REVOLVING DOORS AND THE FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY TIME TO TACKLE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLIMATE POLICY-MAKING Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament AUSTRIA BELGIUM CZECH REPUBLIC FRANCE GERMANY HUNGARY ITALY POLAND SPAIN SWEDEN NORWAY DENMARK THE UNITED KINGDOM Revolving Doors and the Fossil Fuel Industry: Time to tackle conflicts of interest in climate policy-making May 2018 Authors (in order of appearance) Mathias Huter Alex Polfliet Patrick Cummins-Tripodi Ondřej Kopečný Linda Gandalovičová Cyril Lecerf Julian Müller Orsolya Fülöp Alessandro Zagarella Kacper Szulecki Óscar Reyes Niels Selling Andy Rowell Commissioned by The Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament Editing and additional texts by Pam Bartlett Quintanilla Patrick Cummins-Tripodi Design and layout Rubén Aguilera Raquel Lozano [email protected] Special thanks to Max Andersson, Rikard Allvin REVOLVING DOORS AND THE FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY TIME TO TACKLE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLIMATE POLICY-MAKING REVOLVING DOORS AND THE FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY TIME TO TACKLE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLIMATE POLICY-MAKING CONTENTS 08 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 09 INTRODUCTION 10 MAIN FINDINGS 11 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 12 THE REVOLVING DOOR AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON POLICY-MAKING TABLES REVOLVING DOORS RULES IN THE COUNTRIES ASSESSED: OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE LEGISLATION 18 STATISTICS ON CLIMATE POLICIES IN THE COUNTRIES ASSESSED MAP COMPANIES AND THE REVOLVING DOOR IN EACH COUNTRY TABLE SUBSIDIES TO FOSSIL FUELS PER COUNTRY TABLE CLIMATE CHANGE PERFORMANCE INDEX RESULTS 2018 GRAPHS ENERGY MIX PER COUNTRY — COUNTRY CHAPTERS 30 AUSTRIA 40 BELGIUM 48 CZECH REPUBLIC 60 FRANCE 72 GERMANY 80 HUNGARY 88 ITALY 96 POLAND 108 SPAIN 118 SWEDEN—NORWAY—DENMARK 128 THE UNITED KINGDOM REVOLVING DOORS 8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY his report was commissioned by the Greens/EFA Group European country in order to increase their reach, or they in the European Parliament in response to allegations take part in industry associations that have links to ex-pu- Tthat the European Union and its Member States have blic-office-holders. so far refused to engage constructively with governments It is difficult to measure the effect the revolving door has from across the world who are proposing the adoption of a on climate policy. The report does highlight numerous cases conflicts of interest policy for the United Nations Framework of revolving doors between fossil fuel companies and the Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). These countries, public sector but more research is needed before a definitive representing the majority of the world’s population, are ca- link with its effect on climate policy can be made. Neverthe- lling for a framework that would prevent vested interests less, the cases documented highlight the major potential for from dominating UN Climate Change negotiations and conflicts of interest, and when one takes into account what weakening international efforts on climate change. is at stake for large fossil fuel companies, and how much lo- This report therefore seeks to examine the revolving bbying they conduct on climate policy more generally, weak door phenomenon between the public and private sector in revolving door policy provides another avenue of influence Europe, specifically as regards the fossil fuel industry, in an for private fossil fuel interests to exploit. attempt to uncover whether European governments' lack On existing legislation, there is some regulation of the of appetite for this issue might perhaps be stimulated by revolving door in Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, the cosy relationships built up in the region via the revolving Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom, but door phenomenon. the provisions vary in scope. The remaining countries do not Taking Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fran- regulate the issue at all. However, even in countries that do ce, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, Swe- regulate the issue, we find numerous examples of revolving den, and the United Kingdom as case studies, the report first door cases, which indicates that there remain gaps in the le- analyses any existing legislation (or lack thereof) on revol- gislation, enforcement mechanisms are weak or inexistent, ving doors in both the pre- and post-employment stages. and/or that the rules are regularly flouted. Secondly, it showcases a number of high-profile revolving We thus make a number of recommendations. At regio- door examples from each country (typically Ministers, Mem- nal, national and EU level, there should be a cooling-off pe- bers of Parliament, Ministerial advisors and other high-level riod of 3 years to prevent possible conflicts of interest that public officials who have moved from the public sector to can arise from the revolving door, there should be a centrali- the private sector or vice versa). sed lobby transparency register, public-office holders should Although the study is not intended to be exhaustive be obliged to publish declarations of interest detailing their when it comes to documenting revolving door cases, a num- previous roles and these should be scanned to avoid con- ber of observations can be made from our findings. Firstly, flicts of interest, and finally, there should be robust codes revolving doors in Europe are a widespread phenomenon, of conduct that prevent public-officer holders from having with our research in just 13 countries throwing up at least 88 multiple interests concurrently. cases of revolving doors, all of these specifically in the fossil At the United Nations Framework Convention on Clima- fuels sector. Secondly, it is particularly the larger, dominant te Change (UNFCCC) level, we call for the adoption of a clear players in a country’s energy market that feature more pro- definition of what constitutes a conflict of interests, which minently. Thirdly, perhaps in an effort to avoid public con- covers both private and organisational conflicts. On this ba- troversy, it appears that in some countries, companies prefer sis, a conflict of interests policy should be implemented that to hire policy advisors and other high-level officials working provides clear guidelines to climate policy-makers on how to behind the scenes, rather than politicians; while in other engage with different stakeholders in the process without countries such as Austria, Spain or Denmark, high-level po- undermining the objectives of the international climate ne- liticians feature more prominently than advisors. Fourthly, a gotiations. // subtler form of exerting influence, through placing staff in the Cabinets of key Ministers, appears in a number of cases in several countries. Finally, some companies build up rela- tions with former public office holders from more than one Revolving Doors and the Fossil Fuel Industry: Time to tackle conflicts of interest in climate policy-making REVOLVING DOORS INTRODUCTION 9 hen we look at the great challenges of our sector in private organisations, and vice-versa. Lines are blu- time, climate change stands out because of its rred between political and economic power when the same Wscale and its urgency. Although scientists have people that one day are regulators become high-paid em- concluded that the window of opportunity to limit climate ployees of major corporations the next. Policy advisors, Sta- change to 1.5 or 2 degrees is rapidly closing, action on cli- te Secretaries and politicians find themselves sought after mate change is still severely lacking. In addition, it is hard to by organisations who wish to use their contacts, knowledge deny that the fossil fuel industry has been fiercely fighting and strategic insights in order to increase their own reach, effective climate policies over the past couple of decades. influence and sometimes, profits. This industry is not only highly influential, but it is also an Every day, Greens/EFA Members of the European Par- effective recruiter of former regulators in the energy sector, liament come across lobbyists and interest groups that are as shown in this report. And its political influence stands out. trying to influence the decision-making process. Of course, Nowhere is this more visible than in the UNFCCC Confe- in a democratic system it is both normal and desirable that rence of the Parties (or COP) negotiations. Here, the fossil citizens and interest groups should be able to make their fuel industry is given preferential access, in the sense that voices heard. The traditional way of doing this is through they often act as sponsors to the climate negotiations, they the preparation of briefings, media campaigns, advocacy get their own zone for displaying information about them- meetings, public events, network and so forth. selves in a prime location, they get access to key negotia- But to ensure long-term impact, many organisations turn tions and negotiators, and in some cases the fossil fuel in- to the “revolving door” as a key source of influence, informa- dustry is even part of the official delegations representing tion and power. This report gathers together a series of re- some countries during the high-level negotiations. Often, volving door cases between high level officials and the fossil this means that it is the fossil fuel industry which dictates fuels industry in Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, the limits of “possibility” when it comes to fighting climate France, Germany, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden change. Which begs the question: are we failing to live up and the United Kingdom with a view to assessing to what to the challenge because of the cosy relationships that have extent the revolving door phenomenon might have an im- been built up between the fossil fuel industries and politi- pact on climate policy-making across Europe. It shows that cians, for example, through the revolving door? the passage between the public and private sectors, often to The term “revolving door”, refers to the movement of in- areas that public office-holders were previously responsible dividuals from positions in public office to jobs in the same for regulating, is both common and widespread.