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ANN ARBOR, Ml 48106 18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND 1316821 MAHON, KEVIN PATRICK SOVIET INFLUENCE AND DECISION-MAKING: THE POLISH CRISES - 1970 AND 1980. THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, M.A., 198 1 COPR. 1 9 8 1 MAHON, KEVIN PATRICK U n i v e r ^ Microfilms InbEm ctfiO rTcU so o n . z e e b r o .. a n n a r b o r , mi 48106 © 1981 KEVIN PATRICK MAHON All Rights Reserved SOVIET INFLUENCE AND DECISION-MAKING; THE POLISH CRISES - 1970 and 1980 by Kevin Pafrîck Mo bon submitted to the Faculty of the College of Public and International Affairs of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs Signatures of Committee: anDean of the ColCollege 1981 The American University Washington, D. C. 20016 THE AJiEIÎICAiî l ib h a h y SOVIET INFLUENCE AND DECISION-MAKING THE POLISH CRISES - 1970 and 1980 BY Kevin Patrick Mahon ABSTRACT The subject of this thesis is the change in Polish leadership in 1970 and 1980. The paper has two purposes. The first purpose is to determine the extent of Soviet influence on Polish events. The second purpose is to identify the most useful approach in explaining Soviet policy. The major portion of this paper details the interaction between the Polish and Soviet leaderships. There is evidence which suggests that Soviet influence is exerted in a variety of ways with limited effectiveness. The leadership changes were not strictly orchestrated by the Soviet Union. The models discussed in the final chapter ore the cybernetic, the analytic, and the Huntington and Brzezinski models of Soviet decision-making. None of the models explained Soviet policy both before the changes and at the time of the changes. This suggests that a complete model of Soviet decision-making should account for both incremental ism and complexity. II Acknowledgments My thanks are due to the members of my thesis committee, Dr. Linda L. Lubrano and Dr. F. J. Piotrow, for their aid, advice and criticism. I owe a special debt to Dr. Lubrano, whose class lectures were invaluable in the formulation of my views. Also, I wish to express particular thanks to my mother who typed and retyped the draft copy of the thesis. Finally, 1 am grateful to the woman who typed the final manuscript, known to me only as "Mary". 111 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......................................................................................... iü Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1 II. THE 1970 CRISIS ..................................................................................... 12 The Prelude (1956-1967) ................................................................. 13 1968 19 Interim Period - 1969 31 1970 35 1971 and 1972 - The A fte rm a th.................................................... 47 1973-1974 ............................................................................................. 53 III. THE 1980 C R I S I S..................................................................................... 57 1975 57 1976 66 1977 and 1978 - Muddling T h r o u g h.......................................... 74 1979 83 1980 90 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 102 IV. MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING ................................................ 110 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................... 130 IV CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This thesis is concerned with Soviet influence in Poland. Before I outline the methods I will use to determine this, I shall discuss the history of Soviet-East European relations. This historical discussion will show the evolving nature of Soviet policy in Eastern Euiope and it will provide a framework in which to view Soviet behavior in Poland. The international system in the immediate post-WW II period was characterized by two basic facts-its semi-anarchical nature with conflict as a fact of life, and its bipolar structure with the Soviet Union and the United States as the dominate nation states possessing the greatest power. Given these basic facts the Soviet Union and the United States (in the immediate post-WW II period) were aligned against each other as states seeking to maintain their position in the international system and seeking to diminish the position of their adversary. Thus, a global balance of power struggle ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union. One area where this struggle was (and still is) carried out was in Europe where each power used several methods to maintain the balance of power. Towards this end (maintenance of a European balance of power) the Soviet Union established a system of satellite countries in Eastern Europe. At this time the 1 2 Soviet perception of its interests (goals) in Eastern Europe consisted of; (1) a military component where Eastern Europe was perceived as a buffer zone against possible Western attack and/or asa staging area for a possible attack against the West, and (2) an ideological component, where Eastern Europe was perceived as an ideological avant-garde of communist countries furthering the advance of the Soviet model, and as an ideological buffer zone securing the Soviet Union against political, cultural, and ideological improprieties, (There was strict adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology in political, cultural, social, and economic thinking; the local communist parties were dominant in all matters and were loyal to the CPSU and its policies.), and (3) an economic component where Eastern Europe was perceived as an area of economic resources, resources to be exploited and used by the Soviet Union to rebuild their own economy. The Soviet Union, in order to achieve their goals, exercised total domination over the East European states through political influence on the local communist parties. In the course of managing this relationship with the East European satellites, and maintaining the balance of power (and thus securing these states within the Soviet orbit), the Soviet Union's policy has evolved through several stages. ^ Under Stalin the Soviet Union ruled Eastern Europe with on iron hand 1 Information for this discussion was based on Charles G ati, editor. The International Politics of Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976); U .S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union. (Washington, D.C.: Govern ment Printing O ffice, 1979), pp. 137-170; J. F. Brown, "Thirty Years of Comecon," Radio Free Europe Research, RAD Background Report ^8 (Jan. 12, 1979); Adam Utam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 464-694. characterized by Soviet economic exploitation through Joint Stock companies and Soviet military control over the East European armed forces. Stalin, because of war damages, needed a defensive zone against the West and was concerned mainly with the military component of the Soviet-East European relationship. However, Stalin's compulsive vigilance was too great a burden for the Soviet Union, and the post-Stalin leaders soughta more routine relationship. Under Khrushchev, Soviet policy was aimed at establishing East European economic, political, and military dependence on the Soviet Union. CMEA, (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) established in 1949, became more of two-way street. Extreme forms of domination were curbed, while the Soviet leaders sought to legitimize their