The 11 th Panzers in the Defense, 1944 by A. Harding Ganz

frauleins,fu~e~!of the~si~ma'm'selles~fl;;~I;~ii~~:~~~~~~~~:i~~F~~~~~~~I;1 of sunny southern , tan­ talized the weary Landsers ­ troopers - of the 11 th Panzer . The rumors were true: it was the spring of 1944, and the battered division was to be redeployed from the Russian Front to southern France for recuperation and re­ building. On the Ostfront, the brutal struggle continued un­ abated.· The Gennan defense of the Dnieper had been costly, as massive Russian of­ fensives resulted in huge en­ circlement at Korsun­ Cherkassy and Kamenets-Po­ dolsky. Fierce winter blizzards had alternated with the raspu­ titsa, the sudden spring thaws, that sank vehicles into the Ukrainian mud, and then froze them in solid again, as in con­ crete. The elated troopers boarded their trains near Kishinev, bound for Bordeaux. The rest of the division followed in May, by road and rail, via Bu­ dapest and Vienna. But even if the home of the 11 th was in Silesia, safely beyond the fighting fronts, Allied bomb­ ing of the homeland and talk of the expected of ~,.~ Festung Europa by the British and Americans was sobering. Long gone were the dramatic days of the through the Balkans and the drives on Kiev and . These had made the reputation of the Gespenster Panzer would wage a fighting with­ Even if Gennany were ultimately de­ Division - the "Ghost" Division, its drawal up the Rhone valley of south­ feated, the lith PD would generally emblem an eerie sword-wielding spec­ ern France against the advancing accomplish the difficult missions tre on a halftrack. Now its mission American Seventh Army, and in Sep­ given it, improvising methods and op­ would be mobile defense, against the tember and again in November playa erations, and contribute a valuable overwhelming power of the Allied ar­ significant role in thwarting Patton's chapter in the history of annored war­ mies in the West. In August, the 11th Third Anny drive toward the . fare.

26 ARMOR - March-April 1994 Rebuilding in Southern France maintenance section. But these had a longer range of 15,000 meters, some now been worked out, and with its of which were self-propelled as the wide tracks, thick angled armor, and tracked ("Bumble Bee"). Under its popular commander, Gen­ powerful gun, the Panther was argu­ (The Americans acknowledged their eralleutnant (Major General) Wend ably the best of World War II. range limitation, and a l55-mm battal­ von Wietersheim, the 11 th PD was ion was routinely attached or in sup­ While all three of the American ar­ brought up to strength according to port from assets.) The 105s of mored infantry battalions were the 1944 T/O&E. At full strength, it the SP battalion were carried on the mounted in armored halftracks, pro­ would have 13,726 officers and men Panzer II chassis as the duction shortages allowed only the in 15 battalions and detachments and ("Wasp"), though captured chassis first divisional trains. It thus approximated of the four panzer grenadier bat­ were also utilized. the American armored division of talions to be so equipped by 1944. 1944 which, with the routinely at­ The Sd.Kfz. 25 I-series halftracks In France, the towed battalions of tached and antiaircraft were very versatile, and some variants Panzer Regiment 119 further battalions, had an aggregate of 12,774 mounted mortars, flamethrowers, and traded batteries so each had 105-mm personnel, also in 15 battalions and searcWights, comprising at least 22 and 150-mm batteries. Experience had trains. But unlike the U.S. division, different models. They were techni­ demonstrated that the division usually which interchanged battalions under cally sophisticated, according to Guy operated in three Kampjgruppen, each three combat command headquarters, Franz Arend of Belgium, who has ex­ supported by an artillery battalion, the Gennans retained the regimental amples of all models in the Victory and this mixed artillery support was structure with a panzer regiment of Memorial and Bastogne Historical more versatile. The 3rd Battalion, two battalions, two panzer grenadier Center museums, but were rather un­ which Captain Walter Schaefer­ regiments of two battalions each, and derpowered. The American M3 was Kehnert commanded by September, a panzer artillery regiment of three mechanically more reliable, but its also incorporated a battery of Russian battalions. For operations, however, rubber tracks gave poorer cross-coun­ 120-mm mortars, and a battery of the Germans mixed panzer and ar­ try mobility in muddy terrain than the long-range 105-mm guns, the battal­ mored infantry companies in impro­ German steel track, and both had open ion thus providing supporting fires vised Kampjgruppen ( groups), troop compartments, exposed to over­ from 6,000 meters to 20,000 meters and the Americans cross-reinforced head artillery fire. To Major Karl (11 miles). But because of the variety companies in battalion-sized task Thieme, who commanded the 11 th of fire missions required, and disper­ forces and exchanged platoons to Panzer's halftrack-equipped battalion, sal because of Allied air control, notes form mixed company teams. German Gennan unit leaders and vehicle driv­ Lieutenant Rolf Wandhoff, regimental armored doctrine was based on the ers, veterans of the Russian campaign, adjutant, battalion fifes were seldom "combined arms team" concept with could determine trafficability with a massed, and individual batteries often battalions of the three combat arms ­ more experienced eye than could their fifed independent fire missions. American counterparts, and employed , infantry, artillery - all syn­ Replacements were brought in to re­ their halftracks accordingly. The other chronized to work together; and their of the strengths of panzer grenadier battalions were build the units. One opponents had now adopted that con­ the was the concept of transported by truck. The Opel-Blitz cept as well. each field division maintaining a re­ was preferred, but most lacked the placement battalion (Ersatzbataillon) front wheel drive of the sturdy Ameri­ The American armored division had in its home military district (Silesia, can GMC 6x6 "deuce-and-a-half. In three tank battalions, but these had for the 11 th PD). Not only did the re­ any case, equipment shortfalls had to light M5 tanks with 37-mm guns and cruits share a common regional back­ be made up with civilian and French medium M4 Sherman tanks with a ground, but also were immediately vehicles, even including wood-gas fu­ short 75-mm gun. The German panzer trained for and thus associated with eled trucks, and Captain Franz regiment had two battalions of medi­ the unit they would be joining in com­ Thelen, adjutant of Pz.Gren.Rgt. 111, ums, one of the older Panzer IV, now bat. The training cadre were members found himself going up to Paris to mounting a high-velocity 75-mm gun, of the division, and could imbue the requisition whatever he could. the other with the newer Panther, with new recruits with their combat experi­ an even more powerful 75-mm gun. Likewise, only one of the three pan­ ence and their unit procedures and es­ The 1st Battalion of Panzer Regiment zer artillery battalions was self-pro­ prit. This ensured unit cohesion and 15 had received its Panthers at the pelled, the others being halftrack­ morale, generally considered the most Grafenwohr training area in 1943, towed, while all three American ar­ important ingredients in the motiva­ shortly before the battle of . The mored artillery battalions were self­ tion of to fight. (Many who new tanks had numerous mechanical propelled, on the tracked M7 carriage. have analyzed the capabilities of the problems, especially with hydrostatic But all the American howitzers were German Army have unfavorably con­ lock and the final drives, according to 105mm, with a range of 12,000 yards trasted the American "scientific man­ Walter Rahn, then battalion adjutant, ( 11 ,000 meters), whereas the German agement" method of processing indi­ and Martin Lange, a corporal in the division included 150-mm pieces with vidual replacements through replace-

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 27 ment depots, the hated "repple dep­ tacked by the Jabos - Jagdbombers, take the initiative and act decisively pIes," and allocating them to units as or fighter-bombers, troops would pile and independently. needed.) out of the vehicles while crews would put up a barrage of fire. As in , the policy for the com­ But maintaining this regional rela­ bat companies (panzer, panzer grena­ tionship proved ever more difficult Allied artillery had plentiful ammu­ dier, and recon) was that a third of the given wartime demands, and by 1944 nition, and its effectiveness was en­ unit be rotated back to the field re­ replacements were usually allocated hanced by accurate observation and placement detachment. They would by Anny and Anny Group headquar­ corrections from spotter planes aloft. get a rest, would be available as a re­ ters as needed. It was the nucleus of Panzer artillery fire control exercises serve, and would provide an experi­ veterans and the unit commanders, emphasized coordination of artillery, enced cadre in case of extensive casu­ who now provided the cohesion and rocket, and mortar fue on concentra­ alties in the company, given the tre­ continuity that kept the IIth Panzer tion points, and rapid displacement to mendous enemy fuepower. In the an effective combat organization. The avoid counter-battery fire. Wire com­ course of the coming campaigns, one unit commanders came from within munication would be destroyed by is struck by the heavy casualties suf­ the division, and the battalion com­ shell fire and by bombing; radio fered, especially among unit com­ manders of 1944 had been lieutenants would be the primary means of com­ manders - in the next eight months in 1940. Karl Thieme, for example, munication, recognizing transmission the two panzer battalions would have was a platoon leader and then a com­ range limitations imposed by a topog­ eight different commanders, the two pany commander in Pz.Gren.Rgt. 110. raphy of wooded hills. battalions of Pz.Gren.Rgt. 110 would In May 1944, he was promoted com­ have at least six, and the veterans of American ground advances were, mander of its 1st Battalion (half­ Pz.Gren.Rgt. III cannot recall all however, methodical and cautious, tracked) as major, and in November, their battalion commanders; even Cap­ halting at any resistance, and as a rule promoted to lieutenant colonel, would tain Franz Thelen, regimental adjutant, ending at nightfall. The Amis lacked become the regimental commander ­ can list and date the last five regimen­ the grim stubbornness of the Tommys "For me a dream come to fulfillment," tal com.manders but, 'The battalion or the Ivans, preferring to call for ar­ he said. Wounded six times, Thieme commanders changed too frequently, tillery support. Training by Major He­ had received the Knight's Cross for one after another." The casualties re­ inz BOdicker's Pioneer (Engineer) the Kursk fighting, and subsequently flect aggressive leadership up front ­ Battalion 209 was emphasized for all was awarded the Oak Leaves and the adjutant himself often took tempo­ units, as delaying tactics with mines Swords. rary command - and it is notable how and obstacles would further slow an unit cohesion was yet maintained, and enemy advance. Aggressive recon­ the division remained combat-capable, naissance by all units would be im­ Tactical Realities in the West the result of this rotation policy. portant, not only for security, but also to take advantage of the occasional To engage the Allied beachhead in With the long-awaited Allied inva­ negligence of the more powerful en­ Normandy, German panzer units con­ sion at Nonnandy in June 1944, Gen­ emy and launch surprise attacks. verged on that front. Soon, only the eral Wietersheim dispatched a number 11 th PO was left as the mobile strike of the division's officers north to ob­ Other techniques employed on the force for all of Anny Group G south serve how battle conditions differed Eastern Front were still considered of the Loire, and even it lost some of from the Eastern Front. Their reports valid, if modified: its tanks and annored cars. General were analyzed and discussed in com­ Wietersheim had to prepare for three manders' conferences, and tactical re­ Clear, concise Sattelbejehle ("saddle possible scenarios if the Allies also sponses were improvised: Allied air­ orders" or frag(mentary) orders) were invaded southern France: an Allied power was all-pervasive, as already imperative, given the pace of panzer landing on the Riviera, a landing near demonstrated in North Africa and It­ warfare, rather than detailed orders the Rhone River delta, or simultane­ aly. What remained was and control measures. This exempli­ ous landings near Narbonne and on committed to defense of the Reich it­ fied the original concept of Auftrags­ the Biscay coast, to cut off Fascist self. Therefore, standard vehicle road­ taktik - mission tactics, upon which Spain. The theater of possible opera­ march procedures (a panzer battalion German mobile warfare doctrine was tions was thus over 600 kilometers in moving by day at 20 kmph and 50 based. The Kampjgruppe concept of extent (400 miles), and response time meter intervals had a time length of mixed battle groups, the mix of pan­ could be 4-6 days, given probable Al­ about 30 minutes and a road space of zer and panzer grenadier units tailored lied air attacks. Only a mobile some 8,000 meters) were now unreal­ to the situation, would be even more counter-attack strategy after any land­ istic. Vehicles, well-camouflaged with appropriate, but for small-unit engage­ ing was feasible. Training intensified nets and branches, with constant air ments because of Allied air power ­ with a new seriousness, while officers lookouts, would have to "spring" from not mass maneuvers as on the steppes did endless map exercises and route cover to cover in Einzelgruppen of southern Russia. This further re­ reconnaissances to identify secondary single groups of 3-5 vehicles. If at- quired that company-grade officers routes and river fording sites, aSSUffi-

28 ARMOR - March-April 1994 ing the major bridges and communi­ cation routes would be bombed. On 13 August 1944, with intelli­ gence identifying the Rhone delta as the probable landing area, the divi­ sional units began to move toward the Rhone valley. Two days later came the Allied invasion, east of Toulon, against the weak coast defense divi­ sions. Allied air activity was not as In reconnaissance battalions, eight-wheeled annored cars - pakwagens - mounted anti­ all-pervasive as in Normandy, though tank guns and carried a second "reverse driver" who doubled as the radio operator or loader. the task of getting tanks across the Rhone, including using a 60-ton ferry discarded as too vulnerable to hostile drew back. played at Avignon, was a tedious one. fire, though Volkswagen's amphibious no role, as XII TAC (Tactical Air Schwimmwagens were handy. But the Command) bases were too distant. versatility and firepower of the recon The retreat continued, though the Delaying Operations battalion made it tempting to use in highway traffic was lashed by long­ battle itself. That consequent battle range artillery fire. losses reduce the ability of recon units As the Allied armies in the north Another attempt came when the U.S. to carry out their primary missions had by now broken out of Normandy 45th Infantry Division cut a highway has generated an ongoing controversy and were racing across France, driv­ northeast of Lyon on 31 August at about the role and weaponry of such ing toward the German border, 11th Meximieux. The next day, a ll1th units. Panzer had the unenviable task of Kampjgruppe charged through a road­ covering the retreat of 19th Anny up As the 19th Anny columns of men, block of the 179th Infantry and into the Rhone, slowing the AJljed south­ wagons, and vehicles retreated up the the regimental headquarters in the ern advance, yet avoiding being cut Rhone valley, they were savaged by town. When F Company was sur­ off in the north. Delaying tactics were medium bombers and harassed by the rounded in an old chateau it was sur­ now employed, engaging by day, fall­ French Maquis partisans who rose, rendered by its CO. "He was a Dum­ ing back at night, discouraging rapid sensing . The partisans tar­ kopf, snorted one of the disgusted GIs, American advances with hasty mine­ geted service and staff elements, as at­ Bob Slingerland, in a recent letter to fields of antitank Teller (plate) mines tested by Sergeant Albrecht Englert, a Lieutenant Jtirgen von Pflug, 1st Bat­ and antipersonnel S (Schuh) mines. radio operator at army headquarters; talion adjutant - and he spent the The lines of resistance were planned but they avoided IIth Panzer combat rest of the war as a POW in Stalag so the next positions were beyond units, and did not affect combat op­ mc on the Oder. The 117th Cavalry 105mm artillery range (12,000 yards erations. Recon Squadron maneuvered to Mon­ or II kilometers) of the last positions, trevel to the north, but Bode's Recon forcing the Amis to displace their bat­ Battalion II rolled up from Bourg on teries forward each time. Several times the more mobile U.S. Seventh Anny attempted to cut off 3 September. Troops A and B were Major Karl Bode's Reconnaissance 19th Anny, but was stymied by the mauled, and the survivors surren­ Battalion II was especially suited for 11 th Panzer. Annored Task Force dered. To GIs who ran afoul of the delaying actions, as well as for the Butler and the U.S. 36th Infantry Di­ "Ghost Division," it was no "Cham­ missions of scouting, route reconnais­ vision, advancing parallel to the east, pagne Campaign." sance, and flank protection. The unit swung in toward the Rhone defile at was equipped with armored cars and Montelimar on 21 August. Wieters­ A last attempt was made by the light halftracked 250s. But surprise heim divided his units into four French I Corps, racing along the engagements had invariably generated Kampjgruppen, under Lieutenant Swiss border toward the Belfort Gap, a demand for more firepower, and the Colonel Heinrich-Georg Hax of but the IIth PO counterattacked the eight-wheeled armored cars now Pz.Gren.Rgt. 110, Major Thieme of 3rd Algerian Division at Baume-Ies­ mounted 50- and 75-mm antitank the halftrack battalion, Colonel Wilde Dames on the 5th and ambushed its guns, Pakwagens. Lieutenant Werner of Pz.Gren.Rgt. 111, and Bode's Re­ M4 tanks near Montbeliard on the 8th. Strietzel, commanding 2nd Company con Battalion II, and attacked. When until wounded in November, feels the a roadblock was established on the The IIth PO had been suffering ability of the 8-wheelers to drive highway north on the 25th, Wieters­ shortages and losses, yet would some­ backwards as fast as forwards, the heim himself led a midnight charge how gamer new equipment and lash loader or radio operator being the "re­ that scattered it. Several days of fight­ out anew. By 27 August, near Lyon, verse driver," was "of enormous im­ ing in the tangle of hills and valleys Antiaircraft Battalion 277 had finally portance." Motorcycles had long been discouraged the Americans and they acquired four of its authorized "Acht-

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 29 Map 1 11 th Panzer Division in the West, 1944

Sept-Dec 19

11th PO Panther command tank now exhibited at the Pan~ermuseumat Munster Lager, Germany. 3 s.,nember 1944: 11th Para., A«:on Bn. malis U.S. lllth CII.... Ren. Sqn. neat Morb9v..

31 August 1944: l11h PSrT:nrstymiMlItt.mpt bytt'oeU.S.4.5thICloclJl rosd north"M cI Lyon. ~'){- ~,on

21 August 1944: 1Hh FJa~ prevel"llS U.S Jel:h 10.nd Task Forc4l Butler from cutting off 19th Asmy rett"Nt

Major General Wend von Wietersheim, who commanded the 11th PO during operations in 1944.

~Medift:rranean Sea

30 ARMOR - March-April 1994 acht" (8,8cm) dual-purpose guns, yond Nancy. Hitler ordered a counter­ Yet Wietersheim's 11th Panzer was equally deadly against aircraft or ar­ attack and converged panzer units to badly understrength. It had assembled mor, known to the American GI as restore the situation. Two panzer bri­ in the area after being re­ the dreaded "eighty-eight" (nun). gades, the lilth and I 13th, were deployed from the Belfort Gap, but They were "procured" from a supply hurled against Colonel Bruce Clarke's had to detach a Kampfgruppe under depot by the battalion commander, brigade-sized Combat Command A the artillery commander, Lieutenant Major Joachim Menzel, who effec­ near Arracourt, but the panzers were Colonel Erich Hammon, which in­ tively bluffed the depot paymaster, handled roughly by the veteran cluded the self-propelled artillery bat­ though the guns were intended for a American tankers in the days that fol­ talion. In addition, Recon Battalion II different unit. This gun had a velocity lowed. These were new-type forma­ had not yet arrived and Major Arnold of over 800 meters per second (2,600 tions that had no artillery, and organic Kessler's Tank Destroyer Battalion 61 fps) and a flat, accurate trajectory. maintenance and flak assets were was back at Saveme, retraining with The best range to engage the short­ weak; they were not balanced com­ new IV assault guns. In barreled M4 Shennan tank, says Jo­ bined arms teams. Then, when the sun redeploying in the face of American chen Menzel, was between 800-2,000 burned off the early morning fog, P­ air power, the wheeled vehicle march meters. The guns also operated most 47 fighter-bombers swept the battle­ serials had moved rapidly, covered by effectively in pairs. field with a vengeance. The two bri­ the mists of the Rhine River valley, gades were wrecked; one commander but the tracked vehicles, moving by When French M4s came up the was killed by American artillery, the rail, had been delayed by bomb dam­ Audincourt road on 8 September they other by the aircraft. age. The trains had moved at night were ambushed by Menzel's 88s. On and held in tunnels by day, though one side of the road, where it entered The new German commanders, 2nd Company of Panthers lost heavily a narrow valley, Captain Giesebrecht Lieutenant General Hasso von Man­ to medium bombers as its train left a had two guns tracking the leading teuffel at 5th Panzer Army and Gen­ tunnel near too soon before tanks. Menzel himself was with the eral Hermann Balck at Army Group dusk. Pz.Rgt. IS, even incorporating second pair on the other side, sited to G, were fresh from the Russian Front the remnants of Pz.Brig. III, may knock out the tanks at the rear, to trap and had to learn the bitter lesson that, only have had 16 panzers fully opera­ the column. The guns were well­ as Balck's Chief of Staff Colonel tional, and only two artillery batteries camouflaged with branches, and the Friedrich von Mellenthin said, "it was were at hand. Nonetheless the two officers did not use their binoculars clear that American air power put our panzergrenadier regiments were at lest light glint off the lenses. When panzers at a hopeless disadvantage, about 70-80 percent strength, and with Menzel shouted "Feuer!" all guns and that the nonnal principles of ar­ its veteran tankers, the "Ghost Divi­ fired simultaneously, turning the col­ mored warfare did not apply in this sion" was a dangerous foe. umn into a burning shambles. theater" - something the Western veterans had tried to tell them. As they attacked, experienced Ger­ By mid-September 1944 the German man tankers instinctively sought defi­ annies had successfully rejoined in lade in the rolling farmland, and used Lorraine in eastern France. But the But now the experienced 11th Pan­ their longer-ranged 75-mm high-ve­ Allies had exacted heavy losses, and zer Division had arrived, and on a locity guns to advantage. Lieutenant even the 11 th Panzer had lost half its rainy 25 September Kampfgruppen of Karl Zindler commanded his platoon personnel and most of its tanks and Lieutenant Colonel Stenkhoffs Pan­ of Panthers, and also fought his own assault guns in the continuous fight­ zer Regiment IS and Colonel Hax's tank: "Driver, stop! Gunner! Main ing. The remaining men were ex­ Panzer Grenadier Regiment 110 drove gun, armor-piercing, two o'clock, six hausted, and their vehicles worn out. down the valley of the Seille against hundred, Ami tank, on the slope-" The Panther tanks required major the CCA perimeter. This "certainly The loader and gunner shouted simul­ maintenance after 800 kilometers; yet put us on notice that some real pros taneously: "Ready!" "Identified!" Zin­ many had now over 1,500 km on their were joining the opposition:' said dler finished his fire command: odometers. But there was to be no Captain Jimmy Leach, CO of B Com­ "Shoot!" respite for rehabilitation. pany of Lieutenant Colonel Creighton Abrams' 37th Tank Battalion. The 4th Some sources say the M4 Sherman's Armored's Reserve Command had electric-power turret traverse gave the Armored Counterattack come up from fighting at Luneville, American tank an advantage over the and Wood now pulled back west of "manual traverse" of the Panzer IV the - highway and Panther. But both Gennan tanks American General Patton's Third and brought his CCB down from also had power traverse. The Panzer Army had slashed into Lorraine, and Chateau Salins, where it had clashed IV had electric power, generated by a in early September Major General with Panzer Brigade 106, consolidat­ small two-stroke gasoline engine. And John Wood's 4th Armored Division ing his division for some of the most the Panther, like the heavy Tiger, had broke out of the River dramatic armor combat of the Euro­ hydraulic power, the gunner travers­ bridgeheads and drove spearheads be- pean theater. ing by foot pedal. The disadvantage of

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 31 ( Map2 Muleev. Haraucour1• The Arracourt

Seille River Movenvle Vlc-5ur-5lelle• •

Juvellze J~1111 • ~l60mm •

• LezeV 1~111

-'ev 2~'"

Y.1~7""

urdenn• • MoncQun

'0··~.-- '~110 eColneourt 210~~KpowN Laga,de ~11 • Xu,... • ~ .~ Marne-Rhine Canal .Mouacourt • ~ .. •Bauzemont "..,..-- ...... ;...-.t\ hydraulic power was that the engine IVs of Captain Rodenhauser's 2nd the II-man American rifle squad, had to be running since the pumps Battalion were less fonnidable, but with two belt-fed MGs (Machine Gun were driven by the engine transmis­ did have a lower silhouette. The Ger­ 42s) and the automatic MPi (Machine sion shaft. But 1st (panther) Battalion man disadvantage in the Arracourt Pistol 40) and selective-fire Sturm­ commander Major Jiirgen Reichardt fighting was that they were attacking, gewehr (Assault Rifle 44), to the U.S. and Sergeants Lange and Filla said under cover of morning mist, thus ne­ box magazine BAR and semi-auto­ that in battle the engines were running gating their long-range gunnery ad­ matic M 1 Garand rifle. Both sides anyway, according to the maxim "fire vantage. And they met their match in were perennially short of infantry, and and movement." In defense, said Zin­ the skilled tankers of Wood's 4th Ar­ the Germans were now mass-produc­ dler, a tank would be in hull defllade, mored, who maneuvered their more ing fully automatic weapons, compen­ with its gun tube oriented toward the agile M4s and M18 "Hellcat" tank de­ sating for personnel shortages with most likely armor approach, and final stroyers around the undulating coun­ firepower. But GIs traded MIs for gun-laying manually was no problem. tryside in close-quarter engagements. "Tommy Guns" and platoons were supported with mortars and heavy ma­ The apprehension Americans had Pz.Gren.Rgt. Ill, under the tempo­ chineguns, and both sides were sel­ about fighting the German Panther rary command of Major Karl Thieme, dom at full strength anyway. was reflected in XII Corps operations came up on the right of the 110th as notes to units, advising flank engage­ CCA fell back from to Hill Concealed from American air power ments, and warning that head-on at 265. The panzer grenadiers, riding the in the patches of woods east of the 1,000 yards, 75mm rounds might panzers or following in their tracks, Bourdonnay road were the few artil­ penetrate "only when hitting the lower came in against the armored doughs lery pieces available. Menzel's 88s half of the mantiet, when they are de­ in their foxholes along the perimeter. were sited near and tied in flected down, penetrating thin hull Captain Thelen confmns that, at to division artillery, adding flat-trajec­ top-plate," but that the "Hull is invul­ strength, the eight-man panzer grena­ tory fire support across the open nerable to all calibers." The Panzer dier squad had more firepower than fields. But alert 4th Armored ob-

32 ARMOR - March-April 1994 servers in L-4 Cub spotter planes men a kilometer! Two or three called in counter-battery concentra­ panzers provided local sup­ tions from the three annored artillery port in each battalion sector, battalions, and called in fire missions their squealing tracks at night that smashed the German attacks with enough to deter inquisitive HE. By mid-day the fighter bombers American probes. of XIX TAC would swoop in, strafing with rockets and machinegun fire, Captain Johannes Schneider adding the decisive factor. had assumed command of the Yet the higher commanders persisted 2nd Battalion of the 110th in massing panzers for attacks, over near Bezange la Petite. For Wietersheim's objections. On 27 Sep­ two nights engine sounds and tember, 25 panzers from all armor vehicle movement in the Similar to a halftrack. the German Kettenrad motorcycle units launched attacks on the south American lines caused his had a track-laying system instead of a rear wheel. flank of the 4th Armored's Arracourt men to be on the alert, but salient, beginning a three-day battle. when two young Gis wandered into cattle, and l'tat his command post By now, Recon Battalion II had ar­ the front lines, with messkits and ap­ looked like a stock yard. parently lost, it was learned that the rived, fleshed out with Luftwaffe The tanks were topped off with fuel, new 26th "Yankee" Infantry Division trainees, young but poorly trained. though the crews often had to carry was relieving the hard-fought 4th Ar­ The American annored doughs held fuel cans up to the forward positions. mored Division. Stiff local actions firm, especially in the bitter fighting Panzer crews slept in their tanks, with followed, and when 5th Company was for Hill 318, and tanks, artillery, and two of the five-man crew on watch in driven off Hill 265 (by the l04th in­ fighter-bombers lashed the attackers two or three hour shifts, manning the fantry Regiment), Lieutenant Rudolph's back. On the 29th many of the survi­ turret MG and radio. Accompanying platoon of three Panzer IVs helped the vors broke and ran, rallied only by the panzer grenadiers often slept in a grenadiers recapture some of the lost division commander himself. None­ shallow pit, over which the tank ground. Meanwhile Pz.Gren.Rgt. III theless, the stubborn German assaults drove, straddling it, giving protection returned, having attacked and stopped seemed to restore the German front, from artillery fire and the elements, the 45th Division in the Mortagne and by the end of the month both and wannth in cold weather. This had Forest, 6-7 October. sides had gone over to the defensive. been learned in Russia, and was a During this position defense, the good precaution. Major Ray Mason, eagerly awaited company mess trucks S3 (Operations) of the 4th Armored's Linear Defense came up at dusk, towing the Cu­ 22d Armored Field Artillery, for ex­ laschkanone, the field kitchen trailer ample, said the battalion would fire During the October pause the 11th with its distinctive stovepipe, to de­ concentrations 50 yards in from a Panzer held a concave HKL (Haupt­ liver hot meals. The company Ketten­ wood line, for deadly tree bursts. rad, a half-tracked motorcycle, could kampjlinie, or MLR, Main Line of Sergeant Martin Lange of the Pan­ also bring up hot rations in a small Resistance) 18 kilometers long from ther Battalion maintenance group did trailer along narrow trails not subject Moyenvic on the Seille River to Par­ most of his work at night. Mainte­ to harassing and interdiction (H&I) roy on the Marne-Rhine Canal. By nance sections were established in fire. Officers ate with their men, shar­ doctrine and equipment annored units patches of woods, all signs of tread­ ing the discomfort of the front, uncon­ were ill-suited for position defense; in marks leading into the area carefully addition, one of the two panzer grena­ sciously manifesting that indefinable swept away, hidden from spotter dier regiments, the 111 th now under blend of quiet authority, competence, planes and fighter bombers. Canvas and camaraderie that is true leader­ Lieutenant ColOllel Werner von Ruep­ tarpaulins were strung for conceal­ precht, was detached toward St. Die. ship. The mess teams would distribute ment, so lights and welding equip­ rations for the next day, and depart Thus the HKL could only be held as a ment could be used at night. series of scattered strongpoints, utiliz­ before dawn. Hot Wurst and Kaffee ing the stone fann buildings of Lor­ were always morale-boosters, offset­ If some of the llth PO veterans raine. In addition, constant artillery ting the Sclwkakola energy bars and pondered Germany's unfavorable situ­ fire mandated thinning out the for­ chunks of Kommissbrot hard tack, that ation at this stage of the war, most ward positions, and the strongpoints was only softened by suspending in were too preoccupied with battle, were only linked by patrols at night, coffee containers. Army rations were work, and survival to muse for long. giving a semblance of a defense in supplemented by local produce, and Political changes could always occur, depth. Pz.Gren.Rgt. 110, holding a Captain Schaefer-Kehnert of the 3rd new weapons - jet planes, VI Buzz sector of some 10 km, had an effec­ Artillery Battalion wrote his wife that Bombs, and V2 rockets - were com­ tive strength of only 600 men. With he found himself the "division ing into evidence, and defending the only a third forward, that averaged 20 agriculturalist," rounding up hogs and homeland, and discipline, routine, and

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 33 unit morale kept the men fighting. Elastic Defense On 7 November, the 11 th Panzer Nazi ideology was no longer a factor. went on alert, and that night elements Most combat troops held the civilian moved into position north of Morchin­ The division received replacements leadership in contempt, and Schaefer­ gen () in a steady rain. On while in bivouacs east of Met'z, and Kehnert often heard the division com­ the 8th, Patton's Third Army jumped tank strength was brought up to 40 mander refer to Hitler: "Once again off with six infantry divisions and Panthers, 20 Panzer IVs, and 10 the idiot has ordered....;" but not in three armored divisions, supported by Jagdpanzer IV turretless assault guns. the presence of the artillery com­ 38 field artillery battalions and the But 5th Panzer Army headquarters mander, who was a convinced Nazi, fighter bombers of XIX TAC. By the had gone north (to prepare for the Ar­ and who was therefore often detached 9th, the armor was committed, the dennes offensive), and the 11th PD with a Kampfgruppe on missions long armored columns passing was the sole reserve for Army Group away from the division. through the infantry. But the Ameri­ G. During the eight-day rest, Wieters­ can armor was road-bound, restricted The 11th PD veterans also resented heim met with his unit commanders to by the minefields and mud; and sharp the preference and publicity accorded discuss tactics against the next Ameri­ German counterattacks resulted in a the Nazi Waffen-SS (Combat SS), can offensive, expected in November, succession of bloody engagements. who alone were credited with the cap­ toward the Saar industrial basin. ture of Belgrade and of Kharkov ear­ American artillery and airpower, even lier. By 1944, NSFOs - National So­ with the anticipated poorer weather, The 88s of the 9th Flak Division cialist Leadership Officers, were man­ made large-scale armored operations stopped one American column at Fon­ of Pz.Gren. dated to give "political instruction" to impractical, and enemy numerical su­ teny, and a Kampjgruppe Rgt. 11 I occupied Viviers during the the troops. But the Nasojiis were not periority made the OKW (Wehrmacht eager to go up to front-line units, and High Command) order to hold every night, cutting off another column in the 11 th Panzer members who had meter of ground unrealistic. which had reached . (These were Task Forces Maybach a record of leadership in the HJ In a defense in depth, the infantry (Hitler Youth) or SA (Storm Troop­ and Churchill of the 4th Armored's divisions would hold positions two or ers) were authorized to give troop in­ Combat Command B.) The Americans three kilometers forward of the HKL formation classes. These were not re­ finally cleared Viviers but couldn't with a minimum of forces only, to ally taken seriously by cynical combat clear the flanking fue from the for­ "absorb" the initial bombardment and veterans anyway. ests. The bitter fighting for attack. The HKL itself consisted of flared up again on the 11th before the extensive field works and was cov­ Germans pulled back. Two American Finally the 11 th PD was pulled back ered by minefields. The 11 th PD was battalion commanders, one of them into reserve, with the 361st VoIksgre­ held back as an operational reserve. Colonel Alfred Maybach, were among nadier Division taking over the sector As the Delme Ridge and the Nied the . The village cost by the end of October. Captain River were designated the first and the "Ghosts" as well. The 2nd Battal­ Schneider collapsed from exhaustion, second positions of the HKL, sharp ion of the I 10th had come in the night but awoke to find his concerned divi­ local counterattacks would be before; Lieutenant Klele's platoon of sion commander sitting by his side. mounted to slow the American ad­ 8th Company was wiped out in the Schneider insisted he not be evacu­ vance. "Speed, movement, and sur­ house-to-house fighting against the ated, as the battalion was now in re­ prise," recorded Major Thieme, stubborn GIs, and the battalion com­ serve. The general agreed, but ordered "should offset the numerical and ma­ mander, Captain Schneider, was badly the adjutant to report on how much terial superiority of the enemy." wounded by shell fragments and hos­ sleep the captain was getting. "Yes, Mixed companies, Panzerkampjtrupps pitalized until the end of the war. General von Wietersheim was 'like a or "tank battle teams" of a tank pla­ father' with his soldiers!" he recalled. toon and two panzer grenadier pla­ Also on II November, Lieutenant Tn addition, even Army Group com­ toons each, would fight these actions. Walter Rahn, adjutant of the Panther mander Balck, who had commanded Small sections of one tank, one Battalion of Pz.Rgt. 15 (and later bat­ the division in Russia, came down to halftrack, and an artillery forward ob­ talion commander), was at his com­ visit with some of the veterans. Mo­ server, if possible, would link the mand post in the Foret de Chateau rale of any military unit is highly de­ front. Their sudden presence and fire Salins when an excited infantry ser­ pendent on sensing the concern com­ would hopefully magnify their small geant of the 559th Volksgrenadier Di­ manders have for the welfare of their numbers, encourage their own infan­ vision burst in reporting that a hun­ men. A few of the division received try, and make the advancing Ameri­ dred Ami tanks were advancing up leave, and others received additional cans more cautious. While these tac­ the valley. Rahn immediately alerted training. Major Karl Thieme went tics did not conform to the principles the crews of five tanks that were back for regimental command school­ of mass and concentration, they nearby awaiting maintenance, and ing, and would return as a Lieutenant seemed the only practical way to slow mounted a Kettenrad to reconnoiter. Colonel, to command his cherished a powerful American advance along a The American column was road­ Panzer Grenadier Regiment I 10. very broad front. bound, moving up the valley of the

34 ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 flooded Petite Seille. Though the Pan­ with the 4th Armored's own attack under the blows of the American 6th thers were technically deadlined, and (Task Force Oden) in the early morn­ Armored and 80th Divisions, and the averaged only six rounds of ammo ing fog. Biedermann's command tank remnants of the 559th VGD evacuated each, Rahn found them a reverse­ No. 301 was hit and the ammunition Morhange. In the days that followed, slope position near from exploded. He was thrown out of his Pz.Gren.Rgt. III lost its regimental where they could engage the Ameri­ turret hatch with a severe leg wound commander, Lieutenant Colonel von can column at 1,500 meters from hull and his crew members were killed. Ruepprecht, mortally wounded at Hil­ defilade, only the turrets being ex­ Delk Oden's 35th Tank Battalion M4s sprich on 23 November. When Allied posed. Several American tanks and and Major Art West's 10th Armored forces suddenly broke through the vehicles were knocked out; others Infantry Battalion then shot their way Zabern (Saveme) Gap, Hitler released drove ahead, while the rest of the col­ across Dordal Creek and into Gue­ the to close it. umn backed up, turned around, and bling. But the 110th Panzer Grena­ But the PLD's attack ran head-on into detoured on a secondary road. (This diers concentrated that night and deci­ a swing by the 4th Armored east of was Task Force Bill Hunter's 37th mated the American defenders, and the Saar and it was pulled out again a Tank Battalion of Creighton Abrams' Colonel Abrams agreed they should week later, leaving 11th Panzer ele­ CCA.) Contrary to the perception of be pulled out the next day. Oden com­ ments to cover east to the Vosges German regimentation, the initiative plimented the 11 th Panzer troopers Mountains, a 50-kilometer front. shown by, and encouraged in, junior when he said, "those Goddarnn Ger­ officers and NCOs, was a major rea­ mans were the hardest fighting things son for the success of Gennan panzer we had ever tangled with." The 26th The three artillery battalions were forces. "Yankee" Division finally crossed the more dispersed than ever. To super­ creek again on the 18th, but took vise his scattered batteries Captain heavy casualties from Pz.Gren.Rgt. Schaefer-Kehnert, whose 3rd Battal­ The 11th Panzer battle teams were ion usually supported Pz.Gren.Rgt. the "fire brigades," trying to intercept 110, now commanded by Karl Thieme, back as a lieutenant colonel. 111 (now under Colonel Graf von the American thrusts. The pattern of Kielmansegg), divided his headquar­ fighting was of the American infantry Though badly outnumbered, the 11 th ters into a rear command post admin­ advancing through the dripping for­ Panzer was constantly thwarting each istered by his adjutant, and a fOlWard ested hills against the Gennan infan­ American thrust by a skillful shifting command post from which he himself try, and the armor advancing along of available forces. American air did operated. The battalion commander the valleys, thwarted by the mud, not fly at night, and this is when the preferred a captured American jeep mines, and 11th Panzer counterat­ Germans moved. H&I fire at road nicknamed Kleinen Willy ("Little Wil­ tacks. The cold rain and cloud cover junctions was fairly predictable, and lyZ) from the Willys Overland kept off the fighter-bombers, though tracked vehicles in particular could builder's plate, because it was light, seldom the ubiquitous L-4 observation utilize country lanes. German vehicles maneuverable, easy to cover with a Cubs that droned aloft and called in road-marched, led by a guide on foot net, and with its four­ the deadly artillery fire. Casualties or in a VW Kiibelwagen ("bucket wheel drive more powerful than the mounted on both sides in this struggle car") with hooded lights. Tank drivers VW Kiibel. of attrition. followed the marker light of the tank ahead, the four slits blurring into two The 26th Infantry Division reached cat-eye images at the correct vehicle Panzers in Defensive , but at dusk on the 13th a interval of 25 meters. During the con­ Kampjgruppe of liith Panzer Grena­ stant fighting and moving, the crews "just cat-napped when we could," rue­ diers riding ten Panthers charged in, The bitter fighting in the cold mud, fully said Martin Lange, tank driver and most of the 3rd Battalionll04th rain, and sleet continued around Sarre and mechanic. Frequently, the drivers Infantry were captured. Captain Ferdi­ Union and Domfessel as the Germans dozed off whenever the column nand Biedermann, the panzer com­ delayed back to their border. The op­ halted, and then someone would have mander (of 3rd Company), then re­ posing 4th Armored lost two battalion to go back on foot or on the company ceived orders from Wietersheim to commanders wounded and then, after Kettenrad and bang on the fender to make a night road march south to clashing with his corps commander wake them up again. It was important mount a spoiling attack on the 26th over the frustrating, exhausting strug­ for crewmen to rotate positions, spell­ Division's right flank, near Guebling. gle, the able General Wood himself ing the driver, the others slumped in His Kampjgruppe included 17 tanks, was relieved by General Patton. The the seats or curled on the turret basket and panzer grenadiers in halftracks IIth Panzer was falling back through floor alongside the ammo. under Captain Heinz Wolff, com­ the old French Maginot Line fortifica­ manding 1st Battalion of the 110th. On the night of 18 November the tions, its works of little use since they IIth Panzer was ordered to redeploy only faced eastward. Nonetheless Biedermann was just about to launch back near St. Avoid, for meanwhile some of the bunkers afforded shelter his attack on the 14th when it collided the 48th Division had disintegrated from artillery fire, though unit com-

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 35 manders had to enJOIn their men not to become trapped in them. Karl Heinz Loschke, now secretary of At Singling on 6 December, a the 11 th Panzer Division Association, small unit action typical of the at right, with the author on a research campaign was fought when Cap­ visit to Braunschweig in 1989. Loschke served as an artillery officer with the tain Engelmann's 1st Battalion of 11th PO in Russia. Pz.Gren.Rgt. III met the advance of the 4th Armored's Task Force Abrams. A tank-infantry team un­ der Captain Jimmie Leach of the advance, enabling the Wehrmacht to 37th Tank Battalion attacked the regain the initiative. General Wieters­ town, the armored doughs riding heim felt his "cavalry tactics" carried the tanks because the halftracks out by even the smallest battle couldn't negotiate the mud. But groups, were justified by the results. Leacb found the position domi­ The "Gespenster" could take pride in nated by the high velocity German reading a captured document in tank guns on the Welschoff Farm which the American x:n Corps com­ ridge, 1,200 yards to the north, mander complimented the 26th Infan­ and four of his 14 tanks were try Division, confronted by "some of knocked out. Lieutenant Karl Zin­ the best German fighting forces," spe­ dler's platoon of Major Reichardt's cifically the "tough and experienced Panther Battalion launched a 11th Panzer Division." counterattack supported by artil­ lery fire, but lost two panzers in turn. One was Zindler's, with two Conclusion of his crew wounded when they bailed out. Leach recently wrote Zindler that it was probably Ser­ The IIth Panzer Division well geant Bob Fitzgerald's B-13, mount­ test the 90th Division's bridgehead at represents the tremendous fighting ing a new 76mm gun, that had Dillingen. ability of the German Wehrmacht, knocked him out. even as defeat loomed by 1944. Stud­ The Westwall could be a formidable ies have been done to explain German The German advantage was their defensive line. Though the bunker ap­ fighting power, yet none are really longer-ranged tank guns. They lost ertures were too small for the antitank satisfactory. An interesting attempt to that advantage in an attack that closed guns of 1944, the concrete pillboxes measure fighting power through the range with the M4, and were more with machineguns were sited for enfi­ mathematical models rests on ques­ successful when they returned to lading fire to cover the minefields and tionable data and methodology, and a dominating the position by fire. As "dragon's teeth" anti-tank traps, and conclusion in terms of Nazi ideology Lieutenant Bill Marshall's C Com­ they could be held by a minimum of does not explain German combat ef­ pany of Major Albin Irzyk's 8th Tank troops. Major Arnold Kessler's assault fectivenes/' in 1870 or 1914-1918, Battalion came up to relieve Leach's guns covered the bunkers near Zwei­ well before Nazism. Leadership, train­ Team B, one of its tanks was also de­ brticken, and the role of the panzer ing, weaponry, national character, and stroyed, and the Americans aban­ Kampfgruppen was to counterattack traditions all seem to be part of a doned the town as not worth the cost. any breakthrougb. The Westwall complex formula. In the IIth PO a could have been even more formida­ nucleus of capable and experienced These sharp, sudden clashes were to ble, but the combat troops had been unit commanders and NCOs, and a di­ buy time, slowing the relentless denied familiarization with the system vision commander of ability and dedi­ American advance until the German because the Supreme Command cation, used resourcefulness and border Westwall defenses themselves wanted to discourage a "defeatist" at­ imagination to continually assimilate ("Siegfried Line" to the Allies) could titude. ill-trained replacements, adapt tactics be occupied. But the 11th Panzer was Patton's divisions which had borne to adverse circumstances, and credit­ stretched thin, aI!l along the Saar River the brunt of the November offensive ably carry out tbe missions given line, its battle tearns buttressing the in Lorraine were relieved by fresh them. depleted infantry units. Elements of units to recuperate; and on 16 Decem­ Thieme's Pz.Gren.Rgt. 110 counterat­ ber some 19 German divisions to the The "Gespensterdivision" was reha­ tacked the 35th Division at Obergail­ north launched a massive counter-of­ bilitated in the Eifel while in OKW bach; and ten of Captain Roden­ fensive against the American lines in reserve, receiving new drafts and new hauser's Panzer IVs were dispatched the Ardennes. The IIth Panzer bad equipment. In 1945 it would continue even further to the right to help con- played its part in slowing the Allied to fight, to tbe end, at the Orscholz

36 ARMOR - March-April 1994 barrier, in the Rhineland, back across a Captain in S-3 (Operations) of the Glllube galt dem Vaterlllnd (Munchen, Germany, into Czechoslovakia. As IOlst Infantry, 26th Division, who 1976). Donnhauser commanded Pz. tough a foe as it was, it could also knows many of his former opponents. Gren.Rgt. III in Russia and Drews abide by the recognized rules of war­ He generously shared work of his was division operations chief, Ia, and fare, and earn the respect of its ene­ own on the 11 th PD, some of which Schrodek was an officer in Pz.Rgt. 15. mies. In May of 1945, as the Red has been published in the division Jochen Menzel provided a copy of his Army closed in from the east, General newsletter, "Yankee Doings." Louis Der LOwe von Lyon (Berg am See, Wietersheim met with his command­ T. Holz, Chairman of the 2d Cavalry 1988), Walter Schaefer-Kehnert his ers who agreed that a delegation ap­ Regiment Association, was instrumen­ privately published Kriegstagebuch in proach the Americans to negotiate a tal in enabling the author to benefit Feldpostbriejen 1940-1945, and surrender to avoid Russian captivity. significantly from the 11 th PD reun­ O'Gefr. Albrecht Englert his manu­ On 4 May Wietersheim himself met ion activities; and Martin Lange es­ script (with Oberst i.G. Brandsllidter), with Brigadier General Herbert Ear­ corted the author through the Panzer­ Kurze Geschichte und Zusammenstel­ nest, who had commanded CCA of museum Munster Lager, and we lung der Kampje der 19. Armee. the 4th Armored Division and was started up no 1. now commanding the 90th Infantry The IIth PD KTBs (Kriegstage­ Division. Earnest contacted General Other studies are Jorg Staiger, bucker - war diaries) and reports are Patton, who responded that the IIth Riickzug durchs RhOnetal (Neckar­ in NARS (National Archives and Re­ Panzer was the "fairest and bravest" gemund, 1965) and Erich Spiwoks cords Service) Microfilm T-315, but German division against which he had und Hans StOber, Endkampj zwischen the 1944 records for the West are fought, and that it be allowed back Mosel und Inn: Xlll. SS-Armeekorps lacking. Related reports and KTBs of across the border. Colonel Hank Reed (Osnabrtick, 1976). American opera­ LVIII Pz. Korps, Pz. AOK. 5, and of the 2d Cavalry Group, who had ar­ tional accounts include the U.S. Army H.Gr. G are on Microcopy T-314 Roll ranged occasional truces with the IIth official histories Jeffrey J. Clarke and 1497, T-313 Roll 420, and T-31l Roll in Lorraine, stalled negotiations with a Ross Smith, Riviera to the 141. Some monthly status reports Soviet military mission while the col­ Rhine (Washington, DC, 1993) and (Zustandsberichte) in the Bundesar­ mnns of the 11 th Panzer, depleted but Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Cam­ chivlMilitiirarchiv in Freiburg, in RH intact, rolled into honorable, un­ paign (Washingon, DC, 1950), and 10/49, RH 101217, and RH 27-11/135 guarded captivity at Kotzting, Bavaria. special U.S. Army Armor School are useful. In subsequent years the American 2d studies like The Nancy Bridgehead Cav and German veterans would U.S. unit records are in NARS, Suit­ (Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1946) and Ar­ share joint reunions, with the motto: land, Maryland (e.g. 4th Armored Di­ mor vs Mud and Mines (Fort Knox, Aus Feinden werden Freunde - "Ene­ vision in collection 604). Panzer Divi­ Kentucky, 1949-50). mies become friends. sion 44 K.St.N.s are calculated from NARS Microcopy T-78 Rolls 393, 397, and 410, and U.S. T/O&Es of 12 Source Materials February 1944 (T/O&E 17s) with bat­ talion table changes, copies at the CMH (Center of Military History), Dr. A. Harding Ganz gradu­ Essential for this study was corre­ Washington, DC, and the USAMHI ated from Wittenberg Univer­ spondence and discussions with most (U.S. Army Military History Insti­ sity in 1961 with a SA de­ of the veterans mentioned in the text. tute), Carlisle, Pa. The USAMHI, gree, and was awarded an Karl Heinz Loschke, an officer in where John Slonaker has been quite MA degree from Columbia Pz.Art.Rgt. 119 on the Russian Front helpful, also has oral history manu­ University in 1963. Commis­ and Secretary of the IIth Panzer Divi­ scripts, and the post-war accounts sioned from OCS, he served sion veterans' association, has been written by General Wietersheim him­ as a tank platoon leader with exceedingly gracious and helpful in self, MSS #B-364, B-416, and B-417. facilitating contact between the author 3/37th Armor, 4th Armored and the "Gespenster." The author met Published sources on the IIth Pan­ Division, in Germany 1964-' with Herr Loschke in Braunschweig zer Division include the division his­ 66. He received his Ph.D. in 1989, and was invited to the divi­ tory, Obstlt. Anton 1. Donnhauser and from Ohio State University in sion reunion in Kotzting, Bavaria in Generalmajor Werner Drews, Der Weg 1972, and is now an Associ­ May 1992. Attendance was supported der 11. Panzer-Division (Bad Woris­ ate Professor at the OSU by a research grant from the Profes­ hofen, 1982), Gustav W. Schrodek, Newark, Ohio campus. His Die 11. Panzerdivision: Bilddokumente sional Standards Committee of the fields of specialization are 1940-1945 (Friedburg, 1984), copy Ohio State University, Newark Cam­ Modern and military pus. Most valuable has been the mate­ provided by Major General (ret.) Ray­ history. He is a prior contribu­ rials and insights provided by Briga­ mond Mason (22d AFA/4th AD), and dier General (Ret.) William W. Molla, Schrodek's Pz.Rgt. 15 history, Ihr tor to ARMOR.

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 37