who are stakeholders here are very powerful, with almost limitless resources (Jones, 1984). Nonetheless, because these entities have had their resources pooled together by the CHC, they gained power in numbers and thus impact their causes by being part of a network (Bourdieu, 1986). Their network is made up of members who temporarily interact through the CHC in order to advance their vested interest in the same cause

(Stalder, 2006). Since this festival is the CHC’s initiative, however, and not by a US foundation, this collaboration enables “the powerful to appear as just another participant” sponsor when in fact US foundations protect their interests by participating at the festival through large grants (Roelofs, 2003, p. 206).

The CHC serves communities in the five culturally diverse boroughs of NYC (Liu,

2013). Through funding and regulation by the New York City Department of Cultural Affairs

(DCA) of the New York City Council, the CHC accounts to the New York City Council (Liu,

2013). The DCA “is committed to providing access to art and culture for all New Yorkers”, it is “dedicated to supporting and strengthening New York City's vibrant cultural life” through 270 funding designated cultural organizations throughout the city’s five boroughs, and it supports art education in the city (NYCCA, n.d.-a, -b; Goldberg-Miller, 2017). The DCA also “works to promote and advocate for quality arts programming and to articulate the contribution made by the cultural community to the City's economic vitality” (NYCCA, n. d.-b). In this city governance context, the CHC serves to meet the city council’s desire to make its citizens educated, to participate in the economy and to have access to quality arts and culture (Goldberg-

Miller, 2017). The citizens are the main priority, stakeholders and beneficiaries of such cultural programs. The programs are meant to improve their lives, and this is the transformative benefit of such an event.

It also makes sense then that the NYC Council approved of the CHC’s use of festivals as a tool towards economic vitality and cultural transformation. For instance, research has shown that festivals are popular among policy makers (Bianchini & Parkinson, 1993; Picard &

Robinson, 2006; Smith & Forest, 2006). This is partly because they attract “intense expenditure”, encourage “cultural creativity and social cohesion”, and are pivotal to local residents and visitors who seek a leisure cultural experience that brings their sense of belonging into focus (del Barrio et al., 2012, p. 235-243). The economic advantages of the Ubuntu festival would reach beyond the CHC and the arts organizations it is in partnership because festivals have a multiplier economic effect for the business community where the festival happens

(Saayman & Roussouw, 2010). As such, even though economic opportunities from festivals may not be permanent, they are significant in scale (Gibson et al., 2010). There would also be notable economic value for a city like NYC with residents who have a culture of supporting the arts, since the location of a festival directly influences the economic impact of the event because the location determines who attends and the amount of money spent (Saayman &

Saayman, 2005). Beyond NYC residents, however, the city also has a large tourist population which festivals often target to help the location drive a global identity (Macleod, 2006; 271 Johansson & Kociatkiewicz, 2011). Festivals, therefore, validate the actions of governance due to the response of locals and visitors (del Barrio et al., 2012). More so, the cultural instrumentalism that policy makers imbue on festivals sometimes disguises the social function of festivals in order to create economic pathways for other unrelated governance projects

(Crompton & Mackay, 1994; Quinn, 2005; Visser, 2005). Therefore, in addition to CHC internal policy guiding this festival, the NYC Council and the policies of the different sponsors and stakeholders, policy becomes a major theme in this unit of analysis.

The role of the CHC in the context of DCLA policy also invokes a discussion by

Schneider and Ingram (1990) on common types of instrumental policy tools and how policy

“attempts to get people to do things they might not have done otherwise” in compliance and promotion of policy goals (p. 513). The Ubuntu festival by the CHC thus acts as an incentivizing and capacity policy tool for DCLA policies. It is an incentivizing tool that encourages the residents of NYC to participate in their economy and improve their lives in other ways through culture (Goldberg-Miller, 2017). The residents of NYC, because of NYC

Council goals linked to policies implemented by the DCLA, are also stakeholders at the festival because of their implicit involvement as recipients and targets of the city’s policies on what culture does and achieves for them, their well-being and their city. As such, NYC residents are an external influence which shapes the aims of CHC programs, like its festivals. Such stakeholders make up some of the ‘forces’ which determine and predetermine the festival agenda, and those which the CHC cannot wholly control (Hauptfleisch, 2007, p. 44-45).

The next group of stakeholders consists of philanthropic foundations whose interests were in alignment with the objectives of the festival since their missions covered the scope of education, arts and cultural heritage, diversity and enriching the city’s performing arts. Some of the foundations had interests in SA specifically. These interests were represented at the festival and as such were validated by the event. For instance, the Ford Foundation is an 272 organization “guided by a vision of social justice”, and driven by the principles of diversity, equity and inclusion (Ford Foundation, 2018). The foundation believes “in the inherent dignity of all people” and addresses how “around the world, too many people are excluded from the political, economic, and social institutions that shape their lives” (ibid.). For over eighty years, the foundation has been focused on investing in initiatives “to reduce poverty and injustice, strengthen democratic values, promote international cooperation, and advance human achievement” (ibid.). Investments such as these have also been to individuals and ‘frontline institutions’ who are involved in “civil rights, education, arts and culture, human rights, poverty reduction and urban development” (ibid.). The foundation “is an independent organization, led by a distinguished board of trustees whose 16 members hail from four continents and bring leadership and expertise in a wide range of disciplines” and stewarding “a $12 billion endowment” and “making $500 million in grants around the world every year” (ibid.).

The CHC received a grant from the Ford Foundation for the Ubuntu festival (Carnegie

Hall, 2014). The festival was aligned to ideals the Ford Foundation strives for since the event involved and embodied cultural diversity, education, inclusion, exchange and more.

Furthermore, since the early 1990’s, the foundation has been a “major supporter of alternative, local, and vernacular arts” (Roelofs, 2003, p. 84). With these factors considered, there is a suggestion of a convergence of interests between CHC goals for this festival and Ford

Foundation interests. It is also customary for NGO’s and US foundations like this one, and other organizations not directly linked to the government, to also use philanthropy to preserve and promote the image of the USA, in the imagination of the world and within the USA, by taking up altruistic causes that are linked to cultural diplomacy (ibid.; Lawson & Wyszomirski,

2010). Although the organizations are not linked to the government, this act is in itself political since it also serves the interests of the organization’s country of origin and contributes to that country’s security interests. This is notwithstanding that foundations like the Ford foundation 273 have historically funded US government programs and still influence public policy, meaning that they are not apolitical or neutral sponsors (Roelofs, 2003; Faber & McCarthy, 2005).

Another stakeholder, at the Ubuntu festival, who acts in this world-peacekeeper role through their philanthropy and funding mechanisms around the globe is The Andrew Mellon

Foundation (ibid.). This foundation has focused on environmental issues since the early 20th century, but it has also addressed education, media and other causes (ibid.). In contemporary times, the Mellon Foundation covers the areas of humanities scholarship in higher education, arts and cultural heritage, diversity, scholarly communication, as well as ‘international higher education and strategic projects’ (Mellon, n.d.- a, b). The Foundation “endeavors to strengthen, promote, and, where necessary, defend the contributions of the humanities and the arts to human flourishing and to the well-being of diverse and democratic societies” (ibid.). This is why it supports “exemplary institutions of higher education and culture as they renew and provide access to an invaluable heritage of ambitious, path-breaking work” in all forms of expression and representation (ibid.). CHC is such an institution, with a legacy to match.

A representative of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, who was not formally interviewed for this dissertation but responded to an email about the organization’s participation at the festival, explained that in 2007 the foundation provided a grant to the CHC to help launch the global festivals initiative. The representative also clarified that the foundation was otherwise not involved in the organization of the Ubuntu festival. The funding from the foundation, however, supported events of the festival that were related to the interests of the foundation. For instance, one of the performers, Pretty Yende, is an alumnus of the opera program at the University of Cape Town, which is supported by the Mellon Foundation. The opera program has provided bursaries for students who would have not had the opportunity to study opera at university now or during apartheid (Cohen, 2013). According to the Mellon representative, public digital media resources such as humanities-focused essay, about the 274 festival were also supported by the grant. Therefore, the convergence of interests between CHC and the Mellon Foundation were based on three aspects. First, in the development of the humanities. Second, through the inclusion of Pretty Yende on the festival line-up, who was testimony of the successes of the foundation’s developmental work and an example of the

CHC’s values about the capacity of culture to transform lives. Third, both organizations shared interests in the festival’s core mission to celebrate the heritage of SA vocal arts and the democracy of the country.

The Howard Gilman Foundation is another stakeholder at Ubuntu. When it was established, the foundation was focused on “medical, social, educational, environmental, and artistic causes” (Howard Gilman Foundation, n.d.). The foundation’s current mission is to

“support the most robust, innovative, and promising performing arts organizations in New

York City”, where its founder was born, and it creates varied grants towards this purpose

(ibid.). A representative of the Howard Gilman Foundation who was not formally interviewed for this research but responded to an email about the organization’s involvement at the festival, confirmed that the foundation provided funding for the CHC production of the Ubuntu Festival.

The representative also clarified that the foundation did not participate in the organization process of the festival. Although the foundation did not directly participate in the festival, its support for the festival corroborates its mission and identity to support NYC performing arts organizations like the CHC to conduct innovative work through events like this festival.

On the festival’s Committee of Honor list, it appeared that there were more individuals from SA who sponsored the festival than corporations. Geffen outlined that there were no

corporations from within South Africa as sponsors in the way the way that we had for China or Japan, or for Vienna [festivals], because there are fewer major South African corporations that have presences here. There were individuals from South African backgrounds who gave us significant [financial] support for the festival. (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017) 275 Among the SA stakeholders at Ubuntu was the Mai Family Foundation, which was established in 1996 by the SA businessman Vincent Mai (Inside Philanthropy, n.d.). He sponsored the festival in his individual capacity, which is how his family foundation was listed on the list of sponsors (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017). This foundation supports arts, education, mental health, public policy, poverty alleviation and social entrepreneurship programs by organizations in the USA and SA (Lulat, 2008; Takalani

Sesame, n.d.). Through some of its grants, it also currently addresses education and youth issues, policy and global issues and other human services issues (Inside Philanthropy, n.d.).

The CHC’s Ubuntu festival aligned with the foundation’s interests in SA and the USA, especially regarding support for culture and the arts.

The other group of stakeholders were SA government departments and agencies.

According to Walker (2004), it is common for arts and non-arts organizations to collaborate to increase ‘the public value of their activities’ (p. 2-13). Such collaborations allow the organizations to meet “artistic and community service goals” related to each party’s constituency (ibid.). These collaborations can also enrich cultural participation among various audiences and upskill the partners involved (ibid.). In this case CHC was the arts organization, and the SA government departments were some of the non-arts institutions.

Although the SA government departments played a minor role at the festival, they still represented SA tourism, cultural and business interests. In fact, they were enacting government policy for SA’s different sectors, as governments do to contribute to national development

(Matarasso & Landry, 1999). These stakeholders practiced a multiple-objective kind of cultural instrumentalism within a multipurpose kind of cultural diplomacy framework that had numerous objectives (Hicks, 2007). The stakeholders were South African Tourism, South

African Airways, the DAC and the South African Consulate General in New York, which is in essence DIRCO, but acted here as a subsidiary of DIRCO. 276 It was peculiar to notice that the government agency and DAC’s Mzansi Golden

Economy (MGE) partner, South African Tourism (SA Tourism), did not get involved at the festival to serve the purposes of MGE. The agency was instead invited independently of the

DAC. SA Tourism is an agency “responsible for marketing South Africa as a destination internationally and domestically” and accounts to the Department of Tourism (National

Government (n.d.). The agency has committed itself to “meaningfully contributing to the government's objectives of inclusive economic growth, sustainable job creation, and redistribution and transformation of the industry” (South African Tourism, n. d.). The agency served its interest by capitalizing on the festival as an opportunity to meet some of its objectives regarding making SA prominent on the US tourist radar. For instance, the objectives of the agency include to

promote South Africa's scenic beauty, diverse wildlife, ecotourism, and variety of cultures and heritage; use the more focused, cost-effective and customer- driven approach taken to its international marketing operations in a quest to ‘play smarter' in the increasingly competitive global tourism market; … be active in promoting South Africa as a destination for business tourism … (National Government, n. d.-a)

At the festival, SA Tourism sponsored a contest by the CHC. The contest prize was “a trip to South Africa [which] coincided with that they were launching a new campaign…they saw the opportunity. It was mutually beneficial” (J. Geffen, personal communication, August

9, 2017).

South African Airways (SAA) was also listed as a supporter of the festival. The airline is the national carrier, and a state-owned enterprise. It is unsurprising then that one of its objectives is to “support South Africa’s National Developmental Agenda” which prioritizes inclusive development with the partnership of all of SA’s stakeholders towards, amongst others, a better economy (South African Airways, n. d.). SAA plays a role in the promotion of

277 the country’s national identity, and therefore has a stake in the advancement of SA culture within and outside of SA. On its fleet, SAA also carries SA cultural sector products like films and music, and it supports SA sports teams (ibid.). For the festival, SAA “gave [CHC] a certain number of air tickets” despite CHC having United Airline as the official airline (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017). The benefit for SAA was the “recognition in the printed material” (ibid.).

The DAC was another SA government stakeholder at Ubuntu. This is not only due to the department’s collaboration with CHC, but because of its responsibility towards the SA cultural sector represented at the festival. The DAC is tasked by the SA government with promoting and preserving SA heritage and culture, in all of its forms of expression (DACST,

1996). At Ubuntu the DAC played a limited role in that it could not direct the terms of its collaboration or participate in the organization of the festival. Nonetheless, the department’s interests were represented because of the identity of the festival.

The South African Consulate General in New York collaborated with CHC (Carnegie

Hall, 2014; J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017; G. Monyemangene, personal communication, August 31, 2017). The Consulate General is the head of the SA mission in

NYC, which is an arm of DIRCO, and thus of the SA government. DIRCO acts to foster diplomatic relations and advance SA’s social, cultural, political, economic and other interests through its complex infrastructure in different missions around the world. The Consulate in

NY saw a prime opportunity to collaborate with CHC due to the reputable organization it is and the potential for the collaboration to meet some of the Consulate’s objectives in the process

(G. Monyemangene, personal communication, August 31, 2017). Moreover, the former

Consulate General recognized the responsibility of DIRCO to further its mandate by getting involved at the festival. Its mandate, according to SA foreign policy is foremost based on the generation and increase of economic hard power in the USA. There are, thus, multiple 278 implications about soft power here, since SA culture is involved, and hard power. He explained that for the Consulate,

the Ubuntu festival was aimed at celebrating our twenty-year democracy through the exposition of the arts and culture, and through forming linkages with the US, specifically New York, the African diaspora, even the African American communities as well. It was quite interesting …we looked at partnering up with Carnegie simply because every year we look at different things that have a cultural aspect that we think we could work on within the New York area...we had partnered, for instance with the City Council of New York. We had quite a few events…but this time we felt that Carnegie was just the right partner because of their reputation...and also because the concept of Ubuntu itself, ‘I am because you are’, is very critical to South Africa, both as a philosophy and from a value perspective. (G. Monyemangene, personal communication, August 31, 2017).

The concept of Ubuntu in the festival’s identity, therefore, cemented the shared interests on the presentation of SA culture between the SA NYC Consulate and the CHC. For the

Consulate, however, there were a number of related benefits to participating at the festival.

Firstly, from a cultural exchange perspective…from the perspective of showcasing South Africa. It was beneficial in showcasing the concept of Ubuntu and who we are as a people…really from a branding and marketing perspective, that “we’re here, we’re South African, this is who we are, and this is what we have. And to be associated with such a prestigious institution as Carnegie, it brought a lot of mileage [for the country]. Considering that this is something that spanned a month, it was extremely beneficial for country branding, marketing and cultural exchange, skills development… (ibid.)

Musicians and other SA artists who performed at the festival were stakeholders too.

Although their participation was only on stage, their performances affected the outcome of the festival. The success of the festival would also have an impact on their careers, and so they had vested interests in the festival in more ways than one. The careers of the performers would be impacted by this performance for attracting new audiences or making an impression on

American audiences. The careers of the performers would also be impacted by how they

279 created networks at the festival, how they built their reputations, or how they told a story about present and past SA society and culture.

Some of the musicians, for instance, were happy “to represent South Africa” and “to perform a wonderful show to the American audience and show them how beautiful South

African music is” (M. Goldstein, personal communication, June 7, 2017). Others were looking forward to “an opportunity to showcase some of Cape Town's top musicians” and introduce them to “a wider audience” (D. Kramer, personal communication, June 2, 2017). Abdullah

Ibrahim wanted to paint a different portrait of SA, beyond the narrative of apartheid, and expose the possibilities provided by contemporary culture (Carnegie Hall, 2014a). Likewise, some of the artists stated that the festival was an opportunity to project the diversity of SA culture and music beyond the classifications of ‘black and white’, and in negation of the representations of the apartheid era (Carnegie Hall, 2014a). The musicians found the festival an opportunity to expose complex parts of SA identity and history that are not part of everyday conversation.

Like, for instance, the slaves who ‘came to Africa’ from the ‘Indian Ocean basin’ who are discussed less than those from Africa who went on to become slaves away from the continent

(Kramer in Carnegie Hall, 2014b. So, the musicians felt they shared the responsibility with

CHC to represent SA authentically, yet in a way that revealed SA’s cultural complexity.

Phillip Miller expanded on expectations of growth, explaining that

as a composer, I envisaged that the festival gave my work exposure to my music to a New York based audience often not aware of contemporary music originating from SA. To have my music performed at Carnegie Hall, would enhance my reputation and reinforce my success as a composer” (P. Miller, personal communication, May 12, 2017).

Kesivan Naidoo said the festival came at just the right time for him. He had just embarked on a new project with a new band. It was great timing for its exposure. He stated that

280 It was a good opportunity for my own music… the band I’d put together was kind of like of the up-and-coming or already well-established of the young vanguard musicians, and then [we had] Feya Faku, kind of like the elder (K. Naidoo, personal communication, April 7, 2017).

Dizu Plaatjies called it an unmissable ‘gig’ that would go on to “create a lot more opportunities for us…in other countries”, (D. Plaatjies, personal communication, May 5, 2017).

He suggested that it was “a stepping stone” because even though he had previously performed in the USA, he knew that “there are lots of artists from even America [who have] never performed in Carnegie Hall” (D. Plaatjies, personal communication, May 5, 2017). His management in Europe was also adamant that this was an important performance to do,

“whether there was money or no money” (ibid.). Furthermore, Plaatjies wanted to spread the word about Ibuyambo, his most recent ensemble, “because we have toured a lot of European countries, but not the States” (ibid.). In a similar vein, Jacobs of the Young Cape Malay Stars, wanted to “network the best way we knew how” (M. Jacobs, personal communication, May 2,

2017). Jacobs clarified that he contacted the embassy in Washington D.C. and invited the SA

Ambassador, who was at the time Ibrahim Rasool (ibid.). The intention was to see if the choir could “take the show to DC while [we] were there” (ibid.).

Roshnie Moonsammy, a seasoned festival organizer from SA, had a stake in the success of the festival as a representative of the country’s cultural sector, a gatekeeper and thought leader. She was brought in as a consultant to assist with SA-specific logistics (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017). Usually, Moonsamy wears many hats. Apart from being a festival organizer, she has been a manager to SA musicians in the past. She is on the governance structures of cultural organizations and has been involved in cultural advocacy (R.

Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). Her presence at Ubuntu was to help make the festival become a success in a way that represented the SA cultural sector in the best possible light (ibid.). She, thus, had common interests with the CHC and worked in this role in 281 her personal and professional capacity (ibid.). Her presence at the Ubuntu festival was for professional advancement, but also for the advancement of SA culture.

Moonsammy found that the benefits of participating at Ubuntu, despite not being the curator of the festival, were there because of the work she does in the SA cultural sector as a vested stakeholder. She is passionate about the process of organizing festivals and, thus, loves

“promoting and curating programs” (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017).

It was rewarding for her, therefore, to “assist someone doing a whole program of South African artists in New York”, by providing her expertise with “practical and administrative things”

(ibid.). Moonsammy believed that since the CHC was covering most of basic bills regarding accommodation and travel, it was easy to recognize that this was a “fantastic opportunity for

South African artists”, a very important opportunity for SA music and wished that the DAC had been “more involved” and “capitalized on the event” even if the department had to

“relinquish artistic control” (ibid.). For instance, because “most of the shows were sold out” this was great publicity for SA culture and its market (ibid.). Moonsammy was particularly proud of her contribution to the programming’s commitment to showcasing new and classically-inclined SA music styles that rarely get the opportunity to come onto mainstream stages, “like the Cape Malay choirs” (ibid.). She owed the motivation for this approach to the typical Carnegie Hall audiences who customarily consume classical music, who could then relate to choral traditions.

Her involvement also covered a few aspects central to cultural exchange and diplomacy.

First, it reflected the balancing of private-public stakeholder partnerships that shape ‘opinions and perceptions’ about one country in another country (Sölter, 2015, p. 198). Moonsamy was a key agent in that mission. Secondly, her role as an independent SA citizen in the organization of the festival was removed from government policy agendas and would create a foundation for audience to develop trust in the authenticity of the message the CHC made about SA as 282 created beyond government interference (Sölter, 2015). Her role as a participator in the organizing work was as a SA insider from the home country of the showcased culture who was part of local cultural networks (Sölter, 2015). Moonsammy’s role was thus about the organizers tapping into “what matters” in contemporary SA culture so that the organizers can communicate authentic but relevant messages (Sölter, 2015, p. 199).

Process

The CHC was directly involved in the festival organization process, and so most details were mainly internally arranged. For example, the decision to host it in October 2014 was made internally, based on a few factors. The timing was to cater to the anniversary of democracy in

2014, “which meant that it had to be in the fall of 2014” (J. Geffen, personal communication,

August 9, 2017). The festival had to also be “in advance of [Halloween] or else the message would be too diffuse” (ibid.). The scheduling was also because the Carnegie Hall season runs

“from October of the previous year until May or June of the following year [like] Northern hemisphere organizations work” (ibid.).

The CHC also has in-house personnel to manage aspects of festival planning, marketing and communications. After the decision to focus the festival on SA, a few processes involving in-house personnel and consultants followed. This included research on which artists to include. Geffen elucidates below.

In the decision-making process, we spoke to several people just to make sure that …we’re making the decision. We engaged two consultants to help us in programming the festival. There were certain things that didn’t require the help of a consultant, like having Hugh Masekela open the festival, and Angelique Kidjo in her tribute to her mentor Miriam Makeba close the festival and having William Kentridge involved. These are things that, from an international perspective, you know will work. We worked with these two consultants for identifying talent that wouldn’t have otherwise had access to, like the Cape Malay concert, like the Zulu evening, like finding Kesivan Naidoo and The Lights, and also helping us engage them to get the materials in order to help with visas on their side. All the operational elements that you need to bring 283 artists to the US, especially if they don’t have a history of touring to the US…We’ve had a long history in presenting Hugh [Masekela], so when he was coming for another engagement, we met with him and with Josh Georgiou, who is his manager, and asked him what he thought of the idea. He was enthusiastic. He gave us some initial thoughts and then basically said for anything more detailed we would need to engage a consultant. He may have indirectly suggested Josh…For this particular festival, recognizing that we’re going far outside the classical realm [we decided] it would be better to have multiple consultants. So, in addition to Josh, we approached Roshnie Moonsammy, who had been recommended to us through someone at SOAS61 in London… And Roshnie, having organized festivals in South Africa as well as serving as director of the Southern Africa Arts Exchange and founder of Urban Voices, she’d be in a unique position. (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017)

According to Roshnie Moonsammy, due to the CHC “work policies” and

“organizational mandate”, the CHC organizes such festivals and does all the related work in- house, and so it made sense that they did not appoint more coordinators from SA (R.

Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). Throughout the festival organization process, the CHC was involved in “communicating and coordinating” with many different management companies representing the artists to take part in the festival, and Moonsammy assisted with some of the administrative activities (R. Moonsamy, personal communication,

April 13, 2017). In this way, Moonsammy acted more as a cultural affairs specialist from SA, working for CHC interests in the USA (Müller, 2010). In-house work was also assisted by partnerships, which are of importance to CHC. For instance, Jeremy Geffen elaborated on the

CHC approach to collaborating with other discerning cultural institutions, that

Since these are city-wide festivals that we produce – when I say we “produce”, [what I mean is] we organize – Carnegie Hall curates the musical elements of the festival, and then our partner organizations and their particular disciplines around the city curate complementary programming in their specific disciplines, recognizing that they are the experts in their particular fields. So, what was important about this particular subject was that it be a subject that would be of interest to a broad swathe of cultural institutions and which would be intriguing to the general population as well. Carnegie Hall festivals have

61 SOAS is short for The School of Oriental and African Studies, which is part of the University of London. 284 succeeded on the strength of the programming that both we provide, and equally importantly the programming that our cultural partners are able to provide because that gives you the 360-degree view that you want audiences to have. (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017)

The form of collaboration the CHC embarks on with its stakeholders here is similar to what Müller (2010) noticed about partnerships in transnational cultural exchange, which are based on sharing resources. The strengths of what stakeholders individually bring to the table, for instance, is important. Mutual aims are constantly negotiated and adjusted for the sake of the cultural exchange, but without compromising on individual “institutional missions”

(Müller, 2010, p. 102-103). Collaborations are furthered by shared “interests and objectives”

(Müller, 2010, p. 101). She asserts that budgetary concerns also dictate the terms of engagement. As such, “leadership no longer lies in individuals”, but in the “sum of persons and organizations with an area of talents who put their passions, efforts and abilities together in the wake of a common objective” (Müller, 2010, p. 102).

Another example of the in-house operations undertaken for festivals of this nature, with cross-cultural content aimed at multicultural audiences, is the intensive CHC marketing. The marketing primarily involves the use of an established database of a demographically diverse clientele, to which the CHC markets Carnegie Hall events (J. Geffen, personal communication,

August 9, 2017; J. Hempel, personal communication, August 9, 2017). The organization therefore also tapped into this database to market the Ubuntu festival. Jennifer Hempel, the

Carnegie Hall Director of Advertising and Promotion, confirmed that festival goals are about

“taking people on a journey”, but that goals related to marketing involved to “attract new households, of which we did [at Ubuntu]” (J. Hempel, personal communication, August 9,

2017). She stated that the result of the Ubuntu festival was that “first time ticket buyers reaching beyond the traditional Carnegie Hall constituency succeeded as a startling 63.34% [and] of all ticket buyer households were new to Carnegie Hall” (J. Hempel, personal communication, 285 August 9, 2017). Hempel suggested that this was a particularly “high percentage given that the average number of new households for previous festivals were closer to 40%” (ibid.).

Hempel explained that the CHC has a systematic way of measuring achieved attendance results and new audiences, stating,

…we have an integrated database, which is ticketing and donations. That’s what I mean by integrated. We sell our own tickets, so we have all the ticket buyer information. We know their zip codes, we know where they live, and we can identify it to any ticket purchases they may or may not have had in the past. So, if they have no ticket history, we have a new household.” (J. Hempel, personal communication, August 9, 2017)

From this system, Hempel could confirm that not all concerts were sold out, but that rather than just sell tickets the other “metric was to reach new households” (ibid.). She stated that the challenge with festivals like Ubuntu is that they are “much more expensive to market” because the festival may not “necessarily appeal to traditional Carnegie Hall [audiences]” or

“anybody in [the Carnegie Hall] database” who buys tickets to the classical music repertoire offered at Carnegie Hall “or demonstrates such ticket behavior” (ibid.). Due to this goal to attract new audiences, Hempel noted that the Carnegie Hall “had to reach in to mainstream audiences and also specific communities” (ibid.).

As such the marketing involved, among others, using a “multi-platform” where “direct mail pieces”, which were more festival-specific brochures, were posted or emailed “to current ticket buyers” on the Carnegie Hall database, mailing the Carnegie Hall season catalogue to approximately “seventy thousand people”, “word of mouth through the right influencers”, using lists from other cultural institutions, spreading the word through television on “the Africa

Channel and New York One”, discounts on tickets, where some tickets sold for only “twenty dollars with a free drink”, “mainstream newspapers”, “free newspapers distributed to New

York residents in the five boroughs”, mainstream “radio spots”, other newspapers and

286 magazines which created a ripple effect on social media, jazz magazines, Afropop.org, Village

Voice and online platforms, geo-targeted Google display in texts, community newspapers, sending lists to those who rent the Carnegie Hall spaces, using last minute “end of season snail mail” and a “contest to win a trip to South Africa”, which also promoted the festival (ibid.).

Flyers and posters were also “distributed in key neighborhoods” or “zip codes” where some of the artists on the line-up had an audience base that could be determined from the existing

Carnegie database, and at Africa-related events and venues (J. Hempel, personal communication, August 9, 2017). All these forms of publicity and marketing involved codes which could reveal more about those who bought tickets and where those tickets were purchased (ibid.). Furthermore, the CHC had help from its partners who distributed marketing material through their networks. For instance, the SA Consulate in NY was engaged in distributing fliers as well (J. Hempel, personal communication, August 9, 2017).

Further marketing goals, which were “not a budgetary goal” were to “try and get our current [audience] interested in different types of music that wasn’t much cross-over” and to

“sell out concerts” (ibid.). From the segmented attendance figures Hempel shared, it became clear that concerts by artists who regularly toured the USA, or artists who had cultivated an audience base in the USA, had more attendance at the festival. Overall, she resolved that in terms of “just the revenue”, there was definite “return on investment”, but that the focus of the

CHC is “not-for-profit for a reason”, even when considering all the associated costs to the festival (ibid.). She was adamant that the investment is “in the artform” (J. Hempel, personal communication, August 9, 2017). That said, however, over eleven thousand “paid tickets” were sold for just the Carnegie Hall component of the festival, excluding complimentary tickets

(ibid.). Hempel’s testimony here further corroborates the CHC ethos suggested by Geffen (J.

Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017), which values the propagation and sustenance of art and cultural forms for their intangible societal rewards beyond their utilitarian 287 and profit-related benefits (Matarasso, 1997; Schneider, 2005, 2009; Woolf, 2010; Banks,

2011). This ethos aligns with why the organization exists in the first place. What this, and previously discussed objectives, suggests is that the CHC had culture-related goals for this festival which contribute to cultural development.

This mammoth festival also made attempts to be inclusive of its multi-sector stakeholders. Charles Baranowski, the Carnegie Hall government relations associate, recalled that the festival was important “for everyone involved—Carnegie Hall, NYC, and the broader

South African community” (C. Baranowski, personal communication, August 16, 2017).

According to Baranowski, Carnegie Hall invited a range of institutions, organizations, individuals, partners, supporters, government agencies, “to participate in the festival” (ibid.).

These included “South African/U.S. government entities; businesses, foundations, and cultural organizations”, the “U.S. Embassy in South Africa, South African Consulate General in NYC,

South African Embassy in USA, South African Department of Arts and Culture” (ibid.). He stated that there were individuals who also “lent their names to raise the festival’s profile and provide cultural/historical significance to the celebration” (ibid.). Some of them attended the festival, “including Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Ambassador Rasool, Ambassador Gaspard,

Consulate General Monyemangene, Vincent Mai, Jessye Norman” (ibid.). Additionally, “our corporate and foundation sponsors received tickets to select concerts as part of their support” and “the Committee of Honor members and South African officials, were invited as Carnegie

Hall’s guests to specific concerts and the opening and closing celebration of the festival”

(ibid.).

In terms of some of the SA partnerships temporarily formed specifically for the festival,

Geffen stated that they were mutually beneficial. He said, for instance that

having SAA saved Carnegie Hall a huge expense in paying for all those airfares. Usually we pay all-inclusive fees to artists, meaning that the fee that we pay 288 them …covers compensation, hotel and their travel…We couldn’t use that model this time. We had to cover a lot more airfares…a lot more hotel. And SAA’s contribution meant that the burden on Carnegie Hall was significantly lessened. (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017)

Even with this inclusive and mutually beneficial collaborative approach, however, from the testimonies by participants here, it is apparent that the involvement of the DAC at Ubuntu, and its collaboration with CHC, was limited. Representatives of the DAC confirmed that the festival was not a program of the DAC or its International Relations unit, and therefore the

DAC had no major involvement (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017; J.

Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017; L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017; N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017).

Nonetheless, the DAC’s erstwhile Americas consultant international relations manager, Kim

Jawanda, proposed the collaboration between the CHC and DAC to the DAC (L. Ndebele-

Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). By October 2013 Roshnie Moonsammy had known about the upcoming Ubuntu festival, and so when she met Jawanda at SAAF in LA,

2013, Moonsammy suggested that Jawanda get the DAC involved at Ubuntu in her capacity as

Americas consultant international relations manager for the DAC (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). Monsammy also suggested that the CHC contact Jawanda

(ibid.). The CHC and Jawanda were in consultation at some point after that (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017; R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017).

Jawanda later met with some DAC personnel about the Ubuntu festival, but after the engagement and some “input” from the DAC, “the music division” at the DAC did not participate further (N. Tshabalala, personal communication, February 28, 2017). In reflection,

Masokoane considered this “a missed opportunity” (G. Masokoane, personal communication,

July 26, 2017). He suggested that more meaningful collaboration between the DAC and the

289 CHC would have been beneficial to both parties. He explained that the DAC “would have appreciated the way [the CHC] work and [the CHC] could have been exposed to [SA] talent they would not have ordinarily been exposed to or known about” (G. Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). By this remark, Masokoane suggests that there was potential for institution-to-institution skills transfer, and thus a skills-based form of cultural exchange.

Even though the DAC had limited participation, the festival was a multi-faceted cultural diplomacy environment aided by the diversity of the stakeholders. As a minor participant who missed the opportunity to further engage with the organizer, but possessing major stakeholder interests in the festival, the DAC could make a different impact. For instance, Fosler-Lussier

(2012) finds that exercises in cultural diplomacy happen beyond facilitator objectives and achieve more than predetermined tangible outcomes. This is because cultural diplomacy involves “several simultaneous forms of engagement” including “nurturing the desire” for music of the country of origin amongst groups in the country of diffusion abroad, but also involve “creating imagined connections across vast distances” (Fosler-Lussier, 2010, p. 86).

Ang et al. (2015) also point out that cultural diplomacy is driven from multiple directions, and not a central point, and that because cultural diplomacy fosters ‘mutual understanding’, which is of common interest, its impact is beyond furthering national interests (p. 370). As it transpires later in this chapter, the DAC’s MGE strategy supported conditions for stimulating a desire for

SA music among US audiences. And so, as Fosler-Lussier (2012) suggests of cultural diplomacy, it commonly presents “contradictory implications rather than a coherent ideological program” (Fosler-Lussier, 2010, p. 86).

A different collaboration to the one originally envisaged resulted between the DAC and

CHC. Geffen, explained how the resulting collaboration came about, as that

Kim [Jawanda] was more helpful when it came to getting visas and making arrangements for artists to obtain internal funding to support their trip to the 290 United States…On our second meeting, [Kim] brought …a government appointment…with a very strong agenda that was not that helpful [consisting of] what the South African government wanted to see happen with Carnegie Hall’s festival. And in all of our international festivals, we have found that it’s much more powerful and much more impactful to have one culture paying tribute to another rather than having the culture being examined, saying ‘this is exactly how we want to be portrayed’ because that may or may not work in New York. And often, there are political agendas that one is not aware of that can wind up trumping artistic excellence… We did meet with a group of [thirty- five] cultural entities in Johannesburg, that was organized through the [DAC]. While it was fascinating to talk to them all, ultimately, we had to make the decision about what we felt would represent modern South African culture and work for Carnegie Hall’s presentation, knowing who our audience is and the potential audience we wanted to attract. (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017)

Geffen further clarified that the meeting with the DAC had “groups ranging from small grass-roots organizations to the symphony orchestra” (ibid.). He stated that the DAC was “more interested in a democratic process by which they would be included in the festival than they were in helping us develop a mission for the festival” (ibid.). The CHC, however, wanted to showcase what in Carnegie Hall’s opinion is ‘most outstanding about South African culture’

(ibid.). This is how the CHC relied more on its research, consultants and other stakeholders, and owing to that the DAC had limited involvement.

In addition, Geffen’s statements in the last paragraph highlight the responsibilities of the DAC as not only a cultural organization, but an institution of the government that balances

SA’s cultural and political interests in all it does. After all, the DAC is a government department. Thus, the DAC has to adhere to the vision of the government and its established objectives, even though culture is its mission (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17,

2017). As Matarasso and Landry (1999) have pointed out, it is the job of the government to intervene in the activities of national sectors, including culture, for the sake of national development, and that the government may prioritize its goals in that intervention. At the

Ubuntu festival, therefore, the DAC was negotiating for room for government priorities.

291 Although the role of the DAC was ultimately limited, Dizu Plaatjies confirms that his ensemble was among artists who received financial support for their participation at Ubuntu.

The DAC “bought the [flight] tickets” (D. Plaatjies, personal communication, May 5, 2017).

This was funding from MGE’s travel venture funding model for which musicians apply.

Moeniel Jacobs, who is the administrator, musical director and singer of The Young Cape

Malay Stars, established that after applying to the DAC, he received funding for his choir to participate at the Ubuntu festival (M. Jacobs, personal communication, May 2, 2017). This funding, however, was not specifically for flights and accommodation for the choir, since

“Carnegie Hall paid” for those (ibid.)

DIRCO’s role and participation at the festival, on the other hand, was complicated. For one, the SA Consulate in NY was more involved in city-wide activities of the festival rather than specifically for those at Carnegie Hall. Additionally, the SA Consulate in NY was not listed on the Ubuntu posters and media material as collaborating with CHC under the auspices of DIRCO. Instead, the Consulate seems to have acted on its own since it directly took on the partnership with CHC. The former Consulate General in NYC explained that there were ongoing “discussions with Carnegie” (G. Monyemangene, personal communication, August

31, 2017). He said that the Consulate was “approached by the [CHC] CEO because [CHC] knew that [the Consulate] did different events” and that was mainly because in the “three or so years prior to that [the Consulate] had done different types of events, so [the Consulate was] in touch with a lot of different arts and culture entities” (G. Monyemangene, personal communication, August 31, 2017). As such, “from the word go, [the Consulate] agreed to partner [with CHC] going forward” (ibid.). The partnership with the CHC was in order for

DIRCO to meet its government mandate.

According to the former Consulate General, the SA Consulate in NY made some suggestions about the artists to perform at the festival too. In fact, he cites that the Consulate 292 played a role of co-planning, the role of identifying who we thought would be the best people to bring in in terms of the South Africans that were coming to participate … of ensuring that there was some form of community outreach…which is why we did an offshoot in Harlem, for instance so that we could connect with the diaspora in that particular area. We also sponsored a couple of events, [like] the opening reception together with other South African entities such as SAA, SA Tourism, etc., …although Carnegie using their muscle for planning and the resources that they had would have done the bulk of the work, but we were quite an integral part of the planning and some of the events that took place during that time…we made some suggestions in terms of who we would like to see. That is why we also proposed that we would like to see some younger artists as well, particularly those who did most of the engagements at the Apollo [Theatre]. So that we could also bring up some up and coming artists. (ibid.)

The role of DIRCO, was thus more facilitative. Its NYC consulate also acted as a liaison for a once-off event. The consulate contributed to introducing new SA music that was showcased at events of the festival that were not those staged at Carnegie Hall. DIRCO thus had no influence on the artistic imperatives at the Carnegie Hall shows.

Participants also confirmed that the Consulate hosted an opening and closing reception for the festival (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017; G. Monyemangene, personal communication, August 31, 2017). Vusi Mahlasela and Angelique Kidjo attended the closing party (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). Other than this, the

Consulate “invited a lot of stakeholders [in] business, people in the arts, people in in the African diaspora…quite a diverse mixture of stakeholders”, including “the [SA] Ambassador, who came from Washington D.C” (G. Monyemangene, personal communication, August 31, 2017).

Also, the participant “artists were invited to the opening reception, but those would have been the artists that were [in NYC] at that particular time, [otherwise] it would have been very costly

… in New York to hold a reception” (ibid.).

The gesture of DIRCO inviting CCI stakeholders from the USA was important and in some ways a recognition that such networks “provide access to the market” and “support the

293 exchange of ideas and social interaction that are vital for the development” of CCI’s

(Comunian, 2011, p. 1171-1172). From this section and further, the theme of networks becomes a repeated one in this unit of analysis. For instance, environments like festivals have an internationalizing quality, where global interests are stimulated and ‘global networks of power and influence’ are forged ‘between local councils, businesses, governments, and communities’ (Stringer, 2001, p. 141-142). In this way, festivals act as ‘gatekeepers’ of the industry (ibid.). Moreover, in new spaces, networks like these are enhanced, and push artists to

‘think “out of the box”’ regarding their careers and help “spread entrepreneurial ideas and practices” among network members (Markusen & King, 2005, p. 3-19). Both SA CCI participants and CCI participants from the USA at the reception had the potential to benefit from networking and forging relationships. Nonetheless, this was only a unique once-off event which could not build the required cultural infrastructure and networks for SA CCI’s all at once. Events like this have to happen regularly for impact within the CCI’s (Andersson &

Andersson, 2006; Currid, 2007b).

Apart from the musicians, the Consulate “did not invite any South Africans institutions per se”, but it instead “partnered up with what we’d normally call Team South Africa: SAA,

SA Tourism, BrandSA... and there were people from our headquarters, from DIRCO” (G.

Monyemangene, personal communication, August 31, 2017). Nonetheless, there were some disappointments with DIRCO’s role in creating direct relationships with SA artists at the festival. For instance, Miller attended the launch party of the festival, but noted that he did not

“meet the South African Consul General or any staff from the South African embassy” (P.

Miller, personal communication, May 12, 2017). This means that there was an expectation by

Miller of an official introduction, and at least of someone at the NYC Consulate whose role would be a first-point-of-contact with invited SA artists. When Moeniel Jacobs contacted the embassy in Washington D.C. to see if his choir could perform there, the embassy 294 communicated that “they had no funds to assist us” (M. Jacobs, personal communication, May

2, 2017). The scenarios both music practitioners paint is of an absence of an official at the embassy or NYC Consulate who would have the kind of function that provides insights on the cultural and community landscape of NYC so that the artists know which networks to tap into to further their goals or create in roads in the USA (Sikes et al., 2006; Sölter, 2008).

Nevertheless, the SA NYC Consulate facilitated the festival reception by collaborating with many cultural stakeholders. By hosting this once-off event, however, the SA Consulate in

NYC, like other SA missions abroad, did not act in the traditional manner of states conducting cultural diplomacy and building cultural networks and infrastructure for the long term, which are in the national interest (Sikes et al., 2006). Instead, the consulate acted dissimilarly to the portrait which Ferraguto (2015) paints of diplomats who regularly and actively took on the role of patron, agent, and more. Ferraguto (2015) conveyed that to build music and cultural networks, diplomats would host events which were attended by the social, political and cultural elite. These events shaped the “careers and reputations” of musicians because they assisted musicians to produce and disseminate their works, as well as facilitate the “geographical mobility” of the musicians (p. 11-15).

At this reception, DIRCO and the NYC Consulate instead acted partially similarly to what Sölter (2008) explains as a more contemporary execution of cultural diplomacy. This is only in the sense where cultural workers and other citizens act as representatives of a nation and take on the role of diplomats in cultural diplomacy. Otherwise, these representatives still need “insiders who know the scene well enough to quickly connect them locally upon arrival so that they can hit the ground running” (Sölter, 2008, p. 4). Such insiders act as “facilitators” who are “independent of government” of both countries, because such insiders have more credibility than government deployees (p. 4). This may support why at the reception DIRCO and the NYC Consulate invited both the SA CCI participants and USA CCI participants and 295 stakeholders who have no affiliation with the governments of SA or the USA, so that they could be introduced to each other. The Consulate, thus, created an environment which encouraged a more resources-driven multi-stakeholder and spontaneous form of cultural diplomacy.

The reception was also cost-effective, however. Previously in this study I have shown that cultural programming at SA embassies is sparse because of budgetary and strategy challenges (Nawa et al., 2017; L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). This means that SA foreign missions cannot support regular cultural ceremonies such as this reception. As the erstwhile Consular General has also suggested, the Ubuntu festival was different to the usual cultural programming at the Consulate. For instance, the “cultural-based events” are usually carried out by the political and other “consuls”, since “part of their portfolio includes this component”, and not by cultural attaches (G. Monyemangene, personal communication, August 31, 2017). The usual cultural programming sometimes necessitates that the Consulates “partner on other projects with the Department of Arts and Culture”, which is how the Consulate invited the then Deputy Minister of Arts and Culture, Rejoice

Mabudafhasi to be the “keynote speaker” for the festival opening reception that the Consulate hosted (ibid.). Moreover, when relating to standard resources of the cultural programs at the

Consulate, Monyemangene cited that “we put a lot of effort into it…sometimes we put resources, in the sense of financial resources where necessary” (ibid.). As he concedes, the

Ubuntu festival had a larger budget and planning than usual. It was different in that

It involved a huge number of musicians and it was over a very long period of time…five weeks… It was huge, it was well-marketed, it was planned well, on time, and I think we started a year and a half with the planning. Or at least a year… A lot of planning went into it. (G. Monyemangene, personal communication, August 31, 2017)

Geffen pointed out that CHC had “extremely good relations with the Consulate”, but that it ordinarily engages directly with SA artists (J. Geffen, personal communication, August

296 9, 2017). Otherwise, he was also aware of the personnel turnover due to the four-year deployments at embassies, which mean that if the CHC want to work with someone specifically assigned to SA culture, the CHC would have to consult different members of staff every few years (ibid.). He also mentioned that even so, the CHC

had quite significant consultation with the Consulate [in NYC]. They made some suggestions, and honestly, we have found that government entities tend to be more interested in promoting internal [democratic] agendas or being perceived as being even-handed with their opportunities, and that’s not a curated festival. (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017)

To help with the logistics of the festival, the CHC worked with a consultant from SA.

Roshnie Moonsammy, a cultural activist and festival organizer from SA, had vast knowledge about SA talent and other cultural sector logistics. Moonsamy confirmed that colleagues at

SOAS in London “recommended my name to the artistic directors of Carnegie Hall who were doing the Ubuntu festival, so then they contacted me because of my work with American artists and my work in South Africa” (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017).

Before getting to NYC, Moonsamy had some ground work to do in SA for the festival. This partly entailed convincing CHC representatives, who were in SA for a research tour, about which other artists they could add to the festival line-up (ibid.). She created an event in

Johannesburg to showcase the artists concerned (ibid.).

Ultimately, invitations for musicians to perform at Ubuntu were approached individually and variously. Geffen stated that there were musicians who were approached when representatives of the CHC “did a research trip to South Africa” (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017). Other musicians, like Kesivan Naidoo and Madala Kunene, were recommended by Hugh Masekela (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017;

Naidoo, personal communication, April 7, 2017). The next few paragraphs detail part of the recruitment process.

297 According to the Ladysmith Black Mambazo manager the invitation process was straight forward, where Carnegie Hall “was putting together this festival and wanted famous and interesting South African artists to perform. They contacted us to perform and we agreed”

(M. Goldstein, personal communication, June 7, 2017). Meanwhile, a representative of one of the female sopranos who performed a recital as part of the festival, who was not formally interviewed for this research, admitted that although the singer participated at the festival, she only learnt that the recital was in the frame of a whole festival when the event was over. To this, Geffen explained that due to the stature of the two singers who were in recitals at the festival, or their “major importance in the classical music world”, that the CHC “would have presented either of them in recital anyway” (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9,

2017). He further said that, as “major international opera singers”, Pretty Yende and Elza van den Heever were important because “so much of the vocal talent on the opera stage at the moment is coming from South Africa” (ibid.).

Other musicians went through a selection process. For David Kramer, for instance, “the organizers sent a team to South Africa who met with me to discuss the origins and current manifestations of ghoema. I subsequently received an invitation to perform with my band in

New York” (D. Kramer, personal communication, June 2, 2017). For Phillip Miller, he and

William Kentridge “were invited to present” their cine-music project (P. Miller, personal communication, May 12, 2017).

For Moeniel Jacobs, the recruitment process for his choir to be at the festival came through a network connection. He stated that “we were just a couple of guys. Whenever we got a place to perform, we’d perform…basically to keep the culture alive” (M. Jacobs, personal communication, May 2, 2017). One day Jacobs heard from Fahiem Stellenboom “the marketing manager for the Baxter Theater” who remembered that the choir had participated “in a production about Cape Malay culture” in Port Elizabeth (ibid.). Stellenboom “got wind of the 298 showcase” and told Jacobs that there were “people from the USA who were looking for Cape

Malay culture” and SA talent (M. Jacobs, personal communication, May 2, 2017). Stellenboom then asked if Jacobs could put something together. Another Cape Malay group was supposed to be auditioned, but after his choir presented the “ghoema liedjies62 that we do”, the three

Carnegie Hall representatives “were quite impressed with that [and] didn’t go further to go watch other people” (M. Jacobs, personal communication, May 2, 2017). Then “two months later [we] got the email from Jeremy Geffen” and they were formally invited to perform at the

Ubuntu festival (ibid.).

For the drummer Kesivan Naidoo, of the ensemble ‘Kesivan and The Lights’, being invited to be part of the festival was serendipitous but was also possible through music networks. As he explains,

Luckily Hugh Masekela is a friend of mine and he was …advising. He told the directors to come watch a concert of mine, obviously with The Lights, and then, it’s funny because I didn’t even know that’s what they were doing. And this guy comes up to me at the bar and says, ‘that was one of the most stimulating musical experiences I’ve had in a long time’, and obviously I said, ‘thank you’. And then he says, ‘would you ever like to play at Carnegie Hall’, so I said ‘yes, every musician wants to play at Carnegie Hall’. Then he says ‘here, here’s my card’... He says, ‘send me an email and I’m going to make sure you get through’. So, I sent him an email and a month later, he says ‘are you available on the 30th of October 2014 to be part of [the festival]’... then what I did was I actually got Josh, Hugh Masekela’s manager to help manage that part of things because it’s just cleaner when you have a manager… (K. Naidoo, personal communication, April 7, 2017)

In Dizu Plaatjies’ case, he initially received a call from a man in NYC who wanted to

“interview Dizu, Amampondo and Ibuyambo” (D. Plaatjies, personal communication, May 5,

2017). After that

three of them came and then I did an interview with them for almost about four hours… and then I had to tell them the story about myself and Amampondo

62 Liedjie means short song in the SA Afrikaans language. 299 [and] Ibuyambo… Then I asked them what the festival was about and they said the festival was about South African music and they are going to invite quite a number of artists from all over, especially South Africa. (D. Plaatjies, personal communication, May 5, 2017).

Outputs

The festival made a few statements regarding SA culture. The event projected the diversity of

SA culture. As a platform, it exhibited under-exposed cultural forms and vocal traditions on international stages. It presented a more complex part of the SA history spectrum. It also celebrated the centrality of the voice in SA’s social and music traditions (Carnegie Hall,

2014e). These statements were not always easy to transmit, factoring in that they were made to an American audience. For instance,

Where it got complicated was in messaging Cape Malay culture. First of all, because the term commonly accepted in South Africa for the culture has an entirely different and pejorative meaning in the United States. And in order to understand the origins of that culture, you have to understand the history of South Africa. And that is not well-known outside of South Africa. So that was a challenge (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017).

In exposing the diversity of SA culture to a foreign audience, the festival may have acted in an ambassadorial role in revealing the innovation in SA arts and culture and thus a part of SA nationhood (Mulcahy, 2010). As Mulcahy (2010) has shown possible with cultural diplomacy projects, the festival dispersed information about SA with limited overt political messaging. The festival internationalized communications on SA and culture (ibid.). From this perspective, the festival may offer a different lens to the diplomatic relations between SA and the USA because its logic is different to tangible factors such as economics and politics

(Zaharna, 2012).

300 The festival also exceeded the CHC’s expectations. The event drew a large audience to experience messaging about SA culture. As such, the CHC reached new audiences. Stakeholder feedback also suggested that it had a big cultural impact. Geffen confirmed that

It went better than we’d envisioned it go… [For instance,] sixty percent of the audience that attended were new to Carnegie Hall. That’s one of the goals of festivals: to bring in new audiences, in addition to the audience we already have. Other festivals have not gotten close to that number…The cultural impact is more intangible. The way we judge that was by the feedback we got from our audiences, what we gauged from the quality of the performances themselves and also from the performers: their reactions to the festival. All were outstanding... The atmosphere backstage at Carnegie Hall is always very charged … but I’ve rarely felt the atmosphere backstage, in general, to be so joyful as it was during the weeks of that festival…For many of the artists that we presented during the [Ubuntu] festival… there was this sense of gratitude and joy in the opportunity. Also, with our partner organizations in the festival, they all reported that they were able to take on programming that they might not otherwise have been able to present, under the aegis of this festival, because Carnegie Hall provides the overall marketing and public relations umbrella through which the festival is made visible, and for the smaller partner organizations, they don’t get that level of visibility on their own. They need a big organization like Carnegie Hall to help. (J. Geffen, personal communication, August 9, 2017)

On the benefits of a new audience for Carnegie Hall and the CHC, through the festival,

Geffen pointed out that

if sixty percent of the audience is new to Carnegie Hall, that’s a whole new group of people that we’re able to access and to go back to and build upon. Carnegie Hall is thought of primarily as a classical music venue, and there was some classical music. Music presented during this festival, namely South African artists performing classical music [but this] was also a chance for Carnegie to show the variety that we can present. That’s a benefit to us. (ibid.)

It also mattered that the Carnegie Hall concerts attracted high-profile US cultural sector stakeholders to attend. Some of these included “Alicia Keys, Whoopi Goldberg”, “Celine

Dion’s voice coach who also happens to be Angelique Kidjo’s voice coach”, and others (R.

Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). The festival events also received

301 mainstream media coverage, in publications like the New York Times (da Fonseca-Wollheim,

2014; R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). That said, however, there were musicians who were “not aware of any press or media interviews arranged by any of the production team” (P. Miller, personal communication, May 12, 2017).

The SA artists and non-SA artists who collaborated on stage would have become part of new creative networks that would have resulted from working together and being introduced to each other. Due to some of the collaborations being of musicians from different forms of musical expression working together to articulate SA music aesthetics, the collaborators were also culturally immersed in a different experience. Musicians in a production like A Distant

Drum, are an example of this. Forming a creative network is similar to the artistic and career benefits for musicians observed by Gibson (2007) and Jansson and Nilsson (2016) who noticed that these are some of the results of work in temporary spaces like festivals.

The festival was considered a success by the musicians because some of the shows were sold out. This was the case for Ladysmith Black Mambazo, but that might have also been because the group is already “very well established” (M. Goldstein, personal communication,

June 7, 2017). Among others, the Phillip Miller and William Kentridge show was also sold out

(J. Hempel, personal communication, August 9, 2017). Furthermore, the majority of musicians, and their representatives, interviewed were happy to have performed at a venue with such a high profile, prestige and rich history (M. Goldstein, personal communication, June 7, 2017;

D. Kramer, personal communication, June 2, 2017; K. Naidoo, personal communication, April

7, 2017; D. Plaatjies, personal communication, May 5, 2017; Anonymous 1, personal communication, June 30, 2017). Beyond the festival, the musicians were happy that they would always be associated with the venue (M. Jacobs, personal communication, May 2, 2017; D.

Kramer, personal communication, June 2, 2017; K. Naidoo, personal communication, April 7,

2017; D. Plaatjies, personal communication, May 5, 2017). They understood that they were 302 now part of the Carnegie Hall network of musicians who have performed there, just as Hugh

Masekela had become, and that such a network confers artistic legitimacy upon those who belong to it through association, recognition and belonging (Hesmondhalgh, 2002; Jeffri, 2002;

Currid, 2007a; Currid, 2007b; Andersson et al., 2011; Comunian, 2015). Through belonging to this new network, the musicians are also associated with standards recognizable, outside of the network, as those of Carnegie Hall. The musicians also felt that the festival was also a success because of the publicity it showered onto non-mainstream types of SA music like ghoema (D.

Plaatjies, personal communication, May 5, 2017). It was for this reason that Dizu Plaatjies also resolved that the festival was “unique and unusual” (ibid.). The musicians found it meaningful that their performances each “got a standing ovation” (Anonymous 1, personal communication,

June 30, 2017; M. Jacobs, personal communication, May 2, 2017; K. Naidoo, personal communication, April 7, 2017; D. Plaatjies, personal communication, May 5, 2017).

Another musician spoke of validation because of the experience. He mentioned the high standards of professionalism he encountered by the CHC towards many aspects of the festival and himself. This included the stage set up and other logistics (Anonymous 1, personal communication, June 30, 2017). As such, he “felt so important and respected” (ibid.). He felt this way because he did not regard his music as mainstream, but as “Afrocentric” music on the margins of popular culture (ibid.). In fact, he was surprised and “humbled” to get a “standing ovation” (ibid.). Moonsamy also confirmed that some musicians said they were very grateful for their inclusion on the program (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017).

Other cited benefits from participating here were that the festival helped rekindle networks. For example, David Kramer found that being in NYC gave him “the opportunity of re-establishing connection with people [he’d] worked with” on some of his previous musical productions like Kat and The Kings which “was at The Cort Theatre on Broadway” (D. Kramer, personal communication, June 2, 2017). For Roshnie Moonsammy, during her time in NYC, 303 she got to reconnect with Angelique Kidjo, with whom she had worked a few times in SA, various other artists and arts organizations for her work with approaching festivals in SA she was curating and strengthening relationships with arts-presenting bodies (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). Likewise, Phillip Miller found that “a few relationships or networks were enabled” (P. Miller, personal communication, May 12, 2017).

Even in spite of inherently instrumentalist MGE goals involved at the festival, represented by the DAC and its funding which sponsored some of these artists, this group of cultural producers, thus, exploited the festival for inward cultural advancement related to their careers beyond the national economic goals (Nisbett, 2013b; Hadley & Gray, 2017).

There were more intangible rewards. For example, Dizu Plaatjies, mentioned what he found to be a heart-warming moment. He said that “surprisingly, my ex-students…these exchange students, about thirty or forty of them, they were in the auditorium. They bought almost about four boxes of cd’s” (D. Plaatjies, personal communication, May 5, 2017). Apart from the cd’s, Plaatjies also found networking opportunities since he had two concerts in the city. He said he “had a lot of cards” to distribute, even among “South Africans attending the concert” for whom the “music takes them back home” (D. Plaatjies, personal communication,

May 5, 2017). Before leaving for NYC, Plaatjies recalled that “a lady who is a journalist at the

Jewish Museum …in Cape Town” used social media to let other South Africans in NYC know about the festival and Plaatjies’ concerts around the city. He is convinced that this promotion had an impact on the large attendance by SA citizens who live in NYC (ibid.). As a result of the festival, he received “invitations to perform in other countries” and as such his ensemble

“travelled for about four months in Western Europe and also in Eastern Europe” (ibid.).

Plaatjies cited that he was interviewed while in NYC on radio shows, newspapers and magazines, which he said were organized by the Carnegie Hall (ibid.).

304 For the Young Cape Malay Stars, apart from an added “spring in their step” and

‘rejuvenation’, a few performances in SA were possible due to “excitement over” their recent trip to Carnegie Hall (M. Jacobs, personal communication, May 2, 2017). The choir performed at two local festivals, the “Zabalaza Festival, KKenK63” (ibid.). A “show of the production at the Baxter Theatre” in Cape Town was a result (ibid.). Later a local radio interview and newspaper articles followed, which meant more publicity for the choir.

The festival marked a turning point for Kesivan Naidoo’s career. It was a temporary space in which he found opportunities to condensed time for professional, creative and economic rewards (Jansson & Nilsson, 2016). The results of the festival were tangible for him.

Naidoo got positive results from networking and staying in NYC for longer after the festival.

He got to “explore a career in the United States” (K. Naidoo, personal communication, April

7, 2017). He stated that,

I started investigating at least having some sort of career there because of the exposure, and I ended up at Berklee College to do a Masters’ a year later. It wasn’t a direct result of that concert, but …it afforded me to go and investigate these things… I always wanted to be in the United States at some point in my life because…even though I studied jazz from a South African perspective, all of the great people that I had been working with and mentored by, they all spent time in the USA and encouraged me to go. At some point I had to…Particularly New York. And I had played with a lot of American artists in parts of South Africa, and I used [the festival] as an opportunity to further deepen those networks. So, after the concert, I actually stayed a month later on, networking, going to visit people, meeting new people… to see if I could actually make some sort of inroad to being in the United States, and then Danilo Perez…the piano player, I played with him here at the Grahamstown Festival in 2010. He said, ‘I’m starting this ground-breaking Masters’ program. One of its kind, the first one at Berklee…would you be interested in coming?’. So that’s when I made that connection…it’s that little time that I managed to have in New York. Also, [in that month] I ended up doing guest lecturing at Howard [University]…and the University of Delaware... and I actually live in New York now…the jazz mecca of the world…It really humbled [us as band members] because ...there’s an amazing audience within South Africa jazz, but people outside of South Africa don’t really know us, and so at least we broadened the footprint,

63 This is the Klein Karoo Nasionale Kunst fees, a festival that takes place in Oudtshoorn, South Africa around Easter. 305 particularly of the new vanguard of jazz here, a little bit. Of course, I’m still networking…Trans-Atlantic relationships [are] getting stronger between the United States and South Africa, culturally, that is. (K. Naidoo, personal communication, April 7, 2017).

As Geffen had earlier indicated, stakeholder engagement at the festival also led to further cultural exchange opportunities. An example is how the CHC engagement with the US embassy in SA produced music collaborations. Baranowski confirmed this, suggesting that

the U.S. Embassy in South Africa was involved in the festival through Ambassador Gaspard, who was on the Committee of Honor and attended the final performance. Our engagement with U.S. Ambassador Patrick Gaspard around UBUNTU led to additional partnership opportunities with the U.S. Embassy such as Decoda, an independent alumni organization of Carnegie Hall’s Ensemble Connect program, which had a residency in South Africa that was promoted by the Embassy [after 2014 the Ubuntu festival]”. (C. Baranowski, personal communication, August 16, 2017)

Plaatjies, Jacobs and Naidoo’s experiences are evidence of proposals that events like festivals and the networks inherently built around their occurrence are not only strategic personal and professional relationships meant to reap rewards in the long term, but provide opportunities that would not happen outside these spaces in a short amount of time

(Bridgestock, 2005; Gibson, 2007; Jansson & Nilsson, 2016).

Another interesting outcome to this festival was that it became an exercise in a dual kind of cultural diplomacy for both SA and the USA. The festival may not have been carried out by SA government entities, but as a SA government cultural diplomacy exercise it had hard power plans that were executed due to government goals. It was also cultural diplomacy for the sake of peacekeeping for the USA and to drive the USA’s security interests abroad (Kidd,

2012). And so even though cultural diplomacy was not a major priority of the CHC’s, the festival was mainly sponsored by foundations whose missions include peacebuilding between the global community and the USA. US foundations like these often act to preserve and promote the image of the USA, in the imagination of the world and within the USA, by taking 306 up altruistic causes that are linked to cultural diplomacy (ibid.; Lawson & Wyszomirski, 2010).

It is also common in contemporary times for peacekeeping through cultural diplomacy to be carried out by non-state actors, where diplomacy is also not ‘exclusively [be] at the service of diplomacy’ or on a government-to-government basis (Wyszomirski, 2010, p. 1).

As an exercise in cultural diplomacy, the festival was also a demonstration of the shift in the way in which cultural diplomacy is experienced, where “culture is a field of international relations in its own right as much as a tool for foreign policy” (Kozymka, 2014, p. 9). Firstly, as a cultural diplomacy exercise, the festival involved “interagency and public-private coordination” which meant access to funding from the private sector (Schneider, 2009, p. 276).

Secondly, there was some distance between one of the agents of cultural diplomacy and a political agenda (Gienow-Hecht & Donfried, 2010). The US foundations, for example, were not carrying out an official government effort at cultural diplomacy for the USA, while the SA government agencies were. This form of cultural diplomacy was thus cooperation between business, civil society and government on behalf of civil society and government (Gienow-

Hecht & Donfried, 2010). And although the cultural diplomacy was mutually beneficial to these agents and stakeholders, it was “dialogue and exchange” that moved in multiple directions “between the agent and recipient of the cultural diplomacy program” because the agents were also the recipients and the exchange was not simply of culture but of other resources too, and it was facilitated by a third party, the CHC (ibid., p. 23).

Table 3 below summarizes a comparison of the inputs and outputs of the festival, in relation to the objectives of the organizer for the event.

307 What did the What actions were taken to realize this? What did the actions organizers want? achieve? (Projected Benefits, (Inputs, Process) (Actual Benefits, Outputs) Objectives) Fulfil the cultural • Included multiple disciplines in the • Hosted a South Africa- mandate of the program focused festival CHC • Collaborated with other NYC cultural • Hosted a city-wide festival institutions • Festival events occurred in NYC’s 5 boroughs

Take audience on a • Conducted research specifically for the • Showcased familiar and journey of festival unfamiliar SA vocal music discovery • Relied on recommendations, auditions, genres attended concerts and other means to • Presented a multi- recruit festival acts disciplinary festival • Hired two private CCI consultants from SA • Festival reached a city-wide to co-advise on the programming content audience • Collaborated with other NYC multi- • Facilitated cultural disciplinary cultural institutions engagement between SA • Collaborated with DIRCO’s NYC musicians and NYC Consulate audiences • Presented SA music master classes • Festival projected the • Marketed the festival widely, across diversity of SA culture different platforms • Festival engaged with SA history

Celebrate diversity • Programming included diverse SA music • Enabled networking and excellence of genres opportunities between SA SA arts • Hired two private CCI consultants from SA and non-SA CCI role to assist with logistics players • Named the festival Ubuntu to symbolize • Enabled a cross-pollination national unity in cultural diversity of ideas between musicians • Included collaborations with SA and non- • Reached over 60% new SA musicians audiences • Festival activities were sponsored by public • Shared resources with and private entities from the USA and SA stakeholders and reduced production costs • Drew a large audience • Some of the shows were sold out • Received positive feedback from the participant musicians Table 3: Ubuntu Festival (2014) Outputs

308 Celebrate • Scheduled to coincide with the anniversary • Brought awareness of SA anniversary of of SA’s 20 years of democracy in 2014 nationhood SA’s 20 years of • NYC Consulate hosted a reception with • Brought awareness of SA democracy diverse stakeholders culture • Represented international interests due to profiles of its diverse stakeholders • Resulted in a cultural diplomacy exercise

Expand music • Evaluated festival activity using a variety • Retained figures and genre appreciation of tools` measure of the return on scope of current investment and other forms CH audience of impact like CHC audience attendance

Table 3 cont.: Ubuntu Festival (2014) Outputs

Findings

The findings discussed below implicate three prominent themes in this chapter. These are how policy manifests at the festival, how power works and the implication of networks. An emergent fourth theme relates to a role that ties networks together, that of cultural attachés.

Policy

The Ubuntu festival was organized by the CHC, an institution which is independent of the US government and US philanthropic foundations, and an organization which runs artistic ventures only for the NY City Council and the city’s residents. The CHC is, thus, not accountable to the

SA government. Instead, by hosting the festival, the CHC collaborated with DIRCO, the DAC,

US Foundations and other stakeholders to achieve its own cultural mandate for the NY City

Council. The mandate involves showcasing global artistic excellence for its transformative value and making it accessible to NYC’s diverse populace. This festival was thus not for the

SA government, SA artists or South Africans specifically. Due to the collaborations, however, the CHC could initiate, organize, market, host the festival and predominantly fund some of the 309 festival concerts and related activities at Carnegie Hall. The CHC was acting autonomously, within its policy framework and interests. The CHC was following its own agenda.

At the same time, the resultant collaboration between these entities allowed the CHC and other stakeholders represented to communicate their individual interests, as expressed in their organizational policies. The collaboration had mutually beneficial results for each collaborator. For instance, even though the festival was fundamentally to meet the CHC’s mission, it offered commentary on the underpinnings of SA democracy and the country’s society. Therefore, beyond DIRCO simply engaging CHC or Carnegie Hall because of the institution’s stature as a powerful cultural institution, or because of the department’s diplomatic imperative, DIRCO supported the festival because its theme reflects and is emblematic of the department’s foreign policy of Ubuntu. Furthermore, the DAC’s limited involvement at the festival was immaterial since its policies were expressed at the festival. The MGE policy strategy enabled the funding for SA musicians to perform at Ubuntu. The social cohesion and cultural diversity messages of the festival were aligned with DAC principles articulated in the

1996 WPACH as well as those expressed in MGE funding programs.

The involvement of SA government stakeholders in this environment, therefore, no matter how miniscule, could have an impact on SA’s reputation in the USA. Such involvement contributes towards SA government objectives for SA’s reputation to improve so that SA participates on political and market platforms (hard power) or raises its stature and leverage on these platforms. For the SA government stakeholders, the byproduct of a focus on SA music traditions in NYC could be an inadvertent cultivation of SA’s soft and hard power. And so, it would not matter much that the festival was not initiated by a SA government entity, or that cultural diplomacy was not part of festival agenda or priorities. The benefits of such a cultural focus are the same, the SA government hopes to accrue some kind of power.

310 While the SA government stands to benefit from showcasing SA culture abroad, the

CHC also stands to benefit by showcasing a festival with the specific theme of SA cultural diversity. The returns may be small but are significant. By making SA’s cultural diversity the theme of this festival, CHC, treats this diversity as a commodity too because it gains more diverse audiences through it (Van der Horst, 2010). The CHC database gets access to new audiences to which it can further market. These are audiences who would not ordinarily attend

Carnegie Hall events, but attend the Ubuntu festival for either an appreciation of SA culture or specific concerts in the genre of music they are accustomed. It is true that CHC could have used any other theme on a festival about SA and the results would have been similar, to meet its cultural mandate for the NYC Council. The CHC, however, gains something extra by presenting SA cultural diversity.

Also, the Ubuntu festival was a cosmopolitan affair because of its global stakeholders.

It was a celebration of SA’s cultural diversity by those outside of SA culture. It was an imagining of SA culture. The festival was presented outside of government-determined parameters in that its priorities were not to drive government agendas of social cohesion or to create jobs. The CHC focused on artistic excellence and simply put what it perceived to be diverse SA culture on stage, with minimal intervention from the SA government. Although the festival presented how historical elements of SA society fit into contemporary music culture, it did not engineer a politically convenient SA reality. CHC also did not try to bridge USA audience perceptions of SA culture by projecting a palatable or relatable cultural scenario. The

US audience could come to its own conclusions about SA culture. This is how scholars often recommend that soft power should be approached, as a politically unmediated conversation between the artists and audiences of nations (Schneider, 2005; Gienow-Hecht & Donfried,

2010; Zaharna, 2012).

311 As illustrated earlier, even without intentionally driving a SA government agenda, but through the participation of DIRCO, the festival reinforced the ideal of unity in diversity as part of the SA narrative and thereby inadvertently highlighted the DIRCO policy. By doing so, the CHC involuntarily endorsed an interpretation of DIRCO’s Ubuntu foreign policy where its prime resource is the diversity of its people. At the same time, however, in the same policy it is stated that core to USA-SA relations is an economic and developmental agenda before a cultural agenda. Because of this there is discord in the priority of these stakeholders, since one puts culture first and the other does not. Ordinarily, DIRCO’s Ubuntu policy implies that culture is located on the periphery of economic growth in a way that also does not holistically integrate social development at international level through culture. As a post-democracy commentary on SA trajectory of foreign and cultural policies, this festival shows that the advancement of SA cultural interests on US soil are inhibited by the foreign policy of Ubuntu.

Cultural Attachés

Additionally, the absence of cultural attachés at DIRCO embassies and consulates, as well as in policy, created complications for how to engage with the CHC and SA artists. Due to the nonexistence of this portfolio at SA foreign missions, continual cultural alliances between cultural institutions like the CHC and the SA Consulate in NYC are constrained. From the testimonies here, especially by the former NYC Consular General, on DIRCO’s involvement in the long-term promotion of SA culture to grow the SA cultural market, it is apparent that decisions on culture and stakeholder engagement depend on the will, vision and actions of the leader of each consulate at any given time. It takes the commitment of the leader of each consulate to include strong cultural programming, to prioritize it and also plan for it to happen or be implemented outside of consulate buildings. Moreover, this chapter reveals that DIRCO may take initiative to drive SA culture abroad if larger budgets exist for culture at embassies

312 and when there is sponsorship from strategic outside stakeholders. Thus, cultural programs and the cultural networks that would have been built by a cultural attaché for SA depend on the discretion of the appointed Consulate General.

The implication of DIRCO’s engagement with cultural institutions here is that DIRCO applies the arms-length principle in dealing with SA arts and culture. The consulates get third parties, whether domestic or foreign cultural institutions, to facilitate SA arts and culture visibility and engagement at its missions. Previously, the SA Consulate in NYC worked with other cultural institutions in NYC to foster cultural relations between SA and the USA.

Although this approach seems to work, it confuses expectations.

The absence of a cultural attaché’s skills set at the SA NYC Consulate means that for festivals like these DIRCO can work with the DAC and CHC. The Consulate does not have the capacity, however, to directly engage the unique needs of SA artists at such a festival. Evidence of this at the festival was when SA artists expected to make contact with embassy personnel whose function relates to culture but could not. The terms of engagement at the Consulate were, therefore, unclear since some of the musicians anticipated establishing some kind of relationship with the embassy and the Consulate in order to further their cultural interests in

NYC. The inability of the Consulate to connect with cultural stakeholders means that it cannot adequately represent or further their interests. It would be a futile exercise for DIRCO to use culture to try and achieve soft or hard power then, since such an exercise would not be informed by the needs of cultural stakeholders.

Networks

The CHC prioritized SA CCI networks. The organization actively involved representatives of the SA cultural sector in their planning by inviting people who have vested interests in the sector. Even though the CHC was focused on meeting its objectives of showcasing artistic

313 excellence, it used the authority of SA CCI gatekeepers to affirm it. The bar of excellence accepted by the CHC and presented at Carnegie Hall was thus determined by the contribution of cultural industry role players, and not by the SA government. The SA CCI role players that the CHC worked with, like Hugh Masekela and Roshnie Moonsammy, helped populate the networks that drove the festival. Hugh Masekela, in his advisory role, acted as a gatekeeper to

SA musicians who had access to Carnegie Hall and to US audiences. As a musician, he is also a cultural industry participant and talent, and yet he still had the powerful role of advising on further talent to be showcased in NYC. Therefore, musicians recommended other musicians.

And even though CHC representatives went on a research trip to SA, Roshnie Moonsammy, an active festival organizer presented relevant material to CHC representatives for the music talent recruitment process. She was the SA cultural sector gatekeeper who helped choose which artists performed at the festival. She also assisted in managing festival logistics during the organizing of the festival. As such, SA CCI representatives and culture were central to how the

CHC approached its festival organization.

Other ways in which this festival put culture first is that the CHC collaborated with partner cultural institutions in NYC. The organization viewed collaborating with other cultural institutions as important for driving the physical reach of the festival in NYC’s different boroughs. The CHC also used cultural networks made up of these institutions to realize its vision to further the transformative power of culture in the city to diverse populations.

Therefore, although, the CHC was meeting its NYC Council-derived organizational mandate, its primary objective remained the potency of culture.

Through incorporating the views of SA CCI stakeholders, collaborating with NYC cultural institution and its sponsors in ways including assigning responsibilities to some of them, the CHC showed broad stakeholder engagement. The engagement cemented and tested the capacity of institution-to-institution relationships. At the same time, this was a strategic 314 move by CHC. Its representatives admitted that a festival in a city of the size, and with the social dynamics of NYC, stakeholder management and engagement is vital to meet the set objectives.

By showcasing SA artistic excellence, the CHC invested in SA culture by expanding music performance spaces, projects and audiences for the CCI participants. The event was an artistic, professional and commercial opportunity for those who participated in it. Like Gibson

(2007) has suggested of festivals, different forms of organization, collaboration and skills resulted. Through the skills available within the network, for instance, Naidoo could collaborate with Hugh Masekela’s manager who was skilled in managing transnational transactions. From this, Naidoo could also use his networking skills to find opportunities in

NYC and in other parts of the USA. Jacobs found it necessary to hire a stage manager and register a formal business entity to manage the operations of his choir. The musicians thus also spread economic opportunities for other CCI participants whom they hired for the needs of the festival. So, apart from a chance to perform in NYC, the musicians could act more autonomously to establish creative and professional networks for themselves, to get more performances in the USA, and to rekindle professional networks for SA CCI talent or participants who had a working history or an established audience base there. The Ubuntu festival was not a DAC gig, nor was it by the SA government. Therefore, the assumption that it was the SA government’s responsibility to look after the interests of the performers at this gig, on foreign soil, had no veracity. The rules of engagement here were that the CHC had its own mandate, which was not to act beyond the needs of the festival for the musicians.

Simultaneously, the Ubuntu festival was also a missed opportunity for the DAC. It did not grow its networks and capacity for the cultural sector in NYC. The department did not expand its networks with cultural institutions through the festival. The department also did not expand or exploit networks for SA CCI participants, nor did it penetrate CHC networks. Instead 315 the DAC only funded performing artists who were to travel to the festival. The DAC was also only invited to give a speech at the SA NYC Consulate reception by DIRCO. This is unfortunate considering the pivotal role NYC has in influencing global culture and cultural policy.

Power

In terms of how SA benefited in hard and soft power at the festival, this was a chance for CCI participants to garner more esteem by being associated with Carnegie Hall’s prestige. Some of the musicians received more performance opportunities elsewhere in the USA and Europe.

More so, cultural exchange between SA and the USA was deepened, and benefited through individual and institutional stakeholder initiatives. The consulate in NY and CCI participants did not act together to deepen the exchange but acted independently. Some groundwork was possible in country-to-country cultural collaborations, strengthening the foundations of future initiatives in soft power by SA.

Considering the number of people who attended the festival, it is also apparent that there is an interest in SA culture in NYC. Moreover, the festival enabled a new audience base for Carnegie Hall. This new audience contributed to the reimagining of Carnegie Hall as a venue that showcases cultural variety beyond Western art music. This audience also helped

CHC realize its goal of enabling diverse audiences to access quality arts because there was broad NYC community access to SA culture through all the cultural institutions involved in the city-wide venture. The Carnegie Hall brand therefore gained more influence.

316 Chapter 8 – Analysis and Conclusion

Introduction

In this chapter I present the analysis and conclusion of this research. The chapter is structured such that I first compare both festivals, through surveying similarities and differences between the two festivals. I then discuss seven prominent and emergent themes generated from overall collected data. The themes are the purpose of the festivals, the role of policy, the role of networks, the role of the DAC, the music rationale, the implications of power and cultural attachés or network intermediaries. After that I tackle which aspects of this case study are generalizable to theoretical propositions. Lastly, I address the research question and conclude the discussion before I suggest opportunities for further research.

To recap, in the previous two chapters I have drawn conclusions on each of the festivals as a single unit of analysis and detailed the environment of that individual festival. I treated each festival as an intrinsic case, where I ‘learn about that particular case’ as a unique occurrence (Stake, 1995, p. 3). This chapter presents a broader picture, where I first compare both festivals in a table with the seven themes from each unit of analysis across both festivals, thus surveying similarities and differences between the two festivals to deduce meaning and seek implications (Cresswell, 2013, p. 199-200). I then undertake a thematic analysis where I discuss prominent and emergent themes generated from the conclusions on each festival and the overall collected data. The collected data is from multiple sources, including findings from literature, interviews and the theoretical framework. I use the overall collected data to

‘construct a clearer reality’ which answers the research question (Stake, 1995, p. 101; O’Leary,

2005). In this way I treat the festivals like an instrumental case study to ‘explain something else’, which in this instance is the case of SA festivals in the USA and the context of cultural instrumentalism by DIRCO and the DAC (ibid.; Cresswell, 2013). This is the why and how of 317 the research question. Incorporating data from all these steps in the generation of meaning for this study is aligned to what Stake (1995) suggests, that analysis is an ongoing and ever-present process (p. 71).

As such, I approach this chapter based on the layers outlined in the Case Study Design diagram introduced in Chapter 4. In the diagram there are three layers. The layer embedded in the middle layer is made up of two separate units of analysis, each focused on a singular festival. Chapters 6 and 7 addressed the latter most inner embedded layer. The exterior two layers are what this chapter focuses on. The exterior layer is the context of cultural instrumentalism by DIRCO and the DAC which happens in the case of SA festivals in the USA.

A Comparison of the Festivals

Table 4 below shows that the festivals were approached differently. Their organization was different in that the Ubuntu festival prioritized SA CCI representatives by including them throughout the organization process, and had objectives directly relating to culture. The DAC at SAAF, instead, put government interests first and did not involve SA CCI representatives in the organization process even though the objectives of the festival also included growing the capacity of SA CCI’s. Cultural exchange, or people-to-people contact between the people of the USA and SA, was also approached differently. At the Ubuntu festival, apart from the concerts, SA CCI participants directly engaged USA audiences through master classes they gave. SA CCI participants also worked with non-SA CCI participants in some of the performances to increase the number of people in attendance. Of course, activities like master classes are a strategy to get more audiences (Andersson & Andersson, 2006). Such experiences though, are also some of the educational and transformative aspects of festivals (Gibson, 2007;

Ickes, 2013; Jansson & Nilsson, 2016). For instance, as Currid (2007b) observed, that CCI networks also provide industry actors with credibility among other creative industry actors, and

318 this credibility is gaged by which actors one has collaborated with. In contrast at SAAF, the

DAC prescribed the panel topics, determined the topics of discussion, did not include musicians from the USA on the performance program and USA CCI participants did not participate at the panels. Skills development and networking between the people of these countries was, therefore, more possible at Ubuntu than at SAAF. Nonetheless, each festival worked towards its audience and policy goals.

Theme SAAF, 2013 Ubuntu, 2014

Organizer DAC and DIRCO CHC Objectives • US market penetration (audience • Repeat regular themed festival development) programming • Upskilling • Cultural immersion for NYC residents • Fraternity with USA • To meet NYC Council mandate • Country rebranding • Audience diversification • Informed by foreign policy (unity in • Informed by CHC mission diversity) • Informed by cultural policy (WPACH, MGE)

Location • In LA to build on existing exposure of • In NYC since Carnegie Hall is a LA community to SA film culture prestigious NYC cultural institution • LA has developed film and music • NYC represents transnational interests production and market infrastructure • NYC has unparalleled CCI ecology Programming • Multi-genre • Multi-genre • SA performers only • SA and non-SA performers • Showcase of SA cultural diversity • Showcase of SA cultural diversity • Familiar genres to US audiences • Familiar and unfamiliar genres in USA • Familiar and new performers to USA • Familiar and new performers to USA • CCI panel content informed by DAC • Masterclasses informed by musicians

Table 4: A Comparison of the Two Festivals

319 Stakeholders • DAC • CHC • DIRCO • NYC Council • DTI • NYC residents • BrandSA • NYC arts-culture community • Grand Performances • US foundations and corporations • SA CCI representatives • DIRCO • US and SA expat audiences • DAC • SA CCI representatives • SA private sponsors • SA Tourism • SAA Process • Traditional diplomacy • Multi-stakeholder resource-led cultural • Led by government appendages diplomacy • Government departments/agencies • Led by non-government entities engaged • Broad, direct stakeholder engagement • Drove SA government stakeholder • Culture prioritized interests • Autonomy of participants • DAC facilitative, prescriptive and • SA CCI actors central to organization architectural • Systematic event evaluation process • CCI participants are only invitees • Limited post-event evaluation process

Outputs • Promoted SA culture in LA • Promoted SA culture in NYC • Presented new SA music to large • Reached a large audience audience • Cultural activity for NYC residents • Focused on SA CCI’s (MGE goal: • Reached new audiences stimulate demand) • Achieved goal of hosting another • Set a foundation for possible future festival market penetration exercises (MGE • Promoted SA culture in NYC goal: audience development) • DIRCO set foundation for cultivating • Skills development under-represented soft power for diplomatic aims (MGE goal: human capital • Serendipitous spotlight on SA development) government • Cultural exchange goal under- represented (WPACH goal) • Soft and hard power cultivated (foreign policy)

Table 4 cont.: A Comparison of the Two Festivals

320 The Case of SA Festivals in the USA

Purpose of the Festivals

Music as a product has been recognized by UNESCO as one of the most traded cultural goods

(Takara, 2017). These festivals are part of this phenomenon. Both festivals were channels to seek audience development or audience diversification by their organizers and showcased the diversity of SA music for that purpose. Through showcasing SA music abroad, both festivals inadvertently promoted SA culture abroad, but through specifically positioning cultural diversity for gaining audiences, the festival organizers commodified SA cultural diversity.

The festivals were also good testing ground for the DAC’s intentions of expanding SA’s cultural trade networks because the events showcased SA music. It also makes sense that the

DAC tested the demand for SA CCI’s in the USA due to the existing cultural similarities and familiarity between the USA and SA. It has been proven, for instance, that “the trade volume of music is larger between two countries with greater cultural familiarity” (Takara, 2017, p. 2).

Apart from being English-speaking countries, there are other cultural, historical and political ties between the USA, as mentioned previously. As such, trying to generate hard power in the

USA was fitting since the cities chosen enabled some economizing of resources on the part of the DAC and DIRCO, and allowed for collaborations because the cities have the infrastructure to support the CCI’s and international festival programs. Multiplying the means through which to try and generate that power by appealing to allies of the USA, or global networks to which the USA belongs, also makes sense. Multiplying it through capitalizing on how cultural output from cities like LA and NY influences other countries makes sense too. Judging by the kind of organization DIRCO did for both festivals, the department understood that these cities were gateways to the world. The DAC, however, did not capitalize on this gateway access to global

321 networks at the Ubuntu festival in NYC by broadening its strategic role and negotiating to be involved at the festival in different capacities.

Aside from trading SA’s music, these festivals were planned to serve multiple other purposes, like pursuing political alliances and improving SA’s reputation. On the latter, each festival told a positive post-apartheid story about SA society. It offered a glimpse into SA music and its industry and, thus, may have inspired a new narrative about the SA cultural industries.

These were some of the intentions of SA government stakeholders like the DAC, DIRCO and

SA Tourism. From the perspective of these stakeholders, the festivals were intended to help rebrand the country as unique and open to global markets, including to those countries that consume CCI’s and favor tourism or engage in a lot of tourist activity. The festivals thus, were supposed to be catalysts to generating and chasing hard power for SA and for pursuing a CCI- driven soft power.

Through the festivals SA was attempting to position itself as globally competitive and attractive (Vickers, 2012). The country was expressing its international standing, reinforcing the developmental policies it has adopted since 1994, thus confirming a relationship with countries it has formed alliances and the international organizations it has joined (ibid;

Chidester et al, 2003; Smith, 2012; Fisher, 2014). Through these festivals, SA pursues a global citizenship status because it has adopted similar policies to those of countries in the developing and developed world (Chidester et al., 2003; Mapadimeng, 2012). Due to the nature of MGE,

SA also announces that it has adopted UN-agency approved goals on the value of culture and its capacity to be the driver of economies in the developing world (UNESCO, 2012;

Mapadimeng, 2012). SA also does this to strategically align itself politically and economically with developed countries that are US allies, but those which subscribe to development agencies that advance neoliberalism, on which SA democracy was not founded (Meersman, 2007;

Mapadimeng, 2012; Van Graan, 2013). This is also a statement of SA charting a new path. It 322 is, however, difficult to know how the international community and foreign policy audience for which these messages were made received these statements, especially since such messages through culture were not repeated.

The festivals were therefore also statements on the political trajectory of SA. Through the cultural diversity projected at the festivals, SA’s ideal of social cohesion was important for expressing SA’s diplomatic aspirations. The festivals were intended to show SA’s credentials as a working democracy, hence the CHC commemorated this democracy. The festivals also made statements about SA as a nation ready to diversify its soft power from moral authority to also include soft power derived from cultural significance. The festivals were also a statement that the country not only has soft power, but that it is generating an economy-derived hard power. Therefore, as Falassi (1987) suggests of what festivals aim to do regarding identity, these festivals articulate SA’s post-democratic ‘ideology and world view’ on democratic values, its ‘social identity’ as an inclusive diverse society (p. 1-2). The festivals represent SA’s

‘ongoing change’ (Picard & Robinson, 2006, p. 2-5).

Supporting such festivals may benefit the country’s diplomatic goals since international festivals are a channel of cultural education, where mutual understanding is created between the nations involved (Gibson, 2007). That said, however, despite intentions around inclusion and understanding, the festivals were mainly about SA and less about the USA. For instance, based on its history as a nation of immigrants comprised of culturally and linguistically assorted groups from various parts of the world, the US is culturally diverse. The USA has this in common with SA, and it makes sense that the DAC chose this country to focus on shared interests of diversity like this. In fact, SA has celebrated and exploited the diversity of its population for economic and social development purposes by packaging representations of the country’s cultural diversity for “a perceived growing audience of international visitors” and investors, as well as by making this diversity central to the ‘legacy of democracy’ (Rassool, 323 2000, p. 5-12). At the same time though, diversity in the US is not always recognized in relation to governance and political efficacy as it relates to non-Western populations (Zinn & Arnove,

2004). For instance, in terms of cultural and community arts representativity, it is true that in the US the cultural arts are not afforded the same attention and financial support as Western- derived art forms (Manjon & Vega, 2012). This is where SA and the USA are different, where the USA undervalues its cultural arts SA prioritizes them. As a network partner to SA, therefore, the USA is not in fact an ally holistically committed to democratic principles, like

SA. As such, for SAAF objectives, the DAC may have neglected the ethnic specificities of the

USA cultural market or principles of equality. SA, thus, foregoes a thorough evaluation of the

USA cultural structure and its inequalities and focuses on ways to only benefit itself. That said, however, the SA NYC Consulate did reach out to communities that have a direct link with

SA’s political struggle, like those in Harlem. Considering that SA has a history with USA community groups that opposed apartheid, it is strange that the DAC did not involve these community organizations more prominently in its communication of the SA cultural message in the USA, in the country of diffusion.

Nonetheless, the festivals create an opportunity to put a spotlight on the country’s unity- in-diversity-based messages of SA’s moral authority. Simultaneously, they offer a point of departure from the country’s tumultuous political history and narrative around apartheid.

Instead of SA’s reputation as a country that transitioned peacefully into democracy, the new narrative being built from these events is that SA is a democratic country with opportunities for investment. It is a country with a diverse and thriving music culture waiting to be explored.

These festivals were also a test of SA’s cultural diplomacy machinery in the USA. As

Nawa et al (2017) have suggested, the DAC does not directly manage all cultural exchange, but shares with or allocates most of these responsibilities to its agencies. The 1996 WPACH offers limited guidance on cultural diplomacy, which may explain why a festival like SAAF 324 has not been hosted in the USA previously. DIRCO’s foreign policy bases SA’s relationship with the USA on hard power. MGE, however, supports cultural diplomacy due to how its funding is structured to support the penetration of external markets and the expansion of SA cultural markets. Musicians can embark on such a mission independently and can apply for

MGE funding to assist the mission. The DAC could also act directly on cultural diplomacy initiatives like SAAF using motivation in MGE and pursue intergovernmental partnerships encouraged by the NDP to meet its cultural diplomacy goals in the USA.

Either way, cultural diplomacy was not emphasized at the festivals. It was limited at

SAAF, but there was potential that it would result at the Ubuntu festival. For example, even though cultural diplomacy was not central to the objectives of the CHC, the organization had a program and approach to the festival that was ‘culture for culture’s sake’, which inadvertently engaged in a method of cultural diplomacy that builds relationships based on mutual understanding and trust between the people of countries (Schneider, 2005). At the Ubuntu festival, for instance, networking and skills exchange happened in different ways. For instance, some of the artists ran music master classes. Although the master classes did not focus on industry and career mobility, they were spaces of introduction, learning and exposure to SA music for audiences in NY. The musicians who gave the master classes were in an empowered role of being direct transmitters of information to NYC audiences. The musicians had agency.

They were not just objects of spectacle and consumption but were also vessels of SA music traditions and engaged directly in people-to-people contact which is fundamental to cultural diplomacy.

Considering these factors and how central hard power is to the SA government stakeholders at both festivals, and the marginalization of SA CCI’s at SAAF, it is fair to conclude that the growth of the CCI’s were secondary to the festival’s other objectives. For these stakeholders, SA CCI’s were portrayed at the festivals to encourage their consumption in 325 the USA and thus, the presence of the SA CCI’s at the festivals was not about the advancement of the CCI’s. As I discuss this in the next section, policy at the festivals expressed the meaning of the festivals, dictated how the festivals took place and what the priorities were. In this case, the SA economy was first, then culture. At SAAF, the focus was on government mandates. The

CHC at Ubuntu also had no intention of growing the SA CCI’s, but presented them for its own city-related mandate, even though the festival involved CCI networks. DIRCO also did not reach out to SA CCI representatives at Ubuntu about their interests. The DAC and DIRCO, who are the only parties mandated to look after the interests of the SA CCI’s in the USA, by seeking and exploiting networks and stakeholders to drive SA CCI creative, economic and skills development in the USA did not adequately do that. For these reasons, I propose that the festivals only seemed like an attempt at rebranding SA from a post-apartheid nation to a nation with economic potential and a country that warranted tourist and investor attention.

The Role of Policy at the Festivals

I have established that the festivals were an expression of multiple policies by the diverse institutions that converged to make the events possible. These were organizational policies, the policies of various SA government departments and agencies, and broader SA national government development policy. At SAAF, for instance, MGE tenets that prescribe for the advancement and projection of social cohesion, guided the diverse musical expression. MGE is also a continuation of policies and strategies that aim for the exaltation of pride in the nation’s cultural and social diversity, and therefore keeps with principles and guidelines enshrined in the Constitution and maintains ideals held in the WPACH. These are ideals that redress apartheid cultural privileging. The policies include SA populations who demographically make up the majority of the country’s population and whose forms of cultural expression were previously excluded during apartheid (Chidester et al, 2003). Thus, MGE continues on policies

326 that give equal attention to the heritage of all of SA’s different cultural groups (DAC, 1998;

DAC, 2011).

MGE, therefore, capitalizes on SA cultural diversity. Similarly, because of its funding structure geared towards economic objectives or capacity building to meet national economic goals, MGE allows for the exploitation of SA cultural diversity for economic development, the drive for social cohesion, or what the SA government interprets as the greater good. Due to

MGE only funding the type of SA culture which can access international markets at these festivals, and MGE doing so for its economic objectives I interpret this as what McGuigan

(2004) calls economic instrumentalism being imposed on culture. This is when cultural policy caters to economic interests and where culture is deemed fit for public support if it is able to provide economic or politically predetermined public value (Bunting, 2008). MGE supports economic interests this way because it funds CCI activity which is deemed as having the potential for SA economic stimulus and audience development abroad for the same ends. Such

CCI activity is not evaluated post-funding.

Additionally, by using MGE funds to sponsor some of the festival activities at the

SAAF and Ubuntu festivals, the DAC meets its MGE objectives to drive the rebranding of the country. Such objectives include highlighting SA social cohesion through the portrayal of SA cultural diversity, as well as funding touring ventures and cultural events for audience development and consumption in new markets. Projecting social cohesion within SA’s broad cultural diversity, as part of SA’s national image, has been deemed as important by the DAC and national government for ‘fostering unity’, encouraging the idea of a singular national identity, patriotism and an inclusive democratic society (DAC, n. d.). This is an idea which stands in contrast to the apartheid government ideal of separate development with which the current SA government wants to distance itself, and with which SA has been largely associated internationally (Nixon, 2015). It is also worth noting that even though social diversity is 327 portrayed as central to SA democracy here, SA culture is not funded because of its capacity to foster democracy (Schwartz, 2000; Wyszomirski, 2000). Instead, SA culture is funded at the festivals for its capacity for economic stimulus.

In this way, MGE is instrumentalist in nature. Its aimed at contributing to improving

SA’s reputation and to actualize SA’s cultural diplomacy in the absence of comprehensively defined policy by sending musicians abroad and by supporting or initiating programs that send

CCI participants abroad to meet its objectives. So, even though the DAC does not have the tools or infrastructure for cultural diplomacy or to explore external markets, MGE makes it easier for work traditionally done by cultural attachés to be spread across different operational areas. Therefore, cultural diplomacy is enacted by various entities, including by SA CCI participants acting on their own, but with supportive funding by MGE. In fact, these two festivals in 2013 and 2014 are some of the early MGE tools, since the policy strategy’s 2011-

2012 implementation, with which diplomacy through music (culture) has been enacted.

Also, compared to the 1996 WPACH, MGE is where culture and the arts are more expressively conceptualized as economic drivers. The WPACH, for instance, espoused two often parallel ideologies that are also complementary. It suggested the idea of the creative industries, an approach that puts more emphasis on the extrinsic value of culture.

Simultaneously, it also offered an intrinsic value framework for the use of culture in society.

The WPACH thus values the role of arts and culture within a social development framework, and simultaneously embraces the extrinsic value of culture like cultural policy in other countries has done (Vestheim, 2016). Furthermore, since the arts and culture were not fully included in national strategic plans until in the more recent NDP, there was no real impetus to drive the extrinsic approach until the articulation of MGE. At these festivals, the MGE rationale that the DAC and DIRCO have embraced can be summarized in this equation, as that SA culture

+ diplomatic agenda = trade markets. This equation represents the collaboration of these 328 departments in a nutshell. The departments have thus taken an instrumentalist approach to meeting their national mandate and diplomatic goals. MGE addresses the government’s economic intentions, social and domestic political goals, as well as its underlying diplomacy objectives. MGE was the short cut to meeting the DAC’s mandate, without changing overarching national policy.

I discuss this collaboration in more detail in the next section, but it is also a manifestation of policy expression at the festivals. MGE enabled the support of the festivals through galvanizing government partnership or cooperation, as suggested in 1996 WPACH and recommended in the CSA policy strategy. CSA prioritizes government networks first, which are dominant here. At the same time, the NDP recommends multi-directional networks, within and outside of government to grow the economy, but these networks struggle because they are at this point ad hoc and fledgling.

Lastly, as a policy strategy, MGE is characterized as the kind of cultural instrumentalism meant to concurrently benefit the cultural sector as well as the government, as

Nisbett (2013b) suggests it is possible. MGE, however also seems to act for broader government interests rather than for cultural interests. This is noteworthy because it is standard for governments to use festivals as part of a range of instruments to benefit developmental frameworks (Bianchini & Parkinson, 1993; Salamon, 2002; Smith & Forest, 2006). It is also true that in this league, SA is only one of the countries that have recognized that to attain a positive image, it can use “cultural capital” to “foster international trust, cooperation, and collaboration” (Wyszomirski et al, 2003, p. 1). As such, MGE may not seem so problematic because it simply marries matters of national security, like “economic competitiveness” with cultural diplomacy, for the development of new markets and the export of cultural products

(ibid., p. 2). Also, as Jansson and Nilsson (2016) have established about festivals as networks

329 in action, MGE may or may not have been a resource to aid the organic development of SA

CCI networks in the USA by SA musicians and other primary stakeholders.

As much as this is the case, sometimes governments use policy instruments as smokescreens “to depoliticize fundamentally political issues, or to create a minimum consensus on reform by relying on the apparent neutrality of instruments presented as modern” (Kassimm

& Le Gales, 2010, p. 5). This may be the case at these festivals in the sense that the events are modern cultural instruments used to achieve acultural goals like national development goals, which are part of government policy options, but which should also not necessarily be mutually exclusive with goals for the advancement of the cultural sector (Matarasso, 1997). On the surface the festivals appear neutral and apolitical, but they are policy instruments used by SA government stakeholders to achieve only political goals of economic development or hard power. In this context they are a smokescreen where cultural interests and cultural diplomacy pose as prime interests but are not a priority here. To this end, Sölter (2015) finds that as much as ‘promoting the arts abroad as cultural diplomacy is useful to strengthen ties with other countries’, cultural diplomacy should not be directed by government policy agendas that drive a political or an economic agenda, because it has a potential for creating ‘distrust’ amongst foreign audiences (p. 198). An extended involvement of MGE economic objectives in SA festivals that drive cultural diplomacy, therefore, has the potential to derail the SA diplomatic agenda when it happens sans imperatives also formulated by SA cultural stakeholders and sector. This potential impairment may also be exacerbated because the MGE framework fundamentally focuses on funding SA culture abroad, to cater for its inadequate structural resources at embassies, rather than tackling the function of the visibility of SA culture abroad more holistically. I discuss this later in this chapter.

When further considering the facilitatorship role of the DAC, MGE seems to also perpetuate the DAC’s 1996 WPACH-determined facilitator status even though it allows the 330 DAC room to occasionally act as an architect when necessary in determining the agenda for policy changes or enacting programs. At these festivals CCI participants are encouraged by the

DAC, through funding or bringing them over to the USA, to act on their own interests abroad in an unstructured manner. This is the DAC acting as a facilitator, only sending artists to perform abroad and hoping that the artists achieve some kind of recognition or connection with

US CCI participants that would aid further employment opportunities for SA CCI participants in the USA. This is not enough, if the government wants to develop the capacity of the SA

CCI’s or get economic benefits from musicians going abroad. The government has to at least legitimize the presence of SA artists and other CCI participants amongst its cultural and political networks in the USA, it has to broker networks between SA and USA CCI participants, create opportunities for SA and US CCI participants to interact, and assist SA artists to find other related employment opportunities during their time in the USA. This approach to cultural diplomacy is therefore also not enough because MGE and the way in which cultural diplomacy are carried out are incompatible. Both may have concerns for SA CCI participants, but their goals are contradictory.

The Role of Networks at the Festivals

The festivals were also an expression of the networks to which the involved institutions belonged and the influence those networks wield. By collaborating with DIRCO in cultural diplomacy or exchange, the DAC used national networks to further national interests of growing the economy, and as such enacted the directives of the NDP. Cultural diplomacy in

SA is the responsibility of a few government departments and agencies, including DIRCO and the DAC (Nawa, 2014). At the same time, cultural diplomacy is not cheap because it involves a financial commitment (Mark, 2009; Mitchel, 2016). That said, cultural diplomacy can “give substance to efforts by politicians and others” towards national goals (Mark, 2009, p. 38). Yet,

331 DAC and DIRCO budgets do not favor cultural diplomacy, and the DAC also has the burden of a reduced budget due to its lower status within the government agenda (Deacon, 2010).

Apart from submitting to CSA policy strategy recommendations, the DIRCO-DAC collaboration made sense economically and for maximizing resources, even it would be on an ad hoc basis (Duncan, 2010; Nawa et al, 2017; J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17,

2017; L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). However, in terms of networks, none of these departments actually expanded their networks because of this collaboration, for cultural diplomacy, for upskilling SA CCI’s or for long term goals related to national economic development. Such a temporary partnership cannot advance SA’s long term cultural or acultural interests. There has to be political will to engage international cultural networks for the long term.

Also, from the stakeholders at the festivals, it becomes apparent that the DAC also does not use its MGE partners effectively for their broad range of services, or tap into their networks, to pursue MGE-related objectives abroad. DTI is an MGE partner, for example, and it was at

SAAF. The DTI did not get involved at the SA NYC Consulate receptions for the Ubuntu festival, to which the DAC was invited. This was the same case for the IMC, or BrandSA, which was at SAAF, but not at the Ubuntu festival events hosted by the Consulate. The SABC, another MGE partner, was also not part of any of these festivals. SA Tourism, another MGE partner, was not involved at SAAF. SA Tourism was instead involved at the Ubuntu festival on account of DIRCO and CHC, and not because of a binding strategy with the DAC. Most of the services these partners had the potential to contribute to the pursuit of MGE objectives of human capacity development for CCI participants and audience development, which could play a role in economic development through foreign market penetration.

Additionally, even though the DAC has formed these MGE partnership, the department works on an ad hoc basis with these partners. This is with the exception of the DTI with which 332 the DAC has had a collaboration documented as far back as the 2000’s (Maree, 2005). Of course, ad hoc collaborative arrangements exist in policy between similar or different partners as a means to an end (Sandfort & Stone, 2008). Even so, however, this ad hoc arrangement reduces the DAC’s capacity for tackling agendas such as cultural diplomacy. No long-term goals can therefore be established between partners. This is how the partners at the festivals acted individually, outside of an MGE memorandum of understanding, and advanced only their core missions. Due to the ad hoc complexity, the DAC could have treated its MGE partners like actors outside of the traditional government sphere who act to solve public problems through complex multi-directional networks (Salamon, 2002). The DAC could have, thus, utilized such complex networks to bolster its limited capacity to directly invest in cultural diplomacy and nurture the soft power it seeks for the long-term. Partners and actors in such networks affect the kinds of tools possible to meet all of their interests or political positions

(ibid.). It is unfortunate that even so long after the festivals, or possible DIRCO-DAC reflection on them, the DAC and DIRCO still have an ad hoc relationship (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017).

As such, without a long-term partnership, DIRCO renders the DAC weak outside of

SA. Without DIRCO’s ongoing help to establish and navigate networks of necessary local contacts and knowledge, or to bring key stakeholders together in a short space of time, the

DAC cannot be as effective as it could be in building or catalyzing CCI networks for SA in other countries or facilitating this for the SA CCI community. With the long-term assistance of

DIRCO, the DAC could have tapped into other opportunities to enable and exploit networks, which could have meant more USA CCI participant involvement on the SAAF programming, engagement with different communities in LA and active expansion of DAC CCI networks in

LA. This is important because by the DAC supporting these festivals, funding or sending

333 musicians abroad to expand the SA cultural market, the DAC attempts to connect itself to the

US cultural industry and its wide networks for long term impact.

Apart from the musicians it sends abroad, the department also needs long-term exposure to key stakeholders in the large concentration of CCI networks in LA and NYC. As

Hesmondhalgh (2007) suggests, those who collaborate within networks share risks and avoid competition (p. 152-153). For the DAC, the responsibility towards individual musicians could have been shared with the US CCI network actors, since at the festivals the only infrastructure that matters is the infrastructure on US soil. That said, in some ways the DAC shared some of the responsibility of advancing SA CCI interests with the SA CCI participants. The department enabled their travel, but also depended on their acumen and agency to attract and seek opportunities in the USA. Some of the musicians got more performance opportunities as a result of being in the USA for the festivals.

The Role of the DAC

One could argue that how the role of the DAC modifies at these festivals is an expression of policy. The department functions at the festivals in its policy-defined parameters in the 1996

WPACH as a facilitator in the sector. At the same time, MGE suggests that the DAC is facilitator but also makes direct interventions as an architect in that it directly funds programs that adhere to its objectives and the department can initiate relevant programs rather than completely rely on DAC agencies to do that or have sector stakeholders dictate where funding should go. At the festivals the DAC acts in an architectural role too. Of course, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and in fact can be complementary of each other

(Vestheim, 2016). The argument, however, is that the DAC professes facilitatorship based on the 1996 WPACH and is said to operate within this paradigm (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). Due to its changing policy strategies that support the 1996

334 WPACH as well as evolving national development strategies that embrace varying ideologies, in fact, the DAC operates dually according to policy that advocates for a multifaceted approach.

Another policy dynamic though is that it is the prerogative of the DAC Minister to make determinations on cultural diplomacy. This is in the 1996 WPACH. MGE was also, essentially also conceptualized by the Minister of Culture, Paul Mashatile, since his tenure was over

MGE’s inception to its implementation. Beyond policy, there is the political dynamic, where each new Minister directs the path of the DAC at any given time. These factors suggest two forms of authority, the authority of policy at the festivals as well as the authority of the designate Minister of Culture. So, for instance, the DAC administration changed from being led by Minister Paul Mashatile to being directed by Minister Nathi Mthethwa. This was after the national elections in May 2014, and thus after SAAF had taken place in October 2013. The department thus served both forms of authority in order to achieve its mandate.

An example of the DAC’s flexibility when administrations change is also its approach to stakeholder management. The department does not always execute stakeholder management in accordance with its policy-defined role, or of the DAC as a facilitator in the arts-culture sector. Instead, the DAC has at times acted in an architectural role. For instance, the department did not consult the participant SA CCI representatives at SAAF about which USA CCI representatives to invite to the event or about panel topics. The DAC determined all of these without involving primary sector stakeholders. Stakeholder engagement, therefore, prohibited the achievement of some of the goals set for the festival because the DAC could not adequately involve USA CCI counterparts who could affect change according to the needs of the sector participants. SA musicians and invited CCI experts, therefore, did not have access to USA networks they deemed useful at SAAF. Upskilling the sector, which was supposed to happen through the networking and skills exchange of California-based creative workers, innovators

335 and industry gatekeepers with SA CCI representatives, and which was one of the set goals fell through.

This kind of stakeholder management meant that SA CCI participants had little agency at SAAF. Had there been some collective consultation with SA CCI participants, the outcomes could have been different. For instance, musicians have been known to regularly set targets, conduct research and are informed about who is influential in their industry through their domestic and global networks (Ndzuta, 2013). Such intricate insider knowledge would have helped the DAC achieve its goals and should have been used in the planning of the festival.

DAC research was limited in comparison to first-hand knowledge from actual practitioners. At the same time, the fact that CCI participants were not consulted as stakeholders on their own interests at SAAF is emblematic of a known DAC trait of enacting strategies from the top down

(Deacon, 2010).

In contrast, the CHC consulted on the peculiarities of SA music. The organization worked with CCI participants at the Ubuntu festival. Hugh Masekela, for example, who was one of the SA musicians who performed at the festival, had a consultative role with the CHC before the festival happened. He made recommendations on which other SA musicians would be suitable for the event. He did not necessarily have the final say on the festival program but was consulted on some of the programming and had input that shaped the character and quality of the festival as well as other festival outputs. Another SA CCI representative, Roshnie

Moonsammy, participated in the festival organizing as a consultant because of her first-hand knowledge of SA cultural sector conditions and which of the participants had the capacity to meet the aims of CHC for the festival. In these roles, Masekela and Moonsamy acted as industry gatekeepers in a position of influence. Their opinions on which artists were qualified to perform at the festival counted because of their first-hand knowledge and experience in the sector.

Masekela had performed at Carnegie Hall on numerous occasions and was part of the Carnegie 336 network. This mattered to the Carnegie representatives who were scouting for the right talent for their vision of the event. More so, Masekela had access to both musicians and Carnegie

Hall representatives. This means that in his role as a musician he was accessible to other musicians, and as such musicians who were within his network could be within the range of vision of Carnegie Hall representatives at any given moment.

In its role as a facilitator in the sector at the festivals however, and as mentioned previously, the DAC had some success. It provided funding for musicians and other CCI participants to be at the festivals. The musicians had agency to find opportunities for themselves. Some planned ahead and arranged for an extended itinerary in the USA past the festivals. This itinerary afforded them networking and performing activities in the USA.

The DAC also missed an opportunity as a facilitator of sector development. At Ubuntu, both DIRCO and the DAC could have worked closely with invited SA artists. The DAC could have capitalized on the opportunity that the artists are in NYC, a culturally influential city. This could have raised both DIRCO and the DAC’s profile amongst cultural organizations in NYC.

Fundamentally, the onus to promote SA culture and artists abroad rests on both departments.

Ubuntu was the opportunity to further nurture the SA-USA cultural relationship with the USA and with cultural institutions in NYC. The reception event would have been the appropriate environment in which to promote SA culture, with the invitation of key CCI stakeholders in

NYC. It is immaterial that the festival was not the initiative of either department. Festivals are not always initiated by the DAC, but according to MGE, the department has to act on appropriate opportune moments to promote SA culture abroad, which Ubuntu was. Acting on such a moment did not need to be at Carnegie Hall only. The two departments could have worked together to broaden the scope of the reception and share the financial costs. The CHC in this context had no obligation to further SA cultural interests beyond its mandate.

337 From some of the interviews conducted here it also appears that the role of the DAC as a facilitator to SA culture is perceived to limit the DAC’s ability to do more for the sector. For instance, some members of the sector would like to see the DAC take a more architectural role and place musicians in global markets (V. Sithole, personal communication, July 5, 2017).

Others want the DAC to work more directly with ethnic community organizations to further

SA cultural interests abroad (R. Moonsamy, personal communication, April 13, 2017). More evidence of this sentiment that the DAC is not doing enough for the sector has been captured in literature (Maree, 2005; Meersman, 2007). It has also been evident in public debates at policy review Indabas such as the one in November 2016, where the sector and the DAC have divergent expectations of how and what the DAC should do to preserve, protect, promote and develop culture. Some sector practitioners indicated that the DAC is not fulfilling its mandate.

The DAC, on the other hand, understands its role as only a facilitator designated by the

WPACH (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June 8, 2017). As evident at the festivals, the DAC’s 1996 WPACH-declared role is flexible, occasionally changing from facilitator to architect and back under the imperatives of specific policy strategies and leadership, and due to the insufficient policy, infrastructure and financial resources it has to fulfill its mandate.

The difficulty of the DAC to meet its mandate, however, may not only be because of its role as facilitator. It partly has to do with the reduced budget and status of the DAC at

Cabinet level. Here, the department is viewed as “a site of symbolic transformation rather than political power” and due to difficulties in the DAC’s ability to define its value and quantifying its projects (Deacon, 2010, p. 7). In other governance structures, the DAC has been perceived as the ‘song and dance department’ which provides “the entertainment at events…when the serious stuff is done” (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). Masokoane confirmed that this DAC status in government is a crisis for the development of culture (G. 338 Masokoane, personal communication, July 26, 2017). Nonetheless, there have also been efforts to counter these misconceptions where the DAC has tried to raise its profile from “inside government” (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). One of the ways the DAC has been successful at reversing this perception has been through its social cohesion project.

The “government woke up to the fact that without social cohesion, as a society, as a country, we’re not going to get very far, [and] without proper unity and national identity, we’re not going to get very far, and that’s where the arts become very important” (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017).

It is true that social cohesion has been viewed as “the shared sense of identity that creates a nation” (Mulcahy, 2017, p. 251). Social cohesion and job creation are some of the intrinsic and extrinsic benefits that Snowball (2011) writes about that are weighed against practicalities of budgetary limits allocated to culture, and that budgets may advance or thwart cultural development. What we can also make out from this situation is that the DAC has had to use cultural instrumentalism to argue for its own existence. This may be because the DAC has realized that if culture continues to have a low profile on government agendas because the sector’s priorities of inward advancement have no effect on “governments’ other policy ambitions”, then there may be no point in having a cultural policy (Hadley and Gray, 2017, p.

96). The DAC has thus embraced economic speak in policies like MGE.

Another problem inhibiting the portfolio of culture from meeting its mandate has seen a turnover in leadership (Deacon, 2010). From this research and others, it is clear that each deployed Minister of Culture has inevitably brought a different vision compared to the administration before (ibid). No continuity of vision prevails. Some of the Ministers64 have also lacked the contextual technical experience of issues in the cultural domain and are simply

64 A possible exception here is the former cultural Minister Pallo Jordan, who had cultural policy experience in the exiled structures of the ANC during apartheid (Campschreur & Divendal, 1989). 339 political deployments (ibid.). There is, as such, little comprehensive and long-term administration of projects (ibid.).

Cultural Instrumentalism by DIRCO and the DAC

The Music Rationale

Globally, culture has been used progressively instrumentally to achieve bureaucratic goals for social impact, including political, economic goals (Holden, 2004; Belfiore & Bennett, 2007;

Bunting, 2008; Belfiore, 2012). SA also exploits the cultural value of music in the cultural industries to grow the economy and for achieving other national economic goals (DAC, 1998;

Joffe & Newton, 2008). One of the ways the DAC tries to achieve its economic and social development goals is by tapping into the World Music market (Joffe & Newton, 2008; Shaw

& Rodell, 2009). The World Music market places emphasis on ethnicity-derived authenticity, based on preconceived notions of cultural purity. It does so by continuing ‘an old binary of

“the west” and ‘the rest”’ and marketing through “putting hugely diverse bodies of musics into the same box” (Taylor, 1997, p 14). This marketing strategy is similar to how the government often embraces portrayals of SA’s cultural diversity, that reinforce the colonial gaze, as encompassing multiple distinctive cultures that make up the ‘rainbow people’ (Rassool, 2000, p. 5-9). This national strategy thus fits into this World Music category marketing and is evident at both festivals.

Furthermore, there is a perception in SA government that the kind of SA music that reflects the cultural spectrum of the country has done well in global markets (Mkhwanazi,

2016c; English, 2009). This is either indigenous music or music founded on the cultural identity associated with where the music geographically originates (Muller, 2004; Meintjes, 2003).

There have been associations of success granted to SA musicians with busy US and European touring schedules like Johnny Clegg’s bands Juluka and Savuka, and Hugh Masekela, Miriam 340 Makeba, Ladysmith Black Mambazo, Mahotela Queens, Abdullah Ibrahim and Freshlyground.

The regular touring schedules of these musicians internationally have encouraged the perceptions that there are export possibilities for music that is based on the cultural identity and diversity of SA (Muller, 2008; English, 2009). Music like this has been given legitimacy by this purported international success, especially in the West65 where it is less understood

(Muller, 2008). Yet, while the music is distinctive in the West, it has also been attractive in consumer markets outside of SA for over half a century66, even though it was rejected by the apartheid government and could not make significant impact in the domestic economy (Molefe

& Mzileni, 2001; Ansell & Barnard, 2013b; Dlamini, 2010). This music is also viewed by the

DAC and other government agencies as lucrative, and therefore ripe for exploitation, because of the accolades it has received from a prestigious music body like the Grammy Awards67.

Musicians like Miriam Makeba, Ladysmith Black Mambazo, Wouter Kellerman, the Soweto

Gospel Choir and Ladysmith Black Mambazo have all won Grammy’s (The Recording

Academy, n.d.). At the festivals, the music is therefore pushed into these global markets on the rationale that there should be encouragement of the demand through supply.

It is also necessary, however, for the DAC to create opportunities for SA musicians abroad. Cultural instrumentation, for instance, has been imposed on the sector partly because of limited opportunities in SA to create economic growth through the CCI’s. Even though according to Ansell and Barnard (2013) the SA music industry and recorded music is healthy

65 It is often suggested that due to more prosperous economies, citizens of the West support arts and culture more. They also have more vibrant and extensive cultural industries infrastructure, and so African musicians aim at performing in the West (Bernstein et al., 2007). 66 Some of the musicians who were viewed in a negative light by the SA government were those who were in multiracial Afro-jazz bands of the 1950’s like the Blue Notes, Chris McGregor’s Brotherhood of Breath, as well as Miriam Makeba, Hugh Masekela, Abdullah Ibrahim and others (Ansell, 2005; Dalamba, 2006; Dlamini, 2009). 67 If one considers the rules of the Recording Academy which hosts the Grammy Awards, receiving a Grammy is not an indicator of market success or popularity. The process involved for a musician to make the short list is irrespective of the number of records sold, but is determined by Academy affiliation, release dates, record format, distribution methods, voting dates, etc. (The Recording Academy, n.d.). Eligibility for a Grammy nomination therefore excludes a lot of SA musicians, musicians who operate outside of the USA and those not affiliated to the Academy. 341 and contributes significantly to the local economy, in other studies researchers have had different conclusions. There is evidence that live music performance infrastructure in SA does not have the capacity to sustain the careers of musicians and does not have the infrastructure to support it (Bernstein et al., 2007; Coplan, 2007; Ndzuta, 2013). These challenges may explain why musicians are willing to seek opportunities outside of SA (Bernstein et al., 2007).

The DAC still only plays a supportive and facilitative role in this regard and helps musicians expand their global market reach.

The implication here about SA music, therefore, is that in order for the government to address the ailing economy in the post-apartheid era and stimulate economic growth, espousing an instrumentalist approach to culture would make sense. A market niche exists outside the country, especially in the USA and other European countries (SAMEX, 2009). It is tried and tested, due to the perpetual touring schedules of the aforementioned musicians. The music also fits within the genre of World Music, where SA musicians get automatically categorized

(Meintjes, 2003; Muller, 2004; Steingo, 2010; DAC, 1998). Furthermore, many of the musicians who are often categorized as World Music artists, like Miriam Makeba, Hugh

Masekela and Abdullah Ibrahim, have accorded SA visibility abroad over decades, including during apartheid. Some have highlighted the plight of the struggle against apartheid through activism and performance abroad and have been a public relations machine for SA and its culture and encouraged the visibility and patronage of non-Western music (Masekela & Cheers,

2004; Muller, 2004; Coplan, 2007; Gevisser, 2007). Others, like Johnny Clegg and Ladysmith

Black Mambazo, have represented a fusion of SA cultural music forms for decades. These were some of the shared cultural and political ties that Sibusiso Xaba, the former Director General of the DAC, referred to in his speech about the DAC’s intentions at SAAF to reignite existing cultural ties between the USA and SA (CSR, 2013, p. 16-17).

342 That said, however, a counter argument to the supposedly lucrative World Music rationale has also been posed. This counter argument may also explain the DAC’s choice of presenting music genres that are US-friendly, like rock, rap, jazz, and soul, at SAAF, beyond intentions around cultural diplomacy. According to David Alexandra (in Shaw & Rodell,

2009), who is a record company executive and the former head of South African Music Exports

(SAMEX), the idea the DAC has of supporting what he refers to as traditional music or cultural music is not feasible. He finds that the DAC “are concerned with the ‘culture’ part of music mostly and may not look at the economic interests of the sector” (ibid., p 143). In his opinion,

“traditional music tends to just be a novelty overseas” and “does not sell well” and thus the exportation of traditional music cannot be justified “from a business perspective” (Shaw &

Rodell, 2009, p. 143). Alexandra finds that “it is easier to develop ‘pop’ music (jazz, rock, etc.) which is better to build the sector” (ibid.). So, Alexandra suggests two distinctive income streams in the music value chain here, record sales and live music. He implies that World Music works at once-off events like festivals because it provides a performance platform and a once- off income source for the musicians. World Music, however, according to this rationale, is not lucrative for long-term sales of SA music, and thus does not have a significant impact on the economy. At SAAF, therefore, the DAC catered to both music markets. It encouraged demand for SA music forms that are already popular in the USA so that there is long term economic impact. The department also created market access so that musicians can expand their touring platforms in the USA, and by doing so keep promoting the demand for SA music.

The Implications of Power

Festivals, and especially large ones, are a way for musicians to “communicate and educate spectators” about their culture (Gibson, 2007, p. 78). Cultural diplomacy often involves education and skills transfer (Schneider, 2005; Nye, 2004). SAAF was also educational because

343 it offered new SA music, even though it presented music genres familiar to the predominantly

US audience. As stated before, the familiarity was for nurturing the intended fraternity between

SA and the USA. Soft power by its nature is enabled when the commonalities between nations are emphasized in order to build a relationship, which in this case is fraternity. So, apart from a commercial rationale, the DAC was careful to bring SA music that would cater to both its hard and soft power pursuits. Using culture this way supports DIRCO’s track record for advancing SA’s hard power through “economic diplomacy” and “creating a positive image of

South Africa as a trading partner, investor and investment destination” (Smith, 2012, p. 78).

As Zamorano (2016) confirms, however, under the guise of cultural diplomacy the

CCI’s are used by governments instrumentally “for the construction of power within the international system” (p. 166). He suggests that some of this subjects culture “to political and economic instrumentalization by various processes of government management of external cultural representation”, which include only portraying the ‘positive view of the political territory in question’, in order to benefit nation branding aims (ibid., p 178-179). As stated earlier, the instrumentalism that the DAC and DIRCO enacted involved filtering in positive political messages about SA while transmitting messages about SA’s desirable cultural diversity for pursuing SA’s national interest of growing the economy and increasing political power. This simultaneous messaging makes sense when considering the view by Ang et al.

(2015) that political messages for the national interest are interwoven in cultural diplomacy because cultural diplomacy happens ‘in a space where nationalism and internationalism merge’

(p. 367). This perspective holds that ‘national interests embodied in cultural diplomacy are never simply guided by purely instrumental or calculative thinking’ but are “embedded in distinct ideas and affects about the nation and its place within an imagining of other nations”

(ibid., p. 379). Ang et al. (2015) also state that “cultural diplomacy can move beyond the national interest only if this move itself can be understood as being in the national interest” 344 (ibid.). Cultural diplomacy moves beyond the national interest when it creates mutual understanding between nations. In this case, we could see the festivals as meant to achieve national interests in relation to hard and soft power, which relates to mutual understanding.

Through this lens, the enacted cultural diplomacy here is thus multi-textured because it is also embedded in how SA already imagines itself in relation to the USA and the world.

Even so, however, instrumental cultural diplomacy runs the danger of advocating hegemony or showing standardized forms of SA cultural representations for the sake of national competitiveness (Zamorano, 2016). At SAAF, for instance, US friendly music genres were showcased, and this might broaden the demand for that kind of SA music in the USA.

Due to that demand, the production of those music genres would consequently be encouraged in SA making the cultural scales uneven. Therefore, the kind of instrumental cultural diplomacy that DAC-DIRCO were engaged in also has the potential to affect SA’s cultural landscape negatively, by limiting the richness of SA culture for the sake of global competitiveness. As such, in this pursuit of soft power by DIRCO and the DAC, the immediate results of soft power may negatively affect the everyday experience of ordinary CCI participants rather than government interests (Mattern, 2005). This is because of the capacity for soft to create

“competition among actors over the terms of the ‘reality’ of attractiveness” (ibid., p. 610).

Also, in relation to hard power, without cultural and historical nuance, for instance, what the DAC presented at SAAF may come across to a foreign audience as SA posturing on inauthentic universalism (Van der Horst, 2010). This is because the DAC presented music that it is not easily distinguishable from American music and did this for the sake of sales. SA music may come across as camouflaged or disguised as the music of the USA. SA music may come across as un-special, and what Kofi Agawu’s (2000) suggests as ‘embracing sameness’, where cultural interactions constantly change perceptions of music and its identity. This, Van Graan

(2005) attributes to “the impact of American cultural products on the identity and cultures of 345 societies across the globe” (p. 17). So, in essence, rather than further the SA’s government aims of the projection of SA’s cultural diversity, such a strategy may be homogenizing and countering the aims of the foreign policy of Ubuntu.

Another concern about SA seeking soft power in the USA relates to resources. For instance, Van Graan (2005) points out that many countries have to contend with the USA’s dominance in “the creative industries’ world markets” and that there is evidence that the USA creative industries have already captured the imagination of the world (p. 17). As Nye (2004) has also observed, soft power has been perfected and sustained by the USA through its

Hollywood and Broadway productions, music output, as well as education-based exchange, among other resources. The success of these US industries is made possible by infrastructure that has existed for a long time and “long before cultural diplomacy was employed by the US government, American cultural expression was influencing audiences throughout the world”

(Schneider, 2005, p. 149). The concern here is that SA may not have the resources to replicate this strategy or replicate something already perfected by the USA, in the USA. This may also explain why SAAF was also not repeated or that the DAC did not negotiate for other forms of engagement at Ubuntu in NYC. Yes, the music of the USA is omnipresent all over the world

(Schneider in Banks, 2011). SA, on the other hand, may not have the supportive infrastructure to create the same omnipresence (Ndzuta, 2013). Through these festivals, however, SA government departments are staking a claim on the mainstream music markets, where music of the USA appears. The DAC is also expressing an interest in this kind of cultural presence in the USA, using the mode of cultural diplomacy used by the USA. SA, however, does not have the policy framework or economic resources to persistently pursue this agenda (Smith, 2012).

Additionally, in efforts to pursue soft power using cultural diplomacy, however, the

DAC missed two blind spots. First, since the DAC mainly does internal research and has engaged with few external industry mapping studies, with the possible exception of reports 346 from the recently formed SA Cultural Observatory, the department does not have the capacity for planning. This is because the DAC’s planning is not based on assessments made in external research that maps out what exists or what is missing in the capacity of SA CCI’s, research that is important to the identification of problems as well as formulation and justification of policy.

Second, the DAC also had indeterminate means through which to evaluate SAAF. DIRCO, for instance, has means through which it manages and evaluates SA’s moral authority based soft power, and builds on it (ibid.). Cultural diplomacy, however, has an underdeveloped conceptualization and its definitions reflect inconsistencies, meaning that evaluative measures are not concrete. As Gallarotti (2011) also indicates, in as much as soft power is hard to evaluate, its evaluation is necessary to improve strategies and policies for its pursuit. This is also so that authorities know how effective this resource is (ibid.).

These festivals, thus, also confirm what Deacon (2010) has observed that policy research has been used “to provide support for a chosen policy direction” and that “monitoring and evaluation of government programs” are still wanting (Duncan, 2010, p. 10). Therefore, in relation to the internal research conducted by the DAC in support of the festival, the research was a means to an end. The research was rather a way to motivate for why the festivals should take place or be supported instead of a thorough investigation of the industry conditions in LA and NYC or how the DAC could use such conditions to further the needs of SA CCI’s, or a full investigation of the different rewards at the Ubuntu festival.

Cultural Attachés or Network Intermediaries

Throughout this research, from articles on traditional and cultural diplomacy through to the interviews conducted, there was an overarching theme relating to the ad hoc collaboration between the DAC and DIRCO. This theme is of the absence of traditional cultural engagement by DIRCO because there are no cultural attachés or network intermediaries at DIRCO missions

347 abroad. Amongst some of those interviewed, there was stark recognition and contention that the lack of cultural attachés at SA consulates and embassies was a fundamental flaw in SA culture gaining access to foreign territories (L. Ndebele-Koka, personal communication, June

8, 2017; S. Sithole, personal communication, March 25, 2017; S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). This was especially since other sectors have a dedicated attaché at each embassy (J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017).

Literature also points to the centrality of cultural attachés, cultural representatives or network intermediaries in creating technically specific cultural networks for a country in the country of deployment (Ryan, 1989; Arndt, 2005; Ferraguto, 2015; Graham, 2015; Mitchell,

2016). More so that the role involves being a facilitator for the cultural community of the home country and working with other political deployees to know “the cultural environment and locally available resources” of the country of deployment (Keith, 2009, p. 289). As the role has evolved, especially in the US context, some of its duties in some cases have been distributed amongst embassy personnel or consolidated into other roles (Schneider, 2005; Keith, 2009;

Mitchell, 2016). Nonetheless, such a representative would not simply focus on culture for its own sake, but within political instrumentality, and thus also on the capacity of culture to create

“sympathetic understanding” and “an atmosphere more conducive to cooperation between their own country and the host country” (Ryan, 1989, p. 2). A cultural representative, for instance would be a hired in-house local cultural representative who works at a SA mission to advance

SA cultural interests, but one who is active amongst the CCI networks of the country of deployment of the SA consulate or embassy but is not a citizen of SA (Müller, 2010). The absence of such functions at SA embassies and consulates or the nonexistence of a cultural center, probably on a smaller scale to those like the well-resourced Alliance Francaise or

Goethe Institute, means that cultural resources are not used strategically abroad. This also

348 means that the collaboration between DIRCO and the DAC remains uncoordinated (Graham,

2015).

In the last few years, however, as discussed in Chapter 5, there has been an attempt by the DAC to establish a different configuration of the historical tradition and function of cultural attachés or their equivalent. Consultants in this function existed on a temporary basis and outside of the DIRCO order. This was during the tenure of former Cultural Minister Paul

Mashatile. The Minister worked from MGE tenets to adapt the cultural attaché function for the

SA context in such a way that consultants from other countries were hired on a short-term contract in this role. This was the employment of three consultant international relations managers who were based in London, New York and Beijing. They were hired by the DAC to assist with global market access. Soon after the Minister left office after the national elections in 2014, however, and a new Cultural Minister took over the portfolio, the role of these consultants was rescinded (Anonymous 1, personal communication, June 30, 2017). Although this happened, MGE was unchanged and kept in place by the new minister. The DAC instead had cultural exchange programs dedicated to countries in Africa and the BRICS alliance.

Unlike the scenario Müller (2010) paints of a foreign national who is a native of where the embassy is, and works within the embassy, these three former DAC consultants reported directly to the Minister of Culture but could at times also communicate with the embassy or consulate of the city where they were based. The DAC did not share information on these consultants, and therefore there is no evidence of the impact of the consultants. It is probably no coincidence then that the steps taken for these festivals to happen occurred during a time when such a bold approach towards international market access was enacted with these consultants on the DAC payroll. The indication here is that for more impact in expanding the

SA cultural market or market penetration, there is a need for such an intermediary role. Even

CHC, for instance, with all its internal research and other resources, recognized the need for an 349 insider cultural consultant, in the form of Moonsamy, to make cultural messaging more authentic and to engage with key SA stakeholders.

In the meantime, since 1994 the DAC has had an internal International Relations

Directorate to pursue cultural diplomacy from within SA and report to the Minister of Culture

(Nawa et al., 2017; J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017). This is in place of models where a similar individual who is the cultural attaché or operates in such a unit, reports to the ambassador and/or the Minister of Culture regarding the cultural resources and interests of the home country and the country at which the embassy is located (Mitchel, 2016). The internal DAC function of this directorate gets drowned out outside of SA, however, as it is not on the cultural frontlines in a designate country. In order to achieve its goals, this directorate works haphazardly with DIRCO using the limited knowledge that the missions have regarding culture because no attaché is allocated at the missions. The directorate is rendered ineffective because it has indirect contact with cultural stakeholders in the different countries where SA has missions. The directorate only has access to internal government deployees at global missions, and not to cultural institutions in that country.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this was the case at these festivals. The DAC did not have direct relationships with cultural organizations in LA and NYC. The DAC outsourced services to cultural service providers it selected from a pool who responded to a call for the occasion by DIRCO in LA. The DAC in NYC could only work with the NYC Consulate.

Networks, therefore, are customarily not created by the directorate but are limited to intra- government cooperation and outsourcing. The indication from these festivals is that such an approach is insufficient for developing networks that aid growth and market access.

Even so, some of the research respondents were not in support of a possible installation of DAC cultural attachés at DIRCO missions abroad (R. Moonsamy, personal communication,

April 13, 2017). Instead, like Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010), they preferred the arms- 350 length principle where the DAC supports private organizations to engage in cultural diplomacy on their own terms, or for communities and citizens to pursue cultural diplomacy directly without regarding national interests. The suggestion was that it is actually good that the DAC does not have cultural attachés as their function may otherwise be biased towards political interests. Moreover, the implication is also that DAC-aligned cultural attachés would potentially sideline other forms of cultural expression in an otherwise democratizing post- apartheid cultural sector.

Part of the initial government reluctance and lack of political support for cultural attachés at SA missions abroad was also because of their sometimes-extended role, historically, as spies (S. Xaba, personal communication, April 12, 2017). Mitchell (2016) has confirmed the sometimes-dual nature of this role, and that it has been associated with spying. Nonetheless, the rewards of having cultural attachés or cultural intermediaries at SA foreign missions are greater than motivations against the perception of spying. The latter could be more clearly ousted in policy that reintroduces a similar role to cultural attachés at SA embassies and consulates abroad and through the actions of the DAC in the implementation of such a policy.

Alternative to cultural attachés, there are other channels for undertaking cultural exchange at arm’s length. For instance, governments sometimes outsource the management of cultural exchange to independent organizations that are also able to build or maintain international networks. An example of such an arrangement is the AMA program, which has been managed by a company called American Voices for the US State Department (American

Voices, n.d.). Otherwise, as there is also the option Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010) advocate for of an institution or organization unaffiliated with the national government, which engages in cultural diplomacy on its own terms. Such an institution could be autonomous, and entirely directed by SA cultural practitioners. I would extend the proposal by Gienow-Hecht and Donfried (2010) and propose that the institution could be also be financially supported by 351 the DAC. In this way it would act as an arms-length agency of the DAC, if it is “understood as being in the national interest” (Ang et al., 2015). The organization would be acting not for the national interest, but because of the national interest.

My view is that national interests, although predominantly political in nature, suffer further in the absence of a role like this meant to advance SA culture abroad at SA missions.

At the same time, the CCI’s also suffer because they need a connector, a cultural network intermediary, abroad when representatives of the sector act independently of the DAC to pursue creative and career interests abroad. As determined, earlier, national interests are interwoven with individual interests (Nisbett, 2013b; Ang et al., 2015). Through cultural attachés or such an intermediary, the DAC could meet some of these interests and such a function could be complementary to the internal DAC International Relations unit. With cultural attachés, the

DAC could also find new ways of operationalizing its objectives, by ‘thinking outside the box’ rather than using the same network patterns (Comunian, 2015; Markusen & King, 2005).

Cultural attachés, or a similar role, would be useful in significantly building SA’s capacity for cultural development abroad, by building multi-directional networks with government and non-government cultural stakeholders in other countries.

Case Study Generalizability

As mentioned in Chapter 4, Yin (2014) states that “case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions”, or “expand” on theoretical concepts (p. 21). He also explains how case studies can be “applied in reinterpreting the results of existing studies of other concrete situations (Yin, 2014, p. 41). This case study can be used to make at least three generalizations. First, although the apparent purpose of DIRACO and DAC in hosting music festivals abroad was said to be to promote SA musicians and their industry networks in the

USA, the actual practices and implementation evident in the two festivals under study suggest

352 that these are either not indeed the primary reasons for the events or that they were done rather ineffectively. So what seems to be the concern of these two agencies with regard to these two festivals must lie elsewhere –apparently in their utility as a device to jockey for bureaucratic status at the ministerial level. The departments use such events for instrumental ends that are politically-defined at bureaucratic level. So, this case elaborates on cultural instrumentalism in

SA and on the prevalence of instrumentalism in cultural policy. This case also elaborates on how much bureaucratic politics affect national cultural policy.

Secondly, this case yields generalizable findings and contributes to theory building on the management and promotion of SA musical performance abroad. For instance, I have determined that the SA government approaches creating markets for SA music internationally reactively rather than proactively. The government (DAC, DIRCO, etc.) reacts to centrally set national development goals and opportunities that might further those goals rather than creating its own framework for specifically tackling new cultural markets. For example, SA does not have ongoing formally implemented culture-specific programs pronounced in foreign policy to engage with other countries in general and the USA specifically. This means that DIRCO and the DAC muddle through and have to undertake short-term initiatives that are aligned to existing foreign and developmental policy to address the policy void and then implement projects to meet the goals of those strategies. They patch-up where necessary in order to carry out their mandate.

On how the DAC approaches the general development of cultural policy, I similarly submit here that the appendages of government (DAC, DIRCO, DTI, etc.) follow a reactive policy formulation process referred to as Muddling Through for creating markets for SA music.

This theoretical proposition applies here because Lindblom (1959) suggests that Muddling

Through is an incremental process which involves the refinement of existing policy to address interlinked objectives that are relevant to mostly immediate social circumstances rather than to 353 strictly follow a ‘rational-comprehensive’ policy cycle (p. 81-88). Governments tend to create policy by muddling through in order to sustain stability and avoid governance dilemmas, because non-incremental policy is ‘unpredictable in its consequences’ (ibid.). In this way the

SA government simply adds on to existing policy such as the WPACH and policy strategies like CIGS, CSA and MGE. The SA government then uses opportunities that help achieve the goals of existing policies. So, the aspect of how SA music performance is managed abroad and how it is not part of foreign policy is a further example of the theory of Muddling Through within the sphere of cultural policy.

Research Question and Conclusion

Before I explain the findings, I should clarify that in this dissertation I have used the focal points mentioned in Chapter 1 to reveal some of the issues at stake at these festivals. The points

I am referring to are the aims and ends of the festivals, stakeholder identities involved, relationships and networks at the festivals, policies and process that shaped the festivals. These points are already built into and are intertwined with the seven point analytical framework I conceptualized from Getz (2010) and Hauptfleisch (2007) to deconstruct each festival. The analytical framework consists of the festival organizer, location, objectives, programming, stakeholders, process and outputs. Therefore, as explained in the methodology in Chapter 4, the focal points outlined in Chapter 1 are constantly represented throughout the analysis of the two festivals.

On the findings, I have also shown that the festivals involve the policy imperatives of their organizers. For the DAC, DIRCO and other SA government stakeholders the festivals were to pursue national development goals as well as some of the objectives in this group of stakeholders’ individual mandate-related policies. For the CHC, the Ubuntu festival addressed its artistic and organizational objectives and those of its stakeholders. For SA CCI participants,

354 the festivals were supposed to serve as professional opportunities for exposure, networking and creative capacity building. Due to this, the festivals were a contested expression of the policy, networks, the power of each organizer and their stakeholders, whether their different goals were mutually exclusive or compatible.

The festivals also inadvertently articulated each organizer’s power, like how the CHC’s interests to expand its audience base and immerse NYC residents in a transformative cultural experience dominated the Ubuntu festival agenda. Similarly, the festivals inadvertently made statements about the influence the organizer was in pursuit of. In this case the DAC and SA government networks were supposed to be pursuing tangible and intangible benefits that had the potential to generate hard and soft power in the long term for SA in the USA. The festivals also asserted some of the cultural, reputational, financial and other resources stakeholders wielded, like those of the US foundations involved. The festivals also made a statement about how the involvement of SA CCI participants influences the impact of such festivals.

The dissertation also showed that large scale SA festivals in the USA are rare and that this is due to inadequate networking and constraints on budgets that are meant to promote the

SA arts and culture sector abroad. As such, festivals that showcase SA culture on foreign soil are organized by various entities that are not always affiliated to SA government interests or institutions. Such festivals are therefore approached differently because they have different purposes. This means that festivals of this nature may or may not promote SA musicians beyond showcasing their music. This explains why at one festival the musicians were involved in pre and post-showcase activities, while at the other festival musicians were only invited as audience members to a panel discussion on the opportunities in their industry after their performances on stage. The empowerment of SA musicians, therefore, depends on the motivations of the organizer.

355 Having gained some understanding of how and why these festivals happen and who they benefit, I can now address the research question set out in Chapter 1. What I set out to find out was: How do South African music festivals held in the USA promote South African musicians, facilitate industry and government networks, and cultivate state policy goals of hard and soft power? What I discovered was that these festivals were a smoke screen and did not really serve the purposes they were declared to be serving. In practice, the purpose of these festivals was not to promote SA musicians, facilitate industry and government networks or pursue hard and soft power. Instead, the festivals were about SA government bureaucratic politics.

The festivals show that the DAC is only concerned with undertaking some kind of visible action without particular concern with the outcome of the action. The department does not necessarily evaluate its motivations, actions or the projects it chooses. Instead, the DAC uses its actions, programs and motivations to prove that it contributed to the government’s greater plan for national economic growth and job creation. This means that the department acts on the guise of cultural development to motivate for its own bureaucratic position and so that it can justify why it exists as a government department because the cultural ministry is not valued like other government portfolios are at cabinet level. Thus, only the DAC’s activity matters towards the national development goals rather than what it achieves. The activity of the DAC is, therefore, self-motivating for its own sake. The DAC uses culture as a means to another end: to expand its bureaucratic status inside the SA Cabinet. This idea explains why the goals for these festivals were unattainable, especially considering the limited resources invested in reaching them.

In DIRCO’s case, there was an also opportunity to further national goals through only action. DIRCO would also gain more visibility in NYC by collaborating with a prestigious US cultural organization that would reflect well on DIRCO. There was also an opportunity for 356 undertaking diplomacy with limited resources. The latter may explain why there was a larger contingent of representatives from international embassies on the guest list at both receptions in LA and in NYC rather than significant CCI participants from both cities. DIRCO also had to collaborate with the DAC, which made statements on the goals for the festivals. As the key cultural stakeholder in government, the DAC’s statements were definitive of the collaboration, suggesting more pointed efforts towards market access for SA economic development.

As a policy tool and a tool of cultural diplomacy used by DIRCO and the DAC for SA, these festivals were ill-conceived and had little chance of success. This is in part because of the vagueness of SA cultural diplomacy policy which leaves SA’s cultural diplomacy framework open to interpretation and not bound by transparent evaluative measures. It was also not only because SA embassies and consulates do not have the human resources necessary to action such initiatives abroad. This was instead because at the LA festival panels, musicians were not given the opportunity to tell their own story as experts of their industry and what they do. Musicians and the invited CCI experts could not speak for themselves. The designated CCI thought leaders on the panels were also not consulted to shape festival according to the SA industry’s realities. Similarly at DIRCO’s Ubuntu festival receptions, where SA musicians were invited to attend, there was no space to accommodate the voice of SA CCI participants or give them a platform to relay their realities. These events counter traditional wisdom in theory and other literature about how exercises in cultural diplomacy and the pursuit of soft power are carried out, with artists on an ambassadorial platform relating their own experiences.

Artistic stakeholders were disempowered by the government at both festivals. This is, however, symptomatic of a deficiency within the cultural ministry in how it engages with the sector it would seem to serve and represent, but which it deals with by making decisions from the top-down. The ministry does not engage with the sector in good faith, whether regarding the shaping policy or other matters. It is this kind of modus operandus and engagement with 357 sector stakeholders that made it possible for the DAC to participate at these festivals without accountability. After the festivals, the DAC did not have to show firm evidence of how these festivals benefitted the sector.

What I also discovered in relation to other benefits for the sector was that the promotion of SA musicians in the USA was that the SA government only understands its role as a facilitator in the CCI’s. This is the case whether the SA government is represented by the DAC,

DIRCO or DTI. The government only creates platforms like these festivals and MGE touring funding for sector participants to find ways to grow the sector. Musician are therefore expected to promote their own music and profiles. This is also true of the question on industry networks.

Musicians and other CCI participants are expected to create their own networks when the government gives them a platform like the opportunity to attend a festival abroad. Since 1994, however, the government has dictated the terms for the platforms it provides for musicians.

This is why the government could provide a showcase in LA and fund musicians to appear on another in NYC, but could or did not directly get involved in developing SA CCI networks.

This is also partly why the smokescreen of these festivals was easy for the SA government to validate.

Regarding how the festivals facilitated government networks, I found out that part of what made the smoke screen seem legitimate was the portrayal of democratic values such as cultural and social diversity. Such projected values made sense in how SA was meant to woo the USA and its allies so that SA could grow its global political stature, thereby growing its government-to-government networks. But networks need to be nurtured and cultivated, efforts that seem little in evidence after the festival events themselves concluded. This also seemed like traditional diplomacy or a mechanism to get to hard power. However, the use of the words

“we want to use the US as a gateway to world markets for South African products” in speeches by DAC officials at each festival suggested an explicit pursuit of economic markets to meet 358 national development goals of job creation and economic development. Therefore, the government departments could check more boxes and have more evidence that they contributed to the national government development agenda. At both festivals, therefore, it was not external relations with the governments of other countries that were at stake, but SA internal government agency interests. This is why SA government stakeholder interests were central, dominated and defined the festivals.

In relation to how the festivals were supposed to cultivate state policy goals of hard and soft power, at both festivals the involved SA government agency networks communicated a government agenda they hoped to pursue, nurture and invest in areas that have been recognized as having the potential to generate economic (hard) and reputational (soft) power for SA in the

USA and on a global platform. The government stakeholder positioned themselves as though they were collaborating to cultivate state policy goals determined in development-centered policies and strategies such as the NDP, CSA, MGE, Ubuntu foreign policy and other policies.

These policies and strategies fundamentally aim for the stimulation of SA economic growth and economic development. The festivals seemed like these government stakeholders were less interested in pushing a cultural agenda, but more concerned with advancing their individual bureaucratic agendas. So, this network was pushing an acultural agenda, but a government agenda using the language of cultural diplomacy.

The government network also seemed to extol SA cultural diversity for nation branding, project it as a commodity for consumption as well as relay political messages about SA democracy and its achievements in sustaining social cohesion in a culturally diverse society.

This mechanism of using culture for acultural ends is cultural instrumentalism. Part of the smoke screen, therefore, was that cultural instrumentalism was supposed to help the SA government begin to explore and chase state policy goals of hard and soft power in the USA.

Framing the exercise at the festivals through cultural instrumentalism made it politically 359 acceptable for DAC and DIRCO to implement their plans. Nevertheless, hard and soft power could not and were not achieved though because tracking the impact of the festival activity could not be measured based only on two events and it would take many years to measure such an impact even with multiple similar cultural projects by the SA government in the USA.

Also, using the argument of the national interest makes sense since the national interest is assumed to boost the individual interests of cultural stakeholders (Nisbett, 2013b; Ang et al,

2015; J. Mogashoa, personal communication, July 17, 2017). Therefore, the rationale provided by the SA government network is that culture and the economy are meaningfully interwoven beyond quantifiable economic benefits (Gibson, et al., 2010). This also justified involvement at the festivals as if to fulfill the mandates of these departments. Closer observation, however, suggests that the SA government network applied cultural instrumentalism, enabled by the

MGE strategy, through using the language of cultural diplomacy, cultural development, cultural instrumentalism and the national interest to serve their bureaucratic purposes because these goals were neither clearly articulated or likely to be reached.

One of the reasons these goals are not reachable is that in spite of MGE, the DAC does not have a strategy for penetrating markets in the USA. MGE only funds arts and culture projects that attempt market penetration in other countries. MGE, thus, only encourages market penetration and has no prescriptions on how to go about this. The DAC does not have a plan on how to execute market penetration for the cultural sector on its own or with other government departments. This is partly why it has been suggested in the past that for SA music to be ‘export ready’, it needs holistic government support at national, regional government levels, as well as at different levels of professional musicianship so that musicians can achieve

“higher levels of professionalism” not only in the practice of music-making but in its administration (Ansell et al., 2007, p. 4; Ansell & Barnard, 2013a). The DAC has, as such, been operating without enough resources to support the development of SA’s CCI’s even 360 though they expect economic rewards from the CCI’s (Van Graan, 2005). The DAC has not put in place a specific framework for making the music product export-ready at home, making the product export-ready for specific markets, supporting the distribution of the product or training musicians to be effective marketing entrepreneurs. Instead, at these festivals the DAC only supports the music product abroad without the necessary groundwork or evaluating how the product can be absorbed abroad so that implementation is effective. As such, it is not sufficient to say that the DAC supports SA music development through means such as taking it abroad at these festivals.

Additionally, as much as MGE may be a helpful strategy in encouraging cultural diplomacy efforts beyond foreign-policy-designated regions, it is not a comprehensive market penetration strategy because it is not clear about what the role of the government is in the creation of international markets for SA culture beyond funding artists to go abroad. The strategy is also not clear about the necessary steps to achieve market penetration or to stimulate networks that encourage market penetration, whether by CCI participants who get its funding to go abroad or the government. My summation is that the strategy is limited because it can only encourage artists to perform abroad and create opportunities for themselves, but such an approach is not sufficient for economic or other impacts. This is part of why the goals set by the DAC and DIRCO were not feasible at the festivals.

Opportunities for Further Research

From the research question and conclusions drawn in this study there is opportunity for further research or extended discussion on the topics that emerged. One is the isolation and limited status of the SA Culture Ministry in Cabinet and what the legacy of each Minister’s administration has been. There is also an opportunity to further explore the kind of dual- purpose music export model used by the DAC and its guiding policies. Such an exploration of

361 the SA music export model would be useful when compared to those of countries with similar attributes to SA, or what systems those countries have implemented to support the export of their CCI’s.

Another opportunity is presented here by the American Music Abroad (AMA) program, which sans the directive of a cultural ministry in US government, uses a model of cooperation between various government departments with dissimilar policy areas to enable cultural impact abroad. In SA’s instance, questions remain on how government collaboration can better enable the growth of SA CCI markets abroad while operating within a skeletal policy framework for such collaboration. As mentioned earlier, the AMA is not presented here as a best-practice recommendation for collaboration. The programme does offer a way to consider the use of limited governance resources within a space of multiple policy areas though, and especially in a space where cultural interests and politics intersect.

There is also room for more research into the international cultural relations framework of SA, which has not been widely discussed in academic literature, and which this study could not discuss more extensively. Festivals that showcase SA culture outside of SA also fall within this gamut and have not been expansively documented. The cultural relations between SA and the USA, especially with regards to music are also unexplored territory. For instance, it would be useful to know about the impact of the AMA program in SA or about the impact trajectory of SA artists who regularly tour the USA, or what kind of resources such artists require for them to tour the USA. It would also be useful to investigate all the cultural policy strategies and tools implemented by the DAC in the USA for SA music in order to understand what has worked in the past, how it has worked and what has not worked. This point also leads to considerations about the DAC’s policy tool and strategy evaluation systems, and how there is room to examine such systems further. In fact in this dissertation there was constant tension

362 between outcomes and outputs because of research question, which was based on the language the DAC used in addressing these festivals. There is room to explore such tools.

Equally, there is also an opportunity to further explore cultural instrumentalism in the role of SA cultural policy as a measure and component of national security. For instance, searching for policy conceptual frameworks or models would have strengthened my ability to handle and further explain how the DAC and DIRCO framed the instrumentalist approach they took at these festivals in relation to the compromise between accountability and implementation. So, there is room to explore very specific aspects of national security in relation to cultural policy.

Additionally, since MGE has been implemented, questions remain on its general impact. This is the kind of impact this case study could not fully determine. An accumulation of other MGE events, programs and tools would give a fuller picture of the strategy’s impact.

Beyond the limitations of this dissertation, literature has also not offered a structural understanding of MGE, which could more comprehensively explain MGE’s compatibility with existing SA cultural policy, the strategy’s flaws and how it could be improved.

And so, these are only some of the conversations this study has sparked on SA cultural policy and the creation of cultural markets for SA CCI’s. These are conversations that may also contribute to theory building within SA cultural policy spaces. These conversations also have the potential to validate this case study.

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392 Appendix: Supporting Documents

Section 1a: SAAF Program

The arts of South Africa saturate Downtown L.A. for a weekend rich in cultural connections. The “South African Arts Festival 2013” (SAAF) is a vibrant festival of music and film. This inaugural two-day celebration, commissioned by the Republic of South Africa’s Department of Arts and Culture, showcases some of the country’s beloved musical icons and introduces Angenelos to powerful emerging voices. Saturday’s line up, held at Grand Performances at California Plaza, includes Hugh Masakela’s jazz grooves, the Mahotella Queens’ uplifting a capella infused with Jozi’s Zulu hip hop mix, the Parlotones’ arena rock anthems, Simphiwe Dana’s sultry Afro soul, and more. Sunday’s film offerings, at various locations in Downtown L.A., showcase the broad range of South African cinema from uplifting family-friendly fare, to gritty dramas, to documentaries that take you to into Soweto’s street dance subculture, and more. Two days. Two venues. One great weekend. The South African Arts Fest will be conducted at various locations around Downtown Los Angeles. All events at Grand Performances’ WaterCourt outdoor stage are free, no advanced reservations are required. L.A. Live Regal Cinema screenings are also free, advanced reservations begin Fri., Sep. 13, 2013. Music Film Sat · Oct 5 · 4–10 PM · Grand Performances @ California Plaza Sun · Oct 6 · 10AM–4 PM · Regal Theaters at L.A. Live Invited* musical guests include: All screening are free, but advanced reservations required. Hugh Masekela ·Grammy-award winning jazz icon and social Reservation system opens Sept 13, 2013. activist The African Cypher · documentary about Soweto’s street dance Mahotella Queens featuring Jozi · uplifting a capella infused subculture with Jozi’s Zulu hip hop mix Felix · family film Simphiwe Dana · sultry voice of Afro soul Man on Ground · drama Wouter Kellerman · versatile flautist fusing classical and African Metropolis · series of short fiction films set in different contemporary African cities The Parlotones · Joburg’s platinum-selling rockers Fanie Fourie’s Lobola · comedy The Soil · beatbox and a capella sounds Otelo Burning · drama iFani · Xhosa rapper, cultural futurist Sun · Oct 6 · 7PM · Grand Performances @ California Plaza *Due to the nature of live events, this schedule is subject to change. (Outdoor Screening) Khumba · animation, U.S. premiere

Visit www.sa-artsfest.org for full line up and more information. All events are FREE, some advance reservations required. For more information, call Grand Performances 213.687.2190.

Commissioned by The Republic of South Africa’s Department of Arts and Culture as part of the Mzansi Golden Economy Strategy.

About Brand South Africa – Brand South Africa is the ofﬁcial marketing agency of South Africa, with a mandate to build the country’s brand reputation, in order to improve its global competitiveness abroad. Its aim is also to build pride and patriotism among South Africans, in order to contribute to social cohesion and nation brand ambassadorship. www.southafrica.info

About Grand Performances – Hailed as the “Best Free Outdoor Summer Concert Series” by Los Angeles Magazine and called “a grand gift to the public [...] democracy in musical action” by the Los Angeles Times, Grand Performances (GP), L.A.’s premier free outdoor summer performing arts series, presents high-quality music, dance, theater, and more at the breathtaking California Plaza in the heart of Downtown. GP delivers the best of global culture to inspire community among the diverse peoples of Los Angeles, reﬂective of the many cultural interests across the region. All are welcome to enjoy GP’s unique, awe-inspiring venue nestled under the spectacular Downtown skyline. Established in 1987, Grand Performances is a 501(c)(3) located on Bunker Hill. www.grandperformances.org

393 Section 1b: Ubuntu Festival Program

394

395 Section 2: DAC Strategic Planning

2013 DAC sector-wide strategic planning guide (DAC, 2013b, p. 19).

396 Section 3: Data Collection Questionnaires

SAAF Interviews

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR DIRCO, LOS ANGELES CONSULATE

1. What were the aims of the 2013 SAAF festival?

2. How were the aims determined?

3. How did the consulate contribute to the festival?

4. How was the festival of benefit to the consulate?

5. Why was the festival held in Los Angeles?

6. How different was the festival to other events on the consulate’s regular cultural

programming?

7. Is there a cultural attaché at the consulate?

8. Which other organizations/institutions were involved in planning the festival?

9. Which US/LA-based individuals or institutions were invited by the consulate to the

festival?

10. Who were the festival sponsors?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR DAC OFFICIALS, SOUTH AFRICA 1. Why was the festival hosted in LA?

2. What were the aims of the festival?

3. What was the purpose of timing the festivals in October?

4. How does the department decide on where SA music should be promoted?

5. What were the goals behind the choice of musicians performing at the festival?

6. What were the goals behind the choice of industry experts invited to the festival panel?

7. Apart from the DAC, which South African departments or institutions were involved

in the planning of the festival?

397 8. Which international institutions were involved in the planning of the festival?

9. Which other groups/organizations/individuals were invited to the actual festival, and

why?

10. What was the process followed in the planning of the festival?

11. How did the DAC come to sponsor the Ubuntu festival in 2014?

12. What were the benefits of the 2014 Ubuntu festival?

13. What was the connection between the LA festival and the Mzansi Golden Economy?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR ARTISTS/ARTIST MANAGERS 1. How did you come to participate at the festival(s)?

2. What were the envisaged benefits of participating at the LA festival for the musician(s)

you represent?

3. What were the results of being at the festival?

4. Which relationships or networks were enabled by being part of the festival(s)?

5. Did you invite other groups/institutions/industry representatives to the festival?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR SA INDUSTRY EXPERTS/PANELISTS (INVITED BY THE DAC)

1. How did you come to participate at the LA festival?

2. What were the aims of the festival?

3. What was your role before and at the festival?

4. How did you contribute to the festival?

5. How was participating at the festival beneficial to your organization(s)?

6. How was the festival of benefit to you?

7. Which networks or relationships were enabled by being part of the festival(s)?

8. Did you invite other groups/institutions to the festival and why?

9. Do you have a regular relationship with the DAC or DIRCO?

398 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS/AGENCIES 1. How did the department/organization come to participate at the SAAF festival in 2013?

2. What were the aims of the festival?

3. How was the festival beneficial to the interests you represent?

4. What kind of relationship do you have with the Department of Arts and Culture?

5. Which other institutions did you work with for the festival?

6. Which institutions did you invite to the festival?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR PRODUCER (Grand Performances) 1. How did your organization come to be part of the 2013 SAAF?

2. What were the aims of the festival?

3. How were the aims determined?

4. Were the set out objectives met?

5. How were the outcomes of the festival measured?

6. Which relationships or networks were enabled by the festivals for the musicians who

performed at the festival?

7. Which relationships or networks were enabled by the festivals for Grand Performance?

8. Who else was involved in the festival planning?

9. Which sponsors did you work with for the event?

10. What was your choice of sponsors based on?

11. What was the process followed in marketing the festival?

12. What were the goals behind the choice of musicians performing at the festival?

13. Apart from the DAC, did you work with other SA government departments or

institutions in organizing the festival?

14. Which LA-based institutions or organizations did you invite to the festival?

399 15. Are there any public documents available for you to share on the festivals? (e.g.: festival

program, planning, report on outcomes)

Ubuntu Festival Interviews

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR SA ARTIST/ARTIST MANAGERS 1. How did you come to participate at the 2014 Ubuntu festival in New York?

2. What were the envisaged benefits of participating at the festival for the musician you

represent?

3. What were the results of being at the festival?

4. Which relationships or networks were enabled by being part of the festival(s)?

5. Any suggestions on whom else I could interview regarding the festival?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NY 1. How did the Carnegie Corporation initiate the festival?

2. What was important to the Carnegie Corporation about the festival?

3. What were the aims of the festival?

4. How were the aims determined?

5. What was the purpose of timing the festival in October?

6. Were the goals the Carnegie Corporation set out for the festival achieved?

7. How was the festival beneficial to the Carnegie Corporation?

8. What was the approach used in marketing the festival?

9. How did you factor in showcasing South African music to a US audience?

10. What was your choice of sponsors based on?

11. Which institutions/organizations/individuals did the Carnegie Corporation invite to the

festival and why?

12. What kind of relationship does the Carnegie Corporation have with South Africa?

400 13. Does the Carnegie Corporation have a regular/formal relationship with the South

African Department of Arts and Culture?

14. Does the Carnegie Corporation have a regular/formal relationship with South African

Department of International Relations and Cooperation?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR DAC 1. How did the DAC become part of the Ubuntu festival in 2014?

2. What were the aims of the festival?

3. How were the aims determined?

4. What was your role in the planning of the festival?

5. What was the goal behind the choice of musicians performing at the festival?

6. What was the purpose of timing the festival in October?

7. Which relationships or networks were enabled by the festivals for the musicians who

performed at the festival?

8. Which international organizations were involved at the festival?

9. Which South African departments or organizations did the DAC partner up with for the

festival?

10. Which portion of the NY creative sector did the DAC invite to the festival?

11. Are there any public documents available on the festivals? (e.g.: festival program,

planning, report on outcomes)

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR DIRCO, NEW YORK CONSULATE 1. What were the aims of the Ubuntu 2014 festival?

2. How were the aims determined?

3. What was the role of the consulate in the organization of the festival?

4. How did the consulate contribute to the festival?

401 5. How was the festival beneficial to the consulate?

6. How different was the festival to other events on the regular cultural programming of

the consulate?

7. Is there a cultural attaché at the consulate?

8. Which organizations in US/New York did the consulate invite to the festival?

9. Which South African institutions did the consulate invite to the festival?

10. Did the consular officials meet with the SA performers at the festival?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR INVITED SOUTH AFRICAN CREATIVE INDUSTRY SPECIALISTS/REPRESENTATIVES 1. How did your organization come to participate at the 2014 Ubuntu festival in New

York?

2. What were the envisaged benefits of participating at the festival?

3. What were the results of being at the festival?

4. How was the festival beneficial to your organization?

5. Which relationships or networks were enabled by being part of the festival(s)?

6. What kind of relationship do you have with the Department of Arts and Culture?

7. What kind of relationship do you have with the Department of International Relations

and Cooperation?

8. Who else would you recommend I interview regarding the festival?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR SPONSORS/GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 1. How did the department/organization come to participate at the Ubuntu festival in

2014?

2. What were the aims of the festival?

3. How was the festival beneficial to the interests you represent?

402 4. What kind of relationship does the agency have with the Department of Arts and

Culture/Dirco?

5. Which other institutions did you work with for the festival?

6. Which institutions did you invite to the festival?

403