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Allocutive Marking and the Theory of Agreement
Allocutive marking and the theory of agreement SyntaxLab, University of Cambridge, November 5th, 2019 Thomas McFadden Leibniz-Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (ZAS), Berlin [email protected] 1 Introduction In many colloquial varieties of Tamil (Dravidian; South Asia), one commonly comes across utterances of the following kind:1 (1) Naan Ãaaŋgiri vaaŋg-in-een-ŋgæ. I Jangri buy-pst-1sg.sbj-alloc ‘I bought Jangri.’2 Aside from the good news it brings, (1) is of interest because it contains two different types of agreement stacked on top of each other. 1. -een marks quite normal agreement with with the 1sg subject. 2. -ŋgæ marks something far less common: so-called allocutive agreement. + Rather than cross-referencing properties of one of the arguments of the main predicate, allocuative agreement provides information about the addressee. + The addition of -ŋgæ specifically indicates a plural addressee or a singular one who the speaker uses polite forms of address with. + If the addressee is a single familiar person, the suffix is simply lacking, as in (2). (2) Naan Ãaaŋgiri vaaŋg-in-een. I Jangri buy-pst-1sg.sbj ‘I bought Jangri.’ Allocutive agreement (henceforth AllAgr) has been identified in a handful of languages and is characterized by the following properties (see Antonov, 2015, for an initial typological overview): • It marks properties (gender, politeness. ) of the addressee of the current speech context. • It is crucially not limited to cases where the addressee is an argument of the local predicate. • It involves the use of grammaticalized morphological markers in the verbal or clausal inflectional system, thus is distinct from special vocative forms like English ma’am or sir. -
Linguistics 203 - Languages of the World Language Study Guide
Linguistics 203 - Languages of the World Language Study Guide This exam may consist of anything discussed on or after October 20. Be sure to check out the slides on the class webpage for this date onward, as well as the syntax/morphology language notes. This guide discusses the aspects of specific languages we looked at, and you will want to look at the notes of specific languages in the ‘language notes: syntax/morphology’ section of the webpage for examples and basic explanations. This guide does not discuss the linguistic topics we discussed in a more general sense (i.e. where we didn’t focus on a specific language), but you are expected to understand these area as well. On the webpage, these areas are found in the ‘lecture notes/slides’ section. As you study, keep in mind that there are a number of ways I might pose a question to test your knowledge. If you understand the concept, you should be able to answer any of them. These include: Definitional If a language is considered an ergative-absolutive language, what does this mean? Contrastive (definitional) Explain how an ergative-absolutive language differs from a nominative- accusative language. Identificational (which may include a definitional question as well...) Looking at the example below, identify whether language A is an ergative- absolutive language or a nominative accusative language. How do you know? (example) Contrastive (identificational) Below are examples from two different languages. In terms of case marking, how is language A different from language B? (ex. of ergative-absolutive language) (ex. of nominative-accusative language) True / False question T F Basque is an ergative-absolutive language. -
Honorificity, Indexicality and Their Interaction in Magahi
SPEAKER AND ADDRESSEE IN NATURAL LANGUAGE: HONORIFICITY, INDEXICALITY AND THEIR INTERACTION IN MAGAHI BY DEEPAK ALOK A dissertation submitted to the School of Graduate Studies Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Linguistics Written under the direction of Mark Baker and Veneeta Dayal and approved by New Brunswick, New Jersey October, 2020 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Speaker and Addressee in Natural Language: Honorificity, Indexicality and their Interaction in Magahi By Deepak Alok Dissertation Director: Mark Baker and Veneeta Dayal Natural language uses first and second person pronouns to refer to the speaker and addressee. This dissertation takes as its starting point the view that speaker and addressee are also implicated in sentences that do not have such pronouns (Speas and Tenny 2003). It investigates two linguistic phenomena: honorification and indexical shift, and the interactions between them, andshow that these discourse participants have an important role to play. The investigation is based on Magahi, an Eastern Indo-Aryan language spoken mainly in the state of Bihar (India), where these phenomena manifest themselves in ways not previously attested in the literature. The phenomena are analyzed based on the native speaker judgements of the author along with judgements of one more native speaker, and sometimes with others as the occasion has presented itself. Magahi shows a rich honorification system (the encoding of “social status” in grammar) along several interrelated dimensions. Not only 2nd person pronouns but 3rd person pronouns also morphologically mark the honorificity of the referent with respect to the speaker. -
Mismatches in Honorificity Across Allocutive Languages
Mismatches in honorificity across allocutive languages Gurmeet Kaur, Göttingen Akitaka Yamada, Osaka [email protected] [email protected] Symposium: The features of allocutivity, honorifics and social relation @ LSA 2021 1 Introduction • Allocutivity is a phenomenon, where certain languages have distinct verbal morphology that encodes the addressee of the speech act (Oyharçabal, 1993; Miyagawa, 2012; Antonov, 2015; McFadden, 2020; Kaur, 2017; 2020a; 2020b; Haddican, 2018; Alok and Baker, 2018; Yamada, 2019b; Alok, 2020 etc.) • A classic example comes from Basque. (1) a. Pette-k lan egin di-k Peter-ERG work do.PFV 3ERG-M ‘Peter worked.’ (said to a male friend) b. Pette-k lan egin di-n Peter-ERG work do.PFV 3ERG-F ‘Peter worked.’ (said to a female friend) (Oyharçabal, 1993: 92-93) • As existing documentation shows, allocutive forms may or may not interact with 2nd person arguments in the clause. • This divides allocutive languages into two groups: • Group 1 disallows allocutivity with agreeing 2nd person arguments (Basque, Tamil, Magahi, Punjabi). In the absence of phi-agreement, Group 2 (Korean, Japanese) does not restrict allocutivity with any 2nd person arguments. (2) Punjabi a. tusii raam-nuu bulaa raye so (*je) 2pl.nom Ram-DOM call prog.m.hon be.pst.2pl alloc.pl ‘You were calling Ram.’ b. raam twaa-nuu bulaa reyaa sii je Ram.nom 2pl.obl-DOM call prog.m.sg be.pst.3sg alloc.pl ‘Ram was calling you.’ 1 (3) Japanese a. anata-wa ramu-o yon-dei-masi-ta. 2hon-TOP Ram-ACC call-PRG-HONA-PST ‘You were calling Ram.’ b. -
Chapter 1 Negation in a Cross-Linguistic Perspective
Chapter 1 Negation in a cross-linguistic perspective 0. Chapter summary This chapter introduces the empirical scope of our study on the expression and interpretation of negation in natural language. We start with some background notions on negation in logic and language, and continue with a discussion of more linguistic issues concerning negation at the syntax-semantics interface. We zoom in on cross- linguistic variation, both in a synchronic perspective (typology) and in a diachronic perspective (language change). Besides expressions of propositional negation, this book analyzes the form and interpretation of indefinites in the scope of negation. This raises the issue of negative polarity and its relation to negative concord. We present the main facts, criteria, and proposals developed in the literature on this topic. The chapter closes with an overview of the book. We use Optimality Theory to account for the syntax and semantics of negation in a cross-linguistic perspective. This theoretical framework is introduced in Chapter 2. 1 Negation in logic and language The main aim of this book is to provide an account of the patterns of negation we find in natural language. The expression and interpretation of negation in natural language has long fascinated philosophers, logicians, and linguists. Horn’s (1989) Natural history of negation opens with the following statement: “All human systems of communication contain a representation of negation. No animal communication system includes negative utterances, and consequently, none possesses a means for assigning truth value, for lying, for irony, or for coping with false or contradictory statements.” A bit further on the first page, Horn states: “Despite the simplicity of the one-place connective of propositional logic ( ¬p is true if and only if p is not true) and of the laws of inference in which it participate (e.g. -
1 English Subjectless Tagged Sentences Paul Kay Department Of
1 English subjectless tagged sentences Paul Kay Department of Linguistics University of California Berkeley, CA 94720 [email protected] 2 Abstract A colloquial English sentence like Fooled us, didn't they? contains a finite main verb but no expressed subject. The identity of the missing subject of fooled is recovered from the tag subject they: compare Fooled us, didn't she?, Fooled us, didn't you? This paper argues (1) that such subjectless tagged sentences (STSs) pose a problem for grammatical approaches based on movement and empty categories and (2) that STSs receive a revealing analysis as part of a finely articulated family of tagged sentence constructions when viewed within a non-derivational, constructional, multiple-inheritance-based approach.* *I would like to thank Peter Culicover, Liliane Haegeman, Charles Fillmore Andreas Kathol and Richard Oehrle for comments on previous versions of this paper, as well as an anonymous reviewer for Language. They have doubtless offered more good advice than I have accepted. 3 0. Introduction. It has been argued from several points of view that whatever can be done with empty categories (ecs) can be done without them (Ades and Steedman 1982, Gazdar et al. 1984, Kaplan and Zaenen 1989, Pollard and Sag 1994 chapter 9, Sag and Fodor 1994, Kay and Fillmore 1999, Sag 1999). It has also been argued that, because there is no hard evidence for their existence, linguistic theory would be better off dispensing with these unobservable entities (Pickering and Barry 1991, Sag and Fodor 1994, Sag 1999).1 The present paper purports to take the argument one step further by showing that there are things that can be done without empty categories that cannot be done with them, at least not with any of the ecs currently available. -
The Syntax of Answers to Negative Yes/No-Questions in English Anders Holmberg Newcastle University
The syntax of answers to negative yes/no-questions in English Anders Holmberg Newcastle University 1. Introduction This paper will argue that answers to polar questions or yes/no-questions (YNQs) in English are elliptical expressions with basically the structure (1), where IP is identical to the LF of the IP of the question, containing a polarity variable with two possible values, affirmative or negative, which is assigned a value by the focused polarity expression. (1) yes/no Foc [IP ...x... ] The crucial data come from answers to negative questions. English turns out to have a fairly complicated system, with variation depending on which negation is used. The meaning of the answer yes in (2) is straightforward, affirming that John is coming. (2) Q(uestion): Isn’t John coming, too? A(nswer): Yes. (‘John is coming.’) In (3) (for speakers who accept this question as well formed), 1 the meaning of yes alone is indeterminate, and it is therefore not a felicitous answer in this context. The longer version is fine, affirming that John is coming. (3) Q: Isn’t John coming, either? A: a. #Yes. b. Yes, he is. In (4), there is variation regarding the interpretation of yes. Depending on the context it can be a confirmation of the negation in the question, meaning ‘John is not coming’. In other contexts it will be an infelicitous answer, as in (3). (4) Q: Is John not coming? A: a. Yes. (‘John is not coming.’) b. #Yes. In all three cases the (bare) answer no is unambiguous, meaning that John is not coming. -
Sequence-Of-Tense and the Features of Finite Tenses Karen Zagona University of Washington*
Sequence-of-tense and the Features of Finite Tenses Karen Zagona University of Washington* Abstract Sequence-of-tense (SOT) is often described as a (past) tense verb form that does not correspond to a semantically interpretable tense. Since SOT clauses behave in other respects like finite clauses, the question arises as to whether the syntactic category Tense has to be distinguished from the functional category tense. I claim that SOT clauses do in fact contain interpretable PRESENT tense. The “past” form is analyzed as a manifestation of agreement with the (matrix past) controller of the SOT clause evaluation time. One implication of this analysis is that finite verb forms should be analyzed as representing features that correspond to functional categories higher in clause structure, including those of the clausal left periphery. SOT morphology then sheds light on the existence of a series of finer- grained functional heads that contribute to tense construal, and to verbal paradigms. These include Tense, Modality and Force. 1. Introduction The phenomenon of sequence-of-tense (SOT) poses several challenges for the standard assumption that a “past tense” verb form signals the presence of a functional category in clause structure with an interpretable ‘past’ value. SOT is illustrated by the ‘simultaneous’ reading of sentence (1): (1) Terry believed that Sue was pregnant. a. The time of Sue’s pregnancy precedes time of Terry’s belief (precedence) b. The time of Sue’ pregnancy overlaps time of Terry’s belief (simultaneity) For the ‘precedence’ reading in (1a), the embedded clause tense is semantically transparent in the sense that the past form was corresponds to a past ordering relation (relative to the time of Terry’s belief). -
Topic Structures in Chinese Author(S): Xu Liejiong and D
Linguistic Society of America Topic Structures in Chinese Author(s): Xu Liejiong and D. Terence Langendoen Source: Language, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Mar., 1985), pp. 1-27 Published by: Linguistic Society of America Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/413419 Accessed: 11/05/2009 22:37 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=lsa. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Linguistic Society of America is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Language. http://www.jstor.org TOPIC STRUCTURES IN CHINESE Xu LIEJIONG D. -
Empty Categories in LFG
Empty categories in LFG Judith Berman University of Stuttgart Pro ceedings of the LFG Conference University of California San Diego Miriam Butt and Tracy Holloway King Editors CSLI Publications httpwwwcslistanfordedupublications I am grateful to Christian Fortmann Gert Web elhuth Hub ert Haider Joan Bresnan Miriam Butt Steve Berman and Werner Frey for helpful comments and discussion This researchwas supp orted by the DFG Graduiertenkolleg Linguistische Grundlagen fur die Sprachverarb eitung at the University of Stuttgart LFG JBerman Empty Categories in LFG This pap er is concerned with the question whether there is any necessity and evidence for empty categories sp ecically traces in German Following the analysis of weak crossover in Bresnan b and Choi it is shown that the German weak crossover data can b e captured correctly if it is assumed that a topicalized constituent has to b e linked with an empty category in its lo cal domain its minimal clause only in the case of long distance dep endencies The empty category is indep endently motivated by a lo cality requirement on function sp ecication which is empirically supp orted by the fact that free word order in German is restricted to the lo cal clause It is further shown that the empty category cannot o ccupy the canonical p osition of the antecedent Instead it is claimed based on work byFrey that the sp ecier p osition of the functional category is the only p osition in which the empty category is licensed The resulting analysis not only accounts for the weak crossover data -
Affirmative and Negated Modality*
Quaderns de Filologia. Estudis lingüístics. Vol. XIV (2009) 169-192 AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATED MODALITY* Günter Radden Hamburg 0. INTR O DUCTI O N 0.1. Stating the problem Descriptions of modality in English often give the impression that the behaviour of modal verbs is erratic when they occur with negation. A particularly intriguing case is the behaviour of the modal verb must under negation. In its deontic sense, must is used both in affirmative and negated sentences, expressing obligation (1a) and prohibition (1b), respectively. In its epistemic sense, however, must is only used in affirmative sentences expressing necessity (2a). The modal verb that expresses the corresponding negated epistemic modality, i.e. impossibility, is can’t (2b). (1) a. You must switch off your mobile phone. [obligation] b. You mustn’t switch off your mobile phone. [prohibition] (2) a. Your mobile phone must be switched off. [necessity] b. Your mobile phone can’t be switched off. [impossibility] Explanations that have been offered for the use of epistemic can’t are not very helpful. Palmer (1990: 61) argues that mustn’t is not used for the negation of epistemic necessity because can’t is supplied, and Coates (1983: 20) suggests that can’t is used because mustn’t is unavailable. Both “explanations” beg the question: why should can’t be used to denote negated necessity and why should mustn’t be unavailable? Such questions have apparently not been asked for two interrelated reasons: first, the study of modality and negation has been dominated by logic and, secondly, since the modal verbs apparently do * An earlier version of this paper was published in Władysław Chłopicki, Andrzej Pawelec, and Agnieszka Pokojska (eds.), 2007, Cognition in Language: Volume in Honour of Professor Elżbieta Tabakowska, 224-254. -
Assertions and Judgements, Epistemics, and Evidentials 1
Assertions and Judgements, Epistemics, and Evidentials Manfred Krifka1 Leibniz-Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft & Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin [email protected] Workshop 'Speech Acts: Meanings, Uses, Syntactic and Prosodic Realizations' Leibniz-ZAS Berlin, May 29 – 31, 2017 1. Overview Topics to be covered: • The nature of assertion as expressing commitments • Judgements as a separate act from commitments • Subjective epistemics as expressing strength of judgments • Evidentials as expressing source of judgements • Discourse epistemics 2. Assertions as Commitments 2.1 The dynamic view of assertions (1) Assertions as modifying the common ground, “a body of information that is available, or presumed to be available, as a resource for communication” (Stalnaker 1978) (2) Standard view of assertion in dynamic semantics s (Stalnaker 1978, 2002, 2014; Heim 1983, Veltman 1996) φ s+φ – Common ground is modeled by a set of propositions (context set), – Assertion of a proposition restricts the input common ground to an output common ground by intersection. + Example: s + φ = s ⋂ φ (3) Alternative view: Common ground as sets of propositions – Assertion of a proposition adds the proposition to the common ground c φ – Context set: the intersection of the propositions of the common ground + Example: c + φ = c ⋃ {φ} (4) Advantages of this view: c ⋃ {φ} – Meaningful addition of tautologies, e.g. ‘2399 is a prime number’ = – possible modeling of contradictory common grounds (would lead to empty context set) – possible enrichment by imposing