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Uni International 300 N ZEEB ROAD. ANN ARBOR, Ml 48106 18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND 1316821
MAHON, KEVIN PATRICK SOVIET INFLUENCE AND DECISION-MAKING: THE POLISH CRISES - 1970 AND 1980.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, M.A., 198 1
COPR. 1 9 8 1 MAHON, KEVIN PATRICK U n i v e r ^ Microfilms
InbEm ctfiO rTcU so o n . z e e b r o .. a n n a r b o r , mi 48106
© 1981
KEVIN PATRICK MAHON
All Rights Reserved SOVIET INFLUENCE AND DECISION-MAKING;
THE POLISH CRISES - 1970 and 1980
by
Kevin Pafrîck Mo bon
submitted to the
Faculty of the College of Public and International Affairs
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Arts
in
International Affairs
Signatures of Committee:
anDean of the ColCollege
1981
The American University Washington, D. C. 20016
THE AJiEIÎICAiî l ib h a h y SOVIET INFLUENCE AND DECISION-MAKING
THE POLISH CRISES - 1970 and 1980
BY
Kevin Patrick Mahon
ABSTRACT
The subject of this thesis is the change in Polish leadership in 1970 and
1980. The paper has two purposes. The first purpose is to determine the extent of Soviet influence on Polish events. The second purpose is to identify the most useful approach in explaining Soviet policy.
The major portion of this paper details the interaction between the Polish and Soviet leaderships. There is evidence which suggests that Soviet influence is exerted in a variety of ways with limited effectiveness. The leadership changes were not strictly orchestrated by the Soviet Union.
The models discussed in the final chapter ore the cybernetic, the analytic, and the Huntington and Brzezinski models of Soviet decision-making. None of the models explained Soviet policy both before the changes and at the time of the changes. This suggests that a complete model of Soviet decision-making should account for both incremental ism and complexity.
II Acknowledgments
My thanks are due to the members of my thesis committee, Dr. Linda L.
Lubrano and Dr. F. J. Piotrow, for their aid, advice and criticism. I owe a special debt to Dr. Lubrano, whose class lectures were invaluable in the formulation of my views.
Also, I wish to express particular thanks to my mother who typed and retyped the draft copy of the thesis. Finally, 1 am grateful to the woman who typed the final manuscript, known to me only as "Mary".
111 TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...... ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... iü
Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
II. THE 1970 CRISIS ...... 12
The Prelude (1956-1967) ...... 13 1968 19 Interim Period - 1969 31 1970 35 1971 and 1972 - The A fte rm a th...... 47 1973-1974 ...... 53
III. THE 1980 C R I S I S...... 57
1975 57 1976 66 1977 and 1978 - Muddling T h r o u g h...... 74 1979 83 1980 90 Conclusion ...... 102
IV. MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING ...... 110
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 130
IV CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with Soviet influence in Poland. Before I outline the methods I will use to determine this, I shall discuss the history of
Soviet-East European relations. This historical discussion will show the evolving nature of Soviet policy in Eastern Euiope and it will provide a framework in which to view Soviet behavior in Poland.
The international system in the immediate post-WW II period was characterized by two basic facts-its semi-anarchical nature with conflict as a fact of life, and its bipolar structure with the Soviet Union and the United
States as the dominate nation states possessing the greatest power. Given these basic facts the Soviet Union and the United States (in the immediate post-WW II period) were aligned against each other as states seeking to maintain their position in the international system and seeking to diminish the position of their adversary. Thus, a global balance of power struggle ensued between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
One area where this struggle was (and still is) carried out was in Europe where each power used several methods to maintain the balance of power. Towards this end (maintenance of a European balance of power) the Soviet Union established a system of satellite countries in Eastern Europe. At this time the
1 2
Soviet perception of its interests (goals) in Eastern Europe consisted of; (1) a military component where Eastern Europe was perceived as a buffer zone against possible Western attack and/or asa staging area for a possible attack against the
West, and (2) an ideological component, where Eastern Europe was perceived as
an ideological avant-garde of communist countries furthering the advance of the
Soviet model, and as an ideological buffer zone securing the Soviet Union
against political, cultural, and ideological improprieties, (There was strict adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology in political, cultural, social, and economic thinking; the local communist parties were dominant in all matters and
were loyal to the CPSU and its policies.), and (3) an economic component where
Eastern Europe was perceived as an area of economic resources, resources to be
exploited and used by the Soviet Union to rebuild their own economy.
The Soviet Union, in order to achieve their goals, exercised total
domination over the East European states through political influence on the local
communist parties.
In the course of managing this relationship with the East European
satellites, and maintaining the balance of power (and thus securing these states
within the Soviet orbit), the Soviet Union's policy has evolved through several
stages. ^ Under Stalin the Soviet Union ruled Eastern Europe with on iron hand
1 Information for this discussion was based on Charles G ati, editor. The International Politics of Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976); U .S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union. (Washington, D.C.: Govern ment Printing O ffice, 1979), pp. 137-170; J. F. Brown, "Thirty Years of Comecon," Radio Free Europe Research, RAD Background Report ^8 (Jan. 12, 1979); Adam Utam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 464-694. characterized by Soviet economic exploitation through Joint Stock companies and Soviet military control over the East European armed forces. Stalin, because of war damages, needed a defensive zone against the West and was concerned mainly with the military component of the Soviet-East European relationship.
However, Stalin's compulsive vigilance was too great a burden for the
Soviet Union, and the post-Stalin leaders soughta more routine relationship.
Under Khrushchev, Soviet policy was aimed at establishing East European economic, political, and military dependence on the Soviet Union. CMEA,
(Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) established in 1949, became more of two-way street. Extreme forms of domination were curbed, while the Soviet
leaders sought to legitimize their control through the Warsaw Pact Treaty
(established in 1955) and CMEA, Yet Khrushchev's policy of dependence, like
Stalin's policy of domination, became outdated as these policies could no longer
cope with the new realities in Eastern Europe. In the post 1968 period Brezhnev
has pursued a policy aimed at the establishment of East European viability. That
is, under Brezhnev the Soviet Union has attempted to establish a more economically efficient East Europe, while at the some time permitting a limited
re-emergence of national self awareness in each satellite.
This attempt at establishing viability reflected a Soviet recognition of the internal realities of each country. Most of the satellite countries had
developed a high level of anti-Soviet nationalism, a decreasing tolerance of
and an increasing contempt for Soviet domination, and a dissatisfaction with
economic stagnation. In response to these new realities the Soviet leaders have
recognized some of the particular needs and national distinctiveness of several 4
East European states.^ Poland is a good case in point. The Catholic Church has been allowed to exist within Poland's communist society and in fact the Church has become a viable actor in internal affairs. The majority of Poland's farmers are private and are not collectivized and, in addition, the Soviet Union has allowed Poland to trade extensively with the West.
This attempt at establishing viability (a more economically efficient East
Europe) also reflected a Soviet recognition of the realities of the Soviet economy.^
During the 1960's the Soviet Union became the largest supplier of row materials and energy to Eastern Europe. The prices for these commodities were on the overage, below the world market prices, and when inflation hit the Western world in the late 1960's and early 1970's the CMEA prices become substantially lower than the world market prices. It was in the late 1960's that the Soviet
Union's economy was undergoing a declining rate of growth. Western technology was needed to alleviate this declining rate of growth. The purchase of Western technology required hard currency earned mainly from the Soviet sale of energy and raw materials. Selling these commodities on the Western market would earn the Soviet Union more hard currency than selling them to the Poet countries. Thus, the Soviet Union was actually losing money by selling a greater quantity of energy and raw materials to the satellite countries. Some sort of disengagement from the above relationship was in the Soviet Union's best interests. In addition.
U .S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 147.
This economic discussion was based on Paul Marer, "Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability to the Soviet Union? The Economic Aspect," in Charles G ati, editor. The International Politics of Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1976). the cost of Soviet raw material and energy extraction in the future was seen as increasing, since the commodities were in more remote regions where transporta tion and production costs would be high. This meant that the Soviet Union would need investment mainly from its East European allies, and the Soviet Union's need for Western technology would remain a high priority.
The above discussion indicated that the needs of the Soviet Union's economy dictated a more viable Eastern Europe which would be able to supply the USSR with a larger share of hard currency and investment money, and which would be able to assume the role of a more equal trading partner with the Soviet
Union. Thus the Soviet leaders have allowed the satellites to increase their economic ties with the West, and they have directed the satellites to buy a share of their oil from Third World countries. Also, the Soviet Union increased intro-CMEA prices of oil and raw materials. These measures have benefitted both the satellites and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union maintained East
European economic dependence, albeit on a smaller scale, without sacrificing
(to a great extent) hard currency earnings. The East European economies gained access to badly needed Western investment without sacrificing access to Soviet raw material and energy resources.
The above developments demonstrated that the Soviet Union had moderated its insistence on strict cohesion (adherence to Marxist-Leninist thinking and strict adherence to communist-type structures) to gain viability (a more efficient East
European economy able to meet Soviet needs and the internal needs of the satellite countries). Thus, today in Eastern Europe the Soviet Union is performing a balancing act between cohesion and viability which it seeks to control through influence over the local communist parties. This balance has progressed to the point where the Soviet Union no longer seeks to maintain an ideological buffer zone in Eastern Europe. That is the Soviet Union has placed its original goal of an ideological buffer zone in Eastern Europe below its military and economic goals.
Historically the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe has gained viability by sacrificing strict ideological cohesion. For example, increased economic ties with the West eroded Marxist-Leninist ideas by bringing into Eastern Europe Western ideas and influence.
As a result of the evolution in Soviet policy, Soviet goals in Eastern
Europe have also been modified to the point where today the Soviet perception of its interests (goals) consists of: (1) a military component where Eastern Europe
is perceived os a buffer zone against a possible Western attack and/or as a staging area for a possible attack against the West, and (2) on economic component where
Eastern Europe is perceived os a viable trading partner of the Soviet Union.
Soviet methods to achieve their goals today take the form of institutional influence
(through CMEA and the Warsaw Pact treaties) and political influence over the
local communist parties in each satellite country. Thus Soviet interests will be
met in Eastern Europe if the local communist parties maintain their supreme role
in all affairs, maintain internal stability, and maintain allegiance to the Soviet
Union. A threat to any of these conditions will be perceived os a threat to Soviet
interests (goals) in any of the satellite countries. Therefore, it can be hypothe
sized that the Soviet Union will exert a strong influence on the internal events of its
East European satellite countries with an aim towards meeting Soviet interests. The subject of this thesis is the change in Polish leadership in 1970 and
1980. The paper has two purposes. The first purpose will be to determine the amount of Soviet influence on Polish events. Were the changes orchestrated strictly from the outside by the Soviet Union? Were the changes a result of the internal Polish situation? Or were the changes a combination of Soviet influence and the realities of the internal Polish situation? Soviet influence will be determined from the interaction of Soviet behavior and internal Polish events.
Soviet behavior will be defined as Soviet press statements, state visits, loans, grants, providing space for Polish leaders in the Soviet press, economic policies, invitations from Soviet leadership to Polish leaders to meet, and move ment of troops and military exercises. Internal Polish events will be defined as the behavior of all relevant groups-Polish Communist Party, the workers and other opposition (intellectuals. Catholic Church, students, and farmers). Influence will refer to those actions that result in a concrete event meeting the interests (defined above) of the Soviet Union in Poland. Thus, Soviet influence will not always be initiated by the Soviet Union. The Polish leadership may initiate an action
(e.g. changes in the Politburo) which has the tacit approval of the Soviet leaders and thus leads to the conclusion that the Soviet leaders exerted on influence on the Polish leadership. The Soviet Union con also exert pressure on other groups inside Poland without strict initiation on the port of the Soviet leaders. An example of this would be where the Polish workers agree to a compromise with the
Polish leadership knowing that to press further would bring Soviet military intervention. Therefore, Soviet influence will, at times, be subtle (indirect), and at times, overt. 8
The second purpose of my thesis is to identify the most efficient approach in explaining Soviet behavior or policy towards Poland by considering the utility of different approaches of Soviet decision-making. Therefore, I shall describe behavior before, during, and after each crisis. The course (and shifts) of Soviet policy must be noted. This paper will thus cover the years 1966-72 and the years
1975-80. In order to detail Soviet policy I shall note the nature of Soviet behavior towards the Polish leadership. Support will be defined as favorable
Soviet press comments, cordial state visits, loans, grants, and providing of space for Polish leaders in the Soviet press. Neutral Soviet behavior will be defined as silence towards the Polish leaders at crucial times. Non-support will be defined as negative (unfavorable) Soviet press statements and support of another leader.
The three approaches I have selected are as follows: analytic, cybernetic, and Huntington's and Brzezinski's. These three approaches are markedly different from the prominent models of Soviet decision-making (the totalitarian and conflict/ interest group models) and were chosen because of their uniqueness.
Huntington and Brzezinski^ view Soviet decision-making as a four-stage process-initiation, persuasion, decision, and execution. Initiation is from above and trickles down. It is assumed that the top leaders play an active role in policy generation and take the initiative In formulating the more important policy measures.
Policy initiation is seen as the prerogative of the top leadership. Persuasion is described os a mobilization of support and occurs after the decision phase. The
The discussion in this section was based on Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978), pp. 202-223. decision itself is mode at an early stage in the USSR and it is assumed that by generating a policy proposal the party leadership also approves and legitmizes
it. Thus the step from generation to decision is a very short one. The execution stage is closely linked to the persuasion stage since the party apparat supervises both the execution and the persuasion stages. Since execution is supervised and
controlled from above by the party, it is assumed that there is no distortion in the execution of a decision.
Huntington's and Brzezinski's approach assumes that all stages of the
decision-making process are controlled by the party from above. However, the
data will indicate that this is not the cose in Soviet policy towards Poland. An
argument will be made in Chapter Four for the limited utility of Huntington's and
Brzezinski's approach in explaining Soviet behavior towards Poland. g The analytic and cybernetic approaches will be considered together
because I believe their maximum utility is achieved by viewing these approaches
as complementary. That is I believe together they account for both incremental
and complex decision-making, which, os the data will show, is the picture of
Soviet policy towards Poland.
The analytic approach assumes that the policy-maker considers all variables
and makes a rational choice in all decisions. This is done in three stages. First,
the decision-maker formulates a preference ordering of alternative actions.
^ h e discussion of the analytic and cybernetic approaches was based on Arnold Horelick et al., "The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: Decision-Theory- Related Approaches, "Sage Professional Papers in International Studies, 4, 02-039 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications). 10
Second, the decîsîon-maker makes direct calculations of the possible outcome of alternative actions and makes probabilistic judgements about the likelihood of each action occurring. Third, the decision-maker integrates his preferences and outcome judgements to produce an optimal decision by his calculations. It will be argued that this three-stage process of the analytic approach is particularly well suited to Soviet behavior at the height of a crisis when it must choose from among many alternatives. The discussion of the utility of the analytic approach will view the Soviet leadership as one entity.
The cybernetic approach assumes that many decisions ore mode in a less burdensome way. It offers a very simple decision-making mechanism os opposed to the complex analytic mechanism. First, the cybernetic approach assumes that the decision-maker avoids direct outcome coleulotions-ovoids considering alternatives. Second, a decision is fragmented into small manageable pieces
{treated separately). Third, the decision-maker deals only with a very limited range of information in the cybernetic approach. Thus the cybernetic approach assumes that decisions are made incrementally with an aim towards keeping decisions at a simple level. It will be argued that this approach is well suited to
Soviet behavior prior to the changes in Polish leadership in December 1970 and
September 980.
The major difference between the analytic and cybernetic approaches is that one (analytic) assumes the decision-maker is considering alternatives and one (cybernetic) assumes the decision-maker is not considering alternatives. In this sense they are competitive approaches. Yet, it will be shown that Soviet n policy towards Poland is incremental before the height of the crises (changes in
Polish leadership), and complex at the height of the crises. I believe the data will support the use of the analytic and cybernetic as complementary approaches to Soviet decision-making In the case of Poland.
It is clear from the above discussion that Chapter Four of this thesis will use each approach to try to explain the course of Soviet policy towards Poland as laid out in Chapters Two and Three. In this way 1 hope to identify the approach which most efficiently explains Soviet policy towards Poland. CHAPTER II
THE 1970 CRISIS
Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe has taken mony forms since the fall of
Stalin. It is in Poland, more than in any other satellite country, that the Soviet
Union has exhibiteda highly sophisticated approach to the maintenance of Its
East European satellite system. ^
At the time of the leadership change in Poland in December 1970 the
Soviet Union had established a major influence in Poland. Poland was (and still
is) a member of CMEA and the Warsaw Pact. The Polish-Soviet Treaty of 2 Friendship and Cooperation was extended another twenty years in 1965.
Thirty-five percent of all Polish trade was with the Soviet Union.^ Poland
depended on the Soviet Union for 100 percent of its oil and 8 percent of its
iron ore.^ In the 1966-70 period Polish-Soviet trade increased by roughly
^Grayson Kirk and Nils H. Wessell, ed ., The Soviet Threat (Montpelier; Capital City Press, 1978), p. 76.
^Zenon Kliszko, "The 25th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Polish Workers' Party," Kommunist 1 (January 1967), trans. in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) ^40056, p. 108.
^E. Schevchenko, "People's Poland: 25 Years, "International Affairs (Moscow),(July 1969), p. 101.
"^Ibid.
12 13
64 percent over the previous five year period.^ The 1971-75 trade plan between
Poland and the Soviet Union, concluded in December 1970, projected an increase in trade of 67 percent compared to 66-70 period.^ M ilitarily, Soviet troops were stationed in Poland at the time of the crisis and in August 1968, Gomulka commit ted 40,000 Polish troops to the Czechoslovakian invasion,^ Thus, at the time of the December 1970 crisis Poland was tied to the Soviet Union militarily and economically. A major Soviet influence in Poland has been established and this high degree of influence demonstrated the importance that the Soviet Union attached to securing Poland os o loyal communist state. The establishment of this influence allows one to consider a Soviet role in the Polish leadership change.
The Prelude (1956-1967)
Gomulka's first challenge came in March 1968. A brief summary of his policies and positions during the 1960's is necessary to understand his situation in 1968. Gomulka come to power in October 1956 with the support of the Polish
people; he promised economic reform,® and was seen as an anti-Stalinist having
9 been jailed under Stalin. Gomulka regained his position at the top by convincing
^"USSR-Poland: Mutually Advantageous Cooperation, " International AffaIrs(Moscow)XApril 1971), p. 81.
6[bid.
^Jacob Beam, Multiple Exposure (New York: Norton Publishers, 1978), p. 193.
®Adam Bromke, "Poland's Political Crisis," World Today 25 (March 1969): 117.
^Adam Ulan, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 590. 14 the Soviet leaders that he would keep Poland within the Soviet orbit. Thus
Gomulka, in 1956, had satisfied the two major Soviet conditions for on East
European leader, control of the people and securing the particular country within the Soviet orbit. Gomulka's role as on economic reformer was soon reversed.
Plans for major economic reform were shelved, and patch-work changes foiled to pump new life into the Polish economy. ^ ^ Gomulka, throughout the sixties, became a strong defender of the status quo (the Soviet status quo), becoming
Moscow's most faithful ally. For example, Poland backed Arabs in June 1967 19 Mideast War. The 1960's also sow a generation gap develop within Poland.
Approximately half of the population in 1967 was under twenty-four (24) years of age. These were people who had not lived during WWII and had not under gone the Stalinist post-war period. They did not understand the economic stagnation of the sixties.
This economic stagnation was combined with intellectual stagnation characterized by extreme censorship. Little criticism was allowed to get into print.Gomulka did not help himself with either the people or the intellectuals when he refused to receive the Pope in 1966. Not only was Gomulka cut off
^°Ulom, p. 592.
^ ^ " Poland's Slow Road to Promised Freedom," U .S. News and World Report, 16 October 1967, p. 43.
’^Ibid.
^^U.S. News and World Report, 16 October 1967, p. 44.
l^"Gomulka Isn's the Man He Was," Economist, 16 March 1968, p. 39.
^^Bromke, p. 119. 15
from the people and from the intellectuals, but he was also cut off from the lower
levels of the Polish United Workers Party which had undergone a rejuvenation in the 1960's, while the top leadership remained in the hands of the old guard,
This generation gap within the party was detailed in the Polish press in 1971.
Decision-making was in the hands of a few and the Politburo met increasingly
less often. There was a general disregard of voices from below and information
from the top (the party leadership) was often incomplete. Also, news articles 19 on internal party life had dried up.
Challenge to Gomulka from within the party came mainly from a group
calling itself the Partisans (most members commanded communist partisan units
during World War II) headed by Minister of the interior. Major General Mieczyslaw
Moczar. The Partisans were known to be hard-line and resented Soviet domi- 21 nance of Poland. The Partisans had achieved a broad representation in the Polish
United Workers Party (PUMP), the ruling party, by 1967.^^ It is important to
keep in mind that Moczar did not hove Politburo status at this time, 1968.
^^Bromke, p. 121.
^^Wladyslaw Machejek, "Rebellion-But What Kind," Zycie Literacku (Warsaw), 24 January 1971, 11. 1 and 6, trans. in JPRS 52438.
^®J. Majerczok, "We Sought Our Own Argument," Polity ko (Warsaw), 30 January 1971, pp. 1 and 5, trans. in JPRS *^52487.
^^Ibid.
Unquiet on the Eastern Front," Newsweek, 5 May 1969, p. 48,
^^Ibid.
^^Michael Gamornikov, "Poland: Political Pluralism In a One-Party State," Problems of Communism 16 (July 1967): 10. 16
The picture of Poland at the end of 1967 was one of economic stagnation, 23 characterized by shortages of meat and housing , a leadership isolated from the people and lower party levels and challenged from within the party by the
Partisans, and intellectual stagnation.
The official Polish literature in 1966 and 1967 indicated none of the problems described above. In fact, the Polish press in 1966 and 1967 was of no help whatsoever since it lacked articles of a political nature. The Soviet press also did not indicate any of Gomulka's internal problems. The Soviet Union in
1966 and 1967 supported the Gomulka regime wholeheartedly. Soviet-Polish relations were very routine in these years. Gomulka's speech at the Polish
United Workers' Party (PUWP) session was printed in Pravdo.^^ A meeting between Gomulka and Jozef Cyronkiewlcz, Prime Minister of Polish government,
25 and Brezhnev and Kosygin took place in Moscow. The leaders stressed socialist solidarity and fraternal cooperation.^^ Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, was quoted in Provdo as calling the Soviet- 27 Polish alliance indestructable. Gomulka further said that Poland's independence was guaranteed by Soviet friendship and he called for a halt of U .S. bombing in
^^U.S. News and World Report, 16 October 1967, p. 44.
See Provdo, 16 January 1966, p. 5.
^^Pravda, 11 October 1966, p. 1. ^^Ibid.
^^Pravda, 16 October 1966, pp. 1 and 3. 17
28 Vietnam and criticized revanchist policies of West Germany. This literature
clearly showed Gomulka as strongly pro-Soviet and showed Moscow's satisfaction
with the Gomulka regime by allowing Gomulka to air major foreign policy goals
of the Soviet Union.
The congenial atmosphere of Polish-Soviet relations continued in 1967. 29 There was an exchange of leaders in January and April. In September 1967
there was a meeting of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorney, and Gomulka and
30 Cyrankiewicz in Moscow under the heading "friendly meeting." Also, there
was a key article in Kommunist (the party organ of the CPSU) by Zenon Kliszko,
a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the United
31 Polish Workers' Party. In this article, which appeared in January 1967,
Kliszko emphasized the importance of the alliance between PUWP and the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) os fundamental to the success of
the socialist system and the future of Poland. He further remarked that cooperation
and alliance with the USSR were the basic prerequisites for the liberation of the
Polish people. Finally, he said the Polish United Workers' Party was devoted to 32 Morxist-Leninism and to the principles of proletarian internationalism.
^^Ibid. OQ See Pravda, 20 January 1967, p. 1; and 4 April 1967, p. 3,
®®Provda, 23 September 1967, p. 1.
^^Kliszko.
®^KIiszko, p. 112. 18
Kliszko, who entered the Politburo in March, 1959, shortly after Gomulka had solidified his control of PUWP, could be tied to Gomulka. Kliszko was only three years younger than Gomulka and came into the Politburo only after Gomulka had achieved the position of First Secretary. Thus, Kliszko's article could be seen as the position of the Gomulka regime to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders, by allowing a member of the Polish Politburo to publish on article in
Kommunist, the CPSU party organ, gave their approval to the Gomulka regime and to the policies expressed in this article. The picture of Soviet-Polish relations at the end of 1967, therefore, was one of a close alliance, with Poland firmly In the Soviet camp and the Soviet Union satisfied with the Gomulka regime. At this point the Soviet leaders were supporting Gomulka and counting on him to keep Poland within the Soviet camp. Gomulka, by expressing the indestructible alliance between his country and the Soviet Union, realized his position depended upon meeting Soviet prerequisites — adherence to principles of Marxist-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Gomulka had firmly tied himself to the Soviet
Union. This position would allow Gomulka to go only one way in the upcoming crises (in 1968 and 1970) and it became a liability for him in the events of
December 1970,
The Soviet leaders hove not exerted on overt influence because they do not see a need for it. They were satisfied that Gomulka and his cohorts could maintain the supremacy of the Communist Party in all matters while maintaining loyalty to the Soviet Union, Soviet influence was exerted subtly on the members of the
Polish Politburo. Through meetings with Soviet leaders, the Polish leaders were made to realize that their future lies with the Soviet Union, and in meeting the 19 interests of the Soviet Union in Poland. The effect of Soviet influence was seen in the Soviet press statements of the Polish leaders. In these statements the Polish leaders indicated their willingness to uphold the interests of the Soviet Union in
Poland. Soviet influence, subtle in 1966 and 1967, became overt in 1968 when the Soviet Union perceived a threat to their interests in Poland.
1968
Intellectual censorship came to a head in early 1968. The cancellation of an anti-Russian play, Dzlody, was followed by the expulsion of two dissident 33 student leaders, Adam Michnîk and Henryk Szlaifer. Student demonstrations at
Warsaw University on March 8, 1968 followed the expulsions, and there were three days of riots in Warsaw. The protests spread to other universities and did 35 not end until March 23, 1968. The Partisans, in control of the security appara tus, seized the riots to initiate an anti-Zionist campaign in order to challenge
Gomulka by undermining hii> position in the PUWP, and provide the Partisans with an opportunity to gain more positions within the party. On March 11, 1968 the
Polish newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, listed student ringleaders ain manner representing 37 the majority os Jewish. The anti-Zionist campaign was aimed at instituting a purge of Jews within the party. On March 19, 1968 Gomulka made his public OÛ statement on the anti-Zionist campaign in a speech to the Warsaw party aktiv.
A. Ross Johnson, "Poland: End of an Era," Problems of Communism 19 (January-February 1970): 28.
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^*^Johnson, p. 30. Johnson, p. 29.
®®Pravda, 22 March 1968, pp. 3 and 4. trans. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), Volume 20. 20
In this speech G omul ko said Zionism was being attacked as a political program and 39 in no way should be linked to anti-Semitism. Gomulka further said that an alliance with the Soviet Union was mandatory for defense and preservation of western territories, and only a socialist Poland, led by the party of the working class (PUWP), constituted a reliable and dependable ally for the USSR,^^ In this speech Gomulka justified the anti-Zionist campaign but also stressed the impor tance of the alliance with the Soviet Union. Gomulka seemed to imply that only through a Polish United Workers' Party, with him as the head, could Poland hope to receive the support of the Soviet Union, Gomulka was tying his future directly to the Soviet Union, and in effect, he seemed to say that other groups would not have the support of the Soviet Union and thus the future of Poland would not be guaranteed. As will be seen shortly, Gomulka benefitted from his pro-Soviet approach when the Czechoslovakian crisis erupted in the summer of 1968.
The Partisans, with the obstacle of Gomulka's support having been removed, initiated an anti-Zionist purge. In the course of this campaign 15,000 of Poland's 25,000 Jews were driven from thecountry.The purge started off by concentrating on Jews in government and universities and then spread to all walks of life.^^ The purge hit the second level of the party the hardest.The
Partisans succeeded in their purge campaign but were unable to gainfull control because of several measures undertaken by Gomulka.
n o 4 0 41 Ibid. Ibid. Newsweek, 5 May 1969, p. 48.
Spreading Purges," Time, 12 April 1968, p. 34.
^^Newsweek, 5 May 1969, p. 48, 21
First, Gomulka appeased the Partisans by letting the anti-Zionist purge run its course (even though Gomulka's own wife was Jewish)^^ Gomulka's power, concentrated at the top, did not rely on the lower levels of the party for support to any high degree. The effect of the purge on Gomulka was minimal.
Second, Gomulka seemed to have initiated a pro-PUWP campaign in the Polish press in April and May of 1968 by calling for increased party vigilance. In
April 1968 Josef Kepa (First Secretary of Warsaw party organization) known to have switched over to support Gomulka, spoke at a Warsaw Activist Meeting.
In this speech, reported in Trybuno Ludu, Kepa emphasized the need for increased party activity against anti-socialist segments of society.(He did say over whelming majorities of instigators and organizers of student protesters were Poles of Jewish decent.) On April 27, 1968 the Polish Writers Union called for more vigilance against anti-party attitudes and called for measures to coordinate 48 organizations and ideological activity. On May 5, 1968 an editorial in the
Kulturo called for notional unity and said tensions of March should not deter
49 movement towards unity. These articles demonstrated that a call went out to adhere to the principle of PUWP supremacy. This campaign had been started by
Gomulka in his March 19, 1968 speech.
^^Ibid. ^^Johnson, p. 35.
^S ee "Polish Writers View Action Needed Following March Events," Trybuno Ludu (Warsaw), 27 April 1968, p. 3. trons. in JPRS ^45496.
^^Ibid. ^Ibid. 49 Janusz Wilhemi, "What Binds Us Together," Warsaw Kulturo, 5 May 1968, p. 3. trons, in JPRS ^45506. 22
The third measure carried out by Gomulka was to get Marian Spychalski, 50 a close friend of Gomulko, appointed as new Chairman of the State Council on 51 April 12, 1968. This power over appointments allowed Gomulka to solidfy his
position by bringing in another supporter of his policies, and a non-Portison. The
final measure undertaken by Gomulka to survive the Partisan challenge was to
continue to support the Soviet Union, especially in its policies toward the
Czechoslovakian situation. Gomulka was one of the signers of a letter to the
Central Committee of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party which expressed 52 alarm at developments taking place within the country. Also, as previously
mentioned, Gomulka committed 40,000 Polish troops to the invasion of Czecho
slovakia in August. Gomulka continually used the Czech situation to remind the Poles of the danger of antagonizing the Russians, and he implied that the 53 rise of the nationalistic Moczar would certainly do jusr that. Thus through its
invasion of Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union exerted on indirect influence on
the internal Polish events.
The Czech invasion justified Gomulka and stopped Moczar's drive to
the top. Gomulka, after Czechoslovakia, launched purges of his own where more
than 2,000 people — some Partisans — lost their jobs.^^ Gomulka had survived
the initial challenge to his leadership by a combination of measures emphasizing
50"Partisans Step Up Offensive," Economist, 20 April 1968, p. 42.
5lpravda, 12 April 1968, p. 1.
52pravda, 18 July 1968, pp. 1 and 2.
^^Newsweek, 5 May 1969, p. 48 ^^Ibid, 23 a pro-Soviet leaning, a call for party vigilance and by maintaining the power of appointment. It should ne noted that at the July 8, 1968 PUWP plenary session
Moczar did receive candidate Politburo status, but Spychalski was solidly 55 implanted in the Politburo as the new Chairman of the State, The fact that
Moczar gained only candidate status may hove been an indication that Gomulka was solidifying his position even before the events of Czechoslovakia had an effect on Gomulka's position. Gomulka's pro-Soviet tactic would not have been effective if the Soviets had ignored Gomulka, which was not the case. The
Soviet Union continued to back Gomulka throughout 1968 and helped to solidify his position culminating with the Fifth PUWP Congress in November 1968.
Soviet support of the Gomulka regime, very strong in 1966 and 1967, continued to be strong in 1968 with only a moderate shift at the end of 1968.
There was the routine early year meeting of the leaders of the CPSU and the
PUWP in January 1 9 6 8 .^ The first mention of the Polish March troubles in the
Soviet press was contained in Gomulka's March 19th speech which appeared in
Pravda on March 22, 1968.^^ The fact that this was the first mention of the
March episode indicated that the Soviet leaders were standing firmly behind
Gomulka. In his speech Gomulka justified anti-Zionism (never lacking in the
Soviet Union) but he also stressed the importance of the Polish-Soviet alliance.
^^"One More Rung Up for Moczar," Economist, 13 July 1968, p. 31.
^^Pravda, 16 January 1968, p. 1.
^^Pravda, 22 March 1968, pp. 3 and 4. 24
The Soviet Union, by printing this speech, gave support to Gomulka's policies.
It is important to note that Gomulka included the subject of the importance of the Polish-Soviet alliance.
The next Soviet show of support for Gomulka was the approval of the appointment of Marian Spychalski as new Chairman, Council of State. The
Soviet leaders expressed their immediate congratulations to Spychalski^^ and
59 the very next week a speech of Spychalski's was printed in the Soviet press.
Thus, the Soviet Union supported Gomulka's initial reaction to the March events and supported Gomulka's next key move of appointment. This support not only helped Gomulka, but also helped the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet Union
needed support and solidarity in the Czech situation and Gomulka provided this with his signing of the letter to the Czech Central Committee and with his committing of Polish troops to the invasion. The events of 1968 had pushed the
Soviet leaders and Gomulka closer together. The events at the Fifth PUWP
Congress in November 1968 solidified Gomulka's position, but it is at the Congress that there was the first indication of a Soviet shift (however slight) away from total support of Gomulka.
Two important events took place at the Fifth Polish PUWP Congress.
First, four new members were elected to the Politburo, three received full
Politburo status, and one received candidate Politburo status (Moczar remained a candidate m em ber).T he importance of these new members lay in their ages.
^^Pravdg, 10 April 1968, p. 1. ^^Pravda, 19 April 1968, p .5.
^^Richard Staar, "Poland; Myth Versus Reality," Current History 57 (April 1969); 223 25
Two of the three full Politburo members, Jozef Tejchma and Stanislaw Kociolek were at least twenty years younger than Gomulka (Tejchma was 22 years younger, and Kociolek was 28 years younger). The candidate member, Jan Szdlok was twenty years younger than Gomulka. (The third full member, Wladyslaw Kruczek, was only five years younger and appeared to be pro Gomulka.) It should also be pointed out that Stefan Olszowski, twenty-six years younger than Gomulka, was appointed to the Secretariat, The second important event at the Fifth PUWP
Congress was the speech delivered by B r e z h n e v .T h is speech was a major policy speech on Czechoslovakia but it also contained key statements concerning
Poland that are relevant to this paper. In this Speech Brezhnev stressed the rightness of Morxist-Leninist policy and the importance of the party as the leading force in a socialist country. Brezhnev further stated that the policy pursued by the Polish United Workers' party was a fine example of principled Marxist-
62 Leninist policy and of fidelity to the principles of socialist internationalism.
Brezhnev also stressed the importance of and called for the expansion of economic ties among socialist countries; he tied these economic ties to the unity of fraternal countries.
The fact that Brezhnev used the Polish Congress to air a major policy
(on Czechoslovakia) indicated that he gave his approval to the Gomulka regime and to the events at the Polish Congress, including the rise of the "young
^ See "Brezhnev Discusses Czechoslovakia at Polish Congress," Pravda, 13 November 1968, pp. 1 and 2. trans. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Volume 20, No. 46.
62|bid. 2 6 pragmatists" (as they were called in the Western press). It is this approval of the new members of the Polish elite which reflected a slight shift in Soviet policy away from complete support of Gomulka. The young members, because of their tremendous age difference compared to Gomulka, could not be said to owe their position to Gomulka. Also, Gomulka did not gain any new support from the addition of these young members. Therefore I think it can be said that the addition of the young pragmatists was not a policy initiated by Gomulka
(although he must have given his support of the action at some point). It can be speculated further that the Soviet Union may, in fact, have been the initiator of the rise of the young pragmatists, Brezhnev, through his speech, had given his full support of the PUWP, and even recognized the PUWP as a fine example of a party loyal to the principles of Marxist-Leninism. The fact that these new members did not add to Gomulka's support and the Soviet approval of theirrise, points to a shift away from total support by the Soviet Union of Gomulka. If it could be assumed that the rise of the new members was initiated by the Soviet
Union, for reasons cited above, then It could be said that the Soviet Union had asserted a ma}or influence on Polish politics. The new members would be the major step in redressing the generation gap existing not only in the PUWP, but also between the top leadership and the people.
The Soviet leaders, assuming this event was initiated by them, seemed to have taken the first step towards the unseating of Gomulka, or at least they had laid the groundwork for the eventual replacement of Gomulka. A younger leader ship, tuned to the needs and wishes of the people, would be better able to bring
Poland a more viable political system. A younger leadership would also have 27 broader support within the party, especially in the lower ranks where Gomulka was lacking in support. The Soviet leaders seemed to hove provided themselves with an alternative to Gomulka in the event Gomulka and company's position become untenable. Thus, the Soviet Union seemed to have exerted a major influence on Polish events in 1968. Gomulka's ability to manage and control
Polish society and the PUWP's Internal ranks was deteriorating and this was a threat to Soviet interests; support of the younger members was a move designed to safeguard Soviet interests. It should also be noted that Soviet Influence may have been exerted on the internal ranks of the party. The fact that the Soviet Union supported Gomulka throughout the troubled times in March and April may have been a deterrent on those factions In the PUWP who sought to unseat Gomulka.
In this way the Soviet Union could be said to have Indirectly exerted an influence on these groups and may have caused them to moderate their actions against
Gomulka. The fact that the Partisan campaign subsided further supported this position.
However, even though the Soviet Union hod approved of the rise of younger members, its ultimate support remained with Gomulka. Gomulka had been a loyal friend throughout the Czechoslovakian crisis and he had demonstrated that he was capable of keeping Poland within the Soviet camp. Also, the young pragmatists, not having served under Soviet tutelage, still hod to undergo a test of their leanings and loyalties, an apprenticeship under the guiding hand of the
Soviet Union. 28
The idea of apprenticeshipmay be better described asa teacher-student relationship which seemed to exist between the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. In Poland's case this teacher-student relationship could be seen in the routine meetings which took place at different times of the years between the leaderships of the CPSU and the PUWP. As was seen in 1966 and 1967, the Polish leadership visited the Soviet Union at the beginning of each year. The heading in the Soviet press for this exchange of leadership was usually "Friendly Meeting".
A better heading would seem to be "Annual Lesson", This teacher-student relationship was also evident in 1968 when Spychalski's speech showed up in the Soviet press only a week after he was named as the new Chairman, Council of State. The Soviet Union was quick to bring new members under the influences of the Soviet Union. The leaders were made acutely aware of where their future lies - with the Soviet Union and in the expression of the importance of the
Polish-Soviet alliance. This teacher-student relationship could be seen even stronger in the immediate post-Gomulka period in 1971 and 1972.
One final note is necessary concerning Soviet support of Gomulka. I stated above that the Soviet Union's support still remained with Gomulka at the end of 1968. This was supported by the complete absence in the Soviet press of any mention (speeches included) of Moczar and Gierek (Poland's eventual leader). This complete lack of recognition in the Soviet press could have indicated that Moczar and Gierek were not (at this time) being seriously considered as alternatives to Gomulka. Moczar did not achieve full Politburo 29 status at the Fifth PUWP Congress. Also, he supported Polish nationalism and
63 stressed more independence from Moscow. Moczar clearly would not have been a good risk for the Soviet leaders. He probably could not be counted on to keep Poland on a pro-Soviet course. One could speculate that the Soviet
Union may have had something to do with keeping Moczar at candidate Politburo status, a position he hod achieved at the PUWP Plenum in the summer of 1968.
Gierek's case may be a different story. He was already a full member of the
Polish Politburo having entered this body in March 1959.^^ Gierek was a technocrat and did not seem to be as hungry for power as Moczar. (I did not find any evidence to indicate Gierek was consciously seeking the top position in the Polish party.) Thus Gierek seems to have been grouped with Gomulka at this time, and the Soviet Union saw no need to recognize Gierek openly.
This view was strengthened, again, by the fact that Gierek was on record as being very pro-Soviet in his loyalties. Gierek, in a speech published in Trybuno Robotnicza (Polish) on November 4, 1968,^^ said that Poland owed its independence in a great measure to the Soviet Union. He went on to say that friendship with the Soviet Union was the fundamental guarantee of Polish security for today and tomorrow. He stated that the defeat of the anti-socialist element in Czechoslovakia was on act of defending Polish and Soviet independence and preserved a peaceful future. It was clear from this speech that Gierek had learned his lesson well and was firmly within the Soviet camp. The Soviet leaders
^^Bromke, p. 122. ^^Stoor, p. 223.
Excerpt from Speech by Edward G ierek," Trybuno Robot ni cya (Warsaw) ^ 4 November 1968, p. 3. trons, in JPRS ^47047. 30 had no need to "correct" Gierek's loyalties. But it should be noted that Gierek was not one of Gomulka's inner circle. This was brought out by the makeup of the Polish leadership which routinely visited the Soviet Union, Gierek was not one of them. The fact that Gierek was not part of Gomulka's inner circle may have helped him in the December 1970 crisis when Gomulka and his inner circle fell from grace, or more accurately, lost their usefulness.
The picture at the end of 1968 looked like this. The Soviet Union continued its backing of the Gomulka regime but had modified its support with the approval of the rise of the young pragmatists. Moczar had achieved candidate
Politburo status but his rise to the top seemed to have been checked. Moczar's nationalistic leanings probably kept him out of the running as a realistic alterna tive to Gomulka. Gierek's position left him out of the inner circle of the Polish leadership but he was firmly in the Soviet comp.
One final note is necessary before beginning a discussion of the events of 1969 and 1970. The economic and intellectual stagnation of the pre-1968 period continued in 1968. The economic stagnation was the major preoccupation of Gomulka in 1969 and 1970. It was the economic situation which facilitated the downfall of Gomulka, and it was Gierek's ability as an efficient manager^^ which made him an even more attractive and viable alternative to Gomulka.
66 A . Ross Johnson, "Polish Perspectives, Past and Present," Problems of Communism 20 (July-August 1971): 67. 31
Interim Period - 1969
The year 1969 was characterized by an attempt by Gomulka to rejuvenate the Polish economy. Stefan Jedrychowski, a trusted supporter of Gomulka and former head of the planning committee, was named as the new foreign minister at the Fifth PUWP C o n g r e s s .J a c z c z u k was namedas the new head of the economy. In December 1968 the Planning Commission was drastically reorganized.
New men, mainly technicians and economists, were appointed to the planning commission.^® The changes in the planning commission were combined with a selective investment approach in the economic sphere. This campaign for selective investment was played up in the Polish press. An article in the Polish publication, Gospodarka i Administracja Terenowa in October 1969, outlined the changes and their specifications.^^ In this article, there was a description of essential changes in powers and procedural routines in the state administrative bodies. The Council of Ministers gained broader responsibilities in the analysis of complex projects. The Planning Commission gained a larger scope in the transfer of the economy to a selective growth concentrating on expanding selected economic branches and faster rate of growth for these branches. Also, the role of People's Council Praesidiums was substantially increased. Thus Gomulka combined personnel changes with procedural changes.
^^Staar, p. 223.
^^Phillippe Simonnot, "Poland Hesitates Between Waiting" Le Monde (Paris), 8 July 1969, pp. 1 and 3 trons. in JPRS ^48649.
^^See Remigiusz Orzechowski, "Changes in Powers and Procedures Routines of Top Administrative Bodies," Gospodarka Î Administracyi Terenowa (October 1969), pp. 11 - 13, trans, in JPRS ^49296. ' ' 32
These personnel and procedural changes were also combined with on anti-revisionist and anti-criticism campaign in the Polish press. In Trybuno
Ludu there was an article written in response to large scale criticism by workers, and among specialists in the country. This article said criticism was necessary and fundamental to building of socialism, but it said criticism should be relevant.
The summary statement of the article said that the majority of criticism was not constructive. In a speech given by Gierek on April 10, 1969, he stated that criticism should be constructive and that the PUWP was interested in furthering the increase of constructive criticism .T his article indicated that the economic problem had become acute. It was evident that the regime was meeting criticism of its handling of the economy. The changes were a result of an Easter meeting of the PUWP Central Committee in 1969. At this meeting it was revealed that
72 the leadership was distressed by the present trends of Polish industrial investment.
The problem of inefficient allocation of resources was leading to unfinished 73 projects with no resources left to finish the projects. The selective investment
campaign was the result of the leadership's apprehensions. In Poland, 1969 was the year the Gomulka regime had turned its attention towards the economy. As the literature indicated the reforms were meeting with criticism. This meant that
^^Markiewicz, "Political Revisionism and Ways to Overcome It," Trybuno Ludu, 15 April 1969, pp. 3, 5, 7. trans. in JPRS ^47978.
Gierek's April 10, 1969 FJN Speech in Zabrze," Trybuno Robotnicza (Poland), 12 and 13 April 1969, pp. 3 and 5. trons. in JPRS ^48171.
^^"Bit Less Chaos Please," Economist, 19 April 1969, p. 38.
^^Ibid. 33 more for-reaching reforms were necessary, but the criticism indicated that the people might not tolerate drastic reform. Thus, the Gomulka regime had put itself in a box. Drastic reform was needed, but drastic reform meant sacrifice on the part of the people. Gomulka, lacking support from the people, was in a position where total alienation of the people was possible.
Soviet-Pol ish relations in 1969 were very routine and did not reflect the growing dissatisfaction with Gomulka (which reached major proportions in 1970) in Poland. There were the routine exchange of leaders and Jedrychowski, the new Polish foreign minister, was received in Moscow in March 1969.^^
Here again the teacher-student relationship was evident. Two articles in
Kommunist by two Polish Politburo members stressed the importance of the Soviet alliance for Poland. The first article was written by Zenon Klîszko,a
Gomulkionite in January 1969. Kliszko stressed that the CPSU was the source of strength for the PUWP, which upheld principles of proletarian internationalism and Marxist-Leninism, He further stated that the struggle against revisionism of the previous year (March events) had strengthened the PUWP, which had rallied more closely around Comrade Gomulka. The second article was written by
Jan Szydlak, a young pragmatist and candidate Politburo member in July 1969.^^
Szydlak quoted Gomulka when he said nothing will eliminate the decisive role
^^Pravdo, 1 March 1969, p. 1.
75Zenon Kliszko, "The 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Poland," Kommunist 1 (January 1969). trans. in JPRS ^47462.
76jon Szydlak, "The Polish People's Historical Achievements," Kommunist 10 (July 1969). trans. in JPRS #47462. 34 of the Soviet Union in the socialist revolution. He further stated that the Polish
alliance with the Soviet Union was a solid basis for sovereignty and security, and
he condemned the role of the U.S. in Vietnam.
The Kommunist articles were a clear indication that Soviet approval of the Gomulka regime existed, but they also showed that the Polish leadership was putting itself squarely in the Soviet comp. Szydlak's article was another example
of the teacher-student relationship. Szydlak had been brought into the Soviet
camp and had aired a foreign policy statement of the Soviet Union in denouncing the U.S. in Vietnam. Thus, the Soviet leaders continued their support of
Gomulka. The Szydlak article was particulary important because in It Szydlak
quoted Gomulka. This supported the theory that the rise of the young pragmatists
was a Soviet move with long range implications. Szydlak was now on record In
c f ' the Soviet press as supporting Gomulka. The Soviet Union seemed to be bringing the young leaders along slowly while maintaining support of Gomulka. The
Soviet leaders seemed to be willing to have Gomulka and the young leaders
work together, with Gomulka keeping the upper hand.
Soviet influence in 1969 was again subtle. It appeared that the Soviet
Union still saw Gomulka as the man who could satisfy Soviet interests in Poland.
Soviet influence was exercised through the teacher-student relationship. The
Soviet Union had made the young pragmatists realize that their future lay with
the Soviet Union. Also, support of Gomulka and his policies was a clear sign to
other groups that Gomulka had the backing of the Soviet Union, and that the
Soviet Union expected Gomulka's policies to be implemented. In this way the
Soviet Union exerted an influence on other groups. 35
Gierek and Moczar gained in 1969 only in the sense that Gomulka's economic policies were meeting with criticism, Gierek again pledged his support of the Soviet-Polish alliance in December 1969.^^ But 1969 ended as
1968 ended without resolution of the economic problems. Gomulka's tactic of tying himself to the Soviet Union was not enough to overcome the economic problems which were increased by Gomulka's decision to raise food prices in
December 1970.
1970
A discussion of the events leading up to the December 1970 events could not ignore the realities present in Poland at the beginning of the year. The internal situation in Poland had not changed since the end of the year 1968.
Gomulka was still dependent upon a very small circle of people at the top of the PUWP for his support. The influx of the younger members into the Politburo in November 1968 had not changed Gomulka's isolation from the people and the lower party levels. The economic reforms of 1969 aimed at selective investments had not resolved the economic stagnation that had existed throughout the I960's.
Gomulka was, more than ever, tied exclusively to the Soviet Union and in time of trouble could only go one way, strongly towards the Soviet Union. In 1970
Gomulka attempted an even more drastic economic reform, a reform that did not have the support of the people.
^^"Gierek's 23 Dec. Speech Summarized," Trybuno Robotnicza, 24-26 December 1969, pp. 3 and 9. trans. in JPRS #49793. 36
The fact that Gomulka's 1969 reform efforts were continuing to meet resistence from the people was evident from the Polish press. An article in
Kulturo on April 12, 1970 expressed a need for personal initiative in the economic 78 sphere. The author of this article stated that the people were looking exclusively to the top and were concerned only with getting the job done and not with the quality of the work. The author implied that if this trend continued the system could not expand and improve. He called for a movement back to belief in personal initiative. This article showed that the reforms were not meeting their objectives and it called on the people to pump life into the reforms.
In May 1970, at the plenary session of the PUWP Central Committee, 79 Gomulka initiated a new wage system based on material incentive. The incentive system, which emphasized quality of output, threatened to reduce the wages of the w orkers,because the workers were expected to increase the quality of output with inferior machinery and in a system which had constantly
shown itself to be deficient in planning. The new incentive program was adopted in May 1970 and was to be introduced in the new five year plan 81 scheduled to begin at the end of 1970. The speech through which Gomulka
Josef Voityna, "Looking Toward the Top," Kulturo (Warsaw), 12 April 1970, p. 8, trans. in JPRS #50631.
^^Pravda, 26 May 1970, p. 4.
Poland Erupts, Gomulka Steps Out," Newsweek, 28 December 1970, p. 21.
Johnson, "Polish Perspectives," p. 60. 37
82 had introduced the new incentive program was printed in Pravda, and thus it seemed to have the support of the Soviet Union. The initiation of the new incentive program was another indication that the 1968 reforms were failing. 83 Public apprehension over the new wage system, coupled with the failing reforms of 1969, combined to create a volatile internal situation. The volatile situation was not helped by aging leadership isolated and unresponsive to the needs of the people.
Despite the alarming internal situation in Poland the Soviet Union continued to support Gomulka at least as strongly as in the pre-1970 period. 84 Gomulka was awarded the Order of Lenin in February 1970. As was previously noted, Gomulka’s speech to the PUWP Plenum on material incentives was printed in Pravda. Jedrychowski, foreign minister, wrote a lead article in
P r a v d a .Jedrychowski considered the alliance with the Soviet Union as the cornerstone principle of the Polish party. He also supported the Soviet policy of the recognition of post-WWlI borders and criticized the anti-Soviet stance ofthe
Chinese. (Again we see the manifestation of the teacher-student relationship.)
On June 3rd Kliszko and Olszowski, a member ofthe Secretariat and one of the 86 young Pragmatists, were received by Brezhnev in Moscow. Their conversations
®2pravdo, 26 May 1970, p. 4. 83 Johnson, "Polish Perspectives," p. 60.
®^Pravda, 6 February 1970, p. 1.
^^Provda, 22 January 1970, pp. 4 and 5.
®^Pravda, 3 June 1970, p. 1. 38 concerned questions of the further development of fraternal cooperation between the USSR and Poland. On July 22, 1970, Gomulka, Spychalski, and
Cyrankiewicz were recognized in Pravda, on the 26th anniversary of socialist 87 Poland, os the leaders of the PUWP who exemplified the builders of socialism. 83 In May 1970 Gomulka published an article in Kommunist in which he called for the recognition of post WWII Western borders. Gomulka also stated that he was committed to strengthening the Warsaw Pact as the major defense for Europe.
In September 1970 talks were concluded between Poland and the Soviet Union on coordinating the plans of national economic development for the period 89 1971 " 75. The new plan was instituted in December 1970 before the change in leadership.^^
The Soviet press indicated three major themes. First, the Soviet support of Gomulka was stronger than ever. Gomulka was pictured as a leader exem plifying the building of socialism who had received the Order of Lenin. The
Soviet leaders had indicated their approval of his policies through these actions and also through the publication of his Plenum speech. Second, it was evident that Gomulka was placing his bets with the Soviet Union. In his Kommunist article Gomulka expressed the major foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union.
®^Pravda, 22 July 1970, p. 4.
^^lodyslaw Gomulka, "A 1/4 Century After Victory of Facism," Kommunist 8 (May 1970). trans. in JPRS #50994.
®^Pravda, 5 September 1970, p. 4.
^^"USSR-Polond: Mutually Advantageous Cooperation," International Affairs (Moscow),(ApriI 1971), p. 81. 39
This occurrence (Gomulka placing himself with the Soviets) was not new for
Gomulka, but it did emphasize the fact that Gomulka could now go only one way in the event of a crisis. Third, the Soviet Union was continuing its policy of supporting Gomulka while at the same time bringing (tutoring) the young pragmatists along slowly. This was seen in Olszewski's presence in Moscow with
Kliszko. The data appeared to support the fact that the Soviet leaders were willing to support Gomulka and work through Gomulka to secure Poland within the Soviet comp. As late as December 3, 1970 when Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, 91 Jedrychowski, and Kliszko attended a major Warsaw Pact meeting in Berlin, the Soviet leaders continued to put their support behind Gomulka. (All of the major leaders of every Warsaw Pact nation were present at the meeting.) Thus, by late 1970 Gomulka still had the support of the Soviet Union, but he was facing the failure of his economic reforms. The new incentive program, very unpopular with the workers, was on the horizon for 1971. It was in this atmos phere that Gomulka decided to increase the price of foodstuffs while decreasing the prices of soft consumer items.
On December 9, 1970 at a special Politburo session of the PUWP a 92 resolution was adopted to increase the price of foodstuffs. On December 14,
1970 dock workers in Poland's coastal city of Gdansk rioted and marched on 93 PUWP's regional headquarters and burned it to the ground. (The riots were a
^^"Worsaw Pact Meeting in Berlin," Pravda, 3 December 1970, p. 1. trans. in CDSP, Volume 22, No. 48.
^^Alexonder Korab, "Excerpts from Article," Der Tagesspiegil (West Germany), 3 February 1971, p. 3.
93johnson, "Polish Perspectives," p. 59. 4 0 protest against the increase in prices.) Riots spread to other coastal cities and 94 they were put down by force end at least 300 people died.
The price increases had come just before Christmas in a Catholic 95 country where Christmas is a festive holiday. Also, the protests were a culmination of the economic stagnation made worse by the increases in food prices and the impending incentive program which would probably work so as to lower the wage: of the people. (Gomulka's decision to put the riots down by force did not help his position.)
On December 15, 1970the Seventh Plenary session o fth e PUWP was held. At this Plenary session Gierek was elected to the post of First Secretary
97 and Gomulka's resignation was accepted. Jaszczuk, Kliszko, Stzelecki and 98 Spychalski were relieved of their duties. Edward Bobiuch, Piotr Joroszewicz, 99 Moczar, Olszowski and Szydlak were elected as full members of the Politburo.
On December 25, 1970 the Soviet leadership sent congratulations to the new ICO members of the Polish Politburo. On January 2, 1971 Pravda reported that a resolution was adopted by the Polish Republic of Ministers to increase wages and to raise minimum wages. On February 17, 1971, Joroszewicz was quoted
New Leader and Old Problems," Newsweek, 4 January 1971, p. 21.
^^Korob, p. 3.
^^Pravda, 21 December 1971, p. 1. trans. in CDSP, Volume 22, No. 51
^^Ibid. ’ ®lbid. ^^Ibid.
^®®Pravda, 25 December 1970, p. 1.
^^^Pravda, 2 January 1971, p. 4. 41
Pravda "that by utilizing the fraternal assistance rendered by the Soviet Union the Politburo ofthe PUWP repeals the price increases of foodstuffs and returns 102 prices to the pre-December 1970 level." Gierek was also able to increase the supply of foodstuffs in the stores. He was able to increase supplies and freeze food prices because the Soviet Union had doubled its grain shipments 103 to Poland to 4,000 tons a day. The repeal ofthe price increases in February was made possible by a $100 million dollar loan from the Soviet Union to
Poland; this loan also allowed Gierek to increase wages in the short run.
On January 6, 1971, Gierek and Joroszewicz, new Chairman, Council of
State, arrived in Moscow at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee; they were met by Brezhev and Kosygin.The leaders expressed their mutual desire to deepen political, economic, scientific, technical and defense cooperation through CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and the
Warsaw Pact; on every question under discussion complete unanimity of , .106 views was displayed.
An analysis of the December events could not be made without first being aware of the major Soviet influence. It has been shown that major changes in Poland's political environment have the approval of, and at times may even
^®2pravdg, 17 February 1971, p. 5.
Newsweek, 4 January 1971, p. 23.
^®4james Atwater, "Revolt That Shook the Kremlin," Reader's Digest 101 (August 1972): 106.
105,Pravda. 6 January 1971, p. 1. trans. in CDSP, Volume 23, No. 1.
^°4bid. 42 have been initiated by, the Soviet Union. Therefore an analysis of the
December events could be looked at in terms of the alternatives available to the Soviet Union.
Soviet support of Gomulka was fairly consistent right up until the
December events. Gomulka's lack of popular support did not allow him to undertake on economic reform as drastic as a substantial rise In food prices.
If the Soviet leaders did not realize Gomulka lacked popular support, they knew it after he had raised the food prices and the riots followed. The fact that the Soviet leaders provided massive aid to Gierek (in the form of grain shipments and the money loan) indicated that they were determined to reverse the effects of the price increases, that they did not approve of the increases, and that they did not initiate the policy. Thus, the price increase appeared to be initiated solely Gomulka. The untimeliness of the price increases, resulting in the Soviet leaders realization that Gomulka lacked the people's support, ended the Soviet Union's support of Gomulka. Gomulka had lived out his usefulness to the Soviet Union. The element of popular support was
important to the Soviet Union and it was one of the reasons Gomulka had secured
his position os First Secretary in 1956.
Having disposed of Gomulka it is safe to assume that the Soviet Union probably began to consider alternatives. One alternative would be military
intervention. Yet, military intervention would bring an increase in anti-Soviet
nationalism, as it did in Czechoslovakia. Also, military intervention would
require burdensome vigilance on the port ofthe Soviet Union characterized by 43 by slow change within the particular country. Military intervention should be viewed as a last resort by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. So if the
Soviet leaders could find a viable alternative to military intervention they
would use it. In the case of Poland the Soviet leaders did hove o viable alterna tive in Edward Gierek.
Gierek met the two basic qualifications required by the Soviet Union
for on East European leader - support (and subsequent control) ofthe people and a strong pro-Soviet stance, which would secure Poland within the Soviet orbit.
Two facts contributed to Gierek's fulfillment ofthe first condition, support of 108 the people. First, Gierek was popular within his area of Silesia. Second,
Gierek was known to have been absent from the Politburo session where the 109 resolution to increase food prices was adopted. This allowed Gierek not to be tied to this unpopular policy. Gierek's fulfil I ment of the second qualification
was evident from his 1968 speech in the Polish press, cited previously, in which
he supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Also, in o 1969 speech
published in Trybuno Robotnicza in December 1969, ^ Gierek stressed the
continued deepening ofthe indissoluble friendship with the Soviet Union. Thus
Gierek was on record os being pro-Soviet. But Gierek possessed a third
^^^See Christopher D. Jones, "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe," World Politics 29 (January 1977).
^^^Stefon Markowski, "Mr. Gomulka's Economic Legacy," World Today 27 (February 1971): 67.
Korab, p. 3.
^^^yrbuna Robotnicza (Warsaw), 24-26 December 1969, pp. 3 and 9. 44 qualification; he had an expertise in the economic sphere. He was recognized as an efficient manager in his own area, and more important, he was seen more as a manager than as a reformer. ^ ^ ^ Gierek had demonstrated his ability to work within the system which was particulary attractive to the Soviet leaders who have a major interest in maintaining the socialist system in East Europe.
Gierek was clearly a viable alternative for the Soviet leaders and he became their ultimate choice. Not only was Gierek the ultimate choice but it appeared he was the only choice. The Soviet leaders did not seem to consider any other alternatives after they had chosen G ierek. This was evident by the massive aid given to Gierek and the almost immediate approval by the Soviet leaders of the new Politburo in the form of the December 25, 1970 congratulations. As will be shown the Soviet Union's support of Gierek and his policies was as strong os, if not stronger than, its support of Gomulka.
Gierek not only was a viable choice but Soviet support of him also seemed to be the logical course of action. Moczar was known to be strongly nationalistic and there was no data to indicate he had expertise in the economic sphere.
Moczar, though gaining Politburo status, was not a member of the inner circle evidenced by the fact that he did not accompany Gierek and Joroszewicz to
Moscow on January 6, 1971, The theory that Moczar was not considered o viable alternative by the Soviet Union was strengthened by the fact that Moczar did not show up in the Soviet press in 1971 and 1972 and actually faded away from the scene by 1973. Gomulka had outlived his usefulness. The Soviet leaders
^Johnson, "Polish Perspectives," p. 67. 45 could have stayed with Gomulka and supplied him with the loan and grain shipments. But this would not have changed the isolation of the Gomulka regime nor would it have redressed the generation gap. The changes in the Polish
Politburo removed Gomulka and his inner circle from the scene and solidified the position of a younger, more tolerant leadership. Gierek was also the favored choice over any of the young pragmatists. This was because Gierek's age
(eight years younger) allowed him to be an intermediary between the Soviet Union and the young pragmatists. It could be said that the young pragmatists had not yet finished their apprenticeship. A Polish regime under Gierek would allow the further education of the pragmatists to the Soviet Union's way of thinking in a less restrictive political atmosphere but one which would serve the needs of the Soviet Union.
There was one final factor which also seemed to have influenced the
112 Soviets' choice. Czechoslovakia had had damaging effects on Soviet-East
European relations in the form of a rise in anti-Soviet nationalism in Eastern
Europe. Military intervention in Hungary in 1956 had had the same effect.
It seemed plausible that the Soviet leaders perceived the damaging effects of military intervention and the tremendous burden the recovery from military intervention placed on the Soviet Union itself. It would be to the Soviet Union's advantage to find a less damaging policy in dealing with crises in the satellite
119 Unless otherwise indicated, the crux of this argument comes from: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union. (Washington D.C,: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 137-170. 46 countries and a more efficient regulation policy. A Soviet policy geared towards maintaining political stability by meeting the economic needs of the satellite countries would limit political instability and provide an efficient regulation mechanism. Gierek, with his economic expertise, would be a good choice to institute the new Soviet approach. An important port of this new approach would be Soviet control over its implementation. The Soviet Union could achieve this through increased integration through the CMEA structure. The Soviet press in
1971 continually stressed the importance of increased integration for Poland and this would seem to support the above theory.
In summary, the events of December 1970 were greatly influenced by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was able to bring abouta solution to the
Polish crisis, but more important it found a solution meeting the needs of the
Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Also, the Soviet leaders succeeded in installing a pro-Soviet leader in Poland who would secure Poland within the Soviet camp and maintain economic stability (at least in the short run). Finally it was Soviet influence which was the deciding factor in the crisis and this indicated the excessive influence the Soviet Union exerted in Polish affairs. However it should be pointed out that the Soviet Union did not have blanket control over the Polish
internal situation. The solution of the crisis was the result of an interplay of internal Polish forces and external Soviet reactions with the Soviet actions being the deciding factor. The Soviet policy did not appear to go through any substan tial changes os the Soviet Union tied itself to that leader who could best secure
Poland with the Soviet sphere. In this respect Soviet policy was very consistent. 47
Its massive support of Gierek indicated it would go to great lengths to meet its
needs in Eastern Europe. The crucial factor in the crisis was the Soviet ability to influence the Polish internal situation. The Soviet Union, in its selection
of Gierek, had secured its ability to influence the internal situation.
1971 and 1972 - The Aftermath
The years 1971 and 1972 were characterized by a Soviet campaign to
mold the new Polish leadership into a pro-Soviet body capable of meeting the
demands of the Polish people through the institution of a policy of increased
economic and ideological integration with the Soviet Union. Gierek's reforms
included on increase in food supplies, direct contact with the workers, a two
year price freeze, collegiality in leadership by regular meetings of the
Politburo and the Secretariat, and increased dialogue with the Catholic Church .113 - a major deficiency of the Gomulka regime. These reforms took place
within a political atmosphere completely controlled by the Soviet Union.
The Polish press of this period reflects the major influence of the Soviet
Union. In February 1971 an article in Sztander Miodych stressed the sacredness
of the Polish-Soviet alliance. ^ The author In this article said that "whoever
strikes at the Polish-Soviet alliance strikes at the very existence of an independent
115 Poland." Cyrankiewicz commented on the Polish leadership's feeling of
^^^Johnson, "Polish Perspectives," pp. 68 and 69.
^^^Longin Zoreba, "A Fraternal Hand," Sztander Miodych (Warsaw), 19 February 1971, p. 3. trons. In JPRS ^52678.
bid. 48
optimism after the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the PUWP in
March 1971 and he praised the Soviet-Polish friendship attributing Polish inde
pendence to the Soviet Union. Olszowski in September 1971 detailed the
new style of Polish leadership stressing contact with the people through informal
visits to the factories taken by the First Secretary. ^ Jaroszewicz In discussing
the program of the PUWP said that the alliance with the USSR was o guarantee IIP for comprehensive development. In October 1972 Szydlok stated that the
PUWP was consistent in professing the principles of proletarian internationalism
and quoted Gierek when he said "the place of our party is with the CPSU and 119 the place of people's Poland is with the USSR," The Polish literature clearly demonstrated the influence of the Soviet Union. More important was the fact that the above speakers were members of the Polish Politburo and two of them,
Szydlok and Olszowski, were young pragmatists. Thus the teocher-student
relationship continued to take place. The Pragmatists were meeting the demands
required of the Soviet Union for East European leaders. This phenomenon was
also evident in the Soviet press In 1971 and 1972.
^^^"Speech by Josef Cyrankiewicz," Trybuna Opolsko (Warsaw), 16 March 1971, p. 6. trans. in JPRS ^53052.
^^^Interview with Stefan Olszowski," Polityka, 25 September 1971, pp. 1 and 4. trans. In JPRS *1^54469. 118 Piotr Jaroszewicz, "The Program of the Party, The Program of the People," Neues Deutschland (West Germany), 5 December 1971, p. 6. trans. in JPRS ^54774.
^ Speech by Jan Szydlok," Trybuna Ludu, 4 October 1972 pp. 1 and 2. trans. in JPRS ^57435. 49
The Soviet Union, very early in 1971, brought Gierek and Jaroszewicz to Moscow and appeared to lay down the law with the statement that complete 120 unanimity was reached between the Soviet and Polish leaders. Gierek's speech at the Eighth PUWP Plenary session, where he stressed the need for an 121 alliance with the Soviet Union, was printed in Pravda. On March 6, 1971 the Soviet press printed the repeal of price increases in Poland indicating 122 Soviet approval of this measure. Jaroszewicz, Polish Chairman, Council of State, published a lead article in Pravda in July 1971. In this article
Jaroszewicz detailed the economic reforms being undertaken by the Polish leadership and praised the help of the CPSU. He further stated he realized that close ties with the Soviet Union was the true rood to success for Poland.
Olszowski's lead article in Pravda appeared in November 1971.^^^ He described the Soviet Union os the unfailing guarantor of Poland's socialist security. He noted the mistakes of December 1970 and said the party is working to correct these mistakes.
l^Opravda, 6 January 1971, p. 1.
Pravda, 10 February 1971, p. 4.
^^^Pravda, 6 March 1971, p. 3.
^^^Piotr Jaroszewicz, "The Holiday of the Revival of Poland," Pravda, 22 July 1971, pp. 4 and 5. trans. in JPRS ^53833.
^^^Stefan Olszowski, "The Party and the People Have a Single Aim," Pravda, 18 November 1971, p. 4. trans. in JPRS ^5^90. 50 inc Szydlok also had a lead article in Pravda in December 1971. Szydlok said the PUWP, the Polish government, and the Polish people were warm supporters of the socialist integration of the Polish economy. He went on to say that unity with the CPSU and the Soviet Union was an indestructable principle of the PUWP's policy. He emphasized that it was only through socialist coopera tion that the full advantages of the scientific and technological revolution could be realized to their fullest potential. All of the above articles were written by
Polish Politburo members. The articles by Szydlok and Olszowski, young pragmatists, demonstrated the continuance of the Soviet education for the young pragmatists.
The appearance of these articles indicated three basic facts. First, the
Soviet Union was molding the new Polish leadership into loyal Marxist-Leninists.
Second, the Soviet Union was giving its approval to the PUWP leadership and their policies. Third, the Soviet Union was building a credible base for major influence in Poland. Both the Polish and Soviet literature indicated an increased emphasis on the part of the Soviet Union on drawing a picture of a strong alliance between the Soviet Union and Poland. In this respect there was a slight shift in Soviet policy. It appeared that the Soviet Union may have realized that its ability to Influence events in Poland was damaged by the lack of ideological ties between the Polish leadership and the Soviet leadership. The Soviet and
Polish press in 1971 and 1972 was filled with articles extolling the benefits of a strong relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union.
IOC Jan Szydlok, "A Life-Giving Force," Pravda, 1 December 1971, p. 4. trans. In JPRS ^54763. 51
This campaign to build ideological ties was combined with a campaign expressing the importance of economic ties between the two countries through
CMEA. On June 8, 1971 talks were held between Kosygin and Jaroszewicz in
Moscow and agreements were signed on further trade between the Soviet Union
126 and Poland. Szydlak, in December 1971, in on article mentioned above, gave his support to increased socialist integration. An article in International
Affairs, in April 1971 detailed the projected increase in trade between the Soviet 127 Union and Poland for the period 1971-75. In November 1971 the Soviet party organ, Kommunist, contained an article stating that the CMEA member countries had entered the stage of socialist integration and that the Soviet Union would 128 increase the export of raw materials and energy in 1971-75 period. This last article showed that the Soviet Union hod established its goal of effective socialist integration in the CMEA member countries. The idea that the Soviet Union was satisfied with the success of its economic and ideological integration campaigns in Poland was supported by the fact that Brezhnev was the keynote speaker at the 129 Sixth PUWP Congress in December 1971. It should also be pointed out that in
November 1971, Gierek, Jaroszewicz, Szydlok, and Jogielski (the new inner
^^^Provda, 9 June 1971, pp. 1 and 2.
^ ^^1 nt ernati ona I Affairs (Moscow), (Apri I 1971), pp. 81 and 82.
Bogomolov, "The Development of CEMA-Member Countries on the Path of Economic Integration," Kommunist 16 (November 1971), trans. in JPRS ^54783. 19Q See "Brezhnev's Speech to Polish Congress," Pravda, 8 December 1971, pp. 1 and 2. trans. in CDSP, Volume 23, No. 49, pp. 10-12. 52
130 circle) visited the Soviet Union for "friendly talks." At these talks special attention was paid to the development of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and the officials of both countries emphasized their desire to imple ment the Comprehensive Program for the socialist economic integration of the
CMEA countries. Also, "unanimity was reached on all issues." The
November meeting and Brezhnev's speech clearly indicated that the Soviet leaders were satisfied with and approved of the 1971 developments in Poland and in the progress of the Polish leadership. (Brezhnev's speech at the Sixth Congress was very reminiscent of his speech at the Fifth Congress; relations became routinized in 1972 as they had in 1969.) At the PUWP Congress Brezhnev hailed the efforts of Gierek and the PUWP and emphasized that the inviolability of the
Polish borders was guaranteed by Poland's alliance with the USSR and socialist countries. In 1972 Soviet-Polish relations returned to the routine level seen in 1969. Gierek and his policies, backed so strongly throughout 1971, continued to be supported by the Soviet Union with no discernible shifts in that support.
In 1971 the Soviet Union had undertaken a campaign of increased economic and ideological integration aimed at increasing its ability to influence internal events in Poland. The Soviet Union had succeeded in molding o Polish leadership loyal to the principles of Marxist-Leninism and to the policies of the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had established an increased level of economic
^^^Provdo, 11 November 1971, p. 1. 13^lbid.
^^^Pravdo, 8 December 1971, pp. 1 and 2, 53 and ideological integration in Poland and thus had increased its ability to influence events in Poland. This new level of integration would allow Soviet control, would negate the use of force, and would stabilize the internal political situation. Also, this new level of integration (Soviet influencé could be seen as a slight shift in Soviet policy towards Poland. The events of December 1970 had shown the Soviet leaders that they did not possess complete control over internal events in Poland. The policy in 1971 was an attempt to redress this deficiency.
Thus the Soviet Union hod established a new approach In its Polish policy, namely increased economic and ideological integration. This increased emphasis on integration appeared to be the correct approach for the Soviet Union in the short run; the internal situation in Poland had stabilized without excessive Soviet vigilance. As the internal Polish situation destabilized in the middle and late
1970's the increased integration policy of the Soviet Union became outdated.
As the events of the 1980 crisis will show, the Soviet Union recognized the uselessness of its integration policy and the Soviet leaders implemented a policy aimed at establishing viability as outlined in Chapter One.
1973 - 1974^^^
Before leaving the 1970 crisis a discussion of the years 1973 and 1974 is necessary to complete the picture of Gierek's rise to power. This discussion will be concerned only with internal Polish events since Soviet-Polish relations had
1 9/ Information for this discussion was taken from R. W. Dean, "Gierek's Three Years: Retrenchment and Reform", Survey 20 (Spring/Summer 1974); 59-75; "Gierek: Building From Scratch", Time, 14 October 1974, p. 60; "Flat in Every Garage", Economist, 10 November 1973, p. 74; and "Westward Look - and Pray", Economist, 5 October 1974, p. 51. 54 routinized in 1972 and it appeared that the Soviet Union had successfully
molded a pro-Soviet leadership in Poland.
Gierek had satisfied the Soviet requirements for a satellite leader by
establishing (with Soviet support) internal stability, and, by keeping Poland
within the Soviet orbit Gierek could now focus his attention on solidifying
his internal position and this was what he did in 1973 and 1974.
Gierek's moves following the December 1970 crisis had done a great
deal to stabilize a very uncertain situation in Poland in the months after
December. He had lifted the wage freeze, he had rescinded the price increases,
and he had opened a dialogue with the workers. These moves allowed Gierek
to distance himself from Gomulka's policies and they helped to establish Gierek's
credibility with the workers and with the rank and file of the PUWP. In addition,
Gierek had promised economic reform and he had implemented a new economic
policy designed to increase growth.
Gierek's economic policies appeared to have turned around the Polish
economy by the end of 1973. At the First National Party Conference of the
PUWP in October 1973, it was revealed that the national product had increased
twenty-seven percent and that industrial output hod increased by thirty-three
percent. Farm output and wage levels had increased nineteen percent. Prices
had remained frozen since December 1970 and at the Conference it was decided
to keep prices frozen through 1974. At the Conference Gierek noted that food
and light industry now shared top priority with engineering for new investment.
In addition Gierek's easing of restrictions on private farmers (he paid the farmers 55 more money for their goods and he made it easier for the farmers to borrow money and thus gain access to better machinery) resulted in a tremendous increase in food and meat production. In effect, Gierek had increased the incentive of the farmer which was absent during Gomulka's years.
Although Gierek's policies appeared to be moderately successful, this success was mixed. The price freeze had only been possible because of huge state subsidies. These subsidies were a tremendous drain on the state and would be intolerable over the long term. Prices could not remain frozen forever and sooner or later they would hove to be raised. Second, Poland had developed a trade deficit as its imports were rising much more than its exports. Gierek seemed to be risking a temporary trade deficit to gain internal economic growth.
Gierek's economic policies were combined witha political policy which was aimed at solidifying Gierek's internal Party position.
Gierek solidified his position by orchestrating two major changes. First,
Gierek succeeded in having Moczar ousted from the Politburo at the Sixth PUWP
Congress in late 1972. This removed Gierek's major challenger from the PUWP leadership. Second, Gierek installed Party leaders as Chairman of the People's
Councils, This move reduced the People's Councils to disciplinary organs of the PUWP and it allowed Gierek to increase his control over on area which the
PUWP hod previously had limited control. Thus by the end of 1973 Gierek appeared to hove solidified his internal position. He had strengthened his position as the sole leader of the PUWP and he had not only stabilized the economic situation, but he had also increased the growth of the economy. 56
By the end of 1974 it appeared that meaningful economic reforms (change of the system), promised by Gierek in December 1970, was now a dead issue.
There was no more talk of decentralizing decision-making or of increasing worker participation. In October 1974 Gierek visited the United States to try to secure new aid and technology. Gierek seemed to be counting on foreign investment to satisfy the economic needs of Poland. This view was strengthened by the rising foreign debt of Poland after 1974 which will be detailed in Chapter Three.
Despite the absence of meaningful economic reform Gierek did manage to achieve a twelve percent per year economic rote of growth in 1974. Yet, the same problems that had existed at the end of 1973 continued to exist at the end of 1974. These problems consisted of the huge state subsidies (which allowed the continuation of the price freeze) and the rising trade deficit. These problems would not disappear overnight and they would have to be addressed by the
Gierek leadership in the future.
Finally, there did not appear to be any evidence to indicate that
Gierek's strong internal Party position was in jeopardy in 1974. Indeed, overt intra-PUWP criticism of Gierek did not surface until 1979. It was this strong intro-PUWP position that would carry Gierek through future internal troubles.
It seemed clear that the seeds of future economic unrest had surfaced in 1973 and 1974. These seeds would develop into economic stagnation as the
Gierek leadership embarked upon a period of crisis management in 1975. This economic stagnation would combine with social unrest to pose the first challenge to the Gierek leadership in 1976. CHAPTER III
THE 1980 CRISIS
The institutional influence of the Soviet Union on Poland continued throughout the 1970's and was present at the time of the 1980 crisis. Poland continued to be an active member in CMEA and the Warsaw Pact alliance. The Soviet Union continued to supply Poland with two-thirds of its grain and oil anda large proportion of its raw materials.^ At the time of the 1980 crisis the Soviet Union 2 was Poland's largest trading partner, and half of Poland's trade took place within the CMEA structure. It is clear that the Soviet Union was continuing to safeguard its interests.
1975
It was in 1975 that fresh signs of internal unrest surfaced in Poland,
This unrest was due mainly to the poor state of the Polish economy. Edward Gierek
^R. F. Staar, "Poland: The Price of Stability," Current History 70 (March 1976): 101.
^Jan B. DeWeydenthal, "Poland Facing the Brink," Current History (April 1978): 183.
^Morris Bornstein, "East-West Economic Relations and Soviet-East European Economic Relations," in U .S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy in a Time of Change (Wash., D .C .: USGPO, 1979), p. 299.
57 58
4 had come to power in 1970 with an ambitious economic plan for the future.
His strategy combined significant amounts of Western technology, financed on credit, with heavy investment in the growth of Polish industry. Foreign debts incurred in this plan would be repaid by the consequent increase in exports from the Polish economy. Gierek's policies paid off in the early years of 1970 as
Poland's economic growth was one of the highest in the world. The Polish people also saw a marked increase in living conditions as real wages rose eight percent per year while prices of foodstuffs remained frozen. Yet, since 1974 the economic picture hod turned sour. This was due to several reasons. First, the energy crisis of the early 1970's radically increased the cost of oil; thus requiring Poland to divert more hard currency to oil purchases as the Soviet
Union increased intro-CMEA oil prices. (This Soviet price increase will be discussed in detail when considering Soviet behavior.) Second, the recession in the West impeded the sale of Polish goods in hard-currency markets. Third, the investment policy proved ill conceived as forty percent of national income was allocated to investment while domestic consumer demand was left unsatisfied.
Fourth, the Gierek government did not undertake any of the meaningful structural reforms needed to cope with new technology and the growth of productivity.
^Unless otherwise indicated discussion of Gierek's economic policies is taken from: Seweryn Bialer, "Poland and the Soviet Imperium," Foreign Affairs 59, No. 3 (America and World 1980); Adam Bromke, "A New Juncture in Poland," Problems of Communism 25 (September-October 1976); Tighten Belts," Economist, 1 November 1975, p. 85. 5 9
The above economic pressures combined to leave the Polish economy in a poor state in 1975. Poland's foreign debt had risen to two billion dollars, and the country's exports had not kept pace with imports. Productivity had not risen as fast as expected, and the new purchasing power created by successive large wage increases (at constant prices) had led to shortages. Meat was in short supply throughout 1975. Evidence of the unrest caused by the shortages showed up in the Polish press in April 1975, In letters to the editor of the party weekly
Polityka, the people of Poland expressed their dissatisfaction over the government handling of the meat shortages and believed that the government should have recognized the shortages in advance and acted accordingly.^
The state of the Polish economy was not lost on Gierek, In November,
Gierek addressed representatives of textile workers, where he complained about shoddy goods and the squandering of resources, and suggested that quality could be achieved by a "correct" approach, not by force.^ Prior to the Seventh PUWP
Congress Gierek warned the people that the price freeze could not last much longer and at the Congress he said that a "flexible pricing policy" would replace the present price freeze on basic food stuffs; the increase would be phased in gradually.^
Letters to the Editor," Polityka (Warsaw), 5 April 1975, p. 7.
^Staar, p. 101.
^"Troubled Times," Economist, 20 December 1975, p. 45. 6 0
In addition to the economic unrest there was social unrest. This social O unrest stemmed first from the proposed amendments to the Polish Constitution.
These amendments (guidelines came out in October 1975) included a reference to
the PUWP as the leading force in the building of socialism and a reference to the
"unshakeoble" fraternal bond with the Soviet Union. These references were seen
by the intellectuals as a violation of Helsinki (signed in August 1975) and were
seen by the people as a legal basis for a further reduction in cultural and
religious freedom.^ The second aspect of social unrest was the increasing amount
of journalistic criticism directed at the Gierek regime. This was seen in numerous
articles in the Polish press. These articles were concerned with social criticism
and called for criticism only along the lines of the resolutions of the Sixth PUWP
Congress. The articles called fora correct understanding of criticism, consistent
with Marxist-Leninist principles, and with requirements inherent in party policy.
This social unrest was also not lost on Gierek. In the latter stages of 1975
the Gierek regime appeared to implement an ideological offensive aimed at
strengthening the leading role of the party, stemming the tide of unrest, and
reestablishing (maintaining) PUWP control over Polish society. An article by a
Mr. Rybicki, Rector of Warsaw University, emphasized that the Party (PUWP)
governed oil sectors of life and based its foreign policy on that of the Soviet
®For discussion of amendments see Bromke.
^"Lesser Evil," Economist, 31 January 1976, p. 52.
^%ee Zdzislaw Andruszkiewicz, "A Few Comments on Press Criticism," Nowe Drogi (Warsaw) (April 1975), pp. 87-91. trans. in JPRS ^64863. 6 1
Union. ^ ^ The article also said that an attack on the party was in essence an attack on the socialist system. An article by Jerzy Lukaszewicz, secretary of the PUWP Central Committee in charge of propaganda, emphasized that the constant strengthening of the leading role of the party was a fundamental
Leninist principle of successful socialist construction; also he said that the main 19 support of Poland lay in its fraternal ties with the Soviet Union. An editorial in the party weekly, Polityka, entitled "Pre-Congress Discussions," said that the strengthening of the alliance with the USSR is the primary objective of the people's state. All of these articles lauded the correctness of the Soviet-
Polish alliance and emphasized the leading role of the PUWP in all affairs.
The fact that these articles appeared in the latter port of 1975, after the guide lines to the proposed amendments were released, seemed to indicate that they were designed to rally support for the new amendments. This was because the articles were concerned with the two controversial statements in the amendments.
That is the amendments would legalize the supremacy of the PUWP in all affairs, and they would legalize Poland's subordinate role in its alliance with the
Soviet Union.
Rybicki, "The Role of the Party in the Socialist State," Pravo I Zycie, 12 October 1975, p. 3. trons. in JPRS ^66139. 19 Rudi Pravo (Prague), 6 December 1975, p. 6. trans. in JPRS ^66451.
^^Polityka, 8 November 1975, p. 2. trans. in JPRS ^66274. 6 2
It was evident that Gierek was meeting opposition and unrest throughout
1975, but the above events showed that the Gierek regime was aware of the problems and was in control of the situation. Gierek's control of the internal situation was clearly evident at the Seventh Congress of the PUWP held in
December 1975. First, Gierek consolidated his power by dropping from the
Politburo and Central Committee, Franciszek Szlachic, his protege, who apparently had become a threat to Gierek's power. Second, Gierek named one newcomer to the Politburo - with candidate status - Tadeusz Wrzaszcyk, who became Chairman of the Planning Commission. Finally, Gierek enlarged the
Central Committee from 115 to 140 members; the CC was now predominantly filled with men who could be presumed to be Gierek loyalists. Three-fourths of the full members and almost all of the deputy members had been elected since
Gierek's rise. There were no visible groups, inside the PUWP, which posed a challenge to Gierek. It should also be noted that the amendments were approved at the Congress as was a very optimistic plan for the future (next five years) which included the flexible pricing policy previously mentioned. Thus by the end of 1975 Gierek had solidified his position internally by demonstrating an ability to control the internal situation while remaining loyal to the Soviet Union.
Gierek had met the Soviet interests in Poland and the Soviet satisfaction with him was reflected in the cordial Soviet-Polish interactions throughout 1975.
^^Staar, p. 103.
^^Bromke, p. 8, 63 Soviet behavior throughout 1975 was aimed at maintaining CMEA integration. The announcement of several joint CMEA projects (including the
Orenburg pipeline) bears this out. In August Kosygin met with Gierek and
Piotr Jaroszewicz, Premier (Chairman of Council of Ministers) for o friendly visit where attention was given to "all-round development of fraternal ties and fruitful cooperation between Poland and the USSR." At this meeting extensive work was done on the coordination of national-economic plans of the USSR and
Poland; also a great deal of attention was given to the coordination of long-term plans.The emphasis on CMEA integration was not new (as It was initiated
in 1971) and all contacts were cordial in nature.
Cordiality continued in all contacts and Soviet support of the Gierek
regime continued throughout 1975. This support was clearly seen by the fact that Stefan Olszowski and Piotr Jaroszewicz, Polish Politburo members, were 19 given the opportunity to express their views in the CPSU publication Kommunist.
Both of these articles stressed the importance of Poland's alliance with the USSR
and that this alliance was the basis of Poland's independence and the guarantee
of Poland's security. Olszowski stated that Poland was in complete solidarity
^^Izvestia, 26 April 1975, p. 1. trons. in CDSP 27, No. 17, p. 18.
^^Pravda, 14 August 1975, pp., 1 and 4, trans. in CDSP 27, No. 33, p. 14.
’®lbid. 19 See Piotr Jaroszewicz, "Thirty Years of Fraternal Alliance," Kommunist (March 1975), pp. 81-92. trans. in JPRS ^ 64710; and Stefan Olszowski, "In the Interests of Peace and Socialism," Kommunist (January 1975), pp. 74-83. trons. in JPRS 4 4 1 2 0 . 6 4 with Comrade Brezhnev. Both Olszowski and Jaroszewicz concluded their articles by saying that Poland adhered firmly to the foreign policy of the Soviet
Union - the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence. Later in the year
Edward Bobluch, member of the Polish Politburo, addressed the Warsaw Pact 20 Anniversary meeting in May 1975. He, like his colleagues, stressed the importance of the Polish alliance with the Soviet Union and called the Soviet
Union the liberator of Poland. He expressed his desire to strengthen the alliance and espoused the foreign policy of the USSR - disarmament, detente, and peaceful coexistence.
The above articles showed that the Soviet Union supported the Gierek regime but they also showed the continuance of the teacher-student relationship and the indirect Soviet influence on the Polish leaders. In these articles the
Polish leaders confirmed that they realized that their future lay with upholding
Soviet interests in Poland, that is in keeping Poland loyal to the Soviet Union and a member of the socialist commonwealth.
Soviet support culminated at the Seventh PUWP Congress. Mr. Brezhnev,
First Secretary of the CPSU, spoke at this Congress and by doing so gave his support and approval to Gierek's consolidation of power and his future economic
21 plans. Brezhnev praised the PUWP and noted that it had come to the Congress united and confident. Brezhnev also used this occasion to emphasize the unity
^^rybuna Ludu, 15 May 1975, p. 3. trons. in JPRS 44887.
Pravda, 10 December 1975, pp. 1 and 2. trans. in CDSP 27, No. 49, pp. 17 and 18. 65 and strength of the socialist commonwealth; this was probably aimed at the West, which, because of Helsinki, saw an opportunity to tear down the ideological barriers in Eastern Europe. It could also be speculated that the Kremlin may have ordered on ideological crackdown in the satellites, as a clear sign to the West that the Soviet Union would not allow the freer flow of information and ideas
(contained in Basket Three of the Final Act) across borders. The ideological offensive by the Gierek regime in the latter part of 1975 supported this view.
Although this offensive met the needs of the Gierek regime, it also met the foreign policy needs of the Soviet Union and satisfied Soviet interests in Poland.
Thus, this offensive was probably influenced, to a degree, by the Soviet Union, but may have not been strictly initiated by the Soviet Union, and therefore may be seen as another example of indirect Soviet influence.
There was one final aspect of Soviet behavior that must be discussed because it too had an influence on Polish events. In the early part of 1975 the 22 Soviet Union raised the prices of intra-CMEA commodities. This was because the world market prices of raw materials and energy rose dramatically in the early 1970’s thus leaving intra-CMEA prices well below the market prices.
Thus, the Soviet Union was losing valuable hard currency earnings selling oil and raw materials at below market prices to CMEA countries. The 1975 price
increases made the intra-CMEA prices closer to world market prices and allowed the USSR to make up o portion of their hard currency earnings. The intra-CMEA
92 Information for this discussion came from Paul Merer, "Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability to the Soviet Union? The Economic Aspect," in Charles Gati, editor. The International Politics of Eastern Europe (New York: Proeger Publishers, 1976). 66 prices were still slightly below world market prices and thus the Soviet Union was still undergoing an opportunity cost by selling to CMEA countries, but the cost had decreased. As was pointed out earlier these price increases contributed to Poland's poor economic state. Yet, the Soviet alternative would have been to divert more oil and raw material goods away from CMEA countries. This would have created an even larger and more immediate economic crisis in
Poland. This was because Poland would have had to buy these commodities on the world market at world market prices, and therefore would have had to spend more valuable hard currency and further increase its Western debt. The price increases allowed the Soviets to maintain their institutional influence while at the same time allowing the CMEA countries to adjust gradually to economic realities.
The picture of Soviet behavior throughout 1975 was one of Soviet support of the Gierek regime. Soviet influence was exerted indirectly since it perceived its interests as being maintained by the Gierek regime. Gierek was in firm control of his party and had a hold on Polish society despite rising unrest. The year 1976 saw this hold on Polish society decrease as Gierek's regime and
Soviet interests went through a minor crisis.
1976
In the first months of 1976 the Gierek regime continued its ideological campaign in support of the amendments to the constitution in the Party newspaper 67
23 Trybuna Ludu. Articles called for support of the amendments because they reaffirmed what had taken place over the last thirty years, the victories and accomplishments of socialism. The articles stressed that socialism had allowed industrialization of Poland and the forging of ties with the Soviet Union. Gierek himself argued for the amendments by saying their purpose was to reinforce the patriotic unity of the people and to strengthen the integrity of the Polish state.
Gierek also said that the strength of the Polish state and the alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union and socialist countries had served to insure the security of Polish interests.
These articles demonstrated several facts. First, the length (stretching from October 1975 to March 1976) of the ideological campaign indicated that the regime was meeting strong opposition to the amendments. Second, the articles indicated that the Gierek regime (and Gierek in particular) was toeing the hard
Soviet line just as Gomulka had done in the twilight of his career. Yet, Gierek did have control of the internal situation indicated by the adoption of the amend ments by the Sejm with only slight modifications; the controversial phrase about Oc the unshakeable fraternal bond with the Soviet Union was eliminated. Gierek had given the people a compromise (reference to leading role of PUWP was retained) while maintaining his authority. This authority was badly eroded in June.
23 Reference is made to the following: Trybuna Ludu, 6 February 1976, pp. 1 and 4. trans. in JPRS 46811; and Trybuna Ludu, 10 February 1976, p. 1 and 3. trans in JPRS ^66851.
^^Jan Bijak, "A Meeting with E. Gierek," Polityka, 21 February 1976, p. 3. trans. in JPRS 46969.
^^Bromke, p. 12. 6 8
On June 24, 1976 new food price increases were announced by the government; the increases were as high as 69 percent for meat. The workers in
Gdansk promptly went on strike and workers in Ursus and Radom rioted and joined
Gdansk workers on strike.The government almost immediately rescinded the 97 increases saying that they needed further analysis and discussion. But the damage had been done. The Polish people had been promised a gradual increase 90 in prices but instead had gotten a drastic increase and they felt betrayed.
Gierek compounded his mistake by arresting several thousand workers believed to be involved in the strikes.In response to the repressive measures, the
Committee for Defense of the Workers (KOR) was established on September 27,
1976; this committee was composed of social democrats and student leaders of the 1968 revolt.The goals of the KOR included amnesty for all of the imprisioned workers and their reinstatement in the same positions they held prior to June 1976; the KOR also provided assistance to families of the arrested 31 workers. This committee acted openly and gained wide support among the people, and thus established itself as a group opposed to the PUWP,
^^Bromke, p. 1.
^^Pravda, 28 June 1976, p. 3. trans. in CDSP 28, No. 26, p. 26.
Winter of Discontent," Time, 8 November 1976, p. 69. 29|bid.
^^Adam Bromke, "The Opposition in Poland," Problems of Communism 27 (September-October 1978): 39.
^^Bromke, "Opposition", p. 40. 69
In addition to the repressive measures, the Gierek regime implemented a press campaign in support of price increases and citizen education to the problems of the economy. In a representative article M. F. Rokowski, editor of Pol ityka, acknowledged the recent trouble over the price increases, but he emphasized that the pressure for higher prices was, and had been present for a 32 long time. He went on to say that it now appears that "we" (the PUWP) did
not do enough to present this problem In a timely and thorough manner and he
called for greater dialogue and discussion between people and party. Other 33 articles in the Polish press stressed the need for citizen education and noted that prices could not remain frozen. From these articles it was evident that
Gierek's regime suffered a great deal from the June events. The strict hold on the internal events was lost; in fact an opposition group had been established.
More important, the workers and the intellectuals (through the KOR) had united
against the PUWP, further eroding the PUWP's authority in the internal affairs
of Poland. Gierek was now looked upon as a hard-liner by the people; he had
responded to opposition with repression.
Despite the campaign in support of price increases the Gierek regime did not feel it had the backing of the people to try another attempt at price
increases. In September, the party's CC decided to turn over the whole matter
of price changes to five working commissions which were to report their findings
32 Polityka, 3 July 1976, pp. 1 and 2. trans. in JPRS ^67598.
^^See Polityka, 10 July 1976, pp. 1 and 5. trons. in JPRS ^67707; and Ideologia 1 Polityka (September 1976), trans. in JPRS 48022. 7 0 within a year. By the end of 1977 their recommendations were still to be announced.By the end of 1976 the internal situation had not improved.
Poland's foreign debt had risen to ten billion dollars and this meant more food exports, less food for internal consumption, and thus smaller subsidies to keep prices down. {Sooner or later prices had to be raised.) In November 1976 the Soviet Union extended a low interest loan of $1.3 billion to Poland in addition to deliveries of food, raw materials and consumer goods. This was helpful but it could not be regarded as the long-term answer to Poland's troubles.
At the December CC meeting of the Polish Politburo Gierek noted the lines and shortages and called for a quarter of the country's national income to be put into investment in the 1976-80 plan. This meant more investment would go into everyday things such as housing, consumer goods, and farm production.
This was a highly ambitious plan in light of the economic realities and it did not have much chance of succeeding in the future.
One final incident in late December indicated how bad things had become in Poland. The cool miners in Silesia initiated work stoppages in protest of meat shortages and long lines. This was especially threatening to Gierek because he was from Silesia and had always had the support of the coal miners.
Gierek had the stores stocked immediately in recognition of the importance of
^^DeWeydenthal, p. 160. q c For this year-ending analysis see "Big Fence Yet to Jump," Economist, 11 December 1976, p. 58.
Pol and: Meat and Potatoes," Newsweek, 2 January 1978, p. 26. 71 0*7 maintaining his base of support. The coal mine work stoppages indicated how
far Gierek had slipped in the eyes of the people. The economic problems were threatening his very base of support. Gierek and the PUWP were in a quandary
at the end of 1976. Their authority was being questioned, instituotional opposi tion was established, and economic stagnation was rompant. Only the Soviet
aid package allowed Gierek to ride out the storm and muddle through in 1977
and 1978.
Soviet support of Gierek continued in 1976. Gierek spoke at the USSR's
Twenty-fifth Congress and reaffirmed total support of the CPSU's domestic and qp foreign policies. By inviting Gierek to speak at the Congress the USSR was
clearly showing support of Gierek and his policies. The annual lessons for the
Polish Politburo continued in 1976 asTejchma, Olszowski, and Jaroszewicz all
39 made visits to the Soviet Union in April and May. Soviet support was seen in
June when Gierek met with Willie Brandt in West Germany. The meeting was
covered in the Soviet press.In this article the Soviet Union gave full support
to Gierek's call for full implementation of the Final Act of Helsinki and for
implementation of agreements between Poland and West Germany ratified in
March. Further support could be seen in the Soviet treatment of the June events.
37lbid.
38Pravdo, 26 February 1976, p. 6. trons. in CDSP 28, No. 9, p. 7.
39 See the Pravda index for this period.
^^Izvestio, 17 June 1976, p. 3. trons. in CDSP 28, No. 24, p. 12. 72
The first and only mention of the events was contained in a June 28 Pravda article.There was no mention of the riots and the article said that a "possible" price change was withdrawn for further study. The fact that the article did not mention the riots and reported only the withdrawal of the price increases showed that the Soviet Union was supporting the policy of the Polish government and hoping for the best.
Soviet behavior did not change after the June events as the Soviet leaders continued to support Gierek and his regime. Prior to a visit to Moscow,
Gierek received a biographical sketch in Pravda. Following his visit Poland received the aid program previously mentioned. One final show of support was seen in the Soviet Union's approval of the new foreign minister of Poland,
Mr. Wo[taszek, evidenced by Gromyko's congratulatory message. It should be pointed out that Wojtaszek replaced Olszowski, a Gierek rival, who was appointed in charge of economic matters (a highly vulnerable position in communist countries where the particular individual frequently becomes a scapegoat).
Thus it was clear that Soviet support of Gierek was strong and uninterruped throughout 1976. The major question is why the Kremlin continued to support
Gierek? First, Gierek was a known quantity. The Soviet leaders knew where
Pravda, 28 June 1976, p. 3. trons. in CDSP 28, No. 26, p. 26.
Pravda, 9 November 1976, p. 1.
^^Pravdo, 7 December 1976, p. 4. 73
Gierek stood - very pro-Soviet - and they knew his style. Second, the Soviet
Union had made a substantial investment in Gierek. Soviet support of another
leader would see that investment go down the drain, and the Soviet Union would
have had to undertake the burdensome task of cultivating another leader. Third, there was no clear challenger or alternative to Gierek within the PUWP; the
Politburo and CC were composed of Gierek loyalists. Also, Gierek still possessed a degree of popular support which he might be able to expand upon with an improvement in the economic situation. Thus, the substantial Soviet aid package
in November could be seen as a signal to Gierek that he had the support of the
Soviet Union. Fourth, Gierek was the key link in detente with Western Europe
(evidenced by his contacts with Brandt), a major Soviet foreign policy goal in the mid 1970's. Gierek's absence from the scene would severely damage this
detente and would deny Poland aid from West Germany. Thus it seemed that
Gierek was still seen by the Soviet leaders as the man who could most efficiently
meet the interests of the Soviet Union in Poland (given Soviet support).
Soviet influence had been indirect in the first half of 1976, since there
was no need to exert an overt influence. Gierek and company had control of the
situation. This indirect influence was seen in teacher-student meetings and in
Gierek's pursuit of detente with Western Europe. The contact with and possible
aid from West Germany would serve Polish and Soviet interests. The Soviet Union
would benefit from the West European recognition of Helsinki (specifically the
recognition of post-WWIl borders), and any forthcoming economic aid to Poland
would contribute to the normalizing of the economic situation in Poland; this 74 would serve both Polish and Soviet interests. It would be fair to say that a degree of Soviet influence was probably exerted on Gierek to pursue his contacts with West Germany.
Soviet influence became overt (in the form of the aid package) in
November when the mood of discontent and the stagnating economy combined to make Poland a potentially explosive situation which was detrimental to Soviet interests. Soviet aid went a long way towards diffusing the internal tensions and was a good example of the power of Soviet influence. Yet, It should be pointed out that the Soviet Union had no influence on opposition groups. This lack of influence would hurt the Soviet Union in 1977 and 1978 as the opposition grew in power and organization.
1977 and 1978 - Muddling Through
The year 1977 saw the implemention of Gierek's "New Economic
44 Maneuver," which was an extension of the plan set forth at the 1976 CC meeting. This "New Economic Maneuver" (NEM) was a series of initiatives aimed at an increase in production and an improvement in market supplies; these initiatives signaled a shift in emphasis from heavy industry to food production and the expansion of services. The NEM also included farm reforms in the form of easier requirements for farmers to purchase more landand equipment and a retirement plan with pensions based on production records and sales to the state.
There were similar measures to encourage private enterprise - lowered tax rates
^Inform ation on Gierek's NEM came from DeWeydentha!, p. 183. 75 and easier access to tools and machinery. The main thrust of the NEM was the
continued reliance on foreign aid, especially trade with West Germany in the
form of credits. The Gierek government combined the NEM with a new policy of pep talks designed to educate the people about the economy.
The above economic policies appeared to have satisfied the Polish people
since I found no evidence of substantial economic unrest in 1977. Prime Minister
Jaroszewicz did come out in August with a statement that floods had hurt grain
crops and therefore Poland would have to buy grain from the West; this would
further increase the hard currency debt.'^ Jaroszewicz also warned that meat
shortages would continue.These statements a year ago might have precipitated
strikes and protests but in 1977 there was no overt reaction to the statements.
Apparently, the people were glad to be informed of the situation of the economy.
Gierek had learned his lesson well. He was keeping the people well informed
and not undertaking any surprise measures (e.g. the drastic price increases of
a year ago).
The more urgent problem for the Gierek regime in 1977 was the rise of
the opposition. The KOR had increased its effectiveness in the latter part
of 1976, Gierek's reaction was mixed. On the one hand the regime mounted
Message for the Wogs," Economist, 13 August 1977, p. 77. 46|bid.
^^Ibid. 76 a systematic campaign against the KOR, and several of its members lost their
[o b s.^ Yet, on the other hand the workers arrested in 1976 were being released one by one.^^ This vacillation indicated that the Gierek regime was divided over how to deal with this opposition.
On May 7, 1977 a young student, an active KOR supporter, Stanislaw
Pyfas, was found dead on balcony.On a May 15, 2000 Krakow students staged a candlelight procession in his honor through the city.^^ It was believed that the student had died at the hands of the police. A government crackdown followed this procession as the party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, described the KOR as a "group of opponents of the people's power who have tried to exploit the death 53 of a youth to disturb the atmosphere." (The government said the boy fell due to 54 drunkenness.) Six key members of the KOR and four supporters were arrested.
Government repression continued through June and most of July as tension increased and protests surfaced. On July 23 the government relented and all of the prisioners were set free. Government-opposition relations for the remainder of 1977 were stalemated. Throughout 1977 the Gierek regime had remained divided over how to deal with the opposition. This division hindered its
^Bromke, "Opposition," p. 40.
^^Bromke, "Opposition," p. 41. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid.
^^I'Unita (Rome), 21 May 1977, trans. in JPRS ^69350.
^^Quoted In L'Unîto, 21 May 1977.
^^Bromke, "Opposition," p. 41. ^^Ibid. 7 7 effectiveness in handling the oppositionand allowed dissent to spread; there was a proliferation of opposition groups towards the end of 1977.^^
In 1978 the stalemate between the opposition and the government continued.
By the summer there were official KOR representatives in nine cities.Yet, the opposition was unable to extract democratic reforms from the government,
58 and the government was undble to prevent the opposition from trying to do so.
The regime moderated its behavior towards the opposition; there was no mass 59 repression, just torment (e.g. people were fired, detained, etc...). This stalemate was a dangerous situation for the Gierek regime because it failed to eliminate or impede the growth of organized opposition. The PUWP was supposed to be supreme in all affairs and the existence of organized opposition eroded its authority and its legitimacy. The PUWP had lost its ability to influence the rise of opposition groups and thus had lost a portion of its control of Polish society. This development was not looked upon with pleasure by the Soviet
Union (detailed later in the discussion of Soviet behavior).
In the economic sphere the Gierek regime went to great lengths to ensure that an eight percent increase in domestic food supplies was achieved in 1978.
The shops were better stocked than in 1977 and meat lines were shorter due to
^^See Bromke, "Opposition," p. 42.
^^Bromke, "Opposition," p. 40.
^^Bromke, "Opposition," p. 48. 59 Kultura (Paris), (July-August 1978), pp. 3-9. trans. in JPRS ^71590. 78 heavy imports financed by American credits.But these measures were short-run solutions and they were not helping to alleviate the economic pressures that had plagued Poland since 1975. The economy was muddling through with foreign credits (Soviet and Western) - the very thing it needed reduced. Huge subsidies to keep prices down robbed Poland of the hard currency it needed to repay its rising (due to reach $15 billion in 1979) foreign debt. The economic picture at the end of 1978 had not changed much from that of 1975. Gierek's ability to influence the economic situation depended upon access to foreign credits since he lacked popular support for price increases. This access was in jeopardy as
Poland was becoming a less attractive investment. If foreign aid dried up completely Gierek's ability to control (influence) the economic situation would be threotened. This also would be frowned upon by the Soviet Union. As 1978 ended Gierek was maintaining his position, but just barely. One factor in his favor was his solid position within the PUWP.
In 1977 and 1978 Gierek continued to maintain his strong position in the
PUWP. There were no changes in the Politburo or the CC and this writer found no intra-PUWP criticism in either the primary or the secondary sources.
Soviet behavior in 1977 consisted of support for Gierek, A speech by
Gierek in February 1977 at the Ursus tractor plant was published in Pravda,
In this speech Gierek identified certain economic difficulties - "difficulties in supply, power production and transport." Gierek emphasized that these
Reluctant Reformers," Economist, 1 April 1978, p. 79.
^^Pravda, 5 February 1977, p. 4. trans. in CDSP 29, No. 5, p. 20. 79 difficulties existed because a significant portion of industrial enterprises were still in the construction stages. He pointed out that Poland's development rates continued to remain high and he believed the above facts disproved hostile propaganda about a fictitious crisis of the Polish economy. Gierek further stated that the difficulties were temporary and that the Polish government had taken steps to overcome these difficulties. This article showed that the Soviet
Union was supporting Gierek's economic approach because the Soviet Union had published Gierek's statements about his policies in the Soviet press.
Moscow continued its support of Gierek right through the dissident troubles in May. An article in Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow) related the 62 May incidents in a manner totally identical to the Polish press's version. This article related that the student in question did indeed die from a fall due to drunkenness and that the KOR had used the death as an opportunity to demon strate. Like the previous article, this article showed Soviet support for Gierek's handling of the dissidents. In November Gierek spoke In Moscow at the cere monial meeting of the CPSU CC on the Sixteenth Anniversary of the October 63 Revolution. Gierek supported the new Soviet Constitution and stated that
Poland owed its independence to the USSR and that an îndestructable class and national alliance had been forged between Poland and the USSR. Gierek had the support of the Soviet Union and he was also in the Soviet camp.
Nakoryakow, "The Failure of a Certain Provocation," Komsomolakayo Pravda, 12 July 1977, p. 3. trans. in JPRS 69494.
^^Pravda, 3 November 1977, p. 4. trons. in CDSP 29, No. 44, p. 7. 8 0
The remainder of Soviet-Polish interactions consisted of the usual meetings stressing economic integration and the usual exchange of "friendly" leadership visits. There was no available evidence that showed any friction between the
Soviet Union and Poland in 1977. The Soviet leaders were supporting the
Gierek regime and were exerting indirect, subtle influence through the usual channels - Polish leaders and institutional bodies (CMEA and Warsaw Pact).
Soviet behavior in 1978 reflected a degree of dissatisfaction with
Gierek's handling of the opposition. In April, at the height of the Polish government's stalemate with the dissidents, Gierek made an unscheduled two-day visit to M oscow.The fact that the Soviet press account of this meeting did not contain the statement, "complete identity of views," seemed to indicate Soviet dissatisfaction withGierek.Gierek's inability to stem the tide of opposition did not contribute to Soviet interests in Poland. The
Soviet Union desired a loyal communist state where the local Communist Party had supreme control. This was ceasing to be the case in Poland in 1978. Yet,
I do not believe this dissatisfaction led to non-support of Gierek. This was evidenced by the fact that Gierek attended the yearly meeting between Brezhnev and the First Secretaries of all the communist bloc countries in the Crimea.
Further support of the Gierek regime was shown by Soviet approval of Gierek's colleagues. This was evidenced by the increased number of articles in the
Figaro (Paris), 21 April 1978, p. 13. trans. in JPRS ^71254. 65|bid.
66 Pravda, 27 August 1978, p. 1, trans. in CDSP 30, ^34, p. 16. 81
Soviet press by the Polish Politburo. In April 1978, in Izvestia, Henryk
Jablonski, Polish Politburo member, extolled the benefits of the Soviet-Polish alliance and pledged Poland's support of the principles of proletarian inter nationalism.^^ In July 1978 in International Affairs Polish foreign minister
Wojtaszek voiced his support of Soviet foreign policy goals - disarmament, support of Helsinki, e tc .. Also in July 1978 in Pravda Edward Babiuch,
Polish Politburo member, pledged Poland's loyalty to the principles of
Marxist-Leninism and proliterian internationalism.^^ Finally in November
1978 in Sovetskayg Rossiya, Jan Szydlak, Polish Politburo member in charge of ideology, stated that Poland's independence was linked to the victory of the October Revolution.
These articles not only showed Soviet support, they also showed the continuation of the student-teacher relationship and thus indirect Soviet influ ence. The increased amount of influence may be aimed at securing the loyalty of other members of the Polish Politburo in the event an alternative to Gierek is needed. But by the end of 1978 there was still no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union was actively pursuing alternatives to Gierek (e.g. Soviet support of a Politburo shakeup which would bring in a challenger to Gierek).
^^Izvestia, 22 April 1978, p. 5. trans. in JPRS ^7116.
^^Tass, 4 July 1978, trans. In JPRS 71722.
^^Provdo, 22 July 1978, p. 4. trans. in JPRS *^71722.
^^Sovetskaya Rossi ya (Moscow), 19 November 1978, p. 3. trans. in JPRS ^ 72512. 82
Soviet influence had remained indirect in 1977 and 1978, yet this indirect influence increased in 1978 when Gierek's ability to control the opposition was decreasing. It was evident that as Soviet interests were threatened
Soviet pressure tended to increase to the point where itbecame overt as in 1976 and in the 1970 crisis. It should be noted however, that the Soviet Union had no influence over the rise of the dissidents and this opposition forced the Soviet
Union to take a harder look at Gierek. In this way Polish internal events were not strictly dictated by the Soviet Union. The Kremlin's ability to influence and control internal events was limited and management of Poland as a Soviet satellite required caution. The above fact should be kept in mind as Soviet behavior is analyzed in 1979 and 1980.
One final aspect of Soviet behavior in 1978 should be mentioned. In
1978 the Soviet Union foiled to increase oil deliveries toPoland.I did not believe this was non-support because Soviet oil imports to all satellite countries 79 had been severely limited in the 1970's. This failure to increase oil deliveries was, like the 1975 intro-CMEA price increases, part of Soviet grand strategy towards Eastern Europe. Although these measures would tax the satellite econo mies, they would benefit the Soviet economy (increased oil deliveries to the satellite countries would rob the Soviet Union of hard currency earnings and
would also tax the abilities and supplies of the Soviet economy). It was one
^^LeFigaro, 21 April 1978, p. 13.
^^Bornstein, p. 300. 83 thing to sacrifice hard currency in order tofulfill fraternal socialist obligations, 73 it was quite another to do so at the expense of Soviet economic development.
1979
The troubles that had plagued Gierek in the previous years continued in
1979. The government stalemate with the opposition continued as the opposition dug in deeper and became a part of reality in Polishsociety.The economic situation became progressively worse. In February the government came out and said that planned goals in agriculture and industry would not be achieved.
In March it was learned that Poland's foreign debt stood at $15 billion and that the debt service would be fifty percent of anticipated hard currency earnings.
Meat lines continued and prices remained subsidized and housing remained a major problem; also trade with the West had been cut back.^^ The Polish economy was clearly in dire straits.
In addition to the above problems G ierek, for the first time, began to receive criticism from within the PUWP, In July, Politburo member Zdzislaw
Grudzien, called for a further deepening of the Marxist-Leninist knowledge of
^^Quoted in Leslie Dienes, "The Soviet Energy Policy," in Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, p. 227.
^^For details see Kultura (Paris), (March 1979), pp. 39-52. trans. in JPRS «^73433.
Divided We Explode," Economist, 24 February 1979, p. 50.
Reaching an Economic Make or Break Point," Business Week, 14 May 1979, p. 48. 77ibid. 8 4 the members of the party and also stated that recent party discussions had featured "negative phenomena incompatible with party morality,"^® This intra-PUWP criticism came out into the open at the Thirteenth CC Plenum in
August. Tadeusz Grab ski, a CC member for almost four years, delivered a speech
79 extremely critical of current PUWP policies. Grabski began his speech by noting "inconviences" of the economy - lines, shortages, and insufficient coordination. He called the annual economic plan "a document more of propaganda than of an economic type." He said that bad moods are percolating into the spheres of intraparty life and that party discipline was loosening. He finished the speech with favorable references to the Soviet Union (a prerequisite for all Polish leaders) and criticized the lenient handling of the reactionaries
(the government had released most of the workers arrested in 1976).
Grabski's speech was important for several reasons. First, it confirmed the economic difficulties. Second, it confirmed intro-party differences on the handling of the opposition. Third, it confirmed the loosening of party discipline identified by Grudzien. Fourth, and most important, Grabski's article identified a division in the party between hardliners and moderates. This Is evidenced by his statement on the handling of reactionaries and his statement on the loosening of party ties. There seemed to be sentiment in the PUWP for more meaningful economic reform but also for a hardening towards the opposition.
Gierek was offering neither and thus his control of the PUWP was being eroded.
^^Zycie Partii (July 1979), pp. 5-6 trans. in JPRS ^74509.
^^See Dziennik Polski (London), 16 August 1979, trans. in JPRS ^74156. 85
Additional evidence on intra-PUWP division was contained in an article 80 in Kultura (Paris) In September 1979. This article detailed backstage maneu vering by Gierek and Olszowski and it said the two were competing for votes
in the Polish Congress in anticipation of the convening of the Congress in early
1980.
Gierek was able to overcome the difficulties by implementing three
measures. First, to satisfy intra-PUWP criticism he appeared to allow a compro
mise. Olszowski retained his position on the Politburo despite his campaign
Q 1 against Gierek. But, Gierek succeeded In removing Grabski, his main critic,
82 from his position as party leader of a province east of Warsaw. Second, to
satisfy the people and intellectuals, Gierek, gave his blessing to a visit by
the Pope, the former Polish Cardinal Karol W ojtyla, in June 1979. This
maneuver went a long way to divert attention away from the economy and thus
helped to calm the mood of discontent. Gierek's policy of cooperation with the
Pope, and the Catholic Church In general, was outlined by M. F. Rakowski, 83 editor of Polityka. Rakowski stated that "the world outlook differences between
the Catholics and Communists need not be an obstacle in conducting not only
dialogue, but actions aimed at creating the basis of cooperation in all fields of
®^For details see Kultura (September 1979), pp. 69-74. trans. in JPRS ^74371.
®^lbid.
^%altimore Sun, 26 August 1980, p. 1.
®^See Polityka, 2 June 1979, pp. 1, 4. trons. in JPRS ^73808. 8 6 life." The Gierek regime was openly stating that the Catholic Church could exist in a Polish Communist state. In my opinion this was a very realistic and prudent policy by Gierek because of the high percentage of Catholics in
Poland and the passive influence of the Catholic Church in Poland. (I say passive because I believe the Church cannot influence events in a big way by its own action. Yet, the actions of the government against the Church, if overly repressive, could rally the people against the party leadership.)
The third and final policy Gierek followed was one of continued loyalty to the Soviet Union. In May in Pravda, Gierek pledged his support of Soviet foreign policy and stated that Polish foreign policy was based on the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems,
In August G ierek, on vacation in the Soviet Union, met with Brezhnev in the
Kremlin.At this meeting considerable attention was given to the prospects for Soviet-Polish cooperation. The two parties emphasized the strengthening fraternal friendship between the Soviet and Polish peoples. The meeting was described as taking place in "cordial, friendly atmosphere and revealed complete unity of views on all questions discussed." Later in August Gierek attended the annual falling-into-line meeting between Brezhnev and all of the First
Secretaries of the communist bloc in the Crimea.®^ At this meeting all parties
^^Pravda, 8 May 1979, p. 5. trans. in JPRS ^73819.
^^Pravda, 5 August 1979, p. 1. trans. in CDSP 31, No. 31, p. 18.
^^Pravda, 18 August 1979, p. 1. trons. in CDSP 31, No. 33, p. 4. 87 pledged their support of Soviet policies. From these articles it could be seen that Gierek was firmly in the Soviet camp. Gierek knew that tacit Soviet approval was needed for the measures he undertook in 1979. G ierek, by demonstrating an ability to control (to a greater degree than in 1978) the internal situation received Soviet support for his policies.
Soviet support of Gierek's policies was seen early in 1979. In the
January edition of the Soviet publication, Nauka i Reltgia, the election of the new Polish Pope was discussed.This article lauded the Pope's intent to
normalize the Church's relations with the state in socialist countries. It mentioned that Brezhnev sent the new Pope a congratulatory telegram. Later, during the
Pope's visit to Poland Pravda gave a non-derogatory factual account of the oq Pope's activities. After the Pope's visit Pravda quoted Trybuna Ludu's account
8 9 of the visit supporting the Polish treatment of the matter. The Soviet treatment
of the Pope's visit supported the Polish position. The Soviet Union in no way attempted to prohibit or challenge the visit. In this way, it could be seen that the Soviet Union approved of the visit since it did meet Soviet interests by
stemming the mood of discontent and thus be contributing to internal stability.
8 7 Naulvj i Religjg (Moscow), (January), pp. 59-62. trans. in CDSP 31, No. 13, p. 18.
^^Pravda, 13 June 1979, p. 5. trons. in CDSP 31, No. 22, p. 19; and Pravda, 9 June 1979, p. 4. trans. in CDSP 31, No. 23, p. 17.
^^Provdg, 14 June 1979, p. 5. trons. in CDSP 31, No. 24, p. 18. 88
It could also be said that Soviet approval of the visit and of the conciliatory approach to the Church had an influence on Gierek. Without Soviet support he probably would not have undertaken his policy of cooperation. The Soviet
Union did again exert a subtle influence in this matter.
The Soviet leadere also supported Gierek's compromise in internal PUWP affairs. Just prior to the CC Plenum Gierek and Brezhnev had met and expressed complete unity of views. Assuming Gierek knew what he faced at the Plenum, it could be speculated that future Plenum matters were discussed between Gierek and Brezhnev. The complete unity of views seemed to indicate that Brezhnev would support Gierek's moves at the Plenum. Moreover, since the moves satisfied the Gierek and anti-Gierek factions of the PUWP and allowed Gierek to maintain his position (clearly in the Soviet interest), it could be sold that the
Soviet Union had an influence, again subtle, on this party compromise. Gierek's attendance at the Crimea meeting and Soviet behavior in early 1980 was further evidence of Soviet support of Gierek's policies.
The remainder of Soviet-Polish relations in 1979 consisted of routine leader meetings and discussions of economic ties. Throughout 1979 Soviet behavior was one of support for Gierek, and Soviet influence remained subtle and indirect.
One final point needs to be made concerning Soviet influence on Polish events in 1979. Two developments again pointed to the limits of Soviet influence.
First, the Polish government decided to freeze its defense budget in 1979, 8 9 9 0 despite a Soviet request that Warsaw Pact countries increase their budgets.
This worked against Soviet interests and was dictated by Poland's internal economic realities and not Soviet behavior. Second, opposition within the PUWP developed despite a major Soviet influence on PUWP affairs. This division in the PUWP, like the rise of Intellectual opposition, forced the Soviet leaders to slightly alter their behavior in that they had to make decisions on problems previously unforeseen
(e.g. the question of compromise at the Thirteenth CC Polish Plenum). This showed that many times Soviet behavior is reactive rather than anticipatory or premeditated. In 1977 and 1978 the Soviet leaders had to decide how to deal with the opposition, and once this decision was made, they had to decide what behavior would maximize their success in implementing their decision. The same process had to be undertaken in 1979 with respect to the opposition within the PUWP. Thus the Soviet Union did exert an influence, but this influence was not always the deciding factor in the course of Polish events. The events in
1980 followed the above pattern.
Although Gierek had deftly succeeded In maintaining his position, his future was by no means secure. He still faced severe economic difficulties and well organized opposition. The one thing in his favor at the end of 1979, supreme control over the PUWP, was gone. G ierek, like Gomulka before him, was left with only one alternative, complete adherence to Soviet policies. And,
^^Perdro Ramet, "Poland's Economic Dilemma," New Leader, 5 May 1980, pp. 4-5. 90
like his predecessor, Gierek would discover this was not enough because a satellite leader needs Soviet support and an internal base. Gierek's internal base was disappearing.
1980
At the Polish Party Congress in February it was evident that Gierek's
NEM was 0 failure. Gierek detailed Poland's economic woes and laid out a
91 new strategy. He said a rise in real wages will come only if productivity and labor improved. In the next Five-Year Plan investment would be concen- troted in the fields of energy, transport, and agriculture (a major sore spot).
Gierek went on to say that an effort would be mode to pay off a hard-currency
debt of $18 billion, but he pointed out that Poland would have to borrow nearly
$7 billion for repayments and debt service charges. Additional talk at the
Congress concerned a "rational" price structure and a worker input into the
management of the economy. Gierek promised to strengthen the role of workers'
self-management through the Workers Councils. (Yet, legislation in 1974
had reduced the councils chiefly to disciplinary organs.)
In addition to the plan changes Gierek succeeded in orchestrating two
key personnel changes at the Congress. First, Piotr Jaroszewicz, Prime Minister,
was replaced by Edward Babiuch. Babiuch had long been a close associate of
92 Gierek and had a reputation as on able administrator. Jaroszewicz was used
91 See "Poorer Than Last Year," Economist, 16 February 1980, p. 87; and Ramet, pp. 4-5. 99 ^“^Ramet, p. 5. 91 as 0 scapegoat for the poor economic performance of Gierek's regime. Second,
Stefan Olszowski, long time rival of Gierek, was removed from the Politburo oq and appointed as Poland's ambassador to East Germany. Olszowski's ousting removed from the Politburo the only true challenger to Gierek. These two moves solidified Gierek's position in the PUWP and allowed him to regain temporary control of the PUWP.
The Soviet Union supported Gierek's moves at the Congress. The Soviet
Union extended to Poland a $1 billion hard-currency loan and in doing so it 94 gave its tacit approval to Gierek's personnel changes. The loan expressed
Soviet confidence in Gierek's economic plans and his personnel changes. Also, this loan was overt Soviet influence exerted on Poland. The internal situation in Poland at the end of 1979 may have dictated to the Soviet Union that Gierek's position needed strengthening. Through the loan and approval of the personnel changes the Soviet Ui rn exerted o direct influence on the internal situation, an influence that led to a strengthening of Gierek's position and thus a strength ening of the Soviet interests in Poland. Soviet support was a sign to other groups that Gierek's policies alone had Soviet approval and that alternatives were not being considered. Further evidence of Soviet support could be seen in Bobiuch's trip to Moscow in May at the invitation of the Soviet leadership.Babiuch met
^%altimore Sun, 25 August 1980, p. 1; and Newsweek, 8 September 1980, p. 31.
^^Economist, 16 February 1980, p. 87.
^^Provdo, 9 May 1980, p. 1. trans. in CDSP 32, No. 19, p. 17. 92 with Kosygin and Brezhnev in a "cordial atmosphere" characterized by "complete mutual understanding." Babiuch clearly had Soviet approval and Babiuch
himself was clearly within the Soviet comp. Thus, throughout the first part of the year the Soviet Union was continuing its support of Gierek and his policies.
Although Gierek's party position had been strengthened at the Congress,
his internal position (independent of PUWP matters) had not been improved.
Gierek had failed to make any meaningful economic reform (change in system)
and the economy continued to stagnate. By April queues were reaching gigantic
proportions,^^ and meat shortagescontinued.In addition, an article in
Polityka detailed the enormous problems of workers in plants who rarely obtained
housing and could not take advantage of help offered by the plant because loans
were no good without things to buy (house, cor).^^ This last article was par
ticularly important because it gave an indication of worker dissatisfaction.
This dissatisfaction first surfaced at the February Congress in Gierek's reference
to a need for greater worker input into the management of the economy. Thus,
it was evident that the stagnating economy hod alienated the workers. This
development proved to be the undoing of Gierek and combined with the organized
intellectual opposition, presented, for the first time, united opposition against
the Gierek regime.
^^Kultura (April 1980), pp. 70-79. trans. in JPRS ^75781.
97 Ramet, p. 5.
^^Polityka, 3 May 1980, p. 3, trons. in JPRS ^75838. 93
Gierek, with a solid PUWP position and Soviet support behind him, decided on July 2, 1980 to increase the price of certainmeats.Apparently
Gierek believed his position was solid enough to undertake the price increases.
Also, it was possible that Gierek undertook the price increases to re-establish his authority over the people, an authority that had been eroded since the events of June 1976. Finally, Gierek probably believed that the price increases would be the first step towards restoring the Polish economy to some degree of viability. The price increases did not achieve any of these goals.
On the same day that the price increases were announced, strikes broke out in a number of industrial plants throughout the country. OnJuly 10
Gierek told the workers they would hove to accept higher prices or hold back their demands for increased wages. After strikes spread to the eastern city of Lublin, Communist Party leaders appealed for workers to return to their jobs
102 and warned that walkouts could cause "anxiety omong our friends." The government's early approach was to maintain their position on the price increases,
(The reference to "our friends" was a reference to the Soviet Union.) On July 18 the Politburo held an emergency session and set up a commission on workers
^^Baltimore Sun, 4 July 1980, p. 2.
^^^Chronology of a Crisis", New York Times, 31 August 1980, p. A-16.
^^^Baltimore Sun, 11 July 1980, p. 1.
^^^Boltimore Sun, 19 July 1980, p. 1. 94 inq rights; and onJuly 20 the Lublin strikers accepted a compromise pay offer.
Things remained quiet for the remainder of July and at the endJuly of G ierek, on vacation met with Brezhnev in Moscow, Complete mutual understanding between the two was expressed,
The July events had damaged Gierek's authority evidenced by the compromise reached with the Lublin workers. The price increases had achieved the opposite of what Gierek wanted. Yet, through the compromise Gierek was able to maintain control and thus the support of the Soviet Union. There was still no evidence at this point to suggest that the Soviet Union was seeking on alternative. In August Gierek’s position became untenable.
In August strikes spread to other professions (bus drivers, taxi drivers) and on August 14 unrest broke out in Gdansk, where workers took over the Lenin
Shipyard. Strikes spread to other coastal cities and on August 16 representa tives of twenty-one separate enterprises from the coastal areas set up an Interfactory
Strike Committee (MKS) with headquarters at the Gdansk shipyard. The first act undertaken by MKS was to put forth a list of sixteen demands which included pay raises, the right to strike, the right to form an independent union, and freedom of expression, The above events were unprecedented ina Soviet
^^^New York Times, 31 August 1980.
^^^Pravdg, 1 August 1980, p. 1. trans. in CDSP 32, No, 31, p. 14.
^^^New York Times, 31 August 1980.
^^Jan^ ^ J a n B. DeWeydenthal, "Worker"Workers and Party In Poland, "Problems of Communism (November-December 1980): 2.
^^^DeWeydenthal, "Workers and Party," p. 8. 95 satellite country. The workers were ignoring the party trade unions and thus were directly challenging the communist system. Glerek recognized this challenge and promised pay raises (which negated the price increases), but he
1 OS refused to meet the political demands. At about this time the government
implementeda widespread crackdown on the dissidents, but this only strengthened the resolve of the workers. A government commission headed first by T. Pyka
(deputy Prime Minister) and then by M. Jagielski, held initial meetings with the
workers, but failed to reach on agreement. Gierek's measures were foiling to gain order and his authority wos gone. These developments were not in the
Soviet interest, and it could be speculated that the Soviet Union began to look for a viable alternative.
The Soviet Union's first move was to begin jamming Western radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union. This showed a clear dissatisfaction with the events in Poland. Next, at a Plenary session of the PUWP CC a major purge
of hardliners took place. Bobiuch, Lukaszewicz, Szydlak, and Wrzaszczyk
were removed from the Politburo. All of these men were directly tied to
Gierek. In addition S. Olszowski and J. Pinkowski were elected os members
of the Politburo and T. Grabski os a CC member; also, Olszowski and
E. Wojtoszek were elected as members of the Secretariat. ^ ^ ^ The fact that
^^%altimore Sun, 19 August 1980, p. 1.
^^^New York Times, 31 August 1980.
^ ^^Provdo, 25 August 1980, p. 4. trons. in CDSP 32, No. 33, p. 2.
111|bid. 96
Olszowski and Grabski were resurrected indicated that this shakeup was probably a Soviet initiative. Gierek would never hove allowed his two main critics to be reinstated, much less have allowed Olszowski into the Secretariat. This shakeup was aimed at bringing into the Politburo figures not associated with Gierek. In
Olszowski and company the Soviet leaders probably saw a viable alternative, and Gierek was, for all intents and purposes, finished.
One other important event took place at the CC Plenum, Stanislaw
Kania, a member of Gierek's Secretariat and Politburo (but not part of Gierek's inner circle evidenced by the fact that he never accompanied Gierek and company to Moscow), gave the opening briefing on the present social and
112 political situation in Poland. This was a new development for Kania and indicated he was a rising star and had Soviet approval. At this point it was clear that Kania and Olszowski were the leading candidates as Gierek’s replace ment. A direct Soviet influence hod probably made this possible. Yet Soviet influence was not able to stem the tide of the workers' demands.
As government-worker negotiations continued in Gdansk, strikes spread to the mining area of Selesio. Finally, an agreement was reached in Gdansk on August 3 1 . The ogreem: nt gave the workers a right to strike and the right to form an independent trade union, but the workers recognized the leading role
nZthid.
T^^See DeWeydenthal, "Workers and Party.' 97 of the PUWP and Poland's alliances and international obligations. The workers had succeeded In establishing a parallel, alternative structure to the PUWP and thus had challenged the supremacy of the PUWP in all affairs. This went directly against Soviet interests.
The establishment of an independent trade union by the workers in Poland was on unprecedented development in the Soviet bloc. As the leader of the union. Lech Walesa had emerged as a spontaneous leader. These developments, if they survive the crisis, could seriously undermine the influence of the Soviet
Union in Poland; because an independent trade union with an influential leader would jeopardize the monopoly of the PUWP, and it is through the PUWP that the Soviet Union exerts influence on Polish events.
The Soviet Union could not have been happy with these developments and expressed its displeasure in press statements after a twenty-four hour delay.
The Soviet Union accused 'anti-socialist" strike leaders of trying to break the workers' ties to the Communist Party. Further Soviet dissatisfaction was seen in the ouster of Gierek as First Secretary and the approval of Konio in hisploce. Kania, as head of the security police, could most efficiently implement a crackdown on the workers, and the support of Kanlo^^^y the Kremlin was a sign to the workers that the Soviet Union would use force if necessary to put down the workers. This
^^^For list of Soviet press statements see Baltimore Sun, 2 September 1980, p. A-4.
^ ^^Support reflected in his election as First Secretary; this could not have been achieved without Soviet approval. 98 support of Konio also signaled Soviet willingness to fight the implementation of the reforms. Thus, the Soviet leaders seemed to have initially opted for the hard-line towards the workers and the Gdansk agreement. The election of
Olszowski to First Secretary would have signaled a concilotory approach because
Olszowski had popular support anda reputation os a reformer. ^ Soviet support of Konio in the form of a $100 million loon^ and favorable Soviet press statements (Brezhnev described him as a leader who held firm positions of proletarian internationalism and Poland's indestructible friendship with the Soviet
Union and the other socialist states)^ indicated that Kania was indeed their short-run choice. Yet, it should be pointed out that Olszowski and Grabski 119 (elected secretary of PUWP CC) still held positions of power and could not be ruled out as alternatives to Kania.
The Soviet Union's influence in the 1980 crisis hod become overt when its interests were directly threatened. The probable initiation of the Politburo shakeup in late August was designed to influence the workers to moderate their demands. In a sense they did so by their acceptance of the leading role of the party, yet the workers' securing of a trade union forced the Soviet Union to
^ ^^Newsweek, 8 September 1980, p. 31.
^ ^^Newsweek, 15 September 1980, p. 47,
^^^Pravda, 7 September 1980, p. 1, trans. in CDSP 32, No. 36, p. 5
^^^Pravdo, 7 September 1980, p. 4. trons. in CDSP 32, No. 36, p. 6. 99 act again {removal of Gierek) in an attempt to rollback the workers' victory.
Again Soviet influence was only one factor (and this time not the deciding factor) influencing the course of Polish events.
In the remaining months of 1980 the PUWP leadership occupied itself with an attempt to roll back the reforms - a direct Soviet interest and thus undertaken with Soviet support. The PUWP dragged Its feet on implementation of the Gdansk agreements. Meanwhile the workers used their new right to strike effectively and won numerous victories. The workers succeeded in registering 10 million workersand in placing the affirmation of the leading role of the PUWP in the annex to the union charter rather than in the body of the charter. By the end of 1980 the workers hod established the Solidarity Union as a viable counter-structure to the PUWP.
The PUWP itself was divided and this hurt its ability to roll back the
Gdansk agreements. Internally, by the end of 1980, the PUWP was split into
199 • f. three factions. The first faction was headed by T, Fiszback,First Secretary of the Gdansk party organization; he was arguing for a clear acceptance of significant social change. The second faction was headed by Grabski (elected to the Politburo in December), Olszowski, and Rakowski; these men believed that the primary task should be to streamline the economy without internal
^^®See Washington Post, 2 October 1980, p. 1.
^^^Time, 24 November 1980, pp. 49-50.
^^^Factions identified In DeWeydenthal, "Workers and Party," p. 15.
^^^Woshington Post, 3 December 1980, p. A-21, 100 organizational changes. The third faction was headed by Moczar (re-elected to Politburo in December)who believed that the party should be purified before any policy changes were made. The fact the PUWP was divided hurt the Soviet Union's influence on the events.
Soviet behavior throughout the remainder of 1980 was directed towards rolling bock the reforms and manifesting guarded support of Konio. This rollback behavior could be seen in the nature of the Soviet press. Pravda articles constantly quoted Trybuno Ludu articles toeing the Soviet line. A representative 19^ article appeared in Pravda on November 17, This stated that the Polish
leadership could not agree that the trade unions should be independent of the party or become the "sole" authentic representatives of the workers. The article went on to say that the working class's role should be expressed by Its political
organization, by its party, and the state system it has created - the people's
councils, and the Sejm. Finally, the article stated that only a continuation of the previous foreign policy could make Poland an active participant in European cooperation. (This article not only showed Soviet dissatisfaction but it showed that the Polish leadership was seeking a rollback since the above statements
were quoted from the Polish party newspaper.) This "negative" attitude of the
Soviet press was combined with overt intimidation. In late September radio traffic indicated that the Soviet army had mounted an extensive "command post"
124|bid.
^25pravda, 17 November 1980, p. 4. trons. in CDSP 32, No. 46, p. 15. 101 exercise designed to test communications, coordination, and logistics for a 1 9A troop movement into Poland. The military activity was clearly intended to influence both the workers (to moderate their demands) and the PUWP leadership (to continue their rollback campaign). Rollback behavior (negative press statements and military activit)) showed that the Soviet Union was considering a military invasion as one of its alternatives. Further support of this view was 127 found in the October 31 meeting between Polish and Soviet leaders in Moscow.
At this meeting Kania and Pinkowski met with Brezhnev, Tikhonov (Kosygin's replacement), Gromyko, and Rusakov. The presence of Rusakov (chief of the
CPSU Department of Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist
Countries) indicated that the Soviet Union was considering all options that required the expertise of Rusakov. Also, Rusakov was probably used to impress upon the Polish leaders the graveness of the situation (that it may require military intervention). The fact that unity of views was reached showed that the Polish leaders were aware of the feelings of their Soviet counterparts.
The Soviet Union supported Konio's rollback or non-implementation campaign. It has been shown that the Soviet Union probably initiated the
August Politburo changes and had brought great pressure to bear on Konio to maintain his hard-line attitude towards the workers. In this way they supported
Kania since he was representing Soviet interests. Yet Soviet support was
^^^News^^eek, 29 September 1980, p. 35.
^27por details see Pravda, 31 October 1980, p. 1. trons. in CDSP 32, No. 44, p. 12. 102
guarded. This was evident by the existence of several factions in the Politburo.
Olszowski, Moczar, and Grabski had been established as alternatives. Moczar
was permitted space in the Soviet press and took the opportunity to pledge his
128 confidence in the communist system.
The pattern of Soviet behavior in the post-agreement period remained
unchanged, and by the end of the year the Soviet Union had completed prépara- 19Q tions for a possible military move into Poland. A railroad strike in early
December threatened to bring Soviet military intervention and only another
1QA compromise prevented the intervention. As the year ended the Soviet leaders
were told by Polish generals that military intervention would be regarded as
131 act of war and resisted by force of arms.
Conclusion
Soviet behavior in the 1980 crisis paralleled Soviet behavior in the 1970
crisis. The evidence suggested several similarities in Soviet behavior in the two
crises.
First, in both crises the Soviet Union's support of its puppets (Gierek and
Gomulka) was continuous. Yet this support did not continue in a straight line.
That is, the Soviet leaders moderated their support when they sow a need to do so.
^28Pravda, 23 November 1980, p. 5. trans. CDSP 32, No. 47, pp. 6-7.
^^^Boltimore Sun, 5 December 1980, p. A-2.
^^^Newsweek, 8 December 1980, p. 41.
Newsweek, 15 December 1980, p. 40. 103 as was the case in 1968 when the Soviet leaders supported and appeared to initiate the rise of the young pragmatists, in 1979 when the Soviet leaders approved of the party compromise by Gierek, and in 1980 when Kania foiled to stem the crisis atmosphere in Poland. Support of the Polish leader was terminated when Soviet interests were directly challenged (as in the riots of
1970 and 1980), and when the Soviet leaders perceived that the Polish leader could no longer maintain his control (and the PUWP's control) over the internal events. Conversely, Soviet support increased when the Polish leader demon strated an ability to control the internal events.
Second, the evidence suggested that Soviet influence was just one of several factors influencing events in Poland. The Polish leadership changes did seem to be orchestrated by the Soviet Union, but these changes were orchestrated only after internal events had dictated these changes. This seemed to indicate that Soviet influence on internal Polish events was limited. That is
Soviet influence over Polish groups outside the PUWP (e.g. workers, intellectuals.
Catholic Church, students) seemed to be negligible. This limited influence was particularly visible in the 1980 crisis when those groups independent of the party, the dissidents and the workers, established organized opposition to the PUWP through their respective organizations, the KOR and the Solidarity Union,
Third, the evidence suggested a correlation between Soviet influence and the ability of the PUWP's leadership to maintain control. That is Soviet influence seemed to increase when the Polish party leadership began to lose control of the internal situation. In 1970 the Soviet leaders, when they perceived 104 that Gomulka had lost control of the Polish situation, seemed to have orchestrated a change in the Polish leadership. Likewise, in 1980, when the Soviet leaders perceived that Gierek had lost control of the Polish situation they seemed to
hove orchestrated another change in the Polish leadership. Thus, the evidence
seemed to suggest that a loss of control by the PUWP leadership will result in
increased and overt Soviet Influence.
Fourth, if it can be assumed, as the evidence suggested, that the Soviet
Union orchestrated the Polish leadership changes, then the selection of Gierek
to replace Gomulka in 1970 and the selection of Konio to replace Gierek in
1980, indicated the existence of a specific set of conditions required by the
Soviet Union for a Polish leader. Both Kania and Gierek were members of the
Secretariat prior to their rise to power, but they were not port of the inner
circle of the Polish leadership. This was indicated by their absence at high
level meetings between the Soviet and Polish leaderships. In addition both
Konio and Gierek were believed to be loyal supporters of the Soviet Union and
its policies. Thus, the evidence suggested that a candidate for the Polish
leadership should not be part of the inner circle of the former Polish leadership
(this would give the candidate a credibility with the relevant internal groups
since he would not be perceived as a key member in the former leadership),
that he should have experience on the Secretariat of the PUWP, and that he
should have demonstrated a loyalty to the policies of the Soviet Union.
(Membership on the Politburo is assumed.) An individual's candidacy would
probably be enhanced if he possessed askill or expertise in addition to the 105 above requirements. For example, Gierek had demonstrated an economic managerial skill and Konio had directed the party security apparatus.
Fifth, the evidence suggested that military intervention was indeed a lost resort for the Soviet Union. In both crises the Soviet leaders established a new Polish leader with Soviet aid and support. Thus, this appeared to be the favored policy by the Soviet Union in times of crisis in Poland. This suggested that in the minds of the Soviet leaders military intervention entailed a very high cost to the Soviet Union. This seemed to be especially true in the 1980 crisis.
The costs to the Soviet Union of a military invasion of Poland were 199 detailed by Seweryn Bioler in o recent issue of Foreign Affairs. First, in all probability, a Soviet military invasion of Poland would lead to o virtual state of war with the Polish workers and the Polish nation. It is very probable that individual units of the Polish armed forces would resist a Soviet invasion.
The exercise might become a very bloody and protracted affair. Second, the
Soviet Union would acquire a staggering burden following the subjugation of the Polish nation. The Soviet government would not only hove to maintain its occupying army, but it would have to feed the Polish people, sustain the Polish economy, and service o Polish debt of $22 billion to the West. Third, an invasion of Poland would probably shatter the last ties between the CPSU and leading communist parties in Western Europe,
^82see Bioler, pp. 534-536. 106
Fourth, an invasion would destroy what is left of detente with the West and would heal the split in NATO which developed when the NATO countries could not agree on sanctions against the Soviet Union over its invasion of
Afghanistan. Lastly, an invasion of Poland would probably ensure a hardening
of Soviet-U.S. relations.
In summary, the costs to the Soviet Union of a military invasion of Poland in December 1980 would indeed be enormous, and the evidence has suggested that the Soviet leaders recognized these costs since they pursued policies short of military intervention (e.g. support of a new Polish leader, intimidation, and
mobilization of troops).
The course of Soviet policy in the two crises also seemed to demonstrate the changing emphasis the Soviet Union put on its goals in Poland (and Eastern
Europe in general).
In the 1970 crisis the Soviet Union still sought to achieve its original military, ideological, and economic goals as outlined in Chapter One. All three of these goals were pursued equally throughout the 1970 crisis. The
military goal was maintained by securing Poland's membership in the Warsaw
Pact alliance. The fact that Poland contributed troops to the Czechoslovakian
invasion in 1968 supported the view that the military goal maintained its position
in the Soviet Union's policy. The economic goal was maintained by securing
Poland's membership in CMEA and by the Soviet Union's implementation of
increased economic integration of Poland into the CMEA structure in the post-December 1970 period. It should be noted that the economic goal had 107 progressed past the point of strict Soviet exploitation of Eastern Europe (and
Poland), but this economic goal had not yet reached the point where Eastern
Europe was perceived as a viable trading partner. The ideological goal was maintained through continued support by the Soviet Union of Poland's anti- revisionist and anti-criticism campaigns (especially in 1969), and by the Soviet
Union's implementation of increased ideological integration between Poland and the Soviet Union. The fact that no clear counter-structure to the PUWP developed
in Poland supported the view that the Soviet Union continued to emphasize its ideological goal in Poland. (It was probable that the Soviet Union influenced
Polish hard-line domestic policy.) There was no evidence to suggest that the
Soviet Union de-emphosized any of its original three goals in Its policy towards
Poland in the December 1970 crisis.
In the 1980 crisis it appeared that the Soviet Union's behavior demon strated a change in emphasis on its goals in Eastern Europe. That is the Soviet
Union's behavior seemed to indicote a revision of Its three goals to two goals.
The military goal maintained its position (high priority) in the Soviet Union's policy in the years 1975 thru 1980. Again the military goal was maintained by securing Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact alliance; the conditions of this membership did not change and Poland continued to support all facets of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. The economic goal underwent a substantial change without losing its high priority in the Soviet Union's policy. The Soviet
Union came to realize that strict exploitation and economic integration would no longer meet either the Soviet Union's interests in Eastern Europe or the Internal T08 needs of the Soviet Union's economy. Therefore the economic goal of the Soviet
Union in Eastern Europe became the establishment of Eastern Europe os a viable trading partner. The 1975 price increases, the Soviet Union's approval of increased East European economic ties with the West and the denial (in 1978) by the Soviet Union of increased oil shipments to Poland, oil seemed to hove demonstrated a desire on the port of the Soviet Union to establish a viable Eastern
Europe.
The evidence also suggested that in 1980 the Soviet Union's ideological goal in Poland had been assigned (at least)a lower priority by the Soviet Union.
The increased stature of the Catholic Church (culminating in the 1979 visit of the new Polish Pope), the establishment of organized opposition in the form of the KOR, and the existence of o free labor union, all support the view that the
Soviet Union was willing to forego strict ideological cohesion in exchange for internal stability. The fact that the Soviet Union maintained its interest in securing the supremacy of PUWP (evidenced by the Soviet Union's rollback campaign) demonstrated that the Soviet Union did not completely abandon its ideological goal in Poland, This was because the supremacy of the party in all affairs was the cornerstone of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Thus, the view estab lished in Chapter One that the Soviet Union no longer has an ideological goal in Poland (and East Europe) must be revised. The Soviet Union does have an ideological goal, but it seems it has been assigned a lower priority below the military and economic goals. 109
A final note is needed to deal with the future course of events of the
1980 crisis. This paper covered events through December 1980 and therefore
the paper's relevancy is limited to events prior to 1981. However, the findings
of the paper might be helpful in shedding some light on the future course of
events in Poland in 1981.
The findings suggest that in the future the Soviet leaders will continue to exert their major influence over the PUWP leadership. The Soviet leaders
will most likely continue to support that individual who con demonstrate an
ability to control the internal situation by maintaining the supremacy of the
PUWP in all Polish affairs and by maintaining loyalty to the Soviet Union and
its policies. The findings suggest that Soviet influence will increase if the
Polish leadership fails to control the internal situation. That is the Soviet
leaders will probably support a new individual for the position of First Secretary
of the PUWP if they perceive that the current leader (Kania) has lost control of
the internal situation. If a new Polish leader is named his qualifications would
probably include several years experience on the Secretariat (and membership
on the Politburo), and a demonstrated loyalty to the Soviet Union and its
policies. In addition a new leader would probably not be part of the inner circle
of the former Polish leadership. Olszowski would seem to be the most likely
candidate to replace Kania since Olszowski seems to meet the present requirements
for a Polish leader.
Finally, it seems probable that military intervention, because of the
extremely high costs to the Soviet Union, will remain only o lost resort for the
Soviet Union. CHAPTER IV
MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING
This chapter will consider the utility of the approaches to Soviet decision
making outlined in Chapter O ne. The utility of each approach will be determined through a three-stage process. First, I shall set down the assumptions of each model.*
Second, I shall use the assumptions to try to explain Soviet policy towards Poland.
Third, I shall take the results from the second stage and I will formulate a balance
sheet for each approach. That is, I shall determine the limitations and applicability
of the approaches, and in this way assess the utility of each one. It should be
noted that I intend to argue for the use of the analytic and cybernetic models as
complementary approaches to decision-making. Finally, I shall try to show that
Huntington's and Brzezinski's approach,**usually considered as a model dealing
with internal relationships in Soviet decision-making does have some utility in
explaining Soviet decision-making where external relationships are present.
The major exponent of the cybernetic model is John D. Stelnbruner and
the discussion here is based on his book. The Cybernetic Theory of Decision. ^
*The terms model and approach will be used interchangeably.
** Henceforth referred to in the text as the "H/B approach."
^See John D, Stelnbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
110 n i
The thesis of the cybernetic model is that the central focus of the decision process
is the business of eliminating the variety inherent in any significant decision
problem. The cybernetic approach tries to get away from sophisticated mechanisms
of decision-making.
The simplest cybernetic mechanisms do not confront the issue of variety
(the enormous amount of information flowing to the decision-maker), for they
make no calculations of the environment. The cybernetic mechanisms merely track a few feedback variables and beyond that ore perfectly blind to the
environment. The cybernetic decision-maker has a list of operations which he
performs in sequence while monitoring a few feedback variables. He produces
an outcome as a consequence of completing the sequence, but the outcome need
not be conceptualized in advance.
The first major assertion of the cybernetic model is that values are
minimally articulated. That is the cybernetic decision-maker does not assign
values to desirable courses of actions because he does not make outcome
calculations. The essential criterion for the cybernetic decision-maker is simply
survival. Therefore the second major assertion of the cybernetic approach is
that outcome considerations are avoided in the process of decision-making. This
does not mean that the cybernetic decision-maker avoids processing information,
but he is not engaged in the pursuit of on explicitly designed result. He focuses
attention on a few incoming variables without calculating their consequences.
The third major assertion of the cybernetic model is that there is an
established set of responses and thus there is an established and highly focused 112 feedback channel. That is, the cybernetic decision-maker is sensitive to information only if it enters through an established feedback channel and hence many factors which affect the outcome have no effect in the decision process.
The fourth assertion of the cybernetic approach concerns its adaptability in times of complex decision-making. Stelnbruner says that the internal simplicity of the cybernetic approach can be preserved under complexity if the number of decision-makers concerned with the problem is increased. This would allow a more elaborate list of responses with each decision-maker focusing on some limited dimension of the decision. Complex problems thus become fragmented into a larger number of specific problems. This explains the rise of a moss bureaucracy. But Stelnbruner admits that this mass structure must be coordinated to some degree and thus he admits that outcome calculations do creep into the 2 decision-making process at this point.
The final assertion of the cybernetic model is related to its learning mechanism. Cybernetic learning occurs as those responses which are continually successful persist and unsuccessful responses drop out. The cycle of adjustment is slow and occurs sporadically. Thus, the cybernetic approach Is incremental in nature with a marginally adjusting outcome process.
The first and second assertions of the cybernetic approach go together.
In essence these assertions say that the decision-maker avoids direct outcome calculations and he thus avoids any type of preference ordering (value articulation). It has been shown that Soviet policy in the two crises was that
2$teinbruner, p. 77. 113 of continuous support of Gomulka and G ierek. The fact that this support was continuous, albeit with highs and lows, seems to support the first two assertions.
Support allowed the Soviet leaders to keep their decision-making ata simple level and it allowed them to focus their attention on the actions of Gomulka and Gierek. This is not to say that Soviet decision-making proceeded in the absence of relevant information. It is probable that the Soviet leaders received information on the course of Polish events. Yet it seems that all information was utilized in a manner that would maximize the impact of Soviet behavior
(support), or more specifically, maximize Soviet support of Gomulka and Gierek.
Therefore, the Soviet leaders did not appear to hove made outcome calculations or to have undertaken value articulation. If, os the evidence suggests, the
Soviet leaders were not considering alternatives, then it is probable that they were avoiding outcome calculations of alternative courses of action.
The highs and lows of Soviet support also lend credence to the first two assertions of the cybernetic approach. The moderation of support for Gomulka in 1968 (with the initiation of the rise of the young pragmatists) was designed to maintain Soviet interests while at the same time to reduce the unpredictability of internal Polish developments. The Soviet leadership, by molding a pro-Soviet
Polish leadership, would reduce the amount of decision-making concerning Poland.
The pragmatists could be seen os alternatives to Gomulka, but the fact that the
Soviet Union continued its support of Gomulka seemed to indicate that the pragmatists were a long-run alternative. This seemed to be an incremental change by the Soviet Union and it supports the final assertion of the cybernetic approach. 114
The moderation of Soviet support of Gierek in 1979 can be seen in the some light as the 1968 moderation. The Soviet Union gave its tacit approval to the retention of Olszowski on the Polish Politburo. At the time, this seemed to permit the Soviet leaders to ovoid considering alternatives (and outcome calculations), because with Olszowski on the Politburo they could easily promote
Olszowski to the top spot if Gierek's position became untenable. The fact that this appeared to be only an incremental change was strengthened by Olszew ski's removal from the Politburo in 1980.
The increases in Soviet support seem also to substantiate the first two assertions of the cybernetic model in explaining Soviet decision-making. It seems probable that if the Polish leader can maximize his control over the internal situation, Soviet interests will also be maximized in Poland. This development would allow the Soviet Union to ovoid consideration of alternatives, and thus would keep the Soviet decision-making process at a simple level. The increase in Soviet support of Gierek in 1976 and 1980 (in the form of loans and aid packages in addition to the usual avenues of support) was most probably designed to facilitate Gierek's ability to control the internal situation by providing him with a method to improve the economic situation in Poland. Once again these
increases appear to be incremental decisions.
The third assertion of the cybernetic approach says that the cybernetic decision-maker is sensitive to information only if it enters through an established feedback channel, and hence many factors which affect the outcome have no effect in the decision process. This assertion is difficult to test with the evidence 115 presented in this paper because the evidence sheds no light on the internal
mechanism of Soviet foreign policy decision-making. Yet there may be one possible v/oy to test this assumption. The evidence suggests that the Soviet
Union exerts its greatest influence on Polish events through the Polish leadership.
Therefore it might be assumed that an established feedback channel exists between the Soviet and Polish leaderships. For example, through leadership meetings the
Soviet leadership becomes aware of a challenge to its puppet (either Gomulka or
Gierek). Since an established feedback channel assumes an established set of responses in the cybernetic approach, the Soviet Union must then decide whether to moderate or to increase support for its puppet. The established set of responses
is thus either increased or moderated support. Once they implement their
response the Soviet leaders would gain a feedback through the Polish leadership
os to the success of their responses, and would then decide upon a further course
of action if the feedback information called for further action. The fact that
Soviet support, with the highs and lows, was continuous for Gomulka and Gierek
suggests that the above approach may possibly hove some utility in explaining
Soviet policy in these crises.
The fourth assertion soys that in times of complexity the number of
policymakers is increased to provide a more elaborate list of responses. The
evidence suggests that some point in both crises the Soviet leaders appeared
to consider alternatives. This would mean that outcome calculations most
likely took place. 116
The problem with the cybernetic approach is its operation in times of complexity. Stelnbruner has had to alter two of the assertions of the approach in order to deal with complexity. That is, he allows for on increasing number of responses when the approach assumes a limited number of responses. Also, he acknowledges the existence of outcome calculations when the approach assumes the avoidance of outcome considerations. Therefore I believe the approach is best suited to non-complex decision-making.
The balance sheet for the cybernetic approach is mixed. The approach, using the assertions of minimally articulated values, avoidance of outcome calculations, and incremental decision-making, seems toexploin the bulk of
Soviet policy before the height of the crises when evidence suggests that alternatives were not being considered. The third assertion (the existence of an established feedback channel and the existence anof established set of responses) is only partly supported by the evidence. There is no way to prove the existence of on established feedback channel. Yet the evidence does suggest the existence of on established set of responses (Increased or moderated support). The cybernetic approach's utility in complex decision-making Is established only by refuting previous core assertions. This discussion suggests that the greatest utility of the cybernetic approach exists in explaining Soviet decision-making prior to the height of the crises.
The analytic or rational model of decision-making has had much more use than the cybernetic model. The literature on the rational model is extensive and a review of the literature Is beyond the scope of this chapter. It would be a 117 mistake to use one specific application of the rational model to set down the basic assertions of the model. Therefore, the discussion of the analytic model will be based on its discussion in John Steinbruner's book and in the Sage Professional
Paper on Soviet foreign policy decision-making.^ Both of these discussions detail the basic working hypotheses of the analytic model.
The thesis of the analytic approach is that decisions will be token which maximize value given constraints. The decision -maker considers all variables and makes a rational choice in all decisions.
The first major assertion of the rational approach is that values are assigned to possible courses of action. The value of a specific course of action is achieved through a cost/benefit calculation, and once values are assigned to each possible action, these actions are weighed against each other to determine a preference ordering of the possible courses of actions.
The second major assertion of the rational approach is that the decision maker makes direct outcome calculations of the possible courses of action. This assertion implies subjective probabilistic judgements by the decision-maker and it implies sensitivity to pertinent information on the part of the decision-maker.
Also this second major assertion of the analytic approach Implies that the decision-maker will update his outcome calculations with new information as
it becomes relevant to the particular situation.
^See Stelnbruner, pp. 25-46.
^See n. 4 in Chapter One. 118
The third major assertion is that the decision-mal The fourth assertion of the rational approach is that the decision-maker integrates his preferences and outcome judgments to produce an optimal decision by his calculations. Thus, the choosing of an optimal decision is a very subjec tive process and is dependent upon the decision-maker's use of the pertinent information. The final assertion of the rational approach Is that the decision-maker experiences a "causal learning" process. This means that as new information is integrated into the decision-making process, new outcome calculations will take place and thus they are upwardly expanding. It should be noted that my discussion of the utility of the analytic approach will view the Soviet leadership os one entity. This view, os Stelnbruner points out,^ has experienced widespread use (e.g. in Graham Allison's Essence of Decision, and in Jon Trisko's and David Finley's Soviet Foreign Policy) and seems to be an accepted practice. The first and second assertions of the rational approach go together. They suggest that the decision-maker draws up a preference ordering of alternative actions, and then he makes probabilistic outcome calculations of the alternatives. In the discussion of the utility of the cybernetic approach it was shown that the evidence suggested that prior to the height of the crises (changes in the Polish ^Stelnbruner, p. 37. 119 leadership) the Soviet leaders appeared to avoid consideration of alternative courses of actions. This suggests that the Soviet leaders did not undertake a preference ordering of alternative actions and that they did not undertake probabilistic outcome calculations. Thus, the first two assertions appear to have a limited utility in explaining Soviet policy prior to the height of the cirses. The evidence does suggest, however, that the first two assertions appear to have some utility in explaining Soviet policy at the height of the crises. In both crises there was a point where the Soviet Union appeared to consider alternatives to Gierek and Gomulka. This could be seen in Soviet support of Polish leaders other than Gierek and Gomulka in the respective crises. The mobilization of Warsaw Pact troops in the 1980 crisis also seems to support the fact that the Soviet Union was probably considering alternatives to Gierek. If the Soviet leaders were considering alternatives, as the evidence suggests, at the height of the crises, then it is probable that they undertook the exercises of preference ordering and outcome calculation of the alternative actions. Yet, there is no evidence to suggest that the Soviet leaders actually did undertake the processes assumed to be part of the process of choosing alternative courses of action. The lock of evidence damages the utility of the first two assertions in explaining Soviet policy. This lack of evidence is due in part to the type of data (factual, without shedding any light on the actual internal processes of Soviet decision-making) and in part on the nature of the Soviet decision-making process (closed, concealing the actual mechanisms of inputs into the decision making process). 120 The third assertion of the rational approach says that the decision-maker deals with alternative courses of action. This assertion seems to be useful in explaining Soviet policy at the height of the crises when the Soviet leaders appeared to consider alternatives. The fact that they may have considered alternatives is supported by the evidence as mentioned above in the discussion of the first and second assertions of the rational approach. Therefore the third assertion appears to have some utility in explaining Soviet policy at the height of the crises. The fourth assertion of the rational approach says that the decision-maker produces an optimal decision after considering alternative actions. This assertion follows from the previous ones, and the fact that it cannot be determined whether or not preference ordering and outcome calculations were actually made, hurts the utility of this assertion. Yet, this assertion does seem to have some utility in explaining Gierek's rise to power. Gierek, once he became the First Secretary of the PUWP, was able to stabilize and to gain control of the internal Polish situation with the help of Soviet support. History showed that the Soviet Union, in this case, did make the optimal choice at that time. Kania's rise to power seems to disprove the assertion of optimal choice. Kania had not been able to gain control of or to stabilize the Internal situation and thus did not appear to be an optimal choice as far as the Soviet leaders were concerned. The final assertion of the rational approach says that new information is integrated into the decision-making process and this information is used to update outcome,calculations. This assertion has limited utility because, as previously 121 noted, the evidence in this paper sheds no light on the actual processes of Soviet decision-making. Yet, in considering alternatives it is probable that the Soviet leaders did require expanded information on the Polish crises. This last statement is supported by the presence of Rusokov at the October 31, 1980 meeting between Polish and Soviet leaders in Moscow. Rusokov, as chief of the CPSU, Department of Liason with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, can be considered as a specialist on the East European satellite countries, and his presence at the October 1980 meeting seemed to indicate that the Soviet leaders did seek additional information. But the bottom line is that there Is no additional evidence which proves the incorporation of new information by the Soviet leaders. Therefore the final assertion of the rational approach has limited utility in this case. The balance sheet for the rational approach seems to show that it has a limited utility in explaining Soviet policy (in this paper) either prior to the height of the crises or at the height of the crises. Since the approach asserts that the decision-maker considers alternatives, it seems to be blantantly deficient in explaining Soviet policy prior to the height of the crises where the evidence suggests on avoidance of alternative courses of action. Finally the rational approach seems to have only limited utility in explaining Soviet decision-making at the height of the crises. The evidence seems to support the fact that the Soviet leaders began to consider alternative courses of action at the height of the crises, but there is no evidence to indicate that the Soviet leaders undertook preference ordering processes and outcome calculations. The assumption of optimal choice 122 is also brought into question. Only the choice of Gierek seemed to indicate an optimal choice. Finally, there is only limited evidence to suggest that the Soviet leaders incorporated new information into its decision process. In summary, the data seem to support only the third assertion of the rational theory - the fact that the Soviet leaders did, at some point in the crises, begin to consider alternative courses of action (actions not aimed at supporting either Gierek or Gomulko). The H/B approach^ as put forth by Huntington and Brzezinski was designed to explain the internal relationships in Soviet decision-making. Yet, it is the belief of this writer that a credible model of Soviet decision-making should be able to deal with both internal and external factors (relationships) in Soviet decision-making. That is, a model of Soviet decision-making should account for the influence of both internal relationships (the interaction between the Soviet leaders and those groups and individuals below them, inside the Soviet Union), and for the influence of external relationships (the interaction between the Soviet leaders and those groups and individuals outside the Soviet Union) in the decision making process regardless of whether the decision is one of a foreign or domestic nature. This leads to a consideration of the utility of the H/B approach in explaining Soviet policy in the Polish crises, where, as the evidence suggests, external factors had an impact on Soviet decision-making. The central thesis of the H/B approach is that decision-making can be divided into four phases - initiation, persuasion, decision, and execution. ^ h is discussion is based on Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power; USA/USSR (New York: Penguin Books L td., 1978), pp. 202-223. 123 In the first phase, Huntington and Brzezinski assert that in the Soviet Union initiation of a policy takes place from above and trickles down. It is assumed that the top Soviet leaders play an active role in policy generation, that they take the initiative in formulating the most important policy measures, and in fact that they possess the prerogative for policy initiation. The second assertion in the H/B approach is that in the Soviet Union, persuasion (the development of support for a policy proposal) is o "mobilization" process. It is monopolized by the CPSU, and it occurs after the decision phase. The third assertion in the H/B is that in the Soviet Union the Soviet (CPSU) leaders, by generating a policy proposal, also approve and legitimize the policy. Therefore, the step from generation to decision is a very short one. It is also asserted that those who must approve of a decision are all part of a single, small circle with the highest CPSU leaders at the top. The fourth assertion in the H/B approach is that in the Soviet Union the execution of a decision is supervised and controlled from above by the party. It is assumed that there is no distortion in the execution of a decision. Thus the generator of a decision is also the executor of that decision. Finally, t believe an additional assertion must be added to the H/B approach in order to apply the H/B model to Soviet policy towards Poland. This fifth assumption is that the Soviet leaders, in formulating policies, must deal not only with internal relationships, but they must deal also with external relation ships. For example, if the Soviet leadership initiates a decision then this decision trickles down not only to lower groups within the Soviet Union, but it also 124 trickles down to, in this case, Polish groups (e.g. the Polish leadership and the Polish workers). Therefore it is assumed that groups within Poland are below the Soviet leadership, just as groups within the Soviet Union are below the Soviet leadership. This last assumption allows one to consider the utility of the H/B approach in explaining Soviet policy towards Poland. In addition, this assertion may, in fact, increase the utility of the H/B approach without refuting or contradicting any of the core assumptions of the model. In the discussion of the utility of the H/B approach I shall deviate slightly from the methods used in discussing the analytic and cybernetic models. I shall discuss the utility of the assertions collectively within the context of the evidence. The evidence suggests that Soviet decision-making at the height of the crises cannot be explained using the assertion of the H/B approach. This will be demonstrated by a discussion of the rise of Gierek to the top leadership in 1970 and by a discussion of the rise of Kania to the top leadership in 1980. First is the rise of Gierek to the position of First Secretary of the PUWP. Initiation for this move seems to have come from the Soviet leadership, but this initiation appears to have been influenced also by the internal events in Poland. An initiation for this change came only after it was obvious that Gomulka had lost control of the internal situation and had thus outlived his usefulness to the Soviet Union. In this way the initiation of Gomulko's ouster appears to have bubbled up (not trickled down) from below.- The approval of the decision to replace Gomulka with Gierek cannot be said to have been implicit in initiation. 125 The Soviet decision, to some degree, had to reflect internal Polish realities. Gierek would meet the needs of the party by rejuvenating the party apparatus, and would meet the economic needs of the country by instituting reforms and by stabilizing the situation. Thus, just by choosing Gierek the Soviet leaders did not appear to gain approval of their decision. Gierek had to satisfy the rank and file of the PUWP and he had to demonstrate an ability to stabilize the economy. The execution of the decision was not strictly regulated by the CPSU, but, to a large degree, was dependent upon the actions of the new Polish leadership with Gierek as the head. Thus the evidence (in this case) does not support the ideas of initiation, approval, and execution as outlined by the H/B approach. Yet the evidence does support the persuasion assertion, Soviet grain shipments, the massive loan, plus Soviet political support of Gierek in 1971, all seemed to demonstrate a 1970-1971 persuasion campaign by the Soviet Union to mobilize support for Gierek. The fact that this persuasion campaign was implemented after the decision had been mode, further supports the persuasion assertion. Second, the rise of Kania to the position of First Secretary of the PUWP. Initiation for this decision again seemed to have come from below since this decision was influenced by internal Polish affairs. G ierek, like Gomulka, had lost his ability to control the internal situation, and had thus outlived his useful ness. The internal situation required (in the eyes of the Soviet Union) a hard-line 126 leader to stem the liberalizing trend. These internal developments (which dictated a hard-line leader) had developed outside (below) the influence of the Soviet leaders and in this way the initiation for the selection of Kania bubbled up. Again, the approval of this decision cannot be said to have been implicit in initiation. This is evidenced by the continuation of strikes after Kania came to power. The workers, by these strikes, seemed to demonstrate their disapproval of the hard-line Soviet choice and their disapproval of the Soviet desire for a rollback campaign implicit in the selection of Kania. It is evident that the Soviet leaders did not have mass Polish approval of their decision. The execution of the Soviet decision also followed the 1970 pattern; It was not directly controlled by the CPSU and was dependent upon the actions of both the workers and the different factions within the PUWP, over which the Soviet Union had limited influence. Yet the persuasion assertion was supported by the evidence. The Soviet leaders, as in 1970, instituted a persuasion campaign aimed at mobilizing support for their decision. They provided Kania with economic aid and implemented a policy of intimidation. Again this persuasion campaign come after the decision. Thus, from the discussion of Soviet policy at the height of the crises it appears that the H/B approach does have some utility in explaining Soviet decision-making. The discussion of Soviet policy prior to the leadership changes appears to strengthen this limited utility of the H/B approach and it is to this that I now turn, f shall use two examples of Soviet policy prior to the leadership changes. 127 First, the Soviet decision to alter its economic policy towards Eastern Europe (and Poland) in 1975, can be explained partly by the H/B approach. It is probable that information concerning the damaging effects to the Soviet Union of Soviet economic policy towards Eastern Europe may have reached the Soviet leadership from below. In this way initiation was from below and thus cannot be explained by the H/B approach. Yet the remaining stages of the H/B approach do explain the 1975 economic policy. Approval of the decision was implicit in initiation, and the persuasion and execution stages were controlled by the CPSU. The fact that the Soviet leaders failed to increase oil deliveries to Poland in 1978 (an extension of the new economic policy) despite obvious Polish needs, seemed to show that this policy was strictly executed by the Soviet Union. Second, the Soviet decision to support Gierek's moves at the February 1980 Polish Congress can also be explained partly by the H/B approach. Gierek's moves at the Congress (new plan for price increases, the replacement of Jaroszewicz with Babiuch, and the removal of Olszowski to East Germany) were designed to solidify his position and to turn the economy around. These aims were in the Soviet interest and thus Soviet support was a foregone conclusion. There fore these moves seemed to be initiated by internal Polish events. This contradicts the H/B approach. But the remaining stages of the decision follow the decision making mechanism of the H/B approach. Approval was implicit in the initiation of the decision, and the Soviet Union hod total control over the execution of this support. The persuasion campaign was closely tied to the execution of the decision. Once the Soviet leaders had decided to initiate support, the support 128 was approved, and the Soviet Union had strict control over the level of that support. In this way, portions of the decision-making process can be explained by the H/B approach. The balance sheet for the H/B is, like the cybernetic approach, mixed. The H/B approach seems to be more suited to explaining Soviet policy prior to the leadership changes. This suggests that the H/B approach is more efficient in explaining incremental decision-making (if it is assumed that Soviet decision making prior to the leadership changes was incremental, as it was suggested in the discussion of the cybernetic model). The H/B approach seems to be an incomplete model of Soviet decision-making (in this case). The discussion suggests that if the initiation phase is altered to account for a bubbling up of information, the entire approach may have a greater utility. Conclusion The evidence in this paper suggests that Soviet policy towards Poland was, at times incremental (non-complex), and at times complex. (It should be noted that incremental decision-making is considered non-complex because it implies a more simplified decision process, where the decision is divided up into several manageable pieces.) Therefore a complete model of Soviet decision-making should account for both incremental ism and complexity. Neither the analytic nor the cybernetic model accounted for both incre mental and complex decision-making. The cybernetic model appeared to do a good job in explaining Soviet policy prior to the leadership changes because the cybernetic model accounted for incremental decision-making. This suggests that 129 the cybernetic model should be used in explaining non-complex (which also implies the avoidance of consideration of alternative courses of action) Soviet decision-making. The problems the cybernetic model encounters in trying to explain complex decision-making suggests that the model should not be used in explaining complex decision-making. This suggests that the cybernetic approach is not a complete model of Soviet decision-making and that it should be comple mented by a model which accounts for complex decision-making. The discussion in this chapter suggests that the analytic model is not the complementary model that the cybernetic model requires. The analytic model seems only to account for a consideration of alternatives. The processes involved in the consideration of alternatives cannot be substantiated by the evidence in this paper. Yet the utility of the analytic model is hurt more by the nature of the data and the nature of the Soviet system, than by the assertions of the model. However it seems that the analytic model does have soine utility in explaining complex decision-making because it asserts alternative considerations. The H/B approach was discussed independently from the analytic and cybernetic approaches. The discussion of the H/B approach suggests that this approach does have limited utility in explaining Soviet decision-making prior to the Polish leadership changes. The discussion also suggests that the utility of the H/B approach may be enhanced if the assertions of the initiation phase are modified to account for a bubbling up of initiation from below (outside) the Soviet leadership. 130 Selected Bibliography Books and Journal Articles Bioler, Seweryn. "Poland and the Soviet Imperium." Foreign Affairs 59 (America and The World 1980); 522-539. Bromke, Adam. "Poland's Political Crisis." World Today 25 (March 1969). ______. "Beyond the Gomulka Era. " Foreign Affairs 49 (April 1971). ______. "A New Juncture in Poland." Problems of Communism 25 (September-October 1976). . "Czechoslovakia 1968-Polond 1978; A Dilemma for Moscow." International Journal, 33 (Autumn 1978). . "The Opposition in Poland." Problems of Communism 27 (September-October 1978), Brzezinski, Zbigniew, and Huntington, Samuel. P. Political Power: USA/USSR. New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978. Cornell, Richard, ed. The Soviet Political System. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970. Dean, R. W. "Gierek's Three Years: Retrenchment and Reform." Survey 20 (Spring/Summer 1974): 59-75. DeWeydenthal, Jan B. "Workers and Party in Poland." Problems of Communism, 29 (November-December 1980). Gamorinkov, M ichael, "Political Pluralism in a One-Party State." Problems of Communism 16 (July 1967). Gati, Charles, ed. The International Politics of Europe, New York: Praeger, 1976. Gyorgy, Andrew, and Rokowsko-Harmstone, Teresa, editors. Communism in Eastern Europe. Bloomington; Indiana University Press, 1979. Horelich, Arnold, et al. "The Study of Foreign Policy: Decision - Theory - Related Approaches." Sage Professional Papers in International Studies, 4, 02-039. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications. 131 Johnson, A. Ross. "Poland: End of An Era." Problems of Communism 19 (January-Februory 1970), Jones, Christopher D. "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe." World Politics 29 (January, 1977). Kux, Ernest. "Growing Tensions in Eastern Europe." Problems of Communism (March-Apr il 1980). 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