ECOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT REPORT MAIN REPORT
date: 31 January 2012 version 5
SE NNEGC ENERGOATOM Ukraine NPP Safety Upgrade Program: Ecological Assessment
Energoatom - Date 31.01.2012 Page 1
This document is presented by Energoatom for the purposes of the ecological assessment on the Ukrainian NPP Safety Upgrade Project. It does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and European Commission. This report was prepared with assistance of experts from Pöyry (Finland, France, Switzerland & Germany), UCEWP and AESCAR (Ukraine).
Cover page picture rights: Energoatom
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Contents
INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE OF THE REPORT 9
1 GENERAL INFORMATION 10
1.1 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 10 1.2 ACRONYMS 10 1.3 DOCUMENTS THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR THE EA 11 1.3.1 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 11 1.3.2 NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF UKRAINE 12 1.3.3 INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 12 1.4 INFORMATION ON SUP EA EXECUTORS 12 1.5 SUP GOALS 13 1.5.1 UKRAINE ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION SECTOR 13 1.5.2 PRESENTATION OF THE NPPS 14 1.5.3 PURPOSE OF THE UPGRADE PROGRAM 15 1.6 SUP MEASURES STRUCTURE 17 1.6.1 SUP MEASURES AT THE BEGINNING OF EA 17 1.6.2 ADDITIONAL SUP MEASURES DECIDED IN THE LIGHT OF FUKUSHIMA EVENT ANALYSIS 19 1.7 SUP CONNECTION WITH OTHER PROGRAMS 20 1.7.1 PREVIOUS PROGRAMS RELATED TO SAFETY UPGRADE 20 1.7.2 OTHER PROGRAMS UNDER PREPARATION BY ENERGOATOM IN PARALLEL TO SUP 20 1.8 ALTERNATIVES TO SUP IMPLEMENTATION 22 1.8.1 "NO‐PROJECT" ALTERNATIVE 22 1.8.2 OTHER ALTERNATIVES 22 1.9 STATE POLICY ON PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENT AND POPULATION HEALTH 23 1.10 PUBLIC AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT AT NPP LEVEL 23 1.10.1 HEALTH SAFETY ENVIRONMENT (HSE) MANAGEMENT 23 1.10.2 EARLY WARNING AND PREPAREDNESS 25 1.11 LIST OF ECOLOGICAL AND SANITARY‐EPIDEMIOLOGIC LIMITATIONS 27 1.12 LIST OF ANALYZED SOURCES OF POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 28 1.13 LIST OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT TYPES OF UKRAINIAN NPPS IN OPERATION 28 1.13.1 RADIATION IMPACT 28 1.13.2 CHEMICAL IMPACT 29 1.13.3 NON‐RADIATION PHYSICAL IMPACT 29 1.14 LIST OF OBJECTS POTENTIALLY IMPACTED BY UKRAINIAN NPPS 29 1.15 APPROACHES, METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF SUP EA 29 1.16 SCHEDULED EXPERTISE OF SUP AND SUP EA REPORT 30 1.17 MAIN INFORMATION SOURCES USED IN THE PROCESS OF SUP EA 30
2 EA OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION AT THE ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP 31
2.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE NPP 31 2.1.1 AREA AND LOCATION OF THE NPP 31 2.1.2 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP’S INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY AND HAZARD CLASS 32 2.1.3 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP’S PRODUCTION 32 2.1.4 DATA ON RAW MATERIAL, LAND, WATER, ENERGY AND OTHER RESOURCES USED 32 2.1.5 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE NPP TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESS 33
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2.1.6 SUP MEASURES AIMING AT MITIGATION OR ELIMINATION OF HAZARDOUS EMISSIONS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT 34 2.1.7 DESCRIPTION OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TREATMENT SCHEME & SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL VOLUMES 34 2.1.8 DESCRIPTION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT SCHEME AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE VOLUMES 35 2.1.9 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARDOUS AND GENERAL INDUSTRIAL WASTE TREATMENT SCHEME AND VOLUMES 36 2.1.10 SUP MEASURES AIMING AT REDUCING WASTES VOLUMES OR IMPROVING WASTE TREATMENT 36 2.1.11 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DESIGN AND NON‐DESIGN ACCIDENTS ANALYZED 36 2.1.12 DESIGN SOLUTIONS REDUCING OR MITIGATING CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 37 2.1.13 SUP MEASURES AIMING AT REDUCING ACCIDENT RISKS OR MITIGATING ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES 38 2.1.14 SANITARY‐PROTECTION ZONE AND MONITORING ZONE OF NPP 38 2.2 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT ON NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 39 2.2.1 CLIMATE AND MICROCLIMATE 39 2.2.2 AIR QUALITY 40 2.2.3 GEOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 41 2.2.4 AQUATIC ENVIRONMENT (GROUND WATERS, SURFACE WATER BASINS) 42 2.2.5 SOIL AND LANDSCAPE 44 2.2.6 FLORA, FAUNA, RESERVES 45 2.3 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT ON SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 47 2.3.1 SOCIAL BASELINE THE NPP MONITORING ZONE 47 2.3.2 FORECASTED PUBLIC HEALTH REGARDLESS OF SUP (IN NORMAL OPERATION OR IN CASE OF ACCIDENT) 48 2.3.3 IMPACT OF SUP MEASURES ON FORECASTED PUBLIC HEALTH STATE 49 2.3.4 IMPACT OF SUP ON LOCAL POPULATION’S SOCIAL CONDITIONS 50 2.4 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT ON TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT 51 2.4.1 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING STATE WITHIN THE MONITORING ZONE 51 2.4.2 IMPACT OF NPP ON TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT REGARDLESS OF SUP 51 2.4.3 IMPACT OF SUP MEASURES ON TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT 52 2.4.4 POSSIBLE IMPACT ON NPP FROM THE TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 52 2.5 COMPREHENSIVE MEASURES TO ENSURE STANDARD STATE OF ENVIRONMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 53 2.5.1 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF RESOURCE‐SAVING MEASURES TAKEN ON NPP REGARDLESS OF SUP 53 2.5.2 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCE‐SAVING MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH SUP 54 2.5.3 SOCIAL AND WORKERS PROTECTION MEASURES TAKEN ON NPP REGARDLESS OF SUP 54 2.5.4 CHANGES IN SOCIAL AND WORKERS PROTECTION MEASURES AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 55 2.5.5 REHABILITATION (RENEWAL) MEASURES UNDERTAKEN DURING NPP CONSTRUCTION 56 2.5.6 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL REHABILITATION (RENEWAL) MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUP 56 2.5.7 COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN IN THE PROCESS OF NPP OPERATION 56 2.5.8 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATORY MEASURES AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 56 2.5.9 DESCRIPTION OF ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION MEASURES RELATED TO NPP OPERATION 57 2.5.10 NEED FOR CHANGING ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION MEASURES AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 58 2.5.11 RESIDUAL IMPACT OF NPP UNDER NORMAL OPERATION (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 58 2.5.12 CHANGES IN RESIDUAL IMPACT AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 61 2.5.13 COMPLEX ASSESSMENT OF NPP’S ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT UNDER NORMAL OPERATION AS A RESULT OF SUP 62 2.5.14 COMPLEX ASSESSMENT OF ECOLOGICAL RISKS IN CASE OF ACCIDENT ON NPP (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 62 2.5.15 COMPLEX ASSESSMENT OF CHANGES IN ECOLOGICAL RISKS IN CASE OF ACCIDENT ON NPP AS A RESULT OF SUP 62 2.5.16 ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION ACCORDING TO ECOLOGICAL IMPACT ON POPULATION HEALTH 63 2.6 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CHANGE IN THE PROCESS OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 63
3 EA OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION AT THE RIVNE NPP 65
3.1 GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THE NPP 65 3.1.1 AREA AND LOCATION OF THE NPP 65 3.1.2 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF RIVNE NPP INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY AND HAZARD CLASS 66 3.1.3 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF RIVNE NPP PRODUCTION 66 3.1.4 DATA ON RAW MATERIAL, LAND, WATER, ENERGY AND OTHER RESOURCES USED 66
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3.1.5 DESCRIPTION OF THE NPP TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESS 66 3.1.6 SUP MEASURES AIMING AT MITIGATION OR ELIMINATION OF HAZARDOUS EMISSIONS INTO ENVIRONMENT 68 3.1.7 DESCRIPTION OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TREATMENT SCHEME & SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL VOLUMES 68 3.1.8 DESCRIPTION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT SCHEME AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE VOLUMES 69 3.1.9 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARDOUS AND GENERAL INDUSTRIAL WASTE TREATMENT SCHEME AND VOLUMES 70 3.1.10 SUP MEASURES AIMED AT REDUCING WASTES VOLUMES OR IMPROVING WASTE TREATMENT 71 3.1.11 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DESIGN AND NON‐DESIGN ACCIDENTS ANALYZED 71 3.1.12 DESIGN SOLUTIONS REDUCING OR MITIGATING CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 72 3.1.13 SUP MEASURES AIMING AT REDUCING ACCIDENT RISKS OR MITIGATING ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES 72 3.1.14 SANITARY‐PROTECTION ZONE AND MONITORING ZONE OF NPP 72 3.2 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT ON NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 73 3.2.1 CLIMATE AND MICROCLIMATE 73 3.2.2 AIR QUALITY 73 3.2.3 GEOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 75 3.2.4 AQUATIC ENVIRONMENT (GROUND WATERS, SURFACE WATER BASINS) 76 3.2.5 SOIL AND LANDSCAPE 77 3.2.6 FLORA, FAUNA, RESERVES 79 3.3 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT ON SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 80 3.3.1 SOCIAL BASELINE THE NPP MONITORING ZONE 80 3.3.2 FORECASTED PUBLIC HEALTH REGARDLESS OF SUP (IN NORMAL OPERATION OR IN CASE OF ACCIDENT) 82 3.3.3 IMPACT OF SUP MEASURES ON THE OUTCOME OF FORECASTED PUBLIC HEALTH STATE 83 3.3.4 IMPACT OF SUP ON LOCAL POPULATION’S SOCIAL CONDITIONS 84 3.4 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT ON TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT 84 3.4.1 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING STATE WITHIN THE MONITORING ZONE 84 3.4.2 IMPACT OF NPP ON TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT REGARDLESS OF SUP 85 3.4.3 IMPACT OF SUP MEASURES ON TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT 85 3.4.4 POSSIBLE IMPACT ON NPP FROM THE TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 86 3.5 COMPREHENSIVE MEASURES TO ENSURE STANDARD STATE OF ENVIRONMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 87 3.5.1 DESCRIPTION OF RESOURCE‐SAVING MEASURES TAKEN ON NPP REGARDLESS OF SUP 87 3.5.2 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCE‐SAVING MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH SUP 87 3.5.3 SOCIAL AND WORKERS PROTECTION MEASURES TAKEN ON NPP REGARDLESS OF SUP 88 3.5.4 CHANGES IN SOCIAL AND WORKERS PROTECTION MEASURES AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 88 3.5.5 REHABILITATION (RENEWAL) MEASURES UNDERTAKEN DURING NPP CONSTRUCTION 89 3.5.6 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL REHABILITATION (RENEWAL) MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUP 89 3.5.7 COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN IN THE PROCESS OF NPP OPERATION 90 3.5.8 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATORY MEASURES AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 90 3.5.9 DESCRIPTION OF ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION MEASURES RELATED TO NPP OPERATION 90 3.5.10 CHANGES IN THE SET OF PROTECTION MEASURES AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 91 3.5.11 RESIDUAL IMPACT OF NPP UNDER NORMAL OPERATION (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 91 3.5.12 CHANGES IN RESIDUAL IMPACT AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 93 3.5.13 COMPLEX ASSESSMENT OF NPP’S ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT UNDER NORMAL OPERATION AS A RESULT OF SUP 93 3.5.14 COMPLEX ASSESSMENT OF ECOLOGICAL RISKS IN CASE OF ACCIDENT ON NPP (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 93 3.5.15 COMPLEX ASSESSMENT OF CHANGES IN ECOLOGICAL RISKS IN CASE OF ACCIDENT ON NPP AS A RESULT OF SUP 93 3.5.16 ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION ACCORDING TO ECOLOGICAL IMPACT ON POPULATION HEALTH 94 3.6 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CHANGE IN THE PROCESS OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 95
4 EA OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION AT THE KHMELNITSKY NPP 96
4.1 GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THE NPP 96 4.1.1 AREA AND LOCATION OF THE NPP 96 4.1.2 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF KHMELNITSKY NPP INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY AND HAZARD CLASS 97
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4.1.3 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF KHMELNITSKY NPP PRODUCTION 97 4.1.4 DATA ON RAW MATERIAL, LAND, WATER, ENERGY AND OTHER RESOURCES USED 97 4.1.5 DESCRIPTION OF THE NPP TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESS 97 4.1.6 SUP MEASURES AIMING AT MITIGATION OR ELIMINATION OF HAZARDOUS EMISSIONS INTO ENVIRONMENT 98 4.1.7 DESCRIPTION OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TREATMENT SCHEME & SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL VOLUMES 99 4.1.8 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT SCHEME AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE VOLUMES 99 4.1.9 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARDOUS AND GENERAL INDUSTRIAL WASTE TREATMENT SCHEME AND VOLUMES 101 4.1.10 SUP MEASURES AIMING AT REDUCING WASTES VOLUMES OR IMPROVING WASTE TREATMENT 101 4.1.11 DESCRIPTION OF DESIGN AND NON‐DESIGN ACCIDENTS ANALYZED 101 4.1.12 BRIEF DESIGN SOLUTIONS REDUCING OR MITIGATING CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 101 4.1.13 SUP MEASURES AIMING AT REDUCING ACCIDENT RISKS OR MITIGATING ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES 101 4.1.14 SANITARY‐PROTECTION ZONE AND MONITORING ZONE OF NPP 102 4.2 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT ON NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 102 4.2.1 CLIMATE AND MICROCLIMATE 102 4.2.2 AIR QUALITY 103 4.2.3 GEOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 104 4.2.4 AQUATIC ENVIRONMENT (GROUND WATER, SURFACE WATER BASINS) 106 4.2.5 SOIL AND LANDSCAPE 107 4.2.6 FLORA, FAUNA, RESERVES 109 4.3 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT ON SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 110 4.3.1 SOCIAL BASELINE THE NPP MONITORING ZONE 110 4.3.2 FORECASTED PUBLIC HEALTH REGARDLESS OF SUP (IN NORMAL OPERATION OR IN CASE OF ACCIDENT) 112 4.3.3 IMPACT OF SUP MEASURES ON THE OUTCOME OF FORECASTED PUBLIC HEALTH STATE 113 4.3.4 IMPACT OF SUP ON LOCAL POPULATION’S SOCIAL CONDITIONS 114 4.4 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON THE TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT 115 4.4.1 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING STATE WITHIN THE MONITORING ZONE 115 4.4.2 IMPACT OF NPP ON TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT REGARDLESS OF SUP 115 4.4.3 IMPACT OF SUP MEASURES ON TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT 116 4.4.4 POSSIBLE IMPACT ON NPP FROM THE TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 116 4.5 COMPREHENSIVE MEASURES TO ENSURE STANDARD STATE OF ENVIRONMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 117 4.5.1 DESCRIPTION OF RESOURCE‐SAVING MEASURES TAKEN ON NPP REGARDLESS OF SUP 117 4.5.2 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCE‐SAVING MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH SUP 117 4.5.3 SOCIAL AND WORKERS PROTECTION MEASURES TAKEN ON NPP REGARDLESS OF SUP 118 4.5.4 CHANGES IN SOCIAL AND WORKERS PROTECTION MEASURES AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 118 4.5.5 REHABILITATION (RENEWAL) MEASURES UNDERTAKEN DURING NPP CONSTRUCTION 119 4.5.6 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL REHABILITATION (RENEWAL) MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUP 119 4.5.7 COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN IN THE PROCESS OF NPP OPERATION 120 4.5.8 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATORY MEASURES AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 120 4.5.9 DESCRIPTION OF ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION MEASURES RELATED TO NPP OPERATION 120 4.5.10 NEED OF CHANGES IN THE SET OF PROTECTION MEASURES AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 121 4.5.11 RESIDUAL IMPACT OF NPP UNDER NORMAL OPERATION (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 121 4.5.12 CHANGES IN RESIDUAL IMPACT AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 124 4.5.13 ASSESSMENT OF NPP’S ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT UNDER NORMAL OPERATION AS A RESULT OF SUP 124 4.5.14 COMPLEX ASSESSMENT OF ECOLOGICAL RISKS IN CASE OF ACCIDENT ON NPP (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 124 4.5.15 COMPLEX ASSESSMENT OF CHANGES IN ECOLOGICAL RISKS IN CASE OF ACCIDENT ON NPP AS A RESULT OF SUP 124 4.5.16 ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION ACCORDING TO ECOLOGICAL IMPACT ON POPULATION HEALTH 125 4.6 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CHANGE IN THE PROCESS OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 126
5 EA OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION AT THE SOUTH‐UKRAINIAN NPP 127
5.1 GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THE NPP 127 5.1.1 AREA AND LOCATION OF THE NPP 127
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5.1.2 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE SOUTH‐UKRAINIAN NPP’S INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY AND HAZARD CLASS 128 5.1.3 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE SOUTH‐UKRAINIAN NPP’S PRODUCTION 128 5.1.4 DATA ON RAW MATERIAL, LAND, WATER, ENERGY AND OTHER RESOURCES USED 128 5.1.5 DESCRIPTION OF THE NPP TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESS 128 5.1.6 SUP MEASURES AIMING AT MITIGATION OR ELIMINATION OF HAZARDOUS EMISSIONS INTO ENVIRONMENT 129 5.1.7 DESCRIPTION OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TREATMENT SCHEME & SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL VOLUMES 130 5.1.8 DESCRIPTION OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE TREATMENT SCHEME AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE VOLUMES 130 5.1.9 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARDOUS AND GENERAL INDUSTRIAL WASTE TREATMENT SCHEME AND VOLUMES 131 5.1.10 SUP MEASURES AIMING AT REDUCING WASTES VOLUMES OR IMPROVING WASTE TREATMENT 133 5.1.11 DESCRIPTION OF DESIGN AND NON‐DESIGN ACCIDENTS ANALYZED 133 5.1.12 DESIGN SOLUTIONS REDUCING RISKS OR MITIGATING CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 134 5.1.13 SUP MEASURES AIMING AT REDUCING ACCIDENT RISKS OR MITIGATING ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES 134 5.1.14 SANITARY‐PROTECTION ZONE AND MONITORING ZONE OF NPP 134 5.2 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT ON NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 135 5.2.1 CLIMATE AND MICROCLIMATE 135 5.2.2 AIR QUALITY 135 5.2.3 GEOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 137 5.2.4 AQUATIC ENVIRONMENT (GROUND WATER, SURFACE WATER BASINS) 138 5.2.5 SOIL AND LANDSCAPE 139 5.2.6 FLORA, FAUNA, RESERVES 141 5.3 ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT ON SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 142 5.3.1 SOCIAL BASELINE FOR THE NPP MONITORING ZONE 142 5.3.2 FORECASTED POPULATION HEALTH REGARDLESS OF SUP (IN NORMAL OPERATIONS OR IN CASE OF ACCIDENT) 143 5.3.3 IMPACT OF SUP MEASURES ON THE OUTCOME OF FORECASTED PUBLIC HEALTH STATE 144 5.3.4 IMPACT OF SUP ON LOCAL POPULATION’S SOCIAL CONDITIONS 145 5.4 BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON THE TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT 146 5.4.1 SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING STATE IN THE MONITORING ZONE 146 5.4.2 IMPACT OF NPP ON TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT REGARDLESS OF SUP 146 5.4.3 IMPACT OF SUP MEASURES ON TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT 147 5.4.4 POSSIBLE IMPACT ON NPP FROM THE TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 147 5.5 COMPREHENSIVE MEASURES TO ENSURE STANDARD STATE OF ENVIRONMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 148 5.5.1 DESCRIPTION OF RESOURCE‐SAVING MEASURES TAKEN ON NPP REGARDLESS OF SUP 148 5.5.2 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCE‐SAVING MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH SUP 148 5.5.3 SOCIAL AND WORKERS PROTECTION MEASURES TAKEN ON NPP REGARDLESS OF SUP 149 5.5.4 CHANGES IN SOCIAL AND WORKERS PROTECTION MEASURES AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 150 5.5.5 REHABILITATION (RENEWAL) MEASURES UNDERTAKEN DURING NPP CONSTRUCTION 150 5.5.6 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL REHABILITATION (RENEWAL) MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUP 151 5.5.7 COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN IN THE PROCESS OF NPP OPERATION 151 5.5.8 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATORY MEASURES AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 151 5.5.9 DESCRIPTION OF ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION MEASURES RELATED TO NPP OPERATION 151 5.5.10 CHANGES IN THE SET OF PROTECTION MEASURES AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 152 5.5.11 RESIDUAL IMPACT OF NPP UNDER NORMAL OPERATION (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 152 5.5.12 CHANGES IN RESIDUAL IMPACT AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 155 5.5.13 ASSESSMENT OF NPP’S ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT UNDER NORMAL OPERATION AS A RESULT OF SUP 155 5.5.14 COMPLEX ASSESSMENT OF ECOLOGICAL RISKS IN CASE OF ACCIDENT ON NPP (REGARDLESS OF SUP) 155 5.5.15 COMPLEX ASSESSMENT OF CHANGES IN ECOLOGICAL RISKS IN CASE OF ACCIDENT ON NPP AS A RESULT OF SUP 155 5.5.16 ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION ACCORDING TO ECOLOGICAL IMPACT ON POPULATION HEALTH 156 5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CHANGE IN THE PROCESS OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 157
6 ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE SUP TRANSBOUNDARY IMPACTS AND MEASURES AIMED AT INFORMING BOUNDARY STATES 158
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6.1 POSSIBLE TRANSBOUNDARY IMPACT OF UKRAINIAN NPPS AND FORECASTED CHANGES REGARDLESS OF SUP 158 6.2 CHANGES IN ASSESSMENTS AS A RESULT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 159 6.3 MEASURES AIMED AT INFORMING BOUNDARY STATES ON POSSIBLE IMPACT OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION IN TRANSBOUNDARY CONTEXT 159
7 PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS ON ELABORATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SUP 160
7.1 PURPOSE OF THE PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS 160 7.2 METHODOLOGY FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS 160 7.3 TIME FRAMES 163 7.4 INFORMATION AND DATA PROVIDED FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS 164 7.5 PUBLIC EVENTS HELD DURING PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS 164 7.6 SYSTEMATIZATION, ANALYSIS AND PREPARATION OF REPLIES TO QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS FROM THE PUBLIC 169 7.7 LIGHTING THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS IN MASS‐MEDIA 169
8 MITIGATION OR OPTIMISING MEASURES 172
8.1 MITIGATION OR OPTIMISING MEASURES 172 8.1.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED HSE MANAGEMENT 172 8.1.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED PUBLIC INFORMATION 173 8.1.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 174 8.2 INDICATORS AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES 176 8.2.1 IMPLEMENTATION CAPACITY AND FINANCING 176 8.2.2 COMPLETION INDICATORS 176
9 CONCLUSIONS 177
9.1 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 177 9.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCEMENT AND OPTIMISING MEASURES 179
10 MANDATORY ANNEXES 180
10.1 ANNEX A LIST OF REFERENCES 180 10.2 ANNEX B SUMMARY OF THE EA REPORT FOR PUBLIC AT LARGE 183 10.3 ANNEX C QUESTION‐ANSWERS BOOK 183 10.3.1 LIST OF OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE 183 10.3.2 PERSONILIZED QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS AND COMMENTS 185 10.3.3 LIST OF THEMATIC AREAS 200 10.3.4 GENERALIZED QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS, COMMENTS AND ANSWERS TO THEM 201 10.3.5 REFERENCE LIST OF THE QUESTIONS‐ANSWER BOOK 231 10.4 ANNEX D STATEMENT ON ECOLOGICAL CONCEQUENCES OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION 233
11 TECHNICAL APPENDICES 239
11.1 LONG LIST OF SUP MEASURES FOR EACH TYPE OF REACTOR 239 11.2 MAPS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIVE INFORMATION NOT INCORPORATED INTO THE MAIN REPORT 252 11.2.1 NPP RADIATION MONITORING LAYOUT 252 11.2.2 MAPS OF NPPS ENVIRONMENT 255 11.3 OTHER TECHNICAL INFORMATION AND DATA 260
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11.3.1 TECHNICAL PRINCIPLES OF PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS 260 11.3.2 RESULTS OF RADIATION MONITORING IN MONITORING ZONE OF NPPS 261 11.3.3 RESULTS OF CHEMICAL MONITORING OF SURFACE WATER AT NPPS 263 11.3.4 INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENT SCALE (INES) 272 11.3.5 ESTIMATED EFFECTIVE DOSES FOR WHOLE BODY WHICH WILL BE FORMED AS THE RESULT OF NON‐DESIGNED ACCIDENT ON POWER UNIT TYPE VVER1000 OF RIVNE NPP 272 11.3.6 HIV PREVALENCE IN UKRAINE BY OBLAST 274 11.4 LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED/ENGAGED 276 11.4.1 STAKEHOLDERS REGISTERED AT SCOPING MEETINGS 276 11.4.2 STAKEHOLDERS REGISTERED AT PUBLIC MEETINGS 276 11.4.3 LIST OF NGOS 276 11.5 RECORDS OF STAKEHOLDERS’ PARTICIPATION 278 11.5.1 MINUTE OF SCOPING MEETING, KIEV 278 11.5.2 MINUTE OF SCOPING MEETING, KUZNETSOVSK 281 11.5.3 MINUTE OF SCOPING MEETING, NETYSHIN 283 11.5.4 MINUTE OF SCOPING MEETING, ENERGODAR 283 11.5.5 MINUTE OF SCOPING MEETING, YUZHNAUKRAINSK 288 11.5.6 MINUTE OF PUBLIC MEETING, KIEV 290 11.5.7 MINUTE OF PUBLIC MEETING, KUZNETSOVSK 296 11.5.8 MINUTE OF PUBLIC MEETING, NETYSHIN 299 11.5.9 MINUTE OF PUBLIC MEETING, ENERGODAR 302 11.5.10 MINUTE OF PUBLIC MEETING, YUZHNAUKRAINSK 313
12 NON‐TECHNICAL APPENDICES 317
12.1 STUDY METHODOLOGY/WORK PLAN 317 12.1.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 317 12.1.2 IMPACT ON NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 318 12.1.3 IMPACT ON SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 318 12.1.4 IMPACT ON TECHNOGENIC ENVIRONMENT 318 12.2 CONSULTANTS’ ITINERARY 319 12.3 CURRICULA VITAE OF THE CONSULTANTS 320 12.4 TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EA 328 12.5 COMPLEMENTS ADDED TO THE DRAFT EA REPORT TO THE PRESENT EA REPORT 338
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INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE OF THE REPORT
On December 20th 1995, the Government of Ukraine (“GoU”), the Governments of the G-7 countries and the European Commission (“EC”) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a programme to support the closure of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Nuclear safety is one of the four areas developed in accordance with this MoU.
The “Ukrainian NPPs Safety Upgrade Package Program” (SUP) was developed by SE NNEGC “Energoatom” and takes into account all recommendations issued through the final report of the joint project ECIAEA-Ukraine (IAEA report date February 2010 IAEA-EC Agreement 2007/45268) , in accordance with the “Road Map For Nuclear Safety of Operating Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants” of the MoU.
Within the frame of the SUP preparation, Energoatom selected the Kharkiv and Kiev-based Nuclear Engineering Design Institutes to prepare project technical documentation.
The SUP involves safety improvements at existing NPPs, with no new construction, no capacity increase and no life extension.To comply with the requirements of environmental protection SUP should pass the Ecological Assessment (EA). One of EA tasks is to disclose and discuss the EA report in terms of the public consultation process and working over it after the public consultation process is over. .
The Ecological Assessment (EA) is to be carried out in compliance with the national legislation and international conventions signed by Ukraine, as well as the best international environmental and social guidelines for projects financed by IFIs (including EBRD and EU environmental requirements).
Thus, since SUP foresees the safety upgrade of all 4 operating NPPs wihouth new construction or capacity increase EA of SUP is not fully under the requirements of state construction norms concerning environmental impact assessment (EIA) for new construction. EA process is regulated by the normative document specially elaborated for this case.
This Ecological Assessment Report (EAR) is aiming at providing the wide presentation of EA results including the public consultation results
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1 GENERAL INFORMATION
1.1 Terms and Definitions Terms related to the protection of the environment and public health, nuclear and radiation safety are used in this document per meanings determined by Ukrainian legislation. Terms related to EBRD and EC environmental/social documents and guidelines are used in this document per meanings determined by EBRD and EC procedures. In the present report, the term "impact" is understood as a direct and unavoidable consequence of an event. The term “risk” refers to a possible consequence and is associated with a probability of occurrence.
1.2 Acronyms
BOD Biological Oxygen Demand CDF Core Damage Frequency COD Chemical Oxygen Demand CPSAR Control and Protection System of Absorber Rods EA Ecological Assessment EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EC European Commission EIC Emergency and Information Centre EU European Union FS Feasibility Study GHG Green House Gas GoU Government of Ukraine HSE Health Safety Environment IAC Information-Analytic Center IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IFADS Incorrect Fuel Assembly Detection System IFI International Financing Institutions INES International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale LOCA Loss-of-coolant Accident LPD Labour Protection Department LRF Large Release Frequency LRW Liquid radioactive wastes MCE maximum credible earthquake MDA Maximum design accident MIS Measurement Information System MECI Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry MoES Ministry of Emergency Situations MoU Memorandum of Understanding
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MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration MPD Maximum Permissible Discharge NDA Non Disclosure Agreement NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NPP Nuclear Power Plant NRBU-97 Radiation Safety Standards of Ukraine PIU Project Implementation Unit PR Performance Requirement PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment PWR Pressurised Water Reactors SANEP State Administration on Natural Environment Protection SAR Safety Analysis Report SEA Strategic Environmental Assessment SEP Stakeholder Engagement Plan SE NNEGC State Enterprise National Nuclear Energy Generating Company SF Spent Fuel SFA Spent Fuel Assemblies SFDSF Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facility SFP Spent Fuel Pool SME Small and Medium Enterprise SNRIU State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine SoI Statement of Intent SOU General requirements to the EA procedure and to reports preparation of the “Comprehensive Security Upgrade Program (CSUP or SUP) for Ukrainian NPPs’ Energy Units” approved on April 2011 SPZ Sanitary Protection Zone SR Shim Rods SRW Solid radioactive wastes STD Sexually Transmitted Disease SUP Safety Upgrade Program USSE Unified State System for Prevention of and Response to Man-Induced and Natural Emergencies
1.3 Documents that form the basis for the EA
1.3.1 International agreements The Ecological Assessment is developed in line with theinternational agreements and conventions: • The nuclear safety convention: • Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context; • The ESPOO convention; • Joint Convention on exhausted fuel treatment safety and the rad-wastes treatment safety.
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1.3.2 National requirements of Ukraine The EA is to be carried out in compliance with the following requirements of legislation and other relevant documents of Ukraine: • Law of Ukraine “Concerning the atmospheric air protection” (16.10.1992 № 2707-XII); • Law of Ukraine “Concerning information” №2658-12 dated 02.10.1992; • Law of Ukraine “Concerning the usafe of nuclear energy and radiation safety” (08.02.1995 № 39/95); • Law of Ukraine “Concerning egolocial expertise” (09.02.1995 № 45/95) which sets the requirements of ecological and social impacts assessments. Based on this law the content of EIA is regulated by the State Construction Norms DBN А.2.2-1-2003; • Law of Ukraine “Concerning the rad-wastes treatment” №255/95-ВР dated 30.07.1995. • Law of Ukraine “Concerning the citizens requests” № 394/96-ВР dated 02.10.1996. • Law of Ukraine “Concerning the human being protection from the ioning radiation” №15/98-ВР dated 14.01.1998. • Law of Ukraine “Concerning wastes” №187/98-ВР dated 05.03.1998. • Air Code of Ukraine (04.05.1993 № 3167- XII); • Water Code of Ukraine (06.06.1995 № 213/95). • Basic issues of health protection of Ukrainian legislation (19.11.1992 № 2801), • Law of Ukraine “Concerning the objects of heightened danger” (18.01.2001 № 2245-III); Since SUP foresees the safety upgrade on all 4 operating NPPs with no new construction or capacity increase EA of SUP is not fully under the requirements of state construction norms A.2.2- 1-2003 concerning the environmental impact assessment (EIA) for new construction. EA process will be regulated by the normative document elaborated by Energoatom specially for this case and agreed by the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine.
1.3.3 International recommendations EA will be elaborated in accordance with the international recommendations: • Protocol for SEA of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context • Best international environmental and social practices concerning projects financed by IFI (including requirements of EBRD and EU [1, 12])
1.4 Information on SUP EA executors The SUP EA was prepared by Pöyry in association with UCEWP. The following experts were involved in the preparation of the EA (a one-page CV for each expert is presented in the non-technical appendix chapter 12.3): Table 1 – Experts involved in the preparation of the EA
Field of expertise Name Project Director Mika Pohjonen Remo Kropf Project Management & Environment Experts Pierre Biedermann Iaroslav Adamenko Environment Experts Thomas Bonn Vivian Castro Volodymyr Tykhyy Social & Public Consultation experts Andriy Domydenko Robert Zwahlen
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Heidrun Krause Oleg Purtov Nuclear and Radiation Safety Experts Volodymyr Bogorad Alexandra Slepchenko Ludvig Litvinsky Water Contamination Expert Sergii Kivva Air pollution Expert Ivan Kovalets
Pöyry is a global consulting and engineering company dedicated to balanced sustainability and responsible business. Its expertise extends to the fields of energy, industry, urban & mobility, and water & environment. Pöyry has 7000 experts and a local office network in about 50 countries. UCEWP (Ukrainian Centre of Environmental and Water Projects) is a Ukrainian company that emerged in 1986 as a unit within the National Academy of Science of Ukraine for the simulation of radionuclide transport in surface and subsurface water after the Chernobyl accident. During the last decade the team has diversified its activities in information technologies, radiation safety, environmental & health risk assessment, environmental engineering, ecology, hydrology, oceanography, meteorology, river and marine hydraulics, and environmental and water management. «AESCAR» - Ukrainian company established in 2011. The main task of the company is the scientific-technical support of the nuclear energy development according to directions: strategic planning, spent nuclear fuel and rad-wastes treatement, decommissioning NPPs, ecological impact assessment of nuclear energy objects, public consultations, etc.
1.5 SUP Goals
1.5.1 Ukraine electricity production sector In 2009, Ukraine’s electricity production was almost equally relying on the nuclear sector (47%) and fossil fuels (46%). The prime source of renewable electricity production is hydropower (7%). Most of the electricity produced in Ukraine is consumed in Ukraine. Table 2 – Ukraine energy balance
Electricity balance - 2007 TWh % GROSS PRODUCTION, of which 196.20 100.0 hydro 13.26 6.76 nuclear 92.53 47.16 wind 0.04 0.02 thermal, of which 90.38 46.07 coal 66.56 33.93 oil 0.73 0.37 gas 23.09 11.77 biomass 0 0 NET PRODUCTION 180.74 92.12 Imports 2.08 1.06 Exports -10.99 -5.60 Transport/distribution losses -24.02 -12.24 TOTAL CONSUMPTION 147.60 75.23 Energy sector consumption 15.22 7.76 FINAL CONSUMPTION 132.37 67.47 industry 70.58 35.97 transport 9.29 4.74 households, services 52.50 26.76
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(source: Enerdata – World Energy Database 2009)
1.5.2 Presentation of the NPPs Energoatom operates 15 nuclear power reactors located at 4 NPPs with a cumulated capacity of 13 835 MW. All reactors are Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) usually referred to as VVER, from the Russian abbreviation "water-cooled, water-moderated energy reactor".
Figure 1 – Location map of Ukraine NPPs
Four models of reactors are represented: V213, V302, V338 and V320. V302 and V338 are very similar and are considered as practically the same reactors within the frame of the safety upgrade program.
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The table below shows the main characteristics of the 4 NPPs.
Table 3 – Characteristics of Ukraine NPPs
NPP Khmelnitsky Rivne South Ukraine Zaporizhzhya Type VVER VVER VVER VVER 2xV-213, 1xV-302, 1xV-338, Model 2xV-320 6xV-320 2xV-320 1xV-320 Electric power 1x420, 1x415, 2x1000 3x1000 6x1000 (MW) 2x1000
Thermal power 2x1375, 2x3000 3x3000 6x3000 (MW) 2x3000
Load factor 74,2% 67,8% 68,2% 78,5%
Fuel enrichment 3, 66 % (for V-213) 4,26 % (TVSA) 4,26 % (TVSA) 4,26 % (TVSA) on U-235 4,26 % (TVSA)
2010 energy 13.4 16.8 18.0 41.3 production (TWh ) Cooling ponds with Cooling pond and accumulation of all Spraying ponds and Cooling pond and Cooling method spraying ponds and run-off water from cooling towers spraying ponds two cooling towers Gniloï Rog river Cooling water 1.34 m3/s 2.13 m3/s 1.26 m3/s 3.42 m3/s consumption (design value) (design value) (2008 data) (2006 data)
1.5.3 Purpose of the Upgrade Program The purpose of SUP is further implementation of safety upgrade works in terms of long-term state safety upgrade strategy of power units of Ukrainian NPPs. The selection of measures to be included in the SUP is based on the following: 1. the measures should improve the safety of NPP's operation, under both normal and emergency (accident) conditions; 2. the measures should not change the basic design of the NPPs; 3. the measures were identified on the following basis: • measures that are required by Ukrainian norms, regulations and standards; • international recommendations after IAEA and RISKAUDIT assessments; • measures recommended by the Safety Analysis Reports; • measures required by Ukrainian national supervisory authorities; • measures based on operational experience (feedback from the NPPs).
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Table 4 below shows the origin of the requirement influencing the inclusion of the measures in the SUP.
Table 4 – Number of measures and factors justifying their implementation for each type of reactor Factors justifying the need to V-320 Type 1 V-302, 338 Type 2 V-213 Type 3 implement the measure Required by Ukrainian NRS norms, regulations and 60 43 43 standards International recommendations 46 33 42 (IAEA, Riskaudit) Required after safety analysis 33 16 21 Required by Ukrainian national 10 8 13 supervisory authorities Operational experience 36 23 19 Total number of measures by 86 54 54 reactor type
Energoatom estimated that the total cost to carry out all safety upgrade measures will be in the order of 1.18 G€ and implementation will take 7 years (2010-2017). Energoatom started the upgrade programme with its own resources and will continue to do so in the future, but will require substantial loans to finance the implementation of all measures. The portion of the SUP for which finance is sought is expected to be implemented during the period 2012-2017. The implementation of the measures identified for the SUP is planned according to their priority. The prioritization of the measures was based on a probabilistic assessment of their impact on safety improvement: • quantitative impact of each measure on safety: based on each measure's impact on core damage frequency (CDF) and large release frequency (LRF); and • qualitative impact of each measure on safety: through an estimation of the decision- making factor defined in view of number of factors (frequency of accident initial events, possible consequences, safety functions touched by the measure). As a result of the assessment, measures were classified into 5 categories:
Table 5 – Categorization of SUP measures
Quantitative criterion Qualitative criterion Category - expected impact on safety improvement CDF, 1/year LRF, 1/year Decision-making factor Category 0 - limited impact <1Е-07 <1Е-08 1 Category I - small impact <1Е-06 <1Е-07 2-8 Category II - medium impact <1Е-5 <1Е-6 9-16 Category III - high impact <1Е-4 <1Е-5 17-25 Category IV – very high impact >1Е-04 >1Е-05 >25
Based on this categorization, the SUP activities are organized into 3 priority groups: • Priority I: measures having high/very high impact on safety (Categories III & IV); • Priority II: measures having small/medium impact on safety (Categories I & II); • Priority III: measures having a limited impact on safety (Category 0).
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1.6 SUP Measures Structure
1.6.1 SUP measures at the beginning of EA The SUP includes more than 800 safety improvement measures. The long list of these measures is presented in the technical appendix chapter 11.1. Table 6 shows the nature of the measures included in the SUP.
Table 6 – Nature of measures included in the SUP Group of Sub-group of measures Description of the nature of the SUP measures measures included under each sub-group 0 Background 01 Certification The objective is to develop the necessary documents for the certification of NPP equipments and elements under accidental conditions, where such documents are missing or incomplete. 1 Core and fuel 11 Neutron and physical The objectives of these measures are to management characteristics of the • Introduce second generation fuel with improved cycles in order to reduce reactor core: the risk of fluence on the reactor vessel • improve the monitoring of the reactor core in subcritical conditions 13 Fuel Management This item includes measures aimed at improving control, reliability and safety of refuelling activities. It also includes measures to improve the condition of spent fuel storage in cooling-down ponds. 2 Components 21 Primary system These measures aim at improving the safety of the primary cooling system with integrity regards to overpressures and breaks risks. 22 Pressurized systems These measures aim at improving the reliability and monitoring of the pressurized important for safety systems, as well as to develop preventive measures in case of break. 23 Reactor (including These measures aim at improving the monitoring of the reactor aging process as vessel) well as to upgrade the joints and connection parts of the reactor. 24 Other The objective is to develop organizational and technical measures for accident management as well as to optimize the existing maintenance and repair strategies 3 Systems 31 Ensuring the system This set of measures includes the development of procedures, algorithms and reactivity protective measures to keep control of the system’s reactivity under various operational conditions. 32 Ensuring the reserve of These measures aim at supplying or modernizing pipes monitoring equipment, as primary circuit coolant well as to improve the reliability of the emergency power supply.
33 Primary circuit cooling The measures included here are related to: • the replacement of valves which do not meet all the certifications required for normal and emergency conditions • the improvement of the emergency power supply • the redundancy of some equipments of the circuit • the upgrade (equipment & instruction) of some automated responses under emergency situations • complementary procedures for cooling system preservation in case of failure or during cool down
34 Primary circuit pressure This measure includes procedure and equipment adaptation to allow residual heat removal during accident affecting the 2ndary cooling circuit. It also includes modernization of equipment to control the pressure of the low and high pressure emergency cooling systems.
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Group of Sub-group of measures Description of the nature of the SUP measures measures included under each sub-group 35 Auxiliary systems Various measures: • replacement of air conditioners • development of an integrated diagnostic system to provide automatic or automated diagnostic of the reactor systems • additional boron-10 monitoring places • installation of more efficient valves on steam distribution systems • additional protection of cable routing • increase of reliability of heat removal from the cooling-down pond during cold shutdown • installation of a cleaning system for service water spraying pools • additional tools and measures to monitor steam generators aging and fouling • installation of video monitoring equipment • evaluation of the need for additional stand-alone emergency lighting and implementation if necessary • additional measures to ensure the operability of control rooms in emergency situations • allow maintenance of the reactor while refuelling during shutdowns 4 41 Information system This item includes various measures for the modernization of information and Instrumentation control systems to monitor: and Control • operation during and after an accident (I&C) • movements of primary circuit pipelines • alternator hydrogen cooling • reactor building during normal operation • turbine hall • in-core monitoring of fuel and also : • new consoles and panels in control rooms • modernization of standby diesel station 42 Reactor control and The objectives of these measures are to (i) modernize the reactor monitoring protection system system during operation, (ii) modernize power supply of the control room and (iii) avoid common failure of control and emergency protection systems. 43 Safety management Upgrade of safety management equipment and systems in order to increase their systems reliability. 44 Monitoring and control This includes a set of various measures that apply to some reactors to: systems • modernize the NPP radiation monitoring systems • modernize the in-core monitoring system • introduce coolant leak monitoring system on the primary circuit • upgrade standby diesel generators control system • ensure information storage under design and beyond-design accidents • modernize the refuelling machine control system • upgrade the automatic chemical control systems • modernize the electrical part of turbine control systems • detect free and weakly fixed objects • monitor primary pump vibrations • introduce vibration and noise diagnostics systems • introduce equipment residual and fatigue diagnostics systems • Introduce hydrogen monitoring • ensure the boric acid measurement in the emergency cooling system 5 Power supply 51 External sources • Elaboration of methods and equipment to define the NPP cables remaining service life • Modernization of the emergency power supply and accumulator system 52 Energy distribution Various actions to modernize or complement the electric equipments (cables, distribution, switches, relays…) of the NPPs for both normal and emergency situations
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Group of Sub-group of measures Description of the nature of the SUP measures measures included under each sub-group 6 Containment 61 Containment bypass risk Research work to assess the measures that could be required in core melting and buildings situation to prevent early containment bypass (for example, modernization of the reactor cavity doors)
62 Integrity Various measures to: • monitor hydrogen concentration in the containment for beyond design basis accidents, and implement measures to decrease hydrogen concentration • monitor the tension of reinforcing cables of the containment and develop the related monitoring methodology 7 Internal 71 Fire protection Modernization or supply of additional equipments for fire alarm, detection and hazards extinguishing in various locations of the NPPs 72 Protection against Measures related to leak detection and prevention inside the NPP in case of pipe flooding break. 8 External 81 Seismic Global update of the seismic information for NPPs: hazards • seismological monitoring improvement • seismic study and accelerogram / response spectrum calculations for NPPs • review the earthquake resistance of buildings and critical equipment 9 Accident 91 Safety analyses • Develop Safety Analysis Reports in compliance with the normative analyses documents requirements in full scope • Develop and implement a living Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) • Consider in PSA a full range of initiating events for all power unit operational states in line with IAEA requirements • Carry out hydrogen ignition risk analysis 92 Accident management • Improve accident management (analysis, training and instructions) • Development, substantiation, validation and implementation of symptom- based emergency instructions to manage design and beyond design accidents • Improve emergency operation instructions during power shortages and shutdowns • Improve severe accidents analyses
1.6.2 Additional SUP measures decided in the light of Fukushima event analysis
In accordance with the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated April 8, 2011 "Concerning safety upgrade of operation of nuclear power plants of Ukraine", approved by the President of Ukraine № 585/2011, Energoatom has performed a review of the SUP taking into account the analysis of Fukushima NPP accident in Japan.
The following approaches were used: • review of priorities of SUP activities and identification of activities whose implementation should start immediately without additional research; • review of priorities for activities that are directly related to the prevention and / or consequences of severe accidents; • analysis of measures required to improve the reliability of power units in case of the extreme external events and their combinations (accident with full power blackout, accident with loss of final heat sink) and prevent and limit the consequences of such events; • extraordinary reassessment of the security target according to the recommendations of SINRU.
As a result of SUP review the following measures were identified as the priority ones: • Performance of severe accidents analysis. • Development of guidelines for the serious accidents management (GSAM);
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• Ensuring the seismic resistance of components, systems and structures important to safety; • Developing and implementing measures to reduce the concentration of hydrogen in hermetic shell with beyond design accidents; • The introduction of hydrogen concentration monitoring systems in hermetic shell while beyond design accidents; • NPPs radiation control systems modernization; • Instruments maintenance during and after the accident. • The introduction of video control for fire \ explosion and non-serviced premises. • Power supply of the normal operation systems (NOS) from a reliable second category power source, which provides long-term electricity supply for emergency cooling ponds in emergency conditions
1.7 SUP Connection with Other Programs
1.7.1 Previous programs related to safety upgrade Beginning in the 1980's, several safety improvement programs were developed and implemented by Energoatom at the nuclear power plants. The main programs are listed hereafter in order of their implementation: 1 - Consolidated safety improvement measures for operating power units with VVER and RBMK reactor types” SM-88 and SM-90; 2 - “Safety improvement program for NPPs with VVER-1000, 440 reactor types”, 1994; 3 - “Program of priority measures on safety improvement at NPPs with VVER-1000, VVER-440 reactor types”, 1994; 4 - “Set of safety measures for NPPs in operation with VVER-1000 reactors”, 1999; 5 - “Program of priority safety improvement measures for Ukrainian NPPs”, 1999; 6 - “Complex NPP modernization and safety improvement program” approved by the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 504-r of 29 August 2002 (this program was developed after Ukraine ratified the Nuclear Safety Convention in December 1997); 7 - “Safety improvement concept for operating NPP power units” approved by the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 515-r of 13 December 2005 (this program was developed in 2005 after the completion of the previous “Complex NPP modernization and safety improvement program”, and was completed in 2010); 8 - “NPP modernization and safety improvement program of VVER-1000 (В-320) reactor types, part 2 (Khmelnitsky Bloc 2) and part 3 (Rivne bloc 4) 2004-2009. The current safety upgrade program (SUP) for Ukrainian NPPs was developed to further improve safety within the frame of the long-term state strategy on safety improvement of NPPs.
1.7.2 Other programs under preparation by Energoatom in parallel to SUP Appart from the SUP,at the present day Energoatom is implementing thefollowing list of tasks set by the state programs and governmental decisions related to the development of nuclear energy in Ukraine: 1 – Preparation to the construction of power units No 3 and 4 of Khmelnitsky NPP in accordance with the clauses of “Energy strategy of Ukraine till 2030” approved by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine № 145-р dd 15.03.2006, the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of the measures plan for 2006-2010 concerning the implementation of Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030”No 436-р dd 27.07.2006, the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the preparatory measures for the construction of new power units on KhNPP”No 281-р dd 21.07.2005, the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the priority measures for the construction of power units No 3 and No 4 of Khmelnitsky NPP” No 118 dd 18.02.2009, the Law of Ukraine “Concerning the ratification of Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of Rusian Federation concerning the co-
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operation on construction of power units No 3 and No 4 of Khmelnitsky NPP” No 2917-VI dd 12.01.2011. 2 – Preparation to the life extension of the power units VVER-1000 of the operating NPPs of Ukraine in accordance with the clauses of the “Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030” approved by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No145-р dd 15.03.2006 and the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of the measures plan for 2006-2010 concerning the implementation of Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030”No 436-р dd 27.07.2006. 3 – Preparation to the construction of the centralized storage of spent nuclear fuel of power units VVER-440 and VVEr-1000 of RIvne, Khmelnitsky and South-Ukrainian NPPs in accordance with the clauses of the “Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030” approved by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No145-р dd 15.03.2006 and the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of the measures plan for 2006-2010 concerning the implementation of Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030”No 436-р dd 27.07.2006. 4 – Preparation to the construction of the factory for manufacture of heating containers for power units VVER-1000 in accordance with the clauses of the “Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030” approved by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No145-р dd 15.03.2006 and the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of the measures plan for 2006-2010 concerning the implementation of Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030”No 436-р dd 27.07.2006. 5 – Implementation of the Ukrainian-USA project for qualification of nuclear fuel manufactured by the “Westinhouse” for the NPPs of Ukraine in accordance with the clauses of the “Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030” approved by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No145-р dd 15.03.2006, the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of the measures plan for 2006-2010 concerning the implementation of Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030”No 436-р dd 27.07.2006, the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of agreement (in terms of notifications exchange) between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the USA concerning the renewal of Executive Agreement action between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the USA concerning the project for qualification of nuclear fuel for Ukraine” No 2256-р dd 15.12.2010. 6 – Implementation of the “Nationwide target ecological program for radioactive wastes treatment” approved by the Law of Ukraine “Concerning the nationwide target ecological program for radioactive wastes treatment” No 516-VI dd 17.09.2008. The mutual impacts from the implementation of the mentioned tasks and SUP are quantitatively reflected in Table 7.
Table 7 – Mutual influence of ongoing programs for nuclear energy development in Ukraine
Tasks – Tasks which are subjest to influence sourced of influence SUP 1 2 3 4 5 6
SUP none observable1) none none none weak2)
1 none none observable observable none observable
2 none none observable observable observable observable
3 none none none none observable observable
4 none none none none weak observable
5 weak3) none none observable weak none
6 weak3) observable observable none none none
1) SUP implementation will impact only the future scope of works concerning the lifecycle extension of the operating power units, but will not influence the decision of life extension.
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2) while introduction of SUP measures a non-significant increase of rad-wastes is possible. 3) depending on the results of the program, the reassessment of power units safety is possible for relevant aspects.
The possible links between the implementation of mentioned tasks 1-6 and residual impacts of operating NPPs of Ukraine are analyzed in chapters. 2.5.11, 3.5.11, 4.5.11, 5.5.11. The expected impact of SUP implementation to those links is reflected in chapter 2.5.12, 3.5.12, 4.5.12, 5.5.12.
1.8 Alternatives to SUP Implementation
1.8.1 "No-project" alternative The objective of the SUP is to upgrade the operational safety of the 4 operating NPPs of Ukraine through a set of over 800 measures. In this context, the "no project" alternative refers to the absence of implementation of any safety improvement measure included in the SUP. The consequences of the "no project" alternative would be: • the absence of improvement of the operational safety of the NPPs and, therefore, no reduction of the exposure of workers and the public to accident risks; • the non-compliance with Ukraine national standards, norms and safety upgrade requirements concerning NPPs of Ukraine; • the non-compliance with SNRIU requirements, which would be illegal; • the non-compliance with the requirements of international audits carried out by IAEA and RISKAUDIT; • the absence of implementation of the lessons learned from operational experiences. The "no-project" alternative is unacceptable and will therefore not be further discussed. Power unit decommissioning – at the end of a fixed period of operation or earlier- requires that all its security systems and other essential safety equipment are kept operating until the final stop and the first phase of the decommissioning, i.e. until the unloading of spent nuclear fuel. Most of these systems and equipment are also required at the following stages of decommissioning - to complete removal of all wastes from the unit. SUP involves introducing safety upgrade measures that are needed while the certain balance to date of all of their life cycle (the stages of operation and decommissioning). Therefore, the early shut off of NPP without implementation of the SUP activities refers to the non-program alternatives. It should be noted that “Energoatom” does not offer early decommissioning of power units of operating nuclear power plants of Ukraine on its own initiative and the external solution according to the Law of Ukraine “Concerning the Nuclear Energy and Radiation Safety” will be approved by the state authorities which made decisions about construction and is to be brought to the attention of the operating organization no later than two years before final closure. Moreover, as the world (eg, experience of NPP “Greifswald”, Germany) and domestic (experience of the Chernobyl NPP) practice show that in case of early decommissioning duration increases significantly compared to the planned final stop
1.8.2 Other alternatives The objective of the SUP is to upgrade the operational safety of the 4 operating NPPs of Ukraine through a set of over 800 measures. In this context, the word "alternative" refers to any solution aiming at upgrading the safety of the 15 reactors under operation, in a way different from the way proposed in the SUP.
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1.8.2.1 Alternative content of the safety upgrade program The SUP aims at implementing measures that improve the safety of NPP operation in both normal and emergency conditions. The notion of "safety upgrade" refers to any action that allows limiting the exposure (in terms of probability or intensity) of workers, the public and the environment to accidental impacts potentially caused by the operation of NPPs. The SUP includes not only a set of safety upgrade measures, but comprehensively includes all measures that were identified and considered as necessary (1) in compliance with the requirements of Ukraine’s nuclear safety authorities, (2) according to new standards and normative requirements of Ukraine, (3) following the recommendations of international experts from IAEA and RISKAUDIT and (4) based on the operational experience feedback from NPPs. There are no safety upgrade measures that were identified, but then not included in the SUP. The only alternative to the SUP would have been not to include all identified measures in the SUP, and subsequently to lower the level of safety improvements. Such an option was not considered by Energoatom.
1.8.2.2 Alternative planning of implementation of the safety upgrade measures As described in chapter 1.5, the SUP measures were categorized and prioritized in order to identify those which would have the strongest impact on safety improvements. Together with other constraints (procurement and supply times, outage periods, etc…), the SUP implementation plan takes into account the order of priority of the measures, in a way that allows the earliest implementation of those measures which have the strongest impact on safety improvements. The alternative approach to the program implementation with no consideration of the measure priority is less effective.
1.9 State Policy on protection of environment and population health The Law of Ukraine on Environmental Protection (25.06.1991 № 1264) is a framework law that defines general legislative, economical and social rules and requirements for the protection of the environment in the interest of future generations. It is detalized by the list of special laws and codes listed in chapter 1.3.2 adopted aiming at the exact regulatory issues concerning environment. In accordance with the Decision of the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine dated 8th April 2011 “Concerning safety upgrade of NPPs operation in Ukraine” approved by the Order of the President of Ukraine No585/2011, “Energoatom” in terms of preventive measures resulting from the analysis of accident on NPP in Japan had elaborated the review of SUP (see chapter 1.6.2).
1.10 Public and occupational safety management at NPP level
1.10.1 Health Safety Environment (HSE) management
1.10.1.1 Legal and regulatory requirements The right of workers to the protection of their life and health on work site, as well as the right to safe and healthy labour conditions is defined by the Law of Ukraine “On labour protection” of 21.11.2002 №224-IV. The key laws that regulate labour protection are: • Law of Ukraine “On labour protection” of 21.11.2002 №224-IV; • Labour Code of Ukraine; • Law of Ukraine “On compulsory state social insurance from accidents at work and occupational diseases that lead to loss of ability to work”;
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• Rules for the safe work with instruments and devices. Ministry for Labour and Social Policy of Ukraine, 2001, НПАОП 0.00-1.30-01; • Rules for the safe operation of heat-mechanic equipment of the power plant and heat networks. Ministry for Labour and Social Policy of Ukraine, 2001, НПАОП 40.1-1.02-01; • Rules for the safe operation of electrical units. ГНОТУ, 1997, НПАОП 40.1-1.01-97; • Typical instruction on labour protection during works in enclosed space, MoEU, 1997, ГКД 34.03.804-97 ; • Instruction on first aid in case of accident in the process of energy equipment operation. Ministry for Energy and Electricity, USSR, 1986, РД 34.03.702; • Regulations of studies, training and tests of knowledge concerning labour protection and fire safety of top managers and experts of Energoatom, 2009, ПЛ-К.0.07.002-09; • Procedure for the preparation and implementation of works in the area of operating equipment of the industrial ground with engagement of specialized organizations. Energoatom, 2008, СТП 3.0031.059-2008.
1.10.1.2 Implementation of HSE requirements In compliance with Article 13 of the Law of Ukraine on “Labour protection”, there is a labour protection department (LPD) in every NPP. LPD is a structural component of an NPP. The main role of LPDs is to organize the implementation of all necessary legal, organizational, technical, sanitary and hygienic measures ensuring safe labour conditions, the prevention of occupational accidents and diseases within each department of the NPP department. LPD together with other departments addresses the following issues: • safety of production and technological processes; • safety of production equipment; • safety and health of working conditions; • sanitary and household services for workers; • provision of individual and collective protection equipments; • organizational and methodological guidelines on labour protection issues; • participation in the elaboration of LPD measures, and elimination of adverse impact of production factors on workers; • control of the effective implementation of LPD measures and assessment of their efficiency. The LPD work concerns all the aspects of industrial safety and factors of potential negative impact on the employees: radiation impact factors, hazardous chemical substances impact, fire danger factors impact, noise impacts, electrical and mechanical risks, negative climate factors impact, etc. LPD also organizes and manages the use of individual protection equipments: glasses, helmets, gloves, respirators, protective electrician’s belts and safety ropes… Besides the general labour protection requirements, specific measures and instructions for the protection and safety of staff are defined for works, operation or technical maintenance of each equipment type.
1.10.1.3 Certification of workers, selection of sub-contractors By the law, workers have to undergo specific training and medical examination before they work in the NPP. As a result of this procedure, each worker is certified for certain type of work in certain parts of the NPP. Employers are responsible for the certification of their workers, which means that the NPPs do not organize the certification of workers hired by sub-contractors.
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In practice, NPPs have less HSE concerns with local sub-contractors who they know well and which are trained and examined by the same services as NPPs workers. Conversely, NPPs have more concerns with occasional sub-contractors and therefore control them more closely. One of the criteria for the selection of sub-contractors who comply with certification or license requirements is the price of their services. NPPs cannot reject from a bidding procedure a sub- contractor with whom they had previous unsatisfactory experience. Nevertheless, they can stop the contract of a sub-contractor who does not meet the HSE requirements when working in the NPP.
1.10.2 Early warning and preparedness
1.10.2.1 Information and emergency centers
SNRIU Emergency-Information Centre and Sub-Divisions In accordance to the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No 1198 dated 03.08.1998 SNRIU is managing the creation and activities of functional sub-system of Common State System “Safety of nuclear power objects”. On the national level the key element of the sub-system if Information-Analytic Center (IAC) of SNRIU. Activity on the object level is undertaken by the local state Inspections for Nuclear and Radiation Safety USSE functional subsystem "Safety of Nuclear Power Facilities" operates at national, regional and facility levels. Facility-level activities are carried out by on-site State Nuclear Safety Inspectorates while regional-level activities are carried out by State Regional Inspections on Nuclear and Radiation Safety. At the national level, the SNRIU Emergency and Information Centre (EIC) is the key element of the subsystem. The IEC is staffed with skilled SNRIU experts and subordinated organizations. In normal mode of operation, a 24-hour duty is maintained and operational information is received from Ukrainian NPPs, analyzed, recorded, and disclosed via the SNRIU website www.snrc.gov.ua. It is planned to implement at IEC the RODOS decision support system in the event of a radiation accident. To fulfil intergovernmental agreements with other countries on early notification of a radioactive accident, information exchange and cooperation in nuclear safety and radiation protection, communication tests with competent contact centres in Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Latvia, Germany, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Turkey, Hungary, Finland and Sweden were conducted. SNRIU, as a national point of contact established within the Convention on Early Notification of a Radioactive Accident, participated in IAEA ConvEx-1а and ConvEx-2а exercises to test the communication with the IAEA emergency centre and in ConvEx-2b exercise to work out information exchange with the IAEA emergency centre in the event of a radiation accident.
Energoatom Emergency Centres Energoatom's emergency preparedness and response system is integral part of the USSE functional subsystem of nuclear energy and fuel-energy complex, which is within the competence of the Ministry Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine. This part of the functional subsystem of USSE includes, assubjects, (i) the main and reserve emergency centres of Energoatom, (ii) and NPPs support centre which have the status of the separated subsidiary ("Technical Emergency Centre" located in the village of Bilohorodka, Kyiv district), and (iii) the separated subdivision "Atomremontservis". In the event of an emergency at NPP, experts of the support centres are sent to the site where they are at the disposal of the site incident commander. Energoatom’s main emergency centre is located at the Headquarters in Kyiv and the reserve one is located in the village of Dniprovske, Chernigiv oblast (former managing centre of Chernobyl NPP). National regulations envisage the establishment of the on-site and off-site emergency centres at each NPP.
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An on-site emergency centre is designed to manage accident localization and mitigation actions at the NPP site and in the controlled area. An off-site emergency centre is located in the monitoring zone and is to be involved in the event of such accidents when the onsite centre cannot be used. When an accident occurs at NPP, the whole network of Energoatom emergency centres is activated including, if needed, emergency centres of other NPPs, as engineering and technical support. To ensure a reliable video communication link in emergencies, Energoatom installed a satellite communication system that provides the connection between the main and reserve emergency centres, support centres of NPPs, and emergency centres of separated subdivisions. In 2008 a fibre optic communication link was arranged between Energoatom and Rosenergoatom emergency centre. This link is designated for obtaining consultations from Russian scientific and technical organizations in case of an accident at Ukrainian NPPs.
Emergency Training and Exercises National legislation of Ukraine requires emergency training of the operator’s personnel involved in emergency response actions the NPP personnel and SNRIU specialists inclusive. In detail, SNRIU participates in the following emergency exercises: • on-site emergency situations exercise at NPP with full EIC activation; • on-site emergency exercise without EIC activation, with involvement of the personnel of the Emergency and Information Department; • full-scale emergency exercise, with full activation of EIC; • EIC internal emergency exercise based on a radiation accident scenario with radiological terrorism issues; • international IAEA CONVEX-3 exercise of response to a conditional radiation accident at Laguna- Verde NPP in Mexico without EIC activation and with involvement of the personnel of the Emergency and Information Department; • on-site emergency exercises at NPPs without EIC activation. In 2008, the State Nuclear Safety Inspections at NPP participated in 160 emergency exercises at NPPs, including 39 on-site emergency exercises. Based on the results of such exercises, EIC procedures are subject to revision or improvement.
1.10.2.2 Public awareness In case of accident requiring the information of the public, the NPP informs local and regional authorities and administrations according to existing pre-established lists. The responsibility for informing the population lies on the MoES of Ukraine. On practice the population strongly lacks the information concerning the signals and messages of the early awareness and also concerning the actions which should be undertaken in case of this signal (see chapter “Social environmental impact”) The management of evacuation processes (if deemed necessary) in the satellite city and all other cities is fully under the responsibility of the MoES.
1.10.2.3 Incorporation of experience of Fukushima accident The key initial external action of the accident on NPP “Fukushima” was the beyond design- basis tsunami amplitudes caused by the earthquake which is not possible under conditions of NPPs in Ukraine. However, events such as a loss of energy for any reason, disfunctionning of control systems, inadequate emergency plans, impact of human factors and others require detailed analysis of conditions for all nuclear power plants in the world, including Ukraine NPPs. A possible external factor of severe accident at NPP in Ukraine is the earthquake, which is included in the safety analysis reports. Technical solutions for safety upgrade which are to be implemented in the SUP are the revision of seismic risks. It should be noted that SUP, as any long-lasting program, is a subject to periodic review and amendments and, if
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necessary, will be revised on the basis of detailed analysis of accidents at nuclear power plant of “Fukushima” by the international and national experts and the results of the additional testing of operating nuclear power plants ongoing. In particular the implementation schedule of SUP is revised toward the acceleration of certain measures that have the greatest impact on safety (see chapter 1.6.2). List of ecological and sanitary-hygienic legal limitations
1.11 List of ecological and sanitary-epidemiologic limitations According to Ukrainian legislation, the following ecological and sanitary-hygienic limitations apply to the project: • NPP internal personnel and external citizen exposure to radiation; • concentrations or values for emissions and liquid discharges of radioactive and non- radioactive substances into the environment; • level of impact of ionizing radiation open sources; • volume of chemical non-radioactive emissions into the atmosphere; • harmful substances concentration in the lower atmospheric layer; • volumes of specific water and waste treatment; • size of the sanitary-protection and supervision zone. The radiation safety norm of Ukraine NRBU-97 (НРБУ-97) defines two groups of irradiated persons: the personnel (A and B categories) and the population (C category). According to the НРБУ-97 the next persons are divided into 3 categories: • Category “A” (personnel) – people who are directly working with sources of the ionizing radiation (either permanently or on a short-term basis); • Category “B” (personnel) – people with are not directly working with the sources of the ionizing radiation but who can be irradiated because of the nature or location of their work; • Category “C” – the whole population. Ionizing dose limits set by the norms are presented in the table below.
Table 8 - Radiation dose limits (in mSv/year)
Categories of the people irradiated Organs or tissue A B C
(limit of the effective dose) 20 2 1 The limitations of the equivalent dose of the external radiation: DLlens (for the lens) 150 15 15 DLskin (for the skin) 500 50 50 DLextrim (for the hands and feet) 500 50 -
Specific safety measures apply to works with open sources of ionizing radiations, in order to prevent the contamination of the personnel and working place. In accordance to the Main Sanitary Rules of radiation safety provision of Ukraine (MSRU) depending on the minimum level of radionuclide activity at the workplace, 4 groups of radiation danger radionucledes are defined: • A group –1 kBq; • B group – 10 kBq; • C group – 100 kBq; • D group – 1000 kBq and more.
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According to MSRU all works using open sources of ionizing radiation are divided into 3 classes (see Table below).
Table 9 - Classes of works while the industrial contact with radioactive substances in the open way Activity on the working place, kBq Group of radiation Class of works danger of radionuclide I II III A 10 and more From 100 to 10 From 1 to 100 B 10 and more From 10 to 10 From 10 to 10 C 10 and more From 10 to 10 From 100 to 10 D 10 and more From 10 to 10 From 10 to 10 In accordance with MSRU, works following into Classes I, II or III are only allowed for companies that have a specific "sanitary passport". The entrance to such areas must be clearly marked, indicate their classification, and have a sign illustrating that it is a ‘radiation hazard’ zone.
1.12 List of analyzed sources of potential environmental impact The list of basic, potential impact sources include: • radiation impact sources; • non-radiation impact sources, including o chemical impact sources; and o physical impact sources (including thermal exposure sources). • mediated impact sources. The characteristics of these sources are given for each NPP in the respective chapters of this report.
1.13 List of environmental impact types of Ukrainian NPPs in operation
1.13.1 Radiation impact Radiation impacts result from the emission of radioactive pollutants that are generated through the NPP’s production cycle. The main types of radiation impact are: • gaseous radioactive emissions to the atmosphere • solid radioactive wastes (SRW) • liquid radioactive wastes (LRW) SRW generated by NPPs are collected, sorted and temporarily stored at the plant. SRW are mainly generated from: • removed contaminated equipment • removed pipes and armouring • contaminated instruments and devices • worked-out filters and filter materials of ventilation system • removed pieces of heat-insulating materials • solidified LRW • cleaning materials • used working clothes and other personal protection equipment not subject to treatment
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LRW are mostly generated during the operation of water cooling system units and in the case of oil pollution from the reactor compartment pumps. LRW mainly consists of: • uncontrolled leaks of primary circuit coolant • radioactive oil pollution • wasted ion exchange resin from water cooling system units • wastewater generated by clean-up
1.13.2 Chemical impact Chemical impact can affect the atmosphere, water, or soil. Chemical impact to the atmosphere can result from (i) the evaporation of chemical substances, (ii) gas emissions from combustion (vehicles or generators) or (iii) the release of chemical substances by ventilation/aeration/spraying systems. Chemical impact to underground or surface water can result from (i) the release of treated wastewater, (ii) accidental spills, (iii) cooling pond water discharged to surface water bodies or which infiltrates into the ground and (iv) chemical elements carried out by rainwater. Chemical impact to the ground can result from (i) accidental spills, and (ii) infiltration of chemical elements washed away by rainwater.
1.13.3 Non-radiation physical impact The non-radiation physical impact of NPPs on the environment mainly consists of: • thermal impact in connection with the normal operation of NPPs (only one third of the thermal energy is converted into electricity) • humidity increase due to the emission of water into the atmosphere from spraying ponds and cooling ponds • electromagnetic field (inside the NPP and in the vicinity of electric lines) and noise (inside the NPP only) • acoustic impact (only within NPP)
1.14 List of objects potentially impacted by Ukrainian NPPs For each NPP a sanitary-hygienic zone and a monitoring zone are defined. The sanitary-hygienic zone is a 2.7 km radius circle for Khmelnitsky NPP, 2.5 km for Rivne NPP, 2.5 km and the cooling pond for Zaporizhzhya NPP and 2.5 km for South-Ukrainian NPP. The monitoring zone is a 30km radius circle for all NPPs. The objects potentially impacted by NPPs include: • the natural environment (air, water bodies, protected areas,flora and fauna, etc.) • the social environment (settlement, cities, touristic sites, etc) • the technogenic environment (agricultural and industrial facilities, infrastructure, etc…) More detailed and NPP-specific descriptions are provided in the relevant chapter for each NPP.
1.15 Approaches, methods and assumptions of SUP EA EA is focused on the analysis of positive and negative impact on natural, social and technogenic environment of SUP implementation. It also aims at providing the full scale public consultations concerning SUP and the results of its assessment. The key environmental and social aspects addressed follow the requirements of the potential lenders as well as the requirements set in the SOU which was elaborated in compliance with Ukraine’s national legislative requirements on environmental, public health protection and nuclear and radiation protection ensuring compliance with requirements of the EA. The document takes
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into account the provisions and recommendations of regulations, directives and methods of the international organizations collaborating with Energoatom. The SOU document sets the main requirements to the EA procedure and requirements to the report as follows: • EA procedure (particularly, the EA scope, basic qualitative and quantitative EA indicators, etc.); • EA Report contents; • Main aspects of the impact on the environment that have to be considered during the state ecological expertise of the EA Report.
1.16 Scheduled expertise of SUP and SUP EA Report SUP was elaborated by Energoatom, expertly analyzed and agreed by SNRIU and ratified in 2010. EA report is the part of the feasibility study of SUP which is the subject of the complex state expertise in the manner prescribed by the legislation of Ukraine because of the necessity of fulfilling the procedure of obtaining the state guarantees under which the credit will be provided for SUP implementation. At the same time, EA report is needed for feasibility study of SUP in front of the possible lenders (EBRD and Euroatom).
The review, acceptance and approval of the EA report will be done within following steps: 1. draft EA report is disclosed for the public review (June-July 2011); 2. draft EA report is finalized according to the questions, comments and suggestions received from the public (September 2011); 3. final version of EA report is disclosed and supplied to the state expertise as the part of the feasibility study (October 2011).
1.17 Main information sources used in the process of SUP EA The main source of information used in the EA study is data and information from previous EIAs, from the NPP safety analysis reports, from NPP energy unit’s security feasibility studies, from the reports of the operating company on results of ecological monitoring within NPPs’ control areas, ecological reports of other organizations, and conclusions of state expertise in particular, [2- 8,10,16-18,22,25-27,51,55-59,61,62,70,71,78-81,90-95]. All other organizational, project, technical, operational and scientific documentation owned by Energoatom had been used as the additional sources of information in particular, [11,30,50,53,54,56,60,63,64,68,72,76,77,82,83]. The detailed list of the initial documents is provided in Annex 10.1 Original field or laboratory researches and also dose estimations during EA were not needed, not foreseen and were not undertaken the same as the analysis and validation of the approaches and models used while dose assessments as soon as all the key data were taken from the official previously elaborated documents for which appropriate state expertise previously took place.
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2 EA OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION AT THE ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP
2.1 General description of the NPP
2.1.1 Area and location of the NPP Zaporizhzhya NPP is the largest nuclear power plant not only in Ukraine, but also in Europe. It was built in an area where significant anthropogenic changes occurred over the past 50 years (creation of the water reservoir on the Dnipro River, construction of a thermal power plant, construction of Energodar city and of the NPP). The original territory was not suitable for agricultural production due to eolian soils with sparse vegetation.
Figure 2 – Zaporizhzhya NPP and surroundings
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The NPP is situated 400 km southeast of Kiev, in the steppe zone of Ukraine, on the banks of the Kakhovka water reservoir (Dnipro river). The Zaporizhzhya NPP belongs to Kamenka-Dnieper rayon of the Zaporizhzhya oblast. The rayon centre, Kamenka-Dnieper, is located at a distance of 12 km southwest of the NPP. The oblast centre’s city of Zaporizhzhya is located 55 km northeast of the NPP. The NPP Satellite town is Energodar. In total, the 30km monitoring zone comprises 59 settlements: 27 in Zaporizhzhya oblast, 309 in Dnipropetrovsk oblast and 2 in Kherson oblast.
2.1.2 Short description of the Zaporizhzhya NPP’s industrial activity and hazard class The Zaporizhzhya NPP produces heat and electricity. As a result of its activity, Zaporizhzhya NPP produces the following types of non-radioactive wastes: • 1st hazard class: burnt-out mercury-containing lamps. • 2nd hazard class: spent petrochemical products; non-ferrous scrap metal; oily rags; spent batteries. • 3rd hazard class: oil polluted sand; PVC film. • 4th hazard class: heat insulating waste; waste wood; household garbage; waste calcium carbide (from welding); used dressings; processed rubber; broken glass; ferrous metals; spent medical instrument; silt or sediment from car washing.
2.1.3 Short description of the Zaporizhzhya NPP’s production From 1984 to 1987, the first four power units were put into operation. Unit 5 was started in 1989 and unit 6 in 1995. The main characteristics of Zaporizhzhya NPP are listed below. • number of reactors: 6 • type of reactor: VVER-1000 (pressurized water) • total electricity production capacity: 6000 MW The plant generates 40-42 billion kWh, which accounts for one-fifth of the average annual electricity production in Ukraine and for almost 47% of electricity generated by Ukrainian NPPs. The NPP is also a source of heat for the industrial site and for Energodar city. The total installed heating capacity is 1200 Gcal/h (200 Gcal/h from each unit).
2.1.4 Data on raw material, land, water, energy and other resources used For industrial purposes, Zaporizhzhya NPP uses the following resources: • land: the area of the NPP (including the cooling pond) is around 16 km²: o industrial site - 104 ha o sewage treatment plants effluent - 23 ha o construction base area - 97 ha o hydraulic structures with cooling pond - 1520 ha • water transiting through the cooling pond: about 300 million m3 a year; • water evapourated for cooling needs : about 100 million m3 a year; • electricity for own needs: 6% of the total electricity generated; • diesel fuel (for emergency power supply and others): 3 000 m3 reserve; • oil (for turbines and others): 4 800 m3 reserve;
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2.1.5 Brief description of the NPP technological process Each of the six units of the Zaporizhzhya NPP includes the following equipment: • pressurized water reactor type VVER-1000 • turbine type K-1000-60/1500-2 • generator type TVV-1000-4 Pressurised water reactors (PWR) are common throughout the world (for a description of the principles of pressurized water reactors, see the technical presentation and schematic in appendix chapter 11.3.1). The first types began operating in the 1950s. All Zaporizhzhya VVER1000 reactors belong to the V320 series, which were designed at the end of the 1970s. At the Zaporizhzhya NPP, the main building units are oriented towards the cooling pond. Pumping stations, pipelines, industrial water supply and roads are located between the cooling pond and the main building block units. The Zaporizhzhya NPP is connected to the Unified Energy System of Ukraine by three 750 kV transmission lines and one 330 kV line.
Figure 3 – Zaporizhzhya NPP layout
1. reactor building 9. administrative building & checkpoint 1 2. turbine hall 10. checkpoint 2 3. diesel generator 11. dry spent fuel storage site 4. unit pumping station 12. spray pond 5. radioactive waste treatment building A & B 13. dining room 6. solid radwaste storage 14. full-scale simulator 7. auxiliary building 15. training centre 8. laboratory and service building A and B
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2.1.6 SUP measures aiming at mitigation or elimination of hazardous emissions into the environment None of the SUP measures will result in a mitigation or elimination of hazardous emissions into the environment in normal operational conditions. Nevertheless, the following measures will result in a reduction of the risk of radioactive release and are therefore to be considered as a mitigation effort of hazardous emissions risks into the environment: 11301; 11303; 11304; 12102; 12202; 12301; 12401; 13302; 13304; 13306; 13402; 13403; 13502 to 13504; 13506; 13507; 13510; 15201 to 15208; 15210; 16101; 16201 to 16203; 17101 to 17104; 17201 (refer to technical appendix chapter 11.1 for the description of the measures).
2.1.7 Description of spent nuclear fuel treatment scheme & spent nuclear fuel volumes Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) resulting from the production of energy in nuclear reactors is one of the most important components of the NPP process cycle. After its use in the reactor core, nuclear fuel is moved to reactor cooling pools to be stored for 4 to 5 years to decrease residual energy release. Residual energy release is a process induced by radioactive decay of fission products. After cooling in the reactor pools, SNF is loaded into special containers in order to ensure its safety during transportation, and is sent to a SNF storage facility. The current state of the world’s technological advances in the nuclear energy sector do not allow for making final conclusions on the subsequent management of SNF. However, there are several existing approaches applied globally to the subsequent management of SNF: 1. Deferred decision is provided for long-term SNF storage. That allows for changing a decision on subsequent SNF management, taking into account new technologies and economic factors. The deferred decision is applied by Argentina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, South Korea, and Spain. 2. Processing of SNF. There are two types of processing – domestic or abroad: • local processing – processing of SNF to obtain components and substances that may be used and is economically justified (France, Great Britain, India, Japan, and Russia); • processing in other countries – processing of SNF with the return of medium-radioactive waste back to the country or owner (Australia, Bulgaria, Greece, the Netherlands, Switzerland); 3. Disposal – SNF cooling and burial in deep geological formations (Finland, Sweden and USA). In Ukraine, spent fuel from Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South Ukraine NPPs is transported to Russia. VVER-1000’s SNF is transported for storage and VVER-440’s spent fuel (Rivne NPP-1,2) is transported for processing. Taking into account a substantial concentration of power at the Zaporizhzhya NPP-6 with VVER- 1000, in 1998 the decision was made to construct a SNF storage facility within the NPP site. In 2001, Zaporizhzhya NPP commissioned a dry SNF storage facility (DSFSF) with a 50-year service life. The DSFSF design is based on the proven technology of the US Duke Engineering & Services Company and meets international standards, rules and regulations on nuclear and radiation safety. The spent fuel storage site is designed to accommodate 380 containers to hold over 9,000 spent fuel assemblies. Nowadays, 90 containers with spent nuclear fuel are stored in the storage facility. All components for these containers are manufactured at plants in the immediate vicinity to the Zaporizhzhya NPP. The experience in storage of spent nuclear fuel in "dry" containers gained by Ukrainian experts at the Zaporizhzhya NPP site allowed the operating organization Energoatom to sign an Agreement with the American company "Holtec International" to construct a centralized dry-type spent nuclear fuel storage facility (CSFSF) for Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South Ukraine NPPs. The Resolution of
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the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No.131 of 4 February 2008 approved the CSFSF feasibility study. The construction of this facility may start after approval by the Supreme Court of Ukraine. The average annual amount of spent fuel transferred from one VVER -1000 reactor for storage constitutes 42 fuel assemblies. The Zaporizhzhya NPP uses approximately 252 assemblies annually.
2.1.8 Description of radioactive waste treatment scheme and radioactive waste volumes
2.1.8.1 Solid radwaste Solid radioactive wastes (SRW) are classified into 3 groups according to their radioactivity levels: • Group I radwaste includes: cleaning and insulating material, specialised use uniforms, footwear, individual radiation protection means, flexible PVC, construction waste, implements and tools. • Group II radwaste includes: pipework, reinforcement, parts of pumps and drives of control and protection systems, filters of ventilation systems, waste metal, heat insulation material, detachable detectors. • Group III radwaste includes: intermediate hoses, scram control/shim assembly tops, ionisation chambers with communication lines, heat and energy release detectors with communication lines. Groups I and II radwaste are stored in the concrete containers of the storage facility, the capacity of which has been calculated on the basis of the following criteria: • term of storage: until the beginning of power unit decommissioning; • possibility of further removal and reburial; • storage of flammable and non-flammable waste in plastic bags; and • storage of specialised ventilation filters without prior processing. Group III radwaste is stored in concrete containers. The storage capacity is calculated to fit the NPP operation period. The following table shows the amount of SRW which were generated at Zaporizhzhya NPP during 2010 and are close to the average annual data.
Table 10 – Quantity of solid radwaste generated in 2010 (Zaporizhzhya NPP) SRW category Type of SRW Generated SRW (m3)
Low activity (group I) burnable waste 267,7 compressible waste 242,35 metals 24,95 untreatable waste 62,5 aerosol filters 5,05 Total 602,6 Intermediate activity (group II) metals 4,6 others 24,25 Pulp, ion exchanging resins 27 Total 55,85 High activity (group III) Total 0,432
2.1.8.2 Liquid radioactive waste Liquid radioactive waste (LRW) is treated in two steps. A primary concentration by evaporation is performed in two dedicated buildings. Concentrated solutions formed as a result of this primary
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evaporation are sent to a temporary storage. Then, the concentrated liquid is sent to a deep evaporation facility. The following table shows the amount of LRW which were generated at the Zaporizhzhya NPP during 2010 and are close to the average annual data.
Table 11 – Quantity of liquid radwaste generated in 2010 (Zaporizhzhya NPP) Type of LRW Generated waste (m3) Vat residue 906 Used sorbent 6,8
2.1.9 Description of hazardous and general industrial waste treatment scheme and volumes Waste management at the Zaporizhzhya NPP is done in accordance with permits and licensed limits. Class 4 wastes (see chapter 2.1.2), with the exception of tires, are destined for two dedicated landfills and sludge ponds. The remaining waste (classes 1 to 3) is recycled according to signed contracts. The volume of class 4 waste which was produced in 2006 is 10 000 tonnes. The main waste landfill of the Zaporizhzhya NPP has a capacity of 45 000 m3. It was put into operation in 1996 and designed to receive class 4 waste, particularly construction waste, wasted thermal insulation materials and sand-like abrasive materials). The landfill is situated east from the open switchgear- 750 kV area and is delimited by a barbed wire fence (area: 1.6 ha). Access to the landfill is through a gate with a temporary checkpoint and the premises for on-duty staff on duty and fire-fighting equipment. The operation of the landfill complies with the approved instructions for non-utilizable waste burial, agreed with the Health Inspection Service of the city of Energodar on March 16, 2005. The Zaporizhzhya NPP annually monitors the natural environment in the area of the landfill. A monitoring net and supervision points comply with the design. The Zaporizhzhya NPP’s sludge storage has been in operation since December 1984. Its design volume is 206 600 m3. The operation of the sludge storage complies with the approved instruction, agreed with the Health Inspection Service of the city of Energodar on December 15, 2005. The sludge storage area is supported by an impervious asphalt-concrete screen surrounded by a sand- clay layer. The Zaporizhzhya NPP annually monitors the natural environment in the area of sludge storage in compliance with the design.
2.1.10 SUP measures aiming at reducing wastes volumes or improving waste treatment The SUP for the Zaporizhzhya NPP does not contain any measures that directly aim to reduce the volumes of technological (non-radioactive) waste or at improving the ecological or sanitary security of the treatment of this waste. The treatment of non-radioactive waste complies with the legal requirements.
2.1.11 Brief description of design and non-design accidents analyzed The acceptability criteria for the radiological consequences of accidents are defined by NRBU-97.
For the analysis of the radiation consequences of an accident at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, the following design accidents were studied: • Maximum design accident (MDA) – an accident caused by a bilateral rupture of cooling systems (loss-of-coolant accident, LOCA) on the nominal power level; • Accident caused by leaks from the spent fuel basin – (accident during transport or technological operations with fuel); • Accident caused by the fall of the fuel assembly into the spent fuel basin (accident during transport or technological operations with fuel);
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• Accident caused by the fall of the water trap into the spent fuel basin (accident during transport or technological operations with fuel). Analysis of non-designed accidents for ZNPP is planned within the scope of safety analysis works foreseen among the measured of SUP.
2.1.12 Design solutions reducing or mitigating consequences of accidents (regardless of SUP) The Zaporizhzhya NPP design is based on the following safety principles and criteria: (i) NPP safety is ensured through a sequential implementation of (i) physical barriers to ionizing radiation and radioactive release into the environment and (ii) organizational and technical measures to preserve barriers and maintain their efficiency in order to protect workers, the population and the environment. (ii) During the NPP’s operation, the integrity of these barriers is monitored along the whole path of all radioactive elements. Under normal operations, all barriers and security/monitoring measures are working. When a failure is detected in any barriers or measure, the NPP’s operation is prohibited. The system of technical and organizational measures used in the design of the NPP has five levels: • Level 1 - Maintain conditions that prevent abnormal operations; • Level 2 - Prevent design basis accidents for normal operation systems; • Level 3 - Prevent failures of safety systems: • Level 4 - Manage beyond-design basis accidents; • Level 5 - Plan measures to protect personnel and population. The following main safety principles are incorporated into the design: • physical barriers at the path of radioactivity releases (fuel matrix, fuel cladding, coolant circuit boundaries, seals of the reactor system and biological protection); • special safety systems based on the principle of parallel redundant chains; • principles of independence, redundancy, physical separation, consideration of a single failure for the safety system design; • improve technical parameters of the localizing system to prevent release of radioactivity into the environment; • high level of monitoring and automation of engineering processes, including automatic accident management during the most important (first) stage of an accident; • ensure safety under external impacts specific for the considered sites, including natural and man-made impacts; • ensure safety in the wide-range of initiating events considering postulated failures, possible human errors and additional impacts; • apply a conservative approach in selecting technical decisions affecting safety; • using the measures and technical decisions aimed at: o protecting localizing system for design basis accidents; o preventing the initiating events to develop in design basis accidents; o mitigate consequences of the accidents that were not prevented; • ensure a possibility of tests and inspections of safety-important equipment and systems to keep them operable; • organizing a health and safety area and an observation area; • ensuring quality considering the requirements of special regulations.
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2.1.13 SUP measures aiming at reducing accident risks or mitigating accident consequences As part of the preparation of the SUP, a comprehensive safety analysis of the Zaporizhzhya NPP has been carried out by Ukrainian and international experts. This in-depth safety analysis was carried out using up-to-date methodologies, including probabilistic safety analysis. The safety upgrade engineering solutions that will be implemented within the SUP are related to: 0. the certification of all safety equipment; 1. the safety of reactor core characteristics and fuel management operations; 2. the preservation of the integrity of the components of the reactor, primary and secondary cooling systems; 3. the safety of the operation of the NPP systems (reactivity, primary circuit and auxiliary systems); 4. the modernization of information, monitoring and control equipment and control rooms; 5. the safety of power supply; 6. limiting the risks of containment by-pass or loss of integrity; 7. improving the prevention and early detection of internal risks (e.g. fire, flooding); 8. reviewing the seismic risks and ensuring regular updates of the seismic information and analysis; 9. analyzing and improving the management of accident situations.
2.1.14 Sanitary-protection zone and monitoring zone of NPP The sanitary-protection zone of the Zaporizhzhya NPP extends for a 3 km radius from the NPP. The monitoring zone is a 30km radius extending from the NPP. The radiation monitoring system of the Zaporizhzhya NPP aims at performing the following functions: • monitoring the status of protective barriers; • radiation process control: managing the condition of protective barriers and content of radionuclides in the technological environments; • radiation dosimetry; • individual monitoring; • radiation monitoring of the environment; • control of the non-proliferation of radioactive contamination. All monitoring data is treated by the Measurement Information System (MIS) which is an integral part of the overall automated system of radiation monitoring of the NPP and is designed for: • operational monitoring of radiation environment through continuous measurement of exposure dose rate of gamma radiation on the perimeter of the plant (northern, southern, western and eastern sides), the sanitary protection zone (SPZ) and 30km monitoring zone as well as the activity of radionuclides in water at given points; • assessment of the radiological situation around the perimeter of NPP in the SPZ and monitoring zone and meteorological observations data. The system operates continuously. The system consists of 18 monitoring stations. A map showing the location of monitoring points is presented in Appendix chapter 11.2.1.
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2.2 Assessment of impact on natural environment
2.2.1 Climate and microclimate
2.2.1.1 Short description of the existing state within the Monitoring Zone The climate of the area of the Zaporizhzhya NPP region is temperate continental with dry summers and erratic winters with little snow. The average annual air temperature is 10.9°C. The average monthly temperature of the coldest month (January) is minus 1.5°C. The average monthly temperature of the hottest month (July) is 24.4°C. The maximum air temperature in the area of the Zaporizhzhya NPP is observed from June to August. The maximum measured temperature at the Nikopol weather station reached 39°C and 41°C at Zaporizhzhya. The lowest temperatures are observed in January and February. The absolute minimum reached was minus 34°C. The average annual value of the absolute humidity is 9.2 hPa. The highest monthly average humidity, 14.5-15.8 hPa, is observed in summer (June-August), while the lowest values, 4.4-4.5 hPa, are measured in winter (January-February). The annual average relative humidity is 72%. The highest relative humidity (85-87%) is observed in the cold season, and the lowest humidity (58-64%) in the warm period. The annual average humidity deficit is 5.6 hPa. The total average annual rainfall is 430 mm, of which 270 mm falls during the warm season (April- October). The daily maximum rainfall recorded in Nikopol is 72 mm, and 120 mm in Zaporizhzhya. The average maximum observed monthly rainfall duration is 106 hours (December and January), and the lowest is 17-18 hours (July and August). The maximum duration of rainfall, 184 hours, was recorded in March. Fog is observed mainly in the cold season from October to March. In an average year at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, 48-50 days are characterized by fog, the largest annual observation being 96 days. Prevailing throughout the year except winter, winds blow in a north-easterly direction. In winter, the winds tend to blow in a south-western and north-eastern direction (Pril.V5). Throughout the year except summer, winds blow most frequently in a north-eastern and eastern direction (17-21%). In summer, winds tend to blow most frequently in a northern direction (15-17%). The highest monthly average wind velocity, 4.5-4.8 m/s, is observed during the cold season (December-March), while the lowest one, 2.9-3.1 m/s, is observed in the warm season (July- September). The number of days with strong wind for the year totals 17. Most often, strong winds occur from January to May and November. The greatest number of days with a strong wind for the year reached 42. According to the closest weather station, the observed maximum wind speed is 24-28 m/s (Nikopol, Pryshyb) with gusts up to 40 m/s (Pryshyb). Particularly high winds were recorded by the meteorological station of Zaporizhzhya, where gusts reached more than 40 m/sec.
2.2.1.2 Impact of SUP on climate and micro-climate
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP will have no significant impact on the climate and micro-climate characteristics of the surroundings of the Zaporizhzhya NPP. Transport means (train and trucks) used for the supply of equipment and the transport of workers for the implementation of the SUP will produce minor Green House Gas (GHG) emissions that may be considered negligible.
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Impact after implementation of the SUP The SUP does not aim to increase the production of electricity. As result an increase in the quantity of heat or water vapour released by the NPP in the environment is not expected. Consequently, the SUP is not expected to impact the micro-climate around the Zaporizhzhya NPP. The SUP will also not influence the volume of GHGs emitted annually by the operation of the NPP and therefore, no impact on the global climate is expected.
2.2.2 Air quality
2.2.2.1 Short description of the existing state within the Monitoring Zone The physical characteristics of the air are described in chapter 2.2.1, dedicated to meteorology and climate. The main sources of air pollutants at the industrial site of the Zaporizhzhya NPP are the 20 emergency diesel generators for six nuclear units with the reactors VVER-1000. The emitted pollutants are: carbonic oxide, nitrogen dioxide and sulphurous anhydride. Besides the emergency diesel generators, a number of auxiliary productions are located at the site: an electricity repair enterprise, a thermal automation and measurements department, a chemical department, an electricity department, an oil and diesel enterprise, and a thermal and underground networks department. In total, the enterprise has 162 sources of emissions of air contaminants. The total quantity of pollutants discharged into the air at the Zaporizhzhya NPP is around 14 tons/year, and does not exceed the established boundary permissible emissions. The emission reduction measures undertaken at the Zaporizhzhya NPP (replacement of filter elements, repair works on the dust and gas purifying equipment, preventive measures on emergency diesel generators) have resulted in a sharp decrease of the release of pollutants into the air between 2004 and 2006. More than 50% of the carbon oxides and 40% of hydrocarbons emitted into the air origin from vehicles. The observation of radionuclides in the air at the Zaporizhzhya NPP territory for many years shows the following: 1. the content of radio nuclides in the air measured at the Zaporizhzhya NPP before commissioning is at the level of the background values, and is significantly below permissible concentrations; 2. the radiological monitoring for many years shows the absence of radiation impact from the NPP on the air quality of the Zaporizhzhya NPP’s territory.
2.2.2.2 Forecasted changes regardless to SUP (normal operation or in case of accidents) The Zaporizhzhya NPP contributes to a limited extent to the overall emissions of pollutants in Zaporizhzhya and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. For the next few years, the main drivers for the future evolution of air quality in the Zaporizhzhya NPP 30km monitoring zone are: • the evolution of the activity of the main polluting industries: thermal power plant, mines and metallurgy; • the evolution of the volumes of pesticides sprayed by the agricultural sector; • the evolution of standards, norms and emission permits applicable to industries (which applies to the Zaporizhzhya NPP); • the evolution of oil consumption and norms for vehicles. In case of an accident, and depending on the nature of the accident, significant volumes of radioactive pollutants and dust could potentially be released into the atmosphere. Radiologic impacts of air pollution caused by designed accidents are analyzed in the unit 2.3.2.
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2.2.2.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted changes
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP will result in a slight increase in traffic (estimated at less than a 10% increase) in the vicinity of the NPP, for the supply of works and for the transport of additional workers from sub-contractors, in charge of the implementation of the SUP. Thus, the implementation of the SUP will result in additional but negligible air emissions. No large earthworks with large emissions of dust are planned.
Impact after implementation of the SUP The SUP does not increase the production of electricity. Therefore, no increase is expected in the quantity of heat, water vapour, dust or emissions released by the NPP into the environment. The SUP will also not result in the additional use of vehicles, and therefore will not induce additional releases from the vehicle fleet. SUP will decrease the risk of accidents on NPPs and thus the risk of the atmospheric radioactive pollution which is a positive impact of SUP. Moreover SUP implementation will improve the management of the accidental situations which will result in reduction of the amounts of emergency ejections into the atmosphere
2.2.3 Geological environment
2.2.3.1 Short description of the existing state within the monitoring zone
Geological structure and tectonics The entire 30km zone is located at the junction of two major geological groups: the Ukrainian crystalline massif and the Black Sea basin. The geological structure of the area includes Precambrian intrusive and metamorphic rocks which form the hard crystalline basement, as well as sedimentary deposits of Palaeogene, Neocene and quaternary Cenozoic periods which form the upper layers. The geological structure of the territory of the Zaporizhzhya NPP mainly consists of archean deposits of the Ukrainian crystalline shield. Within the 30km zone, Oligocene-Miocene sediments of the Upper Paleocene and sediments of the Pliocene-Miocene age are also common. Since their formation, crystalline rocks were subject to intense tectonic movements, accompanied by folding and fracturing. The presence of a folds axis with a north-eastern direction and a south- western dip can be observed where crystalline rocks crop out. The Zaporizhzhya NPP site is located on the south-eastern flank of this fold. Due to tectonic movements and weathering, the upper granite and granite-gneiss layers form a weathered crust with kaolin, gravel and fractured rocks ranging from one to thirty meters.
Seismicity In 1994 "Stevenson and Associates", (Cleveland, Ohio, USA) conducted an analysis of the levels of seismicity areas in NPPs of Eastern Europe, according to which the recommended value of the peak horizontal seismic acceleration at the Zaporizhzhya NPP should not be less than 0,1 g, which corresponds to an intensity of 7 points on a MSK-64 scale. In 1997, IAEA confirmed this result and recommended additional seismic monitoring in the Zaporizhzhya NPP zone. This measure is included in the SUP.
Ground water In the Zaporizhzhya NPP zone, ground water can be found in both common cracked crystalline rocks aquifers (Dnieper-Takovskogo complex) and sedimentary aquifers of the Palaeogene (Kharkov layer and quaternary sediments).
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Cracked aquifers are confined to places where granite and granite gneiss are fractured. The availability of water is not uniform, and the production rates of wells are small (up to 1 dm3/s). Water is highly mineralized and of no specific interest. The left bank of the Kakhovka reservoir is relatively well endowed with ground water. With regards to the use of ground water, that territory can be divided into two subareas. In the southern part, the Sarmatian deposits aquifer is used, mainly for the rural water supply of Basil, Upper Rogachinskogo and southern Kamensko-Dnipro areas. The northern part of the left bank relies on the quaternary alluvial deposits aquifer. This aquifer has large reserves of ground water exploited for the supply of Energodar and Kamensko-Dnipro. In addition, the aquifer is exploited by individual wells in private farms and for general use (around 70 wells). The NPP site is located on a widespread complex of water-bearing alluvial deposits. The complex consists of two hydraulically interconnected aquifers. The upper horizon predominantly consists of fine-grained quartz sand, and has a free hydraulic surface. Due to the poor filtration capacity of the aeration zone (4-5 m), the aquifer is not protected against the penetration of surface contaminants (biological or chemical pollutants, radionuclides). The lower horizon is an aquifer mainly made of medium-grained sand with gravel and pebble inclusions. The upper and lower horizons are separated by thin (0.4 to 1.8 m) lenses of loam and sandy loam. These two aquifers develop on thick impermeable clay formations of the Palaeogene. This clay prevents the penetration of heavy metals, radionuclides and other pollutants from the Zaporizhzhya NPP and TPP from entering the sedimentary ground water aquifer system of the Palaeogene sediments. Artesian water in sands and sandstones of the Palaeocene are widely used for both individual and centralized water supply in the 30km zone of influence of the Zaporizhzhya NPP.
2.2.3.2 Impact of the SUP on the geological environment The SUP includes the erection and commissioning of additional seismic monitoring equipment (measures 13501, 18101) as recommended by IAEA, as well as various measures to improve the knowledge and understanding of seismic risks in the Zaporizhzhya NPP zone. This is a positive impact of the SUP. In addition, the implementation of the SUP does not include any underground works or large earthworks. Therefore, the implementation and the operation of the SUP are not expected to have any impact on the geology of the zone. In addition, none of the SUP measures is likely to induce man-made seismicity.
2.2.4 Aquatic environment (ground waters, surface water basins)
2.2.4.1 Short description of the existing state within the monitoring zone For cooling needs, the Zaporizhzhya NPP uses water from the cooling pond connected to the Kakhovka reservoir by the artificial canal Kakhovka is an 18 km3 reservoir, located on the course of the Dnipro River (average discharge: 1670 m3/s).
Table 12 – Main characteristics of the Kakhovka reservoir Length km 230 Average width km 9.3 Average depth m 8.5 Maximum depth m 24.0 Surface km² 2 155 Volume km3 18.2
Detailed information concerning the radioactive pollution of the water environment is provided in unit 2.5.11.1 and in Annex 11.3.2.
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The results of many years of hydrogeological monitoring show the following: • there are no significant chemical and thermal impacts of the Zaporizhzhya NPP on ground water systems in the territory of the NPP. • the thermal impact of the Zaporizhzhya NPP on surface water is limited to the vicinity of the cooling ponds outlets (up to 1 km radius). • the radionuclides of underground water is at the level of background concentrations; • the NPP has no significant radiation impact on the aquatic environment.
2.2.4.2 Forecasted changes regardless to SUP (normal operation or in case of accident) The Dnipro River, and Kakhovka reservoir, are severely polluted and subject to intense eutrophication processes in summer, because of industrial and municipal untreated or insufficiently treated wastewater releases. The long-term changes expected in the Kakhovka reservoir are driven by the following factors: • the volume of wastewater releases from industries and cities located in the Dnipro River basin; • the evolution of norms and standards related to industrial and wastewater treatment, and their enforcement; • the migration of radionuclides of technological origin in the Dnipro River basin (Chernobyl releases, Dniprodzerzhinsk radioactive landfill, mining…). Regardless to SUP and in the absence of an accident, the Zaporizhzhya NPP is not expected to have any long-term influence on changes in the Kakhovka reservoir aquatic environment. In case of an accident and depending on the nature of accident the substantial volumes of radioactive pollutants can be potentially released to the aquatic environment. Radiologic concequences of the aquatic environment pollution resulting from the designed accidents are provided in unit 2.3.2.
2.2.4.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted state changes
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP does not include any underground works or large earthworks likely to affect the quality of underground or surface water. Besides, the implementation of the SUP does not require the consumption of a large volume of water, nor the release of a large amount of wastewater. Therefore, the implementation and the operation of the SUP are not expected to have any impact on underground or surface water in the 30km zone.
Impact after implementation of the SUP The SUP does not increase the production of electricity and therefore, no increase in the quantity of cooling water consumed by the NPP is expected. Consequently, the SUP has no expected long- term impacts on the quality or quantity of water used or released by the NPP. SUP will decrease the risk of accidents on NPPs and thus the risk of the aquatic radioactive pollution which is the positive impact of SUP. Moreover SUP implementation will improve the management of the accidental situations which will result in reduction of the amounts of emergency resets into the aquatic environment.
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2.2.5 Soil and landscape
2.2.5.1 Present characteristics of the NPP Monitoring Zone
Geomorphology In terms of geomorphology, the territory of the Zaporizhzhya NPP is connected with the high Pre- Dnipro plain pediment of Ukrainian crystalline shield that was formed during the late Proterizoic period and developed with a rising trend. Geomorphologic conditions of the region are characterized by the existence of above-the-flood- plain benches of the Dnipro River, numbered I, II, II and V. The Zaporizhzhya NPP site is located on the left-bank above-the-flood-plain bench (Vytachev-Buh): it is a sandy bench with eolian relief – an alternation of sandy hillocks and deflation basins. Elevations range from 16 to 35 m. The first above-the-flood-plain bench progresses into second and third loessial benches that stretch along the left bank of the Kakhovka reservoir. The width of the bench ranges from 7 to 8 km. The fifth above-the-flood-plain bench directly joins the third bench and is separated from it by an obvious bench. The width of the 5th bench is about 10 km. Within the second, third and fifth benches, the following modern physical-geological processes are observed: (i) subsidence and (ii) erosion.
Soil Soil types within the 30km zone of the Zaporizhzhya NPP include ordinary black soil with low content of humus on non-loessial rocks and in some areas livery-coloured soil. The NPP site is located in an area of mostly sandy, clay-sandy and sandy-loamy soils, with a low humus content.
Information concerning the radioactive pollution of soils within the monitoring zone of NPP is provided in unit 2.5.11.1 and in Annex 11.3.2.Landscape Within the 30km zone of the Zaporizhzhya NPP, 6 small-scale landscapes can be identified: • loessial valley-gully and gully-beamy lowlands with landslides, washed ordinary black soil with low humus content, forests and bushes; • loessial lowlands with ordinary black soil with low humus content in combination with black soil meadows and sod soil formerly under herb-fescue-feather-grass vegetation; • loessial lowlands with ordinary black soil with average humus content in combination with black soil meadows and alkaline soil formerly under herb-fescue-feather-grass vegetation; • sandy benches with sod in combination with alkaline soil meadows insular pine forests; • loessial lowlands with gullies and small hollows, with lightly-eroded south alkaline black soil and washed black soil of gully bottoms; • loessial lowlands with gullies separated by ravines and south black soil with low humus content, formerly under fescue-feather-grass vegetation.
2.2.5.2 Forecasted changes of the present characteristics regardless to SUP, under normal operation or in case of accidents The Zaporizhzhya NPP 30km zone is characterized by the following exogenous processes that progressively alter the soil and the landscape: • eolian processes (sand blow off and displacement) with partial relief changes; • ravine erosion; • wind erosion; • abrasion of reservoir banks; • technogenic irrigation of the territory that leads to backwater creation and rise in ground water level; None of these processes are directly connected to the operation of the NPP.
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Within the normal conditions of operation Zaporizhzhya NPP is not providing any negative radiation impact on soils. In case of an accident and depending on the nature of accident the substantial volumes of radioactive pollutants from the atmosphere can potentially cover the earth surface. Radiologic concequences of the earth surface pollution resulting from the designed accidents are provided in unit 2.3.2.
2.2.5.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted changes The SUP consists of safety upgrade measures that will be implemented within the NPP site. As summarized in the following table, no impact is expected from the SUP on soils and landscape: Table 13 – Impact of SUP on soils and landscape in Zaporizhzhya NPP monitoring zone Impacts during Impact after Type of Impact implementation of the SUP completion of the SUP impact on eolian processes none none impacts on reservoir banks abrasion none none impacts on erosion by water none none impact on wind erosion none none impact on irrigation and ground water level none none
2.2.6 Flora, fauna, reserves
2.2.6.1 Present characteristics of the NPP Monitoring Zone
Flora The Zaporizhzhya NPP’s 30km zone is located in the botanical region of the "steppes vegetation plain area" of Ukraine. The following types of vegetations prevail: • herb-fescue-feather-grass steppes with Stipa Capillata, Stipa pulcherrima, Stipa Lessingiana, Festuca valesiaca, Koeleria dracilis, Linosyris villosa and agrophytocenoses fragments; • fescue-feather-grass steppes with domination of Stipa Lessingiana, Stipa Ucranica, Festuca valesiaca and agrophytocenoses fragments; • flood plain meadows with domination of Carex Distans, Bolboschoenus maritimus in the alkaline and saline soils along Tomakivka and Bilozirka rivers; and • fragments of deciduous forests of Quercus robur, Ulmus sp., Acer sp., Fraxinus sp. and Robinia. Light coniferous pine forests (Pinus sylvestris), mixed pine-oak and oak-pine forests, and agrophytocenoses are present in the immediate vicinity of the NPP. The following main types of biogeocenoses are identified in the Zaporizhzhya NPP’s 30km zone: • natural biogeocenoses: riverine vegetation of the Kakhovka reservoir, steep banks of the reservoir and flood plain forests; • natural-anthropogenic and anthropogenic biogeocenoses: Crimean pines sand plantations, agrobiocenoses, fields and woodland, vineyards, industrial gardens, settlements and industrial areas. Forests are used mostly for nature protection purposes and are characterized by low productivity. In the steppes zone, flora consists of steppe plants (over 1 400 species). Within the 30km zone there are 62 types of plants registered in the Red Book of Ukraine and 27 vegetation communities registered in the Green Book of Ukraine. The majority of these plants are Category 2 and 3 - vulnerable and rare plants respectively. The most widely spread is the family of feather grass.
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Fauna The Zaporizhzhya NPP’s 30km zone is located in the zoogeographical region of Mediterranean- Central-Asian sub-region of the Pre-Azov steppes province. Within the Zaporizhzhya NPP 30km zone and surroundings, 52 species of mammals, 308 species of birds, 10 species of reptiles, 6 species of Amphibia and about 70 species of fish are identified. Invertebrate fauna is represented by over 4 000 species. In the Pre-Azov steppe province, over 144 species of animals are registered in the Red Book of Ukraine. Bird species’ diversity is connected with migrating and wintering by species from other regions of Europe and Asia. The number of local species is gradually decreasing but includes partridges, geese, mallards, steppe crane, bustards and almost all species of sandpipers. Most of these are under the protection of the Bern convention and are registered in the Red Book of Ukraine. Within the territory of the Pre-Azov steppe province (where the Zaporizhzhya NPP lies) 39 out of 67 species of birds registered in the Red Book of Ukraine are observed. The Kakhovka reservoir counts 42 species of fish, out of which only 20 have commercial value. The main commercial fish species are bream, roach, sander, silver crucian, sardelle, and white and bright silver.
Natural reserves Within the Zaporizhzhya NPP 30km zone, there are 24 territories that are classified in the natural reserve fund. These are mainly local botanic, forest, entomology, landscape and zoological reserves. It should be mentioned that 40 km away from the NPP is the National park “Velykyy lug” (“The great meadow”). The park aims at the protection, renewal and wise use of the typical and unique natural landscape, and historic and cultural characteristics of the steppes zone.
2.2.6.2 Forecasted changes of the present characteristics regardless to SUP, under normal operation or in case of accidents The Zaporizhzhya NPP 30km zone is characterized by the following trends and evolutions with regards to flora and fauna: • a decrease in the number of bird species (presumably due to the decrease of migrating bird species); • the growth of urbanized areas and resulting decrease in natural habitats; • the possible introduction of new agricultural species; • the decrease of forest cover as a result of over-use and increased erosion; • an increase in the surface of protected areas (parks, reserves), as a result of state policy. Among the above mentioned possible evolutions, the increase of production by the Zaporizhzhya NPP is the only one which, if implemented, could potentially induce changes to the flora and fauna baseline during normal operational conditions. The other evolutions and trends are not related to the NPP’s operations. In case of an accident and depending on the nature of accident the species of flora and fauna in the neighboring districts can get the relevant radioactive impact. Radiologic concequences of the agricultural species of flora and fauna pollution resulting from the designed accidents are provided in unit2.3.2
2.2.6.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted state changes The main impact of the Zaporizhzhya NPP on natural habitats within the 30km zone is related to the release of heat in the environment and in particular the discharge of warm water to the Kakhovka reservoir. The SUP aims at improving the safety of NPPs under operation. The implementation of the SUP will not result in an increase or decrease in the quantity of heat released into the environment. Besides, the implementation of the SUP does includes only minor works outside of the NPP industrial site except the seismic monitoring equipment.
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Therefore, the SUP is not expected to have any impact on the fauna, flora or reserves of the monitoring zone. SUP will decrease the risk of accidents on NPPs and thus the risk of the radioactive pollution of the range of the existence of flora and fauna which is the positive impact of SUP. Moreover SUP implementation will improve the management of the accidental situations which will result in reduction of the amounts of emergency resets and ejections.
2.3 Assessment of impact on social environment
2.3.1 Social baseline the NPP Monitoring Zone In total, around 380 000 people live within the 30-km zone around the Zaporizhzhya NPP, which represents a density of 135 people/km² (Ukraine average: 75 people/km²). The city of Energodar, with a population of about 54 000 people is located at a distance of 5 km. The rayon administrative centre, Kamenka-Dniprovskaya, with a population of 14 000, is located at a distance of 12 km. The surrounding cities are: • Marganets: within13 km and a population of 50 000 people; • Nikopol: within 13 km and a population of 122 000 people. A consequence of the development in the region of thermal and nuclear power was the creation of large urban-industrial complexes. Currently, the surroundings of the Zaporizhzhya NPP are characterized by a large development of both industry and agriculture.
From a socio-economic point of view, it is possible to distinguish two parts of the surroundings of Zaporizhzhya NPP: the right bank (Nikopol, Marganets) and the left bank (Kamenka-Dniprovskaya, Velikobelozerka, Vasilevka) of the Dnipro River. Both parts have a specific habitat, influenced to different degrees by the existing thermal and nuclear power plants. The right bank region represents an old-industrial and highly urbanized area and the demographic situation is determined by the predominant influence of large industrial centres, such as Nikopol and Marganets. Like most long-cultivated areas, the right bank has is experiencing a negative demographic trend and the population is predominantly elderly in both urban and rural areas. The geo-demography of the left bank region is quite different. The development of energy production activities has boosted the urbanization process. From 1962 to 1992, the urban population of the right bank has increased by 80%, while the urban population of the left bank increased 4.4 times. Most of the demographic growth was in Energodar and is due to professional migration flows. It should be noted that the growth of the urban population in the Zaporizhzhya NPP region was accompanied by an intense decrease in the rural population.
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Table 14 – Demographic figures for the Zaporizhzhya NPP (2009/2010 official statistic data) Average Migration Natural Gender monthly Unemployment Total City Age classes population population (m/w) wage 2009 rate population growth growth (UAH) 0-14: 13.4% Nikopol 1/1.159 121 784 596 -965 15-64: 7,6 % (Dnipr. 2 233 70.5% (oblast) Marganets oblast) 49 697 144 -444 >65: 16.1% 1/ 1.126 Energodar (city) 0-14: 13.0% 54 417 -99 152 8,9 % 1/1.169 15-64:70.8% 2 105 (oblast) Kamenka- (Zapor. >65:16.2% 13 643 -6 -338 Dniprovskaya oblast) Ukraine 0-14: 13.9% average 1/1.194 15-64:70.0% 2 233 8.4 % (2010) >65:16.1%
Table 15 – Causes of death in the Zaporizhzhya NPP region Infections External Digestion Breathing Cardiovascular Neoplasm and Others cause system system parasites Dnipropetrovsk Oblast 64.9% 12.4% 7.4% 5.6% 3.0% 3.7% 3.0% (2009) Zaporizhzhya Oblast 59.8% 15.8% 7.1% 3.2% 2.4% 1.9% 9.9% (2009) Ukraine 63.0% 11.8% 8.7% 4.4% 3.3% 2.2% 6.7% (2007) Zaporizhzhya and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts have a higher than average rate of HIV prevalence than the Ukraine’s average (see 11.3.6).
2.3.2 Forecasted public health regardless of SUP (in normal operation or in case of accident)
Presently, the main radiation input on human organisms within the 30km zone of the Zaporizhzhya NPP under a normal operation mode of the NPP is made by natural radionuclides 40K, 238U and 232Th and their disintegration products. Artificial radionuclides of global fallouts, radionuclides of Chernobyl origin and radionuclides from Zaporizhzhya NPP emissions exercise significantly lesser impact on exposure dose values. A person individual gets a larger dose from natural radionuclides within an hour than from the Zaporizhzhya NPP emissions within a year (calculated dose: see chapter 2.5.11). The population of the surroundings of the Zaporizhzhya NPP live in an environment which is rather polluted, due to industrial, agricultural and exogenous pollutions. Cardiovascular sicknesses prevail and are the main cause of death. The rate deaths because of oncology deceases is higher than the Ukrainian average. Regardless of the SUP, the drivers for the evolution of the population’s health in the coming years will be: • the evolution of emissions from heavily polluting industrial activities of the region, due to normative or activity changes; • the changes in the access to medical services and medication, which depends on the population’s income level; • the changes in spreading of STDs;
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The operation of Zaporizhzhya NPP presently has no measurable impact on the health of the population. The maximum estimated doses resulting from designed accidents for the population are presented in Table 16
Table 16 - Maximum estimated exposure doses resulting from design accidents (Zaporizhzhya NPP) Effective dose to the Dose to exposed Initial accident Thyroid dose, mGy whole body, mSv skin, mGy Radiation accident caused by 6.51 1.43 3.29 10-2 bilateral rupture (LOCA MDA) Radiation accident caused by a 0.26 0.74 0.01 leak from the spent fuel basin Radiation accident caused by a fall of the fuel assembly into the cooling 3.44 9.25 66.3 pond Radiation accident caused by a fall of the water trap into the spent fuel 6.87 18.5 133 basin Thus, as it can be seen from the table data estimated exposure doses loads even with the design accidents are substantially lower than the population evacuation limit established by acting norms (50 mSv/year for the whole body.
2.3.3 Impact of SUP measures on Forecasted public health state
2.3.3.1 Impacts during the implementation of SUP
Population outside the NPP site The SUP implementation will only require minor works outside the NPP territory (installation of seismic monitoring equipment). The main impacts of the SUP implementation for populations living within the vicinity of the NPP will be disturbances caused by additional transport traffic (supply of new equipment installed within the SUP) and the recruitment of temporary workers. The supply of equipment within the frame of the SUP is planned to be done mainly by train which is the preferred transportation mean used by Energoatom (there is the railway line to the NPP). The use of trucks is expected to keep road traffic to a minimum. Consequently, the impact on the neighbouring populations health usually associated with trucks (noise, air quality degradation and increased traffic risks) are expected to remain at insignificant levels during the implementation of the SUP. The possible employment of temporary workers by the subcontractors involved into SUP implementation will increase the temporary migration processes in the district which potentially can increase the risks of spreading the infection deceases. In particular, resulting from the random sexual relationships the risks of AIDS and other sexually transmitted deceases can increase. The mentioned risks are mitigated by the regular information-educational messages for external workers while their trainings and instructions aiming at raising awareness of the issuesNo other potential or measurable impact on the population’s health is expected during the SUP implementation phase outside of the NPP site.
Workers on the NPP site The implementation of the SUP will require the involvement of external workers and subcontractors, who will be exposed to the radiation and non-radiation risks that exist in any NPP. In accordance with Ukrainian legislation, the specific safety measures described in chapter 1.10.1 apply to all workers (internal, external, permanent or temporary) involved in activities at the NPP site. Those measures aim at preventing accident risks or excessive radiation exposure; they are applied by Energoatom in compliance with the legislation.
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Provided that these measures are implemented, no specific risks for workers’ health is expected from the implementation of the SUP.
2.3.3.2 Impacts after SUP completion After the SUP is completed, the NPP will have an improved level of safety which means for the NPP workers and the population living inside and outside the monitoring zone, a reduction of the risk of incidents or accidents that might affect their health. A reduction in the risk of accidents translates into a reduced risk of contamination for NPP workers and nearby residents. This should lower stress levels related to working at or living near NPPs and will positively impact the psychological health of workers and nearby residents. For this impact to be effective it is important for PAPs to understand and be aware of the SUP and its implications on reducing risks.
2.3.4 Impact of SUP on local population’s social conditions
2.3.4.1 Impacts during the implementation of SUP The implementation of the SUP in the Zaporizhzhya NPP will require around 300 to 400 external workers over the 6-year period of program implementation (on average, 4 400 people work in the Zaporizhzhya NPP on a daily basis). Most of these external workers will be hired by satellite contractors who regularly (and often exclusively) work for the NPP and will provide specific construction or erection services within the framework of the SUP’s implementation. Out of the total budget of the SUP, it is estimated that around 3 to 4 M€ will result in net income for additional workers involved in the SUP implementation for the Zaporizhzhya NPP. Although specific competences might be sought far from the Zaporizhzhya NPP, the population living in the vicinity of the NPP is expected to be positively impacted in terms of income from the SUP implementation from both direct and indirect employment opportunities. Direct employment refers to the possibility for local workers to be hired and therefore receive a salary from the companies that will be selected to assist in the SUP’s implementation. Indirect employment refers to the opportunities related to the additional demand for services by external workers involved in the SUP’s implementation. These services will most often be provided by the population living near the Zaporizhzhya NPP and may include food, hotel, recreational activities, etc Consequently, the SUP implementation is expected to positively impact the economic and social condition of the population living in the vicinity of the NPP. For the population living far from the NPP, the average positive impact in terms of social and economic conditions will be negligible. No negative impact on economic or social conditions is expected from the implementation of the SUP.
2.3.4.2 Impacts after SUP completion Employment: After completion, the SUP will result in minor but permanent additional work needs. Although the residual long-term additional work load induced by the SUP is not estimated in the documents available at this stage, it is obvious from the definition of the measures that several of them will result in additional activities or maintenance needs (maintenance of the additional safety systems, maintenance and operation of the additional monitoring equipment and analysis of their outputs…). The present stage of the project (feasibility study), does not allow for a precise definition of the number of additional jobs that will result from the long-term SUP. However, one can ascertain from similar projects that this figure should remain small compared to the number of people actually involved in the implementation of the SUP described in the previous chapter. Therefore, the SUP, after completion, is expected to have a positive but marginal impact on employment and on the social conditions around the Zaporizhzhya NPP.
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Electricity tariff: Energoatom, as an electricity producer, sells electricity to the market through Ukrenergo, who distributes and sells electricity to consumers. The cost for upgrading the safety of the Zaporizhzhya NPP will be covered by an increase of the bulk tariff between Energoatom and Ukrenergo (there are no plans for the safety upgrade to be subsidised by the State). The increase in Energoatom’s bulk tariff is planned in financial projections, but does not cover only the costs related to the SUP. Therefore, the marginal bulk tariff increase induced by the SUP was not calculated. The manner in which this tariff increase will be reflected on the consumers' tariff is unknown at this time and will be subject to a decision by the tariff regulation authority.
2.4 Assessment of impact on technogenic environment
2.4.1 Short description of the existing state within the monitoring zone Within the 30km monitoring zone of the Zaporizhzhya NPP are located various industrial enterprises. The sanitary-protection zones of these enterprises range from 50 to 500 m. East of the ZNPP and within its SPZis the Zaporizhzhya thermal power plant “Dniproenergo”, which is one of the greatest air polluters in the Zaporizhzhya oblast. On the right bank of the Kakhovka reservoir is the Nikopol-Marganets industrial hub, with pipe and steel rolling industries, mining and concentration plants and machinery-producing industries. It is one of the heaviest polluting areas in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast and also in Ukraine. In the town of Dniprorudne, located 3 km east of the NPP, there is another industrial zone which produces metal and reinforced concrete constructions, unconventional equipment and pipelines and special constructions. The mining industry is represented by manganese and ore extraction (Bilozirka iron ore deposits). In terms of agriculture, the 30km zone represents a region of intense husbandry with developed farming, dairy and vegetable sectors. In the monitoring zone of the NPP are several objects classified as potentially explosive: storages of fuel and oil, gas pipelines, and fuel filling stations. The local railway line Tavrichevsk-Energodar is 2.4 km away from the NPP. The local motorway Ivanivka-Vodyane is 3.0 km from the NPP. The Kakhovka reservoir is a fluvial navigation route (the navigation channel is 4 km away from the NPP, the nearest landing pier “Vodyane” is 6 km away from the NPP). The Zaporizhzhya NPP’s 30km zone also has several places of social value: archaeology, architecture, history, culture and memorial sites. In every settlement within the monitoring zone, there are monuments to the memory of local soldiers and World War II victims.
2.4.2 Impact of NPP on technogenic environment regardless of SUP In normal operation conditions, Zaporizhzhya NPP has limited impacts the technogenic environment: • the activities and infrastructures that can be developed in the vicinity of the NPP are subject to limitations, for safety reasons: those limitations apply in particular to the development of potentially dangerous industrial activities, recreation activities, flying objects, transport of dangerous substances…; • the presence of the NPP boosts the local economy and the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which provide direct or indirect services related to the activity of the NPP; • the satellite city of Energodar benefits from several infrastructure investments made by the NPP. The release of heat in the environment and the consumption of water by the NPP do not affect the technogenic environment at measurable levels. In case of accident with significant release of radionuclides to the environment (INES level > 4), the technogenic environment of the NPP would be affected according to the radionuclides fallout. In
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case of disaster, the creation of an exclusion zone similar to Chernobyl's would result in the end of all regular economic activities in the concerned areas.
2.4.3 Impact of SUP measures on technogenic environment
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The main impact of the implementation of the SUP on the technogenic environment of Zaporizhzhya NPP will be an increase of the activity of the NPP satellite enterprises who will be involved in the program implementation. This additional activity will result in additional transportation (staff and supply), additional income for the population and additional generation of wastes. Considering the planned increase of staff (up to 10 %) and the planned increase of waste generation (5 to 10%) as a result of the SUP implementation, one can reasonably assume that the satellite economic activity induced by the NPP will generally increase by up to 10% during the implementation of the SUP. Consequently, an increase by 10% for communal activities demand (domestic waste collection, drinking water supply, health) can be expected, which can be supported by the infrastructure of the city of Energodar.
Impact after implementation of the SUP Once completed, the SUP will not result in an increase or in a decrease of the activity of the NPP. Therefore, under normal operation, no long term impact on the technogenic environment is expected after the implementation of the SUP. The exposure of the technogenic environment to the consequences of accidents at the NPP will decrease after the implementation of the SUP for the following reasons: • the probability of accidents will decrease; • the potential consequences of some accidents will also decrease, since some of the SUP measures will improve the capacity of the operational staff to early identify problems (for example, additional monitoring equipments) or to correct problems (for example, additional fire protection equipments) Therefore, the expected long term consequences of the SUP for the technogenic environment are essentially positive.
2.4.4 Possible impact on NPP from the technogenic environment (regardless of SUP)
Explosion risk Within the frame of the Safety Analysis Report, the risk of accidental explosion from industries of infrastructures located up to 10 km from R NPP is systematically reviewed. At the present time, all of the potential sources of accidental explosion located at less than 10km from the NPP or inside the NPP territory would, in case of explosion, trigger an excessive pressure considerably less than the normative limit of 10 kPa.
Fires The closest potential source of fire outside the NPP territory is the forest located south of Zaporizhzhya NPP site: this forest is located at a distance of 400 m, and therefore does not represent a significant danger. The other potential sources of fire in the 10 km radius around NPP (and outside its territory) are warehouses containing combustible and flammable liquids described above (TPP oil depot, NPP storage of diesel fuel, gasoline storage at the gas station). Due to their distance, they are not potential sources of fire for Zaporizhzhya NPP. Within the NPP territory, and apart from the reactor core, the main potential sources of fire are primarily the tanks of the tanks and equipments that contain diesel fuel, oil, propane and butane, and hydrogen receivers.
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Emissions of toxic gases In the area of 10km radius around Zaporizhzhya NPP, the main sources of air pollutants are the companies of Energodar industrial zone (in particular Zaporizhzhya thermal power plant). Industrial enterprises located in the cities of Nikopol, Marganets, Kamenka-Dneprovska are outside the 10km NPP zone. There is no potential source of rapidly toxic gases in the vicinity of the NPP.The water treatment plant which supplies the NPP and the city of Energodar uses liquid chlorine.
Aircraft impact The nearest commercial airport is located in Zaporizhzhya, 67 km distance from the NPP. No airline route crosses the 10km zone of NPP.
Failures of hydraulic structures Dams of the Dnipro river cascade were designed for a flood with a probability of occurrence of 0.01%. The safety analysis report presents an analysis of the consequences of a simultaneous or sequential destruction of the dams located upstream from Kakhovka reservoir, in terms of flooding. It appears from this analysis that the key infrastructures of Zaporizhzhya NPP would not be affected by the Kakhovka reservoir level increase. However the risk of floods is not the only risk connected to the dam break of the Dnipro cascade. The mediated potential impacts of this breakdown type can be: 1. Possible damage of the local power networks; 2. Temporary partial or full loss of the vehicle and railway connections; 3. Temporary deficit of the personnel (risk of the high trauma indicator among the personnel + potential difficulties to reach the NPP after the accident for the personnel). As the result the procedure is to be set on NPPs which will define the necessary actions in case of the dum breakdown such as the preventive halt of the power units (wave caused by the dum breakdown will spread over the cascade by the flow of Dnieper river during several days which will provide with some time for the NPP personnel to undertake preventive actions).
2.5 Comprehensive measures to ensure standard state of environment and environmental security
2.5.1 Brief description of resource-saving measures taken on NPP regardless of SUP
Energy-saving measures The Zaporizhzhya NPP consumes around 6 to 7% of its electricity production for its own needs. Several measures were undertaken over the past years to decrease the consumption of electricity by the NPP, such as the introduction of low-consumption lamps. These measures have had a positive but marginal effect on the overall energy consumption of the NPP, which is driven by the energy efficiency of the largest equipment (mostly pumps). The decision to replace pumps by more efficient ones (in order to save electricity) can be made by the management of the NPP based on economic considerations – but this issue is not addressed in the SUP. In addition, in order to further reduce its energy consumption, the Zaporizhzhya NPP has also undertaken measures to reduce their vehicles’ fuel consumption.
Sustainable use and protection of water resources In order to conserve water resources, processed water is treated in a special facility (for demineralization) and after that recirculated within the system. The water balance of the Zaporizhzhya NPP is calculated regularly and submitted to SANEP. The maximum permissible discharge (MPD) from the cooling pond to the Kakhovka reservoir is defined by SANEP.
Recycling waste
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Waste recycling measures were introduced at the Zaporizhzhya NPP in the past few years in order to reduce its environmental footprint. Recycling is undertaken for glass, lamps (containing mercury), batteries, etc…
2.5.2 Need for additional resource-saving measures in connection with SUP
2.5.2.1 During the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP will require a number of additional workers (300 to 400), which is negligible compared to the population of the satellite city of Energodar (50 000). Moreover, a significant part of the additional workers will come from Energodar itself. Therefore, there is no reason to consider that the implementation of the SUP, and the employment of additional workforce, will result in a significant overuse of natural resources in the project area because it will not require a large immigration of workers from outside the area. In addition, none of the SUP’s measures require the use of significant volumes of natural resources (e.g. large volumes of water or large volumes of sand or earth). Therefore, no additional resource-saving measures are deemed necessary during the implementation of the SUP.
2.5.2.2 After the implementation of the SUP The SUP implementation will only require minor works outside the NPP territory (installation of seismic monitoring equipment). Therefore, none of the SUP measures will have a long-term impact on the use of natural resources outside the NPP territory. Inside the NPP’s territory, the operation of units and processes related to SUP measures will not require the significant additional use of resources. The operations of the additional equipment installed within the framework of the SUP will result in marginal, additional energy consumption. No additional water will be used, except in the case of a fire, when the fire protection equipment installed within the frame of SUP would be used.
2.5.3 Social and workers protection measures taken on NPP regardless of SUP
2.5.3.1 Workers protection (HSE) A comprehensive description of the HSE rules that apply to workers and sub-contractors within the NPPs is proposed in chapter 1.10.1.
2.5.3.2 Public information in normal operation The Zaporizhzhya NPP provides regular information to the public through the following means: • internet: a dedicated website (http://www.npp.zp.ua/) provides the public with information about the NPP, its organisation and its operation. The website discloses in real time the radiation monitoring results in the 30km zone. Hydrometeorological data are not available; • own newspaper: the Zaporizhzhya NPP edits a weekly newspaper "Energia" at 6000 exemplars. The newspaper is available for free in public places and provides various information about the NPP and the 30km monitoring zone; • other newspapers: the Zaporizhzhya NPP occasionally publishes articles in local and regional newspapers, usually with the objective of informing the public largely about a specific topic; • thematic brochures made available at information centres and public buildings; • public events are also regularly organised by the Zaporizhzhya NPP; • automatic answering system (phone number 5 68 02): hourly updated, this system provides information about the status of the NPP and radioactivity monitoring.
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2.5.3.3 Emergency plans A description of the emergency plans developed by SNRIU and Energoatom is proposed in chapter 1.10.2. In case of accidents which require the population informing NPP informs the local authorities according to the existing pre-designated order and list. The responsibility for population informing rests on the MoES of Ukraine. The evacuation (if necessary) is also within the responsibilities of MoES of Ukraine. On practice the population strongly lacks the information concerning the signals and messages of the early awareness and also concerning the actions which should be undertaken in case of this signal. Especially this deficit is critical for the monitoring zone population outside of Energodar city
2.5.4 Changes in social and workers protection measures as a result of SUP implementation
2.5.4.1 Workers protection (HSE) According to the law of labour protection of Ukraine, the implementation of the SUP does not require the introduction of specific changes in the management of HSE at the NPP. Nevertheless, in the light of (i) the review of HSE procedures done within the frame of the EA and (ii) the K2/R4 safety upgrade experience, recommendations are made to improve HSE management. These measures are common for all NPPs and are detailed in chapter 8.1.1 and basically consist in: • the introduction of performance indicators to compare the performance of NPPs and sub- contractors; • replicating recommendations made during the previous the K2/R4 safety upgrade • the harmonization of HSE practices and methodology between operating NPPs.
2.5.4.2 Public information The scoping meetings held in May 2011 showed a strong demand from the public for improved information about the regular monitoring of the environment around the NPP, including radioactivity levels. Within the frame of the SUP, it is proposed to improve public information by: • harmonizing the media used for public information; • harmonize the type of environmental monitoring data released to the public. See details of the recommendations that apply to the Zaporizhzhya NPP in chapter 8.1.2.
2.5.4.3 Emergency plans The scoping meetings held in May 2011 also showed a strong demand from the public for improved early warning tools in case of accident. The experience of the Chernobyl and Fukushima cases has shown that most of the primary radioactive fall-out after an accident occurs in a radius of some kilometres around the NPP (to date, Chernobyl exclusion zone is 30km, Fukushima exclusion zone is 20 km). Therefore, it is suggested to extend the "early warning zone" of the NPPs, presently limited to the satellite cities, to the whole 30km monitoring zone. It is also recommended to implement awareness campaigns, in order to inform the population about the actions to undertake in case of alert. From the public side it was suggested to renew the wired radio system which had existed even in Soviet times and its usage aiming at early warning. It should be mentioned that such a decision requires substantial capital investments and limits the circle of informed people with those who are at home and listen to the radio. So far, it is also suggested to review the possibility of early warning system introduction via sms which will be sent to the cell phones.
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The registration requests from the inhabitants of 30 km monitoring zone to be included into such system can also be collected via sms from the interested persons. A feasibility study will be carried out to define the most appropriate and relevant tools and equipments for early warning system before procurement.”.See details on the implementation of this recommendation in chapter 8.1.3.
2.5.5 Rehabilitation (renewal) measures undertaken during NPP construction The NPP was built at a time when ESIAs were not required by the Ukraine’s legislation. The construction norms applicable in Soviet times (the "SNIP") included design criteria aimed at limiting adverse environmental impacts, but which cannot be compared to the comprehensive set of rehabilitation or compensation measures that are undertaken nowadays to preserve the environment when building a new NPP. The design criteria applied at the time of the construction of the NPP and related to environmental protection typically referred to water use and the emission of radioactive or non-radioactive pollutants to the air or to water bodies. From a social point of view, the construction of the Zaporizhzhya NPP probably resulted in resettlement, permanent occupation of agricultural land or reorganisation of public infrastructure (e.g. roads). During Soviet times, there was limited private property, and therefore the reorganisation of social life and infrastructure around the NPP was implemented without compensations for property loss. From the time of the NPP’s construction to today, the evolution of standards and norms has been the main driver for the implementation of environmental measures. Namely, set of these measures had been implemented while the construction finalization of power units No6 of ZNPP (operation started in 1995)
2.5.6 Need for additional rehabilitation (renewal) measures in connection with the SUP The SUP implementation is by nature completely different from the construction of a new NPP. Therefore, none of the SUP measures requires the implementation of rehabilitation or renewal measures in line with the measures that were undertaken at the time of the construction of the NPP.
2.5.7 Compensatory measures taken in the process of NPP operation The design documentation of ZNPP foresees and had been timely undertaken the set of the compensatory measures, namely: • Measures connected to the expropriation and compensation of the land loss because of the land usage; • Setting the limitations of natural resources usage, limitations of ejections and resets of the contaminants to the environment, limitations of the wastes location; • Setting the norms of the payment and the amounts of the payments for the usage of natural resources, for the ejections and resets of contaminants and for the wastes location. The following compensation measures are implemented in accordance with the law: • the electricity tariff is cheaper (subsidized) for the population who live within the 30km monitoring zone of an NPP than for other consumers in Ukraine; • the NPP uses 1% of the total value of its annual production for the improvement of infrastructure and living conditions in the cities located within the 30km monitoring zone. These two measures provide significant advantages to the population living within the 30km monitoring zone. No other specific compensatory measures exist.
2.5.8 Need for additional compensatory measures as a result of SUP implementation There is no reason to change the compensatory measures described in chapter 2.5.7 as a result of the SUP implementation.
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2.5.9 Description of environment protection measures related to NPP operation
2.5.9.1 Protection measures against radioactive emissions The prevention or mitigation of radioactive emissions is ensured by the following technical solutions: • cleaning of air containing radioactive isotopes using spray and iodine filters; • absorbing the filtering of gases containing radioactive molecules, of which the majority are inert noble gas isotopes (xenon and krypton); • organization of obstacles on the way to radioactive substances; • closed circuits to prevent leakage of liquid substances containing radioactive components; • organization of a special system of SRW collection and SRW and LRW storage; • sanitary protection zone; • permanent dosimetric control over emissions as well as air, soil, flora and water pollution control in the sanitary protection zone and monitoring zone.
2.5.9.2 Non-radiation protection measures The NPP is presently undertaking ISO 14000 certification.
Protection and sustainable use of forests, shelter forests, green areas The Zaporizhzhya NPP maintains the green areas located on its territory. Trees, bushes, and grass are planted annually and are maintained. Measures are undertaken to control weed and quarantined herbs within the NPP’s territory.
Protection of water bodies The environmental protection policy of the Zaporizhzhya NPP focuses on water protection (surface and underground water), using both engineering and ecological monitoring methods. Thus, in order to reduce the quantity of copper in the cooling pond, a quantitative assessment of sources of copper income to the cooling pond was undertaken in 2008-2009, and recommendations were elaborated to minimize adverse impact on ecosystems. Ground and surface waters are monitored within the territory of the NPP and in the 30km monitoring zone. Ground water monitoring data are compiled in a report and submitted to the State Administration on Natural Environment Protection (SANEP). Several measures have also been taken in recent years to prevent the transfer of chemicals into ground water from sludge clarification ponds. In 2008-2009, an ultraviolet disinfection facility was built to improve wastewater treatment.
Prevention of air pollution The following measures are implemented by the Zaporizhzhya NPP in order to monitor and preserve air quality: • monitoring of pollutant emissions to the air at emission sources and control points; • regular technical control of the state of gas cleaning facilities; • inventory of objects and sources that include ozone-damaging substances; • replacement of ozone-depleting technologies; • control and record of the СО content of exhaust gases released by the vehicle fleet.
Treatment of industrial and household waste The following measures are implemented by the Zaporizhzhya NPP in order to manage industrial and household waste in a sustainable way:
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• information on the production, location, collection and transfer of waste from the Zaporizhzhya NPP is collected regularly and submitted to supervisory bodies; • samples of soils are collected for chemical control; • in order to minimize radioactive waste volumes, a facility to process radioactive waste, including units for burning, compacting and fragmentation of radioactive wastes is being built.
2.5.10 Need for changing environment protection measures as a result of SUP implementation
During the implementation of the SUP The environment protection measures undertaken by the NPP will not be affected by the implementation of the SUP, and therefore can be continued without any kind of limitation or restriction. The implementation of the SUP does not require additional specific environment protection measures.
After the implementation of the SUP After its implementation, the SUP will generally result in a reduction of risks for the environment around the NPP, through (i) a reduction of the probability of accidents and (ii) a reduction of the potential consequences of accidents, due to improved monitoring equipments allowing for earlier identification of accidents and better management of accident situations. In this context, there is no specific need to develop additional environment protection measures in relation with the implementation of the SUP.
2.5.11 Residual impact of NPP under normal operation (regardless of SUP)
2.5.11.1 Radiation residual impact
Annual exposure dose from gas and spray emission to atmosphere The table below shows the calculated values of average annual near-the-ground concentrations of radionuclides and calculated annual exposure doses from gas and spray emissions of the Zaporizhzhya NPP in 2008 at the border of the sanitary-protection zone. Maximum general individual dose can be up to 0,044 mcSv/year which is not exceed 0,11% of the appropriate quote of dose limit according to NRBU-97 (40 mSv/year).The largest contribution to the dose is from inert radioactive gases.
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Table 17 – Annual individual exposure dose at the border of sanitary protection zone - Zaporizhzhya NPP, peak indexes (2008) Average annual Input of Dose from Dose from Inhalation Emission, near-the-ground Peroral dose Total dose, radionuclides Radionuclide cloud, soil, dose, Bq/year concentration, Sv/year Sv/year into total dose Sv/year Sv/year Sv/year Bq/m3 % Kr-88 3,90E+12 9,6E-03 3,0E-08 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 3,0E-08 68,0 Xe-133 2,81E+13 7,7E-02 3,2E-09 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 3,2E-09 7,3 Xe-135 7,02E+12 1,9E-02 6,5E-09 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 6,5E-09 14,7 I-131 9,04E+07 2,5E-07 1,3E-13 5,5E-11 7,4E-11 3,2E-11 1,6E-10 0,4 Cr-51 2,25E+07 6,1E-08 2,7E-15 1,6E-12 7,9E-14 2,5E-14 1,7E-12 0,004 Mn-54 2,46E+06 6,7E-09 8,0E-15 4,2E-11 3,7E-13 4,5E-12 4,7E-11 0,11 Co-58 2,90E+06 7,8E-09 1,1E-14 5,8E-11 5,7E-13 3,5E-12 6,2E-11 0,14 Co-60 7,47E+06 2,0E-08 7,8E-14 4,0E-10 2,2E-11 1,7E-10 5,9E-10 1,3 Cs-134 5,11E+06 1,4E-08 3,1E-14 1,6E-10 1,0E-11 1,1E-09 1,3E-09 2,9 Cs-137 1,05E+07 2,9E-08 2,4E-14 1,3E-10 3,7E-11 2,0E-09 2,2E-09 5,0 Total dose per ways of exposure, Sv/year 4,0E-08 8,5E-10 1,4E-10 3,3E-09 4,41E-08 100 Contribution to exposure (%) 90,7 1,9 0,3 7,5 100
Annual exposure dose from radionuclides emission into cooling pond The observed amounts of water pollution by tritium and caesium-137 from ZNPP to the external water reservouirs are provided in Annex 11.3.2. The calculated annual individual exposure doses of the critical population group from emission of radionuclides by Zaporizhzhya NPP objects into the cooling pond in 2008 are given in the table below. The emission of radionuclides to the cooling pond results in a possible individual effective exposure dose through consumption of fish from the pond for the critical population group that equals 0.092 µSv/year. This makes 0,92% of the appropriate quote of dose limit according to NRBU-97 (10 mcSv/year).
Table 18 – Exposure to emission of radionuclides by Zaporizhzhya NPP into the cooling pond in 2007, 2008 Calculated value of Emission to cooling radiation capacity of Dose, Input of radionuclides Radionuclide pond in 2008, cooling pond, Sv/year -1 into total dose, % Bq m3·year-1 Tritium 2,30Е+13 3,26Е+08 1,43Е-08 15,5 Mn-54 2,17Е+07 2,95Е+08 3,67Е-10 0,4 Co-60 2,55Е+07 2,65Е+08 1,39Е-09 1,5 Cs-134 3,68Е+07 2,76Е+08 3,55Е-08 38,5 Cs-137 5,84Е+07 2,62Е+08 4,06Е-08 44,1 2008 9,22E-08 100,0 Total dose, Sv/year 2007 7,81E-08
The monitoring of radiation impacts of the Zaporizhzhya NPP on the population under normal operations shows the following: • Radiation conditions are dominated by natural and cosmogenous radionuclides as well as by global atmospheric pollution radionuclides created during nuclear weapon tests and emitted into the atmosphere as a result of the Chernobyl disaster.;
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• In total, the radiation impact level of the Zaporizhzhya NPP on both the population and the environment does not exceed 0.1% of the dose generated by natural sources and therefore does not change natural radiation in the region of the Zaporizhzhya NPP.
2.5.11.2 Non-radiation residual impact
Chemical impact Impacts on water bodies: Chemical impacts on the Kakhovske reservoir are possible from the cooling pond at its outlet or by filtration through the dam. The following points are subject to chemical monitoring - (i) any water flowing into the cooling pond, (ii) the cooling pond itself and (iii) the Kakhovske reservoir upstream and downstream of the outlet. Samples are systematically taken twice a month. In total, 26 biochemical indicators are monitored. The monitoring results in the Kakhovske reservoir upstream and downstream of the cooling pond are presented for year 2006 in appendix chapter11.3.3.. These tables show the contribution of Zaporizhzhya NPP on the biochemical load of surface water, which can be summarized as follows: • the cooling ponds has no significant influence on the concentration of the following parameters (i.e. the concentration measured at the outlet of the pond compares to the upstream and downstream values in the reservoir): Na, Ca, chemical oxygen demand (COD), biological oxygen demand (COD), petrochemicals, NO2, Fe, Ma, Zn, Co, Cd, Pb. • the cooling pond has a measurable influence on the concentration of the following parameters, without exceeding the norms: Mg, K, SO4, Cl, salinity, NH4, NO3, PO4, F and Ni. For Ni, the concentration of releases is about twice the surface water concentration and close to the maximum allowable norm (0.01 mg/dm3). Nitrates and Phosphates concentration in the cooling pond are obviously influenced by releases from neighbouring industry or from Energodar city through the canal that feeds the pond and by seasonal eutrophication processes. • up until the year 2008 the cooling pond released a copper (Cu) concentration that exceeded by two to three times the surface water concentration (which is already far above the norm upstream from the NPP). Considering this, in 2008 the Zaporizhzhya NPP undertook a series of measures to reduce the copper load of water in the cooling pond. Chemical impact on the air: The main sources of pollutant emissions into the atmosphere by the Zaporizhzhya NPP are the 20 backup diesel power generators (MW each), which release nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide and particulate matter during operation. These generators are situated within the NPP compound with other subsidiary industries or workshops (e.g. electronic/electric repair company, heat automation and measurement, chemical plant, oil and diesel tanks, underground utilities, etc.). The NPP motor vehicle fleet includes 441 vehicles (303 gasoline and 138 diesel). The main contaminants - gasoline, nitrogen dioxide, hydrocarbons - are not differentiated in composition. In total, the NPP has 162 sources of emissions of pollutants to the atmosphere. Among these, two sources are equipped with gas cleaning equipment. The total amount of harmful substances emitted into the atmosphere by the Zaporizhzhya NPP does not exceed the level of maximum allowable emissions.
Thermal impact By design, the removal of heat from a reactor compartment at the Zaporizhzhya NPP is: • In normal operation: min: 2.9x106 W – max: 23.4x106 W - average: 17.4x106 W; • During planned cool down: 69.8x106 W in the first 3-5 hours to 29.1x106 W in the next 8 hours; • In case of emergency cooling: from 64x106 W in the first 3 hours to 31.4x106 W, up to the 6th to 10th hour after the cooling started. The temperature of water in the spraying pond in the summer does not exceed 26°C.
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The coldest water temperature in the cooling pond ranges from5 to 9°C, which is higher than in the Kakhovka reservoir. The difference of temperature between the ambient air and cooling pond water leads to rapid evaporation from the water surface, which frequently turns into fog. The water area of the reservoir where a slight increase of temperature can be observed is about 1.2 km². The shape of this area depends on the speed and direction of the wind. However, the total area with a high thermal load remains unchanged. The impact of flushing the cooling pond was studied and is subject to regular monitoring (twice a month). The increase of water temperature in the Kakhovka reservoir reaches 3°C at a distance of 0.7 km, and 1°C up to 1.0 km.
Electromagnetic impact The electromagnetic impact assessment of the Zaporizhzhya NPP has not been performed thus far and electromagnetic impacts are not monitored. This constitutes a deviation which was mentioned in the SAR.
Acoustic impact No acoustic impact assessment of Zaporizhzhya NPP has been performed thus far and acoustic impacts on workers are not monitored. However, all NPP equipment that is a source of noise is designed in compliance with regulatory requirements on noise levels at workplaces. This constitutes a deviation which was mentioned in the SAR.
2.5.11.3 Possible changes of residual impacts resulting from the implementation of tasks set by the state programs and governmental decisions Results of analysis of possible changes of residual impacts resulting from the implementation of the tasks listed in chapter 1.7.2 set by the state programs and the governmental decisions concerning the development of nuclear energy in Ukraine and the relevant issues are provided in Table 19.
Table 19 – Forecasted changes of residual impacts from Zaporizhzhya NPP resulting from the implementation of the state programs and governmental decisions Tasks set by the state programs and governmental decisions (numbers in accordance with chapter 1.7.2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 No No No No Radiation impact changes1) Changes3) changes changes changes changes No No No No No Chemical impact Changes 1) changes changes changes changes changes No No No No No Thermal impact Changes1) changes changes changes changes changes No No No No No Electric and magnetic impact Changes 1) changes changes changes changes changes No No No No No Acoustic impact Changes 1) changes changes changes changes changes 1) changes are connected to the action term of impact factors without changing their intensity and concequences 2) volumes of RAW which are collected on the NPP sites can be changed resulting from the processing and also as the result of sending RAW to the storage after the construction of the relevant storage.
2.5.12 Changes in residual impact as a result of SUP implementation The implementation of the SUP will not result in measurable changes of the quantities of heat and chemical components released by the NPP in the aquatic or atmospheric environment.
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In addition, the SUP measures will not result in any significant changes of the noise or electromagnetic emissions from the NPP. Therefore, the changes in residual impacts as a result of the SUP implementation can be considered as negligible. SUP implementation also will not affect the forecasted changes of residual impacts of Zaporizhzhya NPP resulting from the implementation of tasks set by the state programs and governmental decisions described in unit 2.5.11.3.
2.5.13 Complex assessment of NPP’s environmental impact under normal operation as a result of SUP In the light of the previous chapters, it is clear that the SUP will not result in measurable changes of the impact of the Zaporizhzhya NPP on the technogenic and natural environment under normal operation. The impacts on the social environment are expected to be positive, through the implementation of the proposed measures for (i) improved information of the public and (i) improved HSE practices.
2.5.14 Complex assessment of ecological risks in case of accident on NPP (regardless of SUP) An accident with a level equal to 4 or lower on the INES scale would not result in significant ecological risks.
2.5.15 Complex assessment of changes in ecological risks in case of accident on NPP as a result of SUP With reference to the description of measures proposed in Table 6 (chapter 1.6), the following changes in ecological risks will result from the implementation of the SUP at the Zaporizhzhya NPP:
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Table 20 – Changes in ecological risks as a result of SUP at the Zaporizhzhya NPP Group of Sub-group of measures Changes in ecological risks after SUP measures reduced accident reduced accident probability consequences resulting from improved capacity to manage emergency situations 0 Background 01 Certification x 1 Core and fuel 11 Neutron and physical characteristics of the x management reactor core: 13 Fuel Management x x 2 Components 21 Primary system x x integrity 22 Pressurized systems important for safety x x 23 Reactor (including vessel) x 24 Other x 3 Systems 31 Ensuring the system reactivity x 32 Ensuring the reserve of primary circuit coolant x x 33 Primary circuit cooling x x 34 Primary circuit pressure x 35 Auxiliary systems x x 4 41 Information system x x Instrumentation 42 Reactor control and protection system x x and Control 43 Safety management systems x (I&C) 44 Monitoring and control systems x x 5 Power supply 51 External sources x x 52 Energy distribution x x 6 Containment 61 Containment bypass risk x and buildings 62 Integrity x 7 Internal 71 Fire protection x hazards 72 Protection against flooding x 8 External 81 Seismic x hazards 9 Accident 91 Safety analyses x analyses 92 Accident management x
2.5.16 Economic efficiency of SUP implementation according to ecological impact on population health The implementation of the SUP is driven by compliance objectives, not economic objectives. An estimation of the economic efficiency of the SUP will be possible after the PSA has been done, which is one of the measures of the SUP, i.e. once the accident probability resulting from the SUP is known.
2.6 Environmental impact change in the process of SUP implementation The following table summarize the impacts associated with the SUP, as discussed in the previous chapters. For each item: • "no impact" means that the impact of the NPP on its environment will not be changed as a result of the SUP implementation; • "no negative impact & less risks" means that (i) in normal operation conditions, the impact of the NPP on its environment will not be changed negatively as a result of the SUP implementation and (ii), the risks of negative impacts associated with emergency situations are reduced, either because the probability of occurrence of such emergency is reduced
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and/or because the NPP will have the possibility to limit the negative consequences of such emergency.
Table 21 - Environmental impact change in the process of SUP implementation Water bodies Air & Social underground Soil Flora and fauna atmosphere surface water environment water 1 Radiation impact 1.1 Gas and no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative aerosol radiation impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact risks risks risks risks risks risks 1.2 Estimation of no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative transboundary impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impacts risks risks risks risks risks risks no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative 1.3 Liquid impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less no impact impact & less radioactive waste risks risks risks risks risks 1.4 Periodic flushes from no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact spaying or cooling ponds 1.5 Solid no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact radioactive waste 2 Chemical impact 2.1 Emissions no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact from combustion no negative no negative no negative 2.2 Infiltration to no impact impact & less impact & less no impact no impact impact & less ground water risks risks risks 2.3 Non radioactive liquid no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact waste 2.4 Non radioactive solid no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact waste 3 Physical impacts 3.1 Thermal no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact impact 3.2 Noise and electromagnetic no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact radiation no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative Conclusion impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less risks risks risks risks risks risks
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3 EA OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION AT THE RIVNE NPP
3.1 General characteristic of the NPP
3.1.1 Area and location of the NPP The Rivne NPP is situated in the north-western part of Rivne oblast, 120 km away from the city of Rivne in Volodymyrets rayon on the banks of the Styr River. The decision to locate the NPP there was determined by the low fertility of soils and significant distance to densely populated territories. In terms of physical geography, the 30km zone of the Rivne NPP corresponds to the mixed forests of the region of Volyn Polissya, a western part of the Prypyat River lowland situated on the north of Ukraine and forming an east-west belt with a width varying from 60 to 120 km. The relief of the lowland consists of hills and swells of glacial and water-glacial nature.
Figure 4 – Rivne NPP and surroundings
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3.1.2 Short description of Rivne NPP industrial activity and hazard class The Rivne NPP produces heat and electricity. As a result of this activity, the Rivne NPP produces the following types of non-radioactive wastes: • 1st hazard class: burnt-out mercury-containing lamps. • 2nd hazard class: spent petrochemical products; non-ferrous scrap metal; oily rags; spent batteries. • 3rd hazard class: oil polluted sand; PVC film. • 4th hazard class: heat insulating waste; waste wood; household garbage; waste calcium carbide (from welding); used dressings; processed rubber; broken glass; ferrous metals; spent medical instrument; silt or sediment from car washing.
3.1.3 Short description of Rivne NPP production The Rivne NPP is the first nuclear power plant in Ukraine equipped with VVER-440 type reactors (a pressurized water reactor). The first two VVER-440 power units were put into operation in 1980 and 1981, and Unit 3 with VVER-1000 reactor was put into operation in 1986. In 1990, construction of power units on the site was stopped according to resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine «On Moratorium for Construction of New NPPs». The construction was resumed in 1993, and Unit 4 was put into operation in October, 2004. The main characteristics of the Rivne NPP are: • number of reactors: 4 • type of reactor: 2 x VVER-440 and 2 x VVER-1000 (pressurized water) • total electricity production capacity: 2 835 MW The annual electricity production of the Rivne NPP presently exceeds 17 billion kWh.
3.1.4 Data on raw material, land, water, energy and other resources used For industrial purposes the Rivne NPP uses the following resources: • diesel fuel (for emergency power supply and others): 600 m3 reserve ; • oil (for turbines and others): 1520 m3 reserve ; • land: the area of nuclear power plant is around 2.5 km²: • water evapourated for cooling needs : about 67 million m3 a year; • electricity for own needs: 6 to 7% of the total electricity generated;
3.1.5 Description of the NPP technological process Each of the four units of the Rivne NPP includes the following equipment: • VVER 1000: o pressurized water reactor VVER-1000 o turbine type K-1000-60/1500-2 o generator type TVV-1000-4 • VVER-440 o pressurized water reactor VVER-1000 o turbine type KG-220-44 (2 for each reactor) o generator type TVV-220-2
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Pressurised water reactors (PWR) are common throughout the world (for a description of the principles of pressurized water reactors, see the technical presentation and schematic in appendix chapter 11.3.1). In the Rivne NPP, the main building units are oriented toward the cooling towers. Rivne NPP is connected to the Unified Energy System of Ukraine by two 750 kV transmission lines, four 330 kV lines and one 110 kV line.
Figure 5 – Rivne NPP layout
1. reactor buildings 6. solid radwaste storage 2. turbine hall 7. auxiliary building 3. diesel generator 8. laboratory and service building 4. unit pumping station 9. administrative building & checkpoint 5. radioactive waste treatment building 10. spray pond
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3.1.6 SUP measures aiming at mitigation or elimination of hazardous emissions into environment None of the SUP measures will result in a mitigation or elimination of hazardous emissions into the environment in normal operation conditions. Nevertheless, the following measures will result in a reduction of the risk of radioactive release and therefore, are to be considered as a mitigation of hazardous emissions risks into the environment: • for VVER-440 reactors: 31101; 31301; 32101; 33201; 33302; 33303; 33502; 33503; 34201-34301; 34401-34409; 35102; 35201-35207; 37101; 37105; 37106 (refer to technical appendix chapter 11.1 for the description of the measures). • for VVER-1000 reactors: 11303; 12102; 12202; 12301; 12401; 13302; 13304; 13306; 13402; 13403; 13502; 13504; 13506; 13507; 13510; 15201 to 15208; 15210; 16101; 16201 to 16203; 17101; 17102; 17104; 17201 (refer to technical appendix chapter 11.1 for the description of the measures).
3.1.7 Description of spent nuclear fuel treatment scheme & spent nuclear fuel volumes Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) resulting from the production of energy in nuclear reactors is one of the most important components of the NPP process cycle. After its use in the reactor core, nuclear fuel is moved to reactor cooling pools to be stored for 4 to5 years to decrease residual energy release. Residual energy release is a process induced by radioactive decay of fission products. After cooling in the reactor pools, SNF is loaded into special containers in order to ensure its safety during transportation, and is sent to a SNF storage facility. The current state of the world’s technological advances in the nuclear energy sector do not allow for making final conclusions on the subsequent management of SNF. However, there are several existing approaches applied globally to the subsequent management of SNF: 1. Deferred decision is provided for long-term SNF storage. That allows changing a decision on subsequent SNF management, taking into account new technologies and economic factors. The deferred decision is applied by Argentina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, South Korea, and Spain. 2. Processing of SNF. There are two types of processing – domestic or abroad: • local processing – processing of SNF to obtain components and substances that may be used and is economically justified (France, Great Britain, India, Japan, and Russia); • processing in other countries – processing of SNF with the return of medium-radioactive waste back to the country or owner (Australia, Bulgaria, Greece, the Netherlands, Switzerland); 3. Disposal – SNF cooling and burial in deep geological formations (Finland, Sweden and USA). In Ukraine, spent fuel from Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South Ukraine NPPs is transported to Russia. VVER-1000’s SNF is transported for storage and VVER-440’s spent fuel (Rivne NPP-1,2) is transported for processing. The experience in the storage of spent nuclear fuel in "dry" containers gained by Ukrainian experts at the Zaporizhzhya NPP site allowed Energoatom, the operator, to sign an Agreement with the American company "Holtec International" to construct a centralized dry-type spent nuclear fuel storage facility (CSFSF) for the Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South Ukraine NPPs. The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No.131 of 4 February 2008 approved the CSFSF feasibility study. The construction of this facility may start after approval by the Supreme Council of Ukraine. The average annual amount of spent fuel transferred from one VVER -1000 reactor for storage constitutes 42 fuel assemblies, from VVER -440 energy unit of Rivne NPP – 90 assemblies. The Rivne NPP uses around 264 assemblies annually.
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3.1.8 Description of radioactive waste treatment scheme and radioactive waste volumes
3.1.8.1 Solid radwaste SRW are classified in 3 Groups according to their radioactivity level: • Group I radwaste includes: cleaning and insulating material, specialised use uniforms, footwear, individual radiation protection means, flexible PVC, construction waste, implements and tools. • Group II radwaste includes: pipework, reinforcement, parts of pumps and drives of control and protection systems, filters of ventilation systems, waste metal, heat insulation material, detachable detectors. • Group III radwaste includes: intermediate hoses, scram control/shim assembly tops, ionisation chambers with communication lines, heat and energy release detectors with communication lines. Group I and II radwaste is stored in the concrete containers of the storage facility, the capacity of which has been calculated on the basis of the following criteria: • term of storage: until the beginning of power unit decommissioning; • possibility of further removal and reburial; • storage of flammable and non-flammable waste in plastic bags; and • storage of specialised ventilation filters without prior processing. Group III radwaste is stored in concrete containers. The storage capacity is calculated to fit the NPP operation period. The following table shows the amount of SRW which were generated at the Rivne NPP during 2010 and are close to the average annual data. Table 22 – Quantity of solid radwaste generated in 2010 (Rivne NPP) SRW category Type of SRW Generated SRW (m3) Low activity burnable waste 5,63 (group I) compressible waste 205,603 metals 68,777 untreatable wastes 44,38 aerosol filters - Total 324,386 Intermediate activity metals 3,03 (group II) others 28,221 Total 31,251 High activity (group III) Total 6,168
3.1.8.2 Liquid radioactive waste Liquid radioactive waste (LRW) is treated in two steps. A primary concentration by evaporation is performed in two dedicated buildings. Concentrated solutions formed as a result of this primary evaporation are sent to a temporary storage. Then, the concentrated liquid is sent to a deep evaporation facility.
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The following table shows the amount of LRW which were generated at the Rivne NPP during 2010and are close to the average annual data. Table 23 – Quantity of liquid radwaste generated in 2010 (Rivne NPP) Type of LRW Generated waste m3 Vat residue 1269 Used sorbent 2.65
3.1.9 Description of hazardous and general industrial waste treatment scheme and volumes The Rivne NPP has a license for hazardous waste treatment (collection, transportation, storage, utilization and disposal) concerning the following types of waste: • wasted luminous tubes and devices; • wasted lead acid batteries; • wasted petrochemicals (including wasted engine and industrial oil and their mixtures) Every year, the Rivne NPP submits to the Oblast Environmental Protection service a documented request to get a permit for the production and management of 21 types of waste. The Rivne NPP also gets its limits approved by the Oblast State Administration for the production and management of such waste. The following table shows data on non-radioactive waste treatment at the Rivne NPP for the year 2008. The Rivne NPP manages its non-radioactive wastes in accordance with the set limits. The disposal of waste at the Rivne NPP is carried out according to the limits and permits from the oblast administration in charge of Ecology and Natural Resources: • waste from Classes 1 and 2 is collected from the territory of the NPP for disposal in accordance with contracts concluded with authorized contractors. • some Class 3 waste is also taken away by authorized contractors, while others are treated on-site together with Class 4 waste, which is stored in specific areas. • Class 4 domestic waste is deposited on the landfill waste of Kuznetsovsk city. Table 24 – Non-radioactive wastes characteristics at the Rivne NPP
Annual wastes movement (tons) Hazard Naming and Place of on site class characteristics of wastes storage generated moved limitation Fluorescent lamps and Storage and 12 4,777 4,7821t waste containing mercury, containers (40 000 units) (15906 units) (15923 units) extremely hazardous locked I Lead batteries spoiled or wasted, extremely Storages locked 8 0,780 2,446 hazardous Oil and grease wastes II Metal tanks 120,0 16 0 highly dangerous Moderately hazardous Non-filtered 8,0 4,097 0 sludge sludge ponds III Rivne NPP Spent absorbents of oil industrial waste 2,0 0 0 purification landfill Specific IV Sludge sections of the 27000 1283 1283 sludge ponds Spent sulfonated coal, 35 0,3 0 crushed anthracite, spent Rivne NPP 60 0 0 IV ion exchange resins, industrial waste calcium carbide waste, landfill 5000 749,19 749,19 sludge from tank cleaning, 15000 0 0
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Annual wastes movement (tons) Hazard Naming and Place of on site class characteristics of wastes storage generated moved limitation construction wastes 5000 2825 2825 Domestic IV slag 10 6,12 (6,12) wastes landfill In the cyclone, used for IV Sawdust 50 3,9 (3,9) household needs IV Used tires Special place 25 (10) 11,311 19,8 City domestic IV Domestic waste 1000,0 (0,0) 364 364 waste landfill
3.1.10 SUP measures aimed at reducing wastes volumes or improving waste treatment The SUP for the Rivne NPP does not contain any measures that aim at reducing the volumes of technological (non-radioactive) waste or at improving the ecological or sanitary security of the treatment of this waste.
3.1.11 Brief description of design and non-design accidents analyzed The criteria of acceptability for the radiological consequences of accidents are defined by NRBU- 97. For the analysis of the radiation consequences of an accident at the Rivne NPP, the following design accidents occurring at nominal operations conditions were studied: • for power units 1-2 (VVER-440) o maximum design accident (MDA) – an accident caused by a bilateral rupture of cooling systems (loss-of-coolant accident, LOCA) on the nominal power level in the absence of rainfall; o a decompression of the cap of the steam generator collector; o accident caused by a fall of the spent fuel assemblies in the active zone of the reactor core; o accident caused by the rupture of the cooling line outside the reactor; • for power units 3-4 (VVER-1000) o maximum design accident (MDA) – an accident caused by a bilateral rupture of cooling systems (loss-of-coolant accident, LOCA) on the nominal power level; o a decompression of the cap of the steam generator collector; o accident during fuel and spent fuel management; o accident caused by the fall of the water trap into the CP.
As the non-designed adccident on Rivne NPP to assess the limit of the radiation environmental impact in EIA of power unit No 4 the scenario was analysed with the 10% melting of the active zone of reactor facility VVER-1000 – the accident caused by the deenergizing because of the designed earthquake with further failure of emergency power sources (probability of this accident is estimated at the level of 10-5 рік-1). More detailed analysis of the non-designed accidents for RNPP is foreseen within the scope of safety analysis works within the measures of SUP.
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3.1.12 Design solutions reducing or mitigating consequences of accidents (regardless of SUP) Designed solutions for Rivne NPP are aiming at the reduce of risk and/or mitigation of the concequences of accidents based on the approaches similar to the designed solutions of Zaporizhzhya NPP described in unit.2.1.12.
3.1.13 SUP measures aiming at reducing accident risks or mitigating accident consequences As part of the preparation of the SUP, a comprehensive safety analysis of the Rivne NPP has been carried out by Ukrainian and international experts. This in-depth safety analysis was carried out using up-to-date methodologies, including probabilistic safety analysis. The safety upgrade engineering solutions that will be implemented within the SUP are related to: 0. the certification of all safety equipment 1. the safety of reactor core characteristics and fuel management operations 2. the preservation of the integrity of the components of the reactor, primary and secondary cooling systems 3. the safety of the operation of the NPP systems (reactivity, primary circuit and auxiliary systems) 4. the modernization of information, monitoring and control equipment and control rooms 5. the safety of power supply 6. limiting the risks of containment by-pass or loss of integrity 7. improving the prevention and early detection of internal risks (e.g. fire, flooding) 8. reviewing the seismic risks and ensuring regular updates of the seismic information and analysis 9. developing procedures for analyzing accidents and managing accident situations
3.1.14 Sanitary-protection zone and monitoring zone of NPP The sanitary-protection zone of the Rivne NPP extends for a 2.5 km radius around the NPP. The monitoring zone extends for a 30km radius around the NPP. The radiation monitoring system of the Rivne NPP aims at performing the following functions: • monitoring the status of protective barriers; • radiation process control: managing the condition of protective barriers and content of radionuclides in the technological environments; • radiation dosimetry; • individual monitoring; and • radiation monitoring of the environment. An automated radiation monitoring system named "ASKRO" provides the control of radiation situation at the NPP and within the SPZ and monitoring zone. A map showing the location of monitoring points is presented in Appendix chapter 11.2.1. The central monitoring station of ASKRO is located in Kuznetsovsk. Observations of the radiation environment are undertaken continuously in an automatic mode. The main functions of ASKRO are: (i) automation of measurement processes, (ii) data collection, (iii) data processing, (iv) data display, (v) archiving and storage of information related to the parameters of the radiation situation. ASKRO also provides control over the accidental release of radioactive substances, determines the radiation dose from radioactive fallout, predicts the dispersal of radionuclides in the environment depending on weather conditions, and provides information to the public and officials.
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3.2 Assessment of impact on natural environment
3.2.1 Climate and microclimate
3.2.1.1 Short description of the existing state within the Monitoring Zone The climate of the area of the Rivne NPP is temperate continental with a positive humidity balance. Relatively high temperatures and low relative humidity are observed in the summer and low temperatures, high humidity and the presence of snow cover are observed in the winter. The climate is influenced by both marine and continental air masses. The average annual air temperature in the 30km zone of the Rivne NPP ranges from 7.1 to 7.3°C, the recorded absolute maximum is 36.9 to 37.8°C, and the absolute minimum is minus 32.6 to36.9°C. The average annual relative humidity is 78-79%, and the corresponding annual average absolute humidity is 8.7-8.9 hPa. The study area belongs to the rainfall zone "sufficient humidity". Annual rainfall in the northern zone is 588 mm; 627-648 mm in the central, western and eastern zones - and 579-596 mm in the southern zone. -. About 70% of annual precipitation falls during the warm season. The average number of days with precipitation within the zone varies from 145 to 159 days per year. The number of days with snow cover in the area of the Rivne NPP is 80-85. The average 10-day snow depth in mid-February is 12.9 cm (overall depth of39-55 cm). Prevailing winds are westerly. In the northern zone, the annual frequency of westerly winds is 23%, 19.4% in the east, 20.4% in the central and western zones, 24.6% in the southeast and 21.1% in the southwest. In the study area, calms (winds up to 3 m/s) are the most lasting, and their recurrence is 68-78%. The average annual frequency of calms decreases from the north to the south (from 19.4 to 3%) and from the east to the west (from 15.7 to 11.4%). Strong winds are mainly from the west and the north-west and are confined to the cold period. Extreme wind speeds have been recorded in the southern part of the zone (38-40 m/s).
3.2.1.2 Impact of SUP on climate and micro-climate
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP will have no significant impact on the climate and micro-climate characteristics of the surroundings of the Rivne NPP. Transport means (train and trucks) used for the supply of equipment and transport of workers for the implementation of the SUP will induce minor Green House Gas (GHG) emissions that are considered negligible.
Impact after implementation of the SUP The SUP does not aim at increasing the production of electricity and therefore, no increase in the quantity of heat or water vapour released by the NPP in the environment is expected. Consequently, the SUP has no expected impact on the micro-climate around the Rivne NPP. The SUP will also not have an influence on the volume of GHGs emitted annually by the operations of the NPP and therefore, no impact on the global climate is expected.
3.2.2 Air quality
3.2.2.1 Present characteristic within the NPP Monitoring Zone The impact on the air from the nuclear unit is limited to the emissions from the emergency diesel generators, vehicle fleet, machineries, diesel locomotives and auxiliary enterprises of the Rivne NPP.
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Calculations show that the main contribution to air pollution is from the Transportation Department (the Rivne NPP owns 342 cars: 118 diesel and 224 gasoline cars and 7 diesel locomotives and rail cranes). The basic method to monitor and register emissions of air contaminants at the Rivne NPP is a computational one, which is carried out quarterly on the basis of the data on the actual material balance of the plant. In addition to monitoring by computational method, selective sampling and analysis of industrial emissions from stationary sources is carried out annually. Fifty-three stationary sources of 33 non-radioactive air pollutants are registered. Pollutant concentrations on the border of the sanitary protection zone are far below the MPC in all components, established by the State sanitary rules. Detailed information concerning radioactive pollution of the surface air is provided in unit 3.5.11.1 and in Annex 11.3.2. Observations of the surface air within the monitoring zone of RNPP state that: • The concentration of radionucledes in the air is by orders lower than the acceptable concentrations; • The concentration of radionucledes in the air is similar to the one before the RNPP construction. RNPP is not influencing the quality of the air by the radiation indicators in the substantial manner.
3.2.2.2 Forecasted changes regardless of SUP (normal operation or in case of an accident) The Rivne NPP contributes to a limited extent to the overall emission of pollutants in the 30km zone. For the next few years, the main drivers for the future evolution of air quality in the Rivne NPP 30km monitoring zone are: • the evolution of the activity of the main polluting industries: thermal power plant, mines and metallurgy; • the evolution of the volumes of pesticides sprayed by the agricultural sector; • the evolution of standards, norms and emissions permit applicable to industries (which applies to the Rivne NPP); • the evolution of oil consumption and norms for vehicles. In case of accident, and depending on the nature of the accident, significant volumes of radioactive pollutants and of dust could be released into the atmosphere. In case of an accident, and depending on the nature of the accident, significant volumes of radioactive pollutants and dust could potentially be released into the atmosphere. Radiologic impacts of air pollution caused by designed accidents are analyzed in the unit 3.3.2.
3.2.2.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted changes
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP will result in a slight increase in road traffic (estimated to increase less than 10%) in the vicinity of the NPP, for the supply of works and for the transport of additional workers from the sub-contractors in charge of the implementation of the SUP. Thus, the implementation of the SUP will result in additional but negligible air emissions. No large earthworks with large dust emissions are planned.
Impact after implementation of the SUP The SUP does not aim at increasing the production of electricity and therefore, no increase in the quantity of heat, water vapour, dust or emissions released by the NPP in the environment is expected. The SUP will also not result in additional use of vehicles, and therefore will not induce additional releases from the vehicle fleet.
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SUP will decrease the risk of accidents on NPPs and thus the risk of the atmospheric radioactive pollution which is the positive impact of SUP. Moreover SUP implementation will improve the management of the accidental situations which will result in reduction of the amounts of emergency ejections into the atmosphere.
3.2.3 Geological environment
3.2.3.1 Present characteristics of the NPP Monitoring Zone
Geological structure and tectonics The geological structure of the Rivne NPP 30km zone consists of deposits with a wide range of ages, from loose quaternary deposits to crystalline rocks of the Eastern European platform basal complex (Archean-Proterosozoic period). In terms of tectonics, the Rivne NPP site is related to the Manevichevsk secondary block that is a part of the Polissya geological block that is seamed with a series of tectonic faults with different ranks. The Rivne NPP's 30km zone is seamed with a series of tectonic faults with north-eastern sublatitudinal bearing. Primary faults include Lutsk (Horyn) crust-through tectonic area in the south-eastern part of the NPP 30km zone, 20 km away from the Rivne NPP site. Secondary fractures in the 30km zone include sublatitudinal tectonic areas such as: • Belsky – located in the northern part of the zone, 17 km away from the NPP and stretches on 54 km; • Chartory – located in the central part of the zone, 5 km south from the Rivne NPP. The size of the area is 2 x 0,5 km, and it contains graben-like structures with sublatitudinal bearing. • Sarnensk-Varvarovsk – north-western bearing, in the northern and north-eastern parts of the 30km zone. All other tectonic faults within the 30km zone are of lower rank, have various directions and are characterized by minor vertical shifts and small length and width.
Seismicity Seismic risks in the NPP’s territory are determined by the seismicity of the Ukraine shield. Within the Ukraine shield, sensible earthquakes are rare, with epicentres typically situated within the crust as deep as 5 to 15 km. The magnitude of known earthquakes has never exceeded 5.3 (±0.5). Seismic effects from such earthquakes are local and take place mainly in the vicinity of the epicentre. Currently, seismic hazards of the Ukrainian shield are poorly studied. Thus, in the process of seismic and tectonic division into regions of the area in the vicinity of the Rivne NPP, formalized methods of geological, geophysical and seismic data processing were used. As the result of the undertaken investigation complex it was established that the seimic activity with taking into account the seismic micro-regions for RNPP site is: designed earthquake (probability – 1 time per 100 years) – 5 points, maximal estimated earthquake (probability – 1 time per 10000 years) – 6 points which corresponds to the values set in the project,
Ground water In terms of hydrogeology, the Rivne NPP is situated within the Volyn-Podillya artesian basin, in the zone where it joins the Ukrainian crystalline core-area. Ground water is characterized by widespread development of aquifers connected to the Cainozoic, Mezozoic, Paleozoic, Upper Proterozoic (Riphean, Vendian) and Lower Archean Proterozoic rocks. Three main types of aquifers can be distinguished in the Rivne NPP 30km zone: • upper ground water – quaternary sediments, Palaeogene argilo-arenaceous and large- fragmental rocks;
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• secondary water-bearing horizon that unites water-saturated chalky deposits of Zdolbunov and Vladymyrets suits and are represented by cracked, often karstified, chalk, marl and limestone; • third water-bearing complex, connected with Mogyliv-Podillya, Zabolotye, Babynsk, Ratnensky and Gorbashevsky Vendian deposits as well as Riphean rocks (Polissya series). Ground waters of these deposits are used to supply water to the Rivne NPP and Kuznetsovsk city.
3.2.3.2 Impact of the SUP on the geological environment The SUP includes the establishment and commissioning of additional seismic monitoring equipment (measures 13501, 18101) as recommended by IAEA, as well as various measures to improve the knowledge and understanding of seismic risks in the Rivne NPP’s zone. This is a positive impact of the SUP. The implementation of the SUP does not include any underground works or large earthworks. Therefore, the implementation and the operation of the SUP are not expected to have any impact on the geology of the zone.In addition, none of the SUP measures is likely to induce man-made seismicity.
3.2.4 Aquatic environment (ground waters, surface water basins)
3.2.4.1 Present characteristics of the NPP Monitoring Zone For cooling needs, Rivne NPP uses water from the neighbouring Styr river.
Table 25 – Monthly and annual discharge of Styr river (m3/s) M o n th Annual Type of year average 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 01 02 Average year 58,8 90,0 38,3 34,4 28,9 22,7 24,3 28,5 32,6 29,1 23,5 41,3 37,7 50% Dry year 66,8 54,5 41,9 29,6 22,5 20,2 21,2 23,3 25,7 30,1 22,5 25,5 32,0 75% Dry year 58,2 47,5 36,6 22,6 17,2 15,3 16,1 17,8 19,6 20,8 15,5 17,6 25,4 97%
Surface and ground water are monitored in the Rivne NPP 30km zone. An analysis of ground water data shows an uneven increase in ground water levels in the NPP’s territory, presumably due to the infiltration of process water from the feed and discharge channels, cooling towers and other water structures. Subsequently, the temperature and chemical composition of ground water was modified due to the infiltration of warm and mineralized water. The dynamics of ground water locally led to a strengthening of karst suffusion underground of the Rivne NPP, with no effect outside the NPP’s territory. The hydrodynamic and temperature conditions of the upper aquifer are now considered stable. Over the past decade, the main hydrological parameters of the Styr River have not changed significantly and do not require a revision of the NPP’s design. The distribution of runoff during the year has become more uniform due to climate changes associated with a trend towards higher winter temperatures and lower summer temperatures.
3.2.4.2 Forecasted changes regardless of SUP (normal operation or in case of accidents) The Rivne NPP is one of the main water users of the Styr River. The long-term changes expected in the underground and surface water pattern of the 30km monitoring zone are driven by the following factors:
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• any evolution of karstic processes, for natural reasons or in conjunction with the activity of the NPP; • the evolution of water consumption due to the evolution of socio-economic activities in the Styr River basin (agriculture, industry, population). No trend is presently identified; • the migration of radionuclides of technological origin in the Dnipro River basin (mainly Chernobyl releases). Regardless of the SUP and in the absence of an accident, the impact of the Rivne NPP on the Styr River is not expected to change. In case of an accident, and depending on the volume of radionuclides released to the environment during such an accident, the Rivne NPP could have a long-term impact on the aquatic environment with consequences ranging from negligible to catastrophic. In case of an accident and depending on the nature of accident the substantial volumes of radioactive pollutants can be potentially released to the aquatic environment. Radiologic concequences of the aquatic environment pollution resulting from the designed accidents are provided in unit 3.3.2.
3.2.4.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted state changes
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP does not include any underground works or large earthworks likely to affect the quality of underground or surface water. The implementation of the SUP also does require neither the consumption of large volumes of water nor the release of large amounts of wastewater. Therefore, the implementation and the operation of the SUP are not expected to have any impact on underground or surface water within the 30km zone.
Impact after implementation of the SUP The SUP does not aim at increasing the production of electricity and therefore, no increase in the quantity of cooling water consumed by the NPP is expected. Consequently, the SUP has no expected long-term impact on the quality or quantity of water used or released by the NPP. SUP will decrease the risk of accidents on NPPs and thus the risk of the aquatic radioactive pollution which is the positive impact of SUP. Moreover SUP implementation will improve the management of the accidental situations which will result in reduction of the amounts of emergency resets into the aquatic environment.
3.2.5 Soil and landscape
3.2.5.1 Present characteristics of the NPP Monitoring Zone
Geomorphology In terms of geomorphology, the Rivne NPP 30km zone includes fairly heterogeneous areas. The surface of the territory consists of flat lowlands inclined in a northern direction with altitude varying from 160 m to 200 m. All of the following geomorphologies are represented within the Rivne NPP 30km zone: Verhneprypyat accumulative (alluvial-morainal) lowland, Volyn (Lyubomyl-Stolynsky) morainal horseback, Sernensky accumulative lowland and Kostopol denudational plain. The relief shape is determined by the ancient Dnipro glacier. The glaciogenic relief of Volyn Polissya is characterized by a wide diversity. Morainal plain, characterized by average altitudes of up to 180 m, occupy around 20% of the territory. It basically consists of moraine loam and sand. In the preglacial zone, the landscape consists of mostly flat and swampy water-glacial plains.
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Soil Soils with light mechanic composition prevail within the Rivne NPP 30km zone - sandy, clay-sandy and loamy soils. Loamy soils are not significant– they are present mostly in the flood plains, and loamy soils are rare. The soil cover of the Rivne NPP 30km zone is quite diverse, including sod-podzol, sod, alluvial, meadows, swampy peat and peat-marsh soils (about 280 different soil types).
Information concerning the radioactive pollution of soils within the monitoring zone of NPP is provided in Annex 11.3.2.Landscape Within the Rivne NPP 30km zone, 5 landscape types are represented: 1. coniferous-deciduous plains landscape on uplands, low anthropogenic cover on lowlands: • alluvial lowlands with lakes, sod-podzol soils mostly under pine or oak-pine forests; • sandy, hilly terraces with sandy soil mostly under pine forests; • morainal lowlands with meadows and lowland swamps with pine forests and alder groves; • morainal hilly uplands with sod-podzol soils mostly under pine forests. 2. flood-plain landscape plains: • forest and meadow/swamp flood plains.
3.2.5.2 Forecasted changes of the present characteristics regardless of SUP, under normal operations or in case of accident The Rivne NPP 30km zone is characterized by the following exogenous processes which progressively alter the soil and landscape: • karstification; • ravine erosion; • wind erosion; • flooding by ground water (water logging). Karstic processes are the main concern in relation with grounds in the NPP industrial site and within the neighbouring city of Kuznetsovsk. In order to follow the dynamics of karstification, ground waters level and soil conditions are monitored under the basement of NPP buildings, once a year at a minimum. Other exogenous geological processes within the territory of the Rivne NPP are water logging from the Styr River flood plain and erosion. They do not have impact on the NPP. Conversely, NPP operation does not impact the speed and intensity of exogenous geological processes development. Within the normal conditions of operation Rivne NPP is not providing any negative radiation impact on soils. In case of an accident and depending on the nature of accident the substantial volumes of radioactive pollutants from the atmosphere can potentially cover the earth surface. Radiologic concequences of the earth surface pollution resulting from the designed accidents are provided in unit 3.3.2.
3.2.5.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted changes The SUP consists of safety upgrade measures that will be implemented within the NPP site. As summarized in the following table, no impact is expected from the SUP on soil or the landscape:
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Table 26 – Impact of the SUP on soil and landscape within the Rivne NPP monitoring zone Impacts during Impact after Type of Impact implementation of the completion of the SUP SUP impact on karstic processes none none impacts on water logging none none impacts on erosion by water none none impact on wind erosion none none
3.2.6 Flora, fauna, reserves
3.2.6.1 Present characteristics of the NPP Monitoring Zone
Flora The Rivne NPP 30km zone is located in the "European deciduous" region and covers the 4 botanical regions of the Polissya province. Natural vegetation covers 66.5% of the territory of the Rivne NPP’s 30km zone. Among them 49.6% are forests, 10.9% are meadows, 4.6% are swamps, 1% is waste land and 0.6% is water flora. Agricultural lands occupy 27.1% of the territory, and agrophytocenosis with rural groups of settlements occupy 5.8%. In the flora of interest, forests prevail, particularly pine and oak-pine forests. Relatively small territories are occupied by alder and birch forests and minor territories are occupied by oak, hornbeam-oak and fir forests. Meadow vegetation is represented by flood-plains and mainland meadows. Finally, eutrophic to mezotrophic swamps are also common. Thanks to favourable soil conditions, forest resources are characterized by high-growth indicators. Forests are a good potential resource for technical, food and officinal products. The forest also has a high aesthetic and potential recreational importance, but its recreational use remains marginal. Within the Rivne NPP 30km zone, 23 species that are beyond their usual habitat conditions have been observed.
Fauna The Rivne NPP 30km zone belongs to the zoogeographic Boreal European-Siberian sub-region. It is characterized by deciduous forests and forest-steppe, Eastern-European mixed forests and forest-steppes. The fauna of the Rivne NPP 30km zone is typical of the Polyssian biosphere. Over 4 000 species of insects inhabit the area of the Rivne NPP: (e.g. 23 orders of Pterygota out of 25 known in Ukraine are represented). Protected insect species include a number of butterfly, dragonfly and bumblebee species (18 species totally). Amphibian fauna is represented by 11 species and reptile fauna by 7 species. Ornithological fauna from forest, water-swamp and meadow complexes are represented within the Rivne NPP 30km zone; 190 bird species have been observed out of which 150 reproduce here. Others are migratory birds and visit the region sporadically. Fish fauna accounts for about 20 species, particularly bream, roach, sander and silver crucian. Mammal fauna is represented by 50 species and its composition is primarily determined by the significant forestation of the territory, the low density of the population and the fact that some areas are difficult to access. Among reptile fauna representatives, one species is registered in the Red Book of Ukraine- 11 species of ornithofauna and 6 species of mammals.
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Natural reserves Within the Rivne NPP 30km zone, there are 48 territories belonging to the natural reserve fund, with different protection levels and covering 12 000 ha. These are mainly botanic, forest, hydrology, landscape reserves, and caves. Notably, the 453 ha forest of Bilozirka is located in the north of the Rivne NPP 30km zone. This forest belongs to the Rivne natural reserve and comprises a famous state landscape preserve named “Bile ozero” (Ukrainian for “White lake”). This lake is a basin of karstic origin and one of the biggest lakes in Rivne oblast. Its water is clean and transparent and white limestone can be easily seen on the bottom, which was the reason for the lake to be given its name. On its banks grow rare sparse strips of bog rush and lake bulrush, and white pond lilies can be found in some areas of the lake.
3.2.6.2 Forecasted changes of the present characteristics regardless of SUP, under normal operation or in case of an accident The Rivne NPP 30km zone is characterized by the following trends and evolutions with regards to flora and fauna: • the possible introduction of new agricultural species; • the development of forest cover as a result of an increase of the surface of protected areas (parks, reserves) initiated by state policy; • potential impacts of climate change on forest habitats Among the above mentioned possible evolutions, none is connected to the Rivne NPP’s operation. While the normal conditions of operation Rivne NPP is not providing any negative radiation impact on flora, fauna and reserves. In case of an accident and depending on the nature of accident the species of flora and fauna in the neighboring districts can get the relevant radioactive impact. Radiologic concequences of the agricultural species of flora and fauna pollution resulting from the designed accidents are provided in unit 3.3.2.
3.2.6.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted state changes The main impact of the Rivne NPP on natural habitats within the 30km zone is related to the release of heat in the environment. The SUP aims at improving the safety of NPPs under operation. The implementation of the SUP will not result in an increase or decrease of the quantity of heat released to the environment. In addition, the SUP implementation will only require minor works outside the NPP territory (installation of seismic monitoring equipment). Therefore, the SUP is not expected to have any impact on the fauna, flora or reserves of the monitoring zone SUP will decrease the risk of accidents on NPPs and thus the risk of the radioactive pollution of the range of the existence of flora and fauna which is the positive impact of SUP. Moreover SUP implementation will improve the management of the accidental situations which will result in reduction of the amounts of emergency resets and ejections
3.3 Assessment of impact on social environment
3.3.1 Social baseline the NPP Monitoring Zone The Rivne NPP monitoring zone covers two administrative areas: (i) Rivne and (ii) Volyn. In total, around 130 000 people (95 000 in the Rivne region and 35 000 in the Volyn region) live within the 30km zone around the Rivne NPP, a density of 54.8 people/km² in the Rivne region and 32.7 people/km² in the Volyn region (Ukraine average is 75 people/km²).
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The city of Kuznetsovsk, with a population of about 40 800 people is located at a distance of 3 km. The rayon administrative centre, Vladimerets is located at a distance of 18 km. The surrounding cities are: • Rafalovka: 5 km from the NPP with a population of 3 300 people (Rivne oblast); • Vladimirets: 18 km from the NPP with a population of 8 800 people (Rivne oblast); • Manevichi: 26 km from the NPP with a population of 10 400 people (Volyn oblast). Currently, the surroundings of the Rivne NPP are characterized by a small development of industry and agriculture. The Rivne NPP 30km zone is characterized by non-technical industrial production. Existing enterprises are mainly in the following industries: food, timber, road construction or production of building materials. Industrial facilities are concentrated in Kuznetsovsk, Vladimerets and in Manevichi. The main agricultural crops are wheat, rye, and oats. The total agricultural area is 18 500 ha and has a tendency to decrease at times for economic reasons. The demography is characterized by an urban population of 46.7% and a rural population of 53.3 %. The development of energy production activities has boosted urbanization. Most of the demographic growth has taken place in Kuznetsovsk, due to professional migration flows byNPP staff. The commissioning of the Rivne NPP has provided jobs for about 5 000 people. The growth of the urban population in the Rivne NPP’s region has been accompanied by a decrease in the rural population. Cardiovascular sicknesses prevail and are the main cause of death. Table 27 - Demographic figures for the Rivne NPP (2009/2010 official statistical data) Average monthly Migration Natural Gender Age Unemployment Total City wage population population (m/w) classes rate population 2009 growth growth (UAH) 0-14: 19.3% Kuznetsovsk 1/1.115 40 872 -47 365 15-64: 3,5 % Volodimirets Rivne 1 984 8 829 -38 534 67.9% (oblast) oblast Rafalovka > 65: 12.8% 3 337 - - 0-14: 18.5% 1/0.953 15- 3,2% Manevichi Volyn 1 654 10 410 -132 36 64:67.8% (oblast) oblast > 65:13.6% 0-14: 13.9% Ukraine 15- average 1/1.194 2 233 8.4 % 46 M 64:70.0% (2010) 65 + :16.1%
Table 28 - Causes of death in the Rivne NPP region (2009) Infections External Digestion Breathing Cardiovascular Neoplasm and Others cause system system parasites Rivne Oblast 71,1% 12,1% 6,4% 3,7% 2,0% 1,3% 3,4% (2009) Volyn Oblast 66,3% 9,8% 6,7% 4,4% 6,3% 1,9% 4,6% (2009) Ukraine 63.0% 11.8% 8.7% 4.4% 3.3% 2.2% 6.7% (2007)
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3.3.2 Forecasted public health regardless of SUP (in normal operation or in case of accident) The population living in the surroundings of the Rivne NPP benefit from an environment with very few industries and therefore low exposure to industrial pollution. The Rivne NPP is the main industry of the area.
The drivers for the evolution of the population’s health in the coming years will be: • the absence of development of heavily polluting industrial activities (no plans for large industrial developments are known at the time of writing this report); • the access to medical services and medication, which depends on the population’s income level; • the development of STDs (although Rivne Oblast has an HIV prevalence rate lower than the national average, see 11.3.6); • the preservation of the environment; • the slow decay of 137Cs and 90Sr from Chernobyl, which presently represent the main manmade source of radioactivity in the region. The operation of Rivne NPP presently has no measurable impact on the health of the population. The maximum estimated doses resulting from designed accidents for the population are provided in the Table below. Table 29 - Maximum estimated exposure doses resulting from design accidents (Rivne NPP 1-2 VVER440) Effective dose to the Thyroid dose Dose to exposed skin Initial accident whole body, mSv mGy mGy Radiation accident caused by bilateral rupture (LOCA MDA), calculated effective total dose 8.23 35.9 0.114 resulting from external and internal doses are on the border of the Rivne NPP (2.5 km) after one day Decompression of the cap of the 3.78 5.14 10-1 9.69 10-2 steam generator collector Drop of the spent fuel cassettes in 4.80 10-1 1.56 10-3 6.24 10-2 the active zone of the reactor core The fall of the water trap into the 7.42 10-1 5.18 10-3 4.43 10-2 CP Table 30 - Maximum estimated exposure doses resulting from design accidents (Rivne NPP 3-4 VVER1000) Effective dose to the Dose to exposed skin, Initial accident Thyroid dose, mGy whole body, mSv mGy MDA caused by a bilateral rupture 6,51 1,43 3,29 10-2 of cooling systems (LOCA) Decompression of the cap of the 2,85 43,6 5,2 10-2 steam generator collector Drop of the spent fuel cassettes in 0.2 mSv /year the active zone of the reactor core The fall of the water trap into the 0.2 mSv /year CP As it can be seen from the table the estimated maximum doses even within the designed accidents are much lower than the set by the acting norms level of population evacuation (50mZv for all body). Estimated effective doses for the whole body which will be formed as the result of the non- designed accident on the power unit of VVER-1000 type of Rivne NPP are provided in Annex 11.3.5. As for the maximum designed accident the maximum estimated doses for the population resulting from the non-designed accident are not higher than the population evacuation justification. Result of the estimations done for the power unit No4 EIA of RNPP confirm the
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radiation safety of the concequences of the analyzed non-designed accident for the population as long as there can be possible timely limitation of foodstuffs manufactured on the relefant territory consumption during the axis of radioactive fallout..
3.3.3 Impact of SUP measures on the outcome of Forecasted public health state
3.3.3.1 Impacts during the implementation of SUP
Population outside the NPP site The SUP implementation will only require minor works outside the NPP territory (installation of seismic monitoring equipment). The main impacts of the SUP implementation for populations living in the vicinity of the NPP will be disturbances caused by additional transport (supply of new equipment installed within the SUP) and the recruitment of temporary workers. The supply of equipment within the framework of the SUP is planned to be done mainly by train which is the preferred transportation mean used by Energoatom (the NPP has its own railway station). The use of trucks is expected to be kept to a minimum. Consequently, the impact on neighbouring populations health usually associated with the use of trucks (noise, air quality degradation and increased traffic risks) is expected to be insignificant during the implementation of the SUP. The possible employment of temporary workers by the subcontractors involved into SUP implementation will increase the temporary migration processes in the district which potentially can increase the risks of spreading the infection deceases. In particular, resulting from the random sexual relationships the risks of AIDS and other sexually transmitted deceases can increase. The mentioned risks are mitigated by the regular information-educational messages for external workers while their trainings and instructions aiming at raising awareness of the issuesNo other potential or measurable impact on the population’s health is expected during the SUP implementation phase outside of the NPP site.
On-site workers The implementation of the SUP will require the involvement of external workers and subcontractors, whom will be exposed to the radiation and non-radiation risks that exist in any NPP. In accordance with Ukrainian legislation, the specific safety measures described in chapter 1.10.1 apply to all workers (internal, external, permanent or temporary) involved in activities at the NPP site. These measures aim to prevent accidents or excessive radiation exposure and they are applied by Energoatom in compliance with the legislation. Provided that these measures are implemented, no specific risk for the health of workers is expected from the implementation of the SUP.
3.3.3.2 Impacts after SUP completion After the SUP is completed, the NPP will have an improved level of safety for the NPP workers and the population living inside and outside the monitoring zone, which means a reduction in the risk of incidents or accidents that may affect health. No negative impact will result from the operation of the NPP after the SUP is completed. A reduction in the risk of accidents translates into a reduced risk of contamination for NPP workers and nearby residents. This should lower stress levels related to working at or living near NPPs and will positively impact the psychological health of workers and nearby residents. For this impact to be effective, it is important for PAPs to understand and be aware of the SUP and its implications on reducing risks.
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3.3.4 Impact of SUP on local population’s social conditions
3.3.4.1 Impacts during the implementation of SUP The implementation of the SUP in the Rivne NPP will require around 100 to 200 external workers over the 6-year duration of program implementation (the permanent staff of the Rivne NPP represents 8 030 workers). Most of these external workers will be hired by satellite contractors who regularly (and often exclusively) work for the NPP and will provide specific construction or erection services within the framework of the SUP’s implementation. Out of the SUP’s total budget, it is estimated that around 1 to 2 M€ will result in net income for additional workers involved in the Rivne NPP’s SUP implementation. Although specific competences might be sought outside of the Rivne NPP zone, the population living in the vicinity of the NPP is expected to be positively impacted in terms of income from the SUP implementation from both direct and indirect employment opportunities. Direct employment refers to the possibility for local workers to be hired and therefore receive a salary from the companies that will be selected to assist in the SUP’s implementation Indirect employment refers to the opportunities related to the additional demand for services by external workers involved in the SUP’s implementation. These services will most often be provided by the population living near the Rivne NPP and may include food, hotel, recreational activities, etc… Consequently, the SUP implementation is expected to positively impact the economic and social condition of the population living in the vicinity of the NPP. For the population living far from the NPP, the average positive impact in terms of social and economic conditions will be negligible. No negative impact on the economic or social condition is expected from the implementation of the SUP.
3.3.4.2 Impacts after SUP completion Employment: After completion, the SUP will result in minor but permanent additional work needs. Although the residual long-term additional work load induced by the SUP is not estimated in the documents available at this stage, it is obvious from the definition of the measures that several of them will result in additional activities or maintenance needs (maintenance of the additional safety systems, maintenance and operation of the additional monitoring equipment and analysis of their outputs…). The present stage of the project (feasibility study), does not allow for a precise definition of the number of additional jobs that will result from the long-term SUP. However, one can ascertain from similar projects that this figure should remain small compared to the number of people actually involved in the implementation of the SUP described in the previous chapter. Therefore, the SUP is expected to have a positive but marginal impact on employment and on the social conditions around the Rivne NPP. Electricity tariff: Energoatom, as an electricity producer, sells electricity to the market through Ukrenergo, who distributes and sells electricity to consumers. The cost for upgrading the safety of the Rivne NPP will be covered by an increase of the bulk tariff between Energoatom and Ukrenergo (there are no plans for the safety upgrade to be subsidised by the State). The increase in Energoatom’s bulk tariff is planned in financial projections, but does not cover only the costs related to the SUP. Therefore, the marginal bulk tariff increase induced by the SUP was not calculated. The manner in which this tariff increase will be reflected on the consumers' tariff is unknown at this time and will be subject to a decision by the tariff regulation authority.
3.4 Assessment of impact on technogenic environment
3.4.1 Short description of the existing state within the monitoring zone Within the Rivne NPP 30km zone, there are 18 industrial enterprises. They are local enterprises, with small amounts of inputs and outputs. The sanitary and protection zones of these enterprises range from 50 to 300 m.
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150 m south of the NPP’s territory is the railway main line Kyiv–Kovel. The closest railway station is Rafalivka, situated about 5 km east of the NPP. About 20 km south of the NPP territory is the state highway Kyiv–Kovel. There are also several fuel stations within the Rivne NPP 30km zone. There are no gas or oil pipelines within the 30km zone, but there are 7 fuel and/or oil storage. Within the Rivne NPP 30km zone there are currently 50 communal agricultural households. The main cultivated crops are wheat, rye and oats, covering 18 500 hectares. The Rivne NPP 30km zone also has several places of social value, including: archaeological, architectural, historical and cultural sites as well as memorials. In every settlement within the monitoring zone, there are monuments dedicated to the memory of local soldiers and World War II victims.
3.4.2 Impact of NPP on technogenic environment regardless of SUP In normal operation conditions, Rivne NPP has limited impacts the technogenic environment: • the activities and infrastructures that can be developed in the vicinity of the NPP are subject to limitations, for safety reasons: those limitations apply in particular to the development of potentially dangerous industrial activities, recreation activities, flying objects, transport of dangerous substances…; • the presence of the NPP boosts the local economy and the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which provide direct or indirect services related to the activity of the NPP; • the satellite city of Kuznetsovsk benefits from several infrastructure investments made by the NPP. Atmospheric and aquatic contaminants, thermal ejections and resets, and also the water treatment of NPP do not impact in substantial manner the technogenic environment. While the designed accidents on Rivne NPP including the maximum designed accident their negative impact on the objects of the technogenic envieonment will not exceed the acceptable limits and will not need any additional special measures. In case of the analyzed non-designed accident there can be possible timely limitation of foodstuffs manufactured on the relefant territory consumption during the axis of radioactive fallout.
3.4.3 Impact of SUP measures on technogenic environment
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The main impact of the implementation of the SUP on the technogenic environment of Rivne NPP will be an increase of the activity of the NPP satellite enterprises who will be involved in the program implementation. This additional activity will result in additional transportation (staff and supply), additional income for the population and additional generation of wastes. Considering the planned increase of staff (up to 10 %) and the planned increase of waste generation (5 to 10%) as a result of the SUP implementation, one can reasonably assume that the satellite economic activity induced by the NPP will generally increase by up to 10% during the implementation of the SUP. Consequently, an increase by 10% for communal activities demand (domestic waste collection, drinking water supply, health) can be expected, which can be supported by the infrastructure of the city of Kuznetskov.
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Impact after implementation of the SUP Once completed, the SUP will not result in an increase or in a decrease of the activity of the NPP. Therefore, under normal operation, no long term impact on the technogenic environment is expected after the implementation of the SUP. The exposure of the technogenic environment to the consequences of accidents at the NPP will decrease after the implementation of the SUP for the following reasons: • the probability of accidents will decrease; • the potential consequences of some accidents will also be decreased, since some of the SUP measures will improve the capacity of the operational staff to early identify problems (for example, additional monitoring equipments) or to correct problems (for example, additional fire protection equipments) Therefore, the expected long term consequences of the SUP for the technogenic environment are essentially positive.
3.4.4 Possible impact on NPP from the technogenic environment (regardless of SUP)
Explosion or fire risk Within the frame of the Safety Analysis Report, the risk of accidental explosion or fire from industries of infrastructures located up to 10 km from Rivne NPP is systematically reviewed. At the present time, all of the potential sources of accidental explosion located at less than 10km from the NPP or inside the NPP territory would, in case of explosion, trigger an excessive pressure considerably less than the normative limit of 10 kPa. These potential sources are: Kuznetsovsk fuel storage (100 m3), several fuel service stations (50 m3 to 300 m3), transport enterprise; Sarny-Kovel railway line on which explosive goods may be transported (1km from NPP fence) and the Kiev- Kovel-Ostrog highway, on which can be transported explosive cargo and which is located 8 km from the NPP. Within the NPP territory, the main possible sources of explosion are the liquid gas storage, oxygen and hydrogen receivers, and in fuel or oil tanks.
Emissions of toxic and corrosive substances There is no pipeline, oil pipeline, refinery or chemical plant in the 30km zone around Rivne NPP.
Aircraft impact No airline route crosses the 10km zone of NPP. The estimated probability of core damage caused by the falling of a civil aircraft is 2x10-8 per year (for military aircraft 7.28x10-8).
Failures of hydraulic structures The largest hydraulic structure in the Styr river basin is Hrennikovskoe reservoir (23 Mm3), located 212 km upstream from the intake of Rivne NPP. Rivne NPP site is located significantly higher than the calculated high water levels in the river in case of Hrennikovskoe reservoir dam break. Therefore, the NPP is not directly exposed in case of dam break. The mediated potential impacts of such breakdown can be: 1. Risk of limitation of water intake for the purposes of NPP from river Styr taking into account the movement of precipitates and wrecks and the possible change of riverbed morphology; 2. Possible damage of local power networks.. The concequences of any provided mediated impacts are not critical for Rivne NPP operation.
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3.5 Comprehensive measures to ensure standard state of environment and environmental security
3.5.1 Description of resource-saving measures taken on NPP regardless of SUP
Energy-saving measures The Rivne NPP consumes around 6 to 7% of its electricity production for its own needs. Several measures were undertaken over the past years to decrease the consumption of electricity by the NPP, such as the introduction of low consumption lamps. Those measures had a positive but marginal effect on the overall energy consumption of the NPP, which is driven by the energy efficiency of the largest equipment (mostly pumps). The decision to replace pumps by more efficient ones (in order to save electricity) can be made by the management of the NPP based on economic considerations. This issue is not related to the safety upgrade issues addressed in the SUP. In order to reduce its energy consumption, the Rivne NPP has also undertaken measures to improve the management and reduce the consumption of fuel by its vehicle fleet.
Sustainable use and protection of water resources Several measures have been undertaken at the Rivne NPP in order to limit the abstraction from the Styr River and protect the quality of surface water. Process water used for cooling is now treated in a special facility (for demineralization) and after that it is recirculated. Rain water is also collected and treated before being used as process water. The water balance of the Rivne NPP is calculated regularly and submitted to SANEP.
Recycling waste Waste recycling measures were introduced at the Rivne NPP in the last few years in order to reduce the environmental footprint. Recycling measures focus on glass, lamps (containing mercury), batteries, etc…
3.5.2 Need for additional resource-saving measures in connection with SUP
3.5.2.1 During the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP will require a number of additional workers (100 to 200) which is negligible compared to the population of the satellite city of Kuznetsovsk (40 000). Moreover, a significant part of the additional workers will come from Kuznetsovsk itself. Therefore, there is no reason to consider that the implementation of the SUP, and the employment of additional workers, will result in a significant overuse of natural resources in the project area because it will not require a large in-migration of workers from outside the area. In addition, none of the SUP’s measures require the use of significant volumes of natural resources (e.g. large volumes of water or large volumes of sand or earth). Therefore, no additional resource-saving measures are deemed necessary during the implementation of the SUP.
3.5.2.2 After the implementation of the SUP The SUP implementation will only require minor works outside the NPP territory (installation of seismic monitoring equipment). Therefore, none of the SUP measures will have a long-term impact on the use of natural resources outside the NPP’s territory. Inside the NPP territory, the operation of units and processes of SUP measures will not require a significant additional use of resources. The operation of the additional equipment installed within the frame of the SUP will result in marginal additional energy consumption. No additional water will be used, except in case of fire, when using the additional fire protection equipment installed as part of SUP.
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3.5.3 Social and workers protection measures taken on NPP regardless of SUP
3.5.3.1 Workers protection (HSE) A comprehensive description of the HSE rules that apply to workers and sub-contractors within the NPPs is proposed in chapter 1.10.1.
3.5.3.2 Public information in normal operation The Rivne NPP provides regular information to the public through the following means: • internet: a dedicated website (http://www.rnpp.rv.ua/) provides the public with information about the NPP, its organisation and its operation. The website discloses in real time the radiation and meteorological monitoring results in the 30km zone. Hydrometrological data are not available; • newspapers: the Rivne NPP occasionally publishes articles in local and regional newspapers, usually with the objective of informing the public largely about a specific topic. this includes weekly publications in a newspaper of outflow quality monitoring results from the Rivne NPP to the Styr River (based on analysis by the ecological-chemical laboratory of the environmental protection department); • thematic brochures made available at information centres and public buildings; • public events are also regularly organised by the Rivne NPP.
3.5.3.3 Emergency plans A description of the emergency plans developed by SNRIU and Energoatom is proposed in chapter 1.10.2. In case of accidents which require the population informing NPP informs the local authorities according to the existing pre-designated order and list. The responsibility for population informing rests on the MoES of Ukraine. The evacuation (if necessary) is also within the responsibilities of MoES of Ukraine. On practice the population strongly lacks the information concerning the signals and messages of the early awareness and also concerning the actions which should be undertaken in case of this signal. Especially this deficit is critical for the monitoring zone population outside of Kuznetsovsk city
3.5.4 Changes in social and workers protection measures as a result of SUP implementation
3.5.4.1 Workers protection (HSE) According to the law of labour protection of Ukraine, the implementation of the SUP does not require the introduction of specific changes in the management of HSE at the NPP. Nevertheless, in the light of (i) the review of HSE procedures done within the frame of the EA and (ii) the K2/R4 safety upgrade experience, recommendations are made to improve HSE management. These measures are common for all NPPs and are detailed in chapter 8.1.1 and basically consist in: • the introduction of performance indicators to compare the performance of NPPs and sub- contractors; • replicating recommendations made during the previous the K2/R4 safety upgrade • the harmonization of HSE practices between NPPs.
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3.5.4.2 Public information The scoping meetings held in May 2011 showed a strong demand from the public for improved information about the regular monitoring of the environment around the NPP, including radioactivity levels. Within the frame of the SUP, it is proposed to improve public information by: • harmonizing the media used for public information; • harmonize the type of environmental monitoring data released to the public. See details of the recommendations that apply to the Rivne NPP in chapter 8.1.2.
3.5.4.3 Emergency plans The scoping meetings held in May 2011 also showed a strong demand from the public for improved early warning tools in case of accident. The experience of the Chernobyl and Fukushima cases has shown that most of the primary radioactive fall-out after an accident occurs in a radius of some kilometres around the NPP (to date, Chernobyl exclusion zone is 30km, Fukushima exclusion zone is 20 km). Therefore, it is suggested to extend the "early warning zone" of the NPPs, presently limited to the satellite cities, to the whole 30km monitoring zone. It is also recommended to implement awareness campaigns, in order to inform the population about the actions to undertake in case of alert. From the public side it was suggested to renew the wired radio system which had existed even in Soviet times and its usage aiming at early warning. It should be mentioned that such a decision requires substantial capital investments and limits the circle of informed people with those who are at home and listen to the radio. So far, it is also suggested to review the possibility of early warning system introduction via sms which will be sent to the cell phones. The registration requests from the inhabitants of 30 km monitoring zone to be included into such system can also be collected via sms from the interested persons. A feasibility study will be carried out to define the most appropriate and relevant tools and equipments for early warning system before procurement.See details on the implementation of this recommendation in chapter 8.1.3.
3.5.5 Rehabilitation (renewal) measures undertaken during NPP construction The NPP was built at a time when ESIAs were not required by the Ukraine’s legislation. The construction norms applicable in Soviet times (the "SNIP") included design criteria aiming at limiting adverse environmental impacts, but which cannot be compared to the comprehensive set of rehabilitation or compensation measures that are undertaken nowadays to preserve the environment when building a new NPP. The design criteria applied at the time of the construction of the NPP and related to environmental protection typically referred to water use and the emission of radioactive or non-radioactive pollutants to the air or to water bodies. From a social point of view, the construction of the Rivne NPP probably resulted in resettlement, permanent occupation of agricultural land or reorganisation of public infrastructure (e.g. roads). During Soviet times, there was limited private property, and therefore the reorganisation of social life and infrastructure around the NPP was implemented without compensations for property loss. From the time of the NPP’s construction to today, the evolution of standards and norms has been the main driver for the implementation of environmental measures. Namely, set of these measures had been implemented while the construction finalization of power units No4 of RNPP (operation started in 2004).
3.5.6 Need for additional rehabilitation (renewal) measures in connection with the SUP The SUP implementation is by nature completely different from the construction of a new NPP. Therefore, none of the SUP measures requires the implementation of rehabilitation or renewal measures in line with the measures that were undertaken at the time of the construction of the NPP.
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3.5.7 Compensatory measures taken in the process of NPP operation The second phase project of RNPP construction foresees and had been timely undertaken the set of the compensatory measures, namely: • Measures connected to the expropriation and compensation of the land loss because of the land usage; • Setting the measures for compensation of the fishery losses because of the water intake from river Styr: • Setting the limitations of natural resources usage, limitations of ejections and resets of the contaminants to the environment, limitations of the wastes location; • Setting the norms of payment and amount of payments for the usage of natural resources, for ejections and resets of the contaminants and for the wastes location. The following compensation measures are implemented in accordance with the law: • the electricity tariff is cheaper (subsidized) for the population who live within the 30km monitoring zone of an NPP than for other consumers in Ukraine; • the NPP uses 1% of the total value of its annual production for the improvement of infrastructure and living conditions in the cities located within the 30km monitoring zone. These two measures provide significant advantages to the population living within the 30km monitoring zone. No other specific compensatory measure exists.
3.5.8 Need for additional compensatory measures as a result of SUP implementation There is no reason to change the compensatory measures described in chapter 3.5.7 as a result of the SUP implementation.
3.5.9 Description of environment protection measures related to NPP operation
3.5.9.1 Protection measures against radioactive emissions The prevention or mitigation of radioactive emissions is ensured by the following technical solutions: • cleaning of air containing radioactive isotopes using spray and iodine filters; • organization of obstacles on the way to radioactive substances; • closed circuits to prevent leakage of liquid substances containing radioactive components; • organization of a special system of SRW collection and SRW and LRW storage; • sanitary protection zone; and • permanent dosimetric control over emissions as well as air, soil, flora and water pollution control in the sanitary protection zone and monitoring zone.
3.5.9.2 Non-radiation protection measures The following measures are undertaken at the Rivne NPP in relation with environmental protection: • monitoring of surface and ground water quality; • inventory of air pollutant emission sources and air quality monitoring; • regulation and monitoring of water usage and waste disposal; • replacement of ozone-depleting technologies; • sorting and collection by a specialized company of recyclable waste (wasted mercury- containing lamps, glass, batteries…);
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• elaboration of MPDs; • environmental protection was added as a specific topic to the study program for employees who arrive at the Rivne NPP for the first time; • training of managers on “Ecological aspects of the Rivne NPP activities” within the framework of a specific training (25 persons per month are trained); • rainwater is collected and used as process water, and process water is treated for recirculation in order to reduce water abstraction from the Styr River as well as the discharge of pollutants to the river; • an inventory of all non-radioactive wastes (21 types) produced by Rivne NPP was done and certificates and file cards were issued; • 169 condensators energy unit 4 containing polychlorodiphenyl were decommissioned; • the NPP is presently undertaking ISO 14000 certification
3.5.10 Changes in the set of protection measures as a result of SUP implementation
During the implementation of the SUP The environment protection measures undertaken by the NPP will not be affected by the implementation of the SUP, and therefore can be continued without any kind of limitation or restriction. The implementation of the SUP does not require additional specific environment protection measures.
After the implementation of the SUP After its implementation, the SUP will generally result in a reduction of risks for the environment around the NPP, through (i) a reduction of the probability of accidents and (ii) through a reduction of the potential consequences of accidents, due to improved monitoring equipments allowing for earlier identification of accidents and better management of accident situations. In this context, there is no specific need to develop additional environment protection measures in relation with the implementation of the SUP.
3.5.11 Residual impact of NPP under normal operation (regardless of SUP)
3.5.11.1 Radiation residual impact Total annual emissions of radioactive inert gases (RIG), long-lived radionucledes (LLR) and radionucledes iodine of RNPP are listed in the Annex 11.3.2. There also are given the observed annual discharges of tritium and cesium -137 from the Rivne NPP to the external reservouirs. The most significant contribution into the ionization dose (more than 90%) is from inert radioactive gases. Maximum individual dose (at a distance of 2 km) by the emissions while 4 power units of RNPP does not exceed 0,5 mcSv/year or 1,3% of the appropriate quote dose limit according to NRBU-97 (40 mcSv/year). Beyond SPZ this index is even lesser. Observed annual discharges of tritium and cesium-137 from Rivne NPP to the external water bodies are provided in the Annex 11.3.2. Factual volumes of radioactive discharges are by orders lesser than their allowable indexes for RNPP which are set resulting from the requirement of non-exceeding the appropriate quote of dose limit according to NRBU-97 (10 mcSv/year)
3.5.11.2 Non-radiation residual impact
Chemical impact Impacts on water bodies: Rivne abstract surface water and releases industrial storm water to Styr river 60 m downstream from its water intake.
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Styr river is subject to chemical monitoring. Totally, 23 biochemical indicators are monitored, 500 m upstream and 500 m downstream from the water intake / discharge (monitoring results are presented in appendix chapter 11.3.3). Open-air water reservoirs in the monitoring zone of Rivne NPP zone are rather polluted; Rivne NPP mainly influences the sulphates load of the river, but without exceeding the norm. Chemical impact on the air: The main sources of pollutant emissions into the atmosphere by Rivne NPP are the backup diesel power generators which in operation release: carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide and particulate matter. Those generators are situated within the NPP compound with other subsidiary industries or workshops (electronic/electric repair company, heat automation and measurement, chemical plant, oil and diesel tanks, underground utilities, etc). The NPP motor vehicles fleet includes 342 vehicles (224 gasoline and 118 diesel) and 7 locomotives and railway cranes. The emissions - gasoline, nitrogen dioxide, hydrocarbons, are not differentiated in composition. In total the Rivne NPP has 53 sources of emissions of pollutants to the atmosphere. Several sources are equipped with gas cleaning equipment. The total amount of harmful substances emitted into the atmosphere of Rivne NPP does not exceed the maximum allowable emissions.
Thermal impact Water: Thermal impacts on the environment result from heat emissions directly to the air or from warm water discharges. Water discharged into Styr river is in average 10°C warmer than Styr river water itself, which results in an average increase of Styr river water by 2°C. This figure is below the very permissive maximum acceptable increase of 8°C defined for Rivne NPP. Air: Practical research carried out by Ukrhydromet Institute in 1983-1986 showed that the influence of cooling towers on the microclimate and the environment is limited to the territory of the NPP.
3.5.11.3 Possible changes of residual impacts resulting from the implementation of tasks set by the state programs and governmental decisions Results of analysis of possible changes of residual impacts resulting from the implementation of the tasks listed in chapter 1.7.2 set by the state programs and the governmental decisions concerning the development of nuclear energy in Ukraine and the relevant issues are provided in Table 31 Table 31 - Forecasted changes of residual impacts from Rivne NPP resulting from the implementation of the state programs and governmental decisions Tasks set by the state programs and governmental decisions (numbers in accordance with chapter 1.7.2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 Radiation impact No changes1) Minor No No Changes3) changes change2) changes changes Chemical impact No Changes No No No No changes 1) changes changes changes changes Thermal impact No Changes1) No No No No changes changes changes changes changes Electric and magnetic impact No Changes No No No No changes 1) changes changes changes changes Acoustic impact No Changes No No No No changes 1) changes changes changes changes 1) changes are connected to the action term of impact factors without changing their intensity and consequences
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2) volumes of SNF which are temporarily stored in the cooling-down ponds can increase resulting from the increase of minimal terms of “wet” storage until 8 years before sending SNF to the DSSNF of the “dry” type. 3) volumes of RAW which are collected on the NPP sites can be changed resulting from the processing and also as the result of sending RAW to the storage after the construction of the relevant storage.
3.5.12 Changes in residual impact as a result of SUP implementation The implementation of the SUP will not result in measurable changes of the quantities of heat and chemical components released by the NPP in the aquatic or atmospheric environment. In addition, the SUP measures will not result in any significant changes of the noise or electromagnetic emissions from the NPP. Therefore, the changes in residual impacts as a result of the SUP implementation can be considered as negligible. SUP implementation also will not affect the forecasted changes of residual impacts of RIvne NPP resulting from the implementation of tasks set by the state programs and governmental decisions described in unit 3.5.11.3.
3.5.13 Complex assessment of NPP’s environmental impact under normal operation as a result of SUP In the light of the previous chapters, it is clear that the SUP will not result in measurable changes of the impact of the Rivne NPP on the technogenic and natural environment under normal operation. The impacts on the social environment are expected to be positive, through the implementation of the proposed measures for (i) improved information of the public and (i) improved HSE practices.
3.5.14 Complex assessment of ecological risks in case of accident on NPP (regardless of SUP) An accident with a level equal to 4 or lower on the INES scale would not result in significant ecological risks. Ecological risks within the non-designed accident on RNPP are acceptable with taking into account the probability of such accident, scholastic risks for the social environment and the scopes of the foreseen pollution of the natural environmental components.
3.5.15 Complex assessment of changes in ecological risks in case of accident on NPP as a result of SUP With reference to the description of measures proposed in Table 6 (chapter 1.6), the following changes in ecological risks will result from the implementation of the SUP at the Rivne NPP:
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Table 32 – Changes in ecological risks as a result of SUP at the Rivne NPP Group of Sub-group of measures Changes in ecological risks after SUP measures reduced accident reduced accident probability consequences resulting from improved capacity to manage emergency situations 0 Background 01 Certification x 1 Core and fuel 11 Neutron and physical characteristics of the x management reactor core: 13 Fuel Management x x 2 Components 21 Primary system x x integrity 22 Pressurized systems important for safety x x 23 Reactor (including vessel) x 24 Other x 3 Systems 31 Ensuring the system reactivity x 32 Ensuring the reserve of primary circuit coolant x x 33 Primary circuit cooling x x 34 Primary circuit pressure x 35 Auxiliary systems x x 4 41 Information system x x Instrumentation 42 Reactor control and protection system x x and Control 43 Safety management systems x (I&C) 44 Monitoring and control systems x x 5 Power supply 51 External sources x x 52 Energy distribution x x 6 Containment 61 Containment bypass risk x and buildings 62 Integrity x 7 Internal 71 Fire protection x hazards 72 Protection against flooding x 8 External 81 Seismic x hazards 9 Accident 91 Safety analyses x analyses 92 Accident management x
3.5.16 Assessment of economic efficiency of SUP implementation according to ecological impact on population health The implementation of the SUP is driven by compliance objectives, not economic objectives. An estimation of the economic efficiency of the SUP will be possible after the PSA has been done, which is one of the measures of the SUP, i.e. once the accident probability resulting from the SUP is known.
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3.6 Environmental impact change in the process of SUP implementation The following table summarize the impacts associated with the SUP, as discussed in the previous chapters. For each item: • "no impact" means that the impact of the NPP on its environment will not be changed as a result of the SUP implementation; • "no negative impact & less risks" means that (i) in normal operation conditions, the impact of the NPP on its environment will not be changed negatively as a result of the SUP implementation and (ii), the risks of negative impacts associated with emergency situations are reduced, either because the probability of occurrence of such emergency is reduced and/or because the NPP will have the possibility to limit the negative consequences of such emergency.
Table 33 - Environmental impact change in the process of SUP implementation Water bodies Air & Social underground Soil Flora and fauna atmosphere surface water environment water 1 Radiation impact 1.1 Gas and no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative aerosol radiation impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact risks risks risks risks risks risks 1.2 Estimation of no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative transboundary impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impacts risks risks risks risks risks risks no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative 1.3 Liquid impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less no impact impact & less radioactive waste risks risks risks risks risks 1.4 Periodic flushes from no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact spaying or cooling ponds 1.5 Solid no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact radioactive waste 2 Chemical impact 2.1 Emissions no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact from combustion no negative no negative no negative 2.2 Infiltration to no impact impact & less impact & less no impact no impact impact & less ground water risks risks risks 2.3 Non radioactive liquid no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact waste 2.4 Non radioactive solid no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact waste 3 Physical impacts 3.1 Thermal no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact impact 3.2 Noise and electromagnetic no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact radiation no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative Conclusion impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less risks risks risks risks risks risks
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4 EA OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION AT THE KHMELNITSKY NPP
4.1 General characteristic of the NPP
4.1.1 Area and location of the NPP The Khmelnitsky NPP is situated in the north-western part of Slavuta rayon in Khmelnitsky oblast, on the left bank of the Horyn River, 18 km west of the city of Slavuta. In 30 km zone of KNPP 211 localities of Khmelnitski and Rivne oblasts are situated with the population of 250,7 thousand people (density of population is 89 ppl./km2). Within the 30-km zone the villages Slavuta, Netyshyn and Izyaslav of Khmelnistky oblast and Ostrog of RIvne oblast are situated.Figure 6 – Khmelnitsky NPP and surroundings
There are 85 industrial enterprises within the 30km zone of the Khmelnitsky NPP. The largest ones are the mechanical repair factory in Slavuta city and lime-sand brick and building materials factory. In terms of physical geography, the 30km zone of the Khmelnitsky NPP belongs to the forest- steppe zone of Ukraine.
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4.1.2 Short description of Khmelnitsky NPP industrial activity and hazard class Khmelnitsky NPP produces heat and electricity. As a result of this activity, Khmelnitsky NPP produces the following types of non-radioactive wastes: • 1st hazard class: burnt-out mercury-containing lamps. • 2nd hazard class: spent petrochemical products; non-ferrous scrap metal; oily rags; spent batteries. • 3rd hazard class oil polluted sand; PVC film. • 4th hazard class : heat insulating waste; waste wood; household garbage; waste calcium carbide (from welding); used dressings; processed rubber; broken glass; ferrous metals; spent medical instrument; silt or sediment from car washing
4.1.3 Short description of Khmelnitsky NPP production The Khmelnitsky NPP has been designed as a four-power unit plant. Construction started in 1981. In late 1987 Unit 1 was put into commercial operation. The construction of unit 2 started in 1983. It was expected to be connected to the grid by the end of 1991. When the moratorium on construction of new nuclear power plants was declared the major process components had been erected and personnel had been already trained. Construction of Khmelnitsky Unit 2 was resumed in 1993. On August 8, 2004 Unit 2 (with VVER- 1000 reactor) was connected to the unified energy system of Ukraine. In September 2005, Khmelnitsky Unit 2 was admitted to commercial operation. The main characteristics of the Khmelnitsky NPP are: • number of reactors: 2 • type of reactor: 2 x VVER-1000 (pressurized water) • total electricity production capacity: 2 000 MW After Unit 2 of the Khmelnitsky NPP started up the annual electricity generation exceeds 15 billion kWh The construction of two new reactors is under study and subject to a separate EIA. The SUP is not connected to this extension project.
4.1.4 Data on raw material, land, water, energy and other resources used For industrial purposes, the Khmelnitsky NPP uses the following resources: • land: the area of the NPP (including the cooling pond) is around 21 km²: o Industrial site – 2.3 km² o Hydraulic structures with cooling pond – 19 km² • water evapourated for cooling needs : about 42 million m3 a year; • electricity for own needs: 6 to 7% of the total electricity generated; • diesel fuel (for emergency power supply and others): 1 000 m3 reserve; • oil (for turbines and others): 1 500 m3 reserve;
4.1.5 Description of the NPP technological process Each of the two units of the Khmelnitsky NPP includes the following equipment: • VVER 1000: o pressurized water reactor VVER-1000 o turbine type K-1000-60/3000-2
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o generator type TVV-1000-2 Pressurised water reactors (PWR) are common throughout the world (for a description of the principles of pressurized water reactors, see the technical presentation and schematic in appendix chapter 11.3.1). Khmelnitsky NPP is connected to the Unified Energy System of Ukraine by three 750 kV transmission lines and two 330 kV lines.
Figure 7 – Khmelnitsky NPP layout
1. reactor buildings 6. solid radwaste storage 2. turbine hall 7. auxiliary building 3. diesel generator 8. laboratory and service building 4. unit pumping station 9. administrative building & checkpoint 5. radioactive waste treatment building 10. spray pond
4.1.6 SUP measures aiming at mitigation or elimination of hazardous emissions into environment None of the SUP measures will directly result in a mitigation or elimination of hazardous emissions into the environment in normal operation conditions. Nevertheless, the following measures will result in a reduction of the risk of radioactive release and therefore, are to be considered as a mitigation of hazardous emissions risks into the environment: 11301; 11303; 12102; 12401; 13302; 13306; 13402; 13403; 13502 to 13504; 13506; 13510; 15201; 15202; 15204 to 15208; 15210; 16101; 16201 to 16203; 17102; 17104; 17201 (refer to technical appendix chapter 11.1 for the description of the measures).
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4.1.7 Description of spent nuclear fuel treatment scheme & spent nuclear fuel volumes Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) resulting from the production of energy in nuclear reactors is one of the most important components of the NPP process cycle. After its use in the reactor core, nuclear fuel is moved to reactor cooling pools to be stored for 4-5 years to decrease residual energy release. Residual energy release is a process induced by radioactive decay of fission products. After cooling in the reactor pools, SNF is loaded into special containers in order to ensure its safety during transportation, and is sent to a SNF storage facility. The current state of the world’s technological advances in the nuclear energy sector do not allow for making final conclusions on the subsequent management of SNF. However, there are several existing approaches applied globally to the subsequent management of SNF: 1. Deferred decision is provided for long-term SNF storage. It allows changing a decision on subsequent SNF management, taking into account new technologies and economic factors. The deferred decision is applied by Argentina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, South Korea, and Spain. 2. Processing of SNF. There are two types of processing – domestic or abroad: • local processing – processing of SNF to obtain components and substances that may be used and is economically justified (France, Great Britain, India, Japan, and Russia); • processing in other countries – processing of SNF with the return of medium-radioactive waste back to the country or owner (Australia, Bulgaria, Greece, the Netherlands, Switzerland); 3. Disposal – SNF cooling and burial in deep geological formations (Finland, Sweden and USA). In Ukraine, spent fuel from Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South Ukraine NPPs is transported to Russia. VVER-1000’s SNF is transported for storage and VVER-440’s spent fuel (Rivne NPP-1,2) is transported for processing. The experience in storage of spent nuclear fuel in "dry" containers gained by Ukrainian experts at the Zaporizhzhya NPP site allowed the operating organization Energoatom to sign an Agreement with the American company "Holtec International" to construct a centralized dry-type spent nuclear fuel storage facility (CSFSF) for Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South Ukraine NPPs. The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No.131 of 4 February 2008 approved the CSFSF feasibility study. The construction of this facility may start after approval of the relevant law by the Supreme Council of Ukraine. The average annual amount of spent fuel transferred from one VVER -1000 reactor for storage constitutes 42 fuel assemblies. The Khmelnitsky NPP uses approximately 84 assemblies annually.
4.1.8 Brief description of radioactive waste treatment scheme and radioactive waste volumes
4.1.8.1 Solid radwaste SRW are classified into 3 groups according to their radioactivity levels: • Group I radwaste includes: cleaning and insulating material, specialised use uniforms, footwear, individual radiation protection means, flexible PVC, construction waste, implements and tools. • Group II radwaste includes: pipework, reinforcement, parts of pumps and drives of control and protection systems, filters of ventilation systems, waste metal, heat insulation material, detachable detectors. • Group III radwaste includes: intermediate hoses, scram control/shim assembly tops, ionisation chambers with communication lines, heat and energy release detectors with communication lines. Group I and II radwaste is stored in the concrete containers of the storage facility, the capacity of which has been calculated on the basis of the following criteria: • term of storage: until the beginning of power unit decommissioning;
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• possibility of further removal and reburial; • storage of flammable and non-flammable waste in plastic bags; and • storage of specialised ventilation filters without prior processing. Group III radwaste is stored in concrete containers. The storage capacity is calculated to fit the NPP operation period. The following table shows the amount of SRW which were generated at the Khmelnitsky NPP during 2010 and are close to the average annual data.
Table 34 – Quantity of solid radwaste generated in 2010 (Khmelnitsky NPP) SRW category Type of SRW Generated SRWm3
Low activity (group I) burnable waste 106,7 compressible waste 56,9× metals 6,0× not treatable wastes 36,1× aerosol filters 9,3× Total 215,0 Intermediate activity (group II) metals 0,00 others 0,25 Total 0,25 High activity (group III) Total 0,165
4.1.8.2 Liquid radioactive waste Liquid radioactive waste (LRW) is treated in two steps. A primary concentration by evaporation is performed in two dedicated buildings. Concentrated solutions formed as a result of this primary evaporation are sent to a temporary storage. Then, the concentrated liquid is sent to a deep evaporation facility. The following table shows the amount of LRW which were generated at the Khmelnitsky NPP during 2010 and are close to the average annual data.
Table 35 – Quantity of liquid radwaste generated in 2010 (Khmelnitsky NPP) Type of LRW Generated waste (m3) Vat residue 150,200 Used sorbent 3,000
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4.1.9 Description of hazardous and general industrial waste treatment scheme and volumes Non-radioactive waste from the Khmelnitsky NPP is managed in compliance with limits and permit approvals by the State Office on Natural Environment Protection in Khmelnitsky oblast. The following waste types are produced by Khmelnitsky NPP: • category 2: wasted lubricating oils, wasted accumulators • category 1: lamps containing mercury Flammable, explosive and toxic waste is temporarily stored in the Khmelnitsky NPP in specifically designated places for further collection. Sludge is collected in a sludge pond with an area of 5.0 ha. The temporary storage of lamps is in the storehouse located within the territory of the open switchgear 750/330 kWt. Lamps are preserved in original cardboard packages on metal shelves. The storehouse allows storage of 10 000 luminous lamps at once. Area of the premises constitutes 60 m². Luminous lamps, as they are collected, are recycled by a specialized contractor. Wasted accumulators are preserved in closed premises up to 20 m² equipped with mechanical influx-and-extract ventilation and with restricted staff access before transferring to another owner (subject to a contract). Scrap metal is preserved within a specific concrete and fenced territory of 400 m² before being collected and recycled by a specialized contractor.
4.1.10 SUP measures aiming at reducing wastes volumes or improving waste treatment The SUP for the Khmelnitsky NPP does not contain any measures aiming to reduce the volumes of technological (non-radioactive) waste or at improving the ecological or sanitary security of the treatment of this waste.
4.1.11 Description of design and non-design accidents analyzed The criteria of acceptability for the radiological consequences of accidents are defined by NRBU- 97. IFor the analysis of the radiation consequences of an accident at the Khmelnitsky NPP, the following design accidents occurring at nominal operations conditions were studied: • maximum design accident (MDA) – an accident caused by a bilateral rupture of cooling systems (loss-of-coolant accident, LOCA) on the nominal power level; • a decompression of the cap of the steam generator collector; • accident during fuel and spent fuel management; • accident caused by the rupture of the cooling line outside the reactor;
4.1.12 Brief design solutions reducing or mitigating consequences of accidents (regardless of SUP) Designed solutions for Rivne NPP are aiming at the reduce of risk and/or mitigation of the concequences of accidents based on the approaches similar to the designed solutions of Zaporizhzhya NPP described in unit.2.1.12.
4.1.13 SUP measures aiming at reducing accident risks or mitigating accident consequences As part of the preparation of the SUP, a comprehensive safety analysis of the Khmelnitsky NPP has been carried out by Ukrainian and international experts. This in-depth safety analysis was carried out using up-to-date methodologies, including probabilistic safety analysis. The safety upgrade engineering solutions that will be implemented within the SUP are related to: 0. the certification of all safety equipment 1. the safety of reactor core characteristics and fuel management operations
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2. the preservation of the integrity of the components of the reactor, primary and secondary cooling systems 3. the safety of the operation of the NPP systems (reactivity, primary circuit and auxiliary systems) 4. the modernization of information, monitoring and control equipment and control rooms 5. the safety of power supply 6. limiting the risks of containment by-pass or loss of integrity 7. improving the prevention and early detection of internal risks (e.g. fire, flooding) 8. reviewing the seismic risks and ensuring regular updates of the seismic information and analysis 9. developing procedures for analyzing accidents and managing accident situations
4.1.14 Sanitary-protection zone and monitoring zone of NPP The sanitary-protection zone of the Khmelnitsky NPP extends for a 2.7 km radius around the NPP. The monitoring zone extends for a 30km radius around the NPP. The radiation monitoring system of the Khmelnitsky NPP aims at performing the following functions: • monitoring the status of protective barriers; • radiation process control: managing the condition of protective barriers and content of radionuclides in the technological environments; • radiation dosimetry; • individual monitoring; and • radiation monitoring of the environment. An automated radiation monitoring system named "ASKRO" provides the control of radiation situation at the NPP and within the SPZ and monitoring zone. A map showing the location of monitoring points is presented in Appendix chapter 11.2.1. Observations of the radiation environment are undertaken continuously in an automatic mode. The main functions of ASKRO are: (i) automation of measurement processes, (ii) data collection, (iii) data processing, (iv) data display, (v) archiving and storage of information related to the parameters of the radiation situation. ASKRO also provides control over the accidental release of radioactive substances, determines the radiation dose from radioactive fallout, predicts the dispersal of radionuclides in the environment depending on weather conditions, and provides information to the public and officials.
4.2 Assessment of impact on natural environment
4.2.1 Climate and microclimate
4.2.1.1 Short description of the existing state within the Monitoring Zone The climate of the area of the Khmelnitsky NPP is temperate continental, with relatively high temperatures and low relative humidity in summer; and low temperatures, high humidity and a presence of snow cover in the winter. The climate is influenced by both marine and continental air masses. The climate and meteorological conditions differ substantially from one season to another. The average annual air temperature within the 30km zone of the Khmelnitsky NPP is 6.9-7.1°C. The annual absolute maximum temperature is in the range of 36.1-37.0°C, while the absolute minimum is in the range of minus 33.6 – 34.5°C. July average temperatures range from 18.0 to 18.2°C. January temperatures average from minus 4.9 to minus 5.4°C. The frost-free period lasts 169 days on average. Maximum daily amplitude of air temperature in the area is observed in the summer (13°C).
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The average annual temperature of the soil surface is 8°C, i.e. 1°C above the average annual air temperature. The absolute maximum temperature of the soil surface is 58-60°C, and the absolute minimum is in the range of minus 36-38°C. The average annual relative humidity is 79-80% and the annual average absolute humidity is 8.7- 8.9 hPa. Concerning precipitation, the area is classified as having "sufficient humidity". Sixteen percent of precipitation occurs during the winter, 45% in the spring and autumn, and 39% in the summer. The total average annual rainfall in the northern zone is 568 mm, 670 mm in the central zone and 638 mm in the southern zone. The maximum annual amount of precipitation in the area of the Khmelnitsky NPP is 793 mm in the northern zone, 960 mm in the central and eastern areas and 973 mm in the southern zone. The maximum monthly amount of precipitation falls in June and July (210-247 mm). The lowest annual rainfall in the zone is 347 mm in the cross-northern zone; 409 mm in the central and eastern zone; and 389 mm in the southern zone. The average number of days with precipitation varies from 150 to 163 days, the largest observation being from 168 to 176 days. The number of days with snow cover in the area is 85-98 days. The average 10-day snow depth in mid-February is 12.9 cm, the highest observation being 35-49 cm. Prevailing winds are westward, especially in northern areas (24.7%), as well as in central and eastern parts (20.4%). In the south-western and southern parts, winds are more north-westerly (20.6%). The number of calms within a year is larger in the southern and south-western zone (16.8%) and the lowest is in the northern part (9.4%). In the middle and eastern part of the zone, the frequency of calms is 11.9%. The greatest number of calms is noted in the summer: 23% in the southern zone; 19.4% in the central and eastern zone; and 14.8% in the northern zone. Average annual wind speed is 4.1 m/s in the north area, 2.7 m/s in central and Eastern parts and 3.5 m/s in the southern zone.
4.2.1.2 Impact of SUP on climate and micro-climate
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP will have no significant impact on the climate and micro-climate characteristics of the surroundings of the Khmelnitsky NPP. Transport means (i.e. train and trucks) used for the supply of equipment and the transport of workers for the implementation of the SUP will produce minor Green House Gas (GHG) emissions that may be considered negligible.
Impact after implementation of the SUP The SUP does not aim at increasing the production of electricity. Therefore, an increase in the quantity of heat or water vapour released by the NPP in the environment is not expected. Consequently, the SUP has no expected impact on the micro-climate around the Khmelnitsky NPP. The SUP will also have no influence on the volume of GHGs emitted annually by the operation of the NPP and therefore, no impact on the global climate is expected.
4.2.2 Air quality
4.2.2.1 Present characteristics within the NPP Monitoring Zone The emission of air pollutants from the Khmelnitsky NPP are limited to the emissions from the emergency diesel generators of safety systems, as well as emissions from the vehicles, machinery, diesel locomotives and auxiliary productions located at the main site and other sites. Actual air emissions from the stationary sources of the Khmelnitsky NPP are significantly lower than the allowed limits.
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Detailed information concerning radioactive pollution of the surface air is provided in unit 4.5.11.1 and in Annex 11.3.2. Observations of the surface air within the monitoring zone of KNPP state that: • The concentration of radionucledes in the air is by orders lower than the acceptable concentrations; • The concentration of radionucledes in the air is similar to the one before the KNPP construction. KNPP is not influencing the quality of the air by the radiation indicators in the substantial manner.
4.2.2.2 Forecasted changes regardless of SUP (normal operations or in case of an accident) The Khmelnitsky NPP contributes to a limited extent to the overall emission of pollutants within the 30km zone. Over the next few years, the main drivers of air quality within the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km monitoring zone will be: • the evolution of the activity of the main polluting industries; • the evolution of the volumes of pesticides sprayed by the agricultural sector; • the evolution of standards, norms and emissions permits applicable to industries (which applies to the Khmelnitsky NPP); • the evolution of oil consumption and norms for vehicles. In case of an accident, and depending on the nature of the accident, significant volumes of radioactive pollutants and dust could potentially be released into the atmosphere.
4.2.2.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted changes
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP will result in a slight increase in traffic (estimated to increase less than 10%) in the vicinity of the NPP, for the supply of works and for the transport of additional workers from sub-contractors in charge of the implementation of the SUP. Thus, the implementation of the SUP will result in additional but negligible air emissions. No large earthworks with large emissions of dust are planned.
Impact after implementation of the SUP The SUP does not aim at increasing the production of electricity. Therefore, no increase in the quantity of heat, water vapour, dust or emissions released by the NPP in the environment is expected. In addition, the SUP will not result in additional use of vehicles, and therefore will not induce additional releases from the vehicle fleet. SUP will decrease the risk of accidents on NPPs and thus the risk of the atmospheric radioactive pollution which is the positive impact of SUP. Moreover SUP implementation will improve the management of the accidental situations which will result in reduction of the amounts of emergency ejections into the atmosphere
4.2.3 Geological environment
4.2.3.1 Present characteristics of the NPP Monitoring Zone
Geological structure and tectonics The geology of the Khmelnitsky NPP 30km zone consists in a wide range of structures from loose quaternary deposits to crystalline rocks of the Eastern European platform basal complex. In terms of tectonic structure, the Khmelnitsky NPP 30km zone is characterized by blocks bordered by abyssal fractures with north-eastern and north-western bearings.
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Seismicity According to the schematic temporary map of seismic regions of Europe (General seismic regions GSR-87)”, theKhmelnitsky NPP ground is situated in a magnitude 5 zone (maximum credible earthquake, MCE). Due to the recent increase of requirements concerning the seismicity assessment of nuclear plants, additional studies of seismic hazard of the Khmelnitsky NPP industrial ground and site were conducted. During the period of observations conducted by the Institute of Geophysics of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, a couple of hundred seismic events were registered. None of them identified were local seismic events. The outcomes of additional studies of seismic hazards at theKhmelnitsky NPP ground are Strength level earthquake – magnitude 5; and MCE – magnitude 6. T hese correspond to values used in the design of the NPP. All seismicity studies suggest that changes of seismic conditions are unlikely.
Ground water In terms of hydrogeology, the Khmelnitsky NPP 30km zone is situated within the eastern margin of Volyn-Podillya artesian basin in the joint zone with Ukrainian crystalline core-area and is characterized by the widespread development of superficial aquifers connected with the mass of Cainozoic, Mezozoic, Palaeozoic and upper Proterozoic (Riphean, Vendian) and Lower Archean Proterozoic. The following water-bearing complexes are identified in the region: 1. Ground water connected with quaternary formations connected with flood-plain alluvial deposits as well as fluvio-glacial formations. The ground water cover thickness is not large and mostly does not exceed 3 to 5 m. Waters are hydrocarbonate-calcic. 2. Fissured aquifer located in the marl-chalky complex of Turonian epoch, in the western part of the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone. The cover thickness ranges from 5.0 m to 47.0 m. Waters are hydrocarbonate-calcic. 3. Aquifer of Cenomanian epoch upper chalk, located in the eastern part of the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone. The cover thickness of the aquifer ranges from 10 m to 40 m. Waters are hydrocarbonate-calcic and are widely used for the water supply of settlements within the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone. 4. Aquifer of Lower-Silurian deposits, located within the extreme western part of 30km zone of Khmelnitsky NPP. This aquifer is connected to the mass of fissured limestone with marl interburden. The depth is up to 80 m. The aquifer is headed. Water is hydrocarbonate- calcic and is used for the centralized water supply of separate settlements. 5. Aquifer of Baltic series of lower Cambrian, located within the extreme western part of the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone. It lies as deep as 30 m to 50 m under chalk and quaternary deposits. The aquifer is headed and water is hydrocarbonate-calcic. 6. Lower Proterozoic (Vendian) water-bearing complex, located in western and central parts of the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone. The cover thickness of the complex is 140 m to 220 m. Waters are hydrocarbonate-calcic. The water-bearing complex together with other aquifers with lesser cover thickness are used for centralized household and portable water supply of settlements within the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone. 7. Aquifer of Archean and Lower Proterozoic fissured area. This aquifer is headed. Waters are hydrocarbonate-calcic or magnesium. Within the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone, area Archean and Lower Proterozoic aquifers are not used.
4.2.3.2 Impact of the SUP on the geological environment The SUP includes the erection and commissioning of additional seismic monitoring equipment (measures 13501, 18101) as recommended by the IAEA, as well as various measures to improve the knowledge and understanding of seismic risks in the Khmelnitsky NPP zone. This is a positive impact of the SUP.
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The implementation of the SUP does not include any underground works or large earthworks. Therefore, the implementation and the operation of the SUP are not expected to have any impact on the geology of the zone. In addition, none of the SUP measures are likely to induce man-made seismicity.
4.2.4 Aquatic environment (ground water, surface water basins)
4.2.4.1 Present characteristics of the NPP Monitoring Zone For cooling needs, the Khmelnitsky NPP uses water from the Horyn River, which is a tributary of the Pripyat River. The regime of the Horyn River is characterized by a maximum run-off during the spring floods and minimum run-off in the autumn and winter period. Summer low water is often interrupted by rain and floods and therefore has an unstable character. Annual runoff is subject to fluctuations from year to year, due to the influence of numerous factors, particularly climate variability.
Table 36 – Annual discharge of the Horyn River at the Khmelnitsky NPP (3 830km²) Probability 50 75 80 90 95 97 % Average annual 15,80 13,00 12,30 10,70 9,58 8,85 discharge (m3/s)
Surface and ground water are monitored within the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone. The surface water pattern was modified by the construction of hydraulic structures in relation to the NPP, mainly the cooling reservoir and the feed and discharge channels. The operation of the Khmelnitsky NPP resulted in infiltration of process water. As a consequence, some areas recorded an increase in temperature and salinity of ground water, but to extents that do not affect the environment. The Khmelnitsky NPP’s influence on ground water is local and limited to the NPP’s territory.
4.2.4.2 Forecasted changes regardless of SUP (normal operations or in case of an accident) The long-term changes expected in the underground and surface water pattern of the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km monitoring zone are driven by the following factors: • the evolution of water consumption due to the evolution of socio-economic activities in the Horyn River basin (agriculture, industry, population). The main anticipated increase of water consumption is the possible commissioning of K3 and K4 reactors at the Khmelnitsky NPP (presently subject to a separate feasibility study and EIA). Apart from this, no trend is presently identified; and • the migration of radionuclides of technological origin in the Dnipro River basin (mainly Chernobyl releases). Regardless of SUP, K3/K4 construction and in the absence of an accident, the impact of the Khmelnitsky NPP on the Horyn River is not expected to change. In case of an accident and depending on the nature of accident the substantial volumes of radioactive pollutants can be potentially released to the aquatic environment. Radiologic concequences of the aquatic environment pollution resulting from the designed accidents are provided in unit 4.3.2.
4.2.4.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted state changes
Impact during the implementation of the SUP
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The implementation of the SUP does not include any underground works or large earthworks likely to affect the quality of underground or surface waters. The implementation of the SUP does not require the consumption of large volumes of water, nor the release of large amounts of wastewater. Therefore, the implementation and the operation of the SUP are not expected to have any impact on underground or surface water within the 30km zone.
Impact after implementation of the SUP The SUP does not aim at increasing the production of electricity. Therefore, an increase in the quantity of cooling water consumed by the NPP is not expected. Consequently, the SUP does not have any expected long-term impacts on the quality or quantity of water used or released by the NPP. SUP will decrease the risk of accidents on NPPs and thus the risk of the aquatic radioactive pollution which is the positive impact of SUP. Moreover SUP implementation will improve the management of the accidental situations which will result in reduction of the amounts of emergency resets into the aquatic environment.
4.2.5 Soil and landscape
4.2.5.1 Present characteristics of the NPP Monitoring Zone
Geomorphology In terms of geomorphology, the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone lies within the Volyn-Podillya platform, between the western bank of the Ukrainian shield and the Carpathian alpine geosinclyne. The majority of the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone is located within the Horyn River basin. The right bank of the Horyn River basin consists in the eastern spurs of Volyn upland (Goshchansky plateau), which forms a high and even plain (altitudes from 227 to 260 m). The left bank of the basin is an alternation of leafy plains by valleys leading to the Horyn River (altitudes from 240 to 329 m). A small part of the territory north-east of the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone is located within the Korchyk River basin, a gently leafy low plain with altitudes ranging from 200 m to 219 m.
Soil The soil structures present in the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone is characterized by its diversity and the complexity of soil structures (about 500 soil types), particularly: 1. sod-podzol soil on ancient alluvial and water-glacial deposits; 2. podzoled soil, mainly on loessial grounds; 3. typical black soil on loessial grounds; 4. meadow soil on dealluvial and alluvial deposits; 5. swampy soil on dealluvial, alluvial and water-glacial deposits; and 6. sod soil.
Landscape Seven different types of landscapes are identified within the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone: 1. coniferous-deciduous plains landscape on uplands and lowlands with anthropogenic cover: • moraine lowlands, flat and slightly leafy with sod-podzol soils, mostly under hornbeam pine forest; • alluvial flat-leafy lowlands with sod-podzol soil and low swamps, under pine forests. 2. deciduous plain landscape on uplands and lowlands with anthropogenic cover: • loessial uplands with grey and dark-grey soil, beech groves;
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• structurally denudational uplands with grey and dark-grey podzol soils with hornbeam and beech groves; • loessial denudational leafy uplands with typical black soil with low humus content and podzol black soil, with oak-groves. 3. forest-steppes plains landscape on uplands with anthropogenic cover on Precambrian and Paleozoic rocks, covered with Palaeogene and Neogene deposits: • loessial uplands with deep valleys cut in Paleozoic deposits with grey podzol soil and isolated oak-hornbeam groves. 4. above-the-flood-plain plains: • forest, meadow, steppe and alkaline flood-plains.
4.2.5.2 Forecasted changes to the present characteristics regardless of SUP, under normal operations or in case of an accident The Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone is characterized by the following exogenous processes, which progressively alter the soil and landscape: • erosion by rainfalls and run-off; • formation of ravines; • formation of swamps in river flood-plains; • formation of dead channels as a result of meandering o riverbeds; • covered and semi-covered karstic areas; • subsidence (in territories formed by leossial grounds); • eolian erosion and deposition; • landslides and rock falls; • water logging as a result of backwater formation for ground waters during overflows as well as under technogenic impact on built-on areas. Presently, none of these exogenous processes impacts the NPP. An intensification of exogenous geological processes in the coming years within the 30km zone is possible, but none of them is directly or indirectly triggered by the Khmelnitsky NPP. In order to monitor possible adverse impacts of exogenous processes on the NPP, the following are being monitored: ground water level, soil conditions and karst formation. Within the normal conditions of operation Khmelnitsky NPP is not providing any negative radiation impact on soils. In case of an accident and depending on the nature of accident the substantial volumes of radioactive pollutants from the atmosphere can potentially cover the earth surface. Radiologic concequences of the earth surface pollution resulting from the designed accidents are provided in unit 4.3.2.
4.2.5.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted changes The SUP consists of safety upgrade measures that will be implemented within the NPP site. As summarized in the following table, no impact is expected from the SUP on soils and landscape:
Table 37 – Impact of SUP on soils and landscape within the Khmelnitsky NPP monitoring zone Impacts during Impact after Type of Impact implementation of the SUP completion of the SUP impacts on eolian processes none none impacts on reservoir banks abrasion none none impacts on erosion by water (rainfall or none none rivers
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impacts on karstification processes none none impacts on the formation of ravines none none impacts on wind erosion and eolian none none deposition impacts on rivers hydromorphologic none none evolution impacts on landslides and rockfall risks none none impacts on swamps formation, inundations none none and ground water level
4.2.6 Flora, fauna, reserves
4.2.6.1 Present characteristics within the NPP Monitoring Zone
Flora The Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone lies at the botanic border of European deciduous and European-Siberian Forest-steppes regions. The following species are typical of this area: • oak-pine forests (Shepetovka-Baranovsk geobotanic region) and pine blueberry forests (Kovel-Sarnensk geobotanic district); • hornbeam-oak and hornbeam forests on hills (Smyzh-Ostrog-Pluzhnyansky geobotanic region) and pine, oak-pine forests and eutrophic swamps (Malopolissya geobotanic district) • oak-hornbeam and oak forests (Varkovitsko-Rivne geobotanic region) and fragments of meadow steppes (Lutsk-Rivne geobotanic district); • oak-hornbeam forests (Pochansk-Mizoch geobotanic region); • oak-hornbeam and oak-pine forests (Goshchansk geobotanic region); • meadow steppes with domination of Festuca valesiaca, Poa angustifolia, Carex humills, Brachypodium pinnatum, Sesleria heufieriana and local agrophytocenoses. The natural flora of the Khmelnitsky NPP 30km zone is mostly preserved; agricultural land constitutes 37% in central and eastern parts’ 60% in western parts; and 75% in northern parts. Forests prevail in plant formation but are unevenly distributed, with 40% in the south-western part and 30% in the eastern part - and less so in the northern part. The main meadows flood plains are those of the Horyn River and its tributaries. There are numerous swamps within the 30km zone, but they are typically small. Waterlogged areas are more frequent in the South than in the North.
Fauna According to the zoogeographical regions division, the Khmelnitsky NPP 30km zone lies within the boreal European-Siberian sub-region of Dnistro-Azov paleo-arctic region and the Dnipro left-bank deciduous-forest and forest-steppe areas. The fauna species within the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone includes: • over 350 species of insects; • 11 species of Amphibia; • 7 species of reptiles; • About 157 bird species (as well as 136 migratory bird species); and • about 50 mammal species. In total, 34 of these species are registered in the Red Book of Ukraine.
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Fish fauna account for about 20 species of fish, particularly bream, roach, sander and silver crucian.
Natural reserves Within the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone, there are 47 objects belonging to the natural reserve fund. They cover 3 083 ha (1.1% of the total territory of the 30km zone). These are mainly botanic, forest, hydrological, landscape preserves, holes and natural monuments as well as local parks’ monuments of garden art. The main natural reserves are the botanic preserve “Bushchansky”, the hydrological preserve “Mykhlyansky”, the hydrological natural monument “Lake Svyate (Ukrainian for Saint)”, and the “Teremno” territory, where unique picturesque lakes of karstic origin, pine forests over 100 years old, and forest and swamps as well as natural springs are situated.
4.2.6.2 Forecasted changes of the present characteristics regardless of SUP, under normal operation or in case of an accident The Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone is characterized by the following trends and evolutions with regards to flora and fauna: • the possible introduction of new agricultural species; • the development of forest cover as a result of an increase in the surface of protected areas (parks, reserves) initiated by State policy; and • potential impacts of the climate change on forest habitats. Among the above mentioned possible evolutions, none is connected to the Khmelnitsky NPP’s operations. In case of an accident and depending on the nature of accident the species of flora and fauna in the neighboring districts can get the relevant radioactive impact. Radiologic concequences of the agricultural species of flora and fauna pollution resulting from the designed accidents are provided in unit 4.3.2
4.2.6.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted state changes The main impact of the Khmelnitsky NPP on natural habitats within the 30km zone is related to the release of heat in the environment. The SUP aims at improving the safety of NPPs under operation. The implementation of the SUP will not result in an increase or decrease in the quantity of heat released to the environment. In addition, the SUP implementation will only require minor works outside the NPP territory (installation of seismic monitoring equipment). SUP will decrease the risk of accidents on NPPs and thus the risk of the radioactive pollution of the range of the existence of flora and fauna which is the positive impact of SUP. Moreover SUP implementation will improve the management of the accidental situations which will result in reduction of the amounts of emergency resets and ejections.
4.3 Assessment of impact on social environment
4.3.1 Social baseline the NPP Monitoring Zone In total, 195 760 people (135 900 in the Khmelnitsky region and 59 860 in the Rivne region) live within the 30km zone around the Khmelnitsky NPP, representing a density of 64.7 people/km² in the Khmelnitsky region and 54.8 people/km² in the Rivne region (the national average is 75 people/km²). There are 211 settlements in the 30km zone of the Khmelnitsky NPP. They belong to both Khmelnitsky and Rivne oblasts.
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The surrounding cities are: • Netyshyn: 5 km from the NPP with a population of 36 072 people (Khmelnitsky oblast); • Slavuta: 15 km from the NPP with a population of 35 442 people (Khmelnitsky oblast); • Izyaslav: 25 km from the NPP with a population of 17 275 people (Khmelnitsky oblast); • Ostrog: 9 km from the NPP with a population of 15 429 people (Rivne oblast) According to available statistics, the population of Netyshyn is growing steadily, while the population of Izyaslav and Slavuta has declined over the past 12 years. The proximity to the NPP explains Netyshyn’s population growth. Netyshyn also has the youngest population, with a higher percentage of the population of a working age. The demographic situation in the region is characterized by a population that is 49.6% urban and 50.4% rural. It should be noted that the growth of the urban population in the Khmelnitsky NPP’s region has been accompanied by a decrease in the rural population.
Cardiovascular sicknesses prevail in the region and are the main cause of death. Table 38 - Demographic figures for the Khmelnitsky NPP (2009/2010 official statistic data) Average Migration Natural Gender Unemployment Total City Age classes monthly wage population population (m/w) rate population 2009 (UAH) growth growth 0-14: 19.3% Netyshyn 15-64:70.9% 36 072 -28 213 65 + :9.8% 0-14: 18.7% 1000/1166 9,6 % Slavuta 15-64:62.7% 1 807 35 442 -21 21 (K oblast) (oblast) 65 + :18.6% 0-14: 15.1% Izyaslav 15-64:64.1% 17 275 - - 65 + :20.8% 0-14: 19.3% 1000/1115 15-64: 67.9% 3,5 % Ostrog 1 984 15 429 - - (R oblast) >65: 12.8% (oblast) (oblast) Ukraine 0-14: 13.9% average 1000/1194 15-64:70.0% 2 233 8.4 % 46 M (2010) 65 + :16.1%
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Table 39 - Causes of death in Khmelnitsky NPP region (2009) Infections External Digestion Breathing Cardiovascular Neoplasm and Others cause system system parasites Khmelnitsky Oblast 58,4% 12,2% 5,9% 3,7% 4,2% 1,1% 14,5% (2009) Rivne Oblast 71,1% 12,1% 6,4% 3,7% 2,0% 1,3% 3,4% (2009) Ukraine 63.0% 11.8% 8.7% 4.4% 3.3% 2.2% 6.7% (2007)
4.3.2 Forecasted public health regardless of SUP (in normal operation or in case of accident) According to the calculated emission values (estimated doses are provided in chapter 4.5.11.1), radionuclides from Khmelnitsky NPP emissions provide a negligible contribution to the population annual dose. Within a couple of hours, a person gets almost the same exposure dose from natural background exposure as from Khmelnitsky NPP emissions within a year. In compliance with NRBU-97, the population that lives in the vicinity of the NPP can get an exposure dose due to gas and spray emissions from NPP not exceeding 4% of the dose limit. The drivers for the evolution of the population’s health in the coming years will be: • the absence of development of heavily polluting industrial activities (no plans for large industrial developments were known at the time of writing this report); • the access to medical services and medication, which depends on the population’s income level; • the development of STDs; • the preservation of the environment; • the slow decay of 137Cs and 90Sr from Chernobyl, which presently represent the main manmade source of radioactivity in the region. The operation of Khmelnitsky NPP presently has no measurable impact on the health of the population. The maximum estimated doses resulting from designed accidents for the population are provided in the Table below.
Table 40 - Maximum estimated exposure doses resulting from design accidents (Khmelnitsky) Effective dose to the Thyroid dose Dose to exposed skin Initial accident whole body, mSv mGy mGy Radiation accident caused by 6.51 1.43 3.29 10-2 bilateral rupture (LOCA MDA) Decompression of the cap of the 2.85 43.6 5.2 10-2 steam generator collector Initial accident related to: • the cooling of the spent fuel pond; • fuel damage during the transfer 3.44 9.25 66.3 operations; • fall of fuel assembly into the cooling pond. rupture of the cooling line outside 1.72 10-2 3.35 10-1 2.43 10-4 the reactor
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As it can be seen from the table the estimated maximum doses even within the designed accidents are much lower than the set by the acting norms level of population evacuation (50mZv for all body). Estimated effective doses for the whole body which will be formed as the result of the non- designed accident on the power unit of VVER-1000 type of Rivne NPP are provided in Annex 11.3.5. As for the maximum designed accident the maximum estimated doses for the population resulting from the non-designed accident are not higher than the population evacuation justification. Result of the estimations done for the power unit No2 EIA of KNPP confirm the radiation safety of the concequences of the analyzed non-designed accident for the population as long as there can be possible timely limitation of foodstuffs manufactured on the relefant territory consumption during the axis of radioactive fallout.
4.3.3 Impact of SUP measures on the outcome of Forecasted public health state
4.3.3.1 Impacts during the implementation of SUP
Population outside the NPP site The SUP implementation will only require minor works outside the NPP territory (installation of seismic monitoring equipment). The main impacts of the SUP implementation for populations living in the vicinity of the NPP will be disturbance caused by additional transport (supply of new equipment installed within the SUP) and the recruitment of temporary workers. The supply of equipment within the framework of the SUP is planned to be done mainly by train which is the preferred transportation means used by Energoatom (there is the railway line to the NPP). The use of trucks is expected to be kept marginal. Consequently, the impacts on neighbouring populations’ health usually associated with the use of trucks (noise, air quality degradation and increased traffic risks) are expected to remain at insignificant levels during the implementation of the SUP. The possible employment of temporary workers by the subcontractors involved into SUP implementation will increase the temporary migration processes in the district which potentially can increase the risks of spreading the infection deceases. In particular, resulting from the random sexual relationships the risks of AIDS and other sexually transmitted deceases can increase. The mentioned risks are mitigated by the regular information-educational messages for external workers while their trainings and instructions aiming at raising awareness of the issues. No other observable or potential impact on the population’s health is expected during the SUP implementation phase outside of the NPP site.
Workers on the NPP site The implementation of the SUP will require the involvement of external workers and subcontractors, who will be exposed to the radiation and non-radiation risks that exist in any NPP. According to Ukrainian legislation, the specific safety measures described in chapter 1.10.1 apply to all workers (internal, external, permanent or temporary) involved in activities at the NPP site. Those measures aim at preventing accident risks or excessive radiation exposure; they are applied by Energoatom in compliance with the legislation. Provided that these measures are implemented, no specific risk for the health of workers is expected from the implementation of the SUP.
4.3.3.2 Impacts after SUP completion After the SUP is completed, the NPP will have an improved level of safety. For the NPP workers and the population living inside and outside the monitoring zone, this safety upgrade means a reduction of the risk of incidents or accidents that might affect their health. No negative impact will result from the operation of the NPP after the SUP is completed.
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A reduction in the risk of accidents translates into a reduced risk of contamination for NPP workers and nearby residents. This should lower stress levels related to working at or living near NPPs and will positively impact the psychological health of workers and nearby residents. For this impact to be effective it is important for PAPs to understand and be aware of the SUP and its implications on reducing risks.
4.3.4 Impact of SUP on local population’s social conditions
4.3.4.1 Impacts during the implementation of SUP The implementation of the SUP at theKhmelnitsky NPP will require around 100 to 200 external workers over the program’s 6 year implementation period. Most of these external workers will be hired by satellite contractors who regularly (and often exclusively) work for the NPP and will provide specific construction or erection services within the framework of the SUP’s implementation. Out of the total budget of the SUP, it is estimated that around 1 to 2 M€ will result in net income for additional workers involved in the SUP implementation for the Khmelnitsky NPP. Although specific competences might be sought far from the Khmelnitsky NPP, the population living in the vicinity of the NPP is expected to be positively impacted in terms of income from the SUP implementation from both direct and indirect employment opportunities. Direct employment refers to the possibility for local workers to be hired and therefore receive a salary from the companies that will be selected to assist in the SUP’s implementation. Indirect employment refers to the opportunities related to the additional demand for services by external workers involved in the SUP’s implementation. These services will most often be provided by the population living near the NPP and may include food, hotel, recreational activities, etc… Consequently, the SUP implementation is expected to positively impact the economic and social condition of the population living in the vicinity of the NPP. For the population living far from the NPP, the average positive impact in terms of social and economic conditions will be negligible. No negative impact on economic or social conditions is expected from the implementation of the SUP.
4.3.4.2 Impacts after SUP completion Employment: After completion, the SUP will result in minor but permanent additional work needs. Although the residual long-term additional work load induced by the SUP is not estimated in the documents available at this stage, it is obvious from the definition of the measures that several of them will result in additional activities or maintenance needs (maintenance of the additional safety systems, maintenance and operation of the additional monitoring equipment and analysis of their outputs…). The present stage of the project (feasibility study), does not allow for a precise definition of the number of additional jobs that will result from the long-term SUP. However, one can ascertain from similar projects that this figure should remain small compared to the number of people actually involved in the implementation of the SUP described in the previous chapter. Therefore, the SUP, after completion, is expected to have a positive but marginal impact on employment and on the social conditions around the Khmelnitsky NPP. Electricity tariff: Energoatom, as an electricity producer, sells electricity to the market through Ukrenergo, who distributes and sells electricity to consumers. The cost for upgrading the safety of the Khmelnitsky NPP will be covered by an increase of the bulk tariff between Energoatom and Ukrenergo(there are no plans for the safety upgrade to be subsidised by the State). The increase in Energoatom’s bulk tariff is planned in financial projections, but does not cover only the costs related to the SUP. Therefore, the marginal bulk tariff increase induced by the SUP was not calculated. The manner in which this tariff increase will be reflected on the consumers' tariff is unknown at this time and will be subject to a decision by the tariff regulation authority.
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4.4 Assessment of impacts on the technogenic environment
4.4.1 Short description of the existing state within the monitoring zone There are 85 industrial enterprises within the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone. They are local enterprises, with small amounts of inputs and outputs. The sanitary and protection zones of these enterprises range from 50 to 300 m. There are two military units near the Khmelnitsky NPP (A-3845 in Slavuta and F-1358 in Tsvitokha), where armaments including rocket missiles are kept. The railway main line Shepetivka – Zdolbuniv is situated 8 to 9 km north-east of the Khmelnitsky NPP. The state highway Shepetivka – Ostrog is situated about 6 km north-west of the Khmelnitsky NPP. There are several fuel filling stations within the Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone. The Horyn River, which flows 2 km from the Khmelnitsky NPP’s territory, is unnavigable within the monitoring zone. There are two children’s sanatoria within the 30km zone: “Avagard”, 28 km north of the NPP, close to Symoniv (capacity: 350 kids) and “Korchaginets”, 15 km west of the NPP, close to Mezhyrich (capacity: 320 kids). There are no gas or oil pipelines within the 30km zone. Agriculture is represented by the following number of farms specializing in small grains and animal breeding within the Khmelnitsky NPP 30km zone: • 18 farms in the Slavutsky rayon (Khmelnitsky oblast), 12 000 hectares; • 20 farms in the Izyaslavsky rayon (Khmelnitsky oblast), 16 500 hectares; • 21 farms in the Ostrog rayon (Rivne oblast), 34 200 hectares; and • 8 farms in the Goshchansky rayon (Rivne oblast), 16 400 hectares. The Khmelnitsky NPP’s 30km zone also has memorials and several other places of social value: archaeological, architectural, historical, and cultural. In every settlement within the monitoring zone, there are monuments to the memory of local soldiers and World War II victims.
4.4.2 Impact of NPP on technogenic environment regardless of SUP In normal operation conditions, Khmelnitsky NPP has limited impacts the technogenic environment: • the activities and infrastructures that can be developed in the vicinity of the NPP are subject to limitations, for safety reasons: those limitations apply in particular to the development of potentially dangerous industrial activities, recreation activities, flying objects, transport of dangerous substances…; • the presence of the NPP boosts the local economy and the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which provide direct or indirect services related to the activity of the NPP; • the satellite city of Netyshyn benefits from several infrastructure investments made by the NPP. The release of heat in the environment and the consumption of water by the NPP do not affect the technogenic environment at measurable levels. In case of accident with significant release of radionuclides to the environment (INES level > 4), the technogenic environment of the NPP would be affected according to the radionuclides fallout. In case of disaster, the creation of an exclusion zone similar to Chernobyl's would result in the end of all regular economic activities in the concerned areas.
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4.4.3 Impact of SUP measures on technogenic environment
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The main impact of the implementation of the SUP on the technogenic environment of Khmelnitsky NPP will be an increase of the activity of the NPP satellite enterprises who will be involved in the program implementation. This additional activity will result in additional transportation (staff and supply), additional income for the population and additional generation of wastes. Considering the planned increase of staff (up to 10 %) and the planned increase of waste generation (5 to 10%) as a result of the SUP implementation, one can reasonably assume that the satellite economic activity induced by the NPP will generally increase by up to 10% during the implementation of the SUP. Consequently, an increase by 10% for communal activities demand (domestic waste collection, drinking water supply, health) can be expected, which can be supported by the infrastructure of the city of Netyshyn.
Impact after implementation of the SUP Once completed, the SUP will not result in an increase or in a decrease of the activity of the NPP. Therefore, under normal operation, no long term impact on the technogenic environment is expected after the implementation of the SUP. The exposure of the technogenic environment to the consequences of accidents at the NPP will decrease after the implementation of the SUP for the following reasons: • the probability of accidents will decrease; • the potential consequences of some accidents will also be decreased, since some of the SUP measures will improve the capacity of the operational staff to early identify problems (for example, additional monitoring equipments) or to correct problems (for example, additional fire protection equipments) Therefore, the expected long term consequences of the SUP for the technogenic environment are essentially positive.
4.4.4 Possible impact on NPP from the technogenic environment (regardless of SUP)
Explosion or fire risk Within the frame of the Safety Analysis Report, the risk of accidental explosion or fire from industries of infrastructures located up to 10 km from Khmelnitsky NPP is systematically reviewed. At the present time, all of the potential sources of accidental explosion located at less than 10km from the NPP or inside the NPP territory would, in case of explosion, trigger an excessive pressure considerably less than the normative limit of 10 kPa. These potential sources are: ammunition storage base in Slavuta city (8 km), Shepetovka-Zdolbunov railway line on which explosive goods may be transported passes (8km from NPP fence) and Shepetovka-Ostrog highway, on which explosive cargo can be transported (6 km from the NPP). Within the NPP territory, the main possible sources of explosion or fire are the liquid gas storage, oxygen and hydrogen receivers, and in fuel or oil tanks.
Aircraft impact No airline route crosses the 10km zone of Khmelnitsky NPP. The estimated probability of core damage caused by the falling of a civil aircraft is 10-7 per year (for military aircraft 7.1x10-8).
Failures of hydraulic structures There are only small reservoirs on Horyn river and they are located at a great distance (50 km) from Khmelnitsky NPP site. Their break would not expose Khmelnitsky NPP buildings and structures.
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The artificial cooling pond adjacent to the NPP is delimited by a dam. In case of break of this dam, the staff of Khmelnitsky NPP has a procedure to shutdown the reactor and keep them cooled using only the spaying ponds.
4.5 Comprehensive measures to ensure standard state of environment and environmental security
4.5.1 Description of resource-saving measures taken on NPP regardless of SUP
Energy-saving measures The Khmelnitsky NPP consumes around 6 to 7% of its electricity production for its own needs. Several measures were undertaken over the past years to decrease the consumption of electricity by the NPP, such as the introduction of low consumption lamps. These measures have had a positive but marginal effect on the overall energy consumption of the NPP which is driven by the energy efficiency of the largest equipment (mostly pumps). The decision to replace pumps by more efficient ones (in order to save electricity) can be made by the management of the NPP based on economic considerations- but this issue is not related to the issues addressed in the SUP. In addition, in order to further reduce its energy consumption, the Khmelnitsky NPP has also undertaken measures to reduce their vehicles’ fuel consumption.
Sustainable use and protection of water resources Several measures have been undertaken at the Khmelnitsky NPP in order to conserve water resources. Processed water used for cooling is now treated in a special facility (for demineralization) and after that it is recirculated. Rain water and treated domestic wastewater from the NPP and Netyshyn city are also collected and treated before being used as processed water. The water balance of the Khmelnitsky NPP is calculated regularly and submitted to SANEP.
Recycling waste Waste recycling measures were introduced at the Khmelnitsky NPP in the past years in order to reduce its environmental footprint. Recycling measures focus on glass, lamps (containing mercury), batteries, car tyres, etc.…
4.5.2 Need for additional resource-saving measures in connection with SUP
4.5.2.1 During the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP will require a number of additional workers (100 to 200) which is negligible compared to the population of the satellite city of Netyshyn (30 000). Moreover, a significant part of the additional workers will come from Netyshyn itself. Therefore, there is no reason to consider that the implementation of the SUP, and the employment of additional workers, will result in a significant overuse of natural resources in the project area because it will not require a large in-migration of workers from outside the area. In addition, none of the SUP’s measures require the use of significant volumes of natural resources (e.g. large volumes of water or large volumes of sand or earth). Therefore, no additional resource-saving measures are deemed necessary during the implementation of the SUP.
4.5.2.2 After the implementation of the SUP The SUP implementation will only require minor works outside the NPP territory (installation of seismic monitoring equipment). Therefore, none of the SUP measures will have a long-term impact on the use of natural resources outside the NPP’s territory. Inside the NPP territory, the operation of units and processes of SUP measures will not require a significant additional use of resources. The operation of the additional equipment installed within the frame of the SUP will result in marginal additional energy consumption. No additional water will
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be used, except in case of fire, when using the additional fire protection equipment installed as part of the SUP.
4.5.3 Social and workers protection measures taken on NPP regardless of SUP
4.5.3.1 Workers protection (HSE) A comprehensive description of the HSE rules that apply to workers and sub-contractors within the NPPs is proposed in chapter 1.10.1.
4.5.3.2 Public information in normal operation The Khmelnitsky NPP provides regular information to the public through the following means: • internet: a dedicated website (http://www.xaec.org.ua/index-ua.html) provides the public with information about the NPP, its organisation and its operation. The website discloses daily the radiation monitoring results in the 30km zone. Meteorological or hydrometrological data are not available; • own newspaper: the Khmelnitsky NPP edits a weekly newspaper "Perspectiva" at 2000 exemplars. The newspaper is available for free in public places and provides various information about the NPP and the 30km monitoring zone; • other newspapers: the Khmelnitsky NPP occasionally publishes articles in local and regional newspapers, usually with the objective of informing the public largely about a specific topic; • thematic brochures made available at information centres and public buildings; • public events are also regularly organised by the Khmelnitsky NPP.
4.5.3.3 Emergency plans A description of the emergency plans developed by SNRIU and Energoatom is proposed in chapter 1.10.2. In case of accidents which require the population informing NPP informs the local authorities according to the existing pre-designated order and list. The responsibility for population informing rests on the MoES of Ukraine. The evacuation (if necessary) is also within the responsibilities of MoES of Ukraine. On practice the population strongly lacks the information concerning the signals and messages of the early awareness and also concerning the actions which should be undertaken in case of this signal. Especially this deficit is critical for the monitoring zone population outside of Netyshyn city.
4.5.4 Changes in social and workers protection measures as a result of SUP implementation
4.5.4.1 Workers protection (HSE) According to the law of labour protection of Ukraine, the implementation of the SUP does not require the introduction of specific changes in the management of HSE at the NPP. Nevertheless, in the light of (i) the review of HSE procedures done within the frame of the EA and (ii) the K2/R4 safety upgrade experience, recommendations are made to improve HSE management. These measures are common for all NPPs and are detailed in chapter 8.1.1 and basically consist in: • the introduction of performance indicators to compare the performance of NPPs and sub- contractors; • replicating recommendations made during the previous the K2/R4 safety upgrade • the harmonization of HSE practices between NPPs.
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4.5.4.2 Public information The scoping meetings held in May 2011 showed a strong demand from the public for improved information about the regular monitoring of the environment around the NPP, including radioactivity levels. Within the frame of the SUP, it is proposed to improve public information by: • harmonizing the media used for public information; • harmonize the type of environmental monitoring data released to the public. See details of the recommendations that apply to the Khmelnitsky NPP in chapter 8.1.2.
4.5.4.3 Emergency plans The scoping meetings held in May 2011 also showed a strong demand from the public for improved early warning tools in case of accident. The experience of the Chernobyl and Fukushima cases has shown that most of the primary radioactive fall-out after an accident occurs in a radius of some kilometres around the NPP (to date, Chernobyl exclusion zone is 30km, Fukushima exclusion zone is 20 km). Therefore, it is suggested to extend the "early warning zone" of the NPPs, presently limited to the satellite cities, to the whole 30km monitoring zone. It is also recommended to implement awareness campaigns, in order to inform the population about the actions to undertake in case of alert. From the public side it was suggested to renew the wired radio system which had existed even in Soviet times and its usage aiming at early warning. It should be mentioned that such a decision requires substantial capital investments and limits the circle of informed people with those who are at home and listen to the radio. So far, it is also suggested to review the possibility of early warning system introduction via sms which will be sent to the cell phones. The registration requests from the inhabitants of 30 km monitoring zone to be included into such system can also be collected via sms from the interested persons. A feasibility study will be carried out to define the most appropriate and relevant tools and equipments for early warning system before procurement.See details on the implementation of this recommendation in chapter 8.1.3.
4.5.5 Rehabilitation (renewal) measures undertaken during NPP construction The NPP was built at a time when ESIAs were not required by the Ukraine’s legislation. The construction norms applicable in Soviet times (the "SNIP") included design criteria aiming at limiting adverse environmental impacts, but which cannot be compared to the comprehensive set of rehabilitation or compensation measures that are undertaken nowadays to preserve the environment when building a new NPP. The design criteria applied at the time of the construction of the NPP and related to environmental protection typically referred to water use and the emission of radioactive or non-radioactive pollutants to the air or to water bodies. From a social point of view, the construction of the Khmelnitsky NPP probably resulted in resettlement, permanent occupation of agricultural land or reorganisation of public infrastructure (e.g. roads…). During Soviet times, there was limited private property, and therefore the reorganisation of social life and infrastructure around the NPP was implemented without compensations for property loss. From the time of the NPP’s construction to today, the evolution of standards and norms has been the main driver for the implementation of environmental measures. Namely, set of these measures had been implemented while the construction finalization of power units No2 of KNPP (operation started in 2004).
4.5.6 Need for additional rehabilitation (renewal) measures in connection with the SUP The SUP implementation is by nature completely different from the construction of a new NPP. Therefore, none of the SUP measures requires the implementation of rehabilitation or renewal
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measures in line with the measures that were undertaken at the time of the construction of the NPP.
4.5.7 Compensatory measures taken in the process of NPP operation The project of KNPP construction foresees and had been timely undertaken the set of the compensatory measures, namely: • Measures connected to the expropriation and compensation of the land loss because of the land usage; • Setting the limitations of natural resources usage, limitations of ejections and resets of the contaminants to the environment, limitations of the wastes location; Setting the norms of payment and amount of payments for the usage of natural resources, for ejections and resets of the contaminants and for the wastes location The following compensation measures are implemented in accordance with the law: • the electricity tariff is cheaper (subsidized) for the population who live within the 30km monitoring zone of an NPP than for other consumers in Ukraine; • the NPP uses 1% of the total value of its annual production for the improvement of infrastructure and living conditions in the cities located within the 30km monitoring zone. These two measures provide significant advantages to the population living within the 30km monitoring zone. No other specific compensatory measures exist.
4.5.8 Need for additional compensatory measures as a result of SUP implementation There is no reason to change the compensatory measures described in chapter 4.5.7 as a result of the SUP implementation.
4.5.9 Description of environment protection measures related to NPP operation
4.5.9.1 Protection measures against radioactive emissions The prevention or mitigation of radioactive emissions is ensured by the following technical solutions: • cleaning of air containing radioactive isotopes using spray and iodine filters; • absorbing the filtering of gases containing radioactive molecules, of which the majority are inert noble gas isotopes (xenon and krypton); • organization of obstacles on the way to radioactive substances; • closed circuits to prevent leakage of liquid substances containing radioactive components; • organization of a special system of SRW collection and SRW and LRW storage; • sanitary protection zone; • permanent dosimetric control over emissions as well as air, soil, flora and water pollution control in the sanitary protection zone and monitoring zone.
4.5.9.2 Non-radiation protection measures The NPP is presently undertaking ISO 14000 certification.
Air protection Several measures have been undertaken at the Khmelnitsky NPP in order to reduce air pollution. One of the important measures has been the inventory of adverse atmospheric emissions from permanent emission sources, and the elaboration of maximum permissible discharges (MPD), that allow the release of pollutants in significantly smaller amounts than the previously used maximum permissible concentration (MPC).
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Water bodies protection The cooling pond of the Khmelnitsky NPP is designed as a multi-purpose water object, and is operated in a way that aims at reducing negative environmental impacts on Horyn river: • abstraction of re-filling water from Horyn river only in high-water periods; • absence of thermal impact of the Khmelnitsky on Horyn river; • the pond receives treated domestic and process wastewater of the NPP and neighbouring settlement; • research works on fish fauna in the cooling pond. Phytophagous fishes were introduced (fishery) to limit eutrophication processes.
4.5.10 Need of changes in the set of protection measures as a result of SUP implementation
During the implementation of the SUP The environment protection measures undertaken by the NPP will not be affected by the implementation of the SUP, and therefore can be continued without any kind of limitation or restriction. The implementation of the SUP does not require additional specific environment protection measures.
After the implementation of the SUP After its implementation, the SUP will generally result in a reduction of risks for the environment around the NPP, through (i) a reduction of the probability of accidents and (ii) through a reduction of the potential consequences of accidents, due to improved monitoring equipments allowing for earlier identification of accidents and better management of accident situations. In this context, there is no specific need to develop additional environment protection measures in relation with the implementation of the SUP.
4.5.11 Residual impact of NPP under normal operation (regardless of SUP)
4.5.11.1 Radiation residual impact The assessment of the exposure of population to radiations under normal operation in the vicinity of Khmelnitsky NPP was based on a comprehensive assessment of radionuclides emission in the air and on the ground. The largest contribution is provided by radioactive noble gases 41Ar and 133Xe, during exposure from cloud. The contribution of other sources is significantly smaller. The maximum calculated effective individual dose is 5.8·10-4 mSv/year and was obtained 1.5 km away to the east from the station. Within Khmelnitsky NPP 30km zone, assessments show conclusion that the main source of emissions for human organisms is from the following radionuclides: 40K, 238U, 232Th and products of their disintegration. Radionuclides from Khmelnitsky NPP emissions provide a negligible contribution. Within a couple of hours, a person gets almost the same exposure dose from natural background exposure as from Khmelnitsky NPP emissions within a year. Observed annual discharges of tritium and cesium-137 from Khmelnitska NPP to the external water bodies are provided in the Annex 11.3.2. Factual volumes of radioactive discharges are by orders lesser than their allowable indexes for KhNPP which are set resulting from the requirement of non-exceeding the appropriate quote of dose limit according to NRBU-97 (10 mcSv/year)
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Table 41 - Ways of formation of effective expected annual dose from gas and spray emissions on EAS KNPP differently distant from the plant, mSv/year. Azimuth 90° Radionuclide Cloud Inhalation Soil Food Cloud Inhalation Soil Food 1.5 km 3.0 km Ar-41 4,9E-06 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 3,3E-06 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Ba-140 8,6E-14 4,6E-11 5,5E-12 1,3E-16 5,9E-14 3,1E-11 3,8E-12 8,7E-17 Ce-141 2,1E-15 2,5E-12 6,3E-13 4,7E-17 1,4E-15 1,7E-12 4,3E-13 3,2E-17 Ce-144 2,9E-16 1,2E-11 7,3E-13 8,5E-14 2,0E-16 7,9E-12 4,9E-13 5,8E-14 Co-58 3,6E-13 1,4E-11 2,4E-13 1,6E-15 2,5E-13 9,6E-12 1,6E-13 1,1E-15 Co-60 1,7E-12 3,2E-10 4,0E-10 5,5E-11 1,2E-12 2,2E-10 2,7E-10 3,8E-11 Cr-51 1,0E-13 1,8E-12 2,4E-11 1,1E-17 6,9E-14 1,2E-12 1,7E-11 7,4E-18 Cs-134 3,1E-11 5,6E-09 1,8E-07 2,7E-08 2,1E-11 3,8E-09 1,3E-07 1,8E-08 Cs-137 1,8E-11 1,9E-08 9,5E-07 2,9E-06 1,2E-11 1,3E-08 6,5E-07 2,0E-06 Fe-59 5,5E-14 3,6E-12 2,1E-11 2,2E-16 3,8E-14 2,5E-12 1,4E-11 1,5E-16 I-131 1,1E-10 3,3E-07 1,6E-08 6,1E-12 7,3E-11 2,2E-07 1,1E-08 4,1E-12 I-132 7,7E-10 1,6E-09 5,4E-09 - 5,1E-10 1,0E-09 3,6E-09 - I-133 2,8E-10 1,1E-08 1,8E-09 - 1,9E-10 7,5E-09 1,2E-09 - I-135 6,4E-10 2,6E-09 6,1E-11 - 4,3E-10 1,7E-09 3,8E-11 - Kr-85 1,9E-08 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 1,3E-08 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Kr-85m 1,5E-06 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 1,1E-06 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Kr-87 1,6E-07 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 1,0E-07 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Kr-88 3,4E-06 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 2,3E-06 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Kr-89 4,9E-09 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 1,2E-09 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Kr-90 4,8E-10 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 1,2E-10 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Mn-54 3,7E-13 1,0E-11 1,0E-09 9,9E-12 2,5E-13 7,1E-12 6,9E-10 6,8E-12 Nb-95 1,1E-14 6,5E-13 1,7E-11 3,8E-16 7,2E-15 4,4E-13 1,2E-11 2,6E-16 Ru-103 6,7E-15 1,1E-12 2,6E-12 3,2E-15 4,6E-15 7,3E-13 1,8E-12 2,2E-15 Ru-106 1,4E-16 6,6E-13 4,5E-13 8,0E-13 9,7E-17 4,5E-13 3,1E-13 5,4E-13 Sr-90 0,0E+00 1,4E-11 0,0E+00 1,7E-09 0,0E+00 9,7E-12 0,0E+00 1,2E-09 Te-132 4,5E-15 9,4E-13 1,9E-13 4,3E-18 3,1E-15 6,4E-13 1,3E-13 2,9E-18 Xe-131 4,3E-07 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 2,9E-07 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Xe-133 5,0E-05 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 3,4E-05 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Xe-133m 6,0E-10 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 4,2E-10 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Xe-135 1,3E-05 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 9,1E-06 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Xe-135m 1,4E-06 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 7,7E-07 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Xe-137 2,6E-10 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 7,5E-11 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Xe-138 2,9E-07 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 1,5E-07 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 Zr-95 4,3E-14 6,8E-12 2,5E-11 8,0E-17 2,9E-14 4,6E-12 1,7E-11 5,5E-17 Н-3 0,0E+00 8,0E-06 0,0E+00 - 0,0E+00 5,5E-06 0,0E+00 - TOTAL 6,0E-05 8,4E-06 1,2E-06 2,9E-06 4,1E-05 5,7E-06 7,9E-07 2,0E-06
4.5.11.2 Non-radiation residual impact
Chemical impact Water from the cooling pond can reach Horyn river (i) by filtration through the dam or (ii) through discharge to Gniloi Rog river which flows to Vilia and later Horyn rivers. Seepage from the cooling pond is estimated to 9.53 million m3/year (0,3 m3/s)and is uniformly distributed along the 7 km dam. The impact of seepage on Horyn river quality is considered as negligible. Controlled purges of water from the cooling pond have a more significant impact on river Horyn. For this reason, they are allowed only during the non-vegetation period (from October 1 to May 1). Water quality monitoring results are presented in appendix chapter 11.3.3. Normative requirements are met.
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Air: The main sources of pollutant emissions into the atmosphere by Khmelnisky NPP are the 6 backup diesel power generators and reserve starting boiler which in operation release: carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide and particulate matter. The generators are situated within the NPP compound with other subsidiary industries or workshops (electronic/electric repair company, heat automation and measurement, chemical plant, oil and diesel tanks, underground utilities, etc). The NPP motor vehicles fleet includes 213 automobiles (115 gasoline and 98 diesel) and mainly release contaminants - gasoline, nitrogen dioxide, hydrocarbons. Following an inventory of atmospheric pollutant emissions by Khmelnitsky NPP, the total emissions of pollutants per year was estimated to 488 tones. This figure does not exceed the norm which is expressed in tons without differentiation of the pollutants, which is an uncommon but not critical approach.
Thermal impact Thermal impacts on the environment result from heat emissions directly to the air or from warm water discharges (hydraulic structures, spray pond, cooling pond and all other heat exchange equipments). The temperature of water in the cooling pond in summer does not exceed 30°C, which is considered as the upper limit for aquatic life. Hydrothermal model calculations and surface temperature survey of the cooling pond showed that the temperature of water exceeds the natural water temperature in the Horyn river by 3 to 5.5°C with one 1000 MW unit in operation, and by 8 to 12°C with two 1000 MW unit in operation.
4.5.11.3 Possible changes of residual impacts resulting from the implementation of tasks set by the state programs and governmental decisions Results of analysis of possible changes of residual impacts resulting from the implementation of the tasks listed in chapter 1.7.2 set by the state programs and the governmental decisions concerning the development of nuclear energy in Ukraine and the relevant issues are provided in Table 42
Table 42 – Forecasted changes of residual impacts from Khmelnitsky NPP resulting from the implementation of the state programs and governmental decisions
Tasks set by the state programs and governmental decisions (numbers in accordance with chapter 1.7.2)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Radiation impact Changes Changes1) Minor No No Changes3) change2) changes changes
Chemical impact Changes Changes 1) No No No No changes changes changes changes
Thermal impact Changes Changes1) No No No No changes changes changes changes
Electric and magnetic impact Changes Changes 1) No No No No changes changes changes changes
Acoustic impact Changes Changes 1) No No No No changes changes changes changes
1) intensiveness of all impact factors will increase approximately twice
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2) changes are connected to the action term of impact factors without changing their intensity and concequences 3) volumes of SNF which are temporarily stored in the cooling-down ponds can increase resulting from the increase of minimal terms of “wet” storage until 8 years before sending SNF to the DSSNF of the “dry” type. 4) volumes of RAW which are collected on the NPP sites can be changed resulting from the processing and also as the result of sending RAW to the storage after the construction of the relevant storage. .
4.5.12 Changes in residual impact as a result of SUP implementation The implementation of the SUP will not result in measurable changes of the quantities of heat and chemical components released by the NPP in the aquatic or atmospheric environment. In addition, the SUP measures will not result in any significant changes of the noise or electromagnetic emissions from the NPP. Therefore, the changes in residual impacts as a result of the SUP implementation can be considered as negligible. SUP implementation also will not affect the forecasted changes of residual impacts of RIvne NPP resulting from the implementation of tasks set by the state programs and governmental decisions described in chapter 4.5.11.3.
4.5.13 Assessment of NPP’s environmental impact under normal operation as a result of SUP In the light of the previous chapters, it is clear that the SUP will not result in measurable changes of the impact of the Khmelnitsky NPP on the technogenic and natural environment under normal operation. The impacts on the social environment are expected to be positive, through the implementation of the proposed measures for (i) improved information of the public and (i) improved HSE practices.
4.5.14 Complex assessment of ecological risks in case of accident on NPP (regardless of SUP) An accident with a level equal to 4 or lower on the INES scale would not result in significant ecological risks. Ecological risks within the non-designed accident on KNPP are acceptable with taking into account the probability of such accident, scholastic risks for the social environment and the scopes of the foreseen pollution of the natural environmental components. Assessment of changes in ecological risks in case of accident on NPP as a result of SUP
4.5.15 Complex assessment of changes in ecological risks in case of accident on NPP as a result of SUP With reference to the description of measures proposed in Table 6 (chapter 1.6), the following changes in ecological risks will result from the implementation of the SUP at the Khmelnitsky NPP:
Table 43 – Changes in ecological risks as a result of SUP at the Khmelnitsky NPP Group of Sub-group of measures Changes in ecological risks after SUP measures reduced accident reduced accident probability consequences resulting from improved capacity to manage emergency situations 0 Background 01 Certification x 1 Core and fuel 11 Neutron and physical characteristics of the x management reactor core:
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Group of Sub-group of measures Changes in ecological risks after SUP measures reduced accident reduced accident probability consequences resulting from improved capacity to manage emergency situations 13 Fuel Management x x 2 Components 21 Primary system x x integrity 22 Pressurized systems important for safety x x 23 Reactor (including vessel) x 24 Other x 3 Systems 31 Ensuring the system reactivity x 32 Ensuring the reserve of primary circuit coolant x x 33 Primary circuit cooling x x 34 Primary circuit pressure x 35 Auxiliary systems x x 4 41 Information system x x Instrumentation 42 Reactor control and protection system x x and Control 43 Safety management systems x (I&C) 44 Monitoring and control systems x x 5 Power supply 51 External sources x x 52 Energy distribution x x 6 Containment 61 Containment bypass risk x and buildings 62 Integrity x 7 Internal 71 Fire protection x hazards 72 Protection against flooding x 8 External 81 Seismic x hazards 9 Accident 91 Safety analyses x analyses 92 Accident management x
4.5.16 Economic efficiency of SUP implementation according to ecological impact on population health The implementation of the SUP is driven by compliance objectives, not economic objectives. An estimation of the economic efficiency of the SUP will be possible after the PSA has been done, which is one of the measures of the SUP, i.e. once the accident probability resulting from the SUP is known.
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4.6 Environmental impact change in the process of SUP implementation The following table summarize the impacts associated with the SUP, as discussed in the previous chapters. For each item: • "no impact" means that the impact of the NPP on its environment will not be changed as a result of the SUP implementation; • "no negative impact & less risks" means that (i) in normal operation conditions, the impact of the NPP on its environment will not be changed negatively as a result of the SUP implementation and (ii), the risks of negative impacts associated with emergency situations are reduced, either because the probability of occurrence of such emergency is reduced and/or because the NPP will have the possibility to limit the negative consequences of such emergency.
Table 44 - Environmental impact change in the process of SUP implementation Water bodies Air & Social underground Soil Flora and fauna atmosphere surface water environment water 1 Radiation impact 1.1 Gas and no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative aerosol radiation impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact risks risks risks risks risks risks 1.2 Estimation of no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative transboundary impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impacts risks risks risks risks risks risks no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative 1.3 Liquid impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less no impact impact & less radioactive waste risks risks risks risks risks 1.4 Periodic flushes from no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact spaying or cooling ponds 1.5 Solid no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact radioactive waste 2 Chemical impact 2.1 Emissions no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact from combustion no negative no negative no negative 2.2 Infiltration to no impact impact & less impact & less no impact no impact impact & less ground water risks risks risks 2.3 Non radioactive liquid no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact waste 2.4 Non radioactive solid no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact waste 3 Physical impacts 3.1 Thermal no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact impact 3.2 Noise and electromagnetic no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact radiation no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative Conclusion impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less risks risks risks risks risks risks
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5 EA OF SUP IMPLEMENTATION AT THE SOUTH-UKRAINIAN NPP
5.1 General characteristic of the NPP
5.1.1 Area and location of the NPP The site of the South-Ukrainian NPP is located in the Arbuzynka rayon of Mykolayiv oblast on the left bank of the South Buh River, 2.7 km from this river.
Figure 8 – South-Ukrainian NPP and surroundings
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5.1.2 Short description of the South-Ukrainian NPP’s industrial activity and hazard class The South-Ukrainian NPP produces heat and electricity. As a result of this activity, the South-Ukrainian NPP produces the following types of non- radioactive wastes: • 1st hazard class: burnt-out mercury-containing lamps. • 2nd hazard class: spent petrochemical products; non-ferrous scrap metal; oily rags; spent batteries. • 3rd hazard class: oil polluted sand; PVC film. • 4th hazard class : heat insulating waste; waste wood; household garbage; waste calcium carbide (from welding); used dressings; processed rubber; broken glass; ferrous metals; spent medical instrument; silt or sediment from car washing.
5.1.3 Short description of the South-Ukrainian NPP’s production The first unit of the South-Ukrainian NPP was commissioned in December 1982. Units 2 and 3, 1000 MW each, were commissioned respectively in 1985 and 1989. The South-Ukrainian NPP is the nuclear power plant where the project on nuclear fuel diversification is being implemented. The main characteristics of the South-Ukrainian NPP are: • Number of reactors: 3 • Type of reactor: VVER-1000 (pressurized water) • Total electricity production capacity: 3 000 MW The annual contribution of the South-Ukrainian NPP to the total electricity production in the country exceeds 10%.
5.1.4 Data on raw material, land, water, energy and other resources used The South-Ukrainian NPP uses the following resources for industrial purposes: • Land: the area of nuclear power plant (including the cooling pond) is around 10 km²: o Industrial site – 3.3 km² o Tashlik reservoir – 7 km² • Water evapourated for cooling needs : about 40 million m3 a year; • Electricity for own needs: 6 to 7% of the total electricity generated; • Diesel fuel (for emergency power supply and others): 2 000 m3 reserve ; • Oil (for turbines and others): 6 730 m3 reserve;
5.1.5 Description of the NPP technological process Each of the three units of South-Ukrainian NPP includes the following equipment: • VVER 1000: o pressurized water reactor VVER-1000 o K-1000-60/3000-2 o generator type TVV-1000-4
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Pressurised water reactors (PWR) are common throughout the world (for a description of the principles of pressurized water reactors, see the technical presentation and schematic in appendix chapter 11.3.1). South-Ukrainian NPP is connected to the Unified Energy System of Ukraine.
Figure 9 – South-Ukrainian NPP layout
1. reactor buildings 6. solid radwaste storage 2. turbine hall 7. auxiliary building 3. diesel generator 8. laboratory and service building 4. unit pumping station 9. administrative building & checkpoint 5. radioactive waste treatment building 10. spray pond
5.1.6 SUP measures aiming at mitigation or elimination of hazardous emissions into environment None of the SUP measures will result in a mitigation or elimination of hazardous emissions into the environment in normal operation conditions. Nevertheless, the following measures will result in a reduction of the risk of radioactive release and therefore, are to be considered as a mitigation of hazardous emissions risks into the environment: • for VVER-1000 (302-338) reactors: 21302; 21303; 22101; 22102; 22201 to 22203; 22302; 22401; 23201; 23301; 23302; 23401 to 23403; 23502 to 23504; 24101 to 24104; 24202 to 24205; 24401 to 24404; 25101; 26201 to 26203; 27101 to 27103; 27201 to 27203 (refer to technical appendix chapter 11.1 for the description of the measures). • for VVER-1000 (320) reactors: 11303; 12102; 12301; 12401; 13302; 13304; 13306; 13402; 13403; 13502; 13506; 13507; 13510; 15201 to 15208; 15210; 16101; 16201 to 16203; 17101; 17102; 17104; 17201 (refer to technical appendix chapter 11.1 for the description of the measures).
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5.1.7 Description of spent nuclear fuel treatment scheme & spent nuclear fuel volumes Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) resulting from the production of energy in nuclear reactors is one of the most important components of the NPP process cycle. After its use in the reactor core, nuclear fuel is moved to reactor cooling pools to be stored for 4-5 years to decrease residual energy release. Residual energy release is a process induced by radioactive decay of fission products. After cooling in the reactor pools, SNF is loaded into special containers in order to ensure its safety during transportation, and is sent to a SNF storage facility. The current state of the world’s technological advances in the nuclear energy sector do not allow for making final conclusions on the subsequent management of SNF. However, there are several existing approaches applied globally to the subsequent management of SNF: 1. Deferred decision is provided for long-term SNF storage. It that allows for changing a decision on subsequent SNF management, taking into account new technologies and economic factors. The deferred decision is applied by Argentina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, South Korea, and Spain. 2. Processing of SNF. There are two types of processing – domestic or abroad: • Local processing – processing of SNF to obtain components and substances that may be used and is economically justified (France, Great Britain, India, Japan, and Russia); • Processing in other countries – processing of SNF with the return of medium-radioactive waste back to the country or owner (Australia, Bulgaria, Greece, the Netherlands, Switzerland); 3. Disposal – SNF cooling and burial in deep geological formations (Finland, Sweden and USA). In Ukraine, spent fuel from Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South Ukraine NPPs is transported to Russia. VVER-1000’s SNF is transported for storage and VVER-440’s spent fuel (Rivne NPP-1,2) is transported for processing. The experience in storage of spent nuclear fuel in "dry" containers gained by Ukrainian experts at the Zaporizhzhya NPP site allowed the operating organization Energoatom to sign an Agreement with the American company "Holtec International" to construct a centralized dry-type spent nuclear fuel storage facility (CSFSF) for Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South Ukraine NPPs. The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No.131 of 4 February 2008 approved the CSFSF feasibility study. The construction of this facility may start after approval of the relevant law by the Supreme Council of Ukraine. The average annual amount of spent fuel transferred from one VVER -1000 reactor for storage constitutes 42 fuel assemblies. The South-Ukrainian NPP uses approximately 126 assemblies annually.
5.1.8 Description of radioactive waste treatment scheme and radioactive waste volumes
5.1.8.1 Solid radwaste SRW are classified in 3 Groups according to their radioactivity level: • Group I radwaste includes: cleaning and insulating material, specialised use uniforms, footwear, individual radiation protection means, flexible PVC, construction waste, implements and tools. • Group II radwaste includes: pipework, reinforcement, parts of pumps and drives of control and protection systems, filters of ventilation systems, waste metal, heat insulation material, detachable detectors. • Group III radwaste includes: intermediate hoses, scram control/shim assembly tops, ionisation chambers with communication lines, heat and energy release detectors with communication lines. Group I and II radwaste is stored in the concrete containers of the storage facility, the capacity of which has been calculated on the basis of the following criteria:
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• term of storage:10 years; • possibility of further removal and reburial; • storage of flammable and non-flammable waste in plastic bags; and • storage of specialised ventilation filters without prior processing. Group III radwaste is stored in concrete containers. The storage capacity is calculated to fit the NPP operation period. The following table shows the amount of SRW which are anuually generated at the South- Ukrainian NPP.
Table 45 – Quantity of solid radwaste generated in 2010 (South-Ukrainian NPP) SRW category Type of SRW Generated SRW (m3)
Low activity (group I) burnable waste 94 compressible waste 117 metals 71 not treatable wastes 16 aerosol filters 13 Total 311 Intermediate activity (group II) metals - others 4 Total 4 High activity (group III) Total 0,168
5.1.8.2 Liquid radioactive waste Liquid radioactive waste (LRW) is treated in two steps. A primary concentration by evaporation is performed in two dedicated buildings. Concentrated solutions formed as a result of this primary evaporation are sent to a temporary storage. Then, the concentrated liquid is sent to a deep evaporation facility. The following table shows the amount of LRW which is annually generated at the South-Ukrainian NPP.
Table 46 – Quantity of liquid radwaste generated in 2010 (South-Ukrainian NPP) Type of LRW Generated waste m3 Vat residue 116 Used sorbent 7,3
5.1.9 Description of hazardous and general industrial waste treatment scheme and volumes The basic characteristics and treatment methods for nonradioactive wastes produced by the South-Ukrainian NPP are provided in the table below.
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Table 47 – Non-radioactive waste volumes and treatment (South-Ukrainian NPP) Hazard Acceptable # Name of the group and type of waste Location category limits, t/year 1 Lamps and wastes that include mercury 1 38850 pieces Temporary storage before collection and recycling 2 Damaged or wasted batteries and accumulators 2 17.6 Temporary storage before collection and recycling 3 Damaged or wasted alkaline batteries 2 2.8 Temporary storage before collection and recycling 4 Wastes of technical oils 2 124 Temporary storage before collection and recycling 5 Lubricants and petroleum oil from sewage 2 5 Oil catchers of cleaning facilities Sludge from machinery and mechanisms 6 2 10 Temporary storage before collection and recycling cleaning In closed metallic containers within production 7 Damaged, wasted or polluted rubbing clothes 3 5.4 objects In closed metallic containers within production 8 Damaged, wasted or polluted filtering materials 3 1.1 objects In closed metallic containers within production 9 Sand polluted with petrochemicals 3 15 objects 10 Mazut-polluted sand 3 40 Landfills 11 Damaged or wasted wood and wooden products 3 35.1 Temporary storage before collection and recycling 12 Wasted lubricating-cooling liquids 3 4.2 Closed metallic capacities within production objects Wasted transformers and condensers that In closed warehouses with restricted staff access 13 contain polychloride biphenyl or polychloride 4 3.1 before transfer to other owner tetraphthalate 14 Wastes of oil not marked otherwise 4 0.5 Closed metallic tanks before transfer to other owner 15 Bitumen and rubberoid wastes 4 360 Temporary storage before collection and recycling Temporary storage & transfer to industrial wastes 16 Damaged or wasted ion exchange saturate resin 4 350 dump Temporary storage & transfer to industrial wastes 17 Anthracitous bits 4 160 dump Temporary storage & transfer to industrial wastes 18 Wasted brick-lining and refractories 4 3.5 dump 19 Solid wastes obtained from water desalination 4 665.2 Sludge storage Remnants obtained in the process of sand 20 4 0.2 Designed sand grounds (2) withdrawal 21 Sludge from municipal sewage cleaning 4 2227 Designed sludge ponds 22 Mixed municipal wastes 4 2440 Metallic containers within hard-cover 23 Tyres 4 50 Hard-cover grounds, closed warehouses 24 Cuttings and remnants of textile materials 4 15.25 Warehouses on shelves or in packages Cardboard boxes & transfer to industrial wastes 25 Damaged or worn-out shoes 4 7.6 dump 26 Lump wood wastes, wooden scobs 4 91.6 Metallic containers for temporary storage 27 Damaged or wasted rubber goods and materials 4 9.4 Metallic containers within production objects Temporary storage & transfer to industrial wastes 28 Construction and destruction of buildings 4 552 dump Temporary storage & transfer to industrial wastes 29 Isolation wastes 4 50 dump 30 Broken glass and waste glass 4 32.1 Metallic containers on concrete grounds Temporary storage & transfer to industrial wastes 31 Welding wastes (carbide sludge) 4 1.15 dump 32 Wastes, materials and goods made of plastic 4 30 Warehouses 33 Incompletely burned material 4 300 Designed fenced ground & transfer to industrial dump 34 Abrasive wheel, abrasive paper 4 6.8 Metallic packages within production objects 35 Used medical instruments or equipment 4 0.1 Cardboard boxes in the office of the head nurse Organic wastes from kitchen, suitable for 36 4 20.6 Tank of subsidiary premises of dining rooms composting Metallic containers in warehouses & transfer to other 37 Paper and cardboard waste paper 4 30. owner 38 Furnace clinker 4 1.65 Capacities on forging grounds
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Plastic bags before transfer to industrial wastes 39 Wastes that are not classified 4 1.2 dump 40 Wastes of fire fighting substances 4 1.0 In plastic bags on concrete ground 41 Wasted means of filtering (respirators) 4 1.5 Boxes and other packages within production objects Solids parts of oil separators and water 42 4 220 Sludge pond of cleaning facilities separators Temporary storage & transfer to industrial wastes 43 Broken ceramic isolators 4 5.1 dump Damaged or wasted asbestos-containing 44 4 4.975 In containers or plastic bags within production objects materials Off-grade photo films and paper that include 45 4 0.1 Premises of photo laboratory 8 silver 46 Damaged or wasted photochemicals 4 0.25 Premises of photo laboratory 8 47 Remnants of chemical reagents 1-4 1.5 Laboratories premises, special purpose package Temporary storage & transfer to industrial waste 48 Dismounted soil 4 2000 dump 49 Off-grade office and computer machines 4 9.5 In warehouses before transfer to other owner 50 Used small plastic bins 4 0.5 In warehouses before transfer to population Wastes from cleaning of streets and public 51 4 1814 Underground concrete pits places 52 Oily crushed stone 4 0 Designed fenced concrete ground, before usage 53 Sand from potable or technical water preparation 4 0 Designed fenced concrete ground, before usage 54 Sludge produced during water clarification 4 0 Sludge storage Materials, and product announced to be wastes 55 by producer or supplier that are not marked 4 0 Biopools otherwise
The dynamics of hazardous non-radioactive waste production at the South-Ukrainian NPP from 2007 to 2009 and their distribution according to hazard category are shown in the table below.
Table 48 – Non-radioactive waste dynamics at South-Ukrainian NPP (t/year, 2007 to 2009) Hazard category 2007 2008 2009 Category 1 4,231 5,709 4,498 Category 2 11,093 24,328 35,827 Category 3 1057,801 670,76 333,646 Category 4 4375,299 4409,982 3935,86
5.1.10 SUP measures aiming at reducing wastes volumes or improving waste treatment The SUP for South-Ukrainian NPP does not contain any measure that aims at reducing the volumes of technological (non-radioactive) wastes or at improving the ecological or sanitary security of the treatment of these wastes.
5.1.11 Description of design and non-design accidents analyzed The criteria of acceptability for the radiological consequences of accidents are defined by NRBU- 97. In principle, having taken the lightest countermeasure which consists in limiting outdoor activities for children, the dose of radiations received by individuals does not exceed 10 mSv, 100 mGy and 300 mGy respectively for the entire body, thyroid and skin. For the analysis of the radiation consequences of an accident at the South-Ukrainian NPP, the following design accidents occurring at nominal operations conditions were studied: • Maximum design accident (MDA) – an accident caused by a bilateral rupture of cooling systems (loss-of-coolant accident, LOCA) on the nominal power level;
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• A decompression of the cap of the steam generator collector; • Accident during fuel and spent fuel management; and • Accident caused by the rupture of the cooling line outside the reactor. Analysis of serious over designed accidents for SUNPP is planned within the scope of works for safety analysis foreseen within the SUP measures.
5.1.12 Design solutions reducing risks or mitigating consequences of accidents (regardless of SUP) Designed solutions for South-Ukrainian NPP are aiming at the reduce of risk and/or mitigation of the concequences of accidents based on the approaches similar to the designed solutions of Zaporizhzhya NPP described in unit.2.1.12.
5.1.13 SUP measures aiming at reducing accident risks or mitigating accident consequences As part of the preparation of the SUP, a comprehensive safety analysis of the South-Ukrainian NPP has been carried out by Ukrainian and international experts. This in-depth safety analysis was carried out using up-to-date methodologies, including probabilistic safety analysis. The safety upgrade engineering solutions that will be implemented within the SUP are related to: 0. the certification of all safety equipment 1. the safety of reactor core characteristics and fuel management operations 2. the preservation of the integrity of the components of the reactor, primary and secondary cooling systems 3. the safety of the operation of the NPP systems (reactivity, primary circuit and auxiliary systems) 4. the modernization of information, monitoring and control equipment and control rooms 5. the safety of power supply 6. limiting the risks of containment by-pass or loss of integrity 7. improving the prevention and early detection of internal risks (e.g. fire, flooding) 8. reviewing the seismic risks and ensuring regular updates of the seismic information and analysis 9. developing procedures for analyzing accidents and managing accident situations
5.1.14 Sanitary-protection zone and monitoring zone of NPP The sanitary-protection zone of the South-Ukrainian NPP extends for a 2.5 km radius around the NPP. The monitoring zone extends for a 30km radius around the NPP. The radiation monitoring system of the South-Ukrainian NPP aims at performing the following functions: • monitoring the status of protective barriers; • radiation process control: managing the condition of protective barriers and content of radionuclides in the technological environments; • radiation dosimetry; • individual monitoring; and • radiation monitoring of the environment; • Radiation monitoring of hot water supplied by the NPP An automated radiation monitoring system named "ASKRO" provides the control of radiation situation at the NPP and within the SPZ and monitoring zone. A map showing the location of monitoring points is presented in Appendix chapter 11.2.1.
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Observations of the radiation environment are undertaken continuously in an automatic mode. The main functions of ASKRO are: (i) automation of measurement processes, (ii) data collection, (iii) data processing, (iv) data display, (v) archiving and storage of information related to the parameters of the radiation situation. ASKRO also provides control over the accidental release of radioactive substances, determines the radiation dose from radioactive fallout, predicts the dispersal of radionuclides in the environment depending on weather conditions, and provides information to the public and officials.
5.2 Assessment of impact on natural environment
5.2.1 Climate and microclimate
5.2.1.1 Short description of the existing state within the Monitoring Zone The climate in the area of the South-Ukrainian NPP is temperate continental with dry summers and snowy winters. The climate is influenced by both marine and continental air masses. The average annual air temperature in the 30km zone of the South-Ukrainian NPP is 8.6°C, the absolute maximum is 35°C, and the absolute minimum is minus 34°C. The average annual relative humidity is 73.0% (annual average vapour pressure is 8.9 hPa). The average total annual rainfall is 465 mm, out of which 306 mm falls during the warm season (April-October). The observed daily maximum rainfall reached 212 mm. Throughout the year, north-western and north-eastern winds prevail. The highest monthly average wind speeds are observed in January-March (4.8-5.3 m/s), and the lowest in July-October (3.4-3.6 m/s). The average number of days with strong winds (equal to or more than 15 m/s) for the year is 30, (windiest year: 66). Most often, strong winds occur in late winter to early spring. The observed maximum wind speed reached 24-28 m/s with gusts of up to 34 m/sec. In July 1997, the maximum wind speed recorded in the area of the NPP was 26 m/s.
5.2.1.2 Impact of SUP on climate and micro-climate
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP will have no significant impact on the climate and micro-climate characteristics of the South-Ukrainian NPP ‘s surroundings. Transport means (train and trucks) used for the supply of equipment and transport of workers for the implementation of the SUP will induce minor Green House Gas (GHG) emissions that may be considered negligible.
Impact after implementation of the SUP The SUP does not aim at increasing the production of electricity. Therefore, no increase in the quantity of heat or water vapour released by the NPP in the environment is expected. Consequently, the SUP has no expected impact on the micro-climate around the South-Ukrainian NPP. The SUP will also have no influence on the volume of GHGs emitted annually by the operation of the NPP and therefore, no impact on the global climate is expected.
5.2.2 Air quality
5.2.2.1 Present characteristics within the NPP Monitoring Zone Physical air characteristics connected to the mereorology and climate are provided in chapter 5.2.1. The emission of air pollutants from the SUNPP are limited to the emissions from the emergency diesel generators of safety systems, as well as emissions from the vehicles, machinery, diesel locomotives and auxiliary productions located at the main site and other sites.
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The main method of assessment and records of environmental pollution is the estimation method; estimations are done quarterly based on the data concerning the present-day material balance of NPP. Except the estimation method control the selective sampling and analysis is done. Actual air emissions from the stationary sources of the SUNPP are significantly lower than the allowed limits. Detailed information concerning radioactive pollution of the surface air is provided in unit 5.5.11.1 and in Annex 11.3.2. Observations of the surface air within the monitoring zone of SUNPP state that: • The concentration of radionucledes in the air is by orders lower than the acceptable concentrations.
5.2.2.2 Forecasted changes regardless of SUP (normal operations or in case of an accident) The South-Ukrainian NPP contributes to a limited extent to the overall emissions of pollutants within the 30km zone. For the next few years, the main drivers for the future evolution of air quality in the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km monitoring zone are: • the evolution of the activity of the main polluting industries: thermal power plant, mines and metallurgy; • the evolution of the volumes of pesticides sprayed by the agricultural sector; • the evolution of standards, norms and emissions permits applicable to industries (which applies to the South-Ukrainian NPP); • the evolution of oil consumption and norms for vehicles. In case of an accident, and depending on the nature of the accident, significant volumes of radioactive pollutants and of dust could be released into the atmosphere. In case of an accident, and depending on the nature of the accident, significant volumes of radioactive pollutants and dust could potentially be released into the atmosphere.Radiologic impacts of air pollution caused by designed accidents are analyzed in the unit 5.3.2..
5.2.2.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted changes
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP will result in a slight increase in traffic (estimated to increase by less than 10%) in the vicinity of the NPP, for the supply of works and for the transport of additional workers from sub-contractors in charge of the SUP implementation. Thus, the implementation of the SUP will result in additional but negligible air emissions. No large earthworks with large dust emissions are planned.
Impact after implementation of the SUP The SUP does not aim at increasing the production of electricity. Therefore, no increase in the quantity of heat, water vapour, dust or emissions released by the NPP into the environment is expected. The SUP will also not result in the additional use of vehicles, and therefore will not induce additional releases from the vehicle fleet. The SUP will reduce the risk of nuclear accident, and therefore the risk of large-scale air contamination, a positive impact from the SUP. In addition, in some specific cases, the SUP will also allow keeping control of the NPP even in case of a large scale accident, which in certain cases will result in a reduction of the quantities of pollutants released into the air.
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5.2.3 Geological environment
5.2.3.1 Present characteristic within the NPP Monitoring Zone
Geological structure and tectonics The geology of the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone consists of a wide-range of structures from loose quaternary deposits to crystalline rocks of the Eastern European platform basal complex. In terms of tectonics, the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone lies within the Kerovograd ensemble of the Ukrainian shield of South-Ukrainian monocline. There are a number of major tectonic faults within the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone. None of these faults are considered to be tectonically active (absence of movements in the quaternary period i.e. last 10 000-20 000 years).
Seismicity The latest seismic studies at the South-Ukrainian NPP’s territory confirmed the design magnitude values: SLE – state standard magnitude 5; and MCE – state standard magnitude 6. It should be mentioned that irrespective of the above mentioned additional studies, the company «Stevenson and Associates (Cleveland, Ohio, USA) published analysis of seismicity levels of NPP grounds in Eastern Europe that shows that it is recommended that the value of peak horizontal seismic acceleration for South-Ukrainian NPP does not exceed 0.12g [12].
Ground water The territory of the South-Ukrainian NPP is characterized by an alluvial loam aquifer on an open fissured granite aquifer. The thickness of the upper part ranges from 3.5 to 14.5 m. On average, the thickness of the granite aquifer is 6 to 9 m (locally down to 29 m). The aquifer is free, protected from infiltration of precipitations by clay and loamy quaternary and Neocene deposits. The Tashlyk River drains the aquifer. In connection with the creation of the Tashlyk reservoir, a new technogenic aquifer was created in eolian loams and alluvial loess-like loams of the quaternary period. The average thickness of this aquifer is 4 m.
5.2.3.2 Impact of the SUP on the geological environment The SUP includes the erection and commissioning of additional seismic monitoring equipment (measures 13501, 18101) as recommended by IAEA, as well as various measures to improve the knowledge and understanding of seismic risks in the South-Ukrainian NPP zone. This is a positive impact of the SUP. The implementation of the SUP does not include any underground works or large earthworks. Therefore, the implementation and the operation of the SUP are not expected to have any impact on the geology of the zone. In addition, none of the SUP measures are likely to induce man-made seismicity.
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5.2.4 Aquatic environment (ground water, surface water basins)
5.2.4.1 Present characteristic within the NPP Monitoring Zone For cooling needs, the South-Ukrainian NPP uses water from the Tashlyk reservoir close to the South Buh River.
Table 49 – Main characteristics of Tashlyk reservoir
Normal water level (NWL) 99,5 m Dead water level 95,0 m Volume at NWL 86,0 106 m3 Surface at NWL 8,6 km2 Average depth 10 m Maximum depth 50 m
The South Buh River is 806 km long and has a catchment area of 63 700 km². The river valley forms a canyon with a width ranging from 170 to 350 m, and a height around 50 m. The river has no floodplain. Depending on the bed morphology and on the season, the width of the river itself ranges from 60 to 200 m. The river regime is determined by snow melting and to a lesser extent on winter stock. The Southern Buh River has a mean annual flow of 92 m3/s. Surface and ground waters are monitored within the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone, and the main observations over recent years are the following: • in connection with the creation of the Tashlyk reservoir, the level of ground water at the NPP site increased in the recent years; • the continued flooding of the industrial area leads to a deterioration of the strength and deformation of loam located in the core of shallow foundations and pipelines, and increases the aggressiveness of water towards concrete and metal; • the mineralization of the Tashlyk reservoir has increased regularly over the past few years. The reservoir also suffers from eutrophication. Detailed information concerning radioactive pollution of the aquatic environment is provided in unit 5.5.11.1 and in Annex 11.3.2.
5.2.4.2 Forecasted changes regardless to SUP (normal operation or in case of accidents) The long-term changes expected in the underground and surface water pattern of the South- Ukrainian NPP’s 30km monitoring zone are driven by the following factors: • a rise in the ground water level due to the creation of the Tashlyk reservoir is still ongoing; • the mineralization of the Tashlyk reservoir will keep increasing in relation to the operation of the NPP. In case of an accident and depending on the nature of accident the substantial volumes of radioactive pollutants can be potentially released to the aquatic environment. Radiologic concequences of the aquatic environment pollution resulting from the designed accidents are provided in unit 5.3.2.
5.2.4.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted state changes
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP does not include any underground works or large earthworks likely to affect the quality of underground or surface water.
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The implementation of the SUP does not require the consumption of large volumes of water, nor the release of large amounts of wastewater. Therefore, the implementation and the operation of the SUP are not expected to have any impact on underground or surface water within the 30km zone.
Impact during the operation of NPP and after implementation of the SUP The SUP does not aim at increasing the production of electricity. Therefore, no increase in the quantity of cooling water consumed by the NPP is expected. Consequently, the SUP has no expected long-term impacts on the quality or quantity of water used or released by the NPP. SUP will decrease the risk of accidents on NPPs and thus the risk of the aquatic radioactive pollution which is the positive impact of SUP. Moreover SUP implementation will improve the management of the accidental situations which will result in reduction of the amounts of emergency resets into the aquatic environment
5.2.5 Soil and landscape
5.2.5.1 Present characteristics within the NPP Monitoring Zone
Geomorphology In terms of geomorphology, the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone is a fairly diverse territory. The relief consists of a plain intensively cut by ravines, gullies and valleys (altitudes ranging from 98 to 120 m).The following relief shapes are noticed: 1. Leafed-accumulative platform plains. 2. Fluvial and fluvial-deltaic leafed-accumulative plains with moderate and relatively small rises.
Soil In terms of soil, loesses and loessial rocks prevail in the majority of the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone. The thickness of loessial rocks ranges from 15 to 25 m. In river valleys, the soil is formed by modern and ancient alluvial deposits of diverse origin. Among ancient deposits, sands and loams prevail. Within the 30km zone of SUNPP the following black soil subtypes can be determined: • thick black soil (tchernosium) with small and average humus contents; • typical black soil with small and average humus contents; and • black soil with small humus contents. In the valleys of the Pivdenny Buh River basin, young terraces composed of ancient alluvial sand and loams are common.
Detailed information concerning radioactive pollution of the soils is provided in unit 5.5.11.1 and in Annex 11.3.2.Landscape Four types of landscapes are common within the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone: 1. Northern-steppes herb-fescue-feather-grass landscapes with gorge groves on uplands, and anthropogenic cover on lowlands: • loessial leafy or slightly leafy uplands, separated with river valleys and gullies cut into crystalline rocks, with deep forested ravines and tchernosium; 2. Northern-steppes herb-fescue-feather-grass landscapes with gorge groves on uplands, and anthropogenic cover on lowlands: • loessial uplands, separated with ravines and wide gullies, cut into Neogene deposits, with typical average-humus tchernosium and with herb-fescue-feather-grass vegetation on slopes of rivers and gullies.
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3. Northern-steppes herb-fescue-feather-grass landscape with gorge groves on uplands and lowlands with anthropogenic cover on Neogene and Palaeogene deposits: • sand terraces with sod soil in composition with meadow salterns and insular pine forests. 4. Flood plain landscapes: • fluxes, meadow-steppes and saltern-brakish flood plains.
5.2.5.2 Forecasted changes of the present characteristics regardless of SUP, under normal operations or in case of an accident The South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone is characterized by the following exogenous processes which progressively alter the soil and landscape: • gully erosion; • areal erosion; • subsidence of loessial rocks; • water logging; and • impoundment with ground waters. Due to the creation of the Tashlyk reservoir and subsequent backwater, a technogenic aquifer was created in quaternary deposits. The resulting rise of ground water level at the NPP site was 3.8 to 4.9 m and continues at the speed of 12 cm/year. Locally, this led to water logging in the 30km zone but not inside the NPP’s industrial territory. None of the above-mentioned exogenous processes is directly influenced by or directly influences the operations of the NPP. Within the normal conditions of operation Khmelnitsky NPP is not providing any negative radiation impact on soils. In case of an accident and depending on the nature of accident the substantial volumes of radioactive pollutants from the atmosphere can potentially cover the earth surface. Radiologic concequences of the earth surface pollution resulting from the designed accidents are provided in unit 5.3.2.
5.2.5.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted changes The SUP consists of safety upgrade measures that will be implemented within the NPP site. As summarized in the following table, no impact is expected from the SUP on soils or the landscape.
Table 50 – Impact of SUP on soils and landscape within the South-Ukrainian NPP monitoring zone Impacts during Impact after Type of Impact implementation of the completion of the SUP SUP impact on gully erosion processes none none impacts on areal erosion none none impacts on subsidence of loessial rocks none none impact on water logging and ground water none none level
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5.2.6 Flora, fauna, reserves
5.2.6.1 Present characteristics within the NPP Monitoring Zone
Flora According to the geobotanic division of regions, the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone corresponds to herb-fescue-feather-grass steppes with domination of Stipa capillata, Stipa pulcherrima, Stipa Lessingiana, Festuca valesiaca, Koeleria dracilis, Linosyris villosa, and agrophytocenoses fragments. Local flora includes about 900 species of plants, out of which 27 are registered in the Red Book of Ukraine, and 4 are in the European Red List. A lot of Buh-region and Black Sea region endemic species grow here as well as relicts of different geological periods. The South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone consists of a mosaic of light pine forests (Pinus sylvestris) as well as agrophytocenoses. Changes in the vegetation cover of the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone were mainly driven by the development of agriculture and the over-use of forest resources but they happened long before the beginning of the NPP’s construction. Thus the NPP itself and its cooling pond did not have significant impacts on the regional flora species’ patterns. The NPP’s construction impacts were mitigated through the implementation of landscape gardening measures in the NPP area and surroundings. The majority of flora species of the region do not show signs of abnormal development; observed changes were determined by recreational, agricultural and technogenic impacts. No examples of mutation in relation with the NPP activities on flora were discovered.
Fauna According to the zoogeographical division of regions, the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone is part of the western steppe of the northern pre-Black-Sea region. Vertebrate fauna account for 300 species, out of which 46 are protected, in particular: Dnipro dragon eel, Dunay royal fish, large whip snake, booted eagle, river otter, and badger, among others. The fauna of the region regressed during the last century, due to the reduction of habitats (development of agriculture and deforestation). While the number of forest and edge species decreased, the number of riverine species grew significantly. Within the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone, no endemic species were identified, but there are a number of species which have disappeared or are decreasing, particularly the steppe species, which have almost disappeared from the region. The Buh River constitutes a significant source of food for those species of birds who feed themselves from wetlands and water bodies (larva, mosquitoes, small fish, and amphibians).
Natural reserves Within the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone there are 30 objects belonging to the natural reserve fund. These are mainly botanic, forest, hydrology, landscape, ichthyology and ornithology preserves, caves and natural monuments, as well as municipal parks. Along the South Buh River, starting from Voznesensk and further to the north through the whole 30km monitoring area of the NPP, extends a regional landscape park named “Granite and steppes region of the Buh River”. This park belongs to the natural reserve fund created in order to preserve and promote the sustainable use of natural landscapes of the middle course of the South Buh River and banks. The park is 7 394 hectares. It includes a great number of unique wild nature objects as well as near-Arbuzynsk and near-Blask-sea endemic species: • 900 species of vascular plants, 26 of them registered in the Red Book of Ukraine; • 9 000 species of insects, 56 of them registered in the Red Book of Ukraine; and • 300 species of vertebral animals, 46 of them registered in the Red Book of Ukraine.
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In the South Buh River valley, between the villages of Mygia and Oleksandrivks, 98 archaeological sites have been discovered. They are of great scientific importance and represent a continuous chronological line from Palaeolithic age (30 000 years b.c.). Especially interesting are remains of burials of Cimmerians, Scythians, Sarmatians and ancient Slavs Romans.
5.2.6.2 Forecasted changes of the present characteristics regardless of SUP, under normal operations or in case of an accident The South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone is characterized by the following trends and evolutions with regards to flora and fauna: • active processes of adventive materials introduction; • the development of ruderal species; • the decrease of steppe fauna and flora species; • the development of water bird species; • the possible introduction of new agricultural species; • the decrease of forest cover as a result of over-use and the resulting increase of erosion processes; and • an increase in the surface of protected areas (parks, reserves), as a result of State policy. Among the above mentioned possible evolutions, none is connected to the South-Ukrainian NPP operation. While the normal conditions of operation South-Ukrainian NPP is not providing any negative radiation impact on flora, fauna and reserves. In case of an accident and depending on the nature of accident the species of flora and fauna in the neighboring districts can get the relevant radioactive impact. Radiologic concequences of the agricultural species of flora and fauna pollution resulting from the designed accidents are provided in unit 5.3.2.
5.2.6.3 Impact of SUP measures on forecasted state changes The main impact of the South-Ukrainian NPP on natural habitats within the 30km zone is related to the release of heat in the environment. The SUP aims at improving the safety of NPPs under operation. The implementation of the SUP will not result in an increase or decrease in the quantity of heat released into the environment. The SUP implementation will only require minor works outside the NPP territory (installation of seismic monitoring equipment). Therefore, the SUP is not expected to have any impact on the fauna, flora or reserves of the monitoring zone. SUP will decrease the risk of accidents on NPPs and thus the risk of the radioactive pollution of the range of the existence of flora and fauna which is the positive impact of SUP. Moreover SUP implementation will improve the management of the accidental situations which will result in reduction of the amounts of emergency resets and ejections
5.3 Assessment of impact on social environment
5.3.1 Social baseline for the NPP Monitoring Zone The South-Ukrainian NPP is located in Mykolayiv oblast. In total, 143 200 people live within the 30km zone around the South-Ukrainian NPP, which represents a density of 50.7 people/km² (national average is 75 people/km²). The satellite city of Yuzhnoukrainsk, with a population of about 41 000 people is located at a distance of 2.5 km. The surrounding cities are:
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• Voznesensk: 30km from the NPP with a population of 37 000 people; • Konstantinovka: 4 km from the NPP with a population of 2 300 people; • Arbuzinka: 12 km from the NPP with a population of 6 500 people; • Aleksandrovka: 16 km from the NPP with a population of 5 500 people; • Domanevka: 26 km from the NPP with a population of 6 300 people; • Bratskoe: 29 km from the NPP with a population of 5 500 people. Agriculture is the second largest economic activity and the first source of employment for the area. The demographic situation in the region is characterized by a majority urban population (67.7%) and minority rural population (32.3%). It should be noted that the growth of the urban population in the South-Ukrainian NPP region was accompanied by a decrease in the rural population.The commissioning of the South-Ukrainian NPP provided jobs for about 6 000 people. Cardiovascular sicknesses prevail and are the main cause of death.
Table 51 - Demographic figures for the South-Ukrainian NPP (2009/2010 official statistics data) Average Migration Natural Gender Unemployment Total City Age classes monthly wage population population (m/w) rate population 2009 (UAH) growth growth Yuzhnoukrainsk 40 027 110 69 Voznesensk 37 315 36 -302 Konstantinovka 0-14: 14.4% 2 369 - - 1000/1168 15-64: 70.8% 9,2 % Arbuzinka 2 174 6 513 - - (oblast) >65: 14.9% (oblast) Aleksandrovka (oblast) 5 511 Domanevka 6 337 Bratskoe 5 532 0-14: 13.9% Ukraine average 1000/1194 15-64:70.0% 2 233 8.4 % 46 M (2010) 65 + :16.1%
Table 52 - Causes of death in South-Ukrainian NPP region (2009) Infections External Digestion Breathing Cardiovascular Neoplasm and Others cause system system parasites Nikolaevska Oblast 58,6% 12,6% 7,4% 5,3% 2,1% 3,3% 10,7% (2009) Ukraine 63.0% 11.8% 8.7% 4.4% 3.3% 2.2% 6.7% (2007)
5.3.2 Forecasted population health regardless of SUP (in normal operations or in case of accident) The population living in the surroundings of the South-Ukrainian NPP benefits from an environment with few industries and therefore little exposure to industrial pollutants. The South-Ukrainian NPP (together with the Tashlyk hydropower scheme) is the main industry of the area, and according to the calculated emissions values (see chapter 5.5.11.1), the population dose under nominal operation mode of South-Ukrainian NPP does not exceed quotas of dose limits for population (40 µSv/year). The drivers for the evolution of public health in the coming years will be:
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• the absence of development of heavily polluting industrial activities (no plans for any large industrial developments were known at the time of writing this report); • the access to medical services and medication, which depends on the population’s income- level; • the development of STDs; The operation of South-Ukrainian NPP presently has no measurable impact on the health of the population.. The maximum estimated doses resulting from designed accidents for the population are provided in the Table below.
Table 53 - Maximum estimated exposure doses resulting from design accidents (South-Ukrainian NPP) External exposure External exposure dose due to fallout on Dose to the thyroid Type of accident dose due to passing the soil under the due to inhalation of clouds, Sv most adverse weather the child, Sv conditions, Sv Radiation accident caused by 0.0008 0.091 0.063 bilateral rupture (LOCA MDA) Decompression of the cap of the 0.0007 0.075 0.163 steam generator collector Initial accident related to: Effective dose to the Thyroid dose Dose to exposed skin • the cooling of the spent fuel whole body, mSv mGy mGy pond; • fuel damage during the transfer operations; 3.44 9.25 66.3 • fall of fuel assembly into the cooling pond.
As it can be seen from the table the estimated maximum doses even within the designed accidents are much lower than the set by the acting norms level of population evacuation (50mZv for all body).
5.3.3 Impact of SUP measures on the outcome of Forecasted public health state
5.3.3.1 Impacts during the implementation of SUP
Population outside the NPP site The SUP implementation will only require minor works outside the NPP territory (installation of seismic monitoring equipment). The main impacts of the SUP implementation for populations living in the vicinity of the NPP will be disturbances caused by additional transport (supply of new equipment installed within the SUP) and the recruitment of temporary workers. The supply of equipment within the framework of the SUP is planned to be done mainly by train which is the preferred transportation mean used by Energoatom (there is the railway line to the NPP). The use of trucks is expected to be kept to a minimum. Consequently, the impacts on neighbouring populations’ health usually associated with the use of trucks (noise, air quality degradation and increased traffic risks) are expected to remain at insignificant levels during the SUP implementation. The possible employment of temporary workers by the subcontractors involved into SUP implementation will increase the temporary migration processes in the district which potentially can increase the risks of spreading the infection deceases. In particular, resulting from the random sexual relationships the risks of AIDS and other sexually transmitted deceases can
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increase. The mentioned risks are mitigated by the regular information-educational messages for external workers while their trainings and instructions aiming at raising awareness of the issuesNo other potential or measurable impacts on the population’s health is expected during the SUP implementation phase outside of the NPP site.
On-site workers The implementation of the SUP will require the involvement of external workers and subcontractors, who will be exposed to the radiation and non-radiation risks that exist in any NPP. According to Ukrainian legislation, the specific safety measures described in chapter 1.10.1 apply to all workers (internal, external, permanent or temporary) involved in activities at the NPP site. Those measures aim at preventing accident risks or excessive radiation exposure; they are applied by Energoatom in compliance with the legislation. Provided that these measures are implemented, no specific risk for the health of workers is expected from the implementation of the SUP.
5.3.3.2 Impacts after SUP completion After the SUP is completed, the NPP will have an improved level of safety. For the NPP workers and the population living inside and outside the monitoring zone, this safety upgrade means a reduction of the risk of incidents or accidents that might affect their health. No negative impact will result from the operation of the NPP after the SUP is completed. A reduction in the risk of accidents translates into a reduced risk of contamination for NPP workers and nearby residents. This should lower stress levels related to working at or living near NPPs and will positively impact the psychological health of workers and nearby residents. For this impact to be effective it is important for PAPs to understand and be aware of the SUP and its implications on reducing risks.
5.3.4 Impact of SUP on local population’s social conditions
5.3.4.1 Impacts during the implementation of SUP The implementation of the SUP at the South-Ukrainian NPP will require around 400 to 500 external workers over the program’s 6-year implementation period (the total staff of the South-Ukrainian NPP is 7 035). Most of these external workers will be hired by satellite contractors who regularly (and often exclusively) work for the NPP and will provide specific construction or erection services within the framework of the SUP’s implementation. Out of the SUP’s total budget, it is estimated that around 4 to 5 M€ will result in net income for additional workers involved in the SUP implementation at the South-Ukrainian NPP. Although specific competences might be sought outside of the South-Ukrainian NPP, the population living in the vicinity of the NPP is expected to be positively impacted in terms of income from the SUP implementation from both direct and indirect employment opportunities. Direct employment refers to the possibility for local workers to be hired and therefore receive a salary from the companies that will be selected to assist in the SUP’s implementation Indirect employment refers to the opportunities related to the additional demand for services by external workers involved in the SUP’s implementation. These services will most often be provided by the population living near the South-Ukrainian NPP and may include food, hotel, recreational activities, etc.… Consequently, the SUP implementation is expected to positively impact the economic and social condition of the population living in the vicinity of the NPP. For the population living far from the NPP, the average positive impact in terms of social and economic conditions will be negligible. No negative impact on the economic or social condition is expected from the implementation of the SUP.
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5.3.4.2 Impacts after SUP completion Employment: After completion, the SUP will result in minor but permanent additional work needs. Although the residual, long-term additional work load induced by the SUP is not estimated in the documents available at this stage, it is obvious from the definition of the measures that several of them will result in additional activities or maintenance needs (e.g. maintenance of the additional safety systems, maintenance and operation of the additional monitoring equipment and analysis of their outputs, etc.…). The present stage of the project (feasibility study), does not allow for a precise definition of the number of additional jobs that will result from the long-term SUP. However, one can ascertain from similar projects that this figure should remain small compared to the number of people actually involved in the implementation of the SUP described in the previous chapter. Therefore, the SUP, after completion, is expected to have a positive but marginal impact on employment and on the social conditions around the South-Ukrainian NPP. Electricity tariff: Energoatom, as an electricity producer, sells electricity to the market through Ukrenergo, who distributes and sells electricity to consumers. The cost for upgrading the safety of the South-Ukrainian NPP will be covered by an increase of the bulk tariff between Energoatom and Ukrenergo (there are no plans for the safety upgrade to be subsidised by the State). The increase in Energoatom’s bulk tariff is planned in financial projections, but does not cover only the costs related to the SUP. Therefore, the marginal bulk tariff increase induced by the SUP was not calculated. The manner in which this tariff increase will be reflected on the consumers' tariff is unknown at this time and will be subject to a decision by the tariff regulation authority.
5.4 Brief assessment of impacts on the technogenic environment
5.4.1 Short description of the existing state in the monitoring zone Within the South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone, there are several local enterprises, with small amounts of input and output. The sanitary and protection zones of these enterprises range from 50 to 100 m. The largest industrial site close to South-Ukrainian NPP is the Tashlyk pumped-storage hydropower scheme. The railway line Odessa–Pomoshnya is 2.2 km away from the territory of the South-Ukrainian NPP. The state highway Ulyanivka – Mykolayiv is 0.95 km away from the territory of the South-Ukrainian NPP. There are several fuel filling stations within the 30km zone. Almost all of the territory of the 30km monitoring zone is agricultural land, with a couple of thousands of communal agricultural households. The main crops cultivated are small grains and other crops including spring and winter wheat, barley, sunflower, rape, soybean, feed crop, vegetables and potatoes. The South-Ukrainian NPP’s 30km zone also has several places of social value, including: archaeological, architectural, historical and cultural sites as well as memorials. In every settlement within the monitoring zone, there are monuments dedicated to the memory of local soldiers and World War II victims.
5.4.2 Impact of NPP on technogenic environment regardless of SUP In normal operation conditions, South-Ukrainian NPP has limited impacts the technogenic environment: • the activities and infrastructures that can be developed in the vicinity of the NPP are subject to limitations, for safety reasons: those limitations apply in particular to the development of potentially dangerous industrial activities, recreation activities, flying objects, transport of dangerous substances…; • the presence of the NPP boosts the local economy and the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which provide direct or indirect services related to the activity of the NPP;
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• the satellite city of Yuzhnoukrainsk benefits from several infrastructure investments made by the NPP. The release of heat in the environment and the consumption of water by the NPP do not affect the technogenic environment at measurable levels. In case of accident with significant release of radionuclides to the environment (INES level > 4), the technogenic environment of the NPP would be affected according to the radionuclides fallout. In case of disaster, the creation of an exclusion zone similar to Chernobyl's would result in the end of all regular economic activities in the concerned areas.
5.4.3 Impact of SUP measures on technogenic environment
Impact during the implementation of the SUP The main impact of the implementation of the SUP on the technogenic environment of South- Ukrainian NPP will be an increase of the activity of the NPP satellite enterprises who will be involved in the program implementation. This additional activity will result in additional transportation (staff and supply), additional income for the population and additional generation of wastes. Considering the planned increase of staff (up to 10 %) and the planned increase of waste generation (5 to 10%) as a result of the SUP implementation, one can reasonably assume that the satellite economic activity induced by the NPP will generally increase by up to 10% during the implementation of the SUP. Consequently, an increase by 10% for communal activities demand (domestic waste collection, drinking water supply, health) can be expected, which can be supported by the infrastructure of the city of Yuzhnoukrainsk.
Impact after implementation of the SUP Once completed, the SUP will not result in an increase or in a decrease of the activity of the NPP. Therefore, under normal operation, no long term impact on the technogenic environment is expected after the implementation of the SUP. The exposure of the technogenic environment to the consequences of accidents at the NPP will decrease after the implementation of the SUP for the following reasons: • the probability of accidents will decrease; • the potential consequences of some accidents will also be decreased, since some of the SUP measures will improve the capacity of the operational staff to early identify problems (for example, additional monitoring equipments) or to correct problems (for example, additional fire protection equipments) Therefore, the expected long term consequences of the SUP for the technogenic environment are essentially positive.
5.4.4 Possible impact on NPP from the technogenic environment (regardless of SUP)
Explosions and fires Within the frame of the Safety Analysis Report, the risk of accidental explosion or fire from industries of infrastructures located up to 10 km from South-Ukrainian NPP is systematically reviewed. At the present time, all of the potential sources of accidental explosion located at less than 10km from the NPP or inside the NPP territory would, in case of explosion, trigger an excessive pressure considerably less than the normative limit of 10 kPa. These potential sources are: diesel fuel storage of NPP (2000 m3) located at a distance of 2350 m, high pressure gas pipeline (1000 mm) located 8 km south-west of the NPP, Odessa - Pomoshnaya railway line on which explosive goods may be transported (2,2 km from NPP fence), Ulyanovka - Nikolaev highway, on which explosive cargo can be transported (0.95 km from the NPP).
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Explosive objects located at the SUNPP site Within the NPP territory, the main possible sources of explosion or fire are the liquid gas storage, carbide calcium storage, fuel or oil tanks.
Emissions of toxic and corrosive substances There is no pipeline, oil pipeline, refinery or chemical plant in the 30km zone around South- Ukrainian NPP.
Aircraft impact The nearest commercial airport is located in Nikolaev at 112 km and Kirovograd at 110 km distance from the South-Ukrainian NPP. No airline route crosses the 10km zone of South-Ukrainian NPP. The estimated probability of core damage caused by the falling of a civil aircraft is below 10-7 per year.
Failures of hydraulic structures South-Ukrainian NPP is neither exposed to natural floods from Buh river nor to dam break triggered floods. Tashlyk reservoir which is adjacent to the NPP is delimited by a dam. In case of break of this dam, the staff of South-Ukrainian NPP has a procedure to shutdown the reactor and keep them cooled using only the spaying ponds.
5.5 Comprehensive measures to ensure standard state of environment and environmental security
5.5.1 Description of resource-saving measures taken on NPP regardless of SUP The South-Ukrainian NPP performs a set of measures on environmental protection included into the “Environmental protection and sustainable use of natural resources program of Mykolayiv oblast”.
Energy-saving measures The South-Ukrainian NPP consumes around 6 to 7% of its electricity production for its own needs. Several measures were undertaken over the past few years to decrease the consumption of electricity by the NPP, such as the introduction of low consumption lamps. These measures had a positive but marginal effect on the overall energy consumption of the NPP, which is driven by the energy efficiency of the largest equipment (mostly pumps). The decision to replace pumps by more efficient ones (in order to save electricity) can be made by the management of the NPP based on economic considerations - but this issue is unrelated to the safety upgrade issues addressed by the SUP. In order to reduce its energy consumption, the South-Ukrainian NPP has also undertaken measures to improve the management and reduce the consumption of fuel by its vehicle fleet.
Recycling waste Waste recycling measures were introduced at the South-Ukrainian NPP in the last years in order to reduce the environmental footprint. Recycling measures focus on glass, lamps (containing mercury), batteries, scrap metal, etc.…
5.5.2 Need for additional resource-saving measures in connection with SUP
5.5.2.1 During the implementation of the SUP The implementation of the SUP will require a number of additional workers (400 to 500), which is negligible compared to the population of the satellite city of Yuzhnoukrainsk (42 000). Moreover, a significant part of the additional workers will come from Yuzhnoukrainsk itself.
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Therefore, there is no reason to consider that the implementation of the SUP, and the employment of additional workers, will result in a significant overuse of natural resources in the project area because it will not require a large in-migration of workers from outside the area. In addition, none of the SUP’s measures requires the use of significant volumes of natural resources (e.g. large volumes of water or large volumes of sand or earth). Therefore, no additional resource-saving measures are deemed necessary during the implementation of the SUP.
5.5.2.2 After the implementation of the SUP The SUP does not include measures that would be implemented outside the territory of the NPP. Therefore, none of the SUP measures will have a long-term impact on the use of natural resources outside of the NPP territory. Inside the NPP territory, the operation of units and processes of SUP measures will not require a significant additional use of resources. The operation of the additional equipment installed within the frame of the SUP will result in marginal additional energy consumption. No additional water will be used, except in case of fire, when using the additional fire protection equipment installed as part of SUP.
5.5.3 Social and workers protection measures taken on NPP regardless of SUP
5.5.3.1 Workers protection (HSE) A comprehensive description of the HSE rules that apply to workers and sub-contractors within the NPPs is proposed in chapter 1.10.1.
5.5.3.2 Public information in normal operation The South-Ukrainian NPP provides regular information to the public through the following means: • internet: a webpage on Energoatom's website provides the public with information about the NPP (www.energoatom.kiev.ua/ua/nuclear_plants/npp_su/info). To the difference of other NPPs, the South-Ukrainian NPP does not have its own web site that would disclose monitoring information; • own newspaper: the South-Ukrainian NPP edits a weekly newspaper starting with 2000 exemplars. The newspaper is available for free in public places and provides various information about the NPP and the 30km monitoring zone; • press releases to newspapers: the South-Ukrainian NPP occasionally publishes articles in local and regional newspapers, usually with the objective of informing the public largely about a specific topic. In particular, press releases are disclosed systematically to inform the public about incidents and related corrective or remedial measures; • thematic brochures made available at information centres and public buildings; • public events are also regularly organised by the South-Ukrainian NPP.
5.5.3.3 Emergency plans A description of the emergency plans developed by SNRIU and Energoatom is proposed in chapter 1.10.2. In case of accidents which require the population informing NPP informs the local authorities according to the existing pre-designated order and list. The responsibility for population informing rests on the MoES of Ukraine. The evacuation (if necessary) is also within the responsibilities of MoES of Ukraine. On practice the population strongly lacks the information concerning the signals and messages of the early awareness and also concerning the actions which should be undertaken in case of this
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signal. Especially this deficit is critical for the monitoring zone population outside of Yuzhnoukrainsk city.
5.5.4 Changes in social and workers protection measures as a result of SUP implementation
5.5.4.1 Workers protection (HSE) According to the law of labour protection of Ukraine, the implementation of the SUP does not require the introduction of specific changes in the management of HSE at the NPP. Nevertheless, in the light of (i) the review of HSE procedures done within the frame of the EA and (ii) the K2/R4 safety upgrade experience, recommendations are made to improve HSE management. These measures are common for all NPPs and are detailed in chapter 8.1.1 and basically consist in: • the introduction of performance indicators to compare the performance of NPPs and sub- contractors; • replicating recommendations made during the previous the K2/R4 safety upgrade • the harmonization of HSE practices between NPPs.
5.5.4.2 Public information The scoping meetings held in May 2011 showed a strong demand from the public for improved information about the regular monitoring of the environment around the NPP, including radioactivity levels. Within the frame of the SUP, it is proposed to improve public information by: • harmonizing the media used for public information; • harmonize the type of environmental monitoring data released to the public. See details of the recommendations that apply to the South-Ukrainian NPP in chapter 8.1.2.
5.5.4.3 Emergency plans The scoping meetings held in May 2011 also showed a strong demand from the public for improved early warning tools in case of accident. The experience of the Chernobyl and Fukushima cases has shown that most of the primary radioactive fall-out after an accident occurs in a radius of some kilometres around the NPP (to date, Chernobyl exclusion zone is 30km, Fukushima exclusion zone is 20 km). Therefore, it is suggested to extend the "early warning zone" of the NPPs, presently limited to the satellite cities, to the whole 30km monitoring zone. It is also recommended to implement awareness campaigns, in order to inform the population about the actions to undertake in case of alert. From the public side it was suggested to renew the wired radio system which had existed even in Soviet times and its usage aiming at early warning. It should be mentioned that such a decision requires substantial capital investments and limits the circle of informed people with those who are at home and listen to the radio. So far, it is also suggested to review the possibility of early warning system introduction via sms which will be sent to the cell phones. The registration requests from the inhabitants of 30 km monitoring zone to be included into such system can also be collected via sms from the interested persons. A feasibility study will be carried out to define the most appropriate and relevant tools and equipments for early warning system before procurement.See details on the implementation of this recommendation in chapter 8.1.3.
5.5.5 Rehabilitation (renewal) measures undertaken during NPP construction The NPP was built at a time when ESIAs were not required by the Ukraine’s legislation. The construction norms applicable in Soviet times (the "SNIP") included design criteria aiming at
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limiting adverse environmental impacts, but which cannot be compared to the comprehensive set of rehabilitation or compensation measures that are undertaken nowadays to preserve the environment when building a new NPP. The design criteria applied at the time of the construction of the NPP and related to environmental protection typically referred to water use and the emission of radioactive or non-radioactive pollutants to the air or to water bodies. From a social point of view, the construction of the South-Ukrainian NPP probably resulted in resettlement, permanent occupation of agricultural land or reorganisation of public infrastructure (roads…). During Soviet times, there was limited private property, and therefore the reorganisation of social life and infrastructure around the NPP was implemented without compensations for property loss. From the time of the NPP’s construction to today, the evolution of standards and norms has been the main driver for the implementation of environmental measures.
5.5.6 Need for additional rehabilitation (renewal) measures in connection with the SUP The SUP implementation is by nature completely different from the construction of a new NPP. Therefore, none of the SUP measures requires the implementation of rehabilitation or renewal measures in line with the measures that were undertaken at the time of the construction of the NPP.
5.5.7 Compensatory measures taken in the process of NPP operation The project of SUNPP construction foresees and had been timely undertaken the set of the compensatory measures, namely: • Measures connected to the expropriation and compensation of the land loss because of the land usage; • Setting the limitations of natural resources usage, limitations of ejections and resets of the contaminants to the environment, limitations of the wastes location; • Setting the norms of payment and amount of payments for the usage of natural resources, for ejections and resets of the contaminants and for the wastes location. The following compensation measures are implemented in accordance with the law: • the electricity tariff is cheaper (subsidized) for the population who live within the 30km monitoring zone of an NPP than for other consumers in Ukraine; • the NPP uses 1% of the total value of its annual production for the improvement of infrastructure and living conditions in the cities located within the 30km monitoring zone. These two measures provide significant advantages to the population living within the 30km monitoring zone. No other specific compensatory measure exists.
5.5.8 Need for additional compensatory measures as a result of SUP implementation There is no reason to change the compensatory measures described in chapter 5.5.7 as a result of the SUP implementation.
5.5.9 Description of environment protection measures related to NPP operation
5.5.9.1 Protection measures against radioactive emissions The prevention or mitigation of radioactive emissions is ensured by the following technical solutions: • cleaning of air containing radioactive isotopes using spray and iodine filters; • absorbing the filtering of gases containing radioactive molecules, of which the majority are inert noble gas isotopes (xenon and krypton); • organization of obstacles on the way to radioactive substances;
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• closed circuits to prevent leakage of liquid substances containing radioactive components; • organization of a special system of SRW collection and SRW and LRW storage; • sanitary protection zone; and • permanent dosimetric control over emissions as well as air, soil, flora and water pollution control in the sanitary protection zone and monitoring zone.
5.5.9.2 Non-radiation protection measures The NPP is presently undertaking ISO 14000 certification. The environment protection policy of South-Ukrainian NPP focuses on: • monitoring of the quality of surface and ground water; • inventory of air pollutants emission sources; • air quality monitoring; • recycling of wasted mercury-containing lamps by a specialized company; • regulation and monitoring of water usage and waste disposal; • replacement of ozone-depleting technologies. The heads of workshops and departments present quarterly reports to the environmental protection department on their consumption of water or fuel (transport), as well as on the amounts and types of waste produced. Besides, the South-Ukrainian NPP finances the maintenance of green areas in the territory of the NPP and in the city of Yuzhnukrainsk: planting trees, bushes and flowers, watering of vegetation. Thus, during 2005 – 2008, 1500 to 2000 trees or bushes were planted.
5.5.10 Changes in the set of protection measures as a result of SUP implementation
During the implementation of the SUP The environment protection measures undertaken by the NPP will not be affected by the implementation of the SUP, and therefore can be continued without any kind of limitation or restriction. The implementation of the SUP does not require additional specific environment protection measures.
After the implementation of the SUP After its implementation, the SUP will generally result in a reduction of risks for the environment around the NPP, through (i) a reduction of the probability of accidents and (ii) a reduction of the potential consequences of accidents, due to improved monitoring equipments allowing for earlier identification of accidents and better management of accident situations. In this context, there is no specific need to develop additional environment protection measures in relation with the implementation of the SUP.
5.5.11 Residual impact of NPP under normal operation (regardless of SUP)
5.5.11.1 Radiation residual impact The main potential sources of radioactive emissions exposure for the population that live within South-Ukrainian NPP 30km zone are natural and artificial radionuclides: 90Sr and 137Cs from global fallouts, 90Sr and 137Cs from fallouts of South-Ukrainian NPP emergency emissions as well as a wide range of radionuclides contained in NPP emissions. Under normal operation, the main contribution is provided by natural radionuclides 40K, 238U and 232Th and products of their disintegration. Radionuclides emissions from South-Ukrainian NPP are negligible compared to artificial radionuclides from global fallouts and from Chernobyl.
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The forecasted maximum effective individual exposure doses of the population within South- Ukrainian NPP 30km zone are given in the following table:
Table 54 - Individual exposure of population within 30km monitoring area South-Ukrainian NPP, Sv/year
Way of impact Year Radionuclide Exposure to Exposure to Peroral intake Inhalation intake radioactive radioactive Total cloud falls 137Cs 6,46Е-08 2,05Е-09 2,63Е-14 8,61Е-07 9,28Е-07 2004 60Co 9,14Е-08 2,28Е-08 1,67Е-10 1,55Е-06 1,56Е-06 total 1,56Е-07 2,48Е-08 1,67Е-10 2,41Е-06 2,59Е-06 137Cs 9,62Е-08 3,05Е-09 3,91Е-14 1,28Е-06 1,38Е-06 2005 60Co 2,42Е-07 6,03Е-08 4,43Е-10 4,09Е-06 4,39Е-06 total 3,38Е-07 6,34Е-08 4,43Е-10 5,37Е-06 5,77Е-06 137Cs 7,49Е-08 2,38Е-09 3,04Е-14 9,99Е-07 1,08Е-06 2006 60Co 1,22Е-07 3,03Е-08 2,23Е-10 2,06Е-06 2,21Е-06 total 1,97Е-07 3,27Е-08 2,23Е-10 3,06Е-06 3,29Е-06 137Cs 4,44Е-08 1,41Е-09 1,81Е-14 5,92Е-07 6,38Е-07 2007 60Co 1,76Е-07 4,37Е-08 3,21Е-10 2,97Е-06 3,19Е-06 total 2,20Е-07 4,51Е-08 3,21Е-10 3,56Е-06 3,83Е-06 137Cs 5,41Е-08 1,72Е-09 2,20Е-14 7,22Е-07 7,78Е-07 2008 60Co 9,64Е-08 2,40Е-08 1,76Е-10 1,63Е-06 1,75Е-06 total 1,50Е-07 2,57Е-08 1,76Е-10 2,35Е-06 2,53Е-06 Maximum annual ionization dose for the last 5 years was 5,77 mcSv/year which stands for approximately 14% of the appropriate dose limit (40 mcSv/year) regulated by NRBU-97.
5.5.11.2 Observed annual discharges of tritium and cesium-137 from South-Ukrainian NPP to the external water bodies are provided in the Annex 11.3.2. Factual volumes of radioactive discharges are by orders lesser than their allowable indexes for SUNPP which are set resulting from the requirement of non-exceeding the appropriate quote of dose limit according to NRBU-97 (10 mcSv/year).Non-radiation residual impact
Chemical impact Water bodies: surface water quality is monitored monthly into the Tashlyk cooling pond intake, the cooling pond itself and Yuzhny Buh river upstream and downstream of the cooling pond outlet. Totally, 26 biochemical indicators are monitored. Monitoring results are presented in appendix chapter 11.3.3. Yuzhny Buh water quality meets the requirements for fisheries downstream and upstream the Tashlyk reservoir outlet. The difference of water quality in the river 1.5 km upstream and 0.5 km downstream the outlet is marginal. Air: The main sources of pollutant emissions into the atmosphere by the South-Ukrainian NPP are the 18 backup diesel power generators, which in operation release: carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide and particulate matter. Those generators are situated within the NPP compound with other subsidiary industries or workshops (electronic/electric repair company, heat automation and measurement, chemical plant, oil and diesel tanks, underground utilities, etc). The NPP motor vehicles fleet includes many vehicles (gasoline and diesel). The emissions - gasoline, nitrogen dioxide, hydrocarbons, are not differentiated in composition. Totally, the NPP has 84 sources of emissions of pollutants to the atmosphere out of which two sources are equipped with gas cleaning equipment.
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The total amount of harmful substances emitted into the atmosphere South-Ukrainian NPP is around 6 tons per year.
Thermal impact Thermal impacts on the environment result from heat emissions directly to the air or from warm water discharges (hydraulic structures, spray pond, cooling pond and all other heat exchange equipments). By design the removal of heat from a reactor compartment at South-Ukrainian NPP is: • In normal operation: min: 2.9x106 W – max: 23.4x106 W - average: 17.4x106 W; • In case of emergency cooling: from 64x106 W in the first 3 hours to 31.4x106 W, up to the 6th to 10th hour after the cooling started. The winter water temperature in the cooling pond is 5 to 9°C, which is higher than in Yuzhny Buh river. The difference of temperature between the ambient air and cooling pond water leads to rapid evaporation from water surface, and frequently turns to the formation of fog. The water area of the reservoir where a slight increase of temperature can be observed is about 1.2 km². The shape of this area depends on the speed and direction of the wind. However, the total area with a high thermal load remains unchanged.
5.5.11.3 Possible changes of residual impacts resulting from the implementation of tasks set by the state programs and governmental decisions Results of analysis of possible changes of residual impacts resulting from the implementation of the tasks listed in chapter 1.7.2 set by the state programs and the governmental decisions concerning the development of nuclear energy in Ukraine and the relevant issues are provided in Table 55
Table 55 – Forecasted changes of residual impacts from South-Ukrainian NPP resulting from the implementation of the state programs and governmental decisions
Tasks set by the state programs and governmental decisions (numbers in accordance with chapter 1.7.2)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Radiation impact No Changes1) Minor No No Changes3) changes change2) changes changes
Chemical impact No Changes 1) No No No No changes changes changes changes changes
Thermal impact No Changes1) No No No No changes changes changes changes changes
Electric and magnetic impact No Changes 1) No No No No changes changes changes changes changes
Acoustic impact No Changes 1) No No No No changes changes changes changes changes
1) changes are connected to the action term of impact factors without changing their intensity and concequences 2) volumes of SNF which are temporarily stored in the cooling-down ponds can increase resulting from the increase of minimal terms of “wet” storage until 8 years before sending SNF to the DSSNF of the “dry” type.
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3) volumes of RAW which are collected on the NPP sites can be changed resulting from the processing and also as the result of sending RAW to the storage after the construction of the relevant storage. .
5.5.12 Changes in residual impact as a result of SUP implementation The implementation of the SUP will not result in measurable changes of the quantities of heat and chemical components released by the NPP in the aquatic or atmospheric environment. In addition, the SUP measures will not result in any significant changes of the noise or electromagnetic emissions from the NPP. Therefore, the changes in residual impacts as a result of the SUP implementation can be considered as negligible.
5.5.13 Assessment of NPP’s environmental impact under normal operation as a result of SUP In the light of the previous chapters, it is clear that the SUP will not result in measurable changes of the impact of the South-Ukrainian NPP on the technogenic and natural environment under normal operation. The impacts on the social environment are expected to be positive, through the implementation of the proposed measures for (i) improved information of the public and (i) improved HSE practices.
5.5.14 Complex assessment of ecological risks in case of accident on NPP (regardless of SUP) Ecological risks within the non-designed accident on SUNPP are acceptable with taking into account the probability of such accident, scholastic risks for the social environment and the scopes of the foreseen pollution of the natural environmental components.
5.5.15 Complex assessment of changes in ecological risks in case of accident on NPP as a result of SUP With reference to the description of measures proposed in Table 6 (chapter 1.6), the following changes in ecological risks will result from the implementation of the SUP at the South-Ukrainian NPP:
Table 56 – Changes in ecological risks as a result of SUP at the South-Ukrainian NPP Group of Sub-group of measures Changes in ecological risks after SUP measures reduced accident reduced accident probability consequences resulting from improved capacity to manage emergency situations 0 Background 01 Certification x 1 Core and fuel 11 Neutron and physical characteristics of the x management reactor core: 13 Fuel Management x x 2 Components 21 Primary system x x integrity 22 Pressurized systems important for safety x x 23 Reactor (including vessel) x 24 Other x 3 Systems 31 Ensuring the system reactivity x 32 Ensuring the reserve of primary circuit coolant x x 33 Primary circuit cooling x x 34 Primary circuit pressure x 35 Auxiliary systems x x
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Group of Sub-group of measures Changes in ecological risks after SUP measures reduced accident reduced accident probability consequences resulting from improved capacity to manage emergency situations 4 41 Information system x x Instrumentation 42 Reactor control and protection system x x and Control 43 Safety management systems x (I&C) 44 Monitoring and control systems x x 5 Power supply 51 External sources x x 52 Energy distribution x x 6 Containment 61 Containment bypass risk x and buildings 62 Integrity x 7 Internal 71 Fire protection x hazards 72 Protection against flooding x 8 External 81 Seismic x hazards 9 Accident 91 Safety analyses x analyses 92 Accident management x
5.5.16 Economic efficiency of SUP implementation according to ecological impact on population health The implementation of the SUP is driven by compliance objectives, not economic objectives. An estimation of the economic efficiency of the SUP will be possible after the PSA has been done, which is one of the measures of the SUP, i.e. once the accident probability resulting from the SUP is known.
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5.6 Environmental impact change in the process of SUP implementation The following table summarize the impacts associated with the SUP, as discussed in the previous chapters. For each item: • "no impact" means that the impact of the NPP on its environment will not be changed as a result of the SUP implementation; • "no negative impact & less risks" means that (i) in normal operation conditions, the impact of the NPP on its environment will not be changed negatively as a result of the SUP implementation and (ii), the risks of negative impacts associated with emergency situations are reduced, either because the probability of occurrence of such emergency is reduced and/or because the NPP will have the possibility to limit the negative consequences of such emergency.
Table 57 - Environmental impact change in the process of SUP implementation Water bodies Air & Social underground Soil Flora and fauna atmosphere surface water environment water 1 Radiation impact 1.1 Gas and no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative aerosol radiation impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact risks risks risks risks risks risks 1.2 Estimation of no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative transboundary impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impacts risks risks risks risks risks risks no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative 1.3 Liquid impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less no impact impact & less radioactive waste risks risks risks risks risks 1.4 Periodic flushes from no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact spaying or cooling ponds 1.5 Solid no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact radioactive waste 2 Chemical impact 2.1 Emissions no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact from combustion no negative no negative no negative 2.2 Infiltration to no impact impact & less impact & less no impact no impact impact & less ground water risks risks risks 2.3 Non radioactive liquid no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact waste 2.4 Non radioactive solid no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact waste 3 Physical impacts 3.1 Thermal no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact impact 3.2 Noise and electromagnetic no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact no impact radiation no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative no negative Conclusion impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less impact & less risks risks risks risks risks risks
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6 ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE SUP TRANSBOUNDARY IMPACTS AND MEASURES AIMED AT INFORMING BOUNDARY STATES
6.1 Possible transboundary impact of Ukrainian NPPs and forecasted changes regardless of SUP
Impact during operation The NPP located closest to a foreign country is NPP Rivne where the distance to Belarus is about 60 km. The other three sites are all more than 100 km away from the border to an adjacent country. As presented in detail in chapter 2 to 5 the significant radiation, chemical and physical impacts of the four NPP in normal operation on natural, social and technogenic environment are limited to the satellite cities and to the control zone having a radius of 30km around the NPP. This conclusion applies to the present situation as well as to the forecasted changes without implementing of SUP. Water from Styr River is used for cooling purposes at Rivne NPP. Styr River reaches the Belarus border in about 63 km downstream of Rivne NPP. The monitored thermal and chemical pollution is already negligible at the end of the control zone and therefore also at downstream distances of 60 km and more. The main hydrological parameters of Styr River are and will not be significantly changed due to the amount of evapourated water resulting from the operation of Rivne NPP.
Impact in case of an accident An accident with a level equal to 4 or lower on the INES scale would not result in significant ecological risks. In case of an accident of level 5 or more on the INES scale, the pollution of the environment by radioactive substances would result in ecological impacts directly related to the quantity, type and distribution of emitted radionuclides. Depending on the meteorological conditions radioactive substances transported through the atmosphere would also have an impact outside the Ukrainian territory. With this, e.g. the investigations done on RNPP had demonstrated that the probability of the negative impact on the population health of the neighbouring countries (average scholastic fatal risk) resulting from non-designed accident is for Belorus – approx.1,4х10 , for Poland – 9,3х10 , for Moldova and Romania – 6,1х10 , for Hungary and Slovakia – 2,3х10 , for Czekh Republic – 1,1х10 , for Russia - 4,0х10 , which is by orders less than the level of acceptance set for the population by the national norms and international recommentadions (5х10 ). While non-designed accident on Khmelnitsky NPP average statistic fatal risk for the population of the neighboring countries can be neglected in accordance with the norms of Ukraine and international recommendationsй (less than 5х10 ). The scope of designed accidents is much lower than of non-designed ones. For all the designed accidents on Zaporizhzhya, Rivne, Khmelnitsky and South-Ukrainian NPPs the impact on population of the neighboring countries can be neglected in accordance with the national norms and international recommendations.
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6.2 Changes in assessments as a result of SUP implementation
During SUP implementation As depicted in chapters 2 to 5 the impacts during SUP implementation on natural, social and technogenic environments are mostly negligeable or restricted to the NPPs and their close vicinity in consequence of the characteristics of the SUP measures (not extended demolition and construction works involved). According to these findings a transboundary impact resulting from SUP implementation is excluded.
After SUP implementation According to the results of chapters 2 to 5 the SUP does not aim and will not result in an increase the production of electricity. As result, an increase of emissions to air and water by the operation of NPP is not expected. The SUP will also not affect the radwaste and other waste resulting from operation of the NPP in a significant manner. It is expected, that the SUP after completion will have a positive but marginal impact on employment and on the social conditions around the NPP. This leads to the conclusion that the local environmental and social conditions during normal NPP operation will remain practically unchanged after SUP implementation and consequently no transboundary effects will occur. After its implementation, the SUP will generally result in a reduction of risks for the environment around the NPP, through (i) a reduction of the probability of accidents and (ii) a reduction of the potential consequences of accidents, due to improved monitoring equipments allowing for earlier identification of accidents and better management of accident situations. This reduction in the risk of accidents and their consequences also translate into a generally reduced risk of potential transboundary impacts. So the impact after SUP implementation is positive by tendency but can’t be quantified in more detail due to the unpredictability of accidents that at all have a transboundary impact.
6.3 Measures aimed at informing boundary states on possible impact of SUP implementation in transboundary context The Espoo (EIA) Convention sets out the obligations of countries to assess the environmental impact of certain activities. It also lays down the general obligation of States to notify and consult each other on all major projects under consideration that they are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries. The location of the four NPP sites and the expected degree and extent of the environmental impacts resulting from the SUP leads to the conclusion that a detailed notification and consultation of neighbouring countries is not necessary. On this basis the disclosure of the EA and the Executive Summary in English and in Ukrainian language on the internet for public participation will be the appropriate method of information in the transboundary context.
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7 PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS ON ELABORATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SUP
7.1 Purpose of the public consultations Stakeholder engagement is an important part of the appraisal, management and monitoring of the environmental and social issues associated with the SUP; and public consultations are a key component of the overall stakeholder engagement process of the EA. Public consultations are required by both the lenders and by Ukrainian policies. They enable meaningful consultation with stakeholders through: (i) the disclosure of information, (ii) consultations and (iii) the establishment of a grievance mechanism. These public consultations were designed to accompany the EA throughout its preparation – and to disclose information at key intervals so that stakeholders have been involved and informed in a meaningful and timely manner.
7.2 Methodology for public consultations Generally the PC process concerning SUP and SUP EA includes 4 main phases from which Phase 1 and Phase 2 are implemented while EA: • Phase 0 – disclosure of “Statement of intent concerning Safety upgrade program of power units of NPPs of Ukraine (“Statement of Intent”); • Phase 1 – scoping of SUP EA; • Phase 2 – public discussions concerning SUP and the results of SUP EA and taking into account the results of these discussions • Phase 3 – highlighting the process of SUP measures implementation and disclosure of its results including the ecological aspects.
7.2.1.1 Aim – Phase 0 The aim of Phase 0: Disclosure of SoI is the initial informing the stakeholders about the intent to implement SUP and the planned EA. The templates of the world practice justify that the parties of the potential impact (PPI) and NGOs are to be informed about the projects at the early stages of the preparation of the project.
Step 0.1 Preparation and authorization of SoI SoI was elaborated by “Energoatom” and authorized at the local authorities and regional subdivisions of the state safety regulator in accordance with the requirements of legislation of Ukraine concerning the projects with potential ecological and social concequences. SoI generally informs the stakeholders concerning the intent of parties concerning SUP, its possible impacts, planned scope of assessment of those impacts and informing and engagement public to it.
Step 0.2 Announcement concerning the project “Energoatom” on its internet web-site in 2010 had disclosed the Statement of Intent (SoI) following the link: http://energoatom.kiev.ua/ua/about_nngc/statements.htm?_m=pubs&_t=rec&id=27222.
7.2.1.2 Aim – Phase 1 Aim of Phase 1: Scoping consultations is the start of indication of key stakeholders by “Energoatom” and Consultant in order to organize the primary consultations. Primary consultations are important from the point of view of forming the final stakeholder engagement process.
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Step 1.1 Information concerning the project “Energoatom” on its web-site following the link: http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/ru/safety.htm? had disclosed the next documents: • Information concerning the elaboration of ecological assessment of SUP; • Standard of “Energoatom” СОУ НАЕК 004:1011. Ecological assessment of power units of nuclear power plants. General requirements to the content and composition of the assessment materials; • Invitation to participate in scoping meetings concerning EA. The invitation to participate in scoping meetings concernint EA contains the information concerning the time and place of the meeting and also the contact information to provide questions and comments (e-mail: [email protected] , phone no, contact persons). On behalf of “Energoatom” invitation letters to participate in scoping meetings concerning EA were sent by e-mal to all preliminarily indicated stakeholders listed in the Stakeholders Engagement Plan (SEP). The printed invitation letters were sent to 4 city state administrations of satellite cities of NPPs of Ukraine (Energodar, Kuznetsovsk, Netishyn and Yuzhnoukrainsk).
Step 1.2 Consultations “Energoatom” had organized the scoping meetings with key stakeholders in Kiev and also in 4 satellite cities of NPPs. 3 indicators had set the specificity of these meetings: • The introduction of SUP; • The introduction of scope and procedure of EA (including the planned stakeholders engagement activity); • Collection of initial comments concerning the program and the public consultations process.
Step 1.3 – Disclosure of Phase results By the results of Phase 1 “Energoatom” on its web-site following the link: http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/ru/safety.htm? and NPPs on their web-sites had disclosed the listes documents: • Stakeholders Engagement Plan (SEP); • Scoping report including the minustes of all 5 scoping meetings Documents are free to the public in English and Ukrainian.
7.2.1.3 Aim – Phase 2 The aim of Phase 2: Public consultations concerning the EA report is the provision of stakeholders with the possibility of getting acquainted and commenting on the data received by the results of EA and review of EA report by the results of public consultations including the results of analysis of received notes and comments.
Step 2.1 Disclosure of EA results “Energoatom” on its web-site following the link: http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/ru/safety.htm? and on the web-sites of NPPs had disclosed the next documents: • Informative leaflet concerning SUP and EA; • Draft EA report. Public Summary of EA. • Draft EA report. Main report.
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Both documents in terms of Draft EA report are free to public in English and Ukrainian. Public EA Summary (English version) is also disclosed on the web-site of EBRD www.ebrd.com .
Step 2.2 Information concerning the public consultations “Energoatom” on its web-site following the link: http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/ru/safety.htm? And on web-sites of NPPs had disclosed next documents: • Invitation to participate in public meetings concerning the ecological assessment of SUP; • Press-release concerning public meetings concerning the ecological assessment of SUP; • Agenda of public meetings concerning the ecological assessment of SUP; • Presentation materials “PUBLIC MEETINS. Ecological assessment of SUP. Public consultations process”; • Presentation material “PUBLIC MEETING. Ecological Assessment of SUP”; Invitation to participate in public meetings concerning the ecological assessment of SUP contains information on time and place of meetings and also the addressed and contact phones and also the work hours of public repositories in Kiev and satellite cities of NPPs of Ukraine (Energodar, Kuznetsovsk, Netishyn and Yuzhnoukrainsk). On behalf of “Energoatom” invitation letters to participate in public meetings concerning EA were sent by e-mal to all interested parties including the preliminarily indicated stakeholders. The printed invitation letters were sent to the Heads of oblast councils whose localites are situated within the monitoring zones of operating NPPs of Ukraine (Volyn, Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, RIvne and Khmelnitsky oblasts).
Step 2.2 Consultations “Energoatom” while coordinating the efforts with obast state administrations and local authorities of satellite cities of operating NPPs of Ukraine had organized the public meetings concerning the SUP EA with stakeholders in Kiev and also in 4 satellite cities of NPPs (Energodar, Kuznetsovsk, Netishyn and Yuzhnoukrainsk). 3 indicators had set the specificity of these meetings: • Presenting the public consultation process concerning SUP and SUP EA; • Presenting the results of SUP EA; • Negotiations over SUP and the results of EA including comments and questions of public and “Energoatom” expert answers. From the moment of EA report disclosure public had an opportunity to get acquainted with this project in public repositories opened in terms of public consultation process in Kiev and satellite cities of NPPs. Public meetings and work of public repositories during 90 days since the disclosure of EA report becam the public platform to provide the feedback of “Energoatom” and the Consultant concerning the results of EA report. After the 90 days period since the disclosure of the EA report on the web-site of “Energoatom” the Notification on the active phase of public consultations concerning SUP EA closure was disclosed with the invitation of the stakeholders to participate in further feedback concerning SUP implementation on Phase 3. This notification was also sent by e-mail to all interested parties.
Step 2.3 – Phase 2 results disclosure During Phase 2 on “Energoatom”s web-site following the link: http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/ru/safety.htm? By review of questions and comments received while public meetings, by e-mails or via public repositories 2 present day versions of “Questions-Answers Book concerning the SUP and SUP EA” were disclosed. Final version elaborated after the end of 90 days term of consultations is free to get acquainted in English and Ukrainian.
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This EA Report which includes “Questions-Answers Book concerning the SUP and SUP EA” as its annex after its approval will be located on the web-site of “Energoatom” following the indicated link. Document will be free to get acquainted in English and Ukrainian. The same site will also locate the copy of authorized by the signature of Head of “Energoatom” Statement on ecological concequences of SUP implementation. Printed copies of EA report will be sent to the Heads of oblast councils whose localites are situated within the monitoring zones of operating NPPs of Ukraine (Volyn, Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, RIvne and Khmelnitsky oblasts). After the finalization of EA report expertise foreseen by the legislation conclusions of those expertise and the corrected according to the comments (if any) version of EA report will also be located on the web-site of “Energoatom” following the indicated link.
7.2.1.4 Aim – Phase 3 Aim of Phase 3: Lighting the SUP measures implementation process and disclosure of its results including the ecological aspects is providing the stakeholders with the possibility to get acquinted and to comment on the results of SUP and to provide the relevant feedback for “Energoatom”.
Ways of such feedback establishement on Phase 3 The main ways of public informing and feedback establisehement on Phase 3 will be: • Disclosure of periodic reports on SUP implementation on the web-site of “Energoatom”; • Support of the public communication channel concerning the SUP in actual state by the e- mail [email protected]; • Information centers of operating NPPs in satellite cities (Energodar, Kuznetsovsk, Netishyn and Yuzhnoukrainsk) and the headquarters of “Energoatom” in Kiev operation; • Negotiations of SUP results while periodic public meetings; • Disclosure of periodic reports on public information on Phase 3.
7.3 Time frames • Phase 0: Disclosure SoI – 08.10.2010; • Beginning of Phase 1: Scoping consultations – 27.04.2011; • Meeting of Phase 1 - 10.05.2011 (Kiev), 11.05.2011 (Kuznetsovsk), 13.05.2011 (Netishyn), 17.05.2011 (Energodar), 18.05.2011 (Yuzhnoukrainsk); • Finalization of Phase 1 – 06.06.2011; • Beginning of Phase 2: Public consultations concerning EA report – 22.06.2011; • Meetings of Phase 2 - 19.07.2011 (Kiev), 20.07.2011 (Kuznetsovsk), 21.07.2011 р (Netishyn), 26.07.2011 (Energodar), 27.07.2011 (Yuzhnoukrainsk); • Finalization of Phase 2 (disclosure of “Questions-Answers Book”) – 22.09.2011; • Finalization of Phase 2 (disclosure of EA report) – October 2011; • Finalization of Phase 2 (disclose of expertise conculsions) – December 2011; • Beginning of Phase 3: : Lighting the SUP measures implementation process and disclosure of its results including the ecological aspects – January 2012.
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7.4 Information and data provided for public consultations
Table 58 List of documents publicly disclosed
Phase 0 − Statement of Intent (Disclosure of SoI) − Information concerning SUP ecological assessment elaboration; − Standard of “Energoatom” СОУ НАЕК 004:1011. Ecological assessment of Phase 1 power units of nuclear power plants. General requirements to the content and (Scoping composition of the assessment materials; consultations) − Invitation to participate in scoping meetings concerning EA − Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP); − Scoping report including minustes of all 5 scoping meetings − Informative leaflet concerning SUP and EA; − Draft EA report: Public Summary; − Draft EA report. Main report; − Invitation to participate in public meetings concerning ecological assessment of SUP; Phase 2 − Press-release of public meetings concerning SUP EA; (Public consultation concerning EA report) − Agenda of public meetings concerning ecological assessment of SUP; − Notification on the end of active phase of public consultations; − Questions-Answers Book; − EA report; − Statement on ecological concequences of SUP implementation; − Conclusions of obligatory expertise. Phase 3 − Periodic reports on SUP implementation; (Lighting the SUP − Periodic reports on informing the public measures implementation process and disclosure of its results)
7.5 Public events held during public consultations Energoatom has selected a variety of mediums to disclose information related to the EA of the SUP and to receive feedback and grievances from stakeholders. This multi-modal approach helps to ensure that the maximum number of people is informed of the SUP and the EA. The various communication modalities are summarized below.
Online access “Energoatom” is using its official web-site (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua) with specially degined page “NPP Safety” following the link http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/ua/safety.htm?fp=1 to locate documents concerning SUP and SUP EA. Approved Summary and Draft EA report will be located on the web-site (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua), Public summary will also be located on the web- site of EBRD (www.ebrd.com). Internet link and specially organized e-mail [email protected] was spread over the potential stakeholders and all interested parties. This link will be spread over
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all indicated stakeholders. All documents located on the web-site can be read online or downloaded. Questions and Comments are free to provide “Energoatom” with while first not less than 90 days since the moment of document location, contact e-mail still works. Exact final terms for comments provision will be indicated concerning each document. One can send his/her questions, comments and grievance concerning EA to the specially organized e-mail and/or via web-site of “Energoatom”. By review the answers to them will be located on the web-site as the present day versions of “Questions-Answers Book”. These comments will be reviewed by the specialists of “Energoatom” to be sure that the incorrect (non- censored) sayings will not be located on the web-site. Consultant will divide the received questions into the groups and will thoroughly work with “Energoatom” to prepare the answers for all the questions. Answers for all the questions and comments which were received by all means of communications will be provided in the “Questions-Answers Book” in terms of public meetings and/or in Review of 90 days consultation period which will be included into the final version of EA Report..
Information centres Information centres had been created to enable stakeholders to read hard copies of the various documents. Hard copies of the draft EA are available at various sites, including: (a) the 4 municipalities; (b) Energoatom Headquarters; and (c) the EBRD offices in both Kyiv and London. Interested parties had an opportunity to review the hard copy during the respective institution’s office hours. Each information centre in the municipalities and Energoatom Headquarters also had forms for comments and grievances, to be collected and submitted to Energoatom on a monthly basis.
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Table 59 - Information centres – addresses and office hours
Information center Addresses Working hours
3, Vetrova str., Kiev, 01032 Headquarters of “Energoatom” 08:30 – 17:30 Tel.: +380 44 206 97 57
EBRD office (Kiev) 16, Nemyrovycha-Danchenka str., Kiev, 01001 09:00 – 17:00
Tel.: +380 44 270 6132
EBRD office (London) Subdivition on ecology and permanent development issues One Exchange Square, London EC2A 2JNM UK Tel.: +44 20 7338 6504
32A, Kurchatova str., Information center of Information center ZNPP, Energodar, Zaporizhzhya oblast; 09:00 – 17:00 Energodar Contact phone +38 (06139) 6-21-81
8A, Shevtchenko boulevard, Information Іnformation center center of SUNPP, Yuzhnoukrainsk, Mykolayiv oblast ; 09:00 – 17:00 Yuzhnoukrainsk Contact phone +38 (05136) 5-64-44
5, Independence sq., Information center of Іnformation center RNPP, Kuznetsovsk, Rivne oblast; 09:00 – 17:00 Kuznetsovsk Contact phone +38 (03636) 6-42-43
6, Lisova str., Information center of KhNPP, Іnformation center Netishyn, Khmelnitsky oblast; 09:00 – 17:00 Netishyn Contact phone +38 (03848) 6-37-13
Public meetings “Energoatom” had reached each of four state city administrations of satellite cities of NPPs in order to plan public meetings – to indicate the exact date and place in their jurisdiction. Moreover, information and invitations to participate in Phase 2 meetings were sent to the oblast councils of all oblasts the localities of which are situated within the monitoring zones of operating NPPs of Ukraine (Volyn, Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Rivne and Khmelnitsky oblasts). These meetings with public concerning the results of EA were held within the 90 days term after the disclosure of Public Summary of EA report and the stakeholders were informed about the date, time and place of the meetings minimum in 30 days advance before the meeting. These meetings were open for the wide public, this means that anyone could attend these meetings without the justifying document or invitation. Public meetings made public negotiations of SUP and draft EA report possible. The representatives of “Energoatom”, Consultant for EA and other experts of design institutions were present on those meetings.
Mass media
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Energoatom was using the mass media to inform a greater portion of the population than only the identified stakeholders, with which it communicated directly. Following public disclosure of the EAReport, Energoatom sent a press release to the mass media and located the above mentioned document on its web-site, including (but not limited to the following channels): 1. National newspapers – Day, Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, Uryadovyi Kurier 2. National television – Channel 5, Tonis, TVi 3. Regional newspapers. The press release was drafted and distributed by Energoatom and included the key findings of the EA, information on where interested parties may have had an access to the report and information concerning the places and dates of public meetings.
Targeting vulnerable populations Energoatom has prepared a leaflet in Ukrainian to specifically reach vulnerable populations. The leaflet describes the SUP, the disclosure process, and the grievance mechanism. Energoatom had asked each of the 6 oblast councils which localities are situated within monitoring zones of operating NPPs of Ukraine (Volyn, Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Rivne and Khmelnitsky oblasts) with the requrest to distribute the relevant information.
List of actions undertaken during the public consultation process
Table 60 - Public consultation actions list № Action / Захід Date /Дата Disclosure of SOU of Energoatom. EA of NPPs. Публікація 27.04.2011 1 Стандарту ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом». Екологічна оцінка Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному енергоблоків АЕС сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» Disclosure of information concerning the ecological 27.04.2011 2 assessment of SUP / Публікація інформації про Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному проведення екологічної оцінки КЗПБ сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» 10.05.2011 Scoping meeting in Kiev / Зустріч з визначення масштабів 3 In premises of Energoatom / У приміщенні робіт у Києві ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» 11.05.2011 Scoping meeting in Kuznetsovsk / Зустріч з визначення 4 In information center of Rivne NPP / У масштабів робіт у Кузнецовську інформаційному центрі Рівненської АЕС 13.05.2011 Scoping meeting in Netyshyn / Зустріч з визначення 5 In information center of Khmelnitsky NPP / У масштабів робіт у Нетішині інформаційному центрі Хмельницької АЕС 17.05.2011 Scoping meeting in Energodar / Зустріч з визначення 6 In information center of Zaporizhzhya NPP / масштабів робіт у Енергодарі У інформаційному центрі Запорізької АЕС 18.05.2011 Scoping meeting in South-Ukrainsk / Зустріч з визначення In information center of South-Ukrainian NPP 7 масштабів робіт у Южно-Українську / У інформаційному центрі Южно- Української АЕС Disclosure of SUP presentation / Публікація презентації – 26.05.2011 8 Комплексна (зведена) програма підвищення безпеки Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному енергоблоків АЕС України сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» 06.06.2011 Disclosure of Scoping report (ukr) / Публікація Звіту про 9 Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному визначення масштабів робіт (укр.) сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» 06.06.2011 Disclosure of Stakeholder Engagement Plan (ukr) / 10 Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному Публікація Плану залучення зацікавлених сторін (укр.) сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» Disclosure of draft EA report. Summary for the public (ukr) / 09.06.2011 11 Публікація Проекту звіту про екологічну оцінку. Резюме Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному звіту, розраховане на широку аудиторію (укр.) сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом»
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№ Action / Захід Date /Дата Disclosure of Draft ecological assessment report summary 22.06.2011 for the public (eng) / Публікація Проекту звіту про 12 Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному екологічну оцінку. Резюме звіту, розраховане на широку сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» аудиторію (англ.) 22.06.2011 Disclosure of Stakeholder engagement plan (eng) / 13 Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному Публікація Плану залучення зацікавлених сторін (англ.) сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» 22.06.2011 Disclosure of Scoping study report (eng) / Публікація Звіту 14 Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному про визначення масштабів робіт (англ.) сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» Disclosure of Draft ecological assessment report. Main report 22.06.2011 15 (ukr) / Публікація Проекту звіту про екологічну оцінку. Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному Основний звіт (укр.) сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» Disclosure of Draft ecological assessment report. Main report 01.07.2011 16 (eng) / Публікація Проекту звіту про екологічну оцінку. Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному Основний звіт (англ.) сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» 04.07.2011 Disclosure of informational leaflet (ukr) / Публікація 17 Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному Інформаційного буклету (укр.) сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» Publication of invitation for the public meetings for SUP EA / 13.07.2011 18 Публікація запрошення до зустрічей з громадськістю Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному щодо екологічної оцінки КЗПБ сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» Publication of press-release for the public meetings for SUP 13.07.2011 EA / Публікація прес-релізу про зустрічі з громадськістю 19 Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному щодо Екологічної оцінки Комплексної зведеної програми сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» підвищення безпеки енергоблоків АЕС України Publication of agenda for the public meetings for SUP EA / 13.07.2011 20 Публікація порядку денного зустрічей з громадськістю Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному щодо екологічної оцінки КЗПБ сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» Public meeting for SUP EA in Kiev / Зустріч з громадськістю 20.07.2011, 21 щодо ЕО КЗПБ у м. Київ м. Київ, вул. Гайдара, 6, каб. 218 21.07.2011 Public meeting for SUP EA in Kuznetsovsk / Зустріч з 22 In information center of Rivne NPP / У громадськістю щодо ЕО КЗПБ у м. Кузнецовськ інформаційному центрі Рівненської АЕС Публікація статті «Реалізація Комплексної (зведеної) 21.07.2011 програми підвищення безпеки енергоблоків АЕС України 23 Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному не несе негативних впливів на навколишнє середовище, - сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» висновок експертів» 22.07.2011 Public meeting for SUP EA in Netishyn / Зустріч з 24 In information center of Khmelnitsky NPP / У громадськістю щодо ЕО КЗПБ у м. Нетішин інформаційному центрі Хмельницької АЕС Publication of the presentation material “Public meeting. Ecological assessment of SUP. Public consultation process” / 22.07.2011 25 Публікація презентаційного матеріалу «ЗУСТРІЧ З Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному ГРОМАДСЬКІСТЮ. Екологічна оцінка КЗПБ. Процес сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» консультацій з громадськістю» Publication of material “Public meeting. Ecological 22.07.2011 assessment of SUP” / Публікація презентаційного 26 Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному матеріалу «ЗУСТРІЧ З ГРОМАДСЬКІСТЮ. Екологічна сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» оцінка КЗПБ» Publication of announcement concerning the public meetings 26.07.2011 27 for SUP EA / Публікація повідомлення до зустрічей з Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному громадськістю щодо Екологічної оцінки КЗПБ сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» 26.07.2011 Public meeting for SUP EA in Energodar / Зустріч з 28 In information center of Zaporizhzhya NPP / громадськістю щодо ЕО КЗПБ у м. Енергодар У інформаційному центрі Запорізької АЕС 27.07.2011 Public meeting for SUP EA in Yuzhnoukrainsk / Зустріч з 29 In information center of Khmelnitsky NPP / У громадськістю щодо ЕО КЗПБ у м. Южноукраїнськ інформаційному центрі Хмельницької АЕС
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№ Action / Захід Date /Дата Publication of QUESTIONS-ANSWERS BOOK for Ukraine NPPs Safety Upgrade Program Ecological Assessment (15 September 2011 version 3) / Публікація книги запитань- 16.09.2011 30 відповідей щодо Комплексної (зведеної) програми Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному підвищення безпеки енергоблоків діючих АЕС України сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» (КЗПБ) та екологічної оцінки КЗПБ (версія 3 від 15.09.2011) Publication of QUESTIONS-ANSWERS BOOK for Ukraine NPPs Safety Upgrade Program Ecological Assessment (21 September 2011 version 4) / Публікація книги запитань- 22.09.2011 31 відповідей щодо Комплексної (зведеної) програми Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному підвищення безпеки енергоблоків діючих АЕС України сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» (КЗПБ) та екологічної оцінки КЗПБ (версія 4 від 21.09.2011) Publication of QUESTIONS-ANSWERS BOOK for Ukraine NPPs Safety Upgrade Program Ecological Assessment (21 September 2011 version 4) / Публікація книги запитань- 27.09.2011 32 відповідей щодо Комплексної (зведеної) програми Via web-site of Energoatom / на офіційному підвищення безпеки енергоблоків діючих АЕС України сайті ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» (КЗПБ) та екологічної оцінки КЗПБ (версія 4 від 21.09.2011)
7.6 Systematization, analysis and preparation of replies to questions and comments from the public
Energoatom and the Consultant had collected all feedback from the public that was submitted via the various channels, including forms filled out at information centres, via the website, via the telephone, and at public meetings. The experts of Energoatom and POYRY (France), UCEWP and AESCAR (Ukraine) had carefully read all of this feedback, organized them into categories, and prepared responses to all queries. The present EA report includes a list of questions and answers on the SUP and the EA (see appendix chapter 10.3).
7.7 Lighting the public consultation process in mass-media
Mass-media very actively responded to the invitation of “Energoatom” to participate and to light the public consultations process. Articles, information messages, reviews and comments concerning SUP and SUP EA, in particular concerning the public meetings had appeared in central and regional printed editions (newspapers and magazines), radio and TV shows of the central and regional TRC and on the web-sites of online magazines. Even not full list of these articles, messages, reviews and comments is provided in the below table. Table 61 – List of articles, messages, reviews and comments on SUP and SUP EA in mass- media
№ Name of article/message/comment Type/name of mas-media Date
1 В городе-спутнике Южно-Украинской АЭС состоялись друковане видання 29.07.2011 консультации с общественностью Новости N 2 На ЮУАЭС прошло выездное совещание с участием друковане видання 17.08.2011 Министра энергетики и угольной промышленности Новости N Украины Юрия Бойко
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3 Телепрограма "Світ атома" № 3 телеканал 27.08.2011 УТ-1 4 АЕС в Україні: Безпеку підвищать, ризик залишається радіоканал 22.08.2011 Deutsche Welle
5 Бойко пообещал атомщикам 1 млрд долларов радіоканал 19.09.2011 Proximainform 6 Кабмин потратит $1 млрд. на улучшение ядерной радіоканал 20.08.2011 безопасности UkrHome 7 Программа повышения безопасности украинских АЭС Інтернет-видання 21.09.2011 обойдется в 13,8 млрд. гривен Nuclear.Ru 8 Юрій Недашковський: Атомна генерація і надалі Інтернет-видання 29.08.2011 відіграватиме ключову роль в енергетиці країни "Українська енергетика" (UA-Energy.org") 9 В Южноукраинске консультировались с общественностью Інтернет-видання 28.07.2011 Mukola.net 10 Украина повышает безопасность своих АЭС. В кредит Інтернет-видання 01.08.2011 УРА-ИНФОРМ.com 11 На ЮУАЭС прошло выездное совещание с участием Інтернет-видання 17.08.2011 Министра энергетики и угольной промышленности Mukola.net Украины Юрия Бойко 12 В Украине на повышение безопасности АЭС планируют Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 выделить около 1 миллиарда долларов - Бойко РБК-Украина, "Обозреватель", Подробности.ua, Finobzor, Газета.ua, МинПром, ГолосUA, "Український тиждень" 13 На підвищення безпеки АЕС України планують виділити Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 близько 1 млрд. доларів "Урядовий портал", "Час Пик", ugmk.info, Гал-info 14 Около $1 млрд выделят на повышение безопасности АЭС Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 - Бойко РИА Новости, ПРАЙМ- ТАСС 15 "Енергоатом" розраховує домовитися з ЄБРР і Euroatom Інтернет-видання 17.08.2011 про залучення кредитів для підвищення безпеки АЕС у 1 "Українські Новини", півріччі 2012 Информационный портал "Транспортный бизнес" 16 На мероприятия по повышению безопасности на АЭС Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 Украины планируют потратить около $1 млрд ИА REGNUM 17 На повышение безопасности АЭС Украины планируют Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 выделить примерно $1 млрд УКРИНФОРМ 18 На повышение безопасности ядерной отрасли потратят Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 около $1 млрд – Бойко "Независимое бюро новостей" 19 Кинут миллиард на безопасность АЭС Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 Крымская ПРАВДА 20 В безопасность украинских АЭС пустят $1 млрд. Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 tochka.net 21 Ядерная безопасность обойдется украинцам в Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 дополнительных $1 млрд Интернет-издание "Багнет" 22 На повышение безопасности АЭС Украины планируют Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 выделить около 1 млрд. долларов "Електронні вісті" 23 На заходи з підвищення безпеки в ядерній галузі України Інтернет-видання 19.08.2011 планують витратити близько 1 млрд. доларів "Голос України"
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24 На безопасность украинских АЭС потратят миллиард Інтернет-видання 19.08.2011 долларов дополнительно "Правда Украины" 25 В Азарова пообіцяли виділити $1 млрд на безпеку АЕС Інтернет-видання 19.08.2011 Український тиждень 26 Кабмин профинансирует повышение безопасности АЭС Інтернет-видання 19.08.2011 "Укррудпром" 27 Украинским атомщикам пообещали миллиард долларов Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 donbass.ua 28 Бойко привлечет кредиты для работы АЭС Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 from-ua.com 29 Безопасность на украинских АЭС повысят Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 "Ракурс" 30 Бойко: На повышение безопасности АЭС нужно около 1 Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 млрд долл Finance.ua, Гал-info, Відголос.com 31 Украинским АЭС нужен 1 млрд долларов, чтобы стать Інтернет-видання 18.08.2011 безопасными Деньги.UA 32 Заявление союза «Гражданский дозор» по поводу Інтернет-видання 02.08.2011 организации НАЭК «Энергоатом» консультаций с "Партия зеленых" населением, проживающим в радиусе 30 км. от Запорожской АЭС 33 НЭЦУ требует своевременного вывода старых реакторов Інтернет-видання 22.07.2011 из эксплуатации Fuel Alternative 34 "Энергоатом" хочет экологической оценки повышения Інтернет-видання 20.07.2011 безопасности АЭС Украины. ДОКУМЕНТ, АУДИО, ФОТО UA-Energy.org , AtomNews, me-press.kiev.ua 35 Комплексная программа повышения безопасности Інтернет-видання 26.04.2011 энергоблоков АЭС поможет Украине выйти на РБК-Украина международный уровень по ядерной безопасности, - "Энергоатом" 36 Энергоатом": энергоблоки на украинских АЭС Інтернет-видання 26.04.2011 эксплуатируются безопасно РИА Новости 37 Запорожская АЭС разрабатывает дополнительные Інтернет-видання 20.05.2011 мероприятия по повышению безопасности РепортерUA
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8 MITIGATION OR OPTIMISING MEASURES
8.1 Mitigation or optimising measures
8.1.1 Recommendations for improved HSE management The general objective of the measures proposed in this chapter is: • replication to the SUP and to all NPPs of the improved HSE practices introduced within K2/R4 safety upgrade; • harmonization of HSE management practices between NPPs. The proposed measures are described in the following table:
Table 62 – Recommendations for improved HSE management
# Recommendation Timeline Applicability 1.1 Replication of the visitor introduction improvements carried out within 2012 Zaporizhzhya NPP K2/R4 : first semester South-Ukrainian NPP Following the example of Rivne NPP, edition of a brochure ”Welcome to (as well as Rivne NPP & the NPP” which includes the following information: Khmelnitsky NPP if the • procedure of access to NPP, international languages • rules to be observed on site, versions are not yet available) • warning signals at NPP in case of emergency; • actions in case of emergency. The brochure should be available in Ukrainian and 4 international languages (English, French, German and Russian) 1.2 Workers awareness 1.2.1 Add environmental protection as a specific topic to the study program for starting from Zaporizhzhya NPP employees who arrive at the NPP for the first time (replication of a 2012 Khmelnitsky NPP measure already undertaken at Rivne NPP) South-Ukrainian NPP 1.2.2 Add a specific HSE information (brochure) for workers of sub-contractors starting from All four NPPs coming from another region (alcool, drugs, HIV awareness, and any 2012 specific risk in th area of the NPP at the time they come) 1.3 Completion of the ISO 14000 certification process by the end of All four NPPs 2013 1.4 Facilities for radioactive waste handling have to be completed: by 2015 All four NPPs Provide plans on establishment of means for radioactive waste handling and radwaste conversion into forms applicable to long-term storage in accordance with the Radioactive Waste Management Plan approved by the SNRIU. 1.5 The effective implementation of HSE rules within each NPP is monitored and subject to regular monitoring. Nevertheless, although comprehensive and consistent information is collected within HSE monitoring activities, there is clear potential to improve the quality of analytic data, and to define performance indicators and targets that would allow following-up the evolution of HSE requirements fulfilment within the NPPs. The SUP implementation will require the use of additional workforce through subcontractors and is an opportunity to introduce HSE monitoring indicators, with the primary objective of comparing the levels of performance between NPPs and between sub-contractors:
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# Recommendation Timeline Applicability 1.5.1 Compare the HSE performance of NPPs: starting from Zaporizhzhya NPP Introduce in quarterly and annual reporting the following indicators for all 2012 Rivne NPP NPPs, for example: Khmelnitsky NPP • number of reported HSE deviations / number of worked days x South-Ukrainian NPP 20 000 • number of working days lost / number of worked days x 20 000 Head office • number of days without fatal accident On energoatom's website, show these indicators, for each NPP, including the performance of previous years 1.5.2 Comparing the HSE performance of sub-contractors: starting from Head office, based on data Keep a record of sub-contractors HSE performance and introduce criteria 2012 from the NPPs. for their selection, for example: • number of reported HSE deviations / number of worked days x 20 000 • number of working days lost / number of worked days x 10 000 Define and apply criteria for the exclusion of sub-contractors from the registered list, based on HSE performance indicators.
8.1.2 Recommendations for improved public information The general objective of the measures proposed in this chapter is: • to ensure regular information of the public regarding NPP safety, during the implementation of the SUP and after its completion; • to harmonize public information release tools and practices between NPPs. The proposed measures are described in the following table: Table 63 – Recommendations for improved public information
# Recommendation Timeline Applicability 2.1 Aiming at the support of the communication channels which were opened On a All four NPPs while public consultations concerning SUP and SUP EA one needs to: permanent Headquarters of • annually organize in each satellite city public meeting with basis, starting Energoatom inhabitants of the neighboring territories to NPP aiming at from 2012 answering the questions and collection of notes of population; • leave the e-mail [email protected] open to receive questions, comments and suggestions concerning SUP Questions and remarks from the public should be compiled and used: • by the NPP management to undertake voluntarily any improvement deemed necessary in the view of these questions and remarks • as an input for the Safety Assessment Reports, in order to make sure that environmental or social concerns raised by the public are officially adressed 2.2 Create a specific website at the South-Ukrainian NPP, with general end 2011 South-Ukrainian NPP information like at the three other NPPs. 2.3 Harmonize the monitoring information made available on the web-site of the NPPs:
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# Recommendation Timeline Applicability 2.3.1 • clickable map showing the location of monitoring equipments in the from the All four NPPs, depending 30km monitoring zone; beginning of on their present website • show radiation monitoring results: monthly average and real time (for 2012 configuration, with example, update every 5 minutes). Use the same radiation units at coordination by the head all NPPs (this is presently not the case); office • meteorological monitoring data (real time): temperature, wind direction and velocity, 24 hour precipitation; 2.3.2 • hydrological monitoring results: upstream and downstream water from the Rivne NPP temperature and discharge in Styr river beginning of 2012 2.4 Harmonize the communication tools used by the NPPs for public starting from All four NPPs, depending information, based on a replication of the NPP's best practices, including 2012 on the communication tools as a minimum: they presently use • automatic answering system hourly updated, providing information on the status of the NPP (number of reactors in operation), average and highest radiation level in the monitoring zone and weather condition (free of charge call); • own newspaper with weekly information, including (i) a weekly summary of monitoring data, and (ii) a reminder of the NPP website and automatic answering system number; • thematic brochures at public places in the 30km monitoring zones (not only in the satellite city) • systematic press releases in case of incident or particular event at the NPP, in order to openly inform the public. 2.5 At least every 3 month, inform the population of the progress of the during SUP All four NPPs implementation of the SUP, through newpapers and own website. implementation 2.6 Recommendation to the local executive bodies and local authorities to Starting with MZ of all 4 NPPs locate in the center of each locality of MZ of NPP electronic screens with 2012 information concerning the radiation situation on NPP to be transmitted from the web-sites of NPPs for costs of social-economic risk compensation
8.1.3 Recommendations for improved emergency management The general objective of the measures proposed in this chapter is: • to improve early warning of the population leaving in the 30km zone in case of accident with potential consequences outside the NPP territory; The proposed measures are described in the following table: Table 64 – Recommendations for improved emergency management
# Recommendation Timeline Applicability
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# Recommendation Timeline Applicability 3.1 Set-up an early warning system via SMS text message on mobile phones. Preparation in All four NPPs The alert should be sent automatically to the residents of the 30km zone 2012 cities and settlements. Residents willing to be included in the early warning Implementation list should register at the administration of their residence city; the starting from administration would provide these residents with a brochure (edited by 2013 Energoatom) explaining the actions to be undertaken in case of alarm message. These administrations will transmit the contacts of residents to the NPP who will send a registration confirmation message to residents. Registered residents should be required to re-register regularly (for example every other 3 year) by answering an automatic SMS. The population of the 30km zone should be informed about the set-up of this system using the usual communication tools of the NPPs (website, newspaper and brochures).
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8.2 Indicators and institutional capacities
8.2.1 Implementation capacity and financing All measures recommended under 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 can be implemented directly by the NPPs or the head office using their own resources. Each measure will have a limited cost, in a range of a few thousands to a few tenths of thousands Euros over the SUP duration. The measures recommended under 8.1.3 will require external services from engineering/consulting firms and providers who should be contracted directly by the NPPs. Energoatom's head office will monitor the timely completion of the proposed measures and report it in quarterly reports to the lender(s).
8.2.2 Completion indicators The optimal way to monitor the completion of the proposed measures is to: 1. prepare a planning for their implementation, starting from the beginning of the SUP, showing sub-tasks and deadlines; 2. follow-up the actual completion of each sub-task in quarterly reports, with reference to the planned deadlines. The dates mentioned in the tables of chapters 8.1.1, 8.1.2 and 8.1.3 show that most of these measures could be implemented starting from early 2012 (expected date for the beginning of the SUP implementation). Each NPP should at the actual beginning of the SUP propose its own planning to implement these measures, and submit it to Energoatom's head office for approval.
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9 CONCLUSIONS
9.1 General conclusions Impacts on natural environment: The main impacts of the NPPs on natural environment within the 30km zone are related to the release of heat and pollutants in the environment and in particular to water bodies by cooling processes. The SUP will not result in an increase of the production capacity of the NPPs. Therefore, no significant increase or decrease is expected from the SUP in the quantity of heat, water vapour, dust or emissions released by the NPPs into the environment, or in the quantity of water used for cooling needs. In addition, none of the SUP measures will require the use of significant volumes of natural resources (e.g. large volumes of water or large volumes of sand or earth) for its implementation. Transport means (train and trucks) used for the supply of equipment and the transport of workforce for the implementation of the SUP will produce minor additional greenhouse gases emissions that would not have been released without the SUP (the traffic increase is estimated at less than a 10%). The SUP will not result in a long term additional use of vehicles. The only SUP related works that might be undertaken outside the NPP territories are the erection of new seismic monitoring equipments, which typically require the construction of a well and a shelter. These works will most often be undertaken within the 30km zone at places where NPPs already have radiation or meteorological monitoring equipments. In any case, no significant land acquisition will be required, and no works in protected areas or valuable habitats will be necessary. Therefore, the SUP is not expected to have any impact on the fauna, flora or reserves of the NPPs 30km zone. The SUP will reduce the risk of a nuclear accident, and therefore the risk of large-scale contamination of the environment. In addition, some of the SUP measures will also allow mitigating the consequences of an accident, and thereof the quantities of radioactive or non radioactive pollutants released into the environment. This is a positive output of the SUP. Impacts on social environment: The main impacts of the SUP implementation for the population living within the 30km zones will be disturbances caused by (i) additional transport traffic for the supply of new equipment (but most of the supply is planned by train) and (ii) works related to the installation of additional seismic monitoring equipments, but these are small size works which can be done during the regular working hours. The implementation of the SUP will require the involvement of external workforce and subcontractors, who will be exposed to the radiation and non-radiation risks that exist in any NPP. In accordance with Ukrainian legislation, HSE measures apply to all workers (internal, external, permanent or temporary) involved in activities at the NPP site. Those measures aim at preventing accident risks or excessive radiation exposure; they are applied by Energoatom in compliance with the legislation. After the SUP is completed, the NPPs will have an improved level of safety. A reduction in the risk of accidents translates into a reduced risk of contamination for NPP workers and nearby residents. This should lower stress levels related to working at or living near NPPs and will positively impact the psychological health of workers and nearby residents. For this impact to be effective it is important for PAPs to understand and be aware of the SUP and its implications on reducing risks. The implementation of the SUP in the NPPs will require from 100 to 500 additional external workers over the 6-year period of program implementation at each NPP. Although specific competences might be sought far from the NPPs, the population living in the vicinity of the NPP is expected to be positively impacted in terms of income from the SUP implementation from both direct and indirect employment opportunities. Consequently, the SUP implementation is expected to positively impact the economic and social condition of the population living in the vicinity of the NPP. So no negative impact on economic or social conditions is expected from the implementation of the SUP. After completion, the SUP will result in minor but permanent additional work needs, which will be a long-term positive but marginal impact on employment and on the social conditions around the NPP. Altogether, the expected impact of the SUP on the social environment is expected to be largely positive. Nevertheless, there is a clear demand from the public of the 30km zone for more
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information concerning the safety of the NPPs and early warning in case of accident. This is addressed in the recommendations made within the EA report. Impacts on technogenic environment: In normal operation conditions, the NPP have very limited impact on their technogenic environment. In case of accident with significant release of radionuclides to the technogenic environment of the concerned NPP would be affected according to the radionuclides fallout. In case of disaster, the creation of an exclusion zone similar to Chernobyl's would result in the end of all regular economic activities in the concerned areas. The implementation of the SUP will have a positive impact on their technogenic environment, by bringing more business to satellite enterprises due to the planned increase of staff (5 to 10 %) and the planned increase of waste generation (5 to 10%). Once completed, the SUP will not result in an increase or in a decrease of the activity of the NPP. Therefore, under normal operation, no long term impact on the technogenic environment is expected after the implementation of the SUP. The exposure of the technogenic environment to the consequences of accidents at the NPP will decrease after the implementation of the SUP as the probability of accidents will decrease and the potential consequences of some accidents will also be decreased, since some of the SUP measures will improve the capacity of the operational staff to early identify problems (for example, additional monitoring equipments) or to manage problems (for example, additional fire protection equipments). In conclusion, the expected short and long term impacts of the SUP for the technogenic environment are essentially positive. Assessment of possible SUP transboundary impacts: The SUP does not aim and will not result in an increase the production of electricity. As consequence an increase of emissions to air and water by the operation of NPP is not expected. The SUP will also not affect the radwaste and other waste resulting from operation of the NPP in a significant manner. After its implementation, the SUP will generally result in a reduction of risks for the environment around the NPP, through (i) a reduction of the probability of accidents and (ii) a reduction of the potential consequences of accidents, due to improved monitoring equipments allowing for earlier identification of accidents and better management of accident situations. This reduction in the risk of accidents and their consequences also translate into a generally reduced risk of potential transboundary impacts. So the impact after SUP implementation is positive by tendency. The location of the four NPP sites and the expected degree and extent of the environmental impacts resulting from the SUP leads to the conclusion that a detailed notification and consultation of neighbouring countries is not necessary. On this basis it is recommend that the disclosure of the EA and the Executive Summary in English and in Ukrainian language on the internet for public participation will also be the appropriate method of information in the transboundary context. Public consultations on elaboration and implementation of SUP: Stakeholder engagement is a key component of the overall stakeholder engagement process of the EA since it enables meaningful consultation with stakeholders through the disclosure of information and public consultation. All feedback from the public that is submitted via the various channels, including forms filled out at information centres, via the website, via the telephone, and at public meetings will be collected, organized into categories, and answered in a dedicated chapter of the final version of the EA report (September). Several questions and suggestions received during the scoping meetings have already been taken into account for the preparation of the draft EA report.
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9.2 Recommendations for enhancement and optimising measures The recommendations for enhancement and optimising are sorted in three categories: • Recommendations for improved HSE management include: o the replication to the SUP and to all NPPs of the improved HSE practices introduced within K2/R4 safety upgrade; o the harmonization of HSE management practices between NPPs; o the introduction of performance indicators to compare the HSE performance of NPPs and also evaluate the HSE performance of sub-contractors. • Recommendations for improved public information (a frequent request at scoping meetings) include: o regular information of the public regarding NPP safety, during the implementation of the SUP and after its completion; o the harmonization of public information release tools and practices between NPPs, through a best-practice replication approach. o recommendation to the local executive bodies and local authorities to locate in the center of each locality of MZ of NPP electronic screens with information concerning the radiation situation on NPP to be transmitted from the web-sites of NPPs for costs of social-economic risk compensation. • Recommendations for improved emergency management (also a demand from scoping meetings) include the set-up of an early warning system via SMS text message on mobile phones to voluntarily registered residents of the 30km zone, in case of accident with potential consequences outside the NPP territory. All recommended measures which are under responsibility of Energoatom can be implemented directly by the NPPs or by its head office using their own resources, or with the assistance of external services from engineering/consulting firms and providers. Energoatom's head office will monitor the timely completion of the proposed measures and report it in quarterly reports to the lender(s).
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10 MANDATORY ANNEXES
10.1 Annex A List of references
Title / Название 1 • Екологічна та соціальна політика ЄБРР, 12 травня 2008 р. • Environmental and Social Policy, EBRD, May 2008 • Экологическая и социальная политика, ЄБРР, Май 2008 года 2 • Отчет по анализу безопасности – Блок 1 - Запорожская АЭС Книга 1 - Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности - 21.01.59.OB.01.01 Книга 3 - Влияние АЭС на окружающую природную среду - 21.1.59.ОБ.01.03 • Safety Analysis Report – Additional material concerning safety analysis – Zaporojia NPP Block 1 Book 1 – Additional materials concerning safety analysis - 21.01.59.OB.01.01 Book 3 – NPP impact on environment - 21.1.59.ОБ.01.03 3 • Отчет по анализу безопасности - Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности – Южноукраинская АЭС, Блок 2 Книга 1 - Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности - 23.2.39.ОБ.01 Книга 3 - Влияние АЭС на окружающую природную среду - 23.2.39.ОБ.01.03 • Safety Analysis Report – Additional material concerning safety analysis – South Ukraina NPP, Block 2 Book 1 – Additional materials concerning safety analysis - 23.2.39.ОБ.01 Book 3 – NPP impact on environment - 23.2.39.ОБ.01.03 4 • Отчет по анализу безопасности – Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности – Южноукраинская АЭС, Блок 3 Книга 1 - Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности - 23.3.39.ОБ.01.01 Книга 3 - Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности - 23.3.39.ОБ.01.03 • Safety Analysis Report – Additional material concerning safety analysis – South Ukraina NPP, Bloc 3 Book 1 – Additional materials concerning safety analysis – 23.3.39.ОБ.01.01 Book 3 – Additional materials concerning safety analysis – 23.3.39.ОБ.01.03 5 • Отчет по анализу безопасности – Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности – Ровенская АЭС Книга 1 - Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности - 22.3.145.ОБ.03.1 Книга 3 - Влияние АЭС на окружающую природную среду - 22.3.145.ОБ.03.3 • Safety Analysis Report – Additional material concerning safety analysis – Rivne NPP Book 1 – Additional material concerning safety analysis - 22.3.145.ОБ.03.1 Book 3 – NPP impact on environment - 22.3.145.ОБ.03.3 6 • Отчет по анализу безопасности – Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности – Хмельницкая АЭС Книга 1 - Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности - ЕР33-2008.110.ОД.3 Книга 3 - Влияние АЭС на окружающую природную среду - ЕР33-2008.310.ОД.3 • Safety Analysis Report – Additional material concerning safety analysis – Khmelnitsky NPP Book 1 – Additional materials concerning safety analysis - ЕР33-2008.110.ОД.3 Book 3 – NPP impact on environment - ЕР33-2008.310.ОД.3 7 • Годовые отчеты ОП АЭС по обращению с РАО (2008-2010 гг). • Annual radiation wastes treatment reports (2008-2010). 8 • Отчеты по оценке влияния на окружающую среду по объектам Х2 • K2 EIA complete reports 9 • Заява про наміри щодо зведеної програми підвищення безпеки енергоблоків АЕС України • Statement of Intent concerning Ukraine NPP Safety Upgrade Program 10 • ОЯБ Отчет о ядерной безопасности / Оценка кредита сводной программы повышения безопасности / Документ: UP-PMG-S- DOC-001-01 / Проверка: 01 • NSR Nuclear Safety Report / Upgrade package loan assessment / Document: UP-PMG-S-DOC-001-01 / Revision: 01 11 • Загальна Організаційна Структура ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом» • Energoatom Organization chart 12 • Меморандум про сотрудничество в энергетической отрасли между ЕЭС и Украиной – Определение направления по атомной безопасности – Окончательный отчёт общей рабочей группы – Окончательные выводы • MoU on cooperation in the field of energy between the EU and Ukraine – Roadmap on Nuclear Safety – Joint working group final report – Final summary 13 • UP-PMG-F-DOC-200-00-2 Background of the Project
14 • UP-PMG-F-DOC-270-00-Annex 2.7 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
15 • UP-PMG-F-DOC-280-00-Annex 2.8 EC-IAEA-Ukraine Joint Project
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Title / Название 16 • РИВНЕНСКАЯ АЭС, Энергоблок № 1, ОТЧЕТ ПО ПЕРИОДИЧЕСКОЙ ПЕРЕОЦЕНКЕ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ, Том 5 - 22.1.145.ОППБ.05; 38-741.203.003.ОБ.05, 38-821.203.003.ОБ.05
• Rivne NPP, power unit No 1, Periodical safety re-assessment report, Volume 5 - 22.1.145.ОППБ.05; 38-741.203.003.ОБ.05, 38- 821.203.003.ОБ.05 17 • ОВОС под СХОЯТ, Запорожская АЭС • EIA of used nuclear fuel dry storage, Zaporozhe NPP 18 • Отчёт по ОВОС 2010 • EIA report 2010 19 • План-график КсППБ для КРЕДИТОРОВ • Plan-schedule of measured according to the safety upgrade program for the Lenders 20 • Обобщенный План-график КСПБ • Summarized Plan-Schedule of safety upgrade program 21 • Постанова від 18 липня 1998 р. N 1122, Київ, Про затвердження Порядку проведення громадських слухань з питань використання ядерної енергії та радіаційної безпеки • Resolution dd 18th July 1998, No 1122, Kiev, About approval the Order of public hearings holding concerning the isues of nuclear power usage and radiation safety 22 • Отчеты водохозяйственных балансов прудов-охладителей (для РАЭС* как есть баланс) по четырем АЭС *находится в п 19 (РИВНЕНСКАЯ АЭС, Энергоблок № 1, ОТЧЕТ ПО ПЕРИОДИЧЕСКОЙ ПЕРЕОЦЕНКЕ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ, Том 5 - 22.1.145.ОППБ.05; 38-741.203.003.ОБ.05, 38-821.203.003.ОБ.05) • Reports of the water housing balances of cooling ponds (for Rivne NPP* as it is) for the 4 NPPs *is contained into unit 19 (Rivne NPP, power unit No 1, Periodical safety re-assessment report, Volume 5 - 22.1.145.ОППБ.05; 38- 741.203.003.ОБ.05, 38-821.203.003.ОБ.05) 23 • ЕКОЛОГІЧНА ОЦІНКА «КОМПЛЕКСНОЇ (ЗВЕДЕНОЇ) ПРОГРАМИ ПІДВИЩЕННЯ БЕЗПЕКИ ЕНЕРГОБЛОКІВ АЕС УКРАЇНИ» • EA of the « Complex (summary) SUP of power units on NPPs of Ukraine » 24 ДГН 6.6.1.-6.5.001-98. ДНАОП 0.03-3.24-97. Norms of Radiation Safety of Ukraine. NRBU-97: Ministry of Health Protection of Ukraine, 1997 ДГН 6.6.1.-6.5.001-98. ДНАОП 0.03-3.24-97. Нормы радиационной безопасности Украины. НРБУ-97: МОЗ Украины, 1997 25 Khmelnitsky NPP. Energy unit 2. Ecological impact assessment (EIA) № 43-915.201.012.ОВ01-17 Хмельницкая АЭС. Энергоблок № 2. Оценка воздействий на окружающую среду (ОВОС) № 43-915.201.012.ОВ01-17 26 Khmelnitsky NPP. Energy unit 1. Consolidated safety analysis report. Volume 2. Chapter 9. Ecological impact assessment.09 Хмельницкая АЭС СВОДНЫЙ ОТЧЕТ ПО АНАЛИЗУ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ. Книга 2. Раздел 8 Оценка воздействия на окружающую среду 27 Хмельницкая АЭС. Энергоблок №2. Отчет по анализу безопасности. Том 2. Глава 2. Характеристика района и площадки АС. 43- 923.203.254.ОБ.02.Ред.1. -К:, КИЭП,, 2003 28 Руководящий документ «Требования к содержанию отчета по анализу безопасности действующих на Украине энергоблоков АЭС с реакторами типа ВВЭР», 1995 29 Нормативно-технический документ 38.220.56-84. Том 1. Безопасность в атомной энергетике. Часть 1. Общие положения безопасности АЭС. Методы расчета распространения радиоактивных веществ с АЭС и облучения окружающего населения. Издание первое. Международное хозяйственное объединение "Интератомэнерго". Москва. Энергоатомиздат, 1984 30 ИАЭ им. И.В.Курчатова. «Расчет аварийного облучения населения при МПА на блоке с ВВЭР-1000 Ровенской АЭС». 1989 31 Національний атлас України. – К.: ДНВП «Картографія», 2007. – 440 с.,іл. 32 http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ Державний комітет статистики України. 33 http://meteo.com.ua/ 34 http://www.zoda.gov.ua/ Запорізька обласна державна адміністрація. 35 http://www.rv.gov.ua/ Рівненська обласна державна адміністрація. 36 http://www.adm.km.ua/ Хмельницька обласна державна адміністрація. 37 http://www.voladm.gov.ua/ Волинська обласна державна адміністрація. 38 http://www.adm.dp.gov.ua/ Дніпропетровська обласна державна адміністрація. 39 http://www.mk-oda.gov.ua/ Миколаївська обласна державна адміністрація. 40 http://www.ecohm.gov.ua/ Державне управління охорони навколишнього природного середовища в Хмельницькій області. 41 http://www.duecomk.gov.ua/ Державне управління охорони навколишнього природного середовища в Миколаївській області. 42 http://www.ecorivne.gov.ua/ Державне управління охорони навколишнього природного середовища в Рівненській області. 43 http://ecodnepr.dp.ua/ Державне управління охорони навколишнього природного середовища в Дніпропетровській області. 44 Екологічний паспорт Хмельницької області (2009). // Державне управління охорони навколишнього природного середовища в Хмельницькій області. 45 Екологічний паспорт Миколаївської області (2009). // Державне управління охорони навколишнього природного середовища в Миколаївській області. 46 Екологічний паспорт Рівненської області (2009). // Державне управління охорони навколишнього природного середовища в Рівненській області. 47 Екологічний паспорт Волинської області (2009). // Державне управління охорони навколишнього природного середовища в Волинській області.
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Title / Название 48 Екологічний паспорт Запорізької області (2009). // Державне управління охорони навколишнього природного середовища в Запорізькій області. 49 Екологічний паспорт Дніпропетровської області (2009). // Державне управління охорони навколишнього природного середовища в Дніпропетровській області. 50 0.РБ.2509.ИЭ-08. Регламент радиационного контроля Хмельницкой АЭС 51 Отчеты по радиационной обстановке в районе расположения Хмельницкой АЭС за 1998-2007 гг. Лаборатория внешнего радиационного контроля ХАЭС 52 Государственные санитарные нормативы “Допустимi рiвнi вмiсту радiонуклiдiв Cs-137 та Sr-90 у продуктах харчування та питнiй водi”, 2006 г. 53 Контрольные уровни газо-аэрозольного выброса и водного сброса радиоактивных веществ Хмельницкой АЭС. 0.РБ.0130.НР-07 54 Контрольные уровни (нормы радиационной безопасности) для Хмельницкой АЭС, №0.РБ.0080.НР-08 55 Радиационная обстановка вокруг Южно-Украинской АЭС в предпусковой период (снятие нулевого фона). Отчёт ИЯИ АН УССР, ИБФ МЗ СССР, Николаевская ОблСЭС, Киев, 1980. 56 Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности. Блок №1 Южно-Украинская АЭС. 23.1.39.ОБ.01.03. Книга 3. 57 Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности. Блок №2 Южно-Украинская АЭС. 23.2.39.ОБ.01.03. Книга 3. 58 Дополнительные материалы по анализу безопасности. Блок №3 Южно-Украинская АЭС. 23.3.39.ОБ.01.03. Книга 3. 59 Отчет по периодической переоценке безопасности. Фактор №14. «Воздействие эксплуатации АЭС на окружающую среду», Южно-Украинская АЭС, Энергоблок №1, ООО «Энергориск», Киев, 2010 60 “Допустимый водный сброс радиоактивных веществ в окружающую среду ОП ЮУАЭС (радиационно-гигиенический регламент первой группы) РГ.0.0026.0158” 61 Радиационная обстановка вокруг Южно-Украинской АЭС в предпусковой период (снятие нулевого фона). Отчёт ИЯИ АН УССР, ИБФ МЗ СССР, Николаевская ОблСЭС, Киев, 1980. 62 Отчет по периодической переоценке безопасности. Фактор №14. «Воздействие эксплуатации АЭС на окружающую среду», Южно-Украинская АЭС, Энергоблок №1, ООО «Энергориск», Киев, 2010 63 “Допустимый водный сброс радиоактивных веществ в окружающую среду ОП ЮУАЭС (радиационно-гигиенический регламент первой группы) РГ.0.0026.0158” 64 Отчет УкрНИГМИ «Оценка смерчеопасности территории расположения Южно-Украинской АЭС», Киев, 1993 г 65 Рекомендации по определению расчетных характеристик смерчей при размещении атомных станций. РТМ-53, 89, Москва, 1989, ВГНИПКИ «Атомэнергопроект» 66 РД–95 10444–91 Рекомендации по определению расчетных характеристик смерчей при размещении атомных станций.– М.: Атомэнергопроект, 1991. 67 Брюхань Ф.Ф., Ляхов М.Е., Погребняк В.Н. Смерчеопасные зоны в СССР и размещение атомных станций. – М.: Известия АН СССР, серия географическая № 1, 1989. 68 Материалы метеорологических наблюдений за 1992 - 2003 годы (данные АЭС). 69 СНиП 2.01.01-82 Строительная климатология и геофизика. – М.: Государственный комитет СССР по делам строительства, 1983. 70 Хмельницкая АЭС. Энергоблок № 2. ОВОС. Том 2. Физикогеографическая и климатическая характеристика района и площадки энергоблока.-К.:КИЭП, 2000. 71 Хмельницкая АЭС. Энергоблок № 2. Отчет по анализу безопасности. Дополнительные материалы. Вероятностный анализ безопасности 1 уровня по отношению к внешним экстремальным воздействиям при работе энергоблока на номинальном уровне мощности. Методическое руководство. 43-923.203.075.МД.00. 72 0.РБ.2509.ИЭ-08. Регламент радиационного контроля Хмельницкой АЭС 73 Ліпінський В.М, Осадчий В.І, Бабіченко В.М. Стихійні метеорологічні явища на території України за останнє двадцятиріччя (1986 - 2005). Київ Ніка-Центр. 2006 р. 74 СНиП II-6-74 «Нагрузки и воздействия». 75 ДСП 201-97 Державні санітарні правила охорони атмосферного повітря від забруднення хімічними та біологічними речовинами. - Київ, 1997 (Утвержденные МОЗ Украины от 09.07.97 № 201) 76 Радиационная обстановка в районе строительства РАЭС. Ленинградский научно-исследовательский институт радиационной гигиены (ЛНИИРГ). - Ленинград. 1977 77 132-ДУ.В-2006. Допустимый газо-аэрозольный выброс радиоактивных веществ Ривненской АЭС. (Радиационно-гигиенический регламент первой группы) 78 РАЭС. Энергоблок №4. ОВОС. Том 4. Характеристика окружающей природной среды и оценка воздействий на нее. Книга 1-11. 38-903.201.001.ОВ04.01-11. – К.: КИЭП, 2001. 79 Ровенская АЭС. Энергоблок № 4. ОВОС. Том 2. Физикогеографическая и климатическая характеристика района и площадки энергоблока. 38-903.201.001.ОВ02.- К.: КИЭП, 2001. 80 Ровенская АЭС. Энергоблок №4. Отчет по анализу безопасности. Том 2. Глава 2. Характеристика района и площадки АС. 38- 223.203.003.ОБ.02. – К.: КИЭП, 2003. 81 Ровенская АЭС. Энергоблок № 1. Разработка ВАБ в соответствии с регулирующими требованиями. Вероятностный анализ безопасности 1-го уровня по отношению к внешним экстремальным воздействиям при работе энергоблока на номинальном уровне мощности. База данных. 38-680.203.022.БД.00. – К.: КИЭП. 82 132-1-Р-РБ. Регламент радиационного контроля Ривненской АЭС
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Title / Название 83 Отчет о научно-исследовательской работе «Анализ аэрологического режима территории расположения Хмельницкой и Ровенской АЭС». - К.: НАНУ, Научно-исследовательский центр механики жидкости, 1999. 84 Фондові дані метеорологічних спостережень за 1945-1997 рр. на метеостанціях Маневичі, Сарни, Рівне, Луцьк і Любешов: температура і вологість повітря, атмосферні опади, вітер, сніговий покрив, тумани, атмосферні явища, стихійні метеорологічні явища.– К.: Галузевий державний архів Центральної геофізичної обсерваторії Держкомітету України з питань гідрометеорології, 2000. 85 Стихийные метеорологические явления на Украине и в Молдавии. Климатическое пособие. Под редакцией В.Н. Бабиченко.– Ленинград: Гидрометеоиздат, 2006. 86 В.Н.Бабиченко и др. Температура воздуха на Украине. – Ленинград: Гидрометеоиздат, 1987. 87 Требования к размещению атомных станци»,- М.:Минатомэнерго СССР, 1987. 88 Руководство МАГАТЭ по безопасности № 50-SG-S11A. Учет экстремальных метеорологических явлений при выборе площадок АЭС (без учета тропических циклонов). –Вена, 1983. 89 ГНД 95.1.10.13.046-99 «Выполнение измерений активности радионуклидов в газовых и аэрозольных выбросах из вентиляционных труб атомных станций. Методические указания» 90 Проект углубленного анализа безопасности энергоблока №5 Запорожской АЭС. Анализ исходных событий, связанных с выходом радиоактивности из систем или компонентов 20059DL11R-DBA 91 21.5.70.ОБ.02. «Проект углубленного анализа безопасности энергоблока №5 Запорожской АЭС. Анализ проектных аварий в ограниченном объеме» 92 Запорожская АЭС. Энергоблок № 5. Проект углубленного анализа безопасности энергоблока. ВАБ для внешних экстремальных воздействий в ограниченном объеме – часть 1. Природные экстремальные воздействия и планирование. 20052dl11r-eha, 2002. 93 Запорожская АЭС. Проект. Часть 12. Охрана окружающей среды при строительстве и эксплуатации АЭС.21.0014.0000002.00506.510 КТ.1985г. 94 АПА ДЛЯ ЭНЕРГОБЛОКА №6 ЗАЭС. АДАПТАЦИЯ. Итоговый отчет. ЕР43-2008.364.ОД.1. 95 ДОПОЛНИТЕЛЬНЫЕ РАСЧЕТНЫЕ ОБОСНОВАНИЯ И РАЗРАБОТКА ФИНАЛЬНЫХ ОТЧЕТОВ В ЧАСТИ АПА И АЗПА. Дополнительные расчетные обоснования в части АПА для энергоблоков №1,2,4,6 ЗАЭС. ЕР43-2008.310.ОД.1
10.2 Annex B Summary of the EA Report for public at large The executive summary is provided as a separate stand alone document.
10.3 Annex C Question-Answers book This chapter presents the “Questions-Answer book concerning the Complex Safety Upgrade Program for the power units of NPPs of Ukraine and Ecological Assessment of SUP” as published on Energoatom's website.
10.3.1 List of outgoing correspondence No Received Organization Respondent Address request (date) Khortitsya Forum, Nikopol 1 22.06.2011 Sandul V.A. mailto:[email protected] 2 10.05.2011 Scoping meeting concerning EA, Office 218, 6, Gaidara str., Kiev 3 17.05.2011 Scoping meeting concerning EA, Energodar 4 11.05.2011 Scoping meeting concerning EA, Kuznetsovsk 5 13.05.2011 Scoping meeting concerning EA, Netishyn 6 18.05.2011 Scoping meeting concerning EA, Yuzhnoukrainsk Public committee of national safety of Ukraine 7 08.07.2011 Slyesarenko [email protected]
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V.V. Khortitsya Forum, Nikopol 8 12.07.2011 Sandul V.A. mailto:[email protected] Khortitsya Forum, Nikopol 9 12.07.2011 Sandul V.A. mailto:[email protected] Khortitsya Forum, Nikopol 10 12.07.2011 Sandul V.A. mailto:[email protected] Khortitsya Forum, Nikopol 11 18.07.2011 Sandul V.A. mailto:[email protected] 12 20.07.2011 Rivne oblast state administration Novak V. (0362) 26 08 35 13 26.07.2011 Executive committee of Nikopol city council Obydenna T.S. 3, Elektrometalurhiv str., Nikopol, Dnipropetrovska oblast, 53200, phone 5‐04‐76, fax(05662)5‐13‐25, е‐таіі: [email protected] 14 26.07.2011 Khortitsya Forum, Nikopol, “Zelenyy Svit” Korobko M.I. (“Green World”), “Civil movement for the rights Bagin O.S. of inhabitants of location zone of ZNPP”, Nikopol Sandul V.A. Bilytskiy V.I. Vitko M.D.
CEE Bankwatch Network, National Ecological 15 04.08.2011 Holovko I. [email protected] Center of Ukraine (NECU) 16 19.07.2011 Scoping meeting concerning EA, Office 218, 6, Gaidara str., Kiev 17 20.07.2011 Scoping meeting concerning EA, Kuznetsovsk 18 21.07.2011 Scoping meeting concerning EA, Netishyn 19 26.07.2011 Scoping meeting concerning EA, Energodar 20 27.07.2011 Scoping meeting concerning EA, Yuzhnoukrainsk CEE Bankwatch Network, National Ecological 21 25.08.2011 Holovko I. [email protected] Center of Ukraine (NECU) CEE Bankwatch Network, National Ecological 22 01.09.2011 Holovko I. [email protected] Center of Ukraine (NECU)
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10.3.2 Personilized questions, suggestions and comments № Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 1 1 The disclosed via internet network document named “Stakeholders Engagement Plan” dd 1.1 02.06.2011 (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/ua/safety.htm?_m=pubs&_t=rec&id=29267) contains the table 2 with listed “stakeholders of group B”. The list of Ukrainian NGOs includes Khortytsya Forum (Zaporizhzhya) under the No 13. This Forum is the environmental movement in Zaporizhzhya oblast. “With this I inform that the nationwide environmental movement “Khortytsya Forum” is founded by the founding meeting of 19.04.2008 in Zaporizhzhya. I’m asking to indicate the source which had been used by the developers and to amend the list. 2 1 To provide the requests, suggestions and correspondence, please, indicate the surname 2.1 and the position of the responsible person in “Energoatom” who is responsible for the implementation of the indicated Safety Upgrade Program for the power units of NPPs of Ukraine. Ecological Assessment. 3 1 I suppose the adopted communication public scheme via “contact persons” as the 2.2 unacceptable and as the one which does not comply with current legislation. 4 2 The question concerning the volume of the expected loan and what part of the whole 31.1 program value it will correspond to. 5 2 While the scoping meetings the stakeholders should participate in forming the final 4.1 composition of the EA report. 6 2 Is the lifecycle extension of NPPs foreseen by this program? 5.1 7 2 Will the representative of the Consultant be present in Ukraine on the permanent basis? 1.2 8 2 Is the regulator involved in the EA implementation? 3.1 9 2 Was the impact of financial costs engagement in the indicated volumes assessed on the 31.2 tariffs for the end customers of electricity? 10 2 There was the previous safety upgrade program the term of which should have been already 6.1 finished. Does the new SUP cover all those measures of the previous one which had not been implemented? 11 3 Why only today the issue of SUP implementation became actual if there are only three years 5.2 remained till the decommissioning of NPP? 12 3 Thermal power plant and nuclear power plant are located close to each other. Are you taking 20.1 into account during the elaboration of EA the fact that TPP and NPP are located in such a way? 13 3 Will the monitoring of the general environmental impact of ZNPP during the EA carried out? 4.2 14 3 100 000 citizens of Zaporizhzhya oblast are living in the 30km zone and 200 000 citizens of 2.3 Dnipropetrosvk oblast are living in the 30km zone of NPP. So why is the Dnipropetrovsk oblast not taken into account while the EA? 15 3 Was the impact of dam breakdown considered while calculations? 26.1 16 3 Does the SUP implementation consider the sudden power failure? 20.2 17 3 Concerning the normal operation – what is the normal level of tritium which is produced by 24.1 NPP? 18 3 ZNPP is the most effective nuclear power plant? What is the reason for EBRD investing 5.2 money in South-Ukrainian NPP power units No 1 and 2? 19 3 Is the implementation plan of SUP taking into account yearly discharges from the cooling 24.2 pond into the Dnieper river? 20 3 Why haven’t you told the people that SUP is also about the gas emissions caused by the 23.1 vehicle transport? 21 3 We’ve got a lot of electricity, so why aren’t we using the trolleybus lines to reduce the 34.1 emissions of the harmful gases of cars? 22 3 The cooling pond is situated very clode to the water reservoir and it impacts the water 24.3 reservoir. It would be good to move the cooling pond somewhere else. 23 3 What was the reason of second power unit shutdown? If the reason was not defined then 7.1 how can you restore its operation withour the reasons explanation? 24 3 We require to locate the seismic sencors on each NPP. 6.2 25 3 In 2005 “Energoatom” had promised to allocate the costs for the city water supply system 34.2 repair. People are getting heart attacks and cancer not because of the radiation as soon as it’s really low but because of bad water quality. Will “Energoatom” work over this issue?
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 26 3 During last 17 years it’s my second public meeting. Where does the “POYRY” company 1.3 come from? How may ears of experience of such EAs elaboration have you got? 27 3 We all know that the nuclear power plants are really dangerous and we all should 29.1 understand the danger. The management of NPP does not pay any attention to the population. It’s impossible to contqact with anyone via phone to get any important information nethertheless we’re living the risk zone. 28 3 In 80ies we’ve got more than 20 radio stations which also were used to alert about the 19.1 emergency situations. We’ve got same radio stations but they are not used to inform the population. NPP is obliged to organize the similar radio stations to alert the population. 29 3 It’s the requirement to public the phone number by which anyone can record the information 29.2 to the automatic answering machine, in the local newspaper and the phone calls to this number should be free for all the calls from different phone numbers. 30 3 Are all VVER power units worth rehabilitation and investments? 5.2 31 3 Who is the author of the all four dams breakdown risk assessment? 26.1 32 3 In the cities of Kamyanka and Nikopol (in 30km zone) several years ago we all had the 34.3 indicators of radiation pollution in the city which were located in the city councils. Where are these devices now? 33 3 As the citizens of Ukraine how much will we be forced to spend from our pockets on this EA? 1.4 34 4 Is the measure list of SUP limited by only the measured included? Do any other safety 4.3 upgrade measures exist which were not included into SUP but are necessary to implement? 35 4 After the analysis of Fukushima experience what risks can RNPP face? 21.1 36 4 What will happen if “Energoatom” will not include the loand service spending into the tariff? 31.3 Won’t this lead to the bankruptcy of “Energoatom”? 37 4 It was told that SUP did not include the lifecycle extension but it had been mentioned that 5.2 SUP covered all 15 power units nethertheless some of then were close to the license expire. How can you explain this? 38 4 According to which criteria will you define the schedule of measures implementation? 5.3 39 4 Will the scope of additional radioactive wastes be mentioned in the EA resulting from SUP 12.1 implementation? 40 4 According to which criteria will the safety upgrade measures be chosen from the list of 5.4 lifecycle extension measures? 41 4 Does SUP foresee any ecological measures? 5.5 42 4 At what level in comparison to international NPPs is RNPP? 14.1 43 4 Why the issues of rad-wastes treatment are not shown? 12.1 44 4 Why the issues of population provision with the dosymeters are not shown? 34.4 45 4 Will there be the wastes from the SUP implementation? 12.1 46 4 Does the plan for minimization of rad-wastes exist? 12.2 47 4 Was the preliminary assessment done concerning the percentage to which the level of 20.3 radiactiveness will increase while SUP? 48 4 Will the wider public informing concerning the radioactive situation in the city [Kuznetsovsk] 29.3 happen? 49 4 To provide the fast and safe evacuation of population in case of nuclear accident there is the 19.2 requirement to finish the work through the existing landfill (300-350 m) which will reduce the distance to deliver the cargoes and to evacuate the personnel of the plant for minimum 6 km in South-Eastern direction (in Polytsi). 50 4 With the same goal it is proposed to build a new bridge over the river Styr through funding of 19.3 “Energoatom”. 51 4 With the participation of the Volyn region it is proposed to build a road through the village of 30.1 Great Vedmezhka, Small Vedmezhka to the village of Kamyanka on the Warsaw route. In this case the railway station Chartoryysk will become 4 miles closer to Kuznetsovsk than a railway station Rafalivtsi, in which case the way to Warsaw route on the southwest will reduce by 33 km. 52 4 There is a proposal to install cameras in the villages that the inhabitants of 30km zone could 29.4 be up to date of accident. 53 4 There is a proposal to install a large screen in the center [for each controlled zone], which 29.5 would be informed about the radioactive situation in the city.
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 54 4 At a temperature of minus 15 degrees r.Styr does not freeze which means the thermal and 24.4 chemical pollution. It is required to provide the access to the deputy commission for pollution control. 55 5 What is the need and reason for such consultations with the public? 3.2 56 5 What are the criteria for approval of EA? Is this a national or international criteria? 1.5 57 5 Will the assessment of accidents at nuclear power plants be conducted within the SUP? 6.3 58 5 We would like to get some additional information such as how the security problem is solved 33.1 in other countries. 59 5 We would like to get some additional information, namely to compare the situation in 34.5 Ukraine, with a similar situation in other countries about the environment in order to explain to people that this whole process is aimed at improving the safety of the public and that the goal of the program is to provide environmental protection. Such additional information may be submitted in the form of videos, printed materials, etc. 60 5 We [the "Foundation for Sustainable Development of Sangushko dukes"] directly 34.6 communicate with the population of villages and we would like to get support from government agencies in organizing such meetings. 61 5 Are the regular meetings of this level planned during the implementation of SUP? 29.6 62 6 Perhaps the representatives of NGOs were not prepared for public consultations and were 2.4 not informed of this meeting in advance and actually because of that they do not have any questions. 63 6 There are a lot of unemployed persons among citizens of Yuzhnoukrainsk and we demand 32.1 to involve its citizens in assembly and other work – to use local subcontractors. 64 6 We have the Lyceum which trains specialists for potential future work on nuclear power 28.1 plants and we would like “Energoatom” to support and encourage these students. 65 6 Approximately 5 years ago there was a program of infrastructure development of cities 30.2 located in 30km zone. “Energoatom” had planned to implement this program and since then nothing was done. What is the status of the program and whether it will be implemented in the future? 66 6 It is known that radiation monitoring on South-Ukrainian NPP is performed by only services 15.1 of power plant and there is no independent (non-institutional) control of radiation situation. Citizens are informed about the radiation situation only nuclear power plant personnel. Comment: It’s necessary to create an independent (non-institutional) organization for radiation monitoring conducting. 67 6 Where can I find information? We were unable to find this information on a web-site of 29.7 SUNPP. If this information is available on the website, then everyone will be satisfied. 68 6 What main environmental aspects will be studied in the EA? 4.4 69 6 Have you studied the changes in water quality? There are stations set up to collect 24.5 indicators which are located in four cities in the 30km zone which are the subject to dismantle at least for one month which means that people will not have access to any information within such a long period. Do you think this is acceptable? 70 6 he requirement: to provide the population with the dosimeters. 34.4 71 6 Is there any system for the study of a metal membrane (core) of the reactor? 11.1 72 6 There is a passive public information known throughout the world. All information should be 29.7 placed on the web-site. You [SUNPP] are obliged to inform the public in the passive way. 73 6 Throughout the week we did not know where the scoping and public consultation meetings 2.4 will be held and we were late for a meeting - we have not been adequately informed. 74 6 Suggestion: web-site is not a document that the signed paper version is. We live in a 29.8 democratic country so, please, give us officially tested and approved information. 75 6 Some time ago there were screens set in the specified places in cities that provided the 29.5 public with information on radiation situation. Why can not we return them? 76 6 The cost of electricity for consumers in the 30km zone. We would like to ask for a 50% 30.3 discount for residents of 30km zone because we live in a risk zone and instead of taking this point into consideration the prices continue to rise. 77 6 We know that at this point in the summer there is a shortage of water to maintain efficiency 6.4 and proper functioning of the three reactors [of South-Ukrainian NPP] simultaneously. Is this issue included in the SUP? I understand that the reason of Fukushima case was not an earthquake or tsunami but essentially, the lack of water for cooling.
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 78 6 Rural population (especially older people) will not seek information on the Internet, so we 29.9 need to define a simpler way of informing people about the level of radiation. Let's solve this problem and will not argue about that! 79 6 As far as we know according to the laws of other countries the use of direct cooling systems 6.5 is prohibited. Are these issues included in SUP? The main problem, in fact, is not the use of direct cooling system but the problem of salinity of water. 80 7 Dear Mr. O. Kochugov. Topic that you cover is really important for NGOs but the same 2.5 NGOs do not know anything either about your organization or about the position in it, nor the authority to receive this information and invited NGOs to discussion. 81 8 In disclosed by “Energoatom” and an unknown company POYRY “The invitation to 2.6 participate in the meetings ... ..” on April 27, 2011 without the signature of responsible persons it is reported that from 10 to May 18 in 5 cities of Ukraine the consultations with the public begin. 82 8 There are many examples of non-compliance to the current legislation ... A typical example 3.3 is found at “Energoatom”’s statement of intent on the consolidated safety upgrade program for power units of NPPs of Ukraine. In the list for approval for the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant only officials of Zaporizhzhya region are included although it is known that in this 30km zone only one third of the population lives and two thirds are inhabitants of Dnipropetrovsk region. To settlements surrounding the city located on the right bank of the Kakhovsky reservoir it remains a source of drinking water. 83 8 In a sanitary-protection zone of ZNPP which does not cover the whole territory of the power 15.2 plant (for example cooling pond) with the exit at the same time on the waters of the Kakhovsky reservoir... 84 8 In a sanitary-protection zone of ZNPP ... Zaporizhzhya thermal power plant is located. It is 26.2 unknown how the area of sanitary-protection zone of thermal power plant is defined. 85 8 More than two decades the demands to make an environmental assessment of the effects of 20.4 joint activities of all enterprises of Zaporizhzhya energy complex located in the coastal zone of Kakhovka reservoir are ignored. 86 8 Despite the demands of the referendum in 1994 the DSSNF are located on the territory of 13.1 ZNPP although even then the question of raising diesel-generators on the label above possible flood mark necessity was raised. 87 8 In 1994 ... even then the question of raising diesel-generators on tag above possible flood 19.4 mark was raised. 88 8 The public is outraged by the inclusion of regional industrial site of Zaporizhzhya energy 34.7 complex to the so-called inventory sites to accommodate new nuclear units. 89 8 The need for expansion of ZNPP is stated at the state level by “Energoatom” and ZNPP 34.8 management had started preparatory works. 90 8 We are confident and wary that all planned measures are aiming at providing opportunities 5.1 for expansion of ZNPP and continuation of existing units operation for indefinite terms. 91 8 In the today’s situation we require to prepare with Directorate of the TPP (thermal power 20.5 plant) and publish a joint Statement of Intent on Environmental study of the consequences of ongoing and planned activities. 92 9 In disclosed by “Energoatom” and an unknown company POYRY “The invitation to 2.6 participate in the meetings ... ..” on April 27, 2011 without the signature of responsible persons it is reported that from 10 to May 18 in 5 cities of Ukraine the consultations with the public begin. 93 9 In preparation for the event [public scoping meeting on EA in Energodar dd 05/17/2011] the 2.7 public have made requests for additional information and posed questions were not answered. 94 9 Who is the main responsible person in the system of “Energoatom”? 2.1 95 9 Who organized the tour round the cities in Ukraine including the meeting of May 17 in 2.8 Energodar? 96 9 On whose address one can write formal requests to obtain answers. 2.9 97 9 Why the invitation to the event on May 17, 2011 in Energodar sent by the Internet network 2.6 was not signed. 98 9 Is there a list to whom this invitation [invitation to participate in scoping meetings on 2.10 ecological assessment of “Complex (summary) safety upgrade program for power units of NPPs of Ukraine”] was officially sent signed by a responsible person?
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 99 9 Why the attendees of this event which is called meeting [scoping meeting planning on 2.11 ecological assessment of “Complex (summary) programs safety upgrade program for power units of NPPs of Ukraine “] were not given any materials? 100 9 Who had filled the room, where people were brought from by bus to this meeting [scoping 2.12 meeting in Energodar dd 05/17/2011] which did not participate and in some cases were expressing their outrage? 101 9 Please, provide the official information on the company POYRY, why exactly it is involved 1.3 by “Energoatom” and began working on the ecological assessment of the concept of safety upgrade of power units of NPPs of Ukraine. 102 9 Is the terms of reference for this work approved [Ecological Assessment of SUP] and by 1.6 whom is it consistent? 103 9 The ecological assessment elaboration will be done only on the basis of only the statement 3.4 of intent of “Energoatom”, is that right? 104 9 When is it planned to publish the entire text of the terms of reference for this work 1.6 [Ecological Assessment of SUP]? 105 9 What proposals of the public were considered by the representative of POYRY? 2.13 106 9 On August 27, 2010 at the Information Center of ZNPP the meeting took place with the 34.8 representatives of the public, members of local councils and NGOs. During the meeting the issues of regional public concern according to the declared intentions of ZNPP expansion were discussed... How will the problems raised during the preparation of the stated objectives of ecological assessment be considered? 107 9 What is included in the work list of advertised ecological assessment - reducing adverse 20.4 environmental impacts after the implementation of measures to improve security of power units or planned overall assessment of complex environmental impacts of all activities of the Zaporizhzhya energy complex of hydro power station and nuclear power station? 108 9 The thermal station is also located on the territory of the sanitary-protection zone of 26.2 Zaporizhzhya NPP. There is every reason to believe that the value of the territory of the SPZ of TPP is that which includes nuclear power plant. When and by whom was the sanitary- protection zone of the energy complex approved and whether this issue was considered while the ecological assessment. 109 9 It is known that a number of design institutes oby orders of “Energoatom” elaborated the 34.8 complete study of the plant expansion. Management of ZNPP during the past two years is undertaking the campaign to prepare the sensitive population to their intentions. The options for location of new units and expansion of Energodar, development of new areas for energy needs are discussed. 110 9 Director of ZNPP in his inverview to the newspaper “Znamya Truda” (“The Banner of 34.8 Labour”) said that the expansion of ZNPP results from the tasks set by the Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030, which was approved five years ago by the Cabinet of Ministers. It is known that this paper has nothing about the expansion of ZNPP. Whose initiative is to include ZNPP in the list of stations where expansion is planned? 111 9 On January 17, 2008 Information Center of ZNPP reported that “Energoatom” intends to 34.8 conclude the contract with the JSC "Kyiv Scientific-Research and Design Institute “Energoprojekt “”for development of pre-design documentation for construction of two more power units of Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. Have this work been elaborated according to this contract, were the results made public and will its results be taken into account while the Ecological Assessment? 112 9 National legislation uses the term "monitoring zone" (surveillance zone). Please, give it a 15.3 comprehensive description with a link to see who by whom and by what method should monitor. 113 9 Please, give a full explanation of the term “Ecological Assessment” - a full list of relevant 20.6 international and national regulations. 114 9 What is the object of this assessment - a single estimation of planned actions or introduction 6.6 of a new comprehensive permanent monitoring system for the region's environment of the ZNPP location or the full Zaporizhzhya energy complex? 115 9 Why are the requirements of Ukrainian legislation in the part of the Zaporizhzhya NPP and 32.2 “Energoatom” to create insurance funds not complied. 116 9 Why do the reports on the work of ZNPP always report on the number of electricity 29.10 manufactured and never on terms and amount of the radionuclides generated in particular tritium discharged into the aquatic environment?
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 117 9 By what scenario and by whom were the studies of the possible flooding of the energy 19.4 complex site in case of dams breach located above the plants done. Have they taken into account when selecting the placement of emergency power diesel-generators and SSNF – storage of spent nuclear fuel. 118 9 Is there a scientific-economic justification of the risk zones and monitoring zones definition 15.3 around operating nuclear power plants? What regulations are defining the legal regime for the area around the existing nuclear power plants? 119 9 Are the plans and intentions of “Energoatom” to expand ZNPP agreed with the village 34.8 administrations and regional councils of all areas of the territory which belongs to the monitoring zone. 120 9 According to Art. 74 of the Water Code of Ukraine “usage of technology reservoirs (ponds – 7.2 coolers of thermal and power plants ...) should be in accordance with the norms and rules of operation specified in the technical projects approved in the manner established by legislation”. What adopted rules and regulations are foreseen by this project, by whom are they foreseen and according to which requirements are they approved? 121 9 Are the boundaries of the plant [Zaporizhzhya NPP] defined, in particular the boundaries of 7.3 cooling pond, how it is delineated with Kakhovka reservoir lands and water fund? 122 9 It is known that in the first half of 1990 ZNPP while water housing checking had been given 24.6 prescription for the transition to the reverse water treatment. Direct flow water supply which is currently used at the Zaporizhzhya Energy Complex justifies that this requirement is not fulfilled. Have these requirements been removed by the authority that issued them? If yes, then on what grounds and what work is accepted as a justification? 123 9 Does the project and the second phase of ZNPP foresee the transition to water treatment 34.8 without discharges to Kakhovka reservoir of the first phase - six power units? 124 9 What work were performed by “Energoatom” and ZNPP concerning the study of the general 24.7 state of Kakhovka reservoir, particularly from the standpoint of requirements for sources of drinking water for local people. 125 9 What point is considered as the center in the determination of sanitary-protection zone of the 15.4 first and sixth reactors or between 4 and 5 - and whether is was determined for the entire energy complex 126 9 While expanding ZNPP from which side will the new reactors be set, or a separate site will 34.8 be selected? 127 9 It is known that the result of operation of the whole energy complex is the increase of the 23.2 number of days with high humidity and fog. Is this control undertaken and its impact on the health of the population. 128 9 It was repeatedly reported that ZNPP carries fishering of Kakhovka reservoir to improve 25.1 water quality for the technological needs of the station. What governmental structure is undertaking the control of this hydromelioration, by whom is it done and on the basis of which signed contract, who pays for this work. 129 9 Is the management of the NPP to disclose the feasibility study of “Energoprojekt” on the 34.8 basis of which the director said about the need and opportunity to expand the NPP and conducted the preparatory work, reported in press? Do the activities of “Energoatom” and the detached unit of ZNPP meet existing legislation on industrial design of high hazard? 130 9 On the basis of which laws are the nuclear power plants controlled in the monitoring zones, 15.3 by which normative document is it defined? 131 9 Control of nuclear power plants in the monitoring zone ... what are the results of it and how is 20.7 the influence of other enterprises in the region taken into account? 132 9 It is known that ZNPP maintains extensive international links and plant experts frequently 24.8 visit their counterparts abroad. Are there instances where the national surface water which is used for the needs of the plant is used as a source of drinking water for local people 133 9 What is the trend in the world of water and thermal power plants, whether the plans of 24.9 transitions to water recycling exist. 134 9 It is known that both the NPP itself and local government of Energodar held frequent 28.2 changes of high-ranking elected officials. How can one explain this phenomenon - by the requirements in the field of policy decisions or low-skilled people
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 135 9 Currently, management of ZNPP and of “Energoatom” decide to search for the credits to 34.8 build power lines out of the country Energodar - Kakhovka - and beyond, as well as heating lines Energodar - Zaporizhzhya, which is associated with the planned expansion of the station. At what stage is this issue and by which funds will the station expand - the country's budget or loans from the subsequent calculation of electricity supply 136 10 In the disclosed by “Energoatom” “Invitation to participate in the scoping meetings ... ..” on 2.6 April 27, 2011 without the signatures of the responsible persons it was informed that the work on Ecological Assessment of complex program… had started to be elaborated by POYRY 137 10 Sanitary-protection zone of ZNPP enters the area of Kakhovka water reservoir but does not 15.2 cover the whole territory of the NPP (for example, cooling pond). 138 10 Thus in sanitary-protection zone [Zaporizhzhya NPP] the Zaporizhzhya thermal power plant 26.2 is located. 139 10 More than two decades the requirements to perform an ecological assessment of water 20.4 management, impact assessment, environmental impact of joint activities of all enterprises of Zaporizhzhya energy complex located in the coastal zone Kakhovka reservoir are ignored. 140 10 Despite the demands of the referendum in 1994 the DSSNF is located on the territory of 13.1 ZNPP 141 10 ... the question of the necessity of diesel-generators raising above the possible labels of 19.4 possible flooding [ZNPP site]. 142 10 The public is outraged by the inclusion of regional industrial site of Zaporizhzhya energy 34.7 complex to the so-called list of inventory sites to accommodate new nuclear units. 143 10 The need for ZNPP expansion was declaired at the state level by “Energoatom” and ZNPP 34.8 management started preparatory work. 144 10 The representatives of the public accepted the declaration ... with the requirement to 1.6 disclose the terms of reference and scope of works which are scheduled and called an Ecological Assessment. 145 11 ... I’m asking the contact persons of “Energoatom” to send the materials that are scheduled 2.14 for discussion at a meeting on July 26 146 11 Please advise whether the invitations were sent to the the heads of municipal councils, 2.15 secretaries and village councils of the region of NPPs location for consultation on ecological assessment. 147 11 One more suggestion. Please, do not waste time to translate to the foreign experts, dialogue 2.16 with them is of low productivity to the local population. 148 11 It is proposed to introduce all the experts, to distribute a summary of each expert with 1.7 information concerning the questions in the implementation of which they will be engaged during the EA 149 11 To work constructively and achieve stated objectives it’s not worth to fill the halls of the 2.17 meetings with the “organized community” – employees of ZNPP to demonstrate to donors and create the non-working situation. 150 11 Please also inform people who from the senior management of “Energoatom” will be present 2.18 at the meeting on uly 26 in Energodar and whether they are planning to communicate with the local population. 151 11 With that I send e-mail answer of the Information center of ZNPP of 17 January 2010 on one 29.11 of the Nikopol media publications [newspaper “Rodnoy Nikopol” (“Origin Nikopol”)'from December 17, 2009] as the ratio of attitude of peaceful atom officials to the local population. The answer to the open letter addressed to the Director of ZNPP (seventh at six built power units) is answered by his subordinates. The tone of the answers – our activity is not your business ... 152 12 To review all possible situations that may arise during plant operation in view of accidents 6.7 that occurred in Ukraine and abroad. 153 12 To analyze the adequacy of existing levels of units protection in situations that may arise 6.8 during plant operation, if necessary, provide additional protection. 154 12 To improve the control of reserve power supply systems of protection of nuclear units. 19.5 155 12 Particular attention is to be given to projects, which worked the required service life. 6.9
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 156 12 When analyzing the feasibility study of the Complex (summary) safety upgrade program and 3.5 environmental assessment to take into account certain provisions of Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated 08.04.2011 “On the safety upgrade of nuclear power plants in Ukraine”. 157 13 Please, list the kinds of activities included in the program of priority measures to protect the 19.6 population from radiation factors of environmental pollution in the city of Nikopol. 158 13 Are the emergency trainings with involvement of the local authorities of Nikopol which are in 19.7 the monitoring zone of ZNPP undertaken. If not, why? 159 13 Which works are to be implemented at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant to improve 6.10 safety of nuclear power units? 160 13 What causes disconnection of power units and what measures are undertaken to prevent 6.11 irregular outages? 161 13 “Zaporizhzhya NPP” plans to extend the lifetime of reactors; the relevant works will be 34.9 conducted by independent organizations. But what are the guarantees of trouble-free operation of power units in the future? 162 13 One of the NPPs problems is vulnerability to terrorist attacks. How does this issue influence 18.1 “Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant”? 163 13 What measures are foreseen to ensure the security and stability of the nuclear power plant 19.8 in case of natural disasters and industrial accidents? 164 13 How many hours of ZNPP stock backup power are provided in case of disconnection from 19.9 the main supply? 165 13 Are the studies of the effect of small doses of radiation on the population living in the zone of 22.1 influence of “Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant” undertaken? 166 13 Is the environment monitored. If so, how? 20.7 167 13 Why there is no information board in Nikopol for city residents to review the radiation 29.5 conditions? 168 13 Own dry storage of spent nuclear fuel (DSSNF) is existing only at “Zaporizhzhya NPP”. What 13.2 kind of project and the actual capacity it has got in “Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant”?
169 13 365 days a year Zaporizhzhya NPP is undertaking so-called “purging” of the cooling pond of 24.8 NPP to the Kakhovka reservoir which is the sole source of drinking water supply to Nikopol. In fact, city residents drink water from sources directly connected to cooling pond of NPP. This does not exist anywhere in the world practice. 170 13 365 days a year Zaporizhzhya NPP is undertaking so-called “purging” of the cooling pond of 24.10 NPP to the Kakhovka reservoir which is the sole source of drinking water supply to Nikopol. In fact, city residents drink water from sources directly connected to cooling pond of NPP... Are there any planned changes in the direction of the NPP in the question whether this situation suits everyone except the population of Nikopol. 171 14 At the previous meeting, on May 17, 2011 the representatives of “Energoatom”were asked 2.19 the set of problemmatique issues by the NGOs, the Statement and the press-release were sent. However, based on the content of the materials published on the web-site of “Energoatom” they are not taken into account. 172 14 Using the absence of the Law of Ukraine (project submitted to Supreme Council in 20.4 December 2010) “Concerning Ratification of the Protocol on Strategic Ecological Assessment to the Convention on evaluation of environmental impact in a transboundary context” “Energoatom” had developed and approved the relevant departmental documents in which the accepted notion of “Ecolocial Assessment” is tied to a single nuclear power station unit. As a result of such approaches the draft EA report lacks analysis of situation within the Zaporizhzhya Energy complex. 173 14 This document [the draft EA Report] does not analyze existing and potential risks associated 5.1 with the planned over designed operation and expansion of existing nuclear power plants. It is clear that implementation of SUP plans will enable achievement of continued operation of old reactors in over designed terms and justify the possibility of completion of new nuclear units without preparation of SEA - Strategic Ecological Assessment. With reference to the Energy Strategy - 2030 the justification of Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant expansion in two blocks is elaborated, one South-Ukrainian and two units Zaporizhzhya NPP.
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 174 14 The preparatory works had started on ZNPP - siting new variants of processed blocks, the 34.8 protected lands in the coastal band are captured for plant personnel according to the Energodar City Council desicion, the draft of heating supply of Zaporizhzhya from new units is developed, a loan for the construction of transmission lines Energodar-Kakhovka and later in South-West to the border with Romania is arranged. While justifying the expansion of ZNPP to two blocks the departmental scientific - technical center of “Energoatom” suggested straight-reversible system of technical water supply. 175 14 It is known that a number of countries including the U.S. have set terms of thermal and 24.8 nuclear power plants to water treatment without discharges to surface water bodies. 176 14 The decision on the construction of Zaporizhzhya NPP was taken with ignoring the existing 7.2 at the time regulations, the existing thermal plants were not taken into account. In addition to radiation safety requirements there existed the violations of the requirements to protect atmospheric air and aquatic legislation. Back in 1982 the Council of Ministers of USSR required to complete the project of water supply of Zaporizhzhya NPP excluding filter from the cooling pond - and the effects of thermal discharges and hydrochemical regimes of Kakhovka reservoir - the source of drinking water of south of Ukraine. In 1992 the Ministry of Health prohibited discharges of waste water in the Kakhovka reservoir and the Ministry of Nature issued a requirement to develop measures for the transition to the closed flow water treatment. 177 14 In 1992 the Ministry of Health prohibited discharges of waste water in the Kakhovka 24.6 reservoir and the Ministry of Nature issued a requirement to develop measures for the transition to the closed flow water treatment. However, since 2005 Kakhovka reservoir is used by the Zaporizhzhya energy complex as a station technological pond ... 178 14 Developers of the project of maximum-allowable discharges and permission for special 24.7 water use of the energy complex plants are ignoring the presence of water intakes of drinking water for local people and the state of all Kakhovka reservoir. 179 14 NGOs in the region of Zaporizhzhya energy complex location, nationwide environmental 20.4 movement “Khortytskyy Forum”, “Green World” require from the attracted domestic and foreign experts to investigate the status of surface waters of Kakhovka reservoir, take into account the complex problems arising in the region as a result of whole-Nikopol-Marganets- Energodar ecological-economic industrial zone activity and to analyze compliance with existing water management requirements of water legislation of Ukraine. To do this it’s necessary to define and affirm the size of the SPZ - sanitary - protection zone for the entire energy complex of Zaporizhzhya. 180 14 However, until now there is a lack of any clear definition of “monitoring zone” in the 15.3 legislation 181 14 Also the term of “special social infrastructure” is left unresolved. 30.4 182 14 ... We once again reiterate the need for laying inter basin agreement between the oblasts of 34.10 Zaporizhzhya energy complex and the Kakhovsky catchment reservoir. 183 14 Licenses of ZNPP are considered and coordinated by the regional councils and local 33.2 authorities of the Zaporizhzhya energy complex region. 184 14 Activity of “Energoatom” remains focused on building and capacity increase of nuclear power 2.20 of Ukraine ignoring population, in particular, living in regions of placing nuclear power plants and nuclear industry enterprises. 185 15 Bankwatch have raised a concern that your assessment overlooked the connection between 4.5 this Project and NPPs lifetime extension project and that subsequently this conection wasn't analysed with regard to potential risks it may lead to. so, i'm wondering when and in what format we could expect to see how this our concern was adressed in the process of updating the draft ecological assesment of the Project. 186 16 Do I understand correctly that this SUP applies to the operating units whether it relates to the 5.1 planned 22 new blocks in the Energy Program?
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 187 16 Most representatives of Yuzhnoukrainsk and Mykolayiv region, Zaporozhye region, the city 2.4 of Energodar who took part in scoping meetings did not receive information about this event. I do not know, maybe they were somewhere lost because Energodar’s meeting was attended by a lot of people. For example, there were not many members of the public at the South-Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant - literally a few people and it is very surprising that they have not received this information, although they left their contact details. This was because not enough accurate information was provided concerning the meeting, where it will be held. I would like to say that I want to note that the new plan, which was sent concerning the events – it includes more accurate information, it is positive. 188 16 There is not enough alternative information analysis of the program - for any nuclear power 4.6 plant an issue of nuclear power plant closing was not considered - how it will affect the environmental situation. Particularly acute the situation is on the South-Ukrainian nuclear power plant where a series of small power units - the world's first VVER-1000 exist ... Why the problem of these units decommissioning was not addressed? EIA was carried out, it examined the options with the program and regardless (the program). It would be good if the decommissioning option of one or two blocks of power units at the South-Ukrainian nuclear power plant was considered. 189 16 Particularly acute is the situation at the South-Ukrainian nuclear power plant, where a series 6.12 of small units - the world's first VVER-1000 exists. And the previous safety upgrade program on these blocks was performed only by 40% ... How was it generally taken into account that the previous program was unable to perform and completed only by 40% because of the fact that these units are experimental? 190 16 The question is more concerning the credit and less the program. Why had it happened that 31.1 NCRE has allowed or you decided that you have 400 million for the implementation of such an important safety upgrade program and 800 million should be taken as a credit? Where did these numbers come from? 191 16 It was told that according to the norm - the excess temperature in the river (Horyn) - 8°. It 24.11 was shown that with the working K2 blocks there is already the exceeding of 8-16°. 192 16 Currently the review of “Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030” is ongoing. Till 2017 while the 34.11 Program is in power it is planned to start operation of the 3rd block of the Khmelnytsky NPP. Influence of the 3rd block on the Environment:It was told that according to the norm - the excess temperature in the river (Horyn) - 8°. It was shown that with the working K2 blocks there is already the exceeding of 8-16°. The third block will result in worser situation. 193 16 This report (EA Report) is located on the web-site but it’s located on the different page than 2.21 the program itself. It would be logical that the program and the EA report are not to be searched through the entire site of “Energoatom” .. 194 16 It already been said about informing the public, that people do not have enough information - 2.22 and this is true. To attract the public one should not only attract the people living close to the station but people all over Ukraine must have the information, that such a program is developed, that such measures will be, concerning the improvement of situation through these measures the whole Ukraine should know. Unfortunately, very narrow circle (of people) have this information. 195 16 Maybe, you need to spend money on social advertising (for SUP and SUP EA)? Information 29.12 can be placed not only on the slide-boards but even in the subway, etc.. 196 16 The impact on the social and technogenic environment – here are the questions concerning 4.7 the possible impact. Some inconvenience - extra work of load transport or, conversely, new jobs, attracting new workers, even improvements in the provision of public services. As for me, there is lacking the main - the impact on public health. Still the impact will be. If a person knows that the risk is reduced and that the safety is improved – this is the psychological health, the person is more calm, more assured. This is the reduction of discharges or something else, etc.. But in this program I did not see it.
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 197 16 This EA of the project in compliance with the EBRD requirement was conducted ... on the 4.5 principles, which include the principles of strategic environmental assessment, as specified in EEC Directive and the Protocol to the ESPOO Convention. In particular, this EA report should include information about this program, links with other programs and plans that exist concerning the objects that are considered in this program. I carefully looked through the proposed draft report, I saw a section where you specify which previous safety upgrade programs on NPPs had existed, but this report suggests that in our country we do not have programs for lifecycle extension of power units. I am very glad that today we heard that these plans are indeed acknowledged at least on the 1st SUNPP power unit. It is our strong conviction that the relationship between these programs should be established within the framework of this assessment and, therefore, the cumulative impacts that 1st program and the 2nd program cause have to be evaluated, because they are related, they are integral from each other, because it is a strategic EA, and it was one of the requirements. And unfortunately, we didn’t seen that. And the question I have is primarily for developers and consultants ... why in the course of this assessment you have not set this connection between one and another program and hadn’t established this cumulative effect which surely will be from life extension of old blocks? It is not as impact which can be neglected. 198 16 I would like the representatives of the EBRD to expressed their opinion on the assessment - 1.8 whether the criteria were met, whether the assessment meets the requirements, their expectations from this assessment? 199 16 It (the meeting) had to be attended by representatives of several ministries and departments. 2.23 It seems to me that the powers of the Minister of Energy is sufficient to attract ... representatives of other ministries. My question is whether there are representatives of the regulator - the State Inspectorate for Nuclear Regulation? Are they invited? 200 16 After the events in Fukushima the security of nuclear power plants is reviewed. Won’t is not 21.1 happen that the criteria of security those security measures have to be reviewed? Their effects may introduce some new (action), you again will take credit, generally may have to redo some actions? New security measures. What are the plans, how do you intend to adapt this program to new realities? 201 16 This long-term program as I understand – is 6-year-old, requires very significant steps and it 11.2 is clear that entail increasing periods of scheduled maintenance or increase of their number. Nuclear power plant downtime will increase, generation equipment downtime will increase. Accordingly, a certain amount of electricity will be produced by nuclear power plants but it is likely to be compensated by the electricity generated by thermal power plants. Electricity generated by power plants firstly - is more expensive, secondly - is less ecological. Has anyone counted the following influences - environmental and economic? 202 16 (What) is the economic effect of implementing this program and of the assessment? 31.4 203 16 (Q) to representatives of the bank: the economic effect of implementing this program and of 31.5 the assessment - what are the results, do you see the economic effect? 204 16 I understand that ... we will get the answers before the end of 90 days of the consultation 2.24 process. Will we be able still to submit comments if we see that what is said today is not taken into account? Do you mean that we will see the final report of the 1st October and it will be all? Will there be an opportunity to see in advance whether you’ve taken our (comments) into account or not? 205 17 As for the Rivne NPP, how much money will be needed to implement the program ..? And in 31.6 general such data for the whole Ukraine? 206 17 What part (of the costs of SUP implementing) will be covered by “Energoatom” and how 31.1 much is to be taken as a credit ..? 207 17 It was told that public consultations are held and have you already have some suggestions, 2.25 feedback from the public, even some comments? 208 17 Let’s say that some units of RNPP already exceeded their design age. And this program that 5.1 currently is being developed includes the modernization of the units that already had overworked its age or involves the decommissioning of these units? 209 17 Will recent events that were awakened by accident in Japan concerning the public opinion 34.12 affect the continued construction of Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant? 210 18 The press release stated that approximately 800 measures were to be carried out for 31.6 improvement of energy security. The same the figure of 1.18 billion euros appears which will be used to implement these measures. Does the specific amount of Khmelnytsky NPP sound, or can it be heard?
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 211 18 What are the conditions for the return of the loan, how is it given and what is the term of the 31.7 repayment of the loan? 212 18 Question of seismicity - at one of the meetings the implementation of measures on KhNPP 21.2 was discussed since this nuclear power plant is the closest to the territory of the Romanian Carpathians, so are these measures included in the complex program or are they outside it? 213 18 To implement this program provides the use of state and international lenders costs is 31.8 foreseen. Is there some kind of structure foreseen that will control the use of these funds or they will go elsewhere? 214 18 On what basis the suppliers and workers will be determined? 31.9 215 18 And where is the guarantee that in a year ie in 2012 the company won’t think up something 31.10 else or will not exceed the price (cost of SUP measures)? 216 18 Will the preferences be given to local companies for these measures implementation, some 32.1 equipment supply? 217 19 I hope that respected organizers on behalf of “Energoatom” represented by the EBRD and 2.26 other organizations ... they also hold public hearings in other places ... in the 30-kilometer zone ... Unfortunately here are mostly representatives of Energodar ... I hope that the same public hearings we will hold in Marganets and Nikopol. 218 19 If there is some sort of a technological problem (with the Dnieper dams cascade), then, God 26.1 forbid, we do not want to be in place Fukushima. 219 19 Cities that are ... 7 and 8 km (from the Zaporizhzhya NPP) - unfortunately, the number of 22.2 leukemia in between the children is 2.5 times higher than in other regions of Ukraine, the number of cancers, congenital pathology, etc. certainly justifies that the 30km zone - it is not only a monitoring zone but the zone of influence. 220 19 I (Mr Sokolov, national deputy of Ukraine) if not non-governmental organization would not be 2.15 able to read in the newspapers (about a public meeting in Energodar). 221 19 Does the program of priority measures include the measures of population protection of 5.6 specifically city of Nikopol? 222 19 Why there is no information board in the town of Nikopol to familiarize residents with the 29.13 radiation condition? The placards must be mounted that the city residents can be informed about the radiation at the nuclear power plant. 223 19 The own dry storage of spent nuclear fuel is owned by only Zaporizhzhya NPP. What project 13.2 and the actual capacity has this repository? 224 19 365 days a year Zaporizhzhya NPP is undertaking so-called “purging” of the cooling pond of 24.8 NPP to the Kakhovka reservoir which is the sole source of drinking water supply to Nikopol. In fact, city residents drink water from sources directly connected to cooling pond of NPP. This does not exist anywhere in the world practice. 225 19 365 days a year Zaporizhzhya NPP is undertaking so-called “purging” of the cooling pond of 24.10 NPP to the Kakhovka reservoir which is the sole source of drinking water supply to Nikopol. In fact, city residents drink water from sources directly connected to cooling pond of NPP... Are there any planned changes in the direction of the NPP in the question whether this situation suits everyone except the population of Nikopol. 226 19 You mentioned “the public repository”. When (such repository) will be opened in our city 2.27 (Nіkopol)? 227 19 209 000 people from 340 000 inhabitants of monitoring zone of NPP lives on the territory of 2.28 Dnipropetrovska oblast. This is 61% of the population! For today no one from this percentage except 3-4 who came here knows about this SUP, has no idea of the elaboration of EA and the hearings. Do you consider the consultations as legitimate and the results which you want to get in order to obtain this credit as legitimate in such conditions when the hearings holding is only imitated and the majority of population is not involved into the process? 228 19 You say that in your opinion you inform the public sufficiently. But in your (stakeholders) 2.3 engagement plan only two newspapers are identified for information disclosure concerning the SUP to the public for ZNPP… These newspapers… which none of 203 000 people of Nikopol and Nikopol district receives and reads. Thus, the people remain non-informed and thus is seems that you’re boggling because in Stakeholders Engagement Plan you say that the organizers of consultations will treat the potentially vulnerable population with additional attention… How had you paid this attention to the vulnerable people thousands of which are living in Nikopol and none of them… received anything and knows what is happening today?
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 229 19 You’ve told that no lifecycle extension works of old power units were foreseen… In SUP 5.1 measure No12301 “technical resource assessment of reactor core in operation process” it is told that the obtainment of substantial representative results was important to provide the safe operation of reactor core in the designed term and after the lifecycle extension term… Thus, the proposed EA elaborated by the lenders’ request does not analyze the potential risks resulting from the operation. Why that is when we do see that there is the measure directed to lifecycle extension of operation? 230 19 Why the proposed draft EA report presented for negotiations does not consider the most 4.6 logic alternative – decommissioning the old power units as it had been foreseen by the operation project, construction project of these power units VVER-1000? 231 19 Why the potential risks connected to the lifecycle extension of designed operation were not 4.5 analyzed? 232 19 You say that impacts of nuclear power plants on technogenic environment during normal 20.1 operation can be neglected… There are very famous investigations, there is the work of academician Mr. Yablokov who had investigated the instrumental impact of each NPP not less than 100 km, collective dose – 500 km, etc. In terms of thermal power station location, industrial enterprises the known synergy effect is existing when one negative effect is enlarged by the presence of another one… Why within the SUP EA a comprehensive EA of all technological facilities of the surrounding area is not included? 233 19 Who should provide emergency protection of the population of the city of Nikopol? … Even 5.6 in these safety upgrade plans no word is said concerning the protection of human health! 234 19 The iodine means of protection which were distributed among the Nikopol citizen are already 19.10 overdue. 235 19 We require locating minimum 10 information boards (in city of Nikopol). People should be 29.13 aware in full concerning the situation (on NPP). 236 19 The sandor which is connecting the cooling pond with the Kakhovske water reservoir will not 19.11 close immediately as soon as it has no electric drive. The special request for crane should be submitted in this case, it will come in some time and will close the sandor. 237 19 Please, provide case studies from the world practice when surface waters are used as 24.8 technical water reservoir of special water treatment by nuclear facilities of technical institutions and simultaneously are used as the source of drinking water supply by the densely populated region of the country. 238 19 When the information center of our ZNPP in the daily reports together with the number of 29.10 electricity manufactured will provide the information on the released amounts of iodine isotopes, tritium, radionuclide, and the amount of water evaporation from hydraulic constructions of NPP? 239 19 It’s known that the government of Germany had decided to close asap all nuclear power 33.3 plants with the transition to alternative forms of power. The Government of Japan also joined this decision. How do power units’ life extension plans of “Energoatom” comply with our country’s will to integrate into the European Union? 240 19 How will you comment on the statement of the Director for projects and investments of 5.1 "Atomproektengineering" Mr. Sazonov that the implementation of the SUP will make the extension of the operation of old power units possible? And it’s despite the fact that the EBRD said that the financing of such projects to extend service life of old power units is impossible. 241 19 We ask question concerning the special fund of “Energoatom” which would have to 33.4 accumulate funds for decommissioning of power plants. Is such fund existing, are there enough money on it and how this procedure will be implemented? From another point of view such extension in terms of economical view is not sufficient as soon as the existing nuclear powers of Ukraine are used only by 72%. 242 19 We ask question concerning the special fund of “Energoatom” which would have to 33.5 accumulate funds for decommissioning of power plants. Is such fund existing, are there enough money on it and how this procedure will be implemented? 243 19 As we’ve understood there were no costs for decommissioning of 1st power unit of ZNPP in 33.6 2014, thus, there is the only way – to extend the operation of this unit? 244 19 The volume of credit which “Energoatom” will engage or want to take is 1, 12 billion EUR. 31.7 What is the percentage these funds will be taken under? 245 19 And what will be the way to return (the funds) - electricity or money? 31.11
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 246 19 I have the impression that management of “Energoatom” together with “POYRY” is 5.1 confusing the EBRD with elaboration of EA gradually leading nuclear power units of Ukraine to life extension. 247 19 There is a proposal to build a bridge to Nikopol and to provide the citizens of the city with 30.5 cheap heating. 248 19 Some time ago the public hearings were held concerning DSSNF, etc. Ukraine, safe 45 30.6 million… What is our attitude to “Zaropizstal”? What do we have from this? … You haven’t given anything – to the budget… We are the hostages. 249 19 There are 6 power units (on ZNPP), how many units there will be in addition? 34.8 250 19 How many roads should we have according to the project for the cases of emergency at the 19.12 departure point from Energodar? How can one leave the city by one road? According to the project there should be 3 roads for emergency leaving. Where are they? Two roads are existing. 251 19 What’s the reason of wired-radio? One should inform me if tomorrow any emission happens 19.1 on where the wind blows or what is the direction of the cloud. 252 19 Are you obliged to inform about that (accident on NPP)? Who should finance this broadcast? 19.6 253 19 20 years ago we had the 20 000 radio outlets in the region. Then there was a symbolic fee… 19.1 Today only 1900 radio outlets remained. The payment for the radio has increased for more than 10 times… The question is to shut down the wired radio. How is it possible to notify (people) if there is no radio? It’s impossible to force people living nearby the nuclear power plant to pay for the broadcast. 254 19 The fact that your SUP foresees the systematic population alert via cell phones (by SMS) is 19.1 one side of medal but it is the best to listen to residents and to use alert radio since a number of radio outlets still exists… and still works. 255 19 I would like that… the directions money is allocated for (social-economical risk compensation 30.7 to the population) are (solved) directly on the territories of local governments… And there is a suggestion for those funds that go through "Energoatom": we would like these funds before they are directed to the regions to be discussed with the residents of settlements – what do the residents of the settlements want?.. That… part of people… has the chance… to provide its suggestions on how qualitatively… and with society benefit use these funds. 256 19 There is a proposal - we would like to ask you to complete the draft EA report and to include 4.6 the decommissioning of ZNPP power units as an alternative to their lifecycle extension. 257 20 It had been already told that the procedure of SUP EA was elaborated according to the 3.6 developments including the developments of our Ministry (Ministry of Ecology), the methodology itself. The question is whether the further implementation of the program foresees the EA in general and the included in EA, i.e. EIA on further stages? 258 20 Issue of reconstruction and repairs which are undertaken on NPPs. To implement any of 32.3 these works the tenders are held. I would like to ask the question whether the analysis of the enterprises which are taking part in the tenders had been undertaken. Is it checked whether the salaries are good in the organizations which are taking part in tender, the enough costs are foreseen for the labor protection, social package for the employees? Unfortunately, the main role in tenders is plaid by the price issues and organization which have no normal social package for their employees are the winners as soon as their price is surely lower. I consider that in these issues one has to choose the participants of the tender in more precise manner as soon as it’s our social responsible in front of our people. 259 20 SUP indicates in “measures list”: “different types of monitoring and control systems 5.6 modernization”. What is foreseen under the modernization of control system in context of localities of MZ as the sanitary control? 260 20 Is it foreseen to finance the measures within 30 km zone in case of evacuation or any 5.6 emergency situation on NPP? Approximately 30 years ago the Decree of Council of Ministers of USSR had foreseen the construction of roads, hospitals, (provision of) dosimetric equipment, even houses of culture, the upgrade of bus connection within the 30 km zone to provide the population evacuation in case of the accident. Is something like this foreseen in case of accidents now in terms of this program elaboration? 261 21 Why during EA the link between SUP and the lifecycle extension of power units of NPPs 4.5 program was not established? Accordingly, why the potential concequences of operation in over designed term to which both these programs in complement to each other are leading were not assessed in the relevant manner in terms of this EA?
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№ Generalized № Personilized questions, suggestions and comments request No 262 21 Why… decommissioning of oldest existing nuclear power units was not considered as the 4.6 alternative? 263 22 Draft EA does not contain the full alternative suggestions to the proposed for the review SUP 4.6 (СОУ НАЕК 004:2011 – chapters 7, p.1, u.1.8. Alternatives to the SUP implementation). In process of EA elaboration the alternatives such as secommissioning of power units which had already overworked its designed term with assessment and analysis of all necessary measures. 264 22 Closing date for acceptance of public comments and suggestions on SUP EA was not made 2.29 public. As stated in the Stakeholder Engagement Plan the second phase of public consultation began on 10th June and the consultation period is 90 days. However, in response to our request (No 021/IPA from 29/08/11), you reported that the deadline for comments ends on September 2nd which reduces the 90-day period per week.
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10.3.3 List of thematic areas No of area Name of area
1 EA organization 2 PC process organization 3 Legislative issues of the project, feasibility study and SUP EA expertise 4 Completeness of the EA materials 5 Goals of SUP 6 Completeness of SUP 7 ZNPP operation 8 RNPP operation 9 KhNPP operation 10 SUNPP operation 11 Investigations, experiments and equipment testing, planned prophylactic and capital repais 12 Rad-wastes treatment 13 Spent nuclear fuel treatment 14 Nuclear safety 15 Radiation safety 16 Fire protection safety 17 General industrial safety 18 Physical protection 19 Emergency readiness 20 General issues on environmental impact assessment 21 Geological conditions and seismic impacts 22 Assessment of impacts on social environment 23 Assessment of impacts on atmospheric environment 24 Assessment of impacts on aquatic environment 25 Assessment of impacts on flora and fauna 26 Assessment of mutual impacts of power units and technogenic environment 27 Issues of NPPs impacts in transboundary context 28 Human resources coverage 29 Work with public, informing the population 30 Social-economical risk compensation 31 Financial-economical aspects of SUP implementation 32 Other social-economical issues 33 Other nuclear energy issues 34 Other issues not connected to the SUP elaboration and implementation
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10.3.4 Generalized questions, suggestions, comments and answers to them Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 1 EA organization 1.1 The document "Stakeholder Engagement The notification is taken into account. Documents located on the Plan" includes inaccurate names and web-site of "Energoatom" of scoping phase are working documents addresses of NGOs that have an intermediate character. The information provided in those documents will require adjustments and amendments and will be presented within the final EA report. 1.2 Was the representative of the «PÖYRY» The representative of the consultant (Mr. P. BIEDERMANN) worked company (Consultant of "Energoatom" for in Kiev during the elaboration of the draft EA Report, and was EA) present in Ukraine on a permanent present at all public meetings during the scoping stage and basis? discussion of the EA results. The contract with the consultant ends on approving the EA Report. 1.3 Where does the company "PÖYRY" come «PÖYRY» (France) is the global consulting and engineering from? What experience it has performed in company which is focused on the permanent development and elaboration of EA? appropriate doing business. Its investigations are concerned in such spheres as energy, industry, movable and immovable property, water resources and environment. There are 7000 experts working in this company which has got the local office in more than 50 countries of the world). "PÖYRY" was chosen to elaborate SUP EA by the results of international tender of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 1.4 What is the total value of SUP EA? What European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has allocated a part of these costs will be covered by the grant of 300 thousand euros for SUP EA elaboration. These funds population? are irreversible, so the costs of SUP EA will not be covered by the population of Ukraine at all. 1.5 What are the criteria for EA? Is it national or Criteria of EA are defined in standard “General requirements to the international criteria? ecological assessment procedure and the contents of reporting materials concerning “SUP of power units of NPPs of Ukraine” [40]. This document corresponds to the national requirements for conformity assessment of environmental impact by DBN A.2.2-1 [16] on the activities of the environmental assessment process and results of SUP and was elaborated to meet the provisions of the directive documents of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [51]. Standard [40] during the EA process was located on the site of Energoatom http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/. 1.6 Is there a task for implementation of the Requirements are defined by the Ministry of Ecology of Ukraine in SUP environmental assessment, who had standard СОУ НАЕК 004:1011 “General requirements to the agreed it? ecological assessment procedure and the contents of reporting materials concerning “SUP of power units of NPPs of Ukraine” [40] which is published on the official web-site of Energoatom (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/). Schedule of EA implementation is provided in the approved by EBRD Scoping Report which is also published on the named web-site. Terms of Reference for scope of Consultant’s works (company “PÖYRY”) are approved by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Energoatom. 1.7 It is proposed to publish the CVs of experts Relevant information is provided in units 1.4 and 12.3 of the EA involved in SUP EA and preparation of the Report which is located on the official web-site of "Energoatom" EA report with indicating the areas that (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) and NPPs sites. belonged to their responsibilities.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 1.8 How do the representatives of EBRD (The answer of the representative of EBRD) EA is still under estimate the correlation of EA to the elaboration and understanding on how accurate it is implemented requirements of such an assessment? can be received after the public consultations are over as soon as they will amend the EA report in its final version. EA process which is now under elaboration is a new process for Ukraine; it’s aiming at the maximum incorporation of PC results. Some questions which are asked right now and will rise afterwards are to be taken into account and appear in the final EA report. Thus, one should consider that the terms of reference for SUP EA are limited by the safety upgrade of power units of NPPs of Ukraine and EA is not aiming at the analysis and improvement of the whole energy strategy of the country – it’s the task of state authorities. EBRD as the financial institution and the lender is aiming at the maximum transparency of the project and the widest public access to the information on goals, progress and the concequences of the SUP implementation. 2 PC process organization 2.1 What responsible person of "Energoatom" The head of SUP EA activities is Deputy Director General of is the head of SUP EA? Who is the contact "Atomproektinzhyniryng" of “Energoatom" Mr. Sazonov. Contact person in the PC? persons in the process of PM appear Mr. Kochuhov and Mr. Boyko. 2.2 The adopted scheme of PC is unacceptable The claim is unfounded and untrue. PC Process was organized and does not comply with the legislation. under the legislation and international recommendations [1- 16,40,51]. 2.3 Is the population of other regions which are Yes, information about PC was directed to local authorities of Volyn, in monitoring zone of NPPs involved in EA Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Rivne and Khmelnytsky except areas where nuclear power plants oblasts. Located on the web-site of Energoatom are directly located? (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) information concerning SUP and SUP EA, including the PC process, is available to all interested NGOs and citizens of Ukraine. Regardless of place of residence and citizenship, any representative of the NGOs, the media or just the person concerned had an opportunity to participate in any public meeting, visit the public reception or send the questions, comments, suggestions or complaints by mail, fax or email. 2.4 Perhaps the representatives of NGOs were In advance, before the meetings, "Energoatom" had posted on its not informed in advance about the planned website http://energoatom.kiev.ua/ information on PC process, scoping meetings concerning SUP EA. particularly regarding the dates and venues of scoping meetings under EA and sent letters of invitation for these meetings to the number of pre-identified stakeholders (NGOs, media) with a request to relay them to other stakeholders, and for the same purpose provided the local authorities with the printed copies of the Stakeholder Engagement Plan. 2.5 What are the positions of the contact Not be discussed with public official, functional and other personal persons - Mr. Kochuhov and Mr. Boyko and details of contact persons which in the part of external contacts in what are their powers to distribute the PC process are responsible exclusively for adoption and information in the public consultation registration of correspondence, and for disclosure of prepared for process? distribution in due course official information from "Energoatom" from the indicated on its web-site PC email: [email protected]. 2.6 Why Invitations to participate in scoping Invitations to participate in scoping meetings on environmental meetings on environmental assessment of assessment of "Complex (summary) Safety Upgrade Program of "Complex (summary) Safety Upgrade power units of NPPs of Ukraine" was posted on the official web-site Program of power units of NPPs of Ukraine" of "Energoatom" (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) without signature which was posted on the web-site of of responsible official because this invitation does not include any "Energoatom" and had been sent to the environmental information, which would likely require authorization. NGOs and media by e-mail, was not According to legislation on environmental content of documents that authorized by the signature of the are publicly available, the signature of the responsible officer must responsible official? necessarily be present for the Statement of Intent and the Statement of environmental effects of proposed activities [16].
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 2.7 While preparation for public scoping The statement is untrue. The first correspondence that contained meetings on the EA in May 2011 requests questions, suggestions and comments was received on 22.06.2011, for additional information were made and ie after public meetings in May 2011. These questions, suggestions questions to which no reply had been and comments are included in "Questions-Answers Book". received were provided. 2.8 What is the subject of the PC organization Organizers of the PC process including public meetings are process, including public meetings? "Energoatom" and company "POYRY", as it was indicated in publicly disclosed via the official web-site of "Energoatom" (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua /) and in circulated invitation to participate in scoping meetings on environmental assessment of "Complex (summary) Safety Upgrade Program of power units of NPPs of Ukraine" dated 27.04.2011. 2.9 To what address one can send questions, Contact e-mail ([email protected]), as well as addresses and comments, concerns and complaints about contact numbers of public reception of PC process in Energodar, SUP, SUP Environmental Assessment and Kyiv, Kuznetsovsk, Netishin and Yuzhnoukrayinsk were released on public consultation process on SUP and the official web-site of "Energoatom" SUP EA? (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) and listed in press-releases and invitations for public meetings, which were distributed during the process of PC. 2.10 Is the list of NGOs and the media whom the Such list for Phase 1 PC (EA scoping) is listed in the "Stakeholder invitation for public meetings during the Engagement Plan", released on the official web-site of "Energoatom" process of PC disclosed? (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/). Later this list was supplemented at the requests of all those who showed interest in the PC. Supplemented list will be presented in the final version of the EA Report, which is scheduled for publication in October 2011. 2.11 Why were the participants of scoping The initial phase of the PC (Phase 1) aimed at attracting the public meetings on environmental assessment of to determine the scope of environmental assessment, which is to "Complex (summary) Safety Upgrade plan future work. The only document that was available at the time of Program of power units of NPPs of Ukraine" those meetings was standard СОУ НАЕК 004:1011 «General not provided with the printed information requirements to the ecological assessment procedure and the materials? contents of reporting materials concerning “SUP of power units of NPPs of Ukraine" [40], which beforehead was published on the official web-site of "Energoatom" (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/). Distribution of printed copies of documentation for such meetings is not required and is usually not needed. 2.12 Who took part in scoping meetings on Minutes of meetings with the lists of participants are provided in the environmental assessment of "Complex Scoping Report published on the official web-site of "Energoatom" (summary) Safety Upgrade Program of (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/). power units of NPPs of Ukraine"? 2.13 Which proposals and public comments All received suggestions and comments were taken into account and were taken into account? systematized in the "Questions-Answers Book", which also contain comments on their account. Appropriate adjustments to the draft EA Report will be presented in the final version of this report. 2.14 We are asking to send the materials which As indicated in the invitation to the public meetings "the draft EA are discussed at public meetings on SUP Report (Ukrainian and English versions) and EA Summary report for and SUP EA. public (Ukrainian and English versions), one can get acquainted with while visiting the official web-site of "Energoatom“ http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua. EA Summary Report (English version) is also available on the web-site of EBRD: www.ebrd.com”. 2.15 Were the invitations to the public meetings Except locating the information on the official web-sites of on SUP EA sent to the local executive “Energoatom” and NPP web-sites Information on PC (in particular authorities and local governments of concerning the planned public meetings) was sent to the heads of settlements belonging to the monitoring regional councils of Volyn, Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, zone of nuclear power plants? Rivne and Khmelnytsky oblasts, towns of which are members of the Monitoring Zones of operating nuclear power plants of Ukraine.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 2.16 We offer not to duplicate information The comment is taken into account. With the agreement of the messages in two languages (English and attendees the proposal was adopted for the meetings where the Ukrainian) while the public meetings on people who did not speak Ukrainian were absent (meetings in SUP and SUP EA. Energodar, Kuznetsovsk, Netishyn, and Yuzhnoukrayinsk).
2.17 It is proposed not to invite the NPP workers Proposal is unacceptable. Public meetings are open to all interested to the the public meetings on SUP and SUP persons, regardless of nationality, residence and work, profession EA. and attitude towards nuclear energy. 2.18 Who had taken part in public meetings Each meeting, except for experts - developers of SUP and EA concerning SUP and SUP EA from Report was attended by the authorized representatives of the NPP Energoatom’s side in satellite cities of and "Atomproektengineering" of "Energoatom". The names and NPPs? positions of the participants are listed in the minutes of the relevant meetings, disclosed on the web-site of "Energoatom" (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/). 2.19 During the public meetings and in the The statement is untrue. All questions, suggestions and comments requests sent by the NGOs there were received at the meetings and by other means of delivery without problemmatique questions asked which exceptions were analyzed and shown in this “Questions-Answers were not taken into account. Book”. In case the nature of suggestions and comments is reasonable the appropriate corrections were incorporated into the final EA report. 2.20 The activity of “Energoatom” as it had been The claim is unfounded and untrue. In particular, the PC process before is directed to the rehabilitation and concerning SUP and SUP EA was organized according to the capacity increase of the nuclear powers of requirements of legislation and international recommendations [1- Ukraine with ignoring the requirements of 16,40,51]. population, in particular, the ones living in the regions of NPPs location and nuclear industry enterprises. 2.21 SUP and EA report are located on the web- Indeed, since SUP is crucial for activity of “Energoatom”, a reference site of “Energoatom” on the different pages to the program is listed on the first page of the official web-site of of the site. It is reasonable to locate these “Energoatom” (page “Energoatom”). However, the same page, documents on one page. where the EA report is located (the “Nuclear Safety”), a reference to SUP is also posted. 2.22 The population of Ukraine which is not living The statement is untrue. Information about PC was directed to local close to NPPs have the lack of information governments of Volyn Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, concerning SUP and SUP EA. Rivne and Khmelnytsky oblasts. Placed on the web-site of “Energoatom” (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) information concerning SUP and SUP EA including the PC process is available to all interested NGOs and citizens of Ukraine. Regardless of place of residence and citizenship, any representative of the NGOs, the media or just the person concerned had an opportunity to participate in any public meetings, to visit the public reception or send your questions, comments, suggestions or complaints by mail, fax or email.
2.23 Were the representatives of state regulation The invitation to participate in public meetings during PC was sent to authorities and other interested bodies of all the ministries and agencies. The separate meetings in satellite state executive authorities invited or were cities of nuclear power plant were attended by the representatives of they taking part in the public meetings? regional departments of public safety regulator (environmental inspection, inspection of nuclear and radiation safety, sanitary and epidemiological service). It should be noted that the presence of these bodies was desirable but not mandatory - the responsibility for the PC process is put on the operating organization, and PC is aiming at the widest possible public involvement in the SUP EA. The body of state regulation of nuclear and radiation safety (SNRIU) back in 2010 performed the examination prescribed by law and provided SUP with positive conclusions. State ecological expertise of EA report will be implemented according to [10.40] after the completion of PC process with consideration of its results.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 2.24 When the “Questions-Answers Book” will be “Questions-Asnwers Bood” will be published on the web-site of disclosed? Will there be any time to analyze “Energoatom” (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) by parts according the answers to the public and provide the to their readiness since mid-August. The full version of “Questions- additional comments before the elaboration Answers Book” will be placed on the specified web-site no later than of final EA report is finished? mid-September this year. The final version of the EA Report will be released in early October. It should be noted that one of the recommendations developed during the EA is continuing the process of informing the public about SUP after EA and even after SUP implementation and improvement of mechanisms of such information (see i.8.1.2 of the EA Report). 2.25 Public consultations are held since May, are Generally during the 1st Phase of PC (scoping of EA) 79 questions, there any questions, comments and comments and suggestions were received. These questions are suggestions already received? reflected in the disclosed intermediate reports, substantiated suggestions are taken into account in the first version of the EA report. 2.26 It is proposed to organize the public Issue of holding the public hearings goes beyond the competence of hearings concerning SUP and SUP EA in “Energoatom”. In accordance with the provisions of the law [56.57], the locatlities of the 30km zone around the the organization and conduct of the PH is under the responsibility of operating NPPs of Ukraine. local authorities and local governments. Therefore, this issue will be forwarded to local governments of Volyn Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Rivne and Khmelnitsky regions within the “Questions-Answers Book”. 2.27 It is proposed to open public repositories in The opening of such public repositories in other localities of 30km other big localities of the 30km zones zones is not foreseen by the “Stakeholder Engagement Plan” as around operating NPPs except those in soon as it is considered redundant. In return other information satellite cities of NPPs. channels to provide the questions, suggestions and comments by public exist – by ordinary and electronic mail to the address of any public repository. 2.28 Absolute majority of 30km zone around PC process does not foresee the citizens' will expression by voting operating NPPs inhabitants hadn’t taken or receiving some generalized social data. Thus, the concept of part in the PC process. Do the organizers “legitimacy” and “representativeness” can not be applied to this consider these consultations legitimate and process. One of its tasks was to provide the widest possible public their results representative? awareness of SUP, an environmental assessment of plans and results of SUP EA. This task was accomplished by using all available channels of information - through the media, local self- government, e-mail address to potentially interested community organizations and others. As individuals, who showed interest to SUP and SUP EA and took part in the PC, the number was expectedly limited. It is defined by the specific issues of SUP and relatively low total activeness in public participation on matters not directly affecting the most important aspects of human life. Thus, for all those who expressed interest in participation the conditions to provide questions, comments, suggestions, etc. were created. All comments received from them will be reviewed in detail by specialists and, if necessary, be taken into account in final EA report.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 2.29 Closing date for acceptance of public The statement is untrue. The “Draft Report on the Ecological comments and suggestions on SUP EA Assessment. Summary report, for public” was posted on the official was not made public. As stated in the web-site of “Energoatom” (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) on Stakeholder Engagement Plan the second 09.06.2011. The “Draft Report on the Ecological Assessment. Main phase of public consultation began on 10th Report” was placed on the same site on 22.06.2011. According to June and the consultation period is 90 days. Section 6.1.2.2 of the “Stakeholder Engagement Plan” ”questions, However, in response to our request (No suggestions and comments can be submitted to the “Energoatom” 021/IPA from 29/08/11), you reported that during the first 90 days of placing the documents”. Consequently, the deadline for comments ends on questions, suggestions and comments will be accepted to September 2nd which reduces the 90-day 22.09.2011, treated and, if necessary, be taken into account when period per week. In addition, the draft EA developing the EA Report in final version. Thus, as soon as report did not appear on the web-site of “Questions-Answers Book” is planned to be disclosed earlier the “Energoatom” on June 10th (only June 22nd), letter number 021/IPA from 8/29/11 head informed that “in case of which also effectively reduces the trial further questions, remarks or comments, please send them till the period. September 2nd, 2011. If the comments come later they may be considered but will not be reflected in the “Questions-Answers Book” and the final version of the EA Report”. This means that since the “Questions-Answers Book” is scheduled for publication before the end of 90-day term of PC active phase, comments that come after the disclosure will be considered and, if necessary, be taken into account, but, naturally, can not be reflected in the already published “Questions-Answers Book” that is attached to the final EA Report. 3 Legislative issues of the project, feasibility study and SUP EA expertise 3.1 What was the part of the state regulatory СОУ НАЕК 004:1011 «General requirements to the ecological authorities in EA? assessment procedure and the contents of reporting materials concerning “SUP of power units of NPPs of Ukraine" [40] was approved by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of Ukraine. EA Report in the final version (after adjustments and additions as the result of PC) is subject to environmental assessment in the manner prescribed by law [5,10,40]. 3.2 Why are the public consultations on SUP State guarantees obtainment is necessary to receive the credit for and SUP EA required? SUP implementation. The obligatory condition of such obtainment is the positive conclusions of state expertise concerning SUP feasibility study. EA is a part of such study which in accordance with the law [1-10,15,16,40], international recommendations [51] and best practice should be conducted with the participation of the public. EA Report, adjusted and supplemented by the results of PC will be supplied to the ecological expertise. 3.3 Why does the list of persons who had Requirements for form and content of "Statement of Intent" are set agreed the "Statement of Intent concerning by DBN A.2.2-1-2003 [16]. According to Appendix G (mandatory) of the Consolidated Safety Upgrade Program DBN A.2.2-1-2003, "Statement of Intent" contains "information about of power units of NPPs of Ukraine", include the location of sites (road) construction (options)", does not require officials only from Zaporizhia, Mykolayiv, and can not require determination of zones of facility influence, Rivne and Khmelnitsky regions, while a 30- because such a determination is to be done during the next stage - kilometer zone around the existing nuclear in the course of the impacts on the environment. Accordingly, power plants is also containing the towns of foreseen in [16] approval by the local authority applies to Volyn and Dnipropetrovsk regions? administrative-territorial units, which are located within the area of the facility. 3.4 What are the grounds of Environmental State guarantees obtainment is necessary to receive the credit for Assessment of SUP? SUP implementation. The positive conclusions of state expertise concerning SUP feasibility is a prerequisite. EA is a part of SUP feasibility study which should according to the requirements of legislation [1-10,15,16,40], international recommendations [51] and the best world practice, be conducted with the participation of the public.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 3.5 When analyzing the feasibility study of the Comment is taken into account. Appropriate clarifications are Complex (summary) Safety Upgrade included into the unit 1.9 of the EA report. Elaboration and Program of power units of NPPs of Ukraine implementation of SUP measures are one of the tasks identified by and environmental assessment one should the solution [55]: "2) To approve within three months: ... complex take into account the certain provisions of program of modernization and safety upgrade of nuclear power the Decision of National Security and plants of Ukraine for 2011 - 2017." Defense Council of Ukraine dated 08.04.2011 "On the improvement of safety of nuclear power plants in Ukraine”. 3.6 Is the ecological expertise of EA report Yes, it is. According to the clauses of the standard “General foreseen? requirements to the ecological assessment procedure and the contents of reporting materials concerning “SUP of power units of NPPs of Ukraine” [40] EA Report in the final version (after adjustments and additions as the result of PC) is subject to ecological expertise in the manner prescribed by law [5,10,40]. 4 Completeness of the EA materials 4.1 At the scoping stage stakeholders should Correct, aiming at discussion of the EA Report, Standard “General be involved in the determination of the final requirements to the ecological assessment procedure and the EA report of the EA. contents of reporting materials concerning “SUP of power units of NPPs of Ukraine” [40] was located on the web-site of “Energoatom' 'http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/. 4.2 Does EA foresee the additional measures In terms of SUP EA additional field studies or other measures of to monitor environmental conditions in the physical monitoring of the environment in Monitoring Zone of NPP Monitoring Zone of NPP? are not foreseen. The main source of information used in the EA are the EIA Reports on nuclear safety analysis, technical studies of safety of NPPs, reports of operating organization for radiation safety and environmental monitoring within the Monitoring Zone of NPPs, nuclear and environmental reports of other organizations and civil examinations. Another project, technical, operational and scientific documentation owned by "Energoatom" served as additional sources of information. 4.3 Are there other measures to upgrade safety SUP does not only contain the set of measures to upgrade safety, needed but not included in SUP? but also exhaustively covers all measures whose implementation at the time of the program development was required (1) at the request of state regulation of nuclear and radiation safety, (2) according to the norms and standards of Ukraine (3) recommendations of international experts of IAEA and RISKAUDIT and (4) based on feedback and operating experience. There is no such measure missing in SUP among these requirements and recommendations.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 4.4 What are the main environmental aspects Composition of EA is defined by the Standard “General requirements of the EA? to the ecological assessment procedure and the contents of reporting materials concerning “SUP of power units of NPPs of Ukraine’’ [40]. According to i. 6.1 of the Standard [40], the main objectives of EA, in particular, include: the definition of sources of environmental impacts related to the SUP implementation, identification and brief characterization of the list of analyzed impacts of NPP on the environment, identifying the list of potential objects effects from nuclear power plants that are sensitive to SUP implementation; overview of the current state of environmental, social and technogenic environment within the monitoring zone of each nuclear power plant and the results of the forecast changes in their state of SUP denial (under normal conditions and in accidents at each nuclear power plant); impact assessment of SUP measures on forecasted changes of environmental, social and technogenicl environment and analysis of their compliance with environmental requirements, standards and regulations on safety analysis; analysis of changes or justification of no change impacts on the environment directly while the implementation of SUP measures; brief overview of a complex resource-saving, protection, rehabilitation and security activities which were carried out or are carried out at each nuclear power plant, the analysis of complex changes in these measures as a result of SUP and evaluation of their effectiveness, a review of residual effects of each nuclear power plant under normal conditions (without SUP measures) and analysis of their changes as a result of SUP implementation; comprehensive assessment of environmental risks of accidents at each nuclear power plant (regardless SUP) and changes as a result of these risks with SUP implementation; assessment of cost-effectiveness of SUP implementation on aspects of environmental impact and impact on public health; assessment of possible impacts of SUP in a transboundary context. During the EA process the Standard [40] was located on the web-site of “Energoatom'' 'http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/. 4.5 The draft EA report does not consider the Comment taken into account. in Section 1.7 of the final EA Report, relationship between SUP and programs which contains additional information on SUP connection with the related to the life extension of existing program for life extenion of existing nuclear power units and other nuclear power reactors, and other applicable state and sectoral programs in the field of nuclear energy. applicable state and sectoral programs in Brief description of the possible impact of these programs on the the field of nuclear energy. As a result, the residual effects of nuclear power plants under normal conditions and corresponding risks were left out of in accidents at ZNPP, RNPP, KhNPP and SUNPP regardless SUP is analysis. provided in i.i.2.5.11, 2.5.14, 3.5.11, 3.5.14, 4.5.11, 4.5.14, 5.5.11, 5.5.14 of the final EA Report. Analysis of the SUP impacts in these aspects are presented in i.i.2.5.12, 2.5.15, 3.5.12, 3.5.15, 4.5.12, 4.5.15, 5.5.12 and 5.5.15 of the final EA Report. It should be noted that the SUP measures are related to existing nuclear power plants during their remaining life cycle as defined today (including operation and/or decommissioning). The implementation of SUP measures is not a prerequisite for the decision to extent the operation period of reactors. Conversely, the possible end of operation period of some reactors was not considered as a reason not to implement the SUP of these reactors. The program for life extension of existing nuclear power units is a separate program which is run in parallel to the SUP.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 4.6 Why early decommissioning of existing Comment taken into account. Relevant clarifications are included nuclear power plants of Ukraine, including into the i.1.8.1 of the EA Report Under any option decommissioning the oldest of them - the power units № 1, 2 is considered as the process until the complete unloading of spend of South-Ukrainian NPP, № 1, 2 of nuclear fuel the power unit - at the end of a specified life or earlier, Zaporizhzhya NPP are not considered as all security and other essential safety equipment are operated to the the alternatives to SUP implementation? final stop and the first phase of the OM. Most of these systems and equipment are required at the following stages of OM - to completely remove all wastes from the unit. SUP foresees introduction of measures to upgrade the power units’ safety which is needed for a certain balance to date of all of life cycle (the stages of operation and decommissioning). That’s why their early decommissioning without the introduction of these measures is the only special case not analyzed in the alternatives within EA - non-implementation of SUP. It should be noted that the operating organization “Energoatom” does not offer early OM of units of operating nuclear power plants of Ukraine on its own initiative, and the external solution, according to [6], will be approved by state authorities, who took the decision on construction and inform the operating organization no later than two years before final closure. Moreover, as the world (e.g. experience of NPP “Hreysfald”, Germany) and domestic (experience of the Chernobyl NPP), practices show that in case of early OM its duration significantly increases compared to the planned final stop. 4.7 The EA report doesn’t include the The statement is untrue. The impact on the population health as the information concerning the impact on the result of SUP implementation is analyzed in i.i.2.3.3, 3.3.3, 4.3.3 and population health as the result of SUP 5.3.3 of the EA report. In particular, among the conclusion one can implementation by reducing the factual and see that “a reduction in the risk of accidents translates into a potential impacts (risks) ans as the result reduced risk of contamination for NPP workers and nearby decrease of the psychological pressure on residents. This should lower stress levels related to working at or the human being. living near NPPs and will positively impact the psychological health of workers and nearby residents”. Aiming at the improvement of effectiveness of such positive approach there are appropriate recommendations developed during EA concerning the improvement of informing the public and they are provided in i.8.1.2 of the EA report. 5 Goals of SUP 5.1 Does SUP include the measures for No. SUP measures are related only to safety upgrade of nuclear lifecycle extension of existing nuclear power power plants of Ukraine during the defined remainder of their life plants of Ukraine or the construction of new cycle (the stages of operation and decommissioning). nuclear capacities? 5.2 Why are the issues of old nuclear reactors In contrast to the nuclear power units efficiency (reducing unit costs, safety which worked most of the 30-year increased VP and ICER, etc.) their safety upgrade is certainly term under the original project are actual till important, regardless of their residual life and the planned period of now? further operation. Average operating unit of NPP of Ukraine had worked about 50% of their lifecycle up to the present day. Obviously, the oldest units require the most attention in terms of safety upgrade. Measures implementation of the safety upgrade of each power unit started from the beginning of their operation. Such a process is consistent with international practice, defined as the accumulation of operational experience and gradual tightering of safety requirements. Safety upgrade measures for operating nuclear power plants were implemented earlier according to previous programs, in particular [41-48]. Part of previously planned activities was not implemented due to severe financial and economic situation in the energy sector in a transitional economy and the global economic crisis.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 5.3 What criteria were determined for the As described in i.1.5.3 of EA Report, SUP measures are divided into schedule of SUP measures categories and priorities in consistence with their impact on safety implementation? upgrade. Together with other limitation factors (terms of purchase and supply of equipment, periods of outage, etc.) SUP implementation schedule takes into account the priority measures that will ensure faster implementation of measures that have greater impact on safety upgrade. 5.4 What criteria will be selected to choose The list of SUP measures is defined and allocated according to safety upgrade measures that both are priorities by the degree of their impact on safety upgrade (see i.1.5.3 measures of lifecycle extension? of EA Report). Lifecycle extension is not considered in the SUP. (See also response i.i.5.1, 5.2.). 5.5 Does SUP foresee any environmental Yes. Particularly among SUP measures that have a protective measures? nature, there is foreseen creation of Seismological monitoring on each plant (SUP measures number 18101, 28101, 38101). According to the conclusions of EA, SUP will not affect measures of environmental protection that have already been implemented at NPPs of Ukraine, as well as implementation of the program can go on without any restrictions and reservations and does not require additional specific measures to protect the environment. During the SUP implementation and by the results of its implementation specific, resource-saving, rehabilitation or compensatory measures in addition to those already implemented on site, in the SPZ and Monitoring Zone of NPPs are not necessary. Thus, SUP implementation generally reduces environmental risks in areas adjacent to nuclear power plants, reducing the probability of accidents, improving the emergency situations management at nuclear power plants and, consequently, reducing the potential consequences of accidents. So, actually all activities and programs, and SUP in general have ecological context. 5.6 Does SUP contain the protection measures No, it doesn’t. SUP covers only the safety upgrade measures for the for inhabitants of localities of the Monitoring power units of operating NPPs of Ukraine which will be implemented Zones of NPPs? directly by “Energoatom” on NPPs. Before this aiming at the further improvement of informing the public there are appropriate recommendations developed during the EA process (see unit 8.1.2. of EA report) which concern the issues of early warning of population, unification and spreading the information which is disclosed by “Energoatom”, etc. According to the legislation the responsibility for emergency readiness is at the MOE’s, local executive units and local authorities’ side. 6 Completeness of SUP 6.1 Measures for safety upgrade of operating Measures to improve the safety of operating nuclear power plants nuclear power plants were implemented were implemented earlier according to the previous programs, in earlier according to the previous programs particular [41-48]. Part of previously planned activities was not that hadn’t been implemented in full and on implemented due to severe financial and economic situation in the time and the term of which had already energy sector in a transitional economy and the global economic expired. Will SUP cover all measures to crisis. SUP is significantly wider than the previous programs and improve security for previous programs that includes all previously outstanding events of previous programs have not been implemented? justified in terms of safety upgrade of operating NPPs. 6.2 Installation of seismic sensors at all NPPs is Creation of seismological monitoring systems at each nuclear power required. plant is foreseen in SUP (SUP measures number 18101, 28101, 38101). 6.3 Is there a detailed analysis of accidents Yes. Among the SUP measures by the direction of "Analysis of among SUP measures foreseen? Does the Accidents" it is foreseen to develop the safety analysis reports in full SUP EA assess the consequences of for all nuclear power plants and implement the operational accidents at operating nuclear power probabilistic safety analysis. Information on the environmental risks plants? of accidents at nuclear power plants is listed in the EA Report. Comprehensive Assessment of those risks changes as a result of SUP is presented in i.i.2.5.15, 3.5.15, 4.5.15, 5.5.15 of EA report.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 6.4 Does the SUP cover the effectiveness of Yes. Question the effectiveness of cooling systems are included in cooling systems? Whether it had been SUP in the "Support the stock coolant", "Cooling the first loop", analyzed in the SUP EA the sufficient water "Support Systems". The analysis of water resources of operating resources for operating nuclear power nuclear power plants are in i.i.2.1.4, 2.2.4, 2.5.1 and similar items of plants in the summer? sections 3, 4, 5 of the EA Report. The general conclusion is there are sufficient water resources for operating nuclear power plants in Ukraine. 6.5 According to the legislation of most Yes. In particular, SUP involves improvement and automation of countries with developed nuclear power most water-chemical regimes of the 1st and 2nd loops, and upgrade systems usage of open cooling nuclear of automated chemical control of the 1st and 2nd loops (АХК 1,2). power plants, leading to significant mineralization of water is prohibited. Do the measures of SUP reduce mineralized NPP discharges to the open water? 6.6 What is the aim of SUP EA? Does the EA According to item 5.1 of Standard СОУ НАЕК 004:1011 “General foresee creation or improvement of requirements to the ecological assessment procedure and the environmental monitoring systems? contents of reporting materials concerning “SUP of power units of NPPs of Ukraine’’ [40], "EA is performed to assess the environmental impacts associated with SUP implementation for ensuring compliance with environmental protection and ecological security as a result of its implementation”. Conducting field and laboratory studies, creation of new or improvement of existing monitoring systems within the SUP EA is not expected. However, if necessary, recommendations for SUP amendments by appropriate measures will be included in the EA Report. 6.7 It is required to review all possible situations This task is foreseen by direction 9 of SUP "Analysis of accidents." that may arise during plant operation, In particular, for all units of operating nuclear power plants safety including accidents that occurred in Ukraine analysis reports (SAR) will be developed in full, taking into account and abroad. the full spectrum of initiating events, analysis, severe accidents, and other measures. 6.8 It is required to substantiate the adequacy Adequacy justification of protective barriers and security units is of existing levels of power units’ protection necessarily the part of the project documentation and is to be in situations that may arise during plant confirmed by initial assessment and periodic reassessment of the operation, if necessary, to provide security [18]. SUP foresees the safety analysis reports (SAR) additional protection. development in full for all units of operating nuclear power plants, taking into account the full spectrum of initial events (couse 9 of SUP "Analysis of Accidents"). 6.9 It is required to pay special attention to Terms of safe operation of nuclear power plants do not involve the objects that had worn the normative life use of components, systems and equipment designed more than term. stated life term without the detailed examination and justification of their remaining life term and redefining of life term in agreement with the general designer of nuclear power plant and a body of state regulation. SUP provides a number of measures for modernization or reconstruction of a number of systems and elements that affect the safety of NPPs. 6.10 What safety upgrade measures are planned Technical decisions for safety upgrade which are to be implemented for the power units of NPPs of Ukraine? in terms of SUP at each operating NPP are briefly explained in i.i.2.1.13, 3.1.13, 4.1.13 and 5.1.13 of the EA report. The extended explanation of these measures for each type of power units on each operating NPP are provided in SUP. The named documents are located on the official web-site of “Energoatom” (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) and the sites of NPPs.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 6.11 What are the reasons of the non-planned The main causes of non-planned stops of operating nuclear power stops of power units of operating NPPs of plants are dispatching restrictions and violations in the NPPs Ukraine and what measures are used to operation. In particular, during the last 2010 year the number pf prevent them? these violations occurred at ZNPP is 8, at RNPP - 4, at KhNPP - 6, SUNPP - 4, entailing five unscheduled repairs. None of the violations at the NPPs has not led to the accident and had no impact on safety. In oder to prevent such violations the number of organizational measures to improve planning and prevention activities and technical measures to improve the diagnostic systems, as well as the modernization and reconstruction of main and auxiliary equipment are undertaken. All such technical measures that at the same time are needed to improve the safety of operating nuclear power units of,Ukraine are included in SUP. 6.12 How is is taken into account that the It’s true that the measures foreseen in accordance with the “Safety previous safety upgrade program on the uprade of the power units of operating NPPs Concept” [47] were not power units of “small series” No 1 and 2 of implemented in full. Nonetheless, the major work amounts were SUNPP is implemented only by 40%? implemented exactly on the oldest power units – No 1 and 2 of RNPP, No 1 and 2 of SUNPP and No 1 of ZNPP. In particular, the power unit No 1 of SUNPP has 84 units from the planned 96 implemented (88%). Also see the answers i.i.5.2, 6.1. 7 ZNPP operation 7.1 What was the cause of disconnection from On May 11th, 2011 at 15:25 power unit number 2 of Zaporizhia the mains of power unit № 2 of Zaporizhia nuclear power plant was disconnected from the network effecting nuclear power plant in May 2011? Can it be from the electrical protection. Unit was again connected to the restored without determination of the network on May 12th, at 9:28. Restoration of normal operation of cause? power unit is impossible without detection and removal of the causes of the violation. 7.2 According to Art. 74 of the Water Code of Project Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant with capacity of 4,000 MW Ukraine "usage of technology reservoirs was developed under the USSR Council of Ministers Resolution № (cooling ponds of heat and nuclear power 870 dated 21.10.1976, on the basis of siting act, approved by the plants ...) should be in accordance with the USSR Council of Ministers on 30.06.1976 № 303-9 which foreseen norms and rules of operation specified in the further expansion of nuclear power plant up to 6 000 MW. the technical projects approved in the Project of nuclear power plant with the capacity of 4000 MW had manner established by legislation." By been approved by the USSR Council of Ministers №200R dated whom and on what basis is the technical 04.02.1980. The expansion draft of NPP to 6 000 MW was design of Zaporizhzhya NPP approved; developed in accordance with the Order of the USSR Council of which rules and regulations to use cooling Ministers № 920 dated 14.05.1981 and USSR Council of Ministers pond it foresees? № 448R dated 18.07.1981 on the basis of the design task, approved by the Ministry of the USSR (Minutes № 73 dated 23.07.1982) the project for expansion of the station to 6000 MW (second stage) had been approved in 1988. Concerning cooling pond (CP) the project foreseen all its hydraulic characteristics (in particular, the boundaries, volume, surface area, infiltration, etc.), as well as performance indicators (such as temperature, evaporating, purge, etc.). 7.3 Are the limits of Zaporizhzhya NPP, The boundaries of the industrial area of Zaporizhzhya NPP, and its including cooling pond (CP), defined how it CP are defined by the design documentation of ZNPP (see i.7.4). CP is differentiated from CP Kakhovka is distinct from Kakhovka reservoir, associated with it by underwater reservoir land and water fund? and drainage channels for the purpose of CP purging. 8 RNPP operation No requests 9 KhNPP operation No requests 10 SUNPP operation
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments No requests 11 Investigations, experiments and equipment testing, planned prophylactic and capital repais 11.1 Is there a system of monitoring the reactor Yes. Conditions of the reactor corps are the subject to periodic corps? monitoring. Residual life of the metal shell and welds of the power units is estimated on the basis of programs specimens that are loaded to the active zones from the start of the units operation. 11.2 Will not the SUP implementation lead to the No, it won’t. The increase of planned-prophylactic and capital repairs increase of planned-prophylactic and of power units of operating NPPs as the result of SUP measures capital repairs of the power units of implementation is not foreseen. It is confirmed by the experience of operating NPPs, recude of its working time the analogue measures implementation on power units No of and efficiency, and as the result increase of KhNPP and No 4 of RNPP. loads of TPP with relevant environmental concequences? 12 Rad-wastes treatment 12.1 Will amounts of additional rad-wastes EA is limited to qualitative assessment of additional volumes of rad- resulting from the introduction of SUP wastes, according to the conclusions of which it does not require any measures be evaluated in the EA? changes in radioactive waste treatment systems at nuclear power plants, except for those provided for program of radioactive waste management of “Energoatom”[49], elaborated according to the National Target Environmental Program for radioactive Waste Management [50]. For each individual event the detailed quantitative assessment of additional volumes of rad-wastes (if any) will be carried out as a part of the substantiating materials to obtain a permit for the relevant works. 12.2 Is there a plan to minimize radioactive Yes. Minimization measures are foreseen by the Program of wastes of the nuclear power plants of Radioactive Waste Management of “Energoatom”[49], elaborated Ukraine? according to the National Target Environmental Program of Radioactive Waste Management [50]. 13 Spent nuclear fuel treatment 13.1 Why the pre-station storage of spent Pre-station SSNF is part of the technological cycle of nuclear power nuclear fuel (SSNF) on ZNPP was plant and, as such, is not subject to the Law of Ukraine “Concerning constructed despite the negative results of making decisions about the design, construction of nuclear referendum in 1994? installations and facilities designated for radioactive wastes that are of national importance" [11]. Thus, even for objects of national significance, which are subject to this law, the results of a consultative referendum, if it is held, are advisory for local executive bodies and local authorities in agreeing placing such facility on their territory. In addition, construction of pre-station SSNF of ZNPP did not require additional land allocation, and indicated law was adopted by the Supreme Council of Ukraine in 2005 - after the commissioning of the SSNF. 13.2 What is the designed capacity and the filling Pre-station SSNF of ZNPP is foreseen for 380 containers which can level of pre-station storage of spent nuclear store 9000 spent fuel assemblies (SFA). Today there are 96 fuel (SSNF) of ZNPP? containers on site. The foreseen average year amounts of SNF removal from power units No 1-6 of ZNPP are 252 SFA/year. 14 Nuclear safety
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 14.1 What is the level of nuclear safety of According to the conclusion of all the international expert missions Ukraine in contrast with the international (IAEA, Riskaudit, Wang, etc.) Ukraine NPP safety level ys counterparts? commensurating with the level of nuclear safety of the same age in countries with advanced nuclear energy (EU, Russia, USA, etc.), and in some aspects is the best world experience. 15 Radiation safety 15.1 Radiation monitoring at nuclear power Regardless of the NPP, a constant or periodic radiation monitoring of plants today is done only by internal the towns and in the Monitoring Zone is done by the bodies of services, the population has got the sanitary-epidemiological control, the services of Ministry of information about the radiation situation Emergency Situations of Ukraine, research institutes and other only from the NPPs. It is required to create organization. However, thanks to a special focus of radiation control an independent nuclear power plant systems of NPPs (continuous monitoring and early operational radiation monitoring and informing the warning concerning the protective barriers violations to the flow of public about its results system. radioactive substances), these systems are most susceptible, and their data - the most complete. Compliance systems and the likelihood of their data is controlled by regulators of nuclear safety and the public body on standardization. Full-scale duplicating of these extremely expensive systems by independent organizations is not foreseen by legislation, has no analogues in the world and is not considered economically justified 15.2 Why Sanitary Protection Zone (SPZ) of The statement is untrue. SPZ of Zaporozhzya NPP is set as the Zaporizhzhya NPP does not cover all items territory which covers the circles around each source of emissions of ZNPP, particularly the body of the cooling (ventilation pipes of power units and special buildings) and cooling pond (CP)? ponds. 15.3 What is a “moniroting zone”? When and According to the definition of i.1.13 of OSPU [13], the zone of how is it determined? Who is required to moniroting is a "territory, where the potential impact of radioactive make this monitoring? discharges and emissions of radiation and nuclear facility is possible and where the monitoring happens", and monitoring stands for a “collection of primary data (measurement of power absorbed dose in air, determination of radionuclides in environmental objects, food, water, etc.) to further use this information to monitor radiation- hygienic control and radiation. “ Under the provisions of i.9.4.1 of the same document, “The need for establishement of these zones is determined by the degree of radiation hazard to the public enterprises, and to differentiate firms by these criteria the notion of category of enterprise is introduced.” (According to Article 1, Section VII of the Law of Ukraine “Concerning the use of nuclear energy and radiation safety” [6] the size and borders of the Monitoring Zone are determined “... in the project in accordance with rules, regulations and standards in the field of nuclear energy, consistent with the state regulation of nuclear and radiation safety and approved by the local Councils of People's Deputies.” Pursuant to Article 13, Section III, the Law of Ukraine “Concerning Protection of human beings from the ionizing radiation” [9], “the systematic control of radiation situation ... in areas ... of observations, as well as emissions and discharges of radioactive substances” which legal and physical persons who carry out practical activities are required to undertake. 15.4 How is the Sanitary Protection Zone (SPZ) According to the definition of i.1.13 of OSPU [13]: “Sanitary of the nuclear power plant set? In case if Protection Zone (hereinafter - SPZ) - The area around the radiation- the SPZ is in the form of a circle that serves nuclear facility, where the level of human exposure under normal as its center? operation can exceed the quota limit dose for category B.” Therefore, the size of the SPZ is determined by the distance from emission sources under normal operating conditions (power vent pipes and special building). SPZ is defined for all nuclear power plants taking into account all sources of emissions, as circles around each source. In the case of Zaporizhzhya NPP the cooling pond is also included into SPZ.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 16 Fire protection safety No requests 17 General industrial safety No requests 18 Physical protection 18.1 How is the protection of operating NPPs The requirements to the physical protection of the operating NPPs of provided for cases of nuclear terrorism? Ukraine which are aiming at prevention of nuclear terrorism acts, thefts of radioactive materials and strengthening the regime of non- proliferation of nuclear weapons are set by the Law of Ukraine “Concerning the physical protection of the nuclear facilities, nuclear materials, radioactive wastes, other sources of ionizing radiation” [34] and other normative-legislative acts. Systems of NPPs physical protection created according to these requirements in particular foresee the distribution of responsibilities of officials, admission of persons to work on nuclear installations as a result of special inspection, protection and defense of nuclear power plants, protection of classified information, training of specialists in physical protection, periodic trainings and other organizational and technical solutions. As required by law, the existence of the physical protection systems of NPPs is the obligatory condition of their operation licensing and efficiency of these systems is confirmed by the results of periodic state inspections. 19 Emergency readiness 19.1 It is proposed to restore the system of wired This decision will require significant capital investment and will limit radio that existed in Soviet times, and use it the range of informed individuals to those who are at home and for early warning. listen to the radio. Instead of this, during the EA there were recommendations developed for implementation of the early warning system through SMS messages sent to cell phones. Applications for registration of inhabitants of 30 km surveillance zone in the inclusion of such a system may also be collected through SMS messages from interested persons. These recommendations are detailed in the EA Report i.8.1.3. 19.2 To ensure fast and safe evacuation in the According to u.5.30 of DBN V.1.2-4-2006 “Engineering civil defense event of an accident at the Rivne NPP, measures (civil defense)” [58] in the zone of possible hazardous completion of the road through the existing contamination of NPP project should be at least two of the roads landfill (300-350 m), which would cut the paved. Today for evacuation of personnel from the RNPP site to distance to deliver cargo and personnel Kuznetsovsk within the SPZ there are two roads in the west. evacuation stations, at least, for 6 km in a However, since the distance between them does not exceed 200- southeasterly direction (in Polytsi village) is 250 m the possibility of construction of the third road in northern required. direction with the departure of the road New Rafalivka - Old Rafalivka total length of 3.5 km is considered. 19.3 To ensure fast and safe evacuation in the This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and will be passed to the local event of an accident at the Rivne NPP, the authority within the “Questions-Answers Book”. Currently, 1% of the construction of a new bridge over the river cost of electricity generated by this NPPs goes for the purpose of Styr at cost of “Energoatom” is required. socio-economic compensation foreseen by the legislation for the risk of population [6] and the development of social infrastructure in the 30-kilometer zone around each nuclear power plant. These funds are distributed among administrative units of the zone in the manner prescribed by legislation. List of social infrastructure objects in need of investment, is determined by local communities through local governments that are part of the managers of these funds.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 19.4 Is it required to raise the diesel generators No. In the safety analysis report (SAR) of Zaporizhzhya NPP the and DSNFS of Zaporizhia nuclear power results of analysis of the consequences of sequential destruction of plant at a higher mark considering possible dams located upstream from the Kakhovsky reservoir (without level of flooding? ruining Kakhovska dam) in terms of possible flooding of the ZNPP site are given. The analysis confirmed that the security systems and systems important for safety, including backup diesel generators, and other key infrastructure of ZNPP would not suffer from increasing water level of Kakhovsky reservoir. 19.5 It is recommended to increase control over All operating nuclear power plants are equipped with general plant the backup power supply systems of and block diesel generator stations that are designed and operated nuclear units’ protection. as the interim security systems with the principles of reservation and distribution in space, with appropriate systems of control and management. 19.6 What defensive countermeasures are According to the conclusions of safety analysis reports and EIA for foreseen by the emergency plans for power units of operating nuclear power plants, the possible population of settlements in the monitoring consequences of accidents are limited by sanitary protection zones zones of NPPs case of nuclear power of nuclear power plants, implemention of countermeasures accident? Who is responsible for public concerning the population is not required (see i.i.2.3.2, 3.3.2, 4.3.2, awareness and implementation of 5.3.2 of the EA Report). The foreseen by emergency plans types of countermeasures? possible direct protective countermeasures concerning the population in case of severe accident at nuclear power plants with significant radiological consequences are regulated by NRBU-97 [12]. These countermeasures are divided to the urgent, immediate and long term. In particular, the urgent and immediate radiation protection measures of the acute phase of the accident include: shelter population, limiting the mode of behavior (limit time spent outdoors), evacuation; pharmacological prevention of exposure of thyroid radioactive isotopes of iodine with stable iodine (iodine prophylaxis); temporary ban on the use of some local food production and water use from local sources [12]. Responsibility for informing the public and for introduction of countermeasures relies on the MOE of Ukraine and local authorities and local governments. 19.7 Are the local authorities and local self- Yes. Along with emergency exercise carried out at nuclear power government of the territorial administrative plants the command post exercise involving local unit of MOE of units within the monitoring zone of nuclear Ukraine and local authorities and local government of the regional power plant involved in emergency training level within their responsibility are periodically scheduled. at NPP? Involvement of regional authorities and city/village authorities is done depending on the training scenario of the accident. 19.8 What measures of security and stability of Available at each operating NPP in Ukraine, emergency plans the nuclear power plant are foreseen foresee the measures to respond both to internal and external against natural disasters or industrial relation to NPP events (natural disasters, technological accidents). accidents in the region of NPP location? Depending on the level of external events on nuclear power plant, respond measures have got the wide range from deepening radiation monitoring at the site or within the monitoring zone and/or strengthening the regime of nuclear power units to a complete stop and/or evacuation of personnel not involved in emergency reaction. 19.9 What time is the reserve electricity supply Period of not serviced diesel generators and block of backup diesel on NPP in case of main channel power loss power stations (BDPW) work on operating nuclear power plants is foreseen for? 250 hours. BDPW is designed and operated as the interim security with the principles of reservation and distribution in space. 19.10 Shelf life of iodine protection means that This issue goes beyond the responsibility of “Energoatom” and will residents of Nikopol are distributed had be passed to local executive bodies of Volyn Zaporizhzhya, expired. Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Rivne and Khmelnitsky regions within the “Questions-Answers Book”. 19.11 Sandor which is dividing the cooling pond of Lack of electric drive on sandor bears no fundamental threat to the ZNPP from the Kakhovka reservoir can not case of an accident by a substantial time margin since the beginning be automatically closed in case of accident of the accident to the moment till the need for its closure. However, due to the lack of its electric drive. sandor equipment with electric drive is planned for the next 2012.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 19.12 To ensure fast and safe evacuation in the According to u.5.30 of DBN V.1.2-4-2006 “Engineering civil defense event of an accident at Zaporizhzhya NPP measures (civil defense)” [58] in the zone of possible hazardous the construction of the third field road from contamination of NPP project should be at least two of the roads the city of Energodar is required. paved. Currently there are two ways of Energodar: towards village Dniprovka and towards the village Ivanovka. 20 General issues on environmental impact assessment 20.1 Not far from Zaporizhzhya NPP is TPP. Is The aggregate environmental impact of man-made objects in ZNPP the cumulative effect on the environment Monitoring Zone including ZTPP is not subject to SUP EA. In order from ZNPP and ZTPP included in EA? to ensure compliance with environmental norms in the whole region, the legislation foresees the quotas for harmful discharges, emissions and other negative impacts of each potentially dangerous object, located in the region. In particular, such quotas are established for ZNPP and ZTPP. The subject of SUP EA is adherence to these quotas by only nuclear power plants, including ZNPP. 20.2 Were the accidents caused by a sudden Yes. In the EA to assess the limitation of radiation impact on the blackout on NPP considered within the EA? environment as over designed accident on power unit VVER-1000 an accident caused by a blackout due to design earthquake with a subsequent refusal of emergency power sources, leading to 10% melting of the active zone (the probability of such accidents estimated at 10-5 year-1) is considered. 20.3 Does the EA include the analysis of the Yes. According to the conclusions of the EA, the actual levels of actual levels of radiation, thermal and radiation, thermal and chemical effects of nuclear power plants on chemical effects of nuclear power plants on the environment during the implementation of measures and as a the environment during the implementation result of SUP will be neglected. However, due to additional of SUP measures and as a result of of installation and commissioning, additional radiation doses for the SUP? involved personnel are foreseen, which shall not exceed the permissible level. 20.4 We demand assess the environmental This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and limits of liability of impacts of joint activities of all enterprises of “Energoatom” and will be passed to local executive bodies of Volyn, Zaporizhzhya energy complex located in Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Rivne and Khmelnitsky the coastal zone of Kakhovsky reservoir. regions within the “Questions-Asnwers Book”. It should be noted that the analysis of cumulative environmental impact of man-made objects located within a region, is not required while the construction or operation of any object. Instead of this, to ensure compliance with environmental norms in the whole region, the legislation foresees the quotas for harmful discharges, emissions and other negative impacts of each potentially dangerous object, located in the region. The subject of SUP EA is adherence to these quotas by only nuclear power plants. 20.5 It is required to draft and publish a joint The specified requirement is not foreseen by legislation. statement of intent on environmental Requirements to form and content of “Statement of Intent” are set by grounds for all ongoing and planned DBN A.2.2-1-2003 [16] and do not foresee the common applications activities for Zaporizhzhya NPP and TPP. for different objects and do not apply to existing facilities. Thus, to ensure compliance with environmental norms in the whole region, the legislation provides the quotas for harmful discharges, emissions and other negative impacts of each potentially dangerous object, located in the region. The subject to SUP EA is adherence to these quotas by only nuclear power plants.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 20.6 We demand assess the environmental This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and limits of liability of impacts of joint activities of all enterprises of “Energoatom” and will be passed to local executive bodies of Volyn, Zaporizhzhya energy complex located in Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Rivne and Khmelnitsky the coastal zone of Kakhovsky reservoir. regions within the “Questions-Asnwers Book”. It should be noted that the analysis of cumulative environmental impact of man-made objects located within a region, is not required while the construction or operation of any object. Instead of this, to ensure compliance with environmental norms in the whole region, the legislation foresees the quotas for harmful discharges, emissions and other negative impacts of each potentially dangerous object, located in the region. The subject of SUP EA is adherence to these quotas by only nuclear power plants. 20.7 What are the results of environmental Current results of environmental monitoring in Monitoring Zone of monitoring in the areas of monitoring (MZ) NPP are regularly published on the websites of nuclear power of the NPP and how are the influences of plants, and periodic reports are summarized in the form of NPP and other man-made objects taken into “Energoatom” reports. As part of the EA Report the results for each account? nuclear power plant are examined in sections 2-5, aggregate information – in section 11. To identify the impact of NPP on the background of other sources, the subject of control are not only the characteristics of the components of the environment (air, water, soil) but also directly discharges and emissions of NPPs. The general conclusion is the lack of negative impacts from operating nuclear power plants that would exceed the permissible limits. 21 Geological conditions and seismic impacts 21.1 By the results of the analysis of accidents at The question is taken into account. Appropriate explanations are nuclear power plant "Fukusima" what risks included into the i.1.10.2 of EA report. A key output of an external for the Ukrainian NPPs require event of the accident at NPP “Fukusima” was tsunami of the beyond reassessment? What is their reflection in design-basis amplitudes caused by the earthquake which is SUP? impossible under conditions of NPPs in Ukraine. However, intermediate events, such as loss of energy in general causes, refusal of access control systems, inadequate emergency plans, the impact of human factors and others require detailed analysis of conditions for all nuclear power plants in the world, particularly for NPPs of Ukraine. Possible external output event of severe accident at NPPs in Ukraine is the earthquake that is included in the safety analysis reports. Technical solutions to improve the security which will be implemented within SUP, in particular, are associated with the revision of seismic risks. It should be noted that SUP as any long- acting program, is the subject to periodic review and amendments and, if necessary, revision on the basis of detailed analysis of accidents at nuclear power plant “Fukusima” by international and national experts and additional testing of existing nuclear power plants ongoing. 21.2 Does SUP cover measures concerning the Yes. Possible external output event of severe accident at NPPs in seismicity increase of power unis of Ukraine is the earthquake that is included in the safety analysis operating NPPs of Ukraine? reports. The list of technical solutions to improve the security which will be implemented within SUP, in particular, are associated with the revision of seismic risks and seismicity increase. SUP measures No18101, 28101, 38101 foresee the creation of seismic monitoring systems at each NPP. 22 Assessment of impacts on social environment
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 22.1 What is the impact on the human body Effect of low radiation doses on the human body to this day remains caused by the small radiation doses? Is the subject of scientific debate. Most experts in radiation medicine in such impact investigated on the population the world tend to impact threshold model, whereby small doses does in the areas of monitoring zones of nuclear not cause harm to human body. In any case, natural radioactivity power plants? nowadays determines a major contributor to the dose of territories of MZ of operating NPPs of Ukraine; the impact of NPP is by orders of magnitude smaller and therefore is neglected on the background of natural origin radionuclides radiation. Therefore, research on the impact of small doses on the population has the same weight both within and outside the MZ of NPPs and is done in terms of national programs for radiation medicine. 22.2 Are the data concerning cancer and other Monitoring of the residents health in the MZ is undertaken by diseases in MZ of operating NPPs relevant departments of the Ministry of Health Protection of Ukraine, collected? Do these data show the negative Departments for public health of oblast state departments. impact of nuclear power plants on public “Energoatom” receives the data at the request in the Ministry of health? Health Protection of Ukraine and analyzes them to assess the impacts on social environment in the regions of nuclear power plants location. The general conclusion during all the years of operation of existing nuclear power plants is the absence of their negative impact on public health. The most revealing is the statistics for the Rivne and Khmelnitsky nuclear power plants located in areas with poorly developed industrial infrastructure. In particular, the frequency of cancer incidence in Kuznetsovsk (satellite city of the Rivne NPP) and Dubno (in distance from the Rivne NPP) is respectively 148 and 349 cases per 100 000 people, the one in Netishyn (satellite city of Khmelnitsky NPP) and the city of New Ushytsya (at a distance from the KhNPP) - respectively 252 and 458 cases per 100 000 people. 23 Assessment of impacts on atmospheric environment 23.1 Are the emissions from pollutants caused In EA harmful substances caused by motor transport, which belongs by vehicle transpor considered within the to each plant are considered (i.i.2.2.2, 2.5.11, 3.2.2, 3.5.11, 4.2.2, framework of EA? 4.5.11, 5.2.2, 5.5. 11). Total emissions of harmful substances into the atmosphere from any nuclear power plant, including its vehicles do not exceed acceptable levels. The aggregate environmental impact of emissions of all vehicles in Monitoring Zone of NPPs is not subject to SUP EA. In order to ensure compliance with environmental norms in the whole region, the legislation foresees the quotas for harmful discharges, emissions and other negative impacts of each potentially dangerous object, located in the region. The subject of SUP EA is adherence to these quotas by only nuclear power plants. 23.2 One of the consequences of the thermal Evaporation from the surface of the cooling pond (CP) of NPP and impact of NPPs on the environment is high drop output from cooling towers really cause the changes in local humidity and fog. Are these factors and microclimate. Zone of the impact of CP or a cooling tower (up to 1 their impact on public health controlled? kilometer from the boundaries of objects). Metereologic observations are made at each nuclear power plant, as well as on independent metereologic stations. Negative impact on the climate of the region and as a result of long-term health surveillance is not found. 24 Assessment of impacts on aquatic environment
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 24.1 Dynamics of tritium discharges by each operating nuclear power What are the discharges of tritium to water plant to open water reservoirs during the last 5 years is given in bodies under normal plant operation? i.11.3.2 of the EA Report. In general, any nuclear power plant discharges do not exceed acceptable norms. 24.2 Are the harmful discharges to the open Yes. Information for each nuclear power plant is shown in the water reservoirs during periodic purging of relevant sections of the EA Report (i.i.2.2.4, 2.5.11, 4.2.4, 4.5.11, NPP cooling pond considered within the 5.2.4, 5.5.11, 11.3.2, 11.3.3). EA? 24.3 NPP cooling ponds are located quite close Negative impacts on the open waters from cooling ponds of the NPP to open water reservoirs and adversely (heat, chemical and radiation) are occurring exclusively during their affect them. Why can’t the cooling ponds be periodic purging, usually during the spring floods. Increase of the located further from the river? distance between the cooling pond and open water, to which discharges occur, will not affect the volume of discharges of harmful substances, and practically do not change the level of heat exposure, taking into account the nature of volley purging. Increasing this distance would result only in additional costs for the construction and operation of underwater drainage channels and greater length and appropriate equipment. 24.4 At a temperature of minus 15 degrees r.Styr Discharges to the river Styr from the Rivne NPP are determined does not freeze, which means that thermal mainly by rainwater. These discharges at average are 10 °C warmer and chemical pollution exists. It is required than water in the river that leads to the average temperature rise of to provide access for the deputy water in the river for 2 °C. This value is considerably less than the commission for pollution control. maximum allowable increase of 8 °C, defined for the Rivne NPP. The issue of support of the parliamentary commission is beyond the SUP EA and will be forwarded to local governments as part of “Questions-Answers Book”. 24.5 Was the water quality in Monitoring Zone of Thus, the dynamics of changes of radiation levels and chemical NPP conducted in the framework of EA? Is contamination of groundwater and open water in the Monitoring the long-term break in the control of Zone of NPP was one of the analyzed aspects of the environment. drinking water quality permissible? The information is provided in i.i.2.2.4, 3.2.4, 4.2.4, 5.2.4 of EA Report. According to legislation, control of drinking water quality should be continuous, but the issue of its organization goes beyond SUP EA. 24.6 Direct water usage for nuclear power plants The project of the Zaporizhzhya NPP has got the cooling pond (CP), is prohibited by law. Why today on ZNPP isolated from Kakhovsky reservoir and thus implements the reverse energy complex the change to reverse water usage system. The purge of CP to Kakhovsky reservoir is water system didn’t happen? provided through underwater and outlet channels. 24.7 Does ZNPP monitor water quality in Water quality in Kakhovsky reservoir is controlled by laboratory of Kakhovsky reservoir, in particular, ZNPP above and downstream from the inlet of the cooling pond. monitoring for compliance to the Samples are taken regularly twice a month. There are both radiation requirements concerning the sources of (tritium content, product activation and division) and chemical (26 drinking water? biochemical parameters) monitoring performed. Some results of this monitoring are presented in i.i.11.3.2, 11.3.3 of the EA Report. The results of this monitoring confirmed no negative influence from ZNPP that would exceed the permissible level. At the same time, conclusions concerning the compliance of Kakhovsky water reservoir to the requirements for drinking water supply sources are beyond the competence of “Energoatom”, so the question will be passed to local executive bodies of Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions within the “Questions-Answers Book”. 24.8 Are the open water reservoirs that Yes. Generally accepted international practice is the double use of simultaneously serve as a source of water of open reservoirs - for industrial purposes, such as for nuclear drinking water used for the needs of nuclear power plants and residential areas. This prerequisite is compliance power plants in other countries? to the quality of waste water, if such discharges are foreseen by industrial facility. The same approach is implemented on operating nuclear power plants in Ukraine. 24.9 Is the reversible water use the necessary No. In many countries the issue is solved in different ways. In condition for thermal and nuclear power Ukraine the reverse water use (from purging of cooling ponds) is plants in other countries? necessarily a requirement for nuclear power plants.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 24.10 Is the refusal to undertake the purging No, it isn’t. The obligatory requirement in Ukraine is the reverse regime for cooling ponds into the open water treatment which suggests the purging of the cooling pond. water reservoirs foreseen for the operating Dynamics of changes of radiation and chemical pollution of waters of NPPs of Ukraine? open water reservoirs of MZ of NPPs was one of the analyzed aspects of environment. The relevant information which is provided in the i.i.2.2.4, 3.2.4, 4.2.4 and 5.2.4 of the EA report confirms the admissibility of such a decision. 24.11 Won’t the purges of the cooling pond of No, it won’t. As it is stated in i.4.5.11 of EA report the water KhNPP cause the over normative temperature of cooling pond is exceeding the natural temperature of temperature increase in Horyn river? Horyn river only per 3-3,5°C and 8–12°C accordingly while the operation of 1st and 2nd power units of KhNPP. Moreover, the controlled discharges of waters from the cooling pond (purging) are allowed only in the periods without flora (1st October – 1st May). 25 Assessment of impacts on flora and fauna 25.1 It was reported that in order to improve the The main objective of this activity is fishering of CP of Zaporizhzhya quality of water for technological needs of NPP with herbivorous fish species which is based on technological Zaporizhzhya NPP the fishering of feasibility, the rules of operation of the cooling rate and of fishering. Kakhovka reservoir was undertaken. Who Fishering of the cooling pond over settlement rules are not desirable and on what grounds does these considered a natural forage base rate. After fishering of the cooling exercises? What state agency provides pond the fish adding materials remain. According to the control over this activity? management of ZNPP this surplus is used to provide voluntary assistance to fishering in the Kakhovka reservoir. The implementation of this decision is entrusted to staff of the hydraulic department of “Zaporizhzhya NPP”. Process of fishering of Kakhovka reservoir includes cultivation of the individual weight of at least 150-160 grams with a veterinary permit (the document) in the state of veterinary medicine; fishering permit in public fisheries surveillance (including the drafting order on fishering, establishment of fishering, destination charge, etc..) fishering of Kakhovka reservoir to the formulation act of fishering (fishering location, number, species, date and time). The Commission according to the order of fishery management supervision verifies the necessary documents, random checks hanging individuals. Fishering reservoir with individuals weighing less than 150 grams is prohibited. 26 Assessment of mutual impacts of power units and technogenic environment 26.1 Were the threats for Zaporizhzhya NPP Yes, the threats associated with breakthrough of dams on the caused by destruction by dams breaking on Dnieper cascade were considered in “Waterworks Accidents” i.2.4.4 the Dnieper cascade considered within the of EA Report based on estimations made in the the safety analysis EA? report. The general conclusion is that the key infrastructures of ZNPP will not suffer from the increase of water level in Kakhovske water reservoir. 26.2 Within sanitary-protection zone (SPZ) of the SPZ of ZNPP and SPZ of ZTPP are partially overlapped which is not Zaporizhzhya NPP the TPP is situated. restricted by the legislation as long as the level of mutual negative How then the SPZ of Zaporizhia thermal impacts of these technogenic objects is acceptable. With that, the power plant is defined? issue of setting the SPZ of ZTPP goes beyond the SUP EA. 27 Issues of NPPs impacts in transboundary context No requests
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 28 Human resources coverage 28.1 The support from “Energoatom” of the youth This approach is fully consistent with policy of “Energoatom”, enrolled in secondary and secondary however, the issue goes beyond the SUP EA. special education in settlements within 30 km zones around nuclear power plants who are the future workforce of NPPs is required. 28.2 Is it the cause of frequent personnel No, quality assurance system of “Energoatom” provides continuous changes in the management of professional development for key personnel of the company and its Zaporizhzhya NPP the low qualification or reserve. The level of skills of managers at all levels is periodically non compliance with the industrial policy? checked under the control of the administration and regulation of safety in accordance with the legislation concerning licensing of personnel. The division of responsibilities and internal control system prevents enforcement of a failure of overall policy and corporate policy of “Energoatom”. Employees’ turnover, in particular, and management employees in “Energoatom” and its subdivisions shall not exceed the national average rates for industrial companies. 29 Work with public, informing the population 29.1 We all know that nuclear power plants are The claim is unfounded and untrue. In particular, the website of really dangerous and we all have to "Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant" (http://www.npp.zp.ua) in on-line understand the danger. Management of manner the results of radiation monitoring of the environment in the NPP (ZNPP) is not paying any attention to MZ of ZNPP, current performance of ZNPP and other information is the population. It’s unable to communicate displayed. The same site has got the contact information: with someone on the phone to get any “Information Center. “Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant”, important information, though we live in a 38aKurchatova st., city of Energodar, Zaporizhzhya region, Ukraine, risk zone. 71504. Mailing address: Information Center, “Zaporizhia nuclear power plant”, postal box 526, Post office of Energodar, Zaporizhzhya region, Ukraine, 71504. tel. +38 (06139) 6-21-81, fax: +38 (06139) 6- 21-27, answering machine +38 (06 139 ) 5-68-02, e-mail: [email protected], www.npp.zp.ua, Head of the information center - Merkulova Larisa Ivanovna”. However, in order to further improve the work with the public the recommendations developed during the EA are given in i.8.1.2 of the EA Report. 29.2 It is proposed to create a possibility of free Contact details and other information is posted on the website of records of citizens’ and local media appeals “Energoatom” (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) and NPP sites. The to telephone answering machines of NPP order of requests, proposals, complaints and claims is set by from any telephone network, and make the legislation. Offered free public telephone services paid by NPP, are appropriate telephone numbers public. not included into the expenses covered by the tariff of “Energoatom”, are not required by legislation and are not felt as appropriate. 29.3 Do you plan to improve public awareness of The question is taken into account. It should be noted that the satellite cities and MZ of NPP about the website of “Energoatom” (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) and NPP radiation status of the environment? sites have the results of radiation monitoring of the environment in the MZ of NPPs and other information shown. To further improve public awareness, the EA had developed recommendations, presented in i.8.1.2 of the EA Report. In particular, these recommendations focus on harmonization of information available on the NPP sites, location of chart maps with monitoring points within the MZ, placing the results of radiation monitoring (average and current levels), using standard units at all nuclear power plants and other sites.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 29.4 It is proposed to permanently broadcast This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and is diverted to local images from cameras installed at nuclear governments as part of “Questions-Answers Book”. It should be power plants, on screens, placed in villages noted that this requirement is not provided by the legislation, has no of MZ of NPPs. world analogues and is not seen as appropriate. Instead, the website of “Energoatom” (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) and NPP sites show the results of radiation monitoring of the environment in the MZ of NPPs and other information. 29.5 It is proposed to establish electronic This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and is diverted to local screens with information about the radiation governments as part of “Questions-Answers Book”. Currently, situation in the center of each village in MZ. aiming at the foreseen by the legislation socio-economic compensation for the risk population [6], the development of social infrastructure in the 30-kilometer zone around each nuclear power plant takes 1% of the cost of electricity generated by this NPP. These funds are distributed among administrative units of the zone in the manner prescribed by legislation. List of social infrastructure which is in need of investment, is determined by local communities through local governments that are part of the managers of these funds. It should be noted that the website of “Energoatom” (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) and NPP sites show the results of radiation monitoring of the environment in the MZ of NPPs and other information. 29.6 Is it planned to hold regular public meetings The comment is taken into account. There are recommendations during the SUP implementation? concerning improvement of public information through annual meetings with people to answer questions and collect comments of citizens established during the EA. These recommendations are detailed in the EA Report i.8.1.2. 29.7 It is required to create a website of South- The comment is taken into account. There are recommendations Ukrainian nuclear power plant, which would concerning improvement of public information through the creation of contain the online information about the separate website of South-Ukrainian NPP, similar to sites to the radiation situation at the NPP and MZ of other plants established during the EA. These recommendations are NPP. detailed in the EA Report i.8.1.2. 29.8 Information on websites is not official in Information on websites of “Energoatom” and nuclear power plans nature. It is required to provide information sites has the official character. Those documents which must be on paper with official signatures. signed by authorized officials are placed on these sites as scanned copies with the signatures and seals. Provision of public organizations or individuals with any other information in printed and authorized form, except for information that is available on request from them to the extent and manner prescribed by legislation, is not mandatory. 29.9 Rural population (especially older people) The website of “Energoatom” (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) and has limited access to the Internet for a NPP sites show the results of radiation monitoring of the number of reasons. It is required to create a environment in the MZ of NPPs and other information consistent with simple and affordable public awareness best international practice. Question of other information channels system about the radiation situation in the deployment for the population is beyond SUP and SUP EA and will settlements and the MZ of NPP. be routed to local governments as part of “Questions-Answers Book”. Currently, aiming at the foreseen by the legislation socio- economic compensation for the risk population [6], the development of social infrastructure in the 30-kilometer zone around each nuclear power plant takes 1% of the cost of electricity generated by this NPP. These funds are distributed among administrative units of the zone in the manner prescribed by legislation. List of social infrastructure which is in need of investment, is determined by local communities through local governments that are part of the managers of these funds. 29.10 Why informative messages about work of The mentioned information is published in separate reports of the NPPs of Ukraine contain information on the relevant (environmental) orientation. However, in order to further amount of electricity, but do not include improve the work with the public there are recommendations data on the volume of radioactive wastes, developed during the EA given in i.8.1.2 of the EA Report. emissions and discharges?
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 29.11 The copy of aswer of ZNPP information Analysis of publications in the media and communication with the center dated 17 January 2010 to the administration of ZNPP on matters not related to SUP and prior to publication in the newspaper "Origin the start of PC on SUP and SUP EA are beyond the SUP EA. Thus, Nikopol" dated 17 December 2009. one of the recommendations of the EA report is to improve public awareness (see i.8.1.2 of the EA Report). 29.12 It is suggested to spread the information There were recommendations developed during the EA to improve concerning SUP by the social public awareness on SUP implementation by expanding the use of advertisement channels (advertising videos media, annual meetings with the population to answer questions and on TVs, boards, transport advertisements, collect comments from citizens, and so on. These recommendations etc.) are detailed in i.8.1.2 of the EA Report. It should be noted that unlike the requirements for public information, the use of advertising media by the operating organization is not required by legislation, and the composition of promotional products is not regulated. 29.13 It is proposed to locate the electronic The proposal is taken into account. This proposal is included in the information screens showing the radiation recommendations of the final version of the EA Report. However, it level on NPPs in the center of each locality goes beyond the SUP and will be forwarded to local governments as within the MZ of NPP. a part of “Questions-Answers Book”. Currently, aiming at foreseen by the legislation socio-economic compensation for the population risk [6], 1% of electricity generated by the NPP costs is spent on the development of social infrastructure in the 30-kilometer zone around each nuclear power plant. These funds are distributed among administrative units of the zone in the manner prescribed by legislation. List of social infrastructure objects in need of investment is determined by local communities through local governments that are part of the managers of these funds. It should be noted that the web-site of “Energoatom” (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) and NPP sites show the results of radiation environment monitoring in the MZ of NPPs and other information. 30 Social-economical risk compensation 30.1 It is proposed to build a road through the This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and will be diverted to the local village of Great Vedmezhka, Small authority within the “Questions-Answers Book”. Currently, aiming at Vedmezhka to the village of Kamenka on the foreseen by the legislation socio-economic compensation for the the Warsaw route. In this case the railway risk population [6], the development of social infrastructure in the 30- station Chartoryysk will become 4 km closer kilometer zone around each nuclear power plant takes 1% of the to Kuznetsovsk than a railway station in cost of electricity generated by this NPP. These funds are distributed Rafalivtsi, and in this case the way to among administrative units of the zone in the manner prescribed by Warsaw route in the southwestern direction legislation. List of social infrastructure which is in need of will reduce for 33 km. investment, is determined by local communities through local governments that are part of the managers of these funds. 30.2 At one time there were programs for This issue goes beyond the SUP EA. These programs were formerly infrastructure development of settlements funded by “Energoatom” within its financial capacity including within 30 km zones around nuclear power regulated tariffs for nuclear generation with a clear definition and plants, which largely were not met. What is assignment of costs. Currently, aiming at the foreseen by the the present-day status of these programs legislation socio-economic compensation for the risk population [6], and whether they are implemented in the the development of social infrastructure in the 30-kilometer zone future? around each nuclear power plant takes 1% of the cost of electricity generated by this NPP. These funds are distributed among administrative units of the zone in the manner prescribed by legislation. List of social infrastructure which is in need of investment, is determined by local communities through local governments that are part of the managers of these funds. 30.3 Within the constant increase of electricity This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and will be diverted to the local tariff for households, it is proposed to authority within the “Questions-Answers Book”. increase its promotional discounts for people in the 30-kilometer zone around nuclear power plants with today's 30% to 50%.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 30.4 What does the term “social infrastructure” According to the definition [6]: “special social infrastructure is the mean? facilities designed for the life of the population living in the MZ, including education, health care, culture, physical culture and sports, communication facilities, housing utilities, networks of electricity supply, gas, heat, water and sanitation, buildings and facilities intended for their care, roads, communication systems, etc. used in the accident at the uranium sites, nuclear installations, facilities, designated for radioactive wastes to ensure the safety of the public and personnel involved in its liquidation. " 30.5 It is proposed to construct the bridge to the This issue goes beyond the SUP and SUP EA and will be routed to city of Nikopol and to provide the city with local governments as part of “Questions-Answers Book”. Currently, the cheap heating energy from NPP. aiming at the foreseen by the legislation socio-economic compensation for the risk population [6], the development of social infrastructure in the 30-kilometer zone around each nuclear power plant takes 1% of the cost of electricity generated by this NPP. These funds are distributed among administrative units of the zone in the manner prescribed by legislation. List of social infrastructure which is in need of investment, is determined by local communities through local governments that are part of the managers of these funds. It should be noted that the maximum cost-effective distance of heat transportation from nuclear power plants is up to 10 km. 30.6 Cheap electricity of nuclear generation is The only source of expenditures in the electricity sector is the consumed mainly by the industrial objects. payment for consumed electricity. Population of 30-km zones around What is the benefit of people living near operating nuclear power plants are using cheap electricity rate (70% nuclear power plants from their availability of the cost compared to the rate for another population of Ukraine). and exploitation? In addition, the development of social infrastructure in the 30- kilometer zone around each nuclear power plant takes 1% of the cost of electricity generated by this NPP. These benefits in the established by NCRE of Ukraine order are covered by all electricity consumers (industrial consumers and the entire population of Ukraine). The total population of the MZ of all operating nuclear power plants of Ukraine is about 850 thousand people, representing approximately 1.85% of the population of Ukraine. In general, Ukraine's population consumes about 27% electricity by the tariff which is 3.8 times lower compared to industrial consumers. Therefore, indirectly, about 8.7% and 91.1% indicated benefits for the population of 30-km zones around nuclear power plants are covered by other public and industrial consumers in Ukraine, respectively. 30.7 It is proposed to organize the wide The suggestion is totally right and will be referred to the authorities negotiation with the territory communities within the “Questions-Answers Book”. “Energoatom” had supported over the tasks in terms of cost usage for the and will further support this initiative. socio-economic compensations of risks till the elaboration of the final list of objects and tasks for which these costs will be used. 31 Financial-economical aspects of SUP implementation 31.1 What is the cost of SUP implementation? The full cost of SUP is estimated at 12 billion EUR. About 30% of What part of the costs will be covered by these costs will be covered by “Energoatom” at the expense of the loan? current earnings for sold electricity, 70% need credit. The full financing at the costs of only the the real income would need the substantial increase of the tariff for customers which is unacceptable. Loans will be received from two sources - the EBRD and Euratom loans. The volumes of loans that are considered by the EBRD and Euroatom and are subject to clarification are about 300 miliion and 500 million euros.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 31.2 How SUP implementation in general and in The full cost of SUP is estimated at 12 billion EUR. About 30% of particular the service and repayment of these costs will be covered by “Energoatom” at the expense of credits will affect electricity rates for current earnings for sold electricity, 70% (about 8.4 billion UAH) - consumers? requires credit for 7 years. Loans will be from two sources - loans the EBRD and Euratom, loan terms are not defined yet. Conventionally, one can accept that the period of repayment of credit is twice as the crediting period which means 14 years, and service credit will cost 5% (per annum) of its value. Accordingly, the period of credit funds rate for “Energoatom” will require an increase of about 0.74 kop/kW*h. Nuclear power plants produce about 47% of electricity consumed in Ukraine. Ukraine's population consumes the 27% of electricity by the tariff 3.8 times lower in comparison to industrial consumers. Therefore, the appropriate tariff increase for the population will be about 0.031 kop/kW*h, for industrial customers - about 0.317 kop/kW*h. 31.3 What happens if the costs of servicing and In the present day mechanism for setting tariffs by the National repayment of loans for SUP will not be Committee for Energy Regulating for “Energoatom”, presence of the included in the tariff of “Energoatom”? Does programs approved in the prescribed manner aiming at improvement not this lead to its bankruptcy? of security is the basis for mandatory consideration of relevant costs in this tariff. In addition, loans of SUP were planned under the state guarantee. In the situation when the loan return is impossible to be undertaken by the receiver of the loan (“Energoatom”), the corresponding payments shall be made at the expense of budget funds. Therefore, the reasons to start the bankruptcy process of the loan receiver by the loan agency (EBRD and Euratom) will not occur. 31.4 What is the economical effect of the SUP The direct economical effect of the SUP implementation is not implementation? foreseen. In analogue to other safety upgrade programs concerning the potentially dangerous objects this program is aiming at the safety provision to the natural environment and the population and, as such, has the ecological nature and is irreversible by the forecasted fact expenditures. At the same time, the SUP implementation will provide the significant reduce of accidental risks on NPPs and, thus, amounts of potential spending on its concequences liquidation. In the absence of both in Ukraine and worldwide methodology for calculating this potential economic impact, its quantitative analysis in the framework of EA is impossible. 31.5 How EBRD is estimatin the economic effect (Answer of EBRD representative) EBRD will undertake the of SUP implementation? economical analysis and the assessment of the credit obtainer. Any project planned for the financing is the subject to the analysis according to the financial-economic criteria. 31.6 In what way the planned spending on the The full cost of SUP implementation is estimated at the level of 12 SUP implementation are divided between billion UAH. In terms of these spending the ZNPP, RNPP, KhNPP the operating NPPs of Ukraine? and SUNPP will cover 49,8%, 15,5%, 11,5%, and 23,2% respectively. 31.7 What are the conditions of credit Up to the present moment the conditions of credit obtainment are the obtainment – the percentage for credit and subject to the negotiations with the potential lenders – EBRD and its terms? “Euratom”. The foreseen percents for the credit usage are 3-5%, the terms of credit return is 14 years. The amounts of credit which are previously considered by EBRD and “Euratom” and are the subject to clarification are respectively 300 and 500 million EUR.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 31.8 How is the targeted use of funds allocated Financial control of the target “Energoatom”’s use of the funds from for SUP implementation as also the current current revenue for sold power is the exercise for NCRE of Ukraine, funds of “Energoatom” and credit Audit and Finance departments of Ministry of Energy and Coal controlled? Industry and state tax authorities within their powers. Control over the proper use of credit, at first will be carried out by the lenders themselves, including the EBRD, which usually involves an independent consultant company. Secondly, this control will be provided by the specified control and audit departments and other regulatory state agencies as soon as the credits are provided under governmental guarantees. Control over the timely implementation of safety upgrade measures will be undertaken by the authority of state regulation of nuclear safety and radiation safety – SINRSU and authority of the government - Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry. 31.9 What will be the principles of definitions of Part of measures will be implemented by own powers of suppliers and work contractors while the “Energoatom”. External suppliers of goods and services will be SUP implementation? defined in accordance with the legislation, mainly by the open tenders. 31.10 Is there a guarantee that there won’t arise No, there is no such guarantee. SUP is the subject to the periodic any need in the additional safety upgrade review. As the practice shows it leads to the changes in the scope of measures and the values of SUP will be measures or in their priority, the same it leads to the changes in the exceeded? general value of the program. The significant part of the external supplies in general part causes the additional uncertainties. In addition, SUP is the long-term program (till 2017) and its value is assessed in prices of 2011. 31.11 What will be the way of credit costs return? Credit repayment will be done in cash at the expense of the product Will it be the financial form, energy export or realized by “Energoatom”. other way? 32 Other social- economical issues 32.1 One demands to maximize business and This approach is fully consistent with the policy of “Energoatom” to residents of the MZ of NPPs and other the extent which is not contrary to legislation concerning the choice settlements to installation, commissioning of suppliers of goods and services. and other activities within SUP. 32.2 “Energoatom” and “Zaporizhzhya nuclear The claim is unfounded and untrue. The order of accumulation funds power plant” do not comly with the legal for future decommissioning and disposal of radioactive wastes is requirement for the establishment of defined by legislation [53.54], the appropriate deductions are made insurance funds. by “Energoatom”. Procedure for compensation of nuclear damage is determined by the Law of Ukraine “Concerning the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and its Financial Security'”[52]. This law regulates relations on civil liability for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident, and financial support of such liability, in particular, is determined by the operator responsible for causing death, injury, or property damage. In order to guarantee the financial security liability for nuclear damage between “Energoatom” and pool of financial institutions (so-called “nuclear pool”) the contract of insurance was signed. Thus, in addition to compulsory insurance of civil liability for nuclear damage (in the part not covered by other types of financial support) for the operator [52], the law provided the right to contract voluntary insurance person and property against the risk of radiation exposure for the citizens [9]. However, “Energoatom” is not a financial institution and has no relevance to the realization of this right. (This question goes beyond the SUP EA). 32.3 It is proposed while the open tenders for The suggestion is taken into account. This suggestion in the goods supply and works implementation to processed form is included into the recommendations of the final EA pay more attention to the issues of the report (i.8.1.1.). social security of contractors’ employees.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 33 Other nuclear energy issues 33.1 How is the problem of safety upgrade of the Obviously, the most attention in terms of increased security needs nuclear power plants solved in other have the oldest nuclear power plants. Implementing measures to countries? upgrade safety of each operating nuclear power plant worldwide happens from the very beginning of their operation. Such a process is defined as the accumulation of operational experience and gradual sharpening of safety requirements. In most countries with developed nuclear power, particularly in the EU and the U.S., the cost of safety upgrade is included in the cost of electricity produced at nuclear power plants. 33.2 Licenses of NPP should be considered and Procedure for negotiation and approval of permits and licenses of coordinated by local governments in the the operating organization (operator) is defined by the legislation region where they are located. [6.8]. Changes of this order require appropriate amendments to the legislation. This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and is diverted to local governments as part of “Questions-Answers Book”. 33.3 The German government recently decided This issue goes beyond the SUP and SUP EA. to decommision all nuclear power plants as soon as possible with the transition to alternative forms of electricity. The same plans are existing within the Japanese government. How consistent are the intentions of “Energoatom” for life extension of existing nuclear power plants with power integration aspirations of our country to the EU? 33.4 Life extension of existing nuclear power This issue goes beyond the SUP and SUP EA. The coefficient of reactors from an economic point of view is NPP VVER power unit usafe in principle can not be 100%, as soo as inappropriate as soon as existing nuclear the time is needed for fuel reloading and planning preventive and facilities in Ukraine are used only at 72%. capital repairs. When the project coefficient of operating NPPs of Ukraine is 80%, its actual value in the last 10 years was 74.7%, in the past 2010 - 73.6%. Such shortfalls at the level of 5-6% are not defined by lack of power demand but mainly by the limited bandwidth of networks. At this the final stop of at least one of the reactors VVER-1000 would result in the loss of 7.1% of nuclear generation, so it would have already has exceeded a specified notional reserve due to shortfalls. 33.5 How are the costs for the future Question on accumulation of funds for future decommissioning of decommissioning of operating NPPs of existing nuclear power plants is regulated by the Law of Ukraine Ukraine gathered and stored? “Concerning the regulation of issues related to nuclear safety ensuring” [35]. The procedure and amount of deductions are defined in [53]. Appropriate charges were made by “Energoatom” since 2005. Currently there is about 3% of the total amount required by the future decommissioning. Under the order, the funds were transferred to the special fund of State Budget of Ukraine and in recent years were directed by the state to the decommissioning of the Chernobyl NPP. In 2011 these deductions were suspended by adoption of the “Tax Code of “Ukraine", which does not foresee such a fee. 33.6 Does the small amount of accumulated No. Continued operation of power units on terms provided for initial funds for future decommissioning of existing projects is determined based on their reasonable safety and nuclear power plants of Ukraine and the feasibility of such a decision and is not associated with the Pause in 2011 in related deductions of accumulation of funds for the decommissioning. Thus, according to “Energoatom” mean no alternative to [53], the amount of deductions for future decommissioning is continuation of their operation? calculated based on the remaining period of operation for each unit as defined at the time point of deductions, that does not account for possible future decisions regarding life extension.
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 34 Other issues not connected to the SUP elaboration and implementation 34.1 Why is the use of electric (trolley, subway, This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and limits of liability of etc.) not expanding to reduce emissions by “Energoatom” and will be passed to local executive bodies of Volyn, vehicles on organic fuel? Zaporizhzhya, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Rivne and Khmelnitsky regions within the “Questions-Asnwers Book”. 34.2 Does “Energoatom” plan to allocate funds This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and will be passed to local to repair the water system of the city of executive bodies within the “Questions-Asnwers Book”. Currently, Energodar? aiming at the foreseen by the legislation socio-economic compensation for the risk population [6], the development of social infrastructure in the 30-kilometer zone around each nuclear power plant takes 1% of the cost of electricity generated by this NPP. These funds are distributed among administrative units of the zone in the manner prescribed by legislation. List of social infrastructure which is in need of investment, is determined by local communities through local governments that are part of the managers of these funds. 34.3 In the towns of Nikopol and Kamyanka (in This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and will be passed to local the 30 km zone) during few years we had executive bodies. an indicator of radioactive contamination in the city, which was installed in City Hall. Where are these devices now? 34.4 Why EA did not consider the provision of This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and will be passed to local dosimeters for the public? executive bodies within the “Questions-Asnwers Book”. It should be noted that this requirement is not provided by the legislation, has no world analogues and is not seen as appropriate. Instead, the website of “Energoatom” (http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/) and NPP sites show the results of radiation monitoring of the environment in the MZ of NPPs and other information. 34.5 How is the environment in Ukraine related Overview of the environment in general in Ukraine and its to other countries? Such information in the comparison with other countries is beyond the SUP EA. form of videos, printed materials and other Systematization and dissemination of such information is not part of sources is required to justify that SUP and the process tasks and PC on SUP and SUP EA. The above SUP EA aim at improving public safety and information is currently available through open sources (libraries, ensure environmental protection. internet, periodical scientific and popular publications, etc.). However, regardless to the results of the comparison of areas not associated with the exposure of nuclear power, it can not be regarded as a rationale for SUP implementing environmental and other aspects. 34.6 We [representatives of non-governmental This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and will be passed to local organizations] communicate directly with executive bodies within the “Questions-Asnwers Book”. In terms of the population of villages, and we would like the PC process concerning the SUP and SUP EA e-mail address of to get support from the government each applicant was listed within the addresses to which the agencies in organizing such meetings. information messages about the process were sent. 34.7 Are the platforms of the operating nuclear No. The draft document, containing inventory of sites for new power plants include to the inventory build nuclear power plants currently is under development. Venues of new nuclear power plant sites? operating nuclear power plants do not require inclusion in such inventory because they already have the constructed nuclear power plants. Thus, these sites really are considered in the “Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030” [21] as promising sites for placement of replacing and additional capacities. (This question goes beyond SUP EA). 34.8 The need for expansion of Zaporizhzhya The statement is untrue. Thus, sites of existing nuclear power plants NPP is claimed by “Energoatom” and are really considered the “Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030” [21] “Zaporizhzhya NPP” had started as promising sites for placement of replacing and additional preparatory works. capacities. (This question goes beyond SUP EA).
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Generalized Generalized questions, suggestions and Answers № comments 34.9 Currently life extension of power units of This issue goes beyond the SUP EA. SUP measures related to operating nuclear power plants of Ukraine is safety upgrade concern only existing nuclear power plants of planned on the terms provided for the Ukraine during the remainder of the defined today life cycle (the original project (30 years). What are the stages of operation and decommissioning). guarantees of their safe operation during the additional period? 34.10 … we once again reiterate the need for This issue goes beyond the SUP EA and will be diverted to local laying inter basin agreement between governments as part of “Questions-Answers Book”. regions of Zaporizhzhya energy complex location – catchment of Kakhovka reservoir. 34.11 By the end of SUP (2017) the This issue goes beyond SUP and SUP EA (see the response 5.1). It commissioning of power units number 3 on should be noted that EIA published today for construction of power Khmelnitsky NPP is planned. Won’t the units No 3 and 4 of KhNPP does not foresee the excess of heat purging of cooling pond of KhNPP with 3 exposure of KhNPP, particularly on aquatic and atmospheric working power units lead to the excess of environment. thermal effects on the aquatic environment? 34.12 How will the accident on NPP "Fukushima" This issue goes beyond SUP and SUP EA. A key output of an affect the plans to build power units № 3 external event of the accident at NPP "Fukushima" was the beyond and 4 on Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant? design-basis amplitudes tsunami caused by the earthquake which is impossible under conditions of NPPs in Ukraine. However, intermediate events such as loss of energy in general causes, refusal of access control systems, inadequate emergency plans, the impact of human factors and others require detailed analysis of conditions for all nuclear power plants in the world, particularly for NPPs of Ukraine. The possible external output event of severe accident at NPPs in Ukraine is the earthquake that is included in the feasibility study of power units No 3 and 4 of KhNPP construction, the public discussion of the EIA of which is currently ongoing.
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10.3.5 Reference list of the questions-answer book 1 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the rafitication of the Joint convention on the safe spent fuel treatment and the safe of radioactive wastes treatment”, № 1688-III dd 20.04.2000. 2 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the ratification of the nuclear safety Convention”, №736/ 97-ВР dd 17.12.1997. 3 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the ratification of the Convention on the public access to the information, public participation in the process of decision-making and access to the justice on environmental matters”, № 832-XIV dd 06.07.1999. 4 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the ratification of the Convention on evaluation of environmental impact in a transboundary context”, № 534-XIV dd 19.03.1999. 5 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the Environmental Protection” " № 1264-XII dd 25.07.1991. 6 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the Nuclear Energy and Radiation Safety” №39/ 95-ВР dd 08.02.1995. 7 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the Radioactive Wastes treatment”№255/ 95-ВР dd 30.07.1995. 8 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the licensing activity in the area of nuclear energy” № 1370-XIV dd 11.01.2000. 9 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the Human Protection from ionizing radiation” №15/ 98-ВР dd 14.01.1998. 10 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the Ecological Expertise” №45/ 95-ВР dd 09.02.1995. 11 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the making decisions about the design, construction of nuclear installations and facilities designated for radioactive waste that are of national importance” № 2861-IV dd 08.09.2005 . 12 НРБУ-97. Norms of Radiation Safety of Ukraine. State sanitary norms. MoHP of Ukraine, 1997. 13 ГСП 6.2005-09-02. Basic sanitary rules for radiation safety of Ukraine (OSPU). State sanitary rules. MoHP of Ukraine, 2005. 14 НРБУ-97/Д-2000 Norms of Radiation Safety of Ukraine. Supplement: Radiation protection from potential exposure. MoHP of Ukraine, 2000 15 SCN (DBN) А.2.2-3-2004 The composition, development, coordination and approval of project documentation for construction. State Construction Service of Ukraine, 2004 16 SCN (DBN) А.2.2-1-2003 The composition and content of impact assessment (EIA) in the design and construction of plants, buildings and structures. State Construction Service of Ukraine, 2004 17 СПАС-88, ПНАЕ Health regulations for design and operation of nuclear power plants 18 НП 306.2.141-2008 General safety of nuclear power plants (OPB-2008), SCNS, 2008. 19 НП 306.2.144-2008 The requirements of security when choosing a placement site of power plant. SNRCU 2008. 20 IAEA document №50 -C -S. Safety Manual. Safety of nuclear power plants - Siting Nuclear Power Plant. 21 Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of the Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030”№ 145-р dd 15.03.2006. 22 Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the preparatory measures to build new power units of KhNPP"№ 281-р dd 21.07.2005. 23 Order of Ministry of Energy “Concerning the preparatory measures for the construction of power units № 3and 4 of KhNPP” № 425 dd 22.08.2005. 24 Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of a plan for 2006-2010 for implementation of the Energy Strategy of Ukraine until 2030” № 436-р dd 27.07.2006. 25 Order of tge Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the priority measures for the construction of power units No 3 and No 4 of Khmelnitsky NPP” № 118 dd 18.02.2009. 26 IAEA document No 50-SG-S1. Safety Manual. Incorporation of earthquakes and the phenomenon resulting from it while siting the nuclear power plants, Vienna. IAEA, 1994. 27 SNIP 2.04.02-84 Water supply. External networks and constructions. 28 Order of board of Ministry of fuel and energy of Ukraine “Approval of decision on the choosing the type of reactor facility for construction of power units No 3 and No 4 of Khmelnitsky NPP” №4.1 dd 13.10.2008. 29 НП 306.5.02/3.017-99. Requirements to the quality provision program at all phases of lifecycle of nuclear facilities. 30 НП 306.5.02/2.069-2003. Safety requirements and conditions (licencing conditions) while designing the nuclear facility or storage of radioactive wastes. 31 ДСТУ ISO 10005:2007. Quality management systems. Quality systems management. 32 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the fire protection” № 3745 dd 17.12.1993. 33 Law of Ukraine “Concerning labor protection” dd 21.11.2002. 34 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear materials, radioactive wastes, other sources of ionizing radiation” № 2064-III dd 19.10.2000. 35 Law of Ukraine “Concerning settlement of issues connected to the nuclear safety provision” № 1868-IV dd 24.06.2004. 36 НД 306.2.02/1.004-98. General clauses of safety provision while decommissioning NPPs and investigative nuclear facilities. Ministry of ecology and safety, 1998.
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37 Decommissioning concept for operating nuclear power plants of Ukraine approved by the order of Ministry of fuel and energy №249 dd 12.05.2004. 38 0.ПРО.5797.ПН-08 Decommissioning concept for power units VVER-1000 of “Khmelnitsky NPP”, Kiev “Energoatom”, 2008. 39 ГН 6.6.1.1-130-2006 Permissible levels of radionucledes 137Cs and 90Sr in the food and drinking water. Hygienic standard. 40 СОУ НАЕК 004:1011. ECOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE NPPs’ ENERGY UNITS. General requirements to the content and structure of the evaluation materials. “Energoatom”, 2011. 41 Consolidated safety upgrade measures for operating power units with reactors of VVER and RMBK types.СМ-88 and СM-90 42 Safety upgrade program for NPPs with nuclear facilities VVER-1000, 440, 1994. 43 Priority safety upgrade works program for NPPs with nuclear facilities VVER-1000, VVER-440, 1994. 44 Safety upgrade measures consolidation for operating power units of NPPs of Ukraine with reactors of VVER-1000 (320) type, 1999. 45 Priority safety upgrade measures program for power units of NPPs of Ukraine, 1999. 46 Complex program for modernization and safety upgrade for power units of nuclear power plants, approved by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dd 29.08.2002. №504-р. 47 Safety upgrade concept for operating power units of nuclear power plants, approved by the Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dd 13.12.2005. № 515-р. 48 Program for modernization and safety upgrade of NPPs with nuclear facilities VVER -1000 (В-320), part 2 (KhNPP-2) and part 3 (RNPP-4) for 2004-2009. 49 ПМ-Д.0.05.174-08. Program for radioactive wastes treatment. “Energoatom”, Kiev. SE NNEGC “Energoatom”, 2008. 50 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the nationwide target environmental program for radioactive wastes treatment” № 516-VI dd 17.09.2008. 51 Environmental and Social Policy. EBRD, 2008 52 Law of Ukraine “Concerning the civil responsibility for the nuclear damage and its financial provision” №2893-III dd13.12.2001. 53 Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Issues of creation, collection and usage of financial reserve for nuclear facilities’ decommissioning” №594 dd27.04.2006. 54 Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of Order of setting the normative of fine for the natural environmental pollution and collection of this fine” №303 dd 01.03.1999. 55 Order of President of Ukraine № 585/2011 “Concerning the decision of the National Security and Defence Council dd 8th April 2011 ”Concerning the safety upgrade of the operating nuclear power plants of Ukraine” 56 Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of the order of public hearings on the issues of nuclear energy usage and radiation safety” №1122 dd 18.07.1998. 57 Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of the order of public engagement into the negotiation of issues concerning the decisions which may influence the environment” №771 dd29.06.2011. 58 SCN (DBN) В.1.2-4-2006 “Engineering-technical measures of civil protection (civil defence)”, 2006.
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10.4 Annex D Statement on ecological concequences of SUP implementation
Statement on ecological concequences as the result of Complex Safety Upgrade program for power units of NPPs of Ukraine (SUP) implementation Nuclear energy has one of the leading places in Ukraine's economy. The four operating nuclear power plants (NPP) with 15 units which have nuclear reactors VVER installed whose share is 26.6% of the total installed capacity of the country producing almost half of Ukraine's electricity. State Enterprise “National Nuclear Energy Generating Company “Energoatom” (NNEGC “Energoatom”) is the operating organization which according to the Law of Ukraine “Concerning Nuclear Energy and Radiation Safety” is responsible for the safety of operating nuclear power plants of the country. The main objective of NNEGC “Energoatom” was and remains the nuclear power production in accordance with the mandatory conditions to ensure safety in accordance with applicable requirements and according to international guidelines and best practice.
Data on the planned activity, aim and the ways of its implementation Projects of operating nuclear power reactors in Ukraine were developed the 70-80s of last century according to the acting at that time rules, regulations and standards. Bringing power units in compliance with new regulations and standards was carried out under the safety upgrade programs which were reviewed during operation as performance measures, the expiry of regulations, the accumulation of operating experience and others. Further safety upgrade of existing nuclear power plants to eliminate some inconsistencies to the new requirements taking into account international recommendations and implementation of best practice is one of the priorities of energy development in Ukraine. The necessity of elaboration and implementation of SUP was determined by the next documents: - Law of Ukraine “Concerning the Convention for nuclear safety ratification”, No 36/ 97-ВР dd 17.12.1997; - Law of Ukraine “Concerning the usage of nuclear energy and radiation safety” №39/ 95-ВР dd 08.02.1995; - Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030” № 145-р dd 15.03.2006; - Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Concerning the approval of action plan for 2006-2010 concerning the implementation of Energy Strategy of Ukraine till 2030 року” № 436-р dd 27.07.2006; - Safety upgrade concept for operating power units of nuclear power plants approved by the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dd13.12.2005 № 515-р.; - Order of the President of Ukraine № 585/2011 “Concerning the decision of the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine from 8 April 2011 “Concerning the safety upgrade of operation of nuclear power plants of Ukraine. SUP aims at further safety upgrade of operating nuclear power reactors of Ukraine within the framework of long-term state strategy of safety upgrade of power units of NPPs of Ukraine through: - elimination of inconsistencies of projects of operating nuclear power plants to national norms, rules and safety standards or reducing their impact through the introduction of compensatory measures; - bringing the project safety of all nuclear power plants to a level that meets international safety requirements (standards of IAEA) through the implementation of recommendations of international experts;
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- implementation of international safety upgrade commitments of Ukraine; - implementation of the “Memorandum of Understanding between Ukraine and EU on cooperation in the energy sector” to reach the convergence of energy markets and implement a common strategy towards the progressive integration of the energy market of Ukraine onto the EU market. According to the specified aim SUP ncludes the full range of necessary measures to improve safety under the normal conditions and in accidents at operating power units of nuclear power plants of Ukraine which are determined by: - national norms, rules and safety standards; - international safety recommendations (standards of IAEA) and recommendations of international exterts (Riskaudit); - conculsions and recommendations of Safety Analysis Reports; - requirements of state safety regulation bodies; - operation experience of power units of operating NPPs of Ukraine and the best world practice. SUP covers more than 800 safety upgrade measures of the next directions: - General issues; - Reactor core and fuel treatment; - Completeness of components; - Systems; - Automated technology process management systems (ATPMS); - Power supply; - Containment and building constructions; - Internal danger; - External danger; - Accidents analysis. Implementing of SUP measures is planned according to their determined priority based on probabilistic assessments of their impact on safety upgrade. According to the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated April 8, 2011 “Concerning safety upgrade of nuclear power plants of Ukraine” approved by the Order of President of Ukraine № 585/2011, NNEGC “Energoatom” performed review of preference and added a list of SUP measures as part of preventive measures for the analysis of accidents at nuclear power plant “Fukushima” (Japan), SUP measures are related to safety upgrade of only operating nuclear power plants of Ukraine during the defined today remainder of their life cycle (the stages of operation and decommissioning). Safety upgrade technical measures foreseen by SUP will be implemented directly on the units on sites within monitoring zones and of operating nuclear power plants in Ukraine. The location of sites is: - Zaporizhzhya NPP (ZNPP) – on the bank of Kakhovske water reservoir in steppe zone of Ukraine in the city of Energodar, Zaporizhzhya oblast; - Rivne NPP (RNPP) – near river Styr in the western Woodlands in the city of Kuznetsovsk, Rivne oblast; - Khmelnitsky NPP (KhNPP) – on the bank of Horyn river, on the territory of small woodlands in the city of Netishyn, Khmelnitsky oblast; - South-Ukrainian NPP (SUNPP) – on the bank of Southern Boug river in the city of Yuzhnoukrainsk, Mykolayiv oblast.
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Significant factors that affect or may affect the environment taking into account the possibility of environmental emergencies According to the “Statement of Intent concerning the consolidated safety upgrade program for power units of NPPs of Ukraine” disclosed by “Energoatom” on 08.10.2010 environmental impact assessment of SUP was done in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine and international recommendations in particular SCN (ДБН) А.2.2-1-2003, EU UN Protocol concerning the strategic ecological assessment and the standard СОУ НАЕК 004:2011 “Ecological assessment of power units of nuclear power plants. General requirements to the composition and content of evaluation materials” designed to determine the procedures and scope of ecological assessment and corresponding requirements of national legislation with international recommendations, While ecological assessment (EA) of SUP: - sources of environmental impact associated with the SUP implementation were indicated; - the list of analyzed environmental effects of power units of NPPs is done and their characterization was undertaken; - the list of potential target impacts of nuclear power plants that are sensitive to SUP was indicated; - general description of each operating nuclear power plant was drafted; - the current state of the natural, social and technogenic environment within the monitoring zone of each nuclear power plant and the results of the forecast changes in their state regardless SUP (under normal conditions and in accidents at each nuclear power plant) was examined; - the assessment of SUP measures impacts on forecasted changes of environmental, social and technogenic environment and analysis of their compliance with environmental safety requirements, standards and regulations was undertaken; - changes of environmental impacts or their absence during the implementation of SUP measures were studied; - the complex resource saving, protection, restoration and protection activities carried out or are carried out at each nuclear power plant was reviewed, changes of this complex as a result of these SUP implementation were analyzed and their performance was evaluated; - the residual impacts of each nuclear power plant under normal conditions (regardless SUP measures) was reviewed and their changes as a result of SUP implementation were analyzed; - the comprehensive assessment of accidental environmental risks at each nuclear power plant (regardless SUP measures) and their changes as a result of SUP implementation was elaborated; - cost-effectiveness of SUP implementing on aspects of environmental impact and impact on public health was assessed; - the potential impact of SUP implementation in transboundary context was assessed and measures foreseen by the legislation to inform the neighboring countries were undertaken. The list of analyzed types of influences of operating nuclear power plants on the environment includes radiation, chemical, physical impacts, effects of combined actions and indirect impacts. The EA undertaken has shown that the main are radiation, heat and chemical factors. Impact on the environmental components that would lead to normative levels excess t have not been identified by the EA. The EA analyzed the possible impacts under the normal conditions and in terms of accidents at operating power units of nuclear power plants in relation to those environmental components: - climate and microclimate, - atmospheric environment; - geology environment; - acquatic environment; - soils;
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- flora and fauna, reserves; - social environment. - technogenic environment; While EA the concequences of maximum design basis accident (MDA) and the weighted by their probability severe over designed accidents (ODA), the most severe radiological consequences, determined by the Safety Analysis Reports and EIA of power units of operating nuclear power plants were analyzed. As an MDA the accident were analyzed which are caused by: - bilateral rupture of the cooling system (ARVT); - decompression of steam collector cover; - disturbances in the fresh and spent fuel treatment; - fall of hydro shuttle into the cooling pond. As the ODA the accident caused by disconnection resulting from the design earthquake followed by refusal to emergency power sources leading to 10% melting of the reactor reactor core was analyzed. Power units No 4 of Rivne NPP and No 2 of Khmelnitsky NPP were chosen as referent in accordance with the EIA for these blocks.
Quantitative and qualitative changes of environmental risks and safety of the population as a result of SUP as well as measures to ensure implementation of activities in accordance with environmental standards and regulations Under normal conditions of operation power units of operating nuclear power plants do not pose environmental risks and are not hazardous for the life of the population. Design accidents at operating nuclear power plants including the MDA will not result in significant environmental risks and will not be hazardous to the population. Environmental risks of beyond design-basis accidents at nuclear power plants are acceptable considering the probability of such accidents, scholastic risks to the social environment and the extent of contamination of natural environment components. SUP implementation will lead to the next qualitative changes in environmental risks on NPPs: - reducing the probability of accident; - reducing the consequences of accidents as a result of improving the ability of emergency management. Quantitative estimation of the probability and reassessment of accidents’ consequences will be carried out as one of the SUP measures. Reducing risk of accidents means the overall risk reduction of the potential transboundary impacts. So far, SUP impact in a transboundary context is unambiguously positive.
The list of changes in residual impacts of NPPs of Ukraine related to the SUP SUP implementation will not lead to significant changes in the quantities of heat and chemical discharged of NPPs into the aquatic and atmospheric environment. In addition SUP measures will not lead to any significant changes in the amount of noise and electromagnetic interference of NPPs. Thus, the changes of the residual impact as a result of SUP can be neglected. SUP implementation will not affect the forecasted changes in residual impacts of nuclear power plants as a result of problems identified by other governmental programs and government decisions to be implemented in parallel with SUP. Overall SUP will not lead to significant changes in impacts of Zaporizhzhya, Rivne, Khmelnytsky and South-Ukrainian nuclear power plants to natural and technogenic environment under normal operation. Impacts of the SUP on the social environment under normal operation of existing nuclear power plants will be positive due to the implementation of proposed measures to improve public awareness and improve labor protection.
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After SUP implementation on NPPs the safety level will be improved which in particular means reducing risks of incidents and accidents that could potentially affect the health of workers and the public. In addition, reducing risks of accidents will reduce stress loads associated with the work or living near nuclear power plants which will positively affect the psychological state of workers and population of the surrounding areas.
Measures undertaken to inform the public about planned activity, objectives and ways of its implementation Taken as a basis while SUP EA world practice models to inform the public indicate that the potential impact parties and the public should be informed about the project at the early stages of its preparation and information and feedback channels should be kept open during the whole period of the project implementation. Therefore, 4 main phases were identified for the public consultation process on SUP and EA Phase 1 and Phase 2 of which were implemented while EA: - Phase 0 - disclosure of Statement of Intent concerning the complex safety upgrade program for power units of NPPs of Ukraine; - Phase 1 – scopin consultations concerning EA; - Phase 2 – public consultations concerning the EA report; - Phase 3 – lighting the process of SUP measures implementation and the disclosure of its results including the ecological aspects. The aim of Phase 1 was the indication of key stakeholders aiming at the primary consultations organization. Phase 1 covered the next activity: - Information about the project via disclosure of information concerning the elaboration of SUP EA, standard of “Energoatom” СОУ НАЕК 004:1011. Ecological assessment of power units of nuclear power plants. General requirements to the composition and content of assessment materials and the Invitation to participate in scoping meetings concerning EA; - Consultations via organization and holding the scoping meetings with key stakeholders in Kiev and 4 satellite cities of NPPs (Energodar, Kuznetsovsk, Netishyn and Yuzhnoukrainsk); - Disclosure of Phase 1 results by publication of Stakeholders Engagement Plan and Scoping report including the minutes of all 5 scoping meetings on the official web-site of “Energoatom”. The aim of Phase 2 “Public consultations concerning the EA report” was providing the stakeholders with the possibility to get acquainted and to comment on the data received by the results of EA and review of EA report by the public consultation results including the results of analysis of received comments and suggestions. Phase 2 covered the next activity: - Disclosure of EA results by the publications of Informative leaflet concerning the SUP and EA and documents “Draft EA report. Public Summary” and “Draft EA report. Main report” on the official web-site of “Energoatom”; - Informing about the public consultations by the publication of the Invitation to participate in public meetings concerning the ecological assessment of SUP, press-release of public meetings concerning SUP EA, agenda of the public meetings concerning the ecological assessment of SUP and presentation materials on the official web-site of “Energoatom” and also by sending the mentioned Inviation to the stakeholders’ addresses; - Public consultations during 90 days since the disculosure of EA report by organization and holding the public meetings concerning the SUP EA with stakeholders in Kiev and 4 satellite cities of NPPs (Energodar, Kuznetsovsk, Netishyn and Yuzhnoukrainsk) in coordination with the oblast state administrations and local authorities of satellite cities, providing the stakeholders with the possibility to get acquainted with this project and to provide questions, comments and suggestions in the public repositories opened in Kiev and satellite cities of NPPs and also by ordinary and e-mail; - Disclosure of Phase 2 results by publication of 2 present day versions of “Questions-Answers Book concerning the SUP and SUP EA” and the EA report on SUP corrected by the results of the public consultations on the official web-site of “Energoatom”.
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All documents of Phase1 and Phase 2 were free in Ukrainian and English. The main ways of informing and providing feedback with public while the Phase 3 will be: - Disclosure of periodic reports concerning the SUP implementation on the official web-site of “Energoatom”; - Support of the actual communication channel with public concerning the SUP issues by means of e-mail [email protected]; - Work of information centers of operating NPPs of Ukraine in the satellite cities (Energodar, Kuznetsovsk, Netishyn and Yuzhnoukrainsk) and the headquarters of “Energodar” in Kiev; - Negotiations of SUP results on periodic public meetings; - Disclosure of periodic public information reports on Phase 3.
The obligation of the customer to implement SUP in accordance with the regulations of environmental protection and ecological safety requirements “Energoatom” as the operating organization in full understanding of the importance of activities undertaken, considering the safety of human being and the natural environmental protection as the highest priority commits to: - perform the requirements of environmental legislation of Ukraine, international agreements of Ukraine, standards and rules in the sphere of nuclear energy use, nature use and environmental protection; - create and introduce the environmental protection management systems which in particular includes the accounting of quantitative and qualitative indicators of pollutants emissions into the air, discharges into the water bodies, all types of wastes treatment, rational usage of natural resources, etc.; - undertake monitoring of environment in sanitary-protection and monitoring zones of operating NPPs by organization of observations over the radiation, hydrogeologic, hydrochemical status of environmental objects; - provice the population with open and true information concerning the state of environment in zones of NPPs location; - constructively co-operate with supervision authorities, public organizations and mass-media concerning the ecological safety issues. “Energoatom” commits to implement in full all technical, organization, financial and other decisions foreseen by SUP and also while the whole term of operation and decommissioning of power units of operating NPPs to comply with technological requirements, carry our the material and financial spending on providing their safety operation and at the same time to guarantee the execution of ecological requirements.
President of NNEGC “Energoatom”
______Y. O. Nedashkovskiy
«___»______2011
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11 TECHNICAL APPENDICES
11.1 Long list of SUP measures for each type of reactor
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Table 65 – Measures list and implementation status for reactors type V-320 (C: completed – O: Ongoing – P: Planned) ZapNPP KhNPP RNPP SUNPP Number Priority Name of Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 3 0 0 General 10101 Elaboration of the documents and certification of power unit 10101 I O P P P P P O O O O O elements 1 1 Reactor active core and fuel management 11301 Introduction of the equipment for completion of the activity in 11301 II installation of a fuel assembly in case of power supply loss in the refueling P C P P P P P C C C P machine 11302 Introduction of the equipment and the methodology for cladding leak 11302 III test (KGO) sipping-method in the driving stem of the refueling machine P P P P P P P C C C P during the fuel assembly transporting 11303 II 11303 Risk decrease of the active core damage in the RF state “Refueling P P P P P P P P P P P 11304 Replacement of non-consolidate shelves for spent nuclear fuel 11304 II P P C P P C C C C C C (SNF) storage in cooling ponds (CP) with consolidate shelves (CS) 2 2 Components integrity 12101 Increase of the primary circuit overpressure protection reliability in a 12101 II C C C C C C O C O C O cold state 12102 Implementation of the “leak-before-break” concept for primary circuit 12102 II P P P P P P P C P C P RCP 12201 Prevention of the consequences related to secondary piping break 12201 II C C C C C C C C C C O outside the containment 12202 Implementation of the improved diagnostic system of the ECCS 12202 II P P P P P P C C P C C active core tightness 12203 Replacement of the back pressure valves at the pipes of the direct 12203 III C C C C C C P P P P P steam with enhancement of their reliability and maintainability 12301 Assessment of the technical state and lifetime of the reactor 12301 II P P P P P P C C P C O pressure vessels during operation 12302 Implementation of the equipment to improve the reactor main 12302 II P P P P P P C C C C P connection consolidation 12401 Elaboration of organizational and technical measures in accident 12401 I management: coolant leakage from the primary circuit into the secondary P P P P O P P O P O O one with equivalent cross-section Dcond 100
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ZapNPP KhNPP RNPP SUNPP Number Priority Name of Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 3 12402 Optimization of the strategies of the technical maintenance and 12402 III P P P P P P P P P P P repair (including on the basis of probabilistic approaches) 3 3 Systems 13101 Analysis of the possibility and substantiate the mode of HP ECCS/LP ECCS operation from the adjacent sump through the schedule 13101 II C C C C C C C C C P C cool down line without emergency cool down heat exchanger. Elaboration of the respective emergency procedures 13102 Modernization of the algorithm of safety channels actuation under the 2-nd circuit “ Break protection “ signal in order to assure a timely 13102 I C C C C C C P P P P P negative reactivity and to prevent a repeated criticality mode (actuation of TQ 14-34 channels ) 13103 Implementation of protection against simultaneous introduction of 13103 II C C C C C C P P C C O positive reactivity by two and more ways 13202 Power supply from II category reliable power source of normal 13202 III C C C C C C O C O C C operation systems assuring primary circuit subcriticality 13301 Replacement of SG SV with certification on steam, stem-water 13301 I mixture and water with the functions of emergency pressure release from C C C C C C C C C C O SG 13302 Assurance of the working capacity of the fast acting reducing station with steam discharge into the atmosphere by the efflux of the steam-water 13302 I O O O O O O P P P P O mixture, water, and also with the assurance of the reliable performance of the emergency pressure release 13303 Power supply from the reliable power source of the 2nd category of 13303 III the normal operation systems, which provide long-term powering of the C C C C C C C C P C P emergency feed-water tanks and SG under emergencies 13304 Assurance of the possibility to actuate the blowdown-makeup system in case of the containment localization and assurance of the 13304 II P P P P P P C C P P P automatic actuation of the boric concentrate (TB10) in case of the primary circuit leakage 13305 Assurance of the duplication of the residual heat relief function by 13305 I C C C C C C C C P P P the RF low parameters in case of failure in the scheduled cooling line 13306 Automatic bypassing of the blocking for MSIV shutting upon the 13306 II transfer of the fast acting reducing station with steam discharge into the P P P P P P P P P P P atmosphere into the cooling mode
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ZapNPP KhNPP RNPP SUNPP Number Priority Name of Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 3 13401 Enhancement of the reliability of the heat sink function performance 13401 II from the primary circuit (including implementation of the function “relief- C C C C C C O C O C O powering”) 13402 Modernization of the ECCS VD to ensure the possibility to control 13402 I P P P P O P P O P O O pressure at the thrust by the system pump operation to the primary circuit 13403 Modernization of the ECCS LD to ensure the possibility to control 13403 I P P O P O P P P P O O flow rate under primary system pump operation 13501 Replacement of self-contained conditioners by the conditioners 13501 III P P P P P P C C P C P qualified for "harsh" conditions and seismic impact 13502 II 13502 Introduction of a complex diagnostic system for reactor systems P P P P P P P C P C P 13503 Arrangement of new places to monitor boron-10 concentration in the 13503 II P P P P P P P C C C C systems related to the primary circuit 13504 Installation of the "Disk" type valves at condensate-make-up and 13504 III C P C C P C P C P C C steam distribution systems 13505 Additional protection of cable routing above assemblies of relay 13505 III C C C C C C C C P C P process protection of equipment (RTZO) 13506 Optimization of the heat removal from CP in order to not exceed the 13506 II P P P P P P O O P P P operational limits (following CP PSA results) 13507 Implementation of an "in-process" cleaning system for service water 13507 II P P P P P P C C P P P spraying pools of vital parts 13508 Modernization of the "periodic" and "permanent" steam generator 13508 II blow down system in order to prevent defects at №111 joints of SG C C C C C C P P C C P headers 13509 Implementation of an "industrial" TV system for fire hazardous and 13509 III P P P P O P P C P C P explosive and unattended rooms 13510 III 13510 Implementation of leak tight plugs in SG headers to perform repairs P P P P P P P P P P P 4 4 ASU TP (Process Control System) 14101 II 14101 Instrumentation during and after an accident P P O P P P P P P O P 14102 Introduction of the monitoring system of the pipelines transfer of the 14102 II P P P P P P P C P C P primary circuit 14103 Modernize power unit ICS to include ASRM, AMSRS and SPPB 14103 III O O O P P P C C P C O systems 14104 II 14104 Modernization of the alternator hydrogen cooling monitoring system P P P P P P P P P O P
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ZapNPP KhNPP RNPP SUNPP Number Priority Name of Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 3 14105 Modernization of normal operation systems of the reactor hall upper 14105 II unit (RH UU SNO) of the I&C subsystem, TZBiS, SARiDU (including the O O O O O P O O O C O equipment of auxiliary buildings of safety class 3N). 14106 Modernization of the TH (turbine hall) UU SNO of I&C subsystem (including the system for control of turbine mechanical indicators (SKMVT), 14106 II O O O O O P O O O C O technological protections and alarm system (TZBiS), automatic regulation and remote control system (SARiDU). 14201 Prevention of a common-cause failure of control and emergency 14201 II protection systems resulting from absence of physical separation of pulse C C C P P P P C P C O lines 14202 Modernization of the NFMS (neutron flux monitoring system) to 14202 II O O O O P O C C C C C include SKP system and a reactivity meter 14203 Modernization of the EP-PP (emergency protection-preventive 14203 II C C C P P P C C C C P protection) to comply with NTD requirements 14204 Modernization of the APC (automatic power controller), PLD (power 14204 III C P P P P P C C C C P limiting device) to comply with NTD requirements 14205 Modernization of the CPS drives control system, including a system 14205 II C P P P P P P P C P P for “U” algorithms implementation 14206 Modernization of the CPS CR drives, including electromagnet units 14206 II P P C C C P P C C C C and CPS CR position indicators 14301 Modernization of the control safety systems and the UKTS 14301 II P O O O O P O O O O P replacement 14401 II 14401 Modernization of the NPP radiation monitoring system (RMS) O O O O P P O O O O P 14402 II 14402 Modernization of the SVRK (in-core monitoring system) C C C C O P C C C C O 14403 Creation of a system to retain operability and ensure information 14403 II P P P P P P C C C C P storage under design and beyond design basis accidents (“black box”). 14404 III 14404 Modernization of the standby diesel generators control system P P P P P P P P P P P 14405 III 14405 Modernization of the refueling machine P C P P P P P P C C O 14406 Modernization of the automatic chemical control (ACC-1,2) systems. 14406 III Improvement and automation of the water-chemistry conditions of the P P P P P P O P C C C primary and secondary circuits 14407 III 14407 Reconstruction of the turbine control system K 1000 60/3000 P O C C P 5 5 Power supply
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ZapNPP KhNPP RNPP SUNPP Number Priority Name of Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 3 15101 Elaboration of methods and equipment to define the NPP cables 15101 III P P P P P P C C O C P remaining service life 15201 Replacement of the 6 kV switches in SS channels and SIS, all plant 15201 I O O O O O P O C O C P and all power unit SN 15202 Modernization of the EPSS (emergency power supply system) of 15202 I the first reliability group (including direct current panel (DCP), batteries, O O O O O O P P O O P etc.) 15203 III 15203 Modernization of the safety systems cable system P P P P P P C C O C P 15204 I 15204 Modernization of the in-house power supply system of 6kV P P P P P P P P O C P 15205 Modernization of the safety important systems with replacing 15205 II P P P P P P P C P P P electric motors of 6 and 0.4 kV 15206 I 15206 Modernization of the distribution devices of 0,4 kV O O P P P P P P O P P 15207 Modernization of the containment power and control cables 15207 II O O O O O O O O O O O penetrations 15208 Modernization of the RZA (relay protection and automation) circuits 15208 I P P P P P P P P P P O with introducing a relay on a basis of microelectronics 15210 Transfer to the first group of the reliable power supply of the fast 15210 III acting reducing station with steam discharge-K and of the fast acting P P P P P P P P P P P reducing station with steam discharge-SN 15211 Optimization of the power supply of valves TG, ТХ to ensure the 15211 II P P P P P P P P P P P channel principle 15212 III 15212 Modernization of the turbine generators field systems P P P P P P P P P P O 6 6 Containment and engineering structures 16101 Prevention of the early containment bypass resulting from ingress of 16101 I melt core masses into channels of NFMS ionizing chambers. Modernize P P P P P P P P P P P reactor cavity doors 16201 Introduction of the system to monitor hydrogen concentration in the 16201 I P P P P P P P P P P O containment for beyond design basis accidents 16202 Supply of the SE NPP power units with the system for remote 16202 II control of efforts in AK SPZO (reinforcing cable of the containment pre- P P P P P P P P P P P stressed system) 16203 Elaboration and implementation of measures to decrease hydrogen 16203 I P P P P P P P P P P 0 concentration in the containment for beyond design basis accidents 7 7 Internal hazards
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ZapNPP KhNPP RNPP SUNPP Number Priority Name of Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 3 17101 Modernization of the automatic fire alarm system of NPP safety 17101 III P P P P P P C C O C O system rooms 17102 Development and implementation of the smoke protection system of 17102 III reactor hall rooms and escape routs that do not have limitations as of the P P P P C P P C P C P connection to the environment 17103 Supply of the NPP rooms with stationary devices for automatic gas 17103 III P P P P P P C C C C C fire extinguishing that include electric and electronic equipment 17104 Supply with automatic monitoring systems of power oil-filled 17104 II P P P P P P P P P P P equipment of the NPP power distribution main scheme 17201 Modernization of the MSIV to ensure resistance to internal and 17201 II P P P P P P P P P P O external impacts 8 8 External hazards 18101 Assurance of seismic resistance of safety-significant elements, 18101 II P P P P P P P P P P O systems and structures 9 9 Accidents analyses 19101 Elaboration of the SAR in compliance with the ND requirements in 19101 II O O O O C O O C O C O full scope 19102 II 19102 Elaboration of the on-line PSA P P P P P P P O P P P 19103 Registration of the full range of initiating events for all scheduled 19103 II P P P P P P P P P P P reactor facility conditions in PSA 19201 I 19201 Improvement of the emergency management C C C C C C P C O C C 19202 Elaboration, maintenance, validation and implementation of SOEI to 19202 I C C C C C C O C O C C manage design and beyond design basis accidents 19203 Improvement of the emergency operation instructions occurred in 19203 I P P P P P P P P P P P power decrease and during PPR 19204 Implementation of the severe accidents analysis. Elaboration the 19204 II P P P P P P P P P P P SAMG (severe accident management guide)
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Table 66 – Measures list and implementation status for reactors type V-302 338 (C: completed – O: Ongoing – P: Planned) Number Priority Name of Measure SUNPP1 SUNPP2 0 0 General 20101 I 20101 Elaboration of the materials and certification of the power unit elements O O 1 1 Reactor core and fuel management 21302 Introduction of the equipment and the methodology for cladding leak test (KGO) sipping-method in the driving stem of the refueling machine during the 21302 III P P fuel assembly transporting 2 2 Components integrity 22101 II 22101 Protection reliability enhancement of the primary circuit from high pressure in cold state O O 22102 II 22102 Implementation of the “leak before break” concept for the primary RCP P P 22201 I 22201 Prevention of consequences related to the secondary piping break outside the containment O O 22202 II 22202 Implementation of the upgraded ECCS heat exchanger density diagnostic system P P 22203 III 22203 Replacement of the check valves on the pipelines of live steam with the enhancement of their reliability and maintainability P P 22301 II 22301 Assessment of the technical state and the lifetime of the reactor pressure vessels during operation O O 22302 II 22302 Implementation of the equipment to upgrade main reactor flange pressurization P P 22401 Elaboration of the organizational and technical measures to manage accidents: the primary to secondary coolant leak with equivalent cross-section Dcond 22401 I O O 100 22402 III 22402 Optimizing strategies for maintenance and repairs (including on the basis of probabilistic approaches) P P 3 3 Systems 23103 II 23103 Implementation of the prohibition of the simulations introduction of the positive reactivity by two or more ways P P 23201 Purchase and implementation into operation of an automatic system of the vortex-current control of the heat-exchange pipes and steam generator SG- 23201 I P P 1000 collectors bridges 23301 I 23301 Replacement of the SG SV with certification on steam, stem-water mixture and water with the functions of emergency pressure release from SG O O 23302 Assurance of the working capacity of the fast acting reducing station with steam discharge into the atmosphere by the efflux of the steam-water mixture, 23302 I O O water, and also with the assurance of the reliable performance of the emergency pressure release 23401 I 23401 Increase of the reliability of heat removal from the primary circuit (including the “blowdown-makeup”) O O 23402 I 23402 Modernization of the HP ECCS to control discharge pressure under primary system pump operation O O 23403 I 23403 Modernization of the LP ECCS to control discharge pressure under primary system pump operation O O 23501 III 23501 Replacement of the self-contained air conditioners with the air conditioners, which are qualified for “severe” conditions and seismic effects P P 23502 II 23502 Introduction of the complex diagnostic system of the RF O P
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Number Priority Name of Measure SUNPP1 SUNPP2 23503 II 23503 Analysis of the necessity of the additional self-contained emergency lightning and implementation due to the findings of the analysis P P 23504 II 23504 Arrangement of new place to monitor boron-10 concentration in the systems, connected to the primary circuit P P 4 4 ASU TP (Process Control System) 24101 II 24101 Instrumentation during and after beyond design basis accidents O O 24102 II 24102 Creation of the monitoring system of the pipelines transfer of the primary circuit P P 24103Modernization of the normal operation system important for safety of the reactor hall upper unit (RH UU SNO), (including the control systems), 24103 II P P technological protections, blockings and alarm system (TZBiS), automatic regulation and remote control syst 24104 Modernization of the TH (turbine hall) UU SNO of I&C subsystem (including the system for control of turbine mechanical indicators (SKMVT), 24104 II P P technological protections and alarm system (TZBiS), automatic regulation and remote control system (SARiDU) 24202 II 24202 Modernization of the NFMS to comply with NTD requirements O O 24205 II 24205 Modernization of the CPS CR power supply system P P 24401 II 24401 Modernization of the NPP radiation monitoring systems (RMS) O O 24403 Creation of the system in preserving the working capacity and assuring information storage under conditions of design basis and beyond design basis 24403 II P P accidents (“black box”) 24404 II 24404 Modernization of the standby diesel-generator control system P P 5 5 Power supply 25101 II 25101 Reliability enhancement of the power unit emergency power supply O O 25201 II 25201 Replacement of the 6 kV switchers in the SS sections P P C P 25202 II 25202 Modernization of the emergency power supply (EPS) of the 1st reliability group (including the replacement of the direct current shield) P O 25203 II 25203 Modernization of the SS cable equipment P P 25204 II 25204 Modernization of the in-house power supply system of 6kV P P 25205 II 25205 Modernization of the safety important systems with replacing electric motors of 6 and 0.4 kV P P 25206 II 25206 Modernization of the distribution devices of 0,4 kV P P 25207 II 25207 Modernization of 0,4 kW leak-tight penetrations to enhance reliability P P 25208 II 25208 Modernization of the RZA (relay protection and automation) circuits with introducing a relay on a basis of microelectronics P P 6 6 Containment and engineering structures 26201 II 26201 Introduction of the hydrogen concentration monitoring system in the containment for beyond design-basis accidents O P 26202 II 26202 Supply of the NPP power units with remote control systems of efforts in the containment pre-stressed system of the reinforcing cable (AK SPZO) C O 26203 II 26203 Elaboration and implementation of measures in decrease of hydrogen concentration in the containment for beyond design basis accidents O O
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Number Priority Name of Measure SUNPP1 SUNPP2 26204 II 26204 Elaboration and agreement of a typical monitoring method of NDS ZO and efforts in AK CPZO O O 7 7 Internal hazards 27101 II 27101 Modernization of the automatic fire alarm system of the SS premises of the NPP rooms P P 27103 II 27103 Supply with automatic monitoring systems of power oil-filled equipment of the NPP power distribution main scheme P P 27201 I 27201 Modernization of the BZOK to resist the internal and external effects O O 27203 I 27203 Hydro isolation of APEN premises, physical separation by access and protection from fire C O 8 8 External hazards 28101 II 28101 Assurance of the seismic resistance of the elements, systems and structures, important for safety O O 9 9 Accidents analyses 29101 II 29101 Elaboration of the SAR in compliance with ND in full scope O O 29102 II 29102 Elaboration of the on-line PSA P P 29103 II 29103 Registration of the full range of initiating events for all scheduled reactor facility conditions in PSA P P 29203 I 29203 Improvement of the instructions in elimination of accidents, which appear by lower power in planned preventive maintenance O P 29204 II 29204 Implementation of the severe accidents analysis. Develop SAMG (severe accident management guide) O P
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Table 67 – Measures list and implementation status for reactors type V-213 (C: completed – O: Ongoing – P: Planned) Number Priority Name of Measure RNPP1 RNPP2 0 0 General 30101 І 30101 Develop documents and make qualification of power unit elements O O 1 1 Reactor core and fuel management 31101 ІІ 31101 Introduction of the fuel of second generation with the upgraded 5 (6) annual fuel cycles and decrease fluence on reactor pressure vessel P C 31102 Develop the methodology to identify core subcriticality. Implement measures in the automatic the automatic album of neutron and physical characteristics 31102 ІІ P P (ANFC) 31301 ІІ 31301 Modernization of the power unit spent nuclear fuel cooling pool facing and installation of the racks for fuel compact storage O C 31302 ІІІ 31302 Assurance of the dumping device in the transfer tube while transport package lowering to the elevation lower than 9 meters P P 2 2 Components integrity 32101 І 32101 Implementation of the “leak before break” concept for primary circuit RCP O O 32302 ІІ 32302 Elaboration of a work program to monitor reactor vessel metal performances based on specimens to extend power units operation lifetime C P 32401 Elaboration of the organization and technical measures for accident management: primary to secondary coolant leak with equivalent cross-section Dcond 32401 І C C 100 32402 ІІІ 32402 Optimization of the maintenance and repair strategies (including the ones based on the probabilistic approaches) P P 3 3 Systems 33201 Modernization of the vortex-current monitoring and of the automatic remote suppression of the heat-exchange pipes of the steam generators PGV-213 33201 І O O and PGV-1000 33302 ІІ 33302 Redundancy assurance of the RF scheduled cool down elements under water-moderated mode C C 33303 І 33303 Risk reduction to lose the function of heat removal from the RF resulting from failure of systems power supply under decrease power level and shutdown C C 33501 Replacement of the air-conditioning systems K-1, K-2, K-3 with the conditioners, which in are compliance with the requirements of the applicable safety 33501 ІІІ O O regulations 33502 І 33502 Implementation and procurement of the possibility to remove the residual heat with the help of the LP ECCS under emergency modes C C 33503 Life support of the unit control desk (UCD) and emergency control desk (ECD) under design and beyond design-basis accidents (installation of iodine 33503 ІІІ O O filters) 4 4 ASU TP 34102 ІІ 34102 Modernization of the software and hardware complex of the turbine hall (subsystems TZBiS, SAR and DU, including primary sensors and converters) P P 34103 ІІІ 34103 ICS Modernization to comply with the NTD requirements C C 34104 Modernization of the operation systems of the reactor hall upper unit (subsystems TZBiS, AChSRT, SAR and DU), including primary sensors and 34104 ІІ P P converters)
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34105 ІІ 34105 UCD and ECD consoles and panels modernization to comply with the NTD requirements P P 34106 ІІ 34106 Modernization of the automatic control system (SAU), relay protection and automatics of standby diesel station, including the field system P P 34107 Modernization of the in-core monitoring system (SVRK) of power unit No.1, 2 to improve monitoring of fuel implementation and elimination of deviations 34107 ІІ P C from NTD requirements 34201 ІІ 34201 Introduction of the AZ-IV signal (prohibition to lift up CPS CR) while opening the valves at the “pure condensate’ supply line to the primary makeup system O C 34301 ІІІ 34301 Modernization of the PTK CSS1, 2, 3 (subsystems ECCS, ASN , TZBiS, SAR and DU, including primary sensors and converters) C C 34401 ІІ 34401 Modernization of the TsIISRK (centralized information and measuring system of radiation monitoring of releases in process rooms) O O 34402 ІІ 34402 Introduction of the coolant leak monitoring system of the primary circuit C O 34403 Implementation of the system in preserving the working capacity and assuring information storage under conditions of design basis and beyond design 34403 ІІ O O basis accidents (“black box”) 34404 ІІ 34404 Implementation of the system to detect free and weakly fastened items within the RF O O 34405 ІІ 34405 Implementation of the primary pump vibration monitoring system P P 34406 ІІ 34406 Introduction of the system for vibration and in-vessel noise diagnostics O O 34407 ІІ 34407 Introduction of the system for RF equipment residual and fatigue lifetime diagnostics O O 34408 І 34408 Introduction of the system to monitor hydrogen in SG and MCP boxes (А201) and in the pressurizer room (А527/1) O O 34409 ІІ 34409 Assurance of the boric acid concentration measuring in the ECCS heat exchanger under power unit normal operation O C 5 5 Power supply 35102 І 35102 Modernization of the SS accumulator system P P 35201 І 35201 Modernization of the VMPE-10 switchers along with relay compartments O O 35202 І 35202 Modernization of the direct current panels (SchPT) of power units No.1, 2 O C 35203 ІІ 35203 Modernization of the safety systems cable system O C 35204 І 35204 Modernization of the power units No.1, 2 uninterruptible power supply units (UPS) O C 35205 І 35205 Modernization of the auxiliary power supply system 6/0,4 kV P P 35206 І 35206 Installation of the secondary standby auxiliary transformer O O 35207 ІІ 35207 Modernization of the penetrations in order to increase reliability O O 7 7 Internal hazards 37101 ІІ 37101 Modernization of the automatic fire alarm systems O C 37102 ІІ 37102 Implementation of a fire line system of steel tubes with installing steel valves O O 37103 III 37103 Providing of the rooms with electric equipment of the automatic control systems with stationary installations with automatic gas fire extinguishing C C 37105 ІІ 37105 Bringing the fire endurance of columns where they penetrate cable routing in turbine halls in compliance with the regulatory requirements C O
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37106 ІІ 37106 Equipping with the installation of the automatic control of the power oil-filled equipment of the main circuit power output P P 8 8 External hazards 38101 ІІ 38101 Seismic monitoring equipments O O 9 9 Accident analyses 39101 ІІ 39101 SAR development in compliance with ND in full scope C O 39102 ІІ 39102 Development of an on-line PSA P P 39103 ІІ 39103 Registration of the full range of initiating events for all scheduled reactor facility conditions in PSA P P 39104 І 39104 Carry out in-depth analysis of hydrogen ignition in the turbine hall, develop measures resulting from the analysis O P 39201 І 39201 Introduction of the instructions on insignificant deviations from and violations of normal operation C C 39202 І 39202 Elaboration and implementation of the SOAI C C 39203 І 39203 Improvement of the emergency operation instructions occurred in power decrease and during outage O O 39204 ІІ 39204 Implementation of the severe accidents analysis. Elaboration the SAMG (severe accident management guide) O P
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11.2 Maps and other illustrative information not incorporated into the main report
11.2.1 NPP radiation monitoring layout Figure 10 – Layout of radiation monitoring in Zaporizhzhya NPP 30km zone
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Figure 11 – Layout of radiation monitoring in Rivne NPP 30km zone
Figure 12 – Layout of radiation monitoring in Khmelnitsky NPP 30km zone
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Figure 13 – Layout of radiation monitoring in South-Ukrainian NPP 30km zone
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11.2.2 Maps of NPPs environment
Figure 14 – NPP location map on the territory of Ukraine
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Figure 15 – Land use map around the Zaporizhzhya NPP
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Figure 16 – Land use map around the Rivne NPP
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Figure 17 – Land use map around the Khmelnitsky NPP
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Figure 18 – Land use map around the South-Ukrainian NPP
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11.3 Other technical information and data
11.3.1 Technical principles of Pressurized Water Reactors Pressurised water reactors (PWR) are common throughout the world. Uranium dioxide with low enrichment level of the isotope uranium-235 is used as a fuel for VVER reactors. The fission process generates thermal energy: heat is removed by light water which circulates within the reactor core. This water serves three purposes: • it acts as a neutron moderator allowing the fission chain reaction to take place (without water reaction would be impossible); • it acts as a coolant to remove the heat released by nuclear fission; • it acts as a substance to transfer thermal energy from the core to steam generators. The primary cooling circuit is pressurized in order to prevent water from boiling. From the reactor, water flows to four identical steam generators within which it travels through bundles of tubes immersed in a secondary circuit of water. The secondary cooling circuit water is at a lower pressure so that, as it takes up heat from the ‘primary circuit’ within the tubes, it boils to steam. The primary circuit water is pumped back to the reactor in a ‘closed loop’ to begin its cycle again. The steam produced from the non-radioactive secondary circuit passes to the turbine hall where it drives a turbine coupled to an electricity generator. Then, the steam is condensed as it flows over cold tubes cooled by water drawn from a cooling tower, river, lake or sea. Condensate is returned to the steam generators via a system of pumps, and pre-heaters to begin the cycle again. The power station therefore, has two ‘closed water cycles’ the primary and secondary circuits, and one open cycle the cooling water used for the condensers. Only the primary circuit, which is restricted to the reactor containment building, contains radioactivity.
Figure 19- Pressurized water reactor principles
1. Reactor 7. Condensator 2. Reactor core 8. Generator 3. Control rod drives 9. Transformer and output to electricity consumers 4. Main coolant pump 10. Cooling tower 5. Steam generator 11. Cooling pond 6. Turbine 12. Pump
The reactor is controlled by raising or lowering neutron-absorbing rods and by adjusting the concentration of neutron absorbing chemicals in the primary circuit water. Control systems are designed to automatically control the reactor within specified limits. The instrumentation monitors many parameters and warns operators if any factor is drifting outside
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operating limits. If no corrective action is taken causing the pre-set limits to be exceeded, the reactor will automatically shut down. Engineered safety features and emergency systems are designed to ensure that, irrespective of the cause, the reactor will always be safely shut down and cooled.
11.3.2 Results of radiation monitoring in monitoring zone of NPPS Results of radiation monitoring in monitoring zone of operating NPPs of Ukraine are provided on the presened below drawings and tables. The “zero background” provided in the tables means the status of environment before the construction of NPPs.
Drawing 20 Total emissions of inert radioactive gases of NPPs of Ukraine for 2006-2010.
ТБк/рік 60
40
20
0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ЗАЕС РАЕС ЮУАЕС ХАЭС Drawing 21 Total spray emissions of long-living nucledes of operating NPPs of Ukraine for 2006-2010. МБк/рік 300
200
100
0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ЗАЕС РАЕС ЮУАЕС ХАЭС
Drawing 22 Total emissions of iodine radionucledes of operating NPPs of Ukraine for 2006-2010.
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600
400
200
0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ЗАЕС РАЕС ЮУАЕС ХАЭС Drawing 23 Dynamics of annual cesium-137 ejections to the external water reservoirs on NPPs for 2006-2010.
МБк/рік 1200
900
600
300
0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ЗАЕС РАЕС ЮУАЕС ХАЭС
Drawing 24 Dynamics of annual tritium ejections to the external water reservoirs on NPPs for 2006-2010. ГБк/рік 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ЗАЕС РАЕС ЮУАЕС ХАЕС
Table 61. Reference radionuclide composition of cesium-137 and strontium-90 registered in the waters of upper water reservoirs of NPPs in 2010, Bq/m3
NPP Cesium-137 Strontium-90 «zero background» 2010 «zero background» 2010 ZNPP
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Water reservoir 2,6 ± 0,8 < 3,0 24,3 ± 1,2 16,0 – 33,0 Cooling pond - < 8,0 24,3 ± 1,2 30,0 – 41,0 RNPP River Styr 3,7 – 22,2 < 42,0 - –* –* SUNPP River Southern Bug 13,0 < 38,0 13,0 – 17,0 18,0 – 48,0 Cooling pond 31,0 < 23,0 24,4 30,0 – 35,0 KNPP River Horyn 7,4 5,6 – 6,7 14,8 6,1 – 9,4 Cooling pond – 7,9 – 10,4 – 9,1 – 9,2
Table 62. Reference radionuclide composition of cesium-137 and strontium-90 in the atmospheric air of the locals within the monitoring zone of NPPs of the Company during the reporting 2010 year, mmBq/m3
Cesium-137 Strontium-90 NPP «zero background» 2010 «zero background» 2010 ZNPP 2,2 ± 0,7 1,5 – 3,8 11,1 ± 5,9 0,1 – 0,4 RNPP 11,1 – 59,2 2,8 – 18,7 – – SUNPP 2,4 – 3,0 < 4,2 0,9 – 3,0 0,4 – 2,4 KNPP 2,96 – 4,07 0,9 – 3,8 6,29 – 7,77 0,2 – 0,7
Table 63. Density of contamination of the surface soil layer by cesium-137 on the radiation control posts away from NPPs, Bq/m2
«zero NPP background» SPZ SPZ-10 km 10-20 km > 20 km
ZNPP 1180 390 300 210 210 RNPP 444 – 5070 2250 5340 6340 5090 SUNPP 1376 189 211 386 377 KNPP 1180 217 515 381 375
11.3.3 Results of chemical monitoring of surface water at NPPs
Table 68 – Water quality monitoring at Zaporizhzhya NPP
unit: mg/dm3 July July May April June MPC March August October January February November December Parameter September September
Na 25,0 ice ice 24,8 21,25 27,5 25,3 21,7 24,3 26,5 24,74 24,0 Kakhovske reservoir, 500 m upstream the K 5,3 ice ice 5,1 5,55 5,4 5,1 5,4 5,2 5,2 5,35 5,6
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cooling pond outlet Mg 13,37 ice ice 17,02 17,02 15,81 17,33 15,81 14,0 13,38 15,2 13,99
Ca 46,1 ice ice 49,1 60,62 51,43 48,6 42,09 44,09 45,09 44,09 49,1
chloride 29,6 ice ice 31,9 35,2 32,3 34,4 25,52 29,3 31,7 29,94 31,7
sulfates 56,4 ice ice 48,4 56,5 59,7 58,8 51,05 49,5 60,6 57,15 57,2
salinity 334,1 ice ice 367,7 397,5 381,0 364,8 324,6 329,3 334,7 339,1 347,6
Na 26,0 25,8 25,8 25,3 25,25 25,3 23,5 25,1 24,4 24,6 24,59 24,59
K 5,7 5,7 5,8 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,6 5,5 5,6 5,5 5,55 5,5
Mg 19,46 19,46 18,8 19,46 18,24 18,24 19,46 19,46 19,46 19,46 19,15 19,15
NPP cooling pond Ca 56,11 56,11 56,11 56,11 60,12 60,12 60,12 56,11 56,11 56,11 56,11 56,11 outlet chloride 36,6 36,9 36,0 35,0 35,7 35,6 35,5 35,8 35,8 35,7 35,38 35,2
sulfates 77,1 77,9 75,9 76,4 75,2 76,0 74,0 71,3 71,7 71,8 70,95 70,8
salinity 405,8 404,2 403,3 404,4 412,7 412,6 412,5 406,8 403,5 405,3 402,6 403,0
Na 24,0 ice ice 24,8 23,75 26,7 23,5 20,9 26,3 24,0 23,5 22,0 120 K 5,4 ice ice 5,2 5,85 5,5 5,3 5,1 5,1 5,3 5,45 5,7 50 Mg 14,59 ice ice 17,02 17,02 15,81 17,33 15,2 14,6 13,98 13,38 16,42 40 Kakhovske reservoir, 500 m downstream the Ca 46,1 ice ice 50,1 57,11 52,1 50,6 49,1 44,09 46,09 47,1 49,1 180 cooling pond outlet chloride 29,9 ice ice 35,6 33,4 32,8 33,9 29,06 30,2 31,9 28,16 32,6 300 sulfates 56,3 ice ice 48,9 56,9 60,0 60,2 53,35 51,0 60,7 52,45 56,9 100 salinity 340,6 ice ice 340,7 395,2 375,8 366,2 344,7 340,2 331,2 335,7 352,2 1000
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Organic matter Nitrogen compounds Phosphate if not specified, Permanganate 3 BOD Ammonia the unit is: mg/dm oxidizability. Oil products Nitrates Nitrites Fluorides mgO2/dm3 nitrogen mgO2 dm3 January 10,8 2,74 0,028 0,33 4,62 0,03
February ice ice ice ice ice ice ice March ice ice ice ice ice ice ice April 10,0 2,78 0,028 0,237 1,45 0,024 0,41
Kakhovske May 8,6 2,79 0,027 0,254 1,97 0,03 0,241 reservoir, 500 June 9,53 2,66 0,025 0,312 1,018 0,029 0,218 m upstream the cooling July 8,85 2,69 0,024 0,271 0,717 0,024 0,242 pond outlet August 8,75 2,81 0,022 0,222 0,444 0,014 0,381 September 9,2 2,77 0,035 0,232 0,516 0,024 0,44 October 8,6 2,68 0,024 0,25 1,91 0,028 0,46 November 9,0 2,65 0,031 0,286 3,06 0,0295 0,46 December 6,6 2,71 0,02 0,266 3,52 0,03 0,4 January 10,2 2,66 0,028 0,338 4,67 0,03 0,62 February 10,2 2,65 0,028 0,332 4,17 0,03 0,61 March 10,1 2,65 0,029 0,33 3,76 0,03 0,6 April 10,3 2,65 0,028 0,339 2,38 0,03 0,5 May 10,0 2,65 0,028 0,33 2,36 0,03 0,47
NPP cooling June 9,5 2,65 0,027 0,334 1,417 0,03 0,5 pond outlet July 9,85 2,64 0,028 0,324 1,09 0,029 0,46 August 10,02 2,64 0,026 0,303 0,424 0,024 0,38 September 10,0 2,62 0,027 0,313 0,424 0,028 0,42 October 10,1 2,65 0,027 0,308 1,98 0,03 0,5 November 8,2 2,65 0,027 0,305 3,78 0,029 0,48 December 6,4 2,65 0,026 0,308 4,58 0,03 0,53 January 10,5 2,73 0,029 0,332 4,5 0,031 0,58 February ice ice ice ice ice ice ice March ice ice ice ice ice ice ice April 9,8 2,74 0,03 0,241 2,1 0,024 0,45 Kakhovske May 8,9 2,72 0,025 0,26 2,03 0,032 0,241 reservoir, 500 m June 10,03 2,67 0,025 0,325 1,052 0,03 0,22 downstream July 9,25 2,71 0,03 0,275 0,796 0,025 0,264 the cooling pond outlet August 9,42 2,83 0,018 0,233 0,26 0,019 0,392 September 8,0 2,78 0,031 0,218 0,432 0,024 0,44 October 8,1 2,68 0,024 0,265 1,92 0,029 0,49 November 8,7 2,69 0,024 0,263 3,04 0,0295 0,5 December 7,4 2,69 0,02 0,279 3,93 0,03 0,47 MPC не>15 3 0,05 0,5 40 0,08 0,17
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unit: Month Total iron Fluorides Cu Mn Zn Co Cd Ni Pb mg/dm3 January 0,182 0,24 0,0098 0,019 0,045 0,0005 0,0001 0,0062 0,0018 February ice ice ice ice ice ice ice ice ice March ice ice ice ice ice ice ice ice ice April 0,178 0,25 0,0079 0,02 0,043 0,0006 0,0001 0,0057 0,0017 Kakhovske May 0,468 0,24 0,009 0,021 0,046 0,0005 0,0001 0,0051 0,001 reservoir, 500 m June 0,214 0,27 0,0078 0,0193 0,0443 0,0005 0,0001 0,0048 0,0016 upstream July 0,248 0,28 0,0091 0,019 0,045 0,0006 0,0001 0,0051 0,0017 the cooling pond outlet August 0,215 0,19 0,0078 0,02 0,0451 0,0006 0,0001 0,0059 0,0019 September 0,183 0,31 0,0087 0,017 0,046 0,0007 0,0001 0,0057 0,0018 October 0,181 0,24 0,01040 0,0197 0,045 0,0007 0,0001 0,0063 0,0019 November 0,193 0,269 0,0098 0,0185 0,0405 0,0007 0,0001 0,0047 0,0017 December 0,215 0,189 0,0096 0,0185 0,0445 0,0009 0,0001 0,0056 0,0018 January 0,019 0,29 0,03 0,018 0,045 0,0006 0,0001 0,0097 0,002 February 0,18 0,36 0,03 0,018 0,045 0,0005 0,0001 0,0097 0,002 March 0,17 0,22 0,028 0,018 0,045 0,0006 0,0001 0,0097 0,002 April 0,18 0,29 0,028 0,018 0,045 0,0006 0,0001 0,0097 0,0019 May 0,218 0,295 0,028 0,018 0,045 0,0005 0,0001 0,0097 0,002 NPP June 0,194 0,29 0,027 0,018 0,045 0,0006 0,0001 0,0097 0,0019 cooling pond outlet July 0,198 0,29 0,027 0,018 0,045 0,0008 0,0001 0,0097 0,002 August 0,198 0,245 0,027 0,018 0,045 0,0008 0,0001 0,0097 0,002 September 0,19 0,33 0,0267 0,018 0,045 0,0007 0,0001 0,0097 0,002 October 0,195 0,3 0,0278 0,018 0,045 0,0008 0,0001 0,0097 0,002 November 0,198 0,324 0,03 0,0174 0,043 0,0008 0,0001 0,0097 0,0018 December 0,17 0,277 0,0303 0,017 0,045 0,0008 0,0001 0,0097 0,0017 January 0,187 0,25 0,011 0,018 0,045 0,0004 0,0001 0,0063 0,0019 February ice ice ice ice ice ice ice ice ice March ice ice ice ice ice ice ice ice ice April 0,178 0,28 0,0098 0,02 0,044 0,0005 0,0001 0,0058 0,0018 Kakhovske reservoir, May 0,282 0,235 0,009 0,022 0,047 0,0006 0,0001 0,0052 0,002 500 m June 0,206 0,28 0,0075 0,0193 0,0453 0,0006 0,0001 0,0049 0,0016 downstrea m the July 0,237 0,25 0,0095 0,02 0,045 0,0007 0,0001 0,0053 0,0017 cooling August 0,225 0,18 0,0104 0,02 0,0445 0,0007 0,0001 0,0059 0,0019 pond outlet September 0,186 0,32 0,0101 0,019 0,46 0,0006 0,0001 0,0056 0,0017 October 0,181 0,26 0,0105 0,0205 0,045 0,00087 0,0002 0,0064 0,0019 November 0,188 0,233 0,0076 0,018 0,033 0,0008 0,0001 0,0045 0,0015 December 0,155 0,225 0,0096 0,0185 0,044 0,0008 0,0001 0,0055 0,0016 MPC 0,1 не>0,75 0,001кф. 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,005 0,01 0,1
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Table 69 – Water quality monitoring at Rivne NPP
MPC Styr river water 500 m upstream the water intake, annual data Indicators unit (cat. II fishery ponds) 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 рН рН 6,5 - 8,5 8,15 8,16 8,1 8,2 8,1 8,1 8,2 8,1 8,1 8 8 28ºC summer Temperature t °С 11,9 11,4 12,6 11,9 10,9 11,7 12,3 11,7 13,2 11,3 12,3 8ºC winter in a column of 20 cm should not Transparency sm 19,9 19,7 19,7 20,0 19,9 19,6 19,8 20,0 20,0 20,0 20,0 acquire the odor, flavor, color
Sulfates SO42- mg/l ≤ 100 30,8 30,0 31,6 32,0 35,0 32,6 32,7 32,8 31,5 34,1 54,3 Oil products mg/l < 0,05 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,04 0,06 0,06 0,09 0,04 0,00 0,09 0,15 Chlorides Cl- mg/l ≤ 300 15,4 15,1 13,6 13,5 14,1 15,4 16,3 16,6 16,1 15,5 17,0 Phosphate mg/l ≤ 0,1 0,24 0,27 0,24 0,29 0,27 0,24 0,21 0,23 0,20 0,25 РО43- ≤ 0,5 (< 1,2 NH4Cl, Ammonia mg/l < 1,0 (NH4)2SO4, 0,44 0,27 0,50 0,31 0,26 0,37 0,21 0,17 0,13 0,12 0,53 nitrogen NH4+ < 0,5 NH4NO2)
Nitrites NO2- mg/l ≤ 0,08 0,077 0,105 0,079 0,079 0,076 0,089 0,085 0,056 0,056 0,095 0,069 ≤ 4 ( includes < 0,5 Nitrates NO3- mg/l 4,2 7,52 5,76 6,20 5,76 4,87 6,20 3,99 4,43 5,76 6,33 NH4NO2) Total Fe mg/l ≤ 0,3 0,35 0,21 0,28 0,25 0,37 0,37 0,29 0,29 0,24 0,24 0,25 Cu2+ mg/l 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,002 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,004 0,004 Zn2+ mg/l 0,008 0,012 0,008 0,005 0,006 0,005 0,009 0,008 0,003 0,010 0,005 ≤ 6 (БПКп ≤ 3,0; BOD5 mg/l 1,31 2,34 2,48 2,06 1,99 2,84 2,26 2,59 2,96 2,70 3,47 БПКп ≤ 4,0 зимой) > 4,0 under ice Dissolved mg/l > 6,0 summer 9,82 10,37 10,07 9,81 10,30 10,22 10,10 11,11 11,52 11,99 − Oxygen O2 12:00 COD mg/l ≤ 30,0 33,92 33,35 36,30 32,72 30,26 29,18 18,88 43,19 30,62 − − ≤ 20 (< natural Suspended content +0,75; mg/l 7,0 8,6 5,7 5,8 6,4 9,0 7,9 6,9 9,1 7,3 17,9 matters < natural content +5% при > 30) ≤ 1000 mg/l on dry Salinity mg/l 424,9 501,7 498,5 386,7 353,9 371,0 417,6 395,9 274,8 − − residual mg- Alkalinity Not rated 5,23 4,93 5,08 4,74 4,92 4,71 5,02 − − − − eqv/l Hardness of mg- Not rated 6,17 5,58 5,98 5,26 7,41 6,18 5,97 − − − − water eqv/l mg- Ca2+ ≤ 180 mg/l 4,64 4,50 4,78 4,34 5,60 4,83 4,54 − − − − eqv/l mg- Mg2+ ≤ 40 mg/l 1,51 1,21 1,19 0,92 1,78 1,37 1,42 − − − − eqv/l Synthetic mg/l ≤ 0,5 ------0,02 0,48 − − − surfactants
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MPC of special Industrial storm water of RNPP, annual data Indicators unit permits for water use 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 рН рН from 6,5 to 8,5 8,41 8,53 8,3 8,5 8,5 8,4 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,4 Temperature t °С < 28 22,5 23,3 21,9 20,8 22,6 19,9 20,5 23,3 24,4 25,3 25,8 Transparency sm > 20 19,7 19,1 19,2 19,3 17,8 17,6 18,4 19,0 18,7 16,7 17,7
Sulfates SO42- mg/l < 380 183,8 244,9 331,9 291,1 338,7 268,8 291,4 323,1 255,8 279,8 365,5 Oil products mg/l < 0,31 0,14 0,11 0,11 0,14 0,18 0,19 0,18 0,05 0,00 0,11 0,21 Chlorides Cl- mg/l < 300,0 51,5 52,5 41,5 34,3 34,4 19,5 31,7 35,5 36,6 36,2 34,4
Fluorides РО43- mg/l < 4,12 0,31 0,38 0,47 0,39 0,53 0,49 0,40 0,43 0,44 0,36 0,43 Ammonia mg/l < 1,22 0,57 0,42 0,52 0,49 0,32 0,40 0,31 0,31 0,29 0,22 0,78 nitrogen NH4+
Nitrites NO2- mg/l < 0,098 0,065 0,059 0,043 0,049 0,039 0,069 0,043 0,030 0,030 0,026 0,036
Nitrates NO3- mg/l < 50,00 15,2 26,5 18,04 15,95 15,06 11,52 10,63 9,75 10,63 11,96 15,95 Total Fe mg/l < 0,60 0,25 0,21 0,30 0,32 0,48 0,47 0,37 0,30 0,33 0,32 0,34 Cu2+ mg/l < 0,150 0,204 0,128 0,106 0,093 0,080 0,060 0,072 0,075 0,072 0,093 0,076 Zn2+ mg/l < 0,060 0,013 0,015 0,016 0,011 0,010 0,007 0,011 0,011 0,016 0,014 0,009
BOD5 mg/l < 6,00 1,59 2,14 1,98 2,19 2,01 2,49 2,01 2,05 2,06 2,12 3,18 Dissolved mg/l ≥ 4,0 8,84 9,03 8,54 8,29 8,14 8,50 8,48 8,67 8,85 9,48 – Oxygen O2 COD mg/l < 15,00 8,6 10,4 9,4 10,3 10,5 13,1 10,8 10,9 13,1 11,3 21,5 Suspended mg/l < 1566,00 572,1 776,8 872,5 708,7 762,5 689,5 809,1 868,6 536,7 – – matters Salinity mg/l − 4,45 4,26 3,83 4,93 5,56 4,91 5,28 – – – – mg- Alkalinity − 8,03 8,54 11,26 10,69 13,83 11,03 10,73 – – – – eqv/l mg- Ca2+ − 5,42 6,02 8,79 8,68 11,26 8,99 8,50 – – – – eqv/l mg- Mg2+ − 2,52 2,52 2,48 2,00 2,62 2,05 2,24 – – – – eqv/l
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MPC fishery Styr river water 500 m downstream the water intake, annual data Indicators unit ponds of II Category 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 рН рН 6,5-8,5 7,00 8,20 8,20 8,10 8,30 8,20 8,20 8,20 8,20 8,20 8,19 28ºC summer Temperature °С 13,8 15,7 15,3 16,8 14,9 15,4 12,3 14,1 15,8 12,6 13,7 8ºC winter Transparency sm >20 17,1 20,0 19,9 20,0 19,7 19,6 20,0 20,0 19,7 19,6 20,0 Sulfates mg/l ≤100 54,2 32,8 26,4 44,0 31,2 34,5 39,5 34,3 34,2 32,4 31,0 SO42- Oil products mg/l <0,05 0,12 0,02 0,00 0,06 0,08 0,08 0,06 0,04 0,07 0,05 0,08 Chlorides Cl- mg/l ≤300 16,0 18,8 16,7 19,5 16,3 16,9 15,2 14,5 13,9 14,6 15,8 Fluorides mg/l ≤0,1 0,23 0,30 0,33 0,28 0,33 0,29 0,28 0,26 0,28 0,25 0,19 РО43- Ammonia mg/l ≤0,5 0,34 0,11 0,13 0,19 0,23 0,32 0,22 0,35 0,44 0,32 0,51 nitrogen NH4+
Nitrites NO2- mg/l ≤0,08 0,095 0,066 0,069 0,056 0,072 0,099 0,082 0,089 0,089 0,112 0,081
Nitrates NO3- mg/l ≤4 5,32 6,20 3,54 2,66 4,43 3,98 5,32 5,76 4,43 7,96 4,00 Total Fe mg/l ≤0,3 0,27 0,27 0,25 0,32 0,33 0,39 0,39 0,26 0,32 0,27 0,39 Cu2+ mg/l 0,006 0,008 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,003 0,001 Zn2+ mg/l 0,014 0,012 0,006 0,008 0,008 0,005 0,006 0,006 0,009 0,012 0,008
BOD5 mg/l ≤6,00 2,35 2,27 2,47 2,37 1,86 2,61 1,84 2,05 2,03 1,99 1,64 > 4,0 under ice Dissolved mg/l > 6,0 summer - 11,86 10,66 9,63 8,59 9,35 9,66 9,60 9,38 9,30 9,56 Oxygen O2 12:00 COD mg/l ≤20,0 15,8 9,2 10,8 7,9 8,5 8,3 6,7 6,4 6,4 8,3 40,28 Salinity mg/l ≤1000,00 - - 311,6 395,5 487,3 364,0 371,0 404,4 532,3 541,9 8,4 mg- Alkalinity - - - - - 5,16 4,79 4,76 4,79 4,47 4,69 428,2 eqv/l Hardness of mg------5,86 6,29 7,39 5,51 5,39 5,18 5,17 water eqv/l mg- Ca2+ ≤180 - - - - 4,63 5,11 5,87 4,51 4,26 4,14 6,02 eqv/l mg- Mg2+ ≤40 - - - - 1,27 1,18 1,61 1,00 1,14 1,02 92,38 eqv/l
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Table 70 – Water quality monitoring at Khmelnitsky NPP Average cooling pond water quality indicators Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 рН 8,4 8,62 8,48 8,52 8,45 8,46 8,46 8,29 8,29 8,35 8,44 Total hardness, mg-eqv/l 3,43 3,25 3,15 3,15 3,27 3,22 3,11 2,85 2,81 2,91 3,10 Ca, mg/l 54,65 51,87 51,72 49,71 51,63 50,42 48,66 42,99 40,90 42,75 45,73 Mg, mg/l 8,45 8,04 7,74 7,69 8,35 8,54 8,32 8,60 9,34 9,41 9,88 Na, mg/l 38,89 41,91 36,58 36,21 40,19 42,30 44,39 50,78 54,76 57,68 61,30 K, mg/l 6,59 6,65 6,17 6,87 6,16 5,92 6,50 8,17 8,35 8,79 8,87 bicarbonate, mg-eqv/l 3,01 2,80 2,79 2,63 2,89 2,97 3,05 2,90 2,88 3,11 3,12 carbonate, mg-eqv/l 0,13 0,22 0,09 0,15 0,17 0,14 0,11 0,05 0,03 0,07 0,12 sulfates, mg/l 73,94 81,86 72,12 73,19 76,44 77,62 73,24 82,19 86,54 82,71 90,64 chlorides, mg/l 21,12 21,25 20,78 23,10 23,27 21,58 20,37 23,17 22,59 25,85 28,21 Transparency, sm 38,8 36,8 34,1 24,9 22,3 26,2 26,8 26,9 45,8 48,2 50,0 Oil products, mg/l 0,040 0,032 0,029 0,033 0,024 0,021 0,021 0,020 0,019 0,023 0,019 COD, mgO/l 30,51 32,70 31,13 32,47 29,50 34,10 27,44 32,76 35,30 35,21 36,48 Synthetic surfactants, mg/l 0,029 0,043 0,032 0,062 0,066 0,026 0,017 0,020 0,033 0,026 0,014 Ammonia nitrogen mg/l 0,310 0,401 0,512 0,308 0,316 0,696 0,399 0,342 0,337 0,286 0,310 Nitrites, mg/l 0,014 0,047 0,027 0,027 0,029 0,027 0,026 0,023 0,029 0,021 0,030 Nitrates, mg/l 1,477 0,762 0,848 0,814 1,022 0,936 0,621 0,817 1,089 1,311 1,762 Fluorides, mg/l 0,034 0,102 0,075 0,109 0,174 0,159 0,221 0,155 0,233 0,278 0,305 Total Fe, mg/l 0,126 0,095 0,166 0,163 0,238 0,168 0,132 0,123 0,094 0,100 0,100 Suspended matters, mg/l 16,2 17,7 13,6 11,3 9,9 12,8 14,8 9,5 8,9 6,3 9,0 Permanganate ox, mgO/l 9,3 10,0 9,5 9,3 8,9 9,0 8,2 9,2 8,8 10,2 8,1 BOD5, mgO/l 5,1 6,1 5,5 4,3 4,0 4,7 5,9 5,7 5,8 3,9 4,1 Mineralisation, mg/l 392,9 390,0 369,2 362,8 388,4 393,1 391,8 395,2 400,6 420,4 440,3 Dry residue, mg/l 310,4 315,1 299,1 289,7 300,9 303,8 301,6 307,3 312,8 321,1 350,5
Average quality indicators of raw water taken from river Horyn Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 рН 8,19 8,37 8,33 8,22 8,24 8,08 8,17 8,13 8,02 8,14 8,24 Total hardness, mg-eqv/l 5,81 5,915 5,74 5,72 5,56 5,20 5,62 5,61 5,54 5,53 5,83 Ca, mg/l 94,657 94,58 93,70 94,51 89,00 84,01 90,27 91,27 86,83 89,85 95,59 Mg, mg/l 14,48 14,47 12,96 12,16 13,76 12,23 13,58 13,05 13,68 12,56 12,89 Na, mg/l 16,61 14,31 14,84 18,48 17,25 15,98 15,78 18,52 16,68 17,92 20,25 K, mg/l 5,55 5,04 5,83 5,73 4,98 4,63 4,48 5,11 5,19 5,67 5,32 bicarbonate, mg-eqv/l 4,94 5,05 5,10 5,00 4,79 4,54 5,01 4,90 4,85 5,03 5,11 carbonate, mg-eqv/l 0,0 0,076 0,03 0,01 0,04 0,012 0,013 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 sulfates, mg/l 46,35 43,28 38,57 49,08 54,14 48,23 43,42 51,62 46,79 40,83 52,77 chlorides, mg/l 21,65 21,58 21,44 20,64 21,68 18,03 17,84 18,45 17,48 19,60 19,39 Transparency, sm 21,65 36,5 35,0 25,1 23,2 23,2 26,8 27,6 33,5 39,3 44,0 Chrominanc, degree 33,88 12,0 19,8 51,2 58,0 54,6 33,6 64,1 37,4 35,8 53,5 Oil products, mg/l 0,053 0,034 0,021 0,028 0,029 0,021 0,020 0,022 0,022 0,024 0,029 Synthetic surfactants, mg/l 0,03 0,039 0,032 0,056 0,060 0,024 0,013 0,017 0,047 0,029 0,015 Ammonia nitrogen mg/l 0,40 0,492 0,413 0,352 0,280 0,753 0,380 0,280 0,364 0,395 0,364 Nitrites, mg/l 0,063 0,059 0,057 0,067 0,052 0,080 0,071 0,090 0,078 0,089 0,098 Nitrates, mg/l 8,033 8,978 4,150 8,051 5,729 5,572 6,739 7,642 7,042 6,467 6,970 Fluorides, mg/l 0,085 0,243 0,176 0,191 0,181 0,215 0,245 0,208 0,238 0,209 0,292 Total Fe, mg/l 0,362 0,228 0,183 0,176 0,196 0,361 0,218 0,226 0,158 0,178 0,161 Suspended matters, mg/l 24,42 17,55 15,825 16,333 13,167 11,000 12,050 8,923 9,367 11,75 9,300
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Table 71 – Water quality monitoring at South-Ukrainian NPP Average Yuzhny Buh river water quality indicators near bank pump station at 2001-2008 years Data Indicators Measurement units Min Max Averaged MPC Transparency см 23 29 26 30 Suspended matters mg/l 12,6 29,1 18,4 +0,25 to bgrd Dissolved oxygen mg/l 7,4 14,3 10,8 no < 4 pH 8,1 8,41 8,3 6,5-8,5 Ca mg/l 54 85 66 180 Mg mg/l 22 37 30 40 Hydrocarbonate mg/l 252 377 298 not rated Sulphates mg/l 36 80 62 100 Chlorides mg/l 34 59 40 300 Salinity mg/l 467 644 534 no >1000 Total stiffness mg-eqv/l 5,0 6,9 5,73 not rated Ammonium salt mg/l 0,18 0,92 0,4 0,50 Nitrites mg/l 0,01 0,08 0,03 0,08 Nitrates mg/l 2,86 10,2 5,4 40 BODn mgO2/l 2,0 3,5 2,85 3,0 Permanganate oxidation mgO2/l 4,0 15,0 9,4 no >15 Fluorides mg/l 0,08 0,89 0,41 0,17 Oil products mg/l 0,015 0,045 0,029 0,05 Total Fe mg/l 0,10 0,24 0,17 0,1 Si mg/l 0,1 13,6 3,65 not rated Cu mg/l 0,003 0,05 0,015 no >0,01 Zn mg/l 0,003 0,09 0,031 0,01 Ni mg/l 0,002 0,03 0,0033 0,01 Mn mg/l 0,006 0,26 0,044 0,01 Cr mg/l 0,001 0,012 0,0025 0,005 F mg/l 0,001 0,012 0,0025 no >0,75 Pb mg/l 0,001 0,015 0,007 0,1
Average Tashlyk cooling pond water quality indicators at 2001-2008 years Data Indicators Measurement units Min Max Averaged MPC Transparency см 23 30 28 30 Suspended matters mg/l 10,0 18,2 12,8 +0,25 to bgrd Dissolved oxygen mg/l 6,62 10,8 8,27 no < 4 pH 8,52 8,75 8,66 6,5-8,5 Ca mg/l 41 77 56 180 Mg mg/l 69 82 78 40 Hydrocarbonate mg/l 246 345 310 not rated Sulphates mg/l 346 413 372 100 Chlorides mg/l 130 164 147 300 Salinity mg/l 1070 1220 1153 no >1000 Total stiffness mg-eqv/l 8,36 10,2 9,14 not rated Ammonium salt mg/l 0,15 0,59 0,29 0,50 Nitrites mg/l 0,01 0,08 0,024 0,08 Nitrates mg/l 1,03 6,5 3,78 40 BODn mgO2/l 1,8 3,3 2,43 3,0 Permanganate oxidation mgO2/l 5,2 13,7 8,06 no > 15 Fluorides mg/l 0,07 0,58 0,26 0,17 Oil products mg/l 0,02 0,03 0,023 0,05 Total Fe mg/l 0,05 0,27 0,15 0,1 Si mg/l 0,79 6,5 4,46 not rated Cu mg/l 0,01 0,04 0,026 no >0,01 Zn mg/l 0,003 0,13 0,048 0,01 Ni mg/l 0,004 0,015 0,007 0,01 Mn mg/l 0,003 0,02 0,016 0,01 Cr mg/l 0,001 0,003 0,0023 0,005 F mg/l 0,2 0,7 0,47 no > 0,75 Pb mg/l 0,0005 0,02 0,0078 0,1
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11.3.4 International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)
11.3.5 Estimated effective doses for whole body which will be formed as the result of non- designed accident on power unit type VVER1000 of Rivne NPP
Drawing 25 – Maximum (along the axis of the fallout track) and average effective doses for the whole body which will be formed during the sharp period (14 days) of non-designed accident on power unit type VVER-1000 of Rivne NPP
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Drawing 26 – Maximum (along the axis of the fallout track) and average effective doses for the whole body which will be formed during 50 years after the non-designed accident on power unit type VVER-1000 of Rivne NPP
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11.3.6 HIV prevalence in Ukraine by Oblast
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11.4 List of stakeholders consulted/engaged
11.4.1 Stakeholders registered at scoping meetings see chapter 11.5
11.4.2 Stakeholders registered at public meetings see chapter 11.5
11.4.3 list of NGOs
№ Name of NGO Contact person Address E-mail, fax, phone 1 NGOs group concerning the issues Rudnytska Kiev tel. (+38 044) 353 78 42 of climate changes Khrystyna [email protected] 2 International charity organization Malkova Tamara Post box 201 Tel./fax: (+380 44) 222 7762 “Inforamtion center “Green Kiev, 01025 [email protected] dossier” 3 National ecological center of Stavchuk Iryna Post box 306, 01032, Tel: (+380 44) 353 78 42 Ukraine (NECU) Kiev [email protected] Pasiuk Oleg [email protected] Melnychuk Viktor [email protected] Arthur Denisenko Post box 89, Kiev, Tel: (+380 44) 353 78 41 01025 [email protected] 4 UEA “Green World” Head Korobko Mykola 6, Tobolska str., tel. (+380 097) 917 4431 Ivanovych Kryvyy Rig, 50017 [email protected] Information cener UEA “Green Head Post box 449 Tel/fax: (+380 44) 456 3435 World” Fedorynchyk Sergiy Kiev, 01001 [email protected] Mykhailovych [email protected] 5 Alliance “New Energy of Ukraine” 41, Obolonska str., tel: 8(044) 417 03 38 office 1, Kiev 04071 fax: 8(044) 417-23 87 [email protected] Press-service of +38 050 465 09 49 Alliance [email protected] 6 Nationwide public organization 11, Naberezhno- [email protected] “Our Ukraine” (NGO) Khreshchatytska str., office 67, Kiev, 04070 7 Scientific technical unity of 12, Khreshchatyk str., [email protected] energetic and electricians of 3rd floor, office 303. Ukraine, society organization Kiev, 01001 8 Nationwide ecological public 4, Akademika Yangelya Tel.:+380 (44) 453-47-96 organization “MAMA-86”” str., office 126, Kiev, Tel/fax +380 (44) 456-13-38 03057 [email protected] 9 “Ecology – Right – Person” Kravchenko Olena 9, Ivana Franko str., Tel./fax: (032) 225 76 82 (former “Ecopravo – Lviv”) Valeriyivna, executive office 1a, Lviv, 79005 [email protected] director Post box 316, Lviv, [email protected] 79000
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№ Name of NGO Contact person Address E-mail, fax, phone 10 Western center of Ukrainian Grytsyshyn Petro 4, Mateyka str., Lviv, Tel./fax: (+38 032) 238-73-69 representative office of Mykhailovych 79000 [email protected] “International center of scientific culture – worldwide laboratory” 11 Bureau of ecological investigations Pavelko Anatoliy 9/6, O. Basarab str., [email protected] (BEI) Lviv, 79017 12 Kharkiv public organization Shumilo Oleksiy Post box 10479 tel./fax: (+380 57) 719-1021, (+380 “EcoPravo – Kharkiv” Kharkiv, 61202 57) 719-10-23 [email protected] 13 Ukrainian – American ecological Lychuk Taras 11, Strutynskoji str., Tel: +38 (0362) 24-9136 association (UAEA) office 18, Rivne, 33003 [email protected] 14 Khmelnitski oblast organization of Reznikov Yuriy Post box 111 Tel. (+380 382) 792416 Ukrainian unity for nature Oleksandrovych Khmelnitsky, 29000 [email protected] protection 15 “Ecoclub” Board Head Post box № 73, Rivne, Tel/fax +38 0362 237024 Martyniuk Andriy, Ukraine, 33023 [email protected] coordinator for energy 39, Vidinska str., office program Lyashchuk 310 Olya 16 Cherkassy oblast organization Pleskach Alla 190, Khreshchatyk str., Tel/fax: (+380 472) 47-48-91 “Green World” office 9 [email protected] Cherkasy, 18000 17 Ecological-humanitarian unity Stepanenko Post box № 12, city of tel. (+38 097) 752-4122 “Green World” Oleksandr Chortkiv, Ternopil [email protected] oblast, 48500 18 Ukrainian nuclear unity [email protected] 19 International ecological Ozharovskiy Andriy, 59, Suvorovskiy ave, [email protected] organization “Byellona” expert Saint-Petersburgh, 191015 20 Nationwide charity foundation Radchenko Tamara 19, Vyshgorodska str., Tel/fax.:044 430-43-90, 430-00-64, “Sprout” Dmytrivna, Verbytskiy Kiev, 04074, 430-02-60 Volodymyr [email protected] Valentynovych
21 Nationwide public organization “To Ivanov Anatoliy 12/3, Horodetskogo str., tel. 044 278-46-06 clear sources” Oleksandrovych, the office 63, Kiev, 01001 [email protected] chairman 22 NGO “Live planet” Berzina Svitlana 61, Vidradnyy ave, Kiev Tel.044 332-84-08, 332-84-0 Valeriyivna, [email protected] chairwoman www.ecolable.org.ua 23 NGO “Geologists’ unity of Ukraine” Hafych Liudmyla 28, Dubrovytska str., Tel. 044 468-90-82 Felixivna – first head Kiev [email protected], deputy [email protected] 24 NGO “Clear wave” Zagorodniuk Pavlo 28, Dubrovytska str., Tel. 044 468-90-82, м.050 Oleksiyovych – Kiev 3102369 Chairman [email protected] Yerysheva Antonina Ivanivna
25 Nationwide unity « Ecological Pashenko Olena 30B, Saksaganskogo Tel. 044 251-13-32 guard » Viktorivna, program str., office 33, Kiev [email protected] coordinator 01033 26 Nationwide ecological League Tymochnko Tetyana 30B, Saksaganskogo Tel. 044 251-13-32 Valentynivka, str., office 33, Kiev [email protected] chairwoman 01033
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№ Name of NGO Contact person Address E-mail, fax, phone 27 Scientific technical unity of Dupak Oleksandr 12, Khreshchatyk, 12, Tel. 044 239-47-73, energetic and electricians of Sergiyovych, vice- Kiev, 01001 Tel/fax 044 278-43-07 Ukraine president, [email protected] Ignatyeva Inna Petrivna
28 Cooperator and the businessmen Slyesarenko Vasyl 10, Klovskiy prov., Tel. 044 294-00-28, 254-44-67 unity of Ukraine (CBUU) Viktorovych office 1a, Kiev cell phone.067 150-93-46 [email protected] 29 “Green World” Samoylenko Yuriy Kontraktova sq., office tel/fax 044 417-43-83, 417-02-83, Ivanovych, chairman 203, Kiev, 04070 416-52-18, д.424-33-88 Bosak Adel Vasylivna [email protected]
30 Ukrainian botanic society Dudka Iryna 2, Tereshchenkovska tel. 044 234-61-71, 220-01-36 Oleksandrivna str., Kiev, 01001 [email protected] [email protected] 31 Ukrainian representative office of Sobotovych Emlen 34-A, Palladina ave, tel/fax 044 451-02-36, 424-14-60 international unity “Human Volodymyrovych – Kiev, 03142 235-59-52 ecology” chairman, [email protected] Simonova Olena Dmytrivna Lysenko Olha Borysivna 32 Ukrainian nature protection society Kravchuk Mykola 5B, Barbiusa str., Kiev, tel. 044 289-71-73, 289-73-82 Ostapovych – head 03150 [email protected] deputy of the society, Kurulenko Svyatoslav Sergiyovych – head of Donetsk oblast council 33 Federation of organic movement Konyashyn Andriy tel. 044 425-45-90, Vyacheslavovych, cell phone 050 411-57-10 executive director [email protected]
34 Nationwide Ecological Movement Vyacheslav Zaporizhzhya mailto:[email protected] “Khortytskyy Forum”" Andriyovych Sandul – Head of down Dnieper basin council
11.5 Records of stakeholders’ participation
11.5.1 Minute of scoping meeting, Kiev
List of attendees: • Gennadiy Sazonov, Energoatom • Sergey Tarakanov, Energoatom • Dmitsiy Sergeyenko, Energoatom • Alexander Kochugov, Energoatom • Vitaliy Boyko, Energoatom
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• Michel Levy, AJC Development • Jerome Lazarus, AJC Development • Artiom Kovalenko, AJC Development-Energoatom • Alexander Slavis, EBRD • Pierre Biedermann, Poyry • Andrey Demydenko, Poyry • Ksenia Melnychenko, Poyry • Ludvig Litvinsky, SSEC CSER • Vladimir Zernopolsky, South-Ukrainian NPP • Galina Oleynikova, ‘Mama-86’ • Alexander Guzenko, Energoatom press-service • Aleksey Pasiuk, National Ecological Center of Ukraine • Ihor Yashkin, ‘Ukrainian news’ • Dmitriy Chumak, Ukrainian Nuclear Association • Vyacheslav Rzheutskiy, ‘UNIAN’
Mr. Sazonov had started with the introduction speech concerning the scoping meeting and informed the attendees about the prehistory of Energoatom’s and EBRD co-operation within Safety Upgrade Program. Mr. Sazonov noted that Energoatom had prepared the feasibility study and supplied it to the prospective lenders (EBRD). He clarified that there were two feasibility studies prepared in the context of SUP because of governmental guarantees procedure necessity under which financed would be provided. Both feasibility studies foresee EA of SUP implementation preparation. To prevent development of two EAs the parties had agreed to develop one EA according to the international procedures and Ukrainian legislation at once. To implement this agreement Bank had conducted the tender procedure and as the result had nominated Poyry & UCEWP companies as the Contractor which are working over the EA on the basis of EBRD grant provided by Energoatom. While the introduction speech the attendees (Mr. Aleksey Pasiuk, National Ecological Center of Ukraine) had asked the question concerning the amount of the credit foreseen and what part of the general program costs it stands for. Mr. Sazonov had answered that the estimated value of the program is 1,2 billion EUR, while approx. 30% of this amount will be covered by Energoatom from its funds, and 70% amount stands for the two-part grant of EBRD and Euroatom. Part covered by EBRD is foreseen in the amount of approx. 800 mln EUR but at the present moment Bank is reviewing the technical issues and hadn’t started the negotiation processes concerning the final grant amount. Consultant’s representatives, Mr. Biedermann together with Mr. Demydenko had made the presentation of EA (attached). This presentation had introduced the specifics of EA process, its objectives and the vectors of co-operation with stakeholders. While the process of presentation Mr. Biedermann noted that EA process should be bilateral according to the requirements of EBRD social procedures. He also paid attention to the fact that while the preparation of the Stakeholders Engagement Plan the Consultant tried to engage the maximum number of different stakeholders – as the ones directly involved in the EA preparation, as the others. Mr. Biedermann also mentioned the milestones of the EA implementation: scoping meetings in Kiev and on NPP sites in satellite cities, finalization of the Scoping Report, its disclosure, public consultations, and as the result, development of the final EA report including the comments, suggestions and answers for the questions received while the public consultations. Mr. Biedermann paid attention to the fact that all the public documents will be published on the web- site of Energoatom and everyone can download this information concerning EA. Mr. Biedermann and Mr. Demydenko had thanked everyone for their attention and suggested to start the “questions-answers” stage.
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Mr. Sazonov had commented the Consultant’s presentation with the words that work over the EA implementation is done together with all the projects parties, meetings are held, comments are received and according them the final format of EA report is developed. Mr. Pasiuk had clarified that according to his vision of the scoping meetings the stakeholders should take part in the development of the final contents of EA report. Mr. Litvinsky had answered that Energoatom together with Ministry of Ecology of Ukraine and EBRD had developed the special document which defined the contents of EA report as soon as there was no such reference document in Ukraine and within EBRD documents taking into account the fact that modernization projects was not falling under the standard EIA requirements. Mr. Sazonov had added that the final version of the mentioned document had been agreed by all the parties and disclosed via web-site of Energoatom for the public. He also paid attention to the fact that situation was unprecedented for Ukraine as soon as the normative document had been elaborated specially for EA process. Mr. Pasiuk had asked the question whether and in what part EA was using SEA as soon as such information had been revealed earlier while the presentation. Mr. Biedermann had clarified that SUP formally was not requiring either SEA, or EA. Usually EIA is elaborated for the new construction and SEA is elaborated for the whole sector policy but not the modernization program of the existing objects. In this case the decision to implement EA and to engage the maximum number of stakeholders had been undertaken. Public consultations procedure which is defined in detail in SEA had been taken as the basis for elaboration of the above mentioned tasks. Mr. Biedermann also mentioned that SEA was not ratified by Ukraine and one should not talk about the official SEA. Mr. Litvinsky had added the information about the fact that national requirements concerning EIA elaboration are highly wider then it was required by the new normative document. Standard developed for the EA consists of the detailed description of the object, technologies, economical part and also the work organization plan. Basically SEA is aiming at the environmental and social impact assessment. Within this part SEA and the Standard are almost identical. Mr. Pasiuk had asked whether the mentioned program was foreseeing the lifecycle extension of NPPs. Representatives of Energoatom, the Consultant and Bank had clarified that EA implementation was not foreseeing the lifecycle extention of NPPs, thus, no strategic element was foreseen in this format of EA. Mr. Pasiuk had asked whether the representative of the Consultant would be present in Ukraine on the permanent basis. Mr. Biedermann answered that him as the representative of the Consultant would be present in Kiev until the end of preliminary EA report preparation and after that would be present while the public meetings with stakeholders. Mr. Pasiuk has asked whether the Regulator had been engaged in EA implementation. Mr. Litvinsky had clarified that the Ukrainian party had done the preliminary analysis of the possible impact of each measure. The Consultant’s task is to provide the detailed analysis of the measured foreseen and implement the EA. Mr. Demydenko had noted that the public organizations of the Regulator were invited for the public meetings process as the stakeholders. The representative of the information agency ‘Unian’, Mr. Vyacheslav Rzheutskiy had asked whether one had estimated the possible impact of the credit within the mentioned amounts on the tariffs for the end users. Mr. Sazonov answered that Energoatom being the state enterprise had developed and provided the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine with the project proposal concerning the engagement of the international funds and their own funds use for the financial model analysis. As the result the conclusion that Energoatom’s tariffs will not be much influenced as soon as the percents of the financial credit are not considered as the significant was made. Ministry of Economy of Ukraine and NERC had agreed with the mentioned project. Thus, they had confirmed the lack of the significant influence of the financial means engagement on the selling prices. All the state
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regulatory authorities had analyzed the mentioned project and had provided Energoatom with their positive conclusions – except the Ecological Regulator the positive conclusion of which is to be received in the nearest future. Mr. Pasiuk had clarified that there had been the previous SUP the validity of which had already expired. And as the result he had asked the question on whether the new SUP covered all the measures of the previous SUP which were not implemented. Mr. Tarakanov answered that SUP was more comprehensive than the previous one and it included as the measures from the previous SUP, as the new measures. Mr. Sazonov noted that the scoping meeting was the first public meeting within EA procedure being the kick-off for the range of public meetings and consultations. He thanked the attendees for their interest to the SUP and EA. Mr. Kochugov and Mr. Boyko had also reminded the stakeholders about the possibility of asking questions via communication means stated in the invitation letter.
11.5.2 Minute of scoping meeting, Kuznetsovsk
Date of the meeting: 11.05.2011, 17.00-18.00
Participants of the meeting: Lyashuk A. M. – Head of regional volunteer organization “Chornobyl Union” Bychkova O. P. – Editor of the regional public-political newspaper “New Age” Melnychenko T. I. – Editor of the regional wired radio broadcast Rudys’ F. S. – Head of the regional committee trade union of the state employees Sokol M. A. - Head of the agricultural enterprises association Melnychuk P. D. – Board member of the Manevytski center of SBI “Consumers Union of Ukraine” Fal’kovskyy D. L. – Head of the regional organization of the war and labor veterans Nechyporuk O. G. – Presidium member of the regional female organization Kovalchuk V. I. – First deputy of the mayor Bosyk V. M. – Head of the Humanitarian and Domestic Policy Department Oleshchuk P. V. – Head Deputy of the OM RNPP Kovalets’ S. V. – Head of the city center of the public organization “Ol’beri” Vorobey M. I. – Head of the city public council Bondar V. Y. – Prior of the Holy Pokrovsky Church Kushnir I. L. – Head of the city veterans’ council Korovkin V. O. – Head Deputy of the Ukrainian Nuclear Company Berezyuk Y. M. – Head Deputy of the Volodymyretska regional state administration Ishchyk V. V. – Head of the Domestic Policy, Mass-Media and Public Relationship Department of the regional state administration Kedych K. F. – Head Deputy of the Volodymyretska regional war, labor and armed forces of Ukraine council Skibchyk S. S. – Head Deputy of the chief editor of the Volodymyretska regional newspaper “Volodymyretski informer” Mykolaychuk V. V. – Assistant to the General director of R RNPP Tuz O. – Journalist of “Rivne-1” TV-channel Kotiv Y. – Operator of “Rivne-1” TV-channel Ivanova Y. – Operator of Rivne press-club Martynyuk A. – Head of Rivne “Ecoclub”
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Questions and suggestions of the participants:
• Is the list of SUP measures limited ? Are there any other safety upgrade measures to be implemented which were not included in the SUP? • In view of the Fukushima experience, what specific risks Rivne NPP may face? • What happens if Energoatom doesn’t include costs for the loan service in the tariff? Won’t it lead to Energoatom’s bankruptcy? • It was said that the SUP program does not include the service life extension, but it was mentioned that the SUP includes all 15 power units, while some of them are close to the end of their license. How can you explain this? • By which criteria will you define the schedule for the implementation of measures ? • Will the additional radioactive waste volume resulting from the SUP implementation be mentionned into the Ecological Assessment? • By which criteria will the safety improvement measures be sorted out from the service life extension measures? • Does the SUP provide a number of ecological measures? • At what level of safety is Rivne NPP in comparison with the international NPPs? • Why the issues of radioactive waste management and the provision of population with dosimeters are not mentionned? • Will there be wastes during the SUP implementation? • Is there a plan to minimize radioactive waste exist? Has the tentative evaluation been made by what percentage the radioactivity level will increase during the SUP implementation? • Will there be more information of the population on the radioactive situation in the city [of Kuznetskov]? • In order to provide safe and fast evacuation of the people in case of the nuclear accident the requirement it would be necessary to finish the road across the existing dump (300-350 m), which would shorten the distance for the delivery of loads and for evacuation of the personnel for the distance of at least 6 km in the south-eastern direction (in Polytsya). • With the same objective, it is proposed to build a new bridge across the river Styr a bridge financed by Energoatom. • Together with the Volynskaya oblast, it is proposed to build a road across the villages Velyka Vedmezhka, Mala Vedmezhka to the village Kamyanukha on the Varshavska main road. In this case the railway station Chartoryisk will be 4 km closer to Kuznetsovsk than the railway station in Rafalivka, and the way to the Varsjavska highway in the south-western direction shortens the distance at 33 km one way in this case. • Suggestion to install video cameras at the NPP with screens in villages so that the population of the 30km zone can see the condition of the NPP. • Suggestion to install a large screen in the city center [for each city of the monitoring zone] which would show the status of radioactivity in the city. • By the temperature -15 degrees the river Styr doesn’t freeze which means that there is a thermal and chemical pollution. The requirement is to give access for the deputy commission to conduct monitoring of the pollution.
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11.5.3 Minute of scoping meeting, Netyshin Date of the meeting: 13.05.2011, 10.00-11.00 Participants of the meeting: • Turytskiy B.I. – Chief of the Hydraulic Engineering Facilities of KNPP • Kosik O.P. - Chief of the Department of Modernization and Reconstruction of KNPP • Golod O.V. – Chief of the Laboratory of the Environmental Protection Department of KNPP • Sazonov G.V. - PMG Leader, First General Director Deputy – Director in Projects and Investments of SS Atomproectenginiring • Romanenko S.I. – Chief of the Labour Safety Department of KNPP • Kochugov O.O. – Chief of the Technical Department of the SS “Atomproektenginiring” • Sergeienko D.M. –Deputy Director, Head of Production and Technical Service in the Projects and Investments Direction • Litvinskiy L.L. – Director of Science of SSEC CSER • Kostenko V.V. – Chief of the Radiation Safety Department of KNPP • Bulakova N.M. – Leading Engineer of the Environmental Protection Department of KNPP • Khatiomkin O.V. – KNPP • Panasenko I.V. – President of the Fund of Sustainable Development of Princes of Sangushko. • Shusteruk O.P. – Correspondent of the newspaper “KNPP Perspective” • Stepanyuk T.V. – Editor of the KNPP TV Station • Pierre Biedermann – EA Consultant of the Finnish Company “Poyry”, Director of International Department • Demidenko A.O. - UCEWP • Keda Yu.V. – translator Questions and suggestions to which the participants expect an answer in the EA report: • What is the necessity and the reason to carry out such formal public consultations? • What are the criteria for the approval of the EA? Are they national or international criteria? • Will there be the assessment of the accidents at NPP within the frames of the EA? • We would like to receive some additional information namely (i) how the safety problem is solved in other countries, and (ii) to compare the situation in Ukraine with the same situation in other countries regarding environmental safety, in order to be able to explain to people that the whole process is to ensure people’s safety, and that the programme is aimed at providing environmental safety. This additional information might be video materials, printed materials etc. We [Fund of Sustainable Development of Princes of Sangushko] communicate with people directly, visit villages and would like to get support from state organizations to organize such meetings. • Are regular meetings like this planned during the SUP implementation?
11.5.4 Minute of scoping meeting, Energodar Date of the meeting: 17.05.2011, 10.00-11.30 Place of the meeting: Energodar, ZNPP
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Participants of the meeting: No. Organization Name Position 1 ZNPP Kosse Leonid Head of the Department 2 ZNPP Shepchik Sergey Chief specialist 3 ZNPP Nesterenko Gennadiy Chief of the Reactor Department 4 Nikopol City Council Sandul Vyacheslav Deputy Delegate Consultant 5 ZNPP Zadumov Dmitriy Chief of the laboratory 6 ZNPP Balagurov Dmitriy Engineer Flow Detection Inspector 7 ZNPP Makarevich Elena Guide and Translator 8 National Ecological Center of Khmara Dmitriy Expert in the Issues of Energy Sector Ukraine 9 ZNPP Madyka Dmitriy Engineer 10 ZNPP Pomazanova Svetlana Engineer 11 ZNPP Onischenko Vitalina Specialist 12 ZNPP Gortenko Elena Insulator 13 ZNPP Bernadskaya Natalya Technician 14 ZNPP Konoplyov Sergey Chief of the Department 15 ZNPP Sivirukhin Oleh Engineer 16 Water Ecology Honcharenko Ivan Ecologist 17 Water Ecology Hura Vasiliy Deputy 18 ZNPP Kabirova Elena Engineer 19 ZNPP Rachkova Tatiana Engineer 20 ZNPP Nazaruk Aleksandr Engineer 21 ZNPP Sklyarova Irina Geologist 22 ZNPP Tumankov Ihor Hydro Geologist 23 ZNPP Orlenko Nataliya Engineer 24 ZNPP Kabalina Anzhela Engineer 25 ZNPP Makulina Elena Engineer 26 ZNPP Tsymbaliy Nataliya Engineer 27 ZNPP Chulanovskaya Lyubov Engineer 28 ZNPP Zaychenko Viktoriya Technician 29 ZNPP Hanza Olha Engineer 30 ZNPP Havrushko Tamara Technician 31 ZNPP Marchenko Inna Engineer 32 ZNPP Kaminskaya Elena Engineer 33 ZNPP Pereyaslova Elena Meteorologist 34 ZNPP Voronov Vadim Engineer 35 ZNPP Gnudak Maria Engineer 36 ZNPP Marchenko Irina Engineer 37 ZNPP Ulichnaya Galina Head 38 ZNPP Ryabikh Leonid Technologist 39 ZNPP Magiz Olga Chief Inspector 40 ZNPP Zhuravlyova Nataliya Group Leader 41 ZNPP Shevchenko Olha Engineer 42 ZNPP Piskun Aleksnadr Deputy Head 43 ZNPP Romanyuk Anna Master 44 ZNPP Atamanyuk Olesya House Painter 45 ZNPP Lyashenko Vladimir Sectional Manager 46 ZNPP Goncharova Nadezhda Engineer 47 ZNPP Lyubimova Irina Deputy Head of the Department 48 ZNPP Perevozova Nadezhda Engineer 49 ZNPP Tsyrenova Lyudmila Engineer 50 ZNPP Stovba Svetlana Economist 51 ZNPP Yaroval Lyudmila Engineer 52 ZNPP Zagrebneva Viktoriya Electrical Locksmith 53 ZNPP Atamas’ Yevgeniy Electrical Locksmith 54 ZNPP Gorlov Yevgeniy Crane Operator 55 ZNPP Tkachenko Nataliya Master 56 ZNPP Pogrebnyak Irina Engineer 57 ZNPP Somnik Lyubov Laboratory Assistant 58 ZNPP Picnokha Oksana Planning Engineer 59 Newspaper “Banner of the Correspondent Labor” 60 ZNPP Baranovskiy Oleh Sectional Manager 61 ZNPP Plaksiy Larisa Technician
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62 ZNPP Vatutin Mikhail Technologist 63 ZNPP Redozubov Denis Technologist 64 ZNPP Ruchka Artur Head of the Safety Department 65 ZNPP Farafonova Nataliya Design Engineer 66 ZNPP Valeeva Svetlana Engineer 67 ZNPP Gortenko Aleksey Master 68 ZNPP Kvashnin Ihor Head of the Service 69 ZNPP Mozgovaya Svetlana Head of the Laboratory 70 ZNPP Yakizov Aleksandr Engineer 71 ZNPP Zheltovskiy Vladimir Leading Master 72 ZNPP Gedz Margarita Human Resources Engineer 73 ZNPP Karnaiv Viktor Electrical locksmith 74 ZNPP Zagorulko Dmitriy Master 75 ZNPP Yegorova Dariya Office Manager 76 ZNPP Zhakhovskaya Vita Engineer 77 ZNPP Kareydolg Marina Engineer 78 ZNPP Sverdlenko Marina Engineer 79 ZNPP Kaplonskaya Lyudmila Head of the Department 80 ZNPP Blinova Marina Leading Economist 81 ZNPP Maystrenko Nikolay Primary Circuit Engineer 82 ZNPP Kurbanova Irina Electrical locksmith 83 ZNPP Koltunova Svetlana Technician 84 ZNPP Oshena Galina Engineer 85 ZNPP Lozovskiy Sergey Erection worker 86 ZNPP Zhuk Sergey Head of the Department 87 ZNPP Yasyr Elena Head of the Office 88 Village Council of the Yermakov Sergey Secretary of the Executive Committee v.Vodyanoye 89 Village Council of the Pertrenko Ivan Specialist v.Vodyanoye 90 ZNPP Spiller Sergey Sectional Manager 91 ZNPP Khudan Vladimir Group Leader, Leading Engineer 92 ZNPP Bulgakov Andrey Sectional Manager 93 ZNPP Ilyasov Akay Head of the Guard 94 ZNPP Filipchuk Aleksnadr Team Head 95 ZNPP Minaylov Viktor Team Head 96 ZNPP Yalinich Aleksey Engineer 97 ZNPP Predko Leonid Engineer 98 ZNPP Kvosha Nataliya Engineer 99 ZNPP Kovaleva Valentina Master 100 ZNPP Logvinenko Aleksandr Security Officer 101 ZNPP Davidenko Larisa Production Engineer 102 ZNPP Badyuk Svetlana Technologist 103 ZNPP Grubishich Tatiana Engineer 104 ZNPP Gritsaenko Svetlana Lawyer 105 ZNPP Pankratov Yevgeniy Leading Engineer 106 ZNPP Shevchenko Mikhail Deputy Head 107 ZNPP Zagustina Svetlana Engineer 108 ZNPP Ivanov Aleksandr Sectional Manager 109 ZNPP Student Viktor Deputy Head 110 ZNPP Moskalenko Aleksandr Team Leader 111 ZNPP Kripak Sergey Guard Head 112 ZNPP Dzhura Andrey Electrical Engineer 113 ZNPP Beregovoy Aleksey Senior Master 114 ZNPP Kudryavets Sergey Engineer 115 ZNPP Pritsepa Aleksandr Locksmith 116 ZNPP Avdeev Aleksey Head of the Shift of the Department 117 ZNPP Belyaev Yaroslav Operator 118 ZNPP Sochilo Anton Engineer 119 ZNPP Folkina Svetlana Timekeeper 120 ZNPP Chernezhenko Tatiana Engineer 121 Public Community, Nikopol Golub Vasiliy Pensioner 122 Energodar Zalekoviy Vladimir Pensioner 123 ZNPP Solomina Svetlana Production engineer 124 ZNPP Suprunyuk Aleksandr Operator
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125 ZNPP Aleksandrova Lyudmila Engineer 126 ZNPP Shestakov Konstantin Sectional Manager 127 ZNPP Yakovlev Vitaliy Deputy Head of the Department 128 ZNPP Zhuravskiy Viktor Head of the Department 129 ZNPP Sveschenko Oleh Head of the Shift 130 ZNPP Pechenezhskaya Olha Engineer 131 ZNPP Korablyov Mikhail Deputy Head of the Department 132 ZNPP Gura Mikhail Senior Master 133 ZNPP Khristichenko Tatiana Chief of the Museum 134 ZNPP Kulagin Nikolay Press Photographer 135 ZNPP Danilov Aleksandr Chief Editor of the Radio 136 ZNPP Lutsik Aleksandr Correspondent 137 ZNPP Shitkovskiy Aleksandr Head of the Department 138 ZNPP Shevanova Irina Laboratory Assistant 139 ZNPP Fomina Elena Laboratory Assistant 140 ZNPP Romanova Tatiana Senior Supervisor 141 ZNPP Kazantseva Lyudmila Leading Engineer 142 ZNPP Pospelova Galina Engineer 143 ZNPP Fenev Vladimir Operational Safety Engineer 144 ZNPP Martinenko Sergey Technologist 145 ZNPP Doronina Yuliya Senior Inspector 146 ZNPP Zobkin Valeriy Chief Meteorologist 147 ZNPP Danilevskaya Oksana Senior Inspector 148 ZNPP Zaroyskaya Oksana Supervisor 149 ZNPP Zhuk Yuliya Technologist 150 ZNPP Gromovik Irina Leading Engineer 151 ZNPP Maliy Sergey Leading Engineer 152 ZNPP Kudrenko Dmitriy Engineer 153 ZNPP Tsvirenko Sergey Electrical Locksmith 154 ZNPP Churoyev Viktor Senior Master 155 ZNPP Solomatov Artyom Locksmith 156 ZNPP Pavlenko Denis Specialist 157 ZNPP Krivoruchko Viktor Senior Master 158 ZNPP Kovalyova Yana Electrical Locksmith 159 ZNPP Kolodin Valeriy Master 160 ZNPP Pavlenko Pavel Crane Operator 161 ZNPP Stovbur Sergey Master 162 ZNPP Lobova Lidiya Laboratory Assistant 163 ZNPP Stus’ Tatiana Inspector 164 ZNPP Ovgotova Olha Production Engineer 165 ZNPP Lusin Pavel Processing Specialist 166 ZNPP Romonov Dmitriy Deputy Head of the Department 167 ZNPP Kuleshov Dmitriy Master 168 ZNPP Yermolova Viktoriya Production Engineer 169 ZNPP Yuzva Roman Engineer 170 ZNPP Kruzholo Irina Engineer 171 ZNPP Informational subdivision Kudrya Vladimir Consultant Slavutich 172 ZNPP Malinina Svetlana Engineer 173 ZNPP Informational subdivision Gedz’ Vadim Deputy Head of the Department Slavutich 174 ZNPP Omeka Aleksey Engineer 175 ZNPP Bobich Svetlana Locksmith 176 ZNPP Smetanina Oksana Engineer 177 ZNPP Godina Viktoriya Master 178 ZNPP Logvinov Aleksandr Sectional Manager 179 ZNPP Kostenko Natalia Economist 180 ZNPP Kunitsyn Konstantin Operational Safety Engineer 181 ZNPP Bezvershnko Roman Production Engineer 182 ZNPP Shydlovskiy Yevgeniy Engineer 183 ZNPP Katrich Aleksandr Deputy Head 184 ZNPP Emitbaev Tafur Engineer 185 ZNPP Merkulova Larisa Head 186 ------Lutsyk Vadim Journalist 187 ZNPP Vmodyaksina Olha Head of the Training Center
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188 ZNPP Shirokikh Irina Economist 189 ZNPP Shulimova Lyubov Logistics Manager 190 ZNPP Pavlov Ruslan Operator 191 ZNPP Lozovskiy Sergey Operator 192 ZNPP Ivaschenko Vladimir Deputy Head of the Department 193 SS “Atomproektenginiring” Kochugov O.O. Chief of the Technical Department 194 Company “Poyry” Pierre Biedermann Director of International Department 195 UCEWP Demidenko A.O. Consultant in Public Relations 196 AJC Developpement Keda Yu.V. Translator
Questions and suggestions to which the participants expect an answer in the EA report: • Why only today the issue in SUP implementation has become acute if only 3 years are left until shutting down the NPP? • Deputy of Local Authority. The thermal power plant and the NPP are close to each other. Do you take into account during the EA that TPP and NPP are located close to each other? Will this EA perform monitoring of the general impact of the whole ZNPP on the environment? • 100 000 people of the Zapozohye oblast live in the 30km zone and 200 000 people of the Dnepropetrovsk oblast live in the 30km zone. So why Dnepropetrovska oblast is not taken into account of the EA? • A retired person, former worker of NPP. Were the calculations made on the influence of the dam destruction? Does the SUP implementation take into account sudden shutdown of power supply? • Regarding normal operation what is the level of tritium which is produced at the NPP? • The ZNPP is the most effective power plant. What is the sense in investing the EBRD money into the SU NPP-1, 2? • Does the SUP plan take into account the all year round flashing off the cooling pond into the Dnepr River? Why don’t you tell people that the SUP is also about the gas emissions by cars? We have a lot of electricity so why don’t we have a trolleybus line to reduce emissions by the cars? • Cooling pond is very close to the reservoir and has influence on it. It would be good to move the cooling pond to another place. • Head of the City Energodar. What was the reason to shut-down power unit 2? If the reason was not established, how could you have restored its operation without clearing up the reasons? • We require installing seismic indicators at all NPPs. • In 2005 Energoatom promised to allocate the funds for the project of restoration of the water supply of the city. People get heart attacks and cancer not because of the radiation because the radiation level is really low but because we drink bad water. Will Energoatom work on this issue? • A retired person. For the last 17 years it’s my second public consultation meeting. Where does the company “Poyry” come from? How many years of experience in performing the similar EA do you have? • Local Deputy. We all know that nuclear power units are really dangerous and we all must be aware of the danger. The management of the plant doesn’t pay any attention to the population. It’s impossible to get through to somebody on the phone to receive any important information though we are in the risk zone. In the 80-s we had more than 20 points of the wired radio stations which were also used for the warning. We have such radio stations but they are not used for warning the population. The NPP is obliged to provide such radio stations for warning. • Requirement – to publish the phone number where one can get the information on the answering machine in a local newspaper and the phone calls to this phone number must be free when calling from different phone numbers.
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• Is it worth reanimating all VVER power units and to invest funds into them? • Who is the author of the risks assessment of disruption of simultaneously 4 dams? • The ZNPP site very poorly provided the information on the public consultation. It didn’t even indicate where exactly it would take place. There was no information on the Enegoatom website on the tender at which the Poyry Company won. Why Ukrainian specialists were not selected to perform such EA? • In the cities of Kamenka, Nikopol (within the 30km zone) several years ago we had the indicator of the radiation situation in the city which was installed in the city center. Where are such displays now? • As citizens of Ukraine, how much do we pay from our pockets for this expertise?
11.5.5 Minute of scoping meeting, Yuzhnaukrainsk Date of the meeting: 18.05.2011, 10.00-11.30 Place of the meeting: Yuzhnoukrainsk, SU NPP Participants of the meeting: No. Organization Name Position 1 Oblast Council of Veterans of Ukraine Alefirenko Raisa Authorized Member of the Oblast Council 2 Rayon State Administration of Arbuzinsk Bondarenko Svetlana Chief specialist of the work with law- City enforcement authorities 3 State Ecological Inspection in Kabashniy Andrey Chief Specialist – State Inspector Nikolaevskaya oblast 4 Newspaper “Prybuzskiy Visnyk” Shirko Olena Correspondent 5 Sanitary-epidemiological station of Bontey Nikolay Deputy Head of the Radiological Pervomaysk City and Pervomayskiy rayon Department 6 Ministry of the Emergency Situation in Panasenko Nikolay Deputy Head of Administration Nikolaevskaya oblast 7 Local newspaper “Kontakt” Sizova Natalia Head of the Department 8 TV channel “Tviy Vsesvit”(“Your World”) Chikmenyova Alla Journalist 9 TV channel “Tviy Vsesvit”(“Your World”) Bydarin Sergey Camera Operator 10 City Council of Voznesensk City Lukov Vitaliy City First Deputy Head 11 Rayon State Administration of Malinovskiy Aleksandr Head of the Emergency Department Pervomayskiy City 12 Council of Professional Power Engineer Mironova Vera Chairperson Specialists 13 Sanitary-epidemiological station of Yakunitsa Lyudmila Chief Doctor Yuzhnoukrainsk 14 Lyceum of Yuzhnoukrainsk Kozak Aleksandr Chairperson of the local trade committee of the lyceum 15 City Executive Office of Yuzhnoukrainsk Palikanina Galina Secretary of the Council 16 Rayon Council of Domanivskiy rayon Voyevoda Aleksandr Deputy Head 17 Rayon Council of Domanivskiy rayon Litoshenko Viktor ???? 18 Rayon newspaper “???” Vasyliy Ivashko Editor 19 Ltd.”EUZM” Kalag Lyudmila Deputy Director 20 State Enterprise “TEM” Samoylov Valeriy Chairperson of the local trade 21 Oblast council Fuka Vladimir Head of the permanent commission 22 Fraternal Rayon State Administration Galaban Nikolay Deputy Head 23 Fraternal Rayon sanitary-epidemiological Anokhin Sergey Chief Doctor station 24 Fraternal Rayon State Administration Suvorov Aleksandr Head of the Department
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25 Oblast community of environmental Lyubartsev Sergey Head of the Presidium protection 26 Public council of the state environmental Kuzyuk Andrey Member administration in Nikolayevskaya oblast 27 Nikolayevskaya Oblast Organization Yevgrafov Sergey Member “Kinbury-zhyttya” 28 State ecological administration in Yefimov Vladimir First Deputy Head Nikolayevskaya oblast 29 ??? Kvashov Vlad Chief doctor 30 Rayon State Administration of Voznesensk Chadnov Dmitriy Head of the Department 31 Rayon State Administration of Voznesensk Bilokon’ Ivan Deputy Head 32 Rayon Council of Voznesensk Kanonenko Konstantin Head of the permanent commission 33 Rayon Council of Prybuzsk Negray Vladimir Deputy Head of the Rayon Council 34 Rayon Council of Prybuzsk Krikulenko Yevgeniy Head of the permanent commission 35 Prybuzsk rayon newspaper “Nove Zhittya” Sevastyanov Roman Responsible Secretary (“New Life”) 36 Nikolayevskiy Club “Spilni Dii” (“Common Galkina Antonina Head Actions”) 37 National Ecological Center of Ukraine Khmara Dmitriy Expert 38 Association “Rescue of Nature” Mazurenko Vladimir Head of the Council 39 Association “Rescue of Nature” Gubskiy Vladimir Member of the Council 40 State Organization “Zeleniy Rukh” (“Green Malitskiy Aleksandr Deputy Head Movement”) 41 SS “Atomproektenginiring” Kochugov O.O. Chief of the Technical Department 42 Finnish Company “Poyry” Pierre Biedermann Director of International Department 43 UCEWP Demidenko A.O. Consultant in Public Relations 44 AJC Developpement Keda Yu.V. Translator
Questions:
• Anokhin Sergey, Chief Sanitary Doctor of the Fraternal Rayon sanitary-epidemiological station: Controlling and monitoring institutions will probably express their opinion when they have the results of the activities. Now we have only the concept. Maybe the representatives of the public organizations were not ready for this public consultation and were not informed on this meeting ahead of time and this is why they don’t have any questions. • Mironova Vera, Chairperson of the Council of Professional Power Engineer Specialists: There are many unemployed people among citizens of Yuzhnoukrainsk and we have a requirement to involve our citizens in erection works and other works – the involvement of the local subcontractors. • We have a lyceum which prepares potential specialists for future work at the NPP and we would like “Energoatom” to support and encourage these students. • About 5 years ago a programme was planned to be implemented by Energoatom in developing the infrastructure of the cities in the 30 km zone and nothing has been done so far. What is the status of this programme and shall it be implemented in future? • Galkina Antonina, Head of the Nikolayevskiy Club “Spilni Dii” (“Common Actions”): It is known that the radiation control at SU NPP is performed only by the plant and there is no independent (non-departmental) control of the radiation situation. Citizens are informed on the radiation situation only by the NPP staff. Comment: it’s necessary to create an independent (non-departmental) organization to provide the radiation control. • Where can one find this information? We were not able to find this information on the website of the SU NPP. If this information is available on the website, then everybody will be happy. • Yefimov Vladimir, First Deputy Head of the State ecological administration in Nikolayevskaya oblast: As far as I understand the objective of the EA is not the
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radiation situation but the impact of the SUP implementation on the environment. What are the main ecological aspects to be studied in the EA? • Malitskiy Aleksandr, Deputy Head of the State Organization “Zeleniy Rukh” (“Green Movement”): - Did you study the impact on water quality ? • There are stations in 4 villages at the 30 km zone which get dismantled in order to collect the indicators from them and they are taken away for at least one month which means that people don’t have access to any information for such a long period of time. Do you consider it appropriate? • Requirement: provide people with dosimeters. • Is there any system to study the condition of the rector vessel metal? • There is a principle of passive informing of the population known in the whole world. All the information must be published on the official website. You are obliged to passively inform the population. • During the whole week we didn’t know where the scoping meeting and the public consultation would take place and this is why we came late for the meeting – we were not properly informed. • Proposal: the website is not the document like a signed paper is. We are a democratic country so please provide us with officially proved and approved information. • Kanonenko Konstantin, Head of the permanent commission of Rayon Council of Voznesensk: Before there were screens installed in certain places of the cities which gave information on the radiation situation to the public. Why can’t we have them back? • The cost of electricity for people in the 30km zone. We would like to ask for a 50% discount for the citizens of the 30 km zone because we live in the zone of risk and instead taking this into account the prices go constantly up. • We know that as of today there is lack of water in summer to provide proper operation of 3 units at the same time. Is this problem mentioned in the SUP? As far as I understand the problem of the Fukushima case was not the earthquake and tsunami, but the lack of cooling water. • Comment: People in villages (especially elderly people) will not browse the internet for the information so we need a simpler way of informing people on the radiation level. Let’s solve this problem together and not dispute on it!!! • As far as we know according to the legislation of other countries it’s forbidden to use the direct cooling system. Is this issues included in the SUP? The main problem is actually not the use of the direct cooling system but the problem of water mineralization.
11.5.6 Minute of public meeting, Kiev
Minutes of Public Meeting Протокол зустрічі з громадськістю concerning the Consolidated Safety Upgrade Program for з питань Комплексної (зведеної) програми підвищення power units of NPPs of Ukraine and Ecological безпеки енергоблоків АЕС України (КЗПБ) та Assessment of SUP Екологічної оцінки КЗПБ
19.07.2011, Energoatom office, 19.07.2011, ДП НАЕК «ЕНЕРГОАТОМ» 15:00, 6, Gaidara str. 15:00, вул. Гайдара, 6
Attendees: Присутні: 1. Gennadiy Sazonov – first general director deputy of 1. Сазонов Геннадій Васильович – перший заступник “Atomproektengineering” of Energoatom генерального директора «Атомпроектінжиніринг» ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом»
2. Tarakanov Sergiy – head of modernization department of 2. Тараканов Сергій Олександрович – директор
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Energoatom’s Directorate. департаменту модернізації ВДВ Дирекції ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом».
3. Kochugov Oleksandr – head of technical department of 3. Кочугов Олександр Олександрович – начальник ТВ “Atomproektengineering” ВТС ДПІ ВП «Атомпроектінжиніринг».
4. Ляденко Галина Дингабівна – начальник відділу з 4. Lyadenko Galyna – head of safety upgrade department of підвищення безпеки ВДВ Дирекції ДП НАЕК Energoatom’s Directorate. «Енергоатом».
5. Олена Тетеріна – прес-служба ДП НАЕК 5. Olena Teterina – press-service of Energoatom «Енергоатом»
6. Роберт Адамчик – старший радник ЄБРР з питань 6. Robert Adamczyk – senior advisor of EBRD for екології environmental issues 7. Кулішенко Валерій Миколайович – технічний менеджер, Європейський Банк Реконструкції та 7. Kulishenko Valeriy – technical manager of European Розвитку Bank for Reconstruction and Development 8. П’єр Бідерманн – директор з міжнародних питань 8. Pierre Biedermann – director for international issues of Компанії «PÖYRY». “PÖYRY”
9. Демиденко Андрій – консультант зі зв'язків з 9. Demydenko Andriy – public relations consultant of “PÖYRY”. громадськістю Компанії «PÖYRY».
10. Litvinsky Ludvig – expert of “PÖYRY”. 10. Литвинський Людвіг Леонідович – експерт Компанії «PÖYRY». 11. Melnychenko Kseniya – assistant of “PÖYRY”. 11. Мельниченко Ксенія Вікторівна – асистент Компанії 12. Iryna Petrenko – representative of “UA-Energy” «PÖYRY».
12. Ірина Петренко – представник компанії «UA-Energy» 13. Viktoriya Yurchuk – RBK-Ukraine 13. Вікторія Юрчук – РБК-Україна 14. Stanislav Suprunenko – the attendee of public meeting, private person 14. Станіслав Супруненко – відвідувач слухань, приватна особа 15. Iryna Holovko – representative of NGO group for climate changes issue 15. Ірина Головко – представник групи НУО з питань зміни клімату 16. Dmytro Hmara – National Ecological Center of Ukraine 16. Дмитро Хмара – НЕЦУ 17. Roman Ivanchenko – Interfax
18. Igor Yashkin – Ukrainian news 17. Роман Іванченко – Інтерфакс
19. Halyna Oliynyk – NGO “Mama – 86” 18. Ігор Яшкін – Українські новини
20. Sergiy Fedorynchyk – info-center of Ukrainian Ecological 19. Галина Олійник – НУО «МАМА – 86» Association “Zelenyy Svit” (“Green World” )
20. Сергій Федоринчик – інфо-центр УЕА «Зелений
Agenda of the PM: Світ»
• Registration of attendees of PM and providing them with information materials – 30 min.
Порядок денний ЗГ: • Opening of PM (introduction of the Head) – 10 min. • Реєстрація учасників ЗГ та надання інформаційних
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матеріалів - 30 хв. • Public consultation concerning SUP and SUP EA issues (report of the representative of PÖYRY) – 15 min. • Відкриття ЗГ (вступне слово Головуючого) - 10 хв.
• Results of Ecological Assessment of SUP (report of the • Консультації з громадськістю з питань КЗПБ та ЕО representative of PÖYRY) – 30 min. КЗПБ (доповідь представника компанії «PÖYRY») - 15 хв. • Discussion of SUP and SUP EA issues – 1,5 hours • Результати Екологічної оцінки КЗПБ (доповідь • Closing of PM (final word of the Head) – 5 min. представника компанії «PÖYRY») - 30 хв.
Brief annotation: • Обговорення питань КЗПБ та ЕО КЗПБ - 1,5
On December 20th 1995, the Government of Ukraine (“GoU”), години the Governments of the G-7 countries and the European Commission (“EC”) signed a Memorandum of Understanding • Закриття ЗГ (заключне слово Головуючого) - 5 хв. (MoU) on a programme to support the closure of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Nuclear safety is one of the Коротка анотація: four areas developed in accordance with this MoU. 20 грудня 1995 року Уряд України, уряди країн Великої Сімки та Євро комісія (ЄК) підписали Меморандум про The “Ukrainian NPPs Safety Upgrade Package Program” взаєморозуміння (МВ) щодо програми підтримки закриття (SUP) was developed by SE NNEGC “Energoatom” and takes Чорнобильської атомної електростанції. Ядерна безпека є into account all recommendations issued through the final однією з чотирьох сфер, роботу над якими передбачає МВ. report of the joint project ECIAEA-Ukraine (IAEA report date «Комплексна (зведена) програма підвищення безпеки February 2010 IAEA-EC Agreement 2007/45268) , in енергоблоків АЕС України» (КЗПБ) розроблена ДП НАЕК accordance with the “Road Map For Nuclear Safety of «Енергоатом», в ній взято до уваги всі рекомендації, Operating Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants” of the MoU. винесені в кінцевому звіті спільного проекту ЄК, МАГАТЕ та України (Звіт МАГАТЕ від лютого 2010, Угода між МАГАТЕ та ЄК 2007/45268), згідно «Дорожньої карти The SUP involves safety improvements at existing NPPs, with ядерної безпеки працюючих в Україні атомних no new construction, no capacity increase and no life електростанцій» МВ. extension. To comply with the requirements of environmental КЗПБ передбачає покращення стану безпеки на існуючих protection SUP should pass the Ecological Assessment (EA). АЕС без додаткового будівництва, збільшення One of EA tasks is to disclose and discuss the EA report in потужностей чи подовження строку експлуатації. Для terms of the public consultation process and working over it забезпечення дотримання вимог з охорони навколишнього after the public consultation process is over. For the purposes середовища та екологічної безпеки КЗПБ має пройти of international financing, the SUP is subject to an Ecological Екологічну Оцінку (ЕО). Одним із завдань ЕО є Assessment inclusive of assessments made of the four оприлюднення та обговорення звіту ЕО в рамках процесу nuclear power plants, but not to a full Environmental Impact громадських консультацій, та його доопрацювання після Assessment (EIA). завершення процесу громадських консультацій. Екологічна оцінка (ЕО) має бути проведена у відповідності The Ecological Assessment (EA) is to be carried out in з національним законодавством та міжнародними compliance with the national legislation and international конвенціями, підписаними Україною, а також взірцями conventions signed by Ukraine, as well as the best міжнародних рекомендацій щодо екологічних та соціальних international environmental and social guidelines for projects проектів, що фінансуються МФУ (включаючи екологічні financed by IFIs (including EBRD and EU environmental вимоги ЄБРР та ЄС). requirements). При цьому, оскільки КЗПБ передбачає підвищення безпеки на всіх чотирьох існуючих АЕС без нового будівництва чи Thus, as soon as SUP foresees the safety upgrade of all 4 збільшення потужностей, ЕО КЗПБ не цілком підпадає operating NPPs wihouth new construction or capacity increase під вимоги державних будівельних норм щодо оцінки EA of SUP is not fully under the requirements of state впливів на навколишнє середовище (ОВНС) для нових construction norms concerning environmental impact об’єктів. Процес ЕО регулюється нормативним assessment (EIA) for new construction. EA process is документом, розробленим спеціально для даного випадку. regulated by the normative document specially elaborated for this case.
Питання та пропозиції, які були отримані протягом зустрічі: 1. Чи правильно я розумію, що ця КЗПБ стосується діючих енергоблоків, чи вона стосується 22 нових
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запланованих в Енергетичній програмі блоків?
2. Більшість представників з Южноукраїнська та з Миколаївської області, з Запорізької області, з Енергодара, які приймали участь у «скоупінг»
зустрічах, вони не отримали інформацію про цей захід.
Questions and suggestions which were received during Я не знаю, можливо десь загубились, оскільки в the meeting: Енергодарі було досить багато людей. Наприклад, на 1. Do I understand correctly that this SUP is connected Южноукраїнській АЕС було не так багато only to the operating power units or it is also connected представників громадськості – буквально кілька людей to the 22 new planned by Energy program power units? і дуже дивно, що вони не отримали цю інформацію, хоча вони залишали свої контактні дані. Це було 2. Most of representatives from Yuzhnoukrainsk and пов’язане з тим, що не досить точна інформація Mykolayiv oblast, Zaporizhzhya oblast, from city of надавалась про захід, де він буде знаходитись, де він Energodar who had taken part in the previous meetings буде проходити. Я хотів би сказати, хочу відмітити, що hadn’t received the information concerning this meeting. в новому плані, який розсилався по заходах - там I don’t know, maybe they were lost somewhere as soon більш точна інформація, це є позитивним. as there were a lot of people in Energodar. For example, there were less people present on South-Ukrainian NPP and it’s very surprising that they hadn’t received the 3. Не вистачає альтернативної інформації аналізу цієї information nevertheless they’ve left their contact програми – для жодної АЕС не розглядалося питання information. It was because of inaccurate information закриття атомної станції – наскільки це вплине на concerning the meetings provision, concerning the place екологічну ситуацію. Особливо гостро стоїть ситуація of location and holding the meeting. I would like to note на Южно-Українській АЕС, де мала серія енергоблоків that the new plan which had been sent concerning the – перші в світі ВВЕР-1000. І там попередня програма today’s meetings consists of more detailed information підвищення безпеки на цих блоках була виконана which is the positive moment of EA. лише на 40%. Чому не розглядалося питання закриття цих проблемних блоків? Як взагалі враховувалось, що 3. There is a lack of alternative information on SUP попередню програму із-за того, що ці блоки analysis – the question of any NPP decommissioning експериментальні не змогли виконати, а виконали and the environmental impact of NPP was not taken into лише на 40%? Проводилася ОВНС, розглядалися account. Extremely strong this question is on South- варіанти з Програмою та без (Програми). Було б дуже Ukrainian NPP where small series of power units is добре, якби розглядався варіант виведення з operated – first in the world power units of type VVER- експлуатації одного з блоків чи двох з блоків на Южно- 1000. The previous safety upgrade program was Українській АЕС. implemented for only 40% on these power units. Why the issue of some power units decommissioning was not considered? How it had been taken into account that the 4. Питання більш стосується не так самої програми, як previous program couldn’t be fully implemented and had кредиту. Чому так вийшло, що НКРЕ дозволило чи ви been implemented only for 4% because of the прийняли рішення, що 400 млн у вас є на таку важливу experimental type of these power units? The EIA had Програму підвищення безпеки, а 800 млн треба взяти been undertaken with and regardless (SUP). It would be в кредит? Звідки взялися ці цифри? very good if the decommissioning option of one or two 5. На сьогодні триває перегляд «Енергетичної стратегії power units of SUNPP had been considered. України до 2030 року». До 2017 року, поки діє 4. My question concerns not as much the SUP itself as the Програма, планується введення в експлуатацію 3-го credit. Why had it happened that NCRE had agreed or блоку Хмельницької АЕС. Вплив роботи 3-го блоку на you’ve decided that you’ve already got 400 mln to довкілля: Сказали, що по нормах - перевищення о implement the program and you’d need 800 mln as a температури в річці – 8 градусів. Показали, що коли credit? What was the source of such amounts? працює 2 хмельницьких блоки, там вже перевищення 8-16о. Буде 3-й блок – ще більше.
5. Nowadays the review of “Energy strategy of Ukraine until 2030” is undertaken. It is planned to start operation of 3rd 6. Цей звіт (Звіт про ЕО) на сайті є, але він зовсім на power unit of KhNPP until 2017 while the Program is in іншій сторінці, ніж сама Програма. Логічно було б
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force. The environmental impact of 3rd block operation: it Програму і Звіт про ЕО не шукати по всьому сайту was told that according to the norms the temperature of «Енергоатому». river waters should not exceed 8°C. It was shown that with 2 operating units of KhNPP it already exceeds 8- 16°C. The 3rd block will make the situation worser. 7. Вже було сказано про інформування населення, що людям не вистачає інформації – і це дійсно так. Для 6. This report (EA report) is published on site but on the залучення громадськості потрібно залучати не тільки different page than the Program itself. It will be logical тих людей, які живуть близько до станції, але not to search for the Program and EA report through the інформацію повинні мати люди всієї України, що whole site of “Energoatom”. розробляється така Програма, що будуть такі заходи, про покращення ситуації завдяки цим заходам вся 7. It was told about the problem of informing the public, the Україна повинна знати. На жаль дуже закрите коло lack of information for public – and it’ really so. It is (осіб) цю інформацію має. Можливо треба витратити worth to involve not only the inhabitants of the кошти на соціальну рекламу? Інформацію можна neighboring territories of NPPs but the people of the розмістити не тільки на слайд-бордах, а навіть в whole Ukraine should have this information, that such метро, тощо. Program is elaborated, that such measures would be implemented, that the situation improvement because of these measures the whole Ukraine is to know. Unfortunately, the very narrow circle (of people) knows 8. Вплив на навколишнє соціальне середовище, на this information. Maybe, it’s worth to spend money on техногенне середовище – тут розглядаються питання social advertisement? The information can be located який може бути вплив. Якісь незручності - додаткова not only on slide-boards but also in subway, etc? робота, навантаження транспорту, чи, навпаки, нові робочі місця, залучення нових робочих рук, навіть 8. The social and technogenic impacts are analyzing the покращення в наданні комунальних послуг. Як на issues of what the possible impacts can be. Any мене, немає головного - впливу на здоров’я inconveniences – additional work, vehicle pressure, or, населення. Все рівно буде вплив. Якщо людина буде otherwise, the new work places, involvement of new знати, що зменшені ризики, що покращена безпека – workers, even the improvement of municipal services. As це психологічне здоров’я, людина більш спокійна, for me there is no major information concerning the більш впевнена. Це зменшення скидів, чи ще щось, ще impact on health of population. If the person knows щось. Але в цій програмі я не побачила цього. about the impact reduce on his/her health, about the safety upgrade – this is psychological health, he/she will 9. Ця ЕО даного проекту згідно вимог ЄБРР …має be calmer, assured. This is reducing emissions, проводитися за принципами, які включають принципи something else. But I hadn’t seen such information in Стратегічної екологічної оцінки, як це вказано в this program. директиві ЄЕС і в протоколі до Конвеції ESPOO. Зокрема, звіт такої ЕО має містити інформацію щодо 9. This EA of the project according to the requirements of зв’язків даної програми з іншими програмами та EBRD …is to be carried out by the principles which планами, які існують стосовно об’єктів, які include the Strategic EA ones as it is required by розглядаються в цій програмі. Я уважно передивилася directive of EEU and in ESPOO convention protocol. запропонований проект Звіту, я бачила розділ, в якому Thus, the report of such EA should contain the ви вказали, які були попередні програми з підвищення information concerning the link of this program with other безпеки станцій, але з цього звіту випливає, що у нас в programs and plans which exist concerning the objects країні немає програм з продовження терміну reviewed in this program. I’ve thoroughly reviewed the експлуатації блоків. Я дуже рада тому, що сьогодні ми proposed draft report, I’ve seen the chapter where почули, що такі плани є, дійсно признано хоча би you’ve indicated the previous safety upgrade programs стосовно 1-го южноукраїнського блоку. На наше but it turned out that our country has got no NPP глибоке переконання зв'язок між цими програмами має lifecycle extension programs. I’m very glad that today бути встановлений в рамках цієї оцінки і, відповідно, we’ve heard that such lifecycle extension programs had мали оцінюватися кумулятивні впливи, які been developed nowadays; it’s really said even for 1st спричиняться 1-ю програмою та 2-ю програмою, тому power units of SUNPP. According to our opinion the link що вони зв’язані, вони є невід’ємними одна від одної, between these programs should be set in terms of this тому що це є стратегічна ЕО, і це була одна з вимог. І assessment and accordingly the cumulative effects ми, нажаль, зараз цього не бачимо. І питання у мене в
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should be assessed which are caused by the 1st program першу чергу до розробників і до консультанту…: чому and the 2nd program as soon as they are linked and they в процесі проведення цієї оцінки ви не встановили are integral and as soon as this is the SEA and this was цього зв’язку між однією та іншою програмою і жодним one of requirements. And unfortunately we do not see it. чином не оцінили цей кумулятивний ефект, який буде, And the question is mostly to the developers and to the він, очевидно, буде від продовження терміну Consultant…: why during the EA elaboration you hadn’t експлуатації старих блоків? Це буде не такий влив, indicated this link between one and another program, яким можна знехтувати. and anyhow hadn’t assesses this cumulative effect which will obviously exist caused by the lifecycle 10. Так само хотіла б, щоб представники ЄБРР висловили extension of power units? This will not be such an impact свою думку щодо їх оцінки – чи критерії були виконані, to be neglected. чи ця оцінка відповідає тим вимогам, їхнім очікуванням від цієї оцінки?
10. Also would like the EBRD representatives to express their own thoughts concerning their assessment – 11. Тут (на зустрічі) мали бути присутні представники whether the criteria were complied, whether their низки міністерств та відомств. Мені здається, що assessment is corresponding to their requirements, their повноваження Міністра енергетики достатні для того, expectations from this assessment? щоб залучити… представників інших міністерств. Моє питання: чи присутні тут представники регулятора - 11. Here (on the meeting) the representatives of some Державної інспекції з ядерного регулювання? Чи ministries and institutions should have been present. It запрошувалися вони? seems to me that the credentials of the Minister of energy are enough to engage… the representatives of 12. Після подій у Фукусімі переглядаються питання other ministries. My question is whether there is the безпеки атомних станцій. Чи не може вийти так, що ті representative of Nuclear Regulator today? Where they критерії безпеки, ті заходи безпеки доведеться invited? переглядати? Їх наслідки, можливо якісь нові вводити (заходи), ви знову будете кредит брати, взагалі, 12. After the Fukushima events the safety reassessment on можливо, доведеться перероблювати якісь заходи? NPPs took place. Is there a chance that the criteria of нові заходи безпеки. Які плани, як ви збираєтесь assessment, its safety measures would be under адаптувати цю програму до нових реалій? review? Their consequences, maybe some new (measures) will be introduced, you will take another loan, in general, maybe there will be the need to redo some 13. Ця довготривала програма, наскільки я розумію – 6- measures? New safety measures. What are your plans, річна, вимагає досить значних заходів і очевидно, що how are you going to adopt the program according to the потягне за собою збільшення термінів планових situation in Japan? ремонтів, або збільшення їх кількості. Збільшиться простой атомних електростанцій, генеруючого 13. This long-term program as I understand is 6 year long, it обладнання. Відповідно, певна кількість електроенергії requires significant measures and obviously it will cause не буде вироблена атомною енергетикою, але її, the increase of the planned repairs terms or its скоріш за все, компенсують електроенергією, quantities. The downtime of NPPs and the generating виробленою тепловими електростанціями. equipment will increase. Accordingly, some amount of Електроенергія теплових електростанцій по-перше – nuclear power will not be manufactures by NPPs mostly дорожча, по друге – набагато менш екологічна. Чи possible will be replaced by the power manufactured by хтось рахував такі впливи – екологічні та економічні? thermal power plants. The power of thermal power plants is more expensive and less ecological. Had somebody 14. До представників банку: економічний ефект від calculated these impacts – ecological and economical? реалізації цієї програми та самої оцінки. Наскільки є результати і ви бачите економічний ефект?
14. My question is to the EBRD representatives: to what 15. Наскільки я розумію, … ми отримаємо відповіді до extend do you see the results and the economic effect того, як закінчаться 90 днів процесу консультацій? Ми from the implementation of SUP and the EA itself? зможемо ще подати коментарі, якщо ми побачимо, що не враховане те, що сказане сьогодні? Чи ви маєте на 15. As I understand … we’ll receive the answers before the увазі, що ми побачимо остаточний звіт 1-го жовтня і це
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90 days of public consultation are over. Will we be able вже буде все? Чи буде ще можливість побачити to provide our comments if we see that the said today заздалегідь, чи ви прийняли наші (зауваження) до was not taken into account? Or do you mean that we’ll уваги, чи ні? see the final report on 1st Octobers and this will be the end? Will there be the possibility to see beforehand whether you’ve taken out (notes) into account?
11.5.7 Minute of public meeting, Kuznetsovsk
Minutes of Public Meeting Протокол зустрічі з громадськістю concerning the Consolidated Safety Upgrade Program for з питань Комплексної (зведеної) програми підвищення power units of NPPs of Ukraine and Ecological безпеки енергоблоків АЕС України (КЗПБ) та Assessment of SUP Екологічної оцінки КЗПБ
20.07.2011, Kuznetsovsk, RNPP, 15:00 20.07.2011, м. Кузнецовськ, РАЕС, 15:00
Attendees: Присутні: 21. Комаринський Віктор Сигізмундович – заступник 21. Komarynski Viktor – deputy of general director for capital генерального директора з капітального будівництва- construction – director of UCB of Rivne NPP. начальник УКБ ВП РАЕС.
22. Кратік Петро Федорович – начальник управління 22. Kratik Petro – head of information management and інформаціі та роботи з громадськістю. public relations department.
23. Ляденко Галина Дингабівна – начальник відділу з
підвищення безпеки ВДВ Дирекції ДП НАЕК 23. Lyadenko Galyna – head of safety upgrade department of «Енергоатом». Energoatom’s Directorate. 24. Кочугов Олександр Олександрович – начальник ТВ ВТС ДПІ ВП «Атомпроектінжиніринг».
24. Kochugov Oleksandr – head of technical department of 25. Кулішенко Валерій Миколайович – технічний “Atomproektengineering”. менеджер, Європейський Банк Реконструкції та Розвитку
25. Kulishenko Valeriy – technical manager of European 26. П’єр Бідерманн – директор з міжнародних питань Bank for Reconstruction and Development Компанії «PÖYRY».
26. Pierre Biedermann – director for international issues of
“PÖYRY” 27. Демиденко Андрій – консультант зі зв'язків з
27. Demydenko Andriy – public relations consultant of громадськістю Компанії «PÖYRY». “PÖYRY”. 28. Литвинський Людвіг Леонідович – експерт Компанії 28. Litvinsky Ludvig – expert of “PÖYRY”. «PÖYRY».
29. Мельниченко Ксенія Вікторівна – асистент Компанії 29. Melnychenko Kseniya – assistant of “PÖYRY” «PÖYRY».
30. Sergiy Tabakov – “Visti Rivnenshyny” (“News of Rivne 30. Сергій Табаков – Вісті Рівненщини, м. Рівне region”), city of Rivne 31. Тетяна Бобрікова – Рівненське ТБ, м. Рівне 31. Tetyana Bobrikova – TV of Rivne
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32. Dmytro Kolomys – TV of Rivne 32. Дмитро Коломис – Рівненське ТБ, м. Рівне
33. Valeriy Martyniuk – project “4th power. Agency for 33. Валерій Мартинюк – Проект «4 Влада. Агентство journalists’ investigations”, city of Rivne журналістських розслідувань», м. Рівне
34. Lyudmyla Vlasiuk – newspaper “Nova Doba” (“New 34. Людмила Власюк – Газета «Нова Доба», м. Луцьк Day”), city of Lutsk 35. Вікторія Поліщук – Радіо та Телебачення 35. Viktoriya Polishchuk – Radio and TV of Volyn Radio and Волиньське ДТКР, м. Луцьк TV company, city of Lutsk 36. Вадим Ремісько – Радіо та Телебачення Волиньське 36. Vadym Remisko – Radio and TV of Volyn Radio and TV ДТКР, м. Луцьк company, city of Lutsk
37. Сергій Данилюк – Радіо та Телебачення Волиньське 37. Sergiy Danyliuk - Radio and TV of Volyn Radio and TV company, city of Lutsk ДТКР, м. Луцьк
38. Natalka Siusar – Vidomosti.ua, city of Lutsk 38. Наталка Слюсар – Відомості.ua, м. Луцьк
39. Pavliuk Volodymyr – Manevytska radiologic service, city 39. Павлюк Володимир – Маневицька радіологічна of Lutsk служба, м. Луцьк
40. Derkach Mariya – Manevytska radiologic service, city of 40. Деркач Марія – Маневицька радіологічна служба, м. Lutsk Луцьк
41. Potok Ruslan – Manevytska radiologic service, city of 41. Поток Руслан – Маневицька радіологічна служба, м. Lutsk Луцьк
42. Valeriy Shvediuk – Newspaper “Visti” (“News) of 42. Валерій Шведюк – Газета «Вісті», м. Кузнецовськ Kuznetsovsk 43. Воробей Мирослава – Громадська Рада м. 43. Vorobey Myroslava – public council of Kuznetsovsk Кузнецовська
44. Bodnar Vitaliy – public council of Kuznetsovsk 44. Боднар Віталій – Громадська Рада м. Кузнецовська
45. Пешко Микола – депутат міськради м. Кузнецовська 45. Peshko Mykola – deputy of city council of Kuznetsovsk
46. Кравець Юрій – депутат міськради м. Кузнецовська 46. Kravets Yuriy – deputy of city council of Kuznetsovsk
47. Черняхович Михайло – заступник начальника відділу 47. Chernyakhovych Mykhailo – head deputy of modernization and reconstruction department of RNPP модернізації та реконструкції РАЕС
48. Kuroyedov Sergiy – head engineer deputy of RNPP 48. Куроєдов Сергій – заступник головного інженера ВП concerning the general state of systems РАЕС з загального стану систем
49. Boryshkevych Sergiy - head engineer deputy of RNPP 49. Боришкевич Сергій – заступник головного інженера concerning nuclear and radiation safety ВП РАЕС з ядерної та радіаційної безпеки
50. Тур Борис – заступник генерального директора з якості та 50. Tur Borys – general director deputy of quality and управління РАЕС management of RNPP 51. Мензул Олександр – заступник начальника департаменту РАЕС 51. Menzul Oleksandr - head deputy of RNPP department 52. Кочуров Сергій – начальник відділу охорони 52. Kochurov Sergiy – head of environment protection навколишнього середовища department
53. Романенко Олександр – заступник начальника цеху 53. Romanenko Oleksandr – head deputy of radiation safety workshop of RNPP радіаційної безпеки РАЕС
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54. Федорченко Сергій – служба аналізу безпеки РАЕС 54. Fedorchenko Sergiy – safety analysis service of RNPP
Порядок денний ЗГ: • Реєстрація учасників ЗГ та надання інформаційних Agenda of the PM: матеріалів - 30 хв.
• Registration of attendees of PM and providing them with • Відкриття ЗГ (вступне слово Головуючого) - 10 хв. information materials – 30 min. • Консультації з громадськістю з питань КЗПБ та ЕО • Opening of PM (introduction of the Head) – 10 min. КЗПБ (доповідь представника компанії «PÖYRY») - 15
хв. • Public consultation concerning SUP and SUP EA issues (report of the representative of PÖYRY) – 15 min. • Результати Екологічної оцінки КЗПБ (доповідь • Results of Ecological Assessment of SUP (report of the представника компанії «PÖYRY») - 30 хв. representative of PÖYRY) – 30 min. • Обговорення питань КЗПБ та ЕО КЗПБ - 1,5 • Discussion of SUP and SUP EA issues – 1,5 hours години
• Closing of PM (final word of the Head) – 5 min. • Закриття ЗГ (заключне слово Головуючого) - 5 хв.
Brief annotation: Коротка анотація: 20 грудня 1995 року Уряд України, уряди країн Великої On December 20th 1995, the Government of Ukraine (“GoU”), Сімки та Євро комісія (ЄК) підписали Меморандум про the Governments of the G-7 countries and the European взаєморозуміння (МВ) щодо програми підтримки закриття Commission (“EC”) signed a Memorandum of Understanding Чорнобильської атомної електростанції. Ядерна безпека є (MoU) on a programme to support the closure of the однією з чотирьох сфер, роботу над якими передбачає МВ. Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Nuclear safety is one of the «Комплексна (зведена) програма підвищення безпеки four areas developed in accordance with this MoU. енергоблоків АЕС України» (КЗПБ) розроблена ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом», в ній взято до уваги всі рекомендації, The “Ukrainian NPPs Safety Upgrade Package Program” винесені в кінцевому звіті спільного проекту ЄК, МАГАТЕ (SUP) was developed by SE NNEGC “Energoatom” and takes та України (Звіт МАГАТЕ від лютого 2010, Угода між into account all recommendations issued through the final МАГАТЕ та ЄК 2007/45268), згідно «Дорожньої карти report of the joint project ECIAEA-Ukraine (IAEA report date ядерної безпеки працюючих в Україні атомних February 2010 IAEA-EC Agreement 2007/45268) , in електростанцій» МВ. accordance with the “Road Map For Nuclear Safety of КЗПБ передбачає покращення стану безпеки на існуючих Operating Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants” of the MoU. АЕС без додаткового будівництва, збільшення потужностей чи подовження строку експлуатації. Для The SUP involves safety improvements at existing NPPs, with забезпечення дотримання вимог з охорони навколишнього no new construction, no capacity increase and no life середовища та екологічної безпеки КЗПБ має пройти extension. To comply with the requirements of environmental Екологічну Оцінку (ЕО). Одним із завдань ЕО є protection SUP should pass the Ecological Assessment (EA). оприлюднення та обговорення звіту ЕО в рамках процесу One of EA tasks is to disclose and discuss the EA report in громадських консультацій, та його доопрацювання після terms of the public consultation process and working over it завершення процесу громадських консультацій. after the public consultation process is over. For the purposes Екологічна оцінка (ЕО) має бути проведена у відповідності of international financing, the SUP is subject to an Ecological з національним законодавством та міжнародними Assessment inclusive of assessments made of the four конвенціями, підписаними Україною, а також взірцями nuclear power plants, but not to a full Environmental Impact міжнародних рекомендацій щодо екологічних та соціальних Assessment (EIA). проектів, що фінансуються МФУ (включаючи екологічні вимоги ЄБРР та ЄС). The Ecological Assessment (EA) is to be carried out in При цьому, оскільки КЗПБ передбачає підвищення безпеки compliance with the national legislation and international на всіх чотирьох існуючих АЕС без нового будівництва чи conventions signed by Ukraine, as well as the best збільшення потужностей, ЕО КЗПБ не цілком підпадає international environmental and social guidelines for projects під вимоги державних будівельних норм щодо оцінки financed by IFIs (including EBRD and EU environmental впливів на навколишнє середовище (ОВНС) для нових requirements). об’єктів. Процес ЕО регулюється нормативним документом, розробленим спеціально для даного випадку.
Thus, as soon as SUP foresees the safety upgrade of all 4 Питання та пропозиції, отримані в ході зустрічі:
Ukraine NPP Safety Upgrade Program – Ecological Assessment Report – version 5 Energoatom - Date 31.01.2012 Page 299 operating NPPs wihouth new construction or capacity increase 1. Що стосується Рівненської АЕС, скільки буде потрібно EA of SUP is not fully under the requirements of state грошей для реалізації заходів програми і яка частина construction norms concerning environmental impact буде Енергоатома, а скільки треба буде взяти в assessment (EIA) for new construction. EA process is кредит, ну і взагалі по Україні такі дані? regulated by the normative document specially elaborated for this case. 2. Вже говорили про те, що громадські консультації відбуваються, а чи вже були пропозиції якісь, відгуки від населення, взагалі якісь коментарі вже є? Questions and suggestions received during the meeting: 3. Будемо так казати, що частина енергоблоків РАЕС уже 1. What concerns RNPP how much money will be needed to відпрацювали свій проектний вік. І оця програма, яка implement the measures of safety upgrade program and на сьогоднішній день розробляється, включає в себе which part will be covered by Energoatom, and how much модернізацію тих енергоблоків, які вже відпрацювали, will be taken as a credit, and in general such data for the чи передбачає закриття цих енергоблоків? whole Ukraine? 4. Чи останні події, які збудила аварія в Японії щодо громадської думки, як вони вплинуть на продовження 2. It was already told that public consultations were carried будівництва Хмельницької АЕС? but were there any suggestions, notifications from the population, in general any comments?
3. Let’s say that the part of power units of RNPP had overworked their designed term. Does this program which nowadays is under elaboration include the modernization of these power units which had already overworked their terms or shutdown of these power units?
4. Had the latest actions which the accident in Japan had caused concerning the public opinion changed something in the process of KhNPP construction?
11.5.8 Minute of public meeting, Netyshin
Minutes of Public Meeting Протокол зустрічі з громадськістю concerning the Consolidated Safety Upgrade Program for з питань Комплексної (зведеної) програми підвищення power units of NPPs of Ukraine and Ecological безпеки енергоблоків АЕС України (КЗПБ) та Assessment of SUP Екологічної оцінки КЗПБ
21.07.2011, Netishyn, KhNPP, 15:00 21.07.2011, м. Нетішин, ХАЕС, 15:00
Attendees: Присутні: 55. Рахлінський Олег Васильович – заступник 55. Rakhlinsky Oleg – deputy of general director for capital генерального директора з капітального будівництва ВП construction of Khmelnitsky NPP. ХАЕС.
56. Ляденко Галина Дингабівна – начальник відділу з 56. Lyadenko Galyna – head of safety upgrade department of підвищення безпеки ВДВ Дирекції ДП НАЕК Energoatom’s Directorate. «Енергоатом». 57. Kochugov Oleksandr – head of technical department of “Atomproektengineering” 57. Кочугов Олександр Олександрович – начальник ТВ ВТС ДПІ ВП «Атомпроектінжиніринг». 58. Pierre Biedermann – director for international issues of “PÖYRY” 58. П’єр Бідерманн – директор з міжнародних питань
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Компанії «PÖYRY». 59. Demydenko Andriy – public relations consultant of “PÖYRY”. 59. Демиденко Андрій – консультант зі зв'язків з громадськістю Компанії «PÖYRY». 60. Litvinsky Ludvig – expert of “PÖYRY”. 60. Литвинський Людвіг Леонідович – експерт Компанії 61. Shevchuk Ludmyla – editor of city-regional radio of «PÖYRY». Slavuta 61. Шевчук Людмила Борисівна – редактор 62. Shulyak Lesya – TV journalist of “Podillya-Center” TV- міськрайонного радіо, м. Славута radio company of Khmelnitsky
62. Шуляк Леся Борисівна – тележурналіст ХОДТРК
63. Kryvyy Viktor – TV operator of “Podillya-Center” TV-radio «Поділля-центр», м. Хмельницький company of Khmelnitsky 63. Кривий Віктор Володимирович – телеоператор 64. Filina Olga – chief editor of regional newspaper “Zhyttya I ХОДТРК «Поділля-центр», м. Хмельницький slovo” (“Life and word”) of Ostrog, Rivne oblast 64. Філіна Ольга Йосипівна – гол. редактор районної газети «Життя і слово» м. Острог, Рівненська обл..
Порядок денний ЗГ: • Реєстрація учасників ЗГ та надання інформаційних Agenda of the PM: матеріалів - 30 хв.
• Registration of attendees of PM and providing them with • Відкриття ЗГ (вступне слово Головуючого) - 10 хв. information materials – 30 min. • Консультації з громадськістю з питань КЗПБ та ЕО • Opening of PM (introduction of the Head) – 10 min. КЗПБ (доповідь представника компанії «PÖYRY») - 15
хв. • Public consultation concerning SUP and SUP EA issues (report of the representative of PÖYRY) – 15 min. • Результати Екологічної оцінки КЗПБ (доповідь • Results of Ecological Assessment of SUP (report of the представника компанії «PÖYRY») - 30 хв. representative of PÖYRY) – 30 min. • Обговорення питань КЗПБ та ЕО КЗПБ - 1,5 • Discussion of SUP and SUP EA issues – 1,5 hours години
• Closing of PM (final word of the Head) – 5 min. • Закриття ЗГ (заключне слово Головуючого) - 5 хв.
Brief annotation: Коротка анотація: 20 грудня 1995 року Уряд України, уряди країн Великої On December 20th 1995, the Government of Ukraine (“GoU”), Сімки та Євро комісія (ЄК) підписали Меморандум про the Governments of the G-7 countries and the European взаєморозуміння (МВ) щодо програми підтримки закриття Commission (“EC”) signed a Memorandum of Understanding Чорнобильської атомної електростанції. Ядерна безпека є (MoU) on a programme to support the closure of the однією з чотирьох сфер, роботу над якими передбачає МВ. Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Nuclear safety is one of the «Комплексна (зведена) програма підвищення безпеки four areas developed in accordance with this MoU. енергоблоків АЕС України» (КЗПБ) розроблена ДП НАЕК «Енергоатом», в ній взято до уваги всі рекомендації, The “Ukrainian NPPs Safety Upgrade Package Program” винесені в кінцевому звіті спільного проекту ЄК, МАГАТЕ (SUP) was developed by SE NNEGC “Energoatom” and takes та України (Звіт МАГАТЕ від лютого 2010, Угода між into account all recommendations issued through the final МАГАТЕ та ЄК 2007/45268), згідно «Дорожньої карти report of the joint project ECIAEA-Ukraine (IAEA report date ядерної безпеки працюючих в Україні атомних February 2010 IAEA-EC Agreement 2007/45268) , in електростанцій» МВ. accordance with the “Road Map For Nuclear Safety of КЗПБ передбачає покращення стану безпеки на існуючих Operating Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants” of the MoU. АЕС без додаткового будівництва, збільшення
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потужностей чи подовження строку експлуатації. Для The SUP involves safety improvements at existing NPPs, with забезпечення дотримання вимог з охорони навколишнього no new construction, no capacity increase and no life середовища та екологічної безпеки КЗПБ має пройти extension. To comply with the requirements of environmental Екологічну Оцінку (ЕО). Одним із завдань ЕО є protection SUP should pass the Ecological Assessment (EA). оприлюднення та обговорення звіту ЕО в рамках процесу One of EA tasks is to disclose and discuss the EA report in громадських консультацій, та його доопрацювання після terms of the public consultation process and working over it завершення процесу громадських консультацій. after the public consultation process is over. For the purposes Екологічна оцінка (ЕО) має бути проведена у відповідності of international financing, the SUP is subject to an Ecological з національним законодавством та міжнародними Assessment inclusive of assessments made of the four конвенціями, підписаними Україною, а також взірцями nuclear power plants, but not to a full Environmental Impact міжнародних рекомендацій щодо екологічних та соціальних Assessment (EIA). проектів, що фінансуються МФУ (включаючи екологічні вимоги ЄБРР та ЄС). The Ecological Assessment (EA) is to be carried out in При цьому, оскільки КЗПБ передбачає підвищення безпеки compliance with the national legislation and international на всіх чотирьох існуючих АЕС без нового будівництва чи conventions signed by Ukraine, as well as the best збільшення потужностей, ЕО КЗПБ не цілком підпадає international environmental and social guidelines for projects під вимоги державних будівельних норм щодо оцінки financed by IFIs (including EBRD and EU environmental впливів на навколишнє середовище (ОВНС) для нових requirements). об’єктів. Процес ЕО регулюється нормативним документом, розробленим спеціально для даного випадку.
Thus, as soon as SUP foresees the safety upgrade of all 4 Питання та пропозиції, отримані в ході зустрічі: operating NPPs wihouth new construction or capacity increase 1. В прес-релізі сказано про те, що 800 заходів EA of SUP is not fully under the requirements of state орієнтовно має бути проведено для поліпшення construction norms concerning environmental impact ситуації енергетичної безпеки. Так само звучить цифра assessment (EIA) for new construction. EA process is 1,18 млрд. євро, які будуть використані на реалізацію regulated by the normative document specially elaborated for this case. цих заходів. Конкретна сума по Хмельницькій АЕС звучить, чи можна її дізнатися? 2. Які умови повернення цього кредитування, як вони надаються і який термін повернення цього кредиту? 3. Ці заходи, які передбачаються компанією, вони планомірно розкидані по атомних станціях, чи якась Questions and suggestions received during the meeting: станція буде реалізовувати більше заходів? 1. Press-release included the information that approximately 4. Питання сейсмостійкості – на одній із зустрічей йшлося 800 measures were to be elaborated to improve the про реалізацію заходів на ХАЕС, оскільки ця АЕС situation of nuclear safety. There is also the information знаходиться найближче до території румунських concerning the amount of 1, 18 billion EUR to be used for Карпат, то ці заходи входять у комплексну програму, those measures implementation. Is there the exact amount чи будуть поза нею? for KhNPP or can we get it? 5. На виконання цієї програми передбачається 2. What are the clauses of this credit obtainment, how the використання коштів, як державних, так і міжнародних costs will be provided and what is the term of return? кредиторів. Чи передбачена якась структура, яка буде контролювати використання цих коштів, чи вони підуть 3. Are these measures which are foreseen by the Operator деінде? systematically divided between the power plants or some 6. За яким принципом будуть визначатися NPP will implement more measures and some – less? постачальники, виконавці робіт? 7. А де гарантія, що за рік, тобто в 2012 році компанія 4. There is a question of seismic durability – during one щось інше не придумає чи не перевищить ціну meeting the measures’ implementation on KhNPP had (вартості заходів КЗПБ)? been discussed as soon as this NPP is located the closest to the Romanian part of Carpathians. So, will these 8. Чи будуть надаватися преференції на виконання цих measures be included in the complex program or will be заходів, постачання обладнання якимсь місцевим beyond of the SUP? компаніям?
5. To implement this program the usage of international lenders’ costs and the state finances are foreseen. Is there any structural facility foreseen to control the usage of
Ukraine NPP Safety Upgrade Program – Ecological Assessment Report – version 5 Energoatom - Date 31.01.2012 Page 302
these costs, or they will be spent on other issues?
6. What will be the principle to indicate the suppliers, work executors, etc?
7. What will be the guarantee that in a year, meaning in 2012 the Operator will not change its point of view concerning the credit or will not exceed the tender price (of SUP measures)?
8. Will the preference be given to any local company for these measures implementation and equipment supply?
11.5.9 Minute of public meeting, Energodar
Minutes of Public Meeting Протокол зустрічі з громадськістю concerning the Consolidated Safety Upgrade Program for з питань Комплексної (зведеної) програми підвищення power units of NPPs of Ukraine and Ecological безпеки енергоблоків АЕС України (КЗПБ) та Assessment of SUP Екологічної оцінки КЗПБ
26.07.2011, Energodar, ZNPP, 10:00 26.07.2011, м. Енергодар, ЗАЕС, 10:00
Attendees: Присутні: 65. Корзун Ігор Генадійович – заступник головного 65. Korzun Igor – deputy of general engineer for engineering інженера по інжинірингу ЗАЕС of Zaporizhzhya NPP. 66. Тараканов Сергій Олександрович – директор 66. Tarakanov Sergiy – head of modernization department of департаменту модернізації ВДВ Дирекції ДП НАЕК Energoatom’s Directorate. «Енергоатом».
67. Kochugov Oleksandr – head of technical department of 67. Кочугов Олександр Олександрович – начальник ТВ “Atomproektengineering” ВТС ДПІ ВП «Атомпроектінжиніринг».
68. Pierre Biedermann – director for international issues of 68. П’єр Бідерманн – директор з міжнародних питань “PÖYRY” Компанії «PÖYRY».
69. Demydenko Andriy – public relations consultant of 69. Демиденко Андрій – консультант зі зв'язків з “PÖYRY”. громадськістю Компанії «PÖYRY».
70. Litvinsky Ludvig – expert of “PÖYRY”. 70. Литвинський Людвіг Леонідович – експерт Компанії «PÖYRY». 71. Melnychenko Kseniya – assistant of “PÖYRY”. 71. Мельниченко Ксенія Вікторівна – асистент Компанії 72. Tetyana Romanova – chief controller «PÖYRY».
73. Marharyta Gedz – labor engineer 72. Тетяна Романова – старший контролер, ГЦ ОПЗАЕС
74. Eugene Vasylkivskiy – technician 73. Маргарита Ґедзь – інженер по роботі з персоналом,
ІСПСУР 75. Maryna Shayeva – technician
74. Євген Васильківський – технік ЗАЕС 76. Sergiy Adamenko – locksmith
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77. Tetyana Rachkova – engineer 75. Марина Шаєва – технік ЗАЕС
78. Iya Linnyk – engineer 76. Сергій Адаменко – слюсар
79. Nadiya Kryvenko – head of department 77. Тетяна Рачкова – інженер
80. Oleg Prykhodko – locksmith 78. Ія Лінник – інженер
81. Pavlo Tulupov – locksmith 79. Надія Кривенко – начальник відділу
82. Olga Vildyaksnina – head of department 80. Олег Приходько – слюсар
83. Ivan Shevchenko – head of security post 81. Павло Тулупов – слюсар
84. Oleksandr Kashelin – engineer 82. Ольга Вильдякснина – начальник відділу
85. Alla Yaketseva – chief engineer 83. Іван Шевченко – начальник посту охорони
86. Oleksandr Tolichenko – USG 84. Олександр Кашелін – інженер
87. Oleksiy Marayev – engineer 85. Алла Якецева – ведучий інженер
88. Halyna Havrushenko – isolation engineer 86. Олександр Толиченко – ЗГС
89. Mykola Redozubov – head of department 87. Олексій Мараєв – інженер
90. Viktor Salnykov – chief engineer 88. Галина Гаврушенко – ізоляційник
91. Volodymyr Zamozhnyy – engineer 89. Микола Редозубов – начальник відділу
92. Alevtyna Polezhayeva - hardware engineer 90. Віктор Сальников – ведучий інженер
93. Olga Krasina - hardware engineer 91. Володимир Заможний – інженер
94. Lyubov Kalinichenko – engineer 92. Алевтина Полежаєва – апаратник
95. Eugene Kotyenyev – MOTO 93. Ольга Красіна – апаратник
96. Yutiy Kuprin – locksmith 94. Любов Калініченко – інженер
97. Oleksandr Petrov – locksmith 95. Євген Котєнєв – МОТО
98. Viktor Zhyvoglyad – driver 96. Юрій Купрін – слюсар
99. Mykola Kulagin – journalist of mass-media 97. Олександр Петров – слюсар
100. Leonid Kosse – specialist 98. Віктор Живогляд – водій
101. Volodymyr Olefirenko – driver 99. Микола Кулагін – журналіст УРСМІ
102. Oleksiy Kurmaz – locksmith 100. Леонід Коссе – спеціаліст
103. Anastasiya Michurina – waiter 101. Володимир Олефиренко – водій
104. Olga Voronkova – painter 102. Олексій Курмаз – слюсар 105. Matviy Mosyagin – operator 103. Анастасія Мічурина – офіціант 106. Vitalina Onyshchenko – instructor 104. Ольга Воронкова – маляр 107. Oleg Semenov – chief painter
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105. Матвій Мосягін – оператор 108. Oksana Rogozhkina – engineer 106. Віталіна Онищенко – інструктор 109. Oksana Zarayska – controller 107. Олег Семенов – старший маляр 110. Olga Pechenizka – engineer 108. Оксана Рогожкіна – інженер 111. Volodymyr Bezrukovyy – illuminator 109. Оксана Зарайська – контролер 112. Svitlana Koltunova – technician 110. Ольга Печенізька – інженер 113. Volodymyr Davydchuk – crane operator 111. Володимир Безруковий – освітлювач 114. Viktoriya Melnyk – assistant 112. Світлана Колтунова – технік 115. Denys Lavruk – crane operator 113. Володимир Давидчук – машиніст крану 116. Volodymyr Zubkov – engineer 114. Вікторія Мельник – лаборант 117. Vadym Razumnyy – locksmith 115. Денис Лаврук – машиніст крану 118. Dmytro Bratsylo – locksmith 116. Володимир Зубков – інженер 119. Tamara Chernobayeva – controller 117. Вадим Разумний – слюсар 120. Oleksandr Logvynenko – guard officer 118. Дмитро Брацило – слюсар 121. Viktor Smudin – head deputy 119. Тамара Чернобаєва – контролер 122. Iryna Sverdlenko – engineer-assistant 120. Олександр Логвиненко – охоронець 123. Ivan Liubchyk – chief engineer 121. Віктор Смудін – заступник начальника 124. Oleksandr Shanov – section chief 122. Ірина Свердленко – інженер – лаборант 125. Iryna Shevanova – assistant 123. Іван Любчик – ведучий інженер 126. Tetyana Grintsova – assistant 124. Олександр Шанов – начальник дільниці 127. Olga Pchelnikova – assistant 125. Ірина Шеванова – лаборант 128. Tamara Shurymova – engineer
126. Тетяна Гринцова – лаборант 129. Viktoriya Zaychenko – technician
127. Ольга Пчельнікова – лаборант 130. Svitlana Koverina – engineer
128. Тамара Шуримова – інженер 131. Yuriy Katsalyuk - engineer
129. Вікторія Зайченко – технік 132. Volodymyr Lyashenko – section chief
130. Світлана Коверіна – інженер 133. Valentyna Grinchenko – economist
131. Юрій Кацалак – інженер 134. Oleksandra Kravtsova – assistant
135. Liliya Medvenkina – destructive tester 132. Володимир Ляшенко – начальник дільниці 136. Oleksandr Saushkin – master 133. Валентина Гринченко – економіст 137. Pavlo Korochentsev – electric welder 134. Олександра Кравцова – лаборант
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138. Oleksandra Istratenko – engineer 135. Лілія Медведкіна – дефектоскопіст
139. Yuliya Gostyshcheva – electrician 136. Олександр Саушкін – майстер
140. Olga Grygorenko – technician 137. Павло Короченцев – електрозварювальник 141. Galyna Burukova – software engineer 138. Олександра Істратенко – інженер 142. Semen Garbuzov – pensioner, Human Rights Watch 139. Юлія Гостищева – електромонтер
143. Volodymyr Zhelyabovskiy – chief master 140. Ольга Григоренко – технік
141. Галина Бурукова – інженер-програміст 144. Gennadiy Nesterenko – chief of RO 142. Семен Гарбузов – пенсіонер, 145. Viktor Pliukhin – locksmith правозахисна організація
146. Yuliya Rodnaya – construction electrician 143. Володимир Желябовський – старший
147. Mykola Yakimchuk – driver майстер
148. Viktor Gontaryk – head of radiation 144. Геннадій Нестеренко – начальник РО department 145. Віктор Плюхін – слюсар 149. Oleksandr Dosykov – radio editor 146. Юлія Родная – електромонтажник 150. Oleksandr Zaprudnyy – assistant of the MP 147. Микола Якимчук – водій
151. Fedir Romanko – waiter 148. Віктор Гонтарик – зав. Радіаційним відділом 152. Liudmyla Khalyavka – engineer 149. Олександр Досилов – редактор радіо 153. Larysa Davydenko – enginer 150. Олександр Запрудний – помічник 154. Natalya Bernadska – technician народного депутата
155. Mykola Folkin – locksmith 151. Федір Романко – офіціант
156. Yuriy Konkevych – engineer 152. Людмила Халявка – інженер
157. Eugene Klishchuk – electrician 153. Лариса Давиденко – інженер
158. Dmytro Zavyalov – specialist 154. Наталя Бернадська – технік
159. Olena Lavrentiy – technician 155. Микола Фолькін – слюсар
160. Oleksandr Katrych – head deput 156. Юрій Конкевич – інженер
161. Alevtyna Tsarenko – waiter 157. Євген Клищук – електромонтер
162. Sergiy Fursa – team leader 158. Дмитро Зав’ялов – спеціаліст
163. Kostyantyn Boyko – locksmith 159. Олена Лаврентій – технік
164. Oleg Karyaka – operator 160. Олександр Катрич – заступник начальника 165. Oleksiy Varzin – engineer
161. Алевтина Царенко – офіціант 166. Svitlana Stovba – economist
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162. Сергій Фурса – начальник команди 167. Oleksandr Borovyk – meteorologist 163. Костянтин Бойко – слюсар 168. Sergiy Shpiller – section chief 164. Олег Каряка – оператор 169. Svitlana Valeyeva – engineer 165. Олексій Варзін – інженер 170. Anatoliy Veremko – master 166. Світлана Стовба – економіст 171. Olena Kabyrova – engineer 167. Олександр Боровик – метеоролог 172. Natalya Pelyshchuk – seamstress 168. Сергій Шпіллер – начальник дільниці 173. Natalya Pryshchepa – seamstress 169. Світлана Валеєва – інженер 174. Vitaliy Yakovlev – head deputy 170. Анатолій Веремко – майстер
171. Олена Кабирова – інженер
172. Наталя Пелищук – швачка
175. Lyudmyla Oleksandrova – engineer 173. Наталя Прищепа – швачка
176. Igor Podluzhkov – chief of department 174. Віталій Яковлєв – заступник начальника
177. Svitlna Grytsayenko – legal counsel 175. Людмила Олександова – інженер
178. Sergiy Lyashko – NETO 176. Ігор Подлужков – начальник відділу
179. Vasyl Byelitskiy – deputy of village council 177. Світлана Грицаєнко – юрисконсульт of Kamyanka-Dniprovska 178. Сергій Ляшко – НЕТО 180. Vasyl Hura – deputy of village council of Kamyanka-Dniprovska 179. Василь Бєліцькій – депутат селищної
ради Кам’янка-Дніпровської 181. Vasyl Ivanys – driver
180. Василь Гура – депутат селищної ради 182. Igor Kurganskiy – specialist Кам’янка-Дніпровської 183. Svitlana Nadeyina – chief environmental specialist 181. Василь Іванись – водій
184. Mykhailo Sokolov – deputy of city council 182. Ігор Курганський – спеціаліст of Nikopol 183. Світлана Надеїна – головний спеціаліст 185. Artem Salamatov – locksmith з екології
186. Inna Filonenko – engineer 184. Михайло Соколов – депутат міської ради Нікополя 187. Svitlana Mamnyna – engineer 185. Артем Саламатов – слюсар 188. Larysa Merkulova – chief of department 186. Інна Філоненко – інженер 189. Mykola Didenko – engineer 187. Світлана Мамнина – інженер 190. Vladyslav Nedynyk – head deputy 188. Лариса Меркулова – начальник відділу 191. Oleksandr Ptukha – chief engineer 189. Микола Діденко – інженер 192. Olena Oleksandrova – engineer
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190. Владислав Нединик – заступник 193. Dmytro Zadumov – laboratory chief керівника
191. Олександр Птуха – ведучий інженер 194. Valeriya Olzhysovska – technician 192. Олена Олександрова – інженер 195. Viktor Dombrovskiy – chief engineer deputy 193. Дмитро Задумов – начальник лабораторії 196. Pavlo Kruzhkov – engineer 194. Валерія Олжисовська – технік 197. Olga Loginova – quantity surveyor 195. Віктор Домбровський – заступник 198. Tetyana Kaskalchuk – organizer головного інженера
199. Vitaliy Ubozhenko – master 196. Павло Кружков – інженер 200. Volodymyr Shatalov – operator 197. Ольга Логінова – калькулятор 201. Lyudmyla Petrenko – engineer 198. Тетяна Каскальчук – організатор 202. Olga Ovgatova – engineer 199. Віталій Убоженко – майстер 203. Tetyana Solovytska – technician 200. Володимир Шаталов – оператор 204. Leonid Pretsko – engineer 201. Людмила Петренко – інженер 205. Kostyantyn Shcherban – locksmith 202. Ольга Овгатова – інженер 206. Kostyantyn Herman – locksmith 203. Тетяна Соловицька – технік 207. Natalya Orlenko – engineer 204. Леонід Прецко – інженер 208. Natalya Kvasha – engineer 205. Костянтин Щербань – слюсар 209. Igor Kornyeyenko – master 206. Костянтин Герман – слюсар 210. Dmytro Yevdokov – master 207. Наталя Орленко – інженер 211. Olena Gotsenko – insulation engineer 208. Наталя Кваша – інженер 212. Oleg Savyelyev – master 209. Ігор Корнєєнко – майстер 213. Valentyna Kovalyova – master 210. Дмитро Євдоков – майстер 214. Igor Gumankov – hydro geologist 211. Олена Гоценко – ізоляційник 215. Kostyantyn Lushka – engineer 212. Олег Савєльєв – майстер 216. Larysa Khomenko – timekeeper 213. Валентина Ковальова – майстер 217. Oleksandr Lutsyk – correspondent, Ratio Newspaper 214. Ігор Гуманков – гідрогеолог
218. Volodymyr Baskakov – SME 215. Костянтин Лушка – інженер
219. Andriy Pistun – chief power engineer 216. Лариса Хоменко – табельник
220. Eugen Kravets – locksmith 217. Олександр Луцик – кореспондент, Рац.Газета 221. Ivan Goncharenko – ecologist
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218. Володимир Баскаков – МСБ 222. Oleksandr Razin – deputy of city council of Nikopol 219. Андрій Пістун – головний енергетик
223. Yuriy Babynin – chief of union 220. Євген Кравець – слюсар “Gromadyanska varta” (“Civil Patrol”) of Nikopol 221. Іван Гончаренко – еколог
Agenda of the PM: 222. Олександр Разін – депутат міської ради Нікополя • Registration of attendees of PM and providing them with information materials – 30 min. 223. Юрій Бабинін – голова союзу «Громадянська варта» м. Нікополя • Opening of PM (introduction of the Head) – 10 min.
• Public consultation concerning SUP and SUP EA issues Порядок денний ЗГ: (report of the representative of PÖYRY) – 15 min. • Реєстрація учасників ЗГ та надання інформаційних
матеріалів - 30 хв. • Results of Ecological Assessment of SUP (report of the representative of PÖYRY) – 30 min. • Відкриття ЗГ (вступне слово Головуючого) - 10 хв.
• Discussion of SUP and SUP EA issues – 1,5 hours • Консультації з громадськістю з питань КЗПБ та ЕО
• Closing of PM (final word of the Head) – 5 min. КЗПБ (доповідь представника компанії «PÖYRY») - 15 хв.
• Результати Екологічної оцінки КЗПБ (доповідь представника компанії «PÖYRY») - 30 хв.
• Обговорення питань КЗПБ та ЕО КЗПБ - 1,5 години Brief annotation: • Закриття ЗГ (заключне слово Головуючого) - 5 хв. On December 20th 1995, the Government of Ukraine (“GoU”), the Governments of the G-7 countries and the European Commission (“EC”) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a programme to support the closure of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Nuclear safety is one of the Коротка анотація: four areas developed in accordance with this MoU. 20 грудня 1995 року Уряд України, уряди країн Великої Сімки та Євро комісія (ЄК) підписали Меморандум про The “Ukrainian NPPs Safety Upgrade Package Program” взаєморозуміння (МВ) щодо програми підтримки закриття (SUP) was developed by SE NNEGC “Energoatom” and takes Чорнобильської атомної електростанції. Ядерна безпека є into account all recommendations issued through the final однією з чотирьох сфер, роботу над якими передбачає МВ. report of the joint project ECIAEA-Ukraine (IAEA report date «Комплексна (зведена) програма підвищення безпеки February 2010 IAEA-EC Agreement 2007/45268) , in енергоблоків АЕС України» (КЗПБ) розроблена ДП НАЕК accordance with the “Road Map For Nuclear Safety of «Енергоатом», в ній взято до уваги всі рекомендації, винесені Operating Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants” of the MoU. в кінцевому звіті спільного проекту ЄК, МАГАТЕ та України (Звіт МАГАТЕ від лютого 2010, Угода між МАГАТЕ та ЄК The SUP involves safety improvements at existing NPPs, with 2007/45268), згідно «Дорожньої карти ядерної безпеки no new construction, no capacity increase and no life працюючих в Україні атомних електростанцій» МВ. extension. To comply with the requirements of environmental КЗПБ передбачає покращення стану безпеки на існуючих АЕС protection SUP should pass the Ecological Assessment (EA). без додаткового будівництва, збільшення потужностей чи One of EA tasks is to disclose and discuss the EA report in подовження строку експлуатації. Для забезпечення terms of the public consultation process and working over it дотримання вимог з охорони навколишнього середовища та after the public consultation process is over. For the purposes екологічної безпеки КЗПБ має пройти Екологічну Оцінку (ЕО). of international financing, the SUP is subject to an Ecological Одним із завдань ЕО є оприлюднення та обговорення звіту Assessment inclusive of assessments made of the four ЕО в рамках процесу громадських консультацій, та його nuclear power plants, but not to a full Environmental Impact доопрацювання після завершення процесу громадських Assessment (EIA). консультацій. Екологічна оцінка (ЕО) має бути проведена у відповідності з The Ecological Assessment (EA) is to be carried out in національним законодавством та міжнародними конвенціями,
Ukraine NPP Safety Upgrade Program – Ecological Assessment Report – version 5 Energoatom - Date 31.01.2012 Page 309 compliance with the national legislation and international підписаними Україною, а також взірцями міжнародних conventions signed by Ukraine, as well as the best рекомендацій щодо екологічних та соціальних проектів, що international environmental and social guidelines for projects фінансуються МФУ (включаючи екологічні вимоги ЄБРР та ЄС). financed by IFIs (including EBRD and EU environmental При цьому, оскільки КЗПБ передбачає підвищення безпеки на requirements). всіх чотирьох існуючих АЕС без нового будівництва чи збільшення потужностей, ЕО КЗПБ не цілком підпадає під Thus, as soon as SUP foresees the safety upgrade of all 4 вимоги державних будівельних норм щодо оцінки впливів на operating NPPs wihouth new construction or capacity increase навколишнє середовище (ОВНС) для нових об’єктів. Процес EA of SUP is not fully under the requirements of state ЕО регулюється нормативним документом, розробленим construction norms concerning environmental impact спеціально для даного випадку. assessment (EIA) for new construction. EA process is Питання та пропозиції, отримані в ході зустрічі: regulated by the normative document specially elaborated for 9. Надеюсь, что уважаемые организаторы в лице this case. «Энергоатома», в лице ЕБРР и других организаций…эти общественные слушания проведут
также в других населённых пунктах… в 30-
Questions and suggestions received during the meeting: километровой зоне… К сожалению здесь, в основном, 9. I hope that the respected organizers in the person of представители Энергодара… Надеюсь, что такие же “Energoatom”, EBRD and other organizations… these общественные слушания мы проведем в Марганце и в public hearings will also be held in other localities… within Никополе. 30km zone… Unfortunately here mostly the residents of 10. Города, которые… находятся в 7, 8 километрах (от Energodar are present… I hope that the same public Запорожской АЭС). К сожалению, количество hearings we will hold in Marganets and Nikopol. заболеваний лейкемией у детей в 2,5 раза больше, чем в других регионах Украины, количество раковых 10. The cities… which are in 7, 8 km (from ZNPP). заболеваний, врожденных паталогий и т.д., и.т.д., что, Unfortunately, the number of leukemia deceases among безусловно говорит о том, что 30-километровая зона – children is 2,5 times higher than in other districts of она не только зона наблюдения, но и зона влияния. Ukraine, the number of cancer cases, pathologies, etc. which surely shows that the 30km zone is not only the 11. Я, если бы не общественная организация, в газетах не monitoring zone, but also the impact zone, too. смог бы прочитать (о встрече с общественностью в г.Энергодар).
11. Personally me if not the information from the public 12. Чи включені до програми першочергові заходи з organization would not be able to read in newspapers захисту населення конкретно міста Нікополь? (concerning the public meeting in Energodar). 13. Чому відсутнє інформаційне табло у м. Нікополь для 12. Are the first aid safety measures for citizens of exactly city ознайомлення мешканців з радіаційним станом? У of Nikopol included into the program? місті повинно бути встановлене інформаційне табло, щоб мешканці міста були ознайомлені із радіаційним 13. Why there is no information board in the city of Nikopol to станом на атомній станції. let the citizens get acquainted with the radiation situation? There must be mounted placards to make sure that city 14. Власне сухе сховище відпрацьованого ядерного residents are exposed to radiation at nuclear power plants. палива має лише Запорізька АЕС. Яку проектну та фактичну потужність має це сховище? 14. Zaporizhzhya NPP is the only unit which has got its own dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. What is the use of this 15. Запорізька АЕС 365 днів на рік проводить так звану repository? What is the designed and the factual capacity продувку ставка-охолоджувача станції у Каховське of DSSNF? водосховище, яке є єдиним джерелом водо забезпечення м. Нікополь. Фактично жителі міста п’ють 15. 365 days per year ZNPP is performing so-called purging of воду з джерела напряму з’єднаного з прудом- the cooling pond which is directly connected to Kakhovka охолоджувачем. Такого не існує ніде в світовій reservoir which is the only water source for the city of практиці. Чи плануються якісь зміни у цьому питанні, Nikopol. In fact the city residents are drinking water from чи такий стан справ всіх влаштовує, крім населення the source directly connected to the cooling pond. It does м.Нікополь? not exist anywhere in world practice. Are any changes 16. Вы упомянули о «громадських приймальнях». Когда
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planned in such a scheme or this case is satisfactory for будет открыта у на в городе (м. Нікополь)? everyone except the Nikopol residents? 17. 209 000 из 340 000 населения зоны наблюдения ЗАЭС 16. You’ve mentioned the “public repositories”. When the проживает на территории Днепропетровской области. public repository will be opened in the city of Nikopol? Это - 61% населения! На сегодняшний день ни один человек за исключением 3-4, которые приехали сюда, 17. 209 000 people from 340 000 inhabitants of monitoring не имеет представления об этой программе КСПБ, не zone of NPP lives on the territory of Dnipropetrovska имеет представления об экологической оценке, oblast. This is 61% of the population! For today no one слушаниях. Считаете ли вы в таких условиях from this percentage except 3-4 who came here knows легитимным проведение консультаций и легитимными about this SUP, has no idea of the elaboration of EA and результаты, которые вы хотите получить от этого для the hearings. Do you consider the consultations as получения кредита ЕБРР, когда имитируется legitimate and the results which you want to get in order to проведение слушаний и большая часть населения obtain this credit as legitimate in such conditions when the остается не вовлеченной в этот процесс? hearings holding is only imitated and the majority of population is not involved into the process? 18. Вы говорите, что информируете общественность, по вашему мнению, вполне достаточно. Но в вашем плане привлечения (заинтересованных) сторон говорится о том, что для Запорожской АЭС только 2
газеты определены в качестве органов 18. You say that in your opinion you inform the public распространения информации о программе... Это sufficiently. But in your (stakeholders) engagement plan газеты..., которые никто из 203 000 населения only two newspapers are identified for information Никополя и Никопольщины не получает и не читает. disclosure concerning the SUP to the public for ZNPP… Т.е. люди остаются не проинформированными и таким These newspapers… which none of 203 000 people of образом, создается впечатление, что вы лукавите, Nikopol and Nikopol district receives and reads. Thus, the потому, что в Плане привлечения сторон вы говорите, people remain non-informed and thus is seems that you’re о том, что организаторы консультаций с особой boggling because in Stakeholders Engagement Plan you заботой будут относиться к потенциально уязвимым say that the organizers of consultations will treat the слоям населения… Каким образом вы проявили potentially vulnerable population with additional attention… заботу об этих лицах, которых тысячи находятся в How had you paid this attention to the vulnerable people Никополе и ни один из них… вообще ничего не thousands of which are living in Nikopol and none of получил и не знает, что сегодня здесь происходит? them… received anything and knows what is happening 19. Ви сказали, що ніяких робіт з продовження термінів today? експлуатації застарілих реакторів не передбачено… В КЗПБ, захід №12301 «оцінка технічного стану ресурсу корпусів реакторів в процесі експлуатації» говориться, 19. You’ve told that no lifecycle extension works of old power що важливим для забезпечення безпечної units were foreseen… In SUP measure No12301 експлуатації корпусів реакторів в проектний термін і “technical resource assessment of reactor core in після продовження терміну є отримання достовірних operation process” it is told that the obtainment of представницьких результатів… При цьому substantial representative results was important to provide запропонована екологічна оцінка, виконана на вимогу the safe operation of reactor core in the designed term and кредиторів, не аналізує потенційних ризиків, after the lifecycle extension term… Thus, the proposed EA пов’язаних з понад проектною експлуатацією. Чому, elaborated by the lenders’ request does not analyze the коли ми бачимо, що є захід, спрямований на potential risks resulting from the operation. Why that is продовження терміну експлуатації? when we do see that there is the measure directed to lifecycle extension of operation? 20. Чому запропонований до обговорення проект Звіту про ЕО не містить найбільш логічної альтернативи – вивід з експлуатації старих блоків, як і передбачено 20. Why the proposed draft EA report presented for проектом експлуатації, проектом будівництва цих negotiations does not consider the most logic alternative – реакторів ВВЕР-1000? decommissioning the old power units as it had been foreseen by the operation project, construction project of 21. Чому не проаналізовані потенційні ризики, пов’язані з
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these power units VVER-1000? продовженням термінів проектної експлуатації?
22. Ви стверджуєте, що впливи АЕС на навколишнє 21. Why the potential risks connected to the lifecycle техногенне середовище при нормальній експлуатації extension of designed operation were not analyzed? можуть бути знехтувані… Є надзвичайно відомі дослідження, є труд академіка Яблокова, який чудово 22. You say that impacts of nuclear power plants on виявив вплив інструментальний будь-якої атомної technogenic environment during normal operation can be станції не менше 100 км, колективна доза – 500 км, і neglected… There are very famous investigations, there т.д., і т.д. В умовах розташування теплової is the work of academician Mr. Yablokov who had електростанції, промислових підприємств є давно вже investigated the instrumental impact of each NPP not less відоме ствердження синергізму, коли один негативний than 100 km, collective dose – 500 km, etc. In terms of ефект підкреслюється наявністю іншого… Чому в thermal power station location, industrial enterprises the межах ЕО КЗПБ не включена комплексна ЕО впливу known synergy effect is existing when one negative effect всіх техногенних об’єктів цієї території? is enlarged by the presence of another one… Why within the SUP EA a comprehensive EA of all technological 23. Хто повинен забезпечувати протиаварійний захист facilities of the surrounding area is not included? населення міста Нікополя? … Навіть в цих планах підвищення безпеки ніякої мови про захист здоров’я людей на випадок аварійних ситуацій не передбачено. 23. Who should provide emergency protection of the population of the city of Nikopol? … Even in these safety 24. Термін придатності препаратів йодного захисту, що upgrade plans no word is said concerning the protection of розданий мешканцям Нікополю, прострочений. human health! 25. Ми вимагаємо встановлення як мінімум 10-ти інформаційних табло (у м.Нікополь)... Люди повинні 24. The iodine means of protection which were distributed повністю бути поінформовані про те, що відбувається among the Nikopol citizen are already overdue. (на АЕС). 25. We require locating minimum 10 information boards (in city 26. Моментально шандора, которая соединяет пруд- of Nikopol). People should be aware in full concerning the охладитель и Каховское водохранилище, не закроется situation (on NPP). автоматически, поскольку там нету электропитания. Туда надо выписать наряд на кран, он приедет туда 26. The sandor which is connecting the cooling pond with the через какое-то время и закроет шандору. Kakhovske water reservoir will not close immediately as 27. ЗВЕРНЕННЯ ГРОМАДСЬКИХ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙ ЗС ЗАЕС. soon as it has no electric drive. The special request for Враховане окремо за №014. crane should be submitted in this case, it will come in some time and will close the sandor. 28. Наведіть приклади зі світової практики, коли поверхневі води використовуються як технічна
27. LETTER OF NGOS OF MZ OF ZNPP. Additionally водойма спец водокористування атомних установок included by No014. води технічною установою, і водночас э джерелом питного водопостачання густонаселеного регіону 28. Please, provide case studies from the world practice when країни. surface waters are used as technical water reservoir of special water treatment by nuclear facilities of technical 29. Коли інформаційний центр нашої ЗАЕС в щодобових institutions and simultaneously are used as the source of звітах разом з кількістю виробленої електроенергії drinking water supply by the densely populated region of буде зазначати кількість вивільненого тритію, the country. криптону-85, радіоактивного йоду, інших радіонуклідів, а також об’єм випареної з гідроспоруд АЕС води? 29. When the information center of our ZNPP in the daily reports together with the number of electricity 30. Відомо, що уряд Німеччини нещодавно прийняв manufactured will provide the information on the released рішення про якнайскоріше закриття всіх АЕС з amounts of iodine isotopes, tritium, radionuclide, and the переходом на альтернативні види amount of water evaporation from hydraulic constructions електрозабезпечення. Те саме планує зробити уряд Японії. Як узгоджуються наміри НАЕК «Енергоатом» по продовженню термінів експлуатації енергоблоків з
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of NPP? прагненням нашої країни щодо інтеграції в Євросоюз?
30. It’s known that the government of Germany had decided to 31. Як ви прокоментуєте заяву директора з проектів та close asap all nuclear power plants with the transition to інвестицій ВП «Атомпроектінжиніринг», Геннадія alternative forms of power. The Government of Japan also Сазонова щодо того, що втілення програми КЗПБ joined this decision. How do power units’ life extension зробить можливою програму подовження терміну дії plans of “Energoatom” comply with our country’s will to старих реакторів? І це при тому, що ЄБРР заявив про integrate into the European Union? неможливість фінансування подовження терміну старих реакторів.
31. How will you comment on the statement of the Director for 32. З другого боку таке подовження з економічної точки projects and investments of "Atomproektengineering" зору недоцільне, адже наявні ядерні потужності в Mr. Sazonov that the implementation of the SUP will make України використовуються лише на 72%. the extension of the operation of old power units possible? And it’s despite the fact that the EBRD said that the 33. Ми ставили питання щодо фонду НАЕК «Енергоатом», financing of such projects to extend service life of old в якому б накопичувалися кошти по виведенню power units is impossible. енергоблоків з експлуатації. Чи є такий фонд, чи є достатньо коштів в ньому і як ця процедура взагалі 32. From another point of view such extension in terms of буде проводитись? economical view is not sufficient as soon as the existing nuclear powers of Ukraine are used only by 72%. 34. Наскільки ми зрозуміли, коштів на знаття з експлуатації у 2014 р. 1-го енергоблоку Запорізької 33. We ask question concerning the special fund of АЕС нема, тобто є тільки один шлях - подовження “Energoatom” which would have to accumulate funds for експлуатації цього блоку? decommissioning of power plants. Is such fund existing, are there enough money on it and how this procedure will 35. Об’єм кредиту, який залучає НАЕК «Енергоатом», чи be implemented? хоче залучити, складає 1,2 млрд. євро. Під який відсоток беруться ці кошти? 34. As we’ve understood there were no costs for decommissioning of 1st power unit of ZNPP in 2014, thus, 36. І яким чином це (кредит) буде повертатися – there is the only way – to extend the operation of this unit? електроенергією чи грошима?
37. У мене складається таке враження, що НАЕК 35. The volume of credit which “Energoatom” will engage or «Енергоатом» разом з фірмою «POURY» вводить want to take is 1, 12 billion EUR. What is the percentage керівництво ЄБРР в оману, тим, що виконуючи цю these funds will be taken under? програму планомірно, поступово підходить до подовження терміну дії українських атомних енергоблоків. 36. And what will be the way to return (the funds) - electricity or money? 38. Есть предложение построить мост до Никополя и снабдить никопольчан дешёвым теплом. 37. I have the impression that management of “Energoatom” together with “POYRY” is confusing the EBRD with 39. Когда-то слушания проводили общественные, СХОЯТ elaboration of EA gradually leading nuclear power units of и т.п., Украина, 45 миллионов сохранить… Какое мы Ukraine to life extension. отношение имеем к «Запорожстали»? Что мы от этого имеем? … Вы ничего не дали – в бюджет… Мы –
заложники. 38. There is a proposal to build a bridge to Nikopol and to provide the citizens of the city with cheap heating. 40. Шесть блоков (на ЗАЭС), ещё сколько будет?
39. Some time ago the public hearings were held concerning DSSNF, etc. Ukraine, safe 45 million… What is our attitude 41. По проекту у нас должно быть, - в случае техногенной to “Zaropizstal”? What do we have from this? … You (аварии), - сколько у нас на выезде из Энергодара haven’t given anything – to the budget… We are the дорог должно быть? Как можно выехать по одной hostages. дороге? Должно быть по проекту три дороги на выезд
40. There are 6 power units (on ZNPP), how many units there
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will be in addition? в случае аварии. Где? Две дороги есть.
41. How many roads should we have according to the project 42. Для чего существует радиоточка? Если завтра какой- for the cases of emergency at the departure point from то выброс будет, мне должны объяснить, в какую Energodar? How can one leave the city by one road? сторону ветер дует или куда облако пошло? According to the project there should be 3 roads for emergency leaving. Where are they? Two roads are 43. Обязаны вы об этом (про аварію на АЕС) сообщить existing. или нет? Кто должен финансировать эту трансляцию?
42. What’s the reason of wired-radio? One should inform me if 44. 20 років назад у нас в районі було 20 000 радіоточок. tomorrow any emission happens on where the wind blows Плата була символічна… На сьогодняшній день or what is the direction of the cloud. осталось 1 900 радіоточок. Плата зросла за радіоточку в 10 разів… Стоїть питання – відключити радіостанцію. 43. Are you obliged to inform about that (accident on NPP)? Як же можна буде оповіщати (населення)?.. Не можна, Who should finance this broadcast? щоб оплата за оповіщення вішалась на шию людям, що проживають поблизу атомної станції.
44. 20 years ago we had the 20 000 radio outlets in the 45. То, что в вашей программе по системе обеспечения region. Then there was a symbolic fee… Today only 1900 (предусмотрено обеспечение информацией) через radio outlets remained. The payment for the radio has мобильные телефоны (СМС) – это как бы одна increased for more than 10 times… The question is to shut сторона медали. Не мешало бы все-таки down the wired radio. How is it possible to notify (people) if прислушаться к (предложению об использовании) there is no radio? It’s impossible to force people living радиоточек, которые на сегодняшний день есть,.. nearby the nuclear power plant to pay for the broadcast. радиоточки работают.
45. The fact that your SUP foresees the systematic population 46. Мне бы хотелось, чтобы … направления, на которые alert via cell phones (by SMS) is one side of medal but it is эти деньги (на социально-экономическую компенсацию the best to listen to residents and to use alert radio since a риска населению) идут,.. (решались) непосредственно number of radio outlets still exists… and still works. на территориях органами местного самоуправления… И пожелание к тем денежным средствам, которые непосредственно идут через НАЭК «Энергоатом» –
46. I would like that… the directions money is allocated for хотелось, чтобы эти средства, прежде, чем зайти в (social-economical risk compensation to the population) регионы, были бы обсуждены с жителями населённых are (solved) directly on the territories of local пунктов – а что хотят жители населённых пунктов?.. governments… And there is a suggestion for those funds Чтобы… часть людей… смогла… предоставить свои that go through "Energoatom": we would like these funds предложения, каким образом качественно… и с before they are directed to the regions to be discussed пользой для общества использовать эти средства. with the residents of settlements – what do the residents of 47. Ми просимо доопрацювати Проект Звіту з ЕО, тобто the settlements want?.. That… part of people… has the включити виведення старих реакторів Запорізької АЕС chance… to provide its suggestions on how qualitatively… з експлуатації як альтернативу продовженню строку їх and with society benefit use these funds. роботи.
47. There is a proposal - we would like to ask you to complete the draft EA report and to include the decommissioning of ZNPP power units as an alternative to their lifecycle extension.
11.5.10 Minute of public meeting, Yuzhnaukrainsk
Minutes of Public Meeting Протокол зустрічі з громадськістю
Ukraine NPP Safety Upgrade Program – Ecological Assessment Report – version 5 Energoatom - Date 31.01.2012 Page 314 concerning the Consolidated Safety Upgrade Program for з питань Комплексної (зведеної) програми підвищення power units of NPPs of Ukraine and Ecological безпеки енергоблоків АЕС України (КЗПБ) та Assessment of SUP Екологічної оцінки КЗПБ
27.07.2011, Yuzhnoukrainsk, SUNPP, 10:00 27.07.2011, м. Южноукраїнськ, ЮУАЕС, 10:00
Attendees: Присутні: 224. Фомін Юрій Костянтинович – 224. Fomin Yuriy – deputy of general director for заступник генерального директора з капітального capital construction of South-Ukrainian NPP. будівництва ВП ЮУАЕС.
225. Тараканов Сергій Олександрович – 225. Tarakanov Sergiy – head of modernization директор департаменту модернізації ВДВ Дирекції ДП department of Energoatom’s Directorate. НАЕК «Енергоатом».
226. Kochugov Oleksandr – head of technical 226. Кочугов Олександр Олександрович – department of “Atomproektengineering” начальник ТВ ВТС ДПІ ВП «Атомпроектінжиніринг».
227. Pierre Biedermann – director for 227. П’єр Бідерманн – директор з international issues of “PÖYRY” міжнародних питань Компанії «PÖYRY».
228. Demydenko Andriy – public relations 228. Демиденко Андрій – консультант зі consultant of “PÖYRY”. зв'язків з громадськістю Компанії «PÖYRY».
229. Litvinsky Ludvig – expert of “PÖYRY”. 229. Литвинський Людвіг Леонідович – експерт Компанії «PÖYRY». 230. Melnychenko Kseniya – assistant of “PÖYRY”. 230. Мельниченко Ксенія Вікторівна –
асистент Компанії «PÖYRY».
Agenda of the PM:
Порядок денний ЗГ: • Registration of attendees of PM and providing them with • Реєстрація учасників ЗГ та надання інформаційних information materials – 30 min. матеріалів - 30 хв. • Opening of PM (introduction of the Head) – 10 min. • Відкриття ЗГ (вступне слово Головуючого) - 10 хв. • Public consultation concerning SUP and SUP EA issues (report of the representative of PÖYRY) – 15 min. • Консультації з громадськістю з питань КЗПБ та ЕО КЗПБ (доповідь представника компанії «PÖYRY») - 15 • Results of Ecological Assessment of SUP (report of the хв. representative of PÖYRY) – 30 min. • Результати Екологічної оцінки КЗПБ (доповідь представника компанії «PÖYRY») - 30 хв. • Discussion of SUP and SUP EA issues – 1,5 hours • Обговорення питань КЗПБ та ЕО КЗПБ - 1,5 • Closing of PM (final word of the Head) – 5 min. години
Brief annotation: • Закриття ЗГ (заключне слово Головуючого) - 5 хв.
On December 20th 1995, the Government of Ukraine (“GoU”), Коротка анотація: the Governments of the G-7 countries and the European 20 грудня 1995 року Уряд України, уряди країн Великої Commission (“EC”) signed a Memorandum of Understanding Сімки та Євро комісія (ЄК) підписали Меморандум про (MoU) on a programme to support the closure of the взаєморозуміння (МВ) щодо програми підтримки закриття Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Nuclear safety is one of the Чорнобильської атомної електростанції. Ядерна безпека є four areas developed in accordance with this MoU. однією з чотирьох сфер, роботу над якими передбачає МВ. «Комплексна (зведена) програма підвищення безпеки The “Ukrainian NPPs Safety Upgrade Package Program” енергоблоків АЕС України» (КЗПБ) розроблена ДП НАЕК (SUP) was developed by SE NNEGC “Energoatom” and takes «Енергоатом», в ній взято до уваги всі рекомендації,
Ukraine NPP Safety Upgrade Program – Ecological Assessment Report – version 5 Energoatom - Date 31.01.2012 Page 315 into account all recommendations issued through the final винесені в кінцевому звіті спільного проекту ЄК, МАГАТЕ report of the joint project ECIAEA-Ukraine (IAEA report date та України (Звіт МАГАТЕ від лютого 2010, Угода між February 2010 IAEA-EC Agreement 2007/45268) , in МАГАТЕ та ЄК 2007/45268), згідно «Дорожньої карти accordance with the “Road Map For Nuclear Safety of ядерної безпеки працюючих в Україні атомних Operating Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants” of the MoU. електростанцій» МВ. КЗПБ передбачає покращення стану безпеки на існуючих АЕС без додаткового будівництва, збільшення The SUP involves safety improvements at existing NPPs, with потужностей чи подовження строку експлуатації. Для no new construction, no capacity increase and no life забезпечення дотримання вимог з охорони навколишнього extension. To comply with the requirements of environmental середовища та екологічної безпеки КЗПБ має пройти protection SUP should pass the Ecological Assessment (EA). Екологічну Оцінку (ЕО). Одним із завдань ЕО є One of EA tasks is to disclose and discuss the EA report in оприлюднення та обговорення звіту ЕО в рамках процесу terms of the public consultation process and working over it громадських консультацій, та його доопрацювання після after the public consultation process is over. For the purposes завершення процесу громадських консультацій. of international financing, the SUP is subject to an Ecological Екологічна оцінка (ЕО) має бути проведена у відповідності Assessment inclusive of assessments made of the four з національним законодавством та міжнародними nuclear power plants, but not to a full Environmental Impact конвенціями, підписаними Україною, а також взірцями Assessment (EIA). міжнародних рекомендацій щодо екологічних та соціальних проектів, що фінансуються МФУ (включаючи екологічні The Ecological Assessment (EA) is to be carried out in вимоги ЄБРР та ЄС). compliance with the national legislation and international При цьому, оскільки КЗПБ передбачає підвищення безпеки conventions signed by Ukraine, as well as the best на всіх чотирьох існуючих АЕС без нового будівництва чи international environmental and social guidelines for projects збільшення потужностей, ЕО КЗПБ не цілком підпадає financed by IFIs (including EBRD and EU environmental під вимоги державних будівельних норм щодо оцінки requirements). впливів на навколишнє середовище (ОВНС) для нових об’єктів. Процес ЕО регулюється нормативним Thus, as soon as SUP foresees the safety upgrade of all 4 документом, розробленим спеціально для даного випадку. operating NPPs wihouth new construction or capacity increase EA of SUP is not fully under the requirements of state Питання та пропозиції, отримані в ході зустрічі: construction norms concerning environmental impact 48. Говорилось о том, что процедура ЭО КЗПБ assessment (EIA) for new construction. EA process is осуществлялась в соответствии с наработками в т.ч. и regulated by the normative document specially elaborated for нашего Министерства (Минэкологии), методология this case. сама. Вопрос – предполагает ли дальнейшее
осуществление программы проведение экологической экспертизы проекта в целом и того, что включено в ЭО или, как у нас говорят, в ОВОС, на дальнейших этапах? Questions and suggestions received during the meeting: 48. It had been already told that the procedure of SUP EA was elaborated according to the developments including the 49. Вопросы реконструкции, ремонтов, которые developments of our Ministry (Ministry of Ecology), the проводятся на АЭС. На каждую эту работу проводятся methodology itself. The question is whether the further тендера. Хотела бы задать вопрос о том, проводится implementation of the program foresees the EA in general ли анализ дел на предприятиях, участвующих в and the included in EA, i.e. EIA on further stages? тендере? Проверяется ли - хорошая ли зарплата в организации, которая подаёт свою заявку, выделяются ли достаточные средства на охрану труда, есть ли 49. Issue of reconstruction and repairs which are undertaken социальный пакет для работников этой организации? on NPPs. To implement any of these works the tenders К сожалению, в тендерах учитывается вопрос цены и are held. I would like to ask the question whether the когда организации, не имеют нормальный социальный analysis of the enterprises which are taking part in the пакет для своих работников, естественно, у них tenders had been undertaken. Is it checked whether the дешевле цена… Я думаю, что в этих вопросах надо salaries are good in the organizations which are taking более чётко подходить к выбору тех, кто выигрывает part in tender, the enough costs are foreseen for the labor тендер, потому что это социальная ответственность protection, social package for the employees? перед нашими людьми. Unfortunately, the main role in tenders is plaid by the price issues and organization which have no normal social 50. В КЗПБ в «описі заходів» указано: «різноманітні типи package for their employees are the winners as soon as модернізації систем мониторингу та контролю». Что their price is surely lower. I consider that in these issues предусматривается под модернизацией систем
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one has to choose the participants of the tender in more мониторинга, чётко касаясь населённых пунктов «зони precise manner as soon as it’s our social responsible in спостереження»? front of our people. 51. Предусматривается ли в мероприятиях по 30- километровой зоне на случай эвакуации, на случай 50. SUP indicates in “measures list”: “different types of каких-то ЧП на станции финансирование программой? monitoring and control systems modernization”. What is Порядка 30 лет назад было постановление Совета foreseen under the modernization of control system in Министров СССР, в котором предусматривалось context of localities of MZ as the sanitary control? строительство дорог, больниц, (предоставление) дозиметрических приборов, даже домов культуры, на улучшение автобусного сообщения в 30-километровой 51. Is it foreseen to finance the measures within 30 km zone in зоне, чтобы обеспечить на случай аварии эвакуацию case of evacuation or any emergency situation on NPP? населения. Предусматривается ли что-то на эти цели Approximately 30 years ago the Decree of Council of в связи с разработкой этой программы? Ministers of USSR had foreseen the construction of roads, hospitals, (provision of) dosimetric equipment, even houses of culture, the upgrade of bus connection within the 30 km zone to provide the population evacuation in case of the accident. Is something like this foreseen in case of accidents now in terms of this program elaboration?
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12 NON-TECHNICAL APPENDICES
12.1 Study methodology/work plan
12.1.1 General requirements The EA focuses on reviweing the positive and negative environmental and social impacts of the SUP. It also aims at undertaking a comprehensive consultation of the public, in relation with the safety of NPPs under operation. The EA does not address issues environmental and social outside the scope of the SUP, such as Ukraine energy strategy, alternatives energy sources, the construction of new reactors, the increase of nuclear power production or the life extension of reactors. The key environmental and social aspects to be addressed follow the requirements set in the protocol: General requirements to the EA procedure and to reports preparation of the SUP for Ukrainian NPPs’ Energy Units” approved on April 2011 and reffered to as the "SOU". This SOU document was elaborated in compliance with Ukraine national legislative requirements in the sense of environment, population health protection and nuclear and radiation protection ensuring, particularly in compliance with requirements to EA. The document takes into account provisions and recommendations of regulations, directives and methods of international organization that “Energoatom” collaborates with. The SOU document sets the main requirements to the EA procedure and requirements to the report as follows: • EA procedure (particularly, EA scope, basic qualitative and quantitative EA indicators etc.); • EA Report contents; • Main aspects of impact on environment that have to be considered during the state ecological expertise of the EA Report.
According to the SOU document the following tasks will be carried out for the EA: • General characteristic of every NPP; Definition and short characteristic of the list of taken into account environmental impact types of NPPs’ energy units • Short characteristic of the environmental impact types of NPPs’ taken into account • Definition of the sources of environmental impact connected with SUP implementation; • Definition of the list of potential NPPs energy units impact objects, sensitive to SUP implementation; • Short review of the existing state of natural, social and technogenic environment within control areas of every NPP, forecasts of their state changes provided cancellation of SUP implementation (under normal operation and in case of accidents on every NPP); • Assessment of SUP impact on forecasted changes of natural, social and technogenic environment, analysis of the measures’ conformity with ecological requirements, standards and security rules; • Analysis of changes or substantiation of the lack of environmental changes during the process of the SUP implementation; • Short review of the set of resource-saving, protection, renewal and security measures that are or were taken on every NPP; Analysis of changes of the measures set as a result of SUP implementation and assessment of its efficiency; • Review of residual impact of every NPP under normal operation (without regard to SUP measures) and analysis of its change as a result of SUP implementation; • Integrated assessment of ecological risks in case of accidents on every NPP (without regard to SUP measures) and changes of such risks as a result of SUP implementation; • Assessment of economic efficiency of SUP implementation according to aspects of ecological impact and impact on population health; • Assessment of possible SUP implementation impact in transboundary context; • Preparation of a “Statement on ecological impact of SUP implementation”;
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12.1.2 Impact on natural environment In accordance with the SOU the impact of SUP on the following natural environment aspects will be analyzed and assessed: • Climate and microclimate • Ambient air quality • Geological environment • Aquatic Environment including surface water bodies and groundwater • Soil • Flora, fauna and natural reserves The study area to analyse and assess the impact on these natural environment aspects normally correspond to the monitoring zones (MZ) of the NPPs. But if the analysis of SUP measures give evidence that a significant impact will occur outside the MZ, then the study zone will be adapted accordingly.
12.1.3 Impact on social environment In accordance with the SOU the impact of SUP on the following social environment aspects will be analyzed and assessed: • Population health • Population’s social conditions (living conditions and needs satisfaction) • Workers health The EA report will include a review of Energoatom's occupational safety management and emergency planning. The study area to analyse and assess the impact on the social environment corresponds to the sanitary-hygienic zones of the NPPs. But if the analysis of SUP measures give evidence that a significant social impact will occur outside these areas, then the study zone will be adapted accordingly.
12.1.4 Impact on technogenic environment The technogenic environment taken into consideration encompasses the NPP itself and the other sensitive areas within the MZ that are used for industrial activities and purposes.
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12.2 Consultants’ itinerary
Period/Date Action Status
March 2011 beginning of the EA assignment done
April 2011 preparation of the scoping study report and stakeholder engagement plan
May 10th to 18th, 2011 participation to the scoping meetings in Kiev, Kuznetsovsk (Rivne NPP), Netyshyn (Khmelnitsky NPP), Energodar (Zaporizhzhya NPP) and Yujnoukrainsk (South-Ukrainian NPP)
End of May 2011 finalization of the scoping study report and stakeholder engagement plan
preparation of the draft EA report
July 2011 participation to the public meetings in Kiev, still to be done Kuznetsovsk (Rivne NPP), Netyshyn (Khmelnitsky NPP), Energodar (Zaporizhzhya NPP) and Yujnoukrainsk (South-Ukrainian NPP)
September 2011 at the end of the consultation period, preparation of the question and answers book and finalization of the EA report
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12.3 Curricula vitae of the consultants
Project Director Mika Pohjonen Remo Kropf Project Management & Environment experts Pierre Biedermann Iaroslav Adamenko Environment experts Thomas Bonn Vivian Castro Volodymyr Tykhyy Social & Public Consultation experts Andriy Domydenko Robert Zwahlen Heidrun Krause Oleg Purtov Nuclear and Radiation Safety experts Volodymyr Bogorad Alexandra Slepchenko Water Contamination expert Sergii Kivva Air pollution expert Ivan Kovalets
Position : Project Director Name of Firm : PÖYRY Name of Staff: Mika POHJONEN Profession : Nuclear Energy Expert Date of birth: 1964 Nationality : Finn Experience : 21 years Membership in professional • Member of The Association of the Research Diving Biologists of Finland societies : • Member of The Finnish Environmental Impact Assessment Society Key qualifications : Project and business management, strategy and operational advice, nuclear project development and management, environmental impact assessment, environmental legislation and permit procedures, due diligence and liability assessment, environmental management. Education : • M.Sc. in Limnology, 1989 University of Helsinki, Finland:
Other training : • Change management: Managers leading change: Pöyry 2010 • Course in negotiation skills: Pöyry 2009 • Course in business administration: Pöyry 2009 • Trainer´s House Ltd: Advisory Services Sales Training 2003 – 2004 • Jaakko Pöyry Leadership Academy & Mercuria Business School: Specialist Qualification in Management 2000 – 2002
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Position: Sr. Environmental Expert Name of Firm: PÖYRY Name of Staff: Remo KROPF Profession: Environmental Expert Date of birth: 1949 Nationality: Swiss Experience: 35 years Membership in professional • Cercl'Air: Association of Swiss Air Quality Experts societies: • Swiss Noise Abatement Association • Swiss Physical Society Key qualifications: Environmental Impact Analysis and Assessments, Environmental Management Plans, Health and Safety Audits, Institutional development and training programs for environmental agencies and local counterpart staff. Air quality and noise studies and expertise (for infrastructure projects, industries, cities, regions etc.) including: • planning and implementation of air pollution control and GHG abatement strategies (regional and nation-wide) • recommendations for cost-effective noise and air quality management programs with respect to existing and future standards • evaluation of applicability and efficiency of air pollution and noise control technology Education: • MSc. in Atmospheric Physics, 1975 Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich Other training: • Postgraduate Courses in Air Pollution Monitoring and Control Techniques • Postgraduate Courses in Training and Human Resources Development Activities
Position : Resident Project Manager, environment expert Name of Firm : PÖYRY Environment S.A. Name of Staff: Pierre BIEDERMANN Profession : Water & Environment Expert Date of birth: 22 October 1970 Nationality : French • Member of the French Committee on Large Dams Membership in professional • Member of the French Hydrotechnics Society societies : • Member of International Water Association • Postgraduate course in Geotechnics, 2001 Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Ponts et Chaussées, Paris, France • Graduated Hydraulics Engineer, 1991 – 1995 Education : Specialise: water resources management and hydraulic schemes Ecole Nationale Supérieure d’Hydraulique et de Mécanique, Grenoble, France • Higher and Special Mathematics, 1988 – 1991 Lycée Thiers, Marseille, France Pierre Biedermann is a Water and Environment expert, specializing in challenging projects: multipurpose schemes, transboundary projects, mega-projects, sensitive projects, projects with strong time constraints… Key qualifications : His competences cover the technical, environmental and social aspects of the whole project cycle: strategies, identification and preparation, preliminary studies and implementation. Pierre Biedermann has a strong theoretical background and excellent practical experiences in 30 countries of Asia, Middle East, Africa and CIS countries. Languages : French (mother tongue), English, Russian, German, Spanish
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Proposed Position: EIA Expert
Name of Firm: Director of State Institute of Environmental Monitoring – EIA (OVNS) licensed company (subcontracted to UCEWP)
Name of Staff: Adamenko YAROSLAV Profession: Environmental Engineering Date of birth: 25May, 1964 Nationality: Ukrainian Years with Firm: Contracts for 24 years Membership in professional • Certified EIA Expert, Ukraine societies: Key qualifications: Yaroslav Adamenko has over 20 years of experience in environmental impact assessments of large-scale projects in the Ukraine. His competences cover the technical, environmental and social aspects over the whole project cycle - project identification and preparation, bankable studies, stakeholder participation, alternatives analysis, GIS-modelling, and impact on soils. He successfully combines excellent theoretical knowledge with strong project experience and knowledge of EIA procedures and legislation in the Ukraine. Education : • PhD, Environmental Engineering, 1986-1989 Ivano-Frankovsk Institute of Oil and Gas, Ukraine • MSc in Geological Engineering, 9/1981-8/1986 Ivano-Frankovsk Institute of Oil and Gas, Ukraine
Proposed Position: Environmental Specialist Name of Firm: PÖYRY Name of Staff: Thomas BONN Profession: Senior Adviser Date of birth: 1968 Nationality: Finn Experience: 21 years
Membership in professional • The Finnish Environmental Impact Assessment Society societies : • Societas Pro Fauna et Flora Fennica Key qualifications : Environmental and social impact assessment, environmental licensing, environmental due diligence and auditing, environmental studies, EU environmental legislation, conservation biology, Natura 2000 –assessments His fields of specialization include environmental and social impact assessment, environmental licensing, feasibility studies, biodiversity issues etc. During his time at Pöyry Mr. Bonn has worked in numerous domestic and international wind power, nuclear power, biomass, waste-to- energy, and other energy related projects. Education : • M.Sc. Biology, 1994 University of Helsinki, Department of Botany
Other Training • Quality training, T-Konsultit Oy, 1998 • Project Manager training, T-Konsultit Oy, 1998
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Position : Social Assessment Expert
Name of Firm : PÖYRY Environment S.A.
Name of Staff: Vivian CASTRO
Profession : Water & Environment Expert
Date of birth: 20 July 1978
Nationality : USA & Costa Rica
Membership in professional
societies : • BSc, Sociology, University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), USA Education : • MSc, Urban Planning, Columbia University, USA Socio-economist with 10 years of experience in 15 countries working on infrastructure projects. She is a former World Bank staff and knows development partner safeguards well. She has led the socioeconomic and RAP aspects of ESIAs and has significant experience in project management and leading and training teams and addressing social and economic issues in all Key qualifications : project phases. She also has vast experience in designing surveys and studies and leading socio-economic studies on various topics, including for ESIAs and SEAs. She also has experience designing Stakeholder Engagement Plans and managing public consultations. Languages : English (mother tongue), Spanish (mother tongue), French, Arabic
Position : Public Consultation Expert Name of Firm : PÖYRY Name of Staff: Robert ZWAHLEN Profession : Senior Environment and Social Development Specialist Date of birth: 19 May, 1947 Nationality : Swiss Experience : 33 years Membership in professional • American Sociologists Association societies : • International Society for Ecological Economics • British Ecological Society • International Society of Tropical Medicine and Parasitology Key qualifications : Dr. Zwahlen’s expertise comprises Strategic Environmental Assessment, ecological studies, natural resources management, environmental policy, institutional strengthening and training, Social Impact Assessments, resettlement planning, Environmental Impact Assessments (mainly for power and water resources development related projects). Education : • Ph.D. in Zoology, 1974 University of Berne, Switzerland • M.S. in Biology, 1972 University of Berne, Switzerland
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Position : Radiation Safety Expert Name of Firm : PÖYRY Name of Staff: Heidrun KRAUSE Profession : Senior radiation and nuclear safety expert Date of birth: 1954 Nationality : German Experience : 31 years Key qualifications : Final disposal and interim storage and of radioactive wastes Safety engineering and certificates of conformity for licensing authority of NPP and nuclear facilities
Education : Technical University Dresden Study: Chemical and Environmental Engineering Master of Engineering Science: 1976
Position : Radiation and Nuclear Safety Expert, Technical Assistant
Name of Firm : UCEWP
Name of Staff: Oleg PURTOV
Profession : Nuclear Physicist
Date of birth: 14 June 1959
Nationality : Ukrainian
Membership in professional • Member of Ukrainian Nuclear Society societies : • • Ph.D. in Nuclear Physics, 1992 • Postgraduate course in Nuclear Physics, 1987-1991 Education : Institute for Nuclear Research of Ukraine Academy of Science, Kiev,Ukraine • Kiev State University Shevchenko, Physical faculty, 1976-1981, Kiev,Ukraine Specialise: Experimental Nuclear Physics Oleg Purtov is a Radiation and Nuclear Safety Expert, specializing in Ukrainian nowadays projects: as Project Management, Manager for Technical Services and Research Business, Neutron physics, Reactor physics and nuclear spectroscopy, radiation safety and monitoring systems, decommissioning, environmental impact assessment projects... His experience covers all fields were nuclear and environments are closely linked: nuclear Key qualifications : power, nuclear power plants, radioactive release, radiation protection, radioactive waste, decommissioning. His competences cover the technical, environmental and social aspects of the project cycle: preparation, preliminary studies. Oleg Purtov has a good theoretical background and practical experiences in Ukraine. Languages : Russian (mother tongue), Ukrainian, English, German
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Position : Environment & Social Expert
Name of Firm : UCEWP
Name of Staff: Andryi DEMYDENKO
Profession : Environment & Social Expert
Date of birth: 26 March 1953
Nationality : Ukraine
Membership in professional Global Water Partnership (CEE Council Member), International Network of Green societies : Planners (1994 – 2004, Board member) • Ph.D. in theoretical physics & biophysics N. Bogolyubov Institute for Theoretical Physics, Ukraine (1977-1983) • General physics Education : Kyiv State University, Department of Physics, Ukraine (1970-1975) • UNDP and GTZ, Prague (2007) Strategic Environmental Assessment course Over 25 years of professional experience in development and implementation of environmental policy and governance, strategic environmental assessment and decision support analysis to assess sustainability of land and water resource use. Key qualifications : Experienced in organising research, training, and workshops on environmental policy and governance, application of EU SEA and Water Framework Directives tools and instruments
Languages : Ukrainian (mother tongue), Russian, English
Position : Radiation protection Expert
Name of Firm : UCEWP
Name of Staff: Volodymyr BOGORAD
Profession : Radiation protection NPP
Date of birth: 7 March 1953
Nationality : Ukraine
Membership in professional • Member of the Ukraine Nuclear Society societies : • Moscow State University 1970-1975 Specialise: mechanic Education : • Kiev State University 1975-1979 Specialise: mathematician • received scientific degree of the candidate of physico-mathematical sciences (PHD) -2000 Volodymyr Bogorad is a radiation protection expert, specializing in dosimetric calculations and radiation risk assessment Key qualifications : His experience covers all fields connected with estimation of influence of ionizing radiation. Volodymyr Bogorad has a strong theoretical background and excellent practical experiences in Ukraine. Languages : Ukrainian (mother tongue), Russian, English
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Position : Water Contamination Expert
Name of Firm : UCEWP
Name of Staff: Sergii KIVVA
Profession : Environmental Modeller
Date of birth: 4 May 1957
Nationality : Ukrainian • Ph.D. in Computational Mathematics, 1987 Institute of Cybernetics, Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, Kiev, Ukraine • Postgraduate course in Mathematical Physics and Computational Mathematics Education : 1979-1982, Kiev State University, Kiev, Ukraine • MSc in Mathematics, 1974 – 1979 Kiev State University, Kiev, Ukraine
Sergii Kivva has more than 20 years of experience in mathematical modelling of environmental contamination. Key qualifications : He has expertise in the modelling of radionuclide contamination of subsurface environment, including radionuclide dispersion from waste storages via ground water pathways, surface water pollution, marine hydraulics and coastal erosion. Languages : Russian (mother tongue), Ukrainian, English
Proposed Position: Atmospheric impacts Name of Firm: UCEWP Name of Staff: Ivan KOVALETS Profession: Environmental Modeller Date of birth: 14 December 1973 Nationality: Ukrainian Years with Firm: 12 years Membership in professional N/A societies: Key qualifications: Ivan Kovalets specializes in the development and application of atmospheric environmental modelling tools with an emphasis on nuclear safety assessment studies. His competences cover nuclear emergency response and safety assessment and atmospheric dispersion of the radionuclide. He combines an excellent theoretical base with a strong practical experience in Ukrainian and international projects on nuclear safety studies. He has written about 60 scientific publications. He participated in the development of the atmospheric dispersion module of the EU nuclear emergency response system RODOS and guided its implementation in the Ukraine. He received an award from the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers for Youth Contribution in Ukraine Development and has also received various grants and fellowships, including from the National Academy of Science of Ukraine for Young Scientists (awarded in 2001, 2005, 2007); NATO Reintegration grant (2006), EURATOM fellowships (2002, 2005), grant of the President of Ukraine for Young Scientists (2004), and Scholarship of the World Federation of Scientists (2004). Education : • PhD in Fluid Mechanics awarded by Scientific Council of the Institute of Hydromechanics NAS of Ukraine in 2001 • MSc in Applied Mathematics and Physics Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Moscow, 1990-1996
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Proposed Position: Main scientific officer
Name of Firm: AESCAR LLC
Name of Staff: Ludvig LITVINSKY
Profession: Nuclea physycist
Date of birth: 06 July 1960
Nationality: Ukrainian
Years with Firm: • Member of the Ukrainian nuclear society
Membership in professional • Doctor of physics and mathematics, nuclear physics, 1995 societies: • PhD of physics and mathematics, nuclear physics,1987 • Aftergraduate course of nuclear physics,, 1982-1985 Nuclear investigations institute of Academy of Science of Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine • Kiev State University n.a. T. Shevtchenko, faculty of physics, ,1977-1982, Kiev, Ukraine Course: Ecperimental nuclear physics Key qualifications: Ludvig Litvinsky is the radiation and nuclear safety expert who is specialized in the international and national cimplex projects: as the project manager, head of department, key expert. His experience includes all fields of activities toughly connected to the nuclear and environmental issues meaningly: neutron physics, reactor physics and nuclear spectroscopy, radiation and nuclear technologies, SNF and RAW treatment, decommissioning, strategic planning, EIA projects, public consultations. Languages : Russian (native), Ukrainian, English
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12.4 Terms of Reference for the EA
1. Background Ukraine relies heavily on nuclear power for its energy supply with nuclear energy supplying 47.9% of the country’s electricity production of 173 billion kWh in 2009.
Ukraine’s 15 nuclear power units at four Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) are operated by Energoatom, the country's nuclear power utility (the Client). The capacity increased from 11,835 MWe gross in 2003 to 13,835 in 2009, which was 26.3% of the country's total installed capacity. This increase was due to the start of two new VVER-1000 reactors. All operational reactors are Russian designed VVER types, two being 440 MWe V-213 models and the rest the larger 1000 MWe units - two early models and the rest V-320s. Given below is information on the Ukrainian NPPs. Ukraine power reactors operating Type Reactor MWe net Commercial operation V=PWR Khmelnitsky-1 V-320 950 Aug 1988 Khmelnitsky-2 V-320 950 Aug 2005 Rovno-1 V-213 402 Sep 1981 Rovno-2 V-213 416 Jul 1982 Rovno-3 V-320 950 May 1987 Rovno-4 V-320 950 late 2005 South Ukraine-1 V-302 950 Oct 1983 South Ukraine-2 V-338 950 Apr 1985 South Ukraine-3 V-320 950 Dec 1989 Zaporozhe-1 V-320 950 Dec 1985 Zaporozhe-2 V-320 950 Feb 1986 Zaporozhe-3 V-320 950 Mar 1987 Zaporozhe-4 V-320 950 Apr 1988 Zaporozhe-5 V-320 950 Oct 1989 Zaporozhe-6 V-320 950 Sep 1996
Total (15) 13,168 MWe net (13,835 MWe gross – Energoatom May 2010)
The Ukrainian government plans for the future construction of new nuclear reactors as well as the completion of Khmelnitsky NPP unit 3 and 4. These investments are not part of the current study. In 1995 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the governments of the G7 countries, the EC and the Ukrainian government which required closure of the operating Chernobyl reactors. Thus, Chernobyl reactors were shut down - the last in December 2000. In 1997 the Ukrainian government decided on the completion of the two partially built reactors; Khmelnitsky-2 and Rovno-4 (K2-R4). Both reactors were 80% complete when a halt was imposed in 1990. Ukraine decided on a moratorium on construction of new power units. In 2004 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD or the Bank) and Euratom provided a USD 25 million loan towards the implementation of K2-R4 after the start-up of the modernization program. In 2009, the K2/R4 modernization program was successfully completed. In 2010 the State Nuclear Regulatory Commission of Ukraine (SNRIU), jointly with RISKAUDIT experts, inspected the K2/R4 units to check completeness of implementation of the modernization program. The RISKAUDIT experts confirmed the completion of all the K2/R4 modernization program measures. Over the past few years a consolidated program for NPP safety improvement has been developed in the framework of a long-term safety improvement program. It includes programs / investment plans for each plant and for each reactor type. This program is based on over 32 programs at a cost of around EUR 1.45 billion. Most of the measures aim to replace the old Soviet era monitoring and control equipment with a modern one that meets the new nuclear safety standards and regulations. The measures are to be performed according to the “Requirements on nuclear systems modernization and a procedure to assess their safety” as approved by SNRIU resolution #4 dated 10 January 2005. Such safety improvements are already being undertaken by Energoatom at Rovno NPP units 1 and 2 and SU NPP – 1. The main program is to be implemented by 2017 and will allow for the safe operation of
Ukraine NPP Safety Upgrade Program – Ecological Assessment Report – version 5 Energoatom - Date 31.01.2012 Page 329 existing NPPs in Ukraine in line with similar operations worldwide. The safe operation of existing units is a priority for the Ukrainian government and international agencies. Energoatom has started developing a Feasibility Study. A summary of the program and current status is attached in Annex 2. Energoatom will retain the Kharkiv and Kiev based nuclear engineering design institutes to prepare the feasibility studies (in Ukrainian referred to as TEO), which will include the data to develop an Ecological Assessment (EA) for each power plant in line with Ukrainian norms and requirements to be submitted as part of the TEO. Energoatom will provide all historic documents and ongoing studies, and will facilitate the discussions between the design institutes and the Consultant to ensure the same documents are available to all parties to enable the development of the EA. It is against this background that potential Lenders (the EBRD and the EC, hereinafter referred to as Lenders), in close co-operation with the national authorities in Ukraine, intend to commission an Ecological Assessment. The EA is to be carried out in compliance with EBRD Policies, notably the Environmental and Social Policy (Performance Requirement 1 or PR 1) and the Public Information Policy as well as EU environmental law. The EA should take account of the requirements and guidance provided in the respective EU SEA (Strategic Environmental Assessment) Directive (Directive 2001/42/EC) as well as the Kiev signed UNECE SEA Protocol1; and should also meet international best practice in Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) development. However, the EU Directive will serve as guidance only.2. 2. This Assignment The Client now intends to retain a consulting company (the Consultant) to carry out the EA in line with the requirements as set out hereinafter (the Assignment). Given that the Project involves safety improvements at existing NPPs, with no new construction or capacity increase, for the purposes of international financing, the Project should be subject to an Ecological Assessment inclusive of assessments made of the four nuclear power plants, prior to the Lenders being able to consider the Project for financing. Furthermore, the EA shall be prepared in line with Ukrainian regulatory requirements and international best practice, such as the EU SEA Directive and UNECE guidelines3. This study will supplement the TEO being undertaken by Energoatom of the specific upgrade projects and will allow for an overall Ecological Assessment of the Upgrade Program. The Consultant will work closely with Energoatom and the design institutes. In line with national permitting, the Ukrainian Ministry of Environment has requested that the EA should include distinctive sections (chapters/annexes – to be agreed), on each of the four NPPs as part of one overreaching study. The EA will only cover the safety work on the existing plants, and not new capacity, but will cover any associated facilities (any cooling water issues, etc.). Given that there is no formal approval process in Ukraine for approving SEAs, only for Environmental Impact Assessments (in Ukrainian referred to as OVOS), and also considering the Project specificity (operating NPPs safety upgrade) the Ministry of Environment with Energoatom is developing a protocol for internal approval of the EA in Ukraine and also the requirements to the information structure to be included into the EA in view of national normative document No. DBN A.2.2-1-2003, that will enable the EA to be reviewed and approved as needed within Ukraine. The Consultant will review this process as part of the inception process and provide recommendations, as appropriate. Energoatom will prepare the data on each NPP in accordance with the requirements agreed by the Ministry of Environment to make an Ecological Assessment, as required under national legislation for the approval of the TEO. This will be a separate study paid for by Energoatom. Energoatom will provide technical and logistic support to the Consultant and provide copies of all current and past studies. All studies undertaken by the EC, EBRD and other donor institutions will also be provided. Energoatom and the Ministry of Fuels and Energy of Ukraine will provide access to all the NPP and technical details of the investment program as well as National Energy and Nuclear sector strategies. 3. Objective of Assignment The objective of this EA is to describe, identify and assess the likely significant effects on the environment of implementing the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Safety Upgrade Program to be taken into account in its preparation and the support to be provided by international donor agencies as well as approval by the Ukrainian authorities. Therefore the EA shall: (a) be part of the Feasibility Study to be submitted for a State Review process and to be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; (b) be structured to meet Lenders’ environmental and social requirements inclusive of public consultation and form the basis of the Lenders’ due diligence process. The EA will provide decision-makers in Ukraine, potential Lenders as well as stakeholders with relevant information to assess the environmental and social challenges and considerations with regard to the Nuclear Power Plant Safety Upgrade Program and the envisaged public consultation (as defined by the SEP). This information should help to ensure that environmental and social concerns are appropriately integrated in the decision-making and implementation processes. 4. Scope of Work and Tasks
1 http://www.unece.org/env/eia/sea_protocol.htm 2 On 8 July 2010 a meeting of representatives of SE NNEGC Energoatom, Ministry of Environment of Ukraine and Western PMT Consultants took place. Terms of Reference for EA development were discussed at the meeting. As a result of the meeting, Chief of Assessment Administration O.N. Kartatsev presented the following comments: "Ukraine has no legislative basis in using SEA, thus the Ministry of Ukraine has no legal right to use the term SEA and to refer to the guidelines of the EU. At the same time, the Ministry of Environment agrees with the content of the provided document. Thus it is proposed to refer to "Ecological Assessment" wording, without any change of the scope of the deliverable itself." 3 Information can be found at http://www.unece.org/env/eia/documents/pamphlets/Pamphlet%20-%20SEA%20Protocol%20Implementation.pdf and http://www.unece.org/env/sea/eecca_capacity.htm
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4.1 General Scope of Work
The Consultant will work closely with Energoatom and their advisor to ensure consistency of approach between the various studies being undertaken.
The EA study will include an inception report, which will act as the initial status report and gap analysis on what needs to be undertaken to meet the project objectives, followed by a scoping study and subsequently the main EA report. The scoping and main report shall include: (a) a description of the consolidated NPP Safety Upgrade Program and its alternatives; (b) a brief description of the institutional and legislative framework of the sector in Ukraine and requirements of international agencies and Lenders; (c) a brief presentation of the relevant environmental and social policy and objectives of Ukraine and Lenders; (d) an identification of the key stakeholders and their concerns; (e) an identification of the key Upgrade Program (environment/social interactions); (f) a description of the scope of the environmental and social baseline to be prepared; (g) an impact identification and evaluation methodologies to be used in the EA study; (h) an indication of the timeframes, costs and resources needed to carry out the EA study.
The EA study will include among others: (i) an environmental and social assessment of the Ukrainian NPP Safety Upgrade Program, taking into account the potential environmental and social impacts of its implementation and its consistency with Ukrainian and EU and Lenders' environmental and social policies and objectives; (ii) recommendations for safety upgrade program formulation (including performance indicators, use of technical assistance and other aid delivery methods) and for sector program enhancement.
4.2 General Tasks of the Consultant
(a) Preparation of an EA and the EA Report
The Consultant will:
(i) Meet and obtain information from the relevant design institutes and the Energoatom team responsible for preparation of the TEO and ONVS. The Consultant shall carry out site visits to all of the four NPPs. (ii) Take account of the definitions, requirements, outputs, etc. as defined by Ukrainian regulations and best practice4; take account of relevant national and international standards and industry guidelines and best practise; take account of nature and sanitation protected areas, including those that would fall under the definition of EU Habitats Directives; take account of international experience in EAs and international best practice in EIA, and public information and consultation. (iii) Review all existing planning, development, technical, social and environmental information relevant to this study and the regions it covers. (iv) Collect baseline data on, for example, protected areas - sensitive habitats as defined by national, regional and international conversations and legislation, as well as important migratory pathways or specific conditions / constraints to consider when operating the existing nuclear energy facilities. (v) Undertake a scoping study as required for the EA inclusive of stakeholder engagement. The scoping study should determine the likely extent of the EA, the level of detail that will be needed for the review and to identify what information will be included in the EA report. (vi) Working with the relevant authorities, carry out a review of the environmental and social impact, opportunities and limitations of the program. (vii) Prepare an EA Report with chapters for each assessed technology in draft form (for comments) and in final form (after consideration of comments and inputs arising from the public disclosure and consultation plus comments from the Bank and Energoatom).
(b) Public information and consultation associated with the development of an EA as required under EBRD policies and the Ukrainian normative documents
The Consultant will:
4 For example EU Directive 2001/42/EC (Directive on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Plans and Programs on the Environment)
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(i) Develop a Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP) for the EA process. As part of the SEP process the Consultant should identify those individuals or groups likely to be affected by nuclear energy projects as well as any other individuals or groups who may have an interest in such projects. The SEP will include: • Developing of a scoping document and initial SEP with public consultations at scoping stage in Kiev, and near to the four Nuclear Power Plants, as defined by the SEP. The SEP will be agreed with the Bank prior to issue. • Following the development of the report the Consultant will assist in preparing the public consultations and attend all the public consultation sessions. These will be held near the four NPPs as well as in Kiev. Adequate notification will be given by Energoatom prior to each meeting. (ii) Create a website where information and guidance can be made available to all stakeholders and where details on the scoping study, the SEP, the EA, and public meetings can be placed. (iii) Work closely with the relevant national and regional authorities to ensure that all relevant national and international stakeholders, the public, NGOs, etc. are notified and, as far as reasonable and practical, involved in the scoping and the development of the EA. The public consultation process will also need to take account of international requirements (e.g. the Convention on EIA in the Transboundary Context - Espoo Convention as well as the Aarhus convention. The project will be developed to ensure full compliance with the Aarhus convention). (iv) Assist in organising and carrying out the public consultation process as required under the EBRD's Environmental and Social Policy and its Public Information Policy. This should include assisting in the logistics and organisation for public meetings and the development and provision of all necessary information material for meetings. (v) Provide a summary of the public consultation process.
The Bank will assist with the provisions of guidance and templates on the SEP process. Details of the SEP process requirements can be found within the EBRD's Environmental and Social Policy document, under Performance Requirement 10 as well as the EBRD Public Information Policy document. (c) Specific Tasks of Consultant
Specifically, the Consultant shall carry out tasks as follows: (i) Scoping study • Overview of the Upgrade Program and its institutional and legislative framework o The Consultant must describe the Upgrade Program under assessment, including any alternatives to be considered and which have been agreed between the Lenders, Energoatom and the government. If deemed necessary the Consultant may suggest variants to the alternatives, which must be justified. o A description must be made of the Upgrade Program institutional and legislative framework, including the organizations responsible for the implementation of the Upgrade Program, for the management of its environmental impacts and for the EA process, as well as the relevant environmental policy and legislation. o The specific decisions and process that should be influenced by the EA must be identified, especially aspects of NPP Safety Upgrade Program formulation. o An overview must also be given of the wider policy framework related to the Upgrade Program in order to identify other planning or policy documents which will need to be explored in the EA study to be clarified. • Description of key stakeholders and their concerns o The involvement of stakeholders in the EA process is a key success factor. The Consultant should identify key stakeholders (key groups and institutions, environmental agencies, NGOs, representatives of the public and others, including those groups potentially affected by the likely environmental impacts of implementing the Upgrade Program). o The Consultant shall review records of any national public consultation processes that may have taken place as part of the Upgrade Program preparation process. Based on this review and on additional consultations, they should identify key stakeholders' concerns and values with respect to the Upgrade Program under consideration. The stakeholder engagement strategy to be employed has to be agreed with the Lenders, Energoatom and Ministry of Environment. The strategy should provide stakeholders an opportunity to influence decisions. o Due to the large geographical areas that may be covered by the Upgrade Program, stakeholder engagement could focus on key stakeholders, especially targeting directly affected and vulnerable groups as well as key stakeholders that may not have been adequately represented. Records must be kept of all consultations and comments received. • Description of key environmental and social aspects to be addressed in the EA o On the basis of the policy, institutional and legislative framework analysis, as well as the participation of stakeholders, the consultants must identify the key environmental aspects that should be addressed in the EA study. That is, the key Upgrade Program–environment interactions that need to be given special consideration and emphasis. Depending on expected impacts on society and the scope of other studies, there is also a need to determine to which extent social impacts should be assessed5.
5 In this case, impacts on humans should be disaggregated according to sex, age, or other relevant social criteria.
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• Description of the scope of the environmental baseline to be prepared in the EA study o Also on the basis of the information obtained above, the Consultant shall provide indications on the scope of the environmental baseline needed for the EA study. This will include a proposal of the geographical units that will need to be addressed. All geographical units identified should be justified. • Recommendations on specific impact identification and evaluation methodologies to be used in the EA study o The Consultant shall provide an indication of the impact identification and evaluation methodologies that will be used in the EA study. Special attention should be given to identifying those environmental and social interactions that will merit quantitative analyses and those for which qualitative analyses should be carried out. (ii) EA study The scope of the EA study will be agreed with Energoatom, the Ministry of Environment and the Bank on the basis of the results of the scoping study, the study may have a main section and supplementary section to meet EBRD requirements. The EA study will be based on the results of the scoping stage and include an environmental and social baseline study, an identification of environmental and social opportunities and constraints, an identification and assessment of the potential environmental and social impacts, an analysis of performance indicators, an assessment of the institutional capacities to address environmental and social challenges and conclusions and recommendations (for NPP Safety Upgrade Program formulation). Environmental and social baseline study A description and appraisal must be made of the current state of the environment and social issues, focusing on those key environmental and social components identified by the scoping study. The trends for the various environmental and social components must be identified and a projection must be made of the state of the environment on the short-, medium- and long-term for the UP implementation and if the UP is not implemented. External factors must be taken into account, including the influence of other sectoral policies, such as the National Energy Policy. If the “no implementation” scenario is unrealistic the most probable “business as usual” scenario should be selected. The geographical (or mapping) units to be addressed should be described. Identification and evaluation of environmental and social opportunities and constraints The environmental and social factors and resources that can affect (positively or negatively) the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the UP should be identified, described and assessed for each alternative. These factors may include expected impacts from other National Policy drives/requirements. This part of the study should also consider the environmental issues that could potentially be addressed by the assessed other programs/studies. The study should assess if the UP provides an adequate response to these opportunities and constraints. Identification and evaluation of impacts The potential environmental and social impacts and risks from implementing the UP must be identified and described for each alternative being studied, taking into account the views and concerns of stakeholders. Their significance should be determined according to their characteristics (e.g. duration, probability, magnitude, mitigability, reversibility) and the sensitivity of the environment. Those impacts which are significant should be assessed in detail taking into account: • the views and concerns of stakeholders, • the consistency with international commitments (IAEA), • the socio-economic consequences (especially on vulnerable groups and ethnic minorities), • compliance with environmental regulations and standards, • consistency with environmental objectives and policies, and • their implications for sustainable development. (More information could be provided on how the methodology presented in the scoping study has been used for impact identification and evaluation). Analysis of performance indicators Performance indicators proposed by the UP (or already envisaged by the existing funding or international agreements for the NPP Upgrade Program) should be assessed and revised from an environmental and social perspective, i.e. their usefulness to identify the environmental effects (positive and negative) of UP implementation. Proposals should be made for the NPP Upgrade Program performance indicators and monitoring system. Assessment of the capacities to address environmental challenges The capacity of regulatory institutions to address the environmental issues, especially the impacts identified, should be assessed. (Consultants might be requested to incorporate information on the budget availability – mid-term expenditure framework.) Stakeholder engagement Stakeholders should be engaged throughout the EA study according to the stakeholder engagement strategy agreed in the scoping stage. Conclusions and recommendations This chapter will summarise the key environmental and social issues for the sector(s) involved, including policy and institutional constraints, challenges and main recommendations. Recommendations should be made on how to optimise positive impacts and the opportunities to enhance the environment, as well as on how to mitigate environmental constraints, negative effects and risks. They should suggest the selection of an alternative (if more than one alternative is envisaged), potential changes in the UP design, implementation and monitoring modalities, or co-operation actions. In view of the preparation of a support program recommendations should especially be made to support the overall assessment of the sector program (referring to the assessment areas described for instance in EC guidelines) as well as for the NPP Safety Upgrade formulation.
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Recommendations for UP enhancement should be distinguished from those for NPP safety upgrade formulation. The recommendations for UP enhancement should be addressed to the Ukrainian Authorities and Energoatom for incorporation in its policy dialogue with the government. Recommendations to the Lenders for NPP safety upgrade formulation must address the possibility of providing technical assistance or the use of other financing to address specific weaknesses in the environmental institutional, legal and policy framework. They should also include proposals for indicators. The limitations of the EA and its assumptions should be presented. The recommendations should take into account the views presented by the stakeholders and explain how these were integrated. In the case of concerns that were not integrated in the final recommendations, the reasons thereof should be given. 5. Implementation Arrangements The Consultant shall report to Energoatom’s project manager.
5.1 Timing
The Consultant shall commence work no later than 5 days after conclusion of the Contract (kick-off date). The Assignment is to be completed within 12 months. Key time milestones are as follows:
• End of week from the kick-off meeting provide an inception report. This will in essence act as a gap analysis and definition of the project and will include key elements of the scoping study; • Formal scoping study and Stakeholder Engagement Plan by month 2, to enable agreement of both by month 2 and allow for public consultation in month 3; • End of month 5: submission of a draft EA Report to the Bank, who will provide comments, following which the Consultant will have 2 weeks to provide an amended version; submission of the draft report on the project due diligence, benefits and obstacles (task 4); • End of month 6: draft EA Report ready for 120 days public consultation; public consultation commences; submission of the final report on the project due diligence, benefits and obstacles (task 4); • End of month 10: end of public consultation; Consultant will amend the draft EA Report following the public consultations as required by the Bank and Energoatom comments 4 weeks after the end of the public consultation period); • End of month 12: submission of the agreed final EA Report and the Report on Public Consultation.
5.2 Liaison with Stakeholders
The Consultant will liaise closely with the Bank, Energoatom and the Ministry of Environment, among others, and points of contact/responsibility as nominated by the Bank and Energoatom.
The Consultant is requested to attend a minimum of five meetings with the Bank/Energoatom at the Bank’s Resident Office in Kyiv or at an in-country venue nominated by Energoatom:
• at the beginning of the EA process – kick off meeting; • on submission of the draft inception report and scoping study (see Section 6 below); • Prior to beginning the scoping meetings; • on completion of the final report (for a formal presentation to the Bank); • Prior to beginning the public consultation process.
5.3 Facilities, Equipment, Staff
As part of this Assignment, and within the budget assigned, the Consultant will:
• provide all equipment required for the project (e.g. laptops, PCs, photocopiers, etc.) that will remain its property at the end of the assignment; • arrange any office facilities, etc. which may be required for its own use; • arrange any facilities required for public meetings (as part of public information/disclosure); this should be based on one meeting in the study area; • Arrange for translation facilities at the Consultant's expense as provided in the agreed budget.
The consultant will cover his own expense during the public consultation process, with Energo Atom covering all costs of facilities, refreshments, adverts etc. Energoatom will provide full cooperation and access to all current and past studies as well as the NPPs.
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Energoatom will provide additional locally experienced experts as part of the TEO and ONVS process. These experts will be available to discuss the project and provide technical information as required. However, the Consultant needs to have adequate staff to be able to professionally engage with the Energoatom team. 5.4 Travel The Consultant is responsible for all necessary travel arrangements to and within Ukraine.
6. Deliverables and Reporting Requirements 6.1 Reports to be Delivered
Deliverable No. 1: Inception Report The Consultant will provide an Inception Report not later than 4 weeks after commencement of the Assignment to Energoatom and the Bank. This report should include (but not necessarily be limited to) the following: • identify relevant regulations, guidelines, industry standards, etc.; • identify relevant existing information; • identify information gaps which are likely to have a significant impact on the assignment and the quality and usefulness of the final report; • provide all details or any necessary material amendments to the work plan initially proposed; • identify key stakeholders (e.g. local, national and international institutions and NGOs); • provide an outline SEP; • describe how the Consultant intends to manage interactions with the Bank, Energoatom and the Ministry of Environment.
Deliverable No. 2: Scoping Study The Scoping Study is to be presented in the format given in Appendix 1, although this is to be used as a guide as the inception report needs to be tailored to meet the requirements of the Project. Following the issue of an inception report and meeting to be held in Kiev, the Consultant will prepare in week 6 a draft Stakeholder Engagement Plan and scoping study; copies are to be presented to the Bank for comments in English and Ukrainian. Following the approval of the scoping study (assumed in week 7-8), scoping meetings will be undertaken in week 10 in line with a program outlined in the SEP. The invitation to the scoping meetings will be issued at least 2 full weeks before they are due to take place, in national and local papers, and other media as required. Energoatom will assist with the process. EnergoAtom will cover all costs of the meeting and preparation for the meetings (including venues, refreshments etc). The consultant will cover his direct costs Deliverable No. 3: EA Report Draft EA Report The EA Report should, in structure, content, detail and presentation, take account of the requirements of the EU SEA Directive and best international practice such as the SEA Protocol as well as the Ukrainian requirements associated with the implementation of the SEA Protocol. The report will include Annexes relating to each of the four NPPs, this study will be undertaken under a separate contract with Energoatom and in line with the requirements agreed by the Ministry of Environment to enable the approval of the project by the Ukrainian authorities. The Consultant is encouraged to discuss the report structure and presentation with the Bank and Energoatom at an early stage. The Consultant will provide the Bank and Energoatom with an EA Report with separate chapters for each of the four existing NPPs (and any supporting annexes) in draft form not later than 4 months after commencement of the assignment. The Bank and Energoatom will provide comments. The Consultant will then (if required) have 2 weeks to amend the draft as necessary. Final EA Report Following acceptance of the amended draft by the Bank and Energoatom the reports will be made available for public comment. Following completion of the public consultation in accordance with Bank procedures (120 days), and taking account of any comment from the public, the Consultant will prepare the final EA Report within 2 months of completion of the 120 days period (final comments from the Bank and Energoatom to be provided to the Consultant not later than one month after completion of the 120 day consultation period). During the TEO (feasibility study) review in Ukraine the Consultant shall follow the EA agreement process (as part of TEO agreement) and, if needed, shall amend the EA if required by the state review experts. Deliverable No. 4: Report on Public Consultation The Consultant will provide Energoatom with a concise report summarising:
• liaison with interested parties during the development of the EA (e.g. at scoping stage) with the development of a scoping report and SEP; and • the formal 120 days public consultation process of the EA document with meetings held in Kiev and each of the NPPs (comments and how these were taken into account).
Deliverables No. 5: Monthly Progress Reports
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The Consultant will present brief monthly progress reports to Energoatom (copy to the Bank) providing a summary of progress made (against the initial work plan) and will flag up any problem which could materially affect the EA implementation. The inception report will count as the first progress report. General Reporting Requirements, Reporting Language and Number of Copies The Consultant shall send copies of all reports/deliverables to the EBRD too. The Inception Report, the Monthly Progress Reports and all correspondence with the Bank and Energoatom will be in English and Ukrainian or Russian. The Final EA Report, the Report on Public Consultation and all materials prepared for public information and disclosure will be in English and in Ukrainian. All reports are to be submitted in hard copy (5 copies to each of Energoatom and the Bank) and in electronic format. ANNEX 1 – Standard report formats
Standard format for the EA scoping report Maximum length of the main report (without appendices): 25 pages. The following text appears on the inside front cover of the report: This report is financed by EBRD and is presented by the [name of consultant] for the … Energoatom, Ministry of Fuels and Energy of Ukraine and the European Commission. It does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the … or the EBRD and European Commission. 1. Executive summary 2. Description of the Upgrade Program under consideration 3. Overview of institutional and legislation documents 4. Description of key stakeholders and their concerns 5. Description of key environmental and social aspects to be addressed in the EA study 6. Description of the scope of the environmental and social baseline to be prepared in the EA study 7. Recommendations on specific impact identification and evaluation methodologies to be used in the EA study 8. Proposal of time frames and resources needed for the EA study 9. Technical appendices I. Stakeholder engagement methodology II. List of stakeholders engaged or consulted III. Records of stakeholder participation. IV. List of documents consulted Standard format sector EA report The following text appears on the inside front cover of the report: This report is financed by EBRD and is presented by the [name of consultant] for the … Energoatom, Ministry of Fuels and Energy of Ukraine and the European Commission. It does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the … or the EBRD and European Commission. Maximum length of the main report (without appendices): 100 pages. 1. Executive summary 2. Scope 3. Background 3.1 Upgrade Program justification and purpose 3.2 Alternatives 3.3 Environmental and Social policy, legislative and planning framework 4. Approach and methodology 4.1 General approach 4.2 Geographical or environmental mapping units 4.3 Assumptions, uncertainties and constraints 5. Environmental and social baseline study 6. Impact identification and evaluation 7. Analysis of alternatives 8. Mitigation or optimising measures 9. Indicators and institutional capacities 10. Conclusions and recommendations 10.1. General conclusions 10.2. Recommendations for Upgrade Program formulation 10.3. Recommendations for enhancement 11. Technical appendices • Maps and other illustrative information not incorporated into the main report • Other technical information and data, as required • List of stakeholders consulted/engaged • Records of stakeholders’ participation • Questions and answers book 12. Other appendices • Study methodology/work plan (2–4 pages)
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• Consultants’ itinerary (1–2 pages) • List of documentation consulted (1–2 pages) • Curricula vitae of the consultants (1 page per person) • Terms of Reference for the EA
In additional separate chapters, or annexes will be provided for each of the four NPP’s in Ukraine. ANNEX 2
Information on project documentation development and environmental impact assessment issues to allocate land for the Ukraine's NPPs Consolidated Nuclear Safety Improvement Project (SPB) (As of 01/04/2010) 1. Status of development of project documentation SPB is to be performed at all 15 Ukrainian nuclear power units. It consists of individual measures that practically do not change the technical and economic parameters of power units. It is to be implemented at the existing building and constructions. It is aimed only at improving the safety and reliability of the units. Most of the measures are to replace the obsolete equipment with modern one that meets the new nuclear safety standards and regulations. The measures are to be performed according to the "Requirements on nuclear systems modernization and a procedure to assess their safety” as approved by SNRIU resolution #4 dated 10 January 2005. At RNPP -1,2 and SUNPP - 1 the measures are being performed using DP Energoatom own funding. DP Energoatom began developing a feasibility study (TER) for the SPB Project. An explanatory note, a list of measures for each unit, technical description of each measure were drafted. A preliminary expert evaluation of measures implementation was made to prepare a loan request and to conduct preliminary negotiations with the Lenders. Energoatom intend to evaluate the cost of each measure using the contracts already concluded for K2/R4 similar measures, letters of equipment manufacturers, technical solutions, and expert evaluation of the measures that have not yet been implemented. We are working to assess the cost of each measure according to DBN D.1.1-1-2000 "Guidelines to evaluate the cost of construction". Design object estimated payments for each individual unit and for each safety measure are to be developed.
2. The state of ecological expertise (project environment impact) All SPB safety measures will be implemented with the defence in-depth as identified by Safety analysis report and the recommendations of IAEA and Risk audit experts after assessment of power plants’ safety. SPB implementation will assure safety of nuclear reactors as of international standards. It will also ensure implementation of the Plan of measures on nuclear safety for the operated Ukrainian nuclear power plants, developed in accordance with the Memorandum of cooperation on energy between Ukraine and the European Union, signed December 01, 2005. National nuclear energy is one of the most stable areas of fuel and energy complex of Ukraine and plays a leading role in the energy supply for Ukraine. Changed balance of power generation since Ukraine’s independence towards nuclear energy has further reduced negative impact on environment by reducing gas emissions of thermoelectric power stations. Evaluation of the safety of nuclear power plants has confirmed its consistency with the Western standards. During electricity production at nuclear power plant DP Energoatom implement the national environmental standards and legislation and control implementation of environmental measures. According to the general provisions on safety assurance the basic purpose of nuclear safety is to protect personnel and environment against unacceptable radiation impact at all stages of the life cycle of a nuclear plant. One of the fundamental safety principles is implementation of the defence in-depth. To increase the defence in-depth and to reduce the likely environment negative impact the Operator implements the Consolidated Safety Upgrade Program measures. The project covers all the existing power plants of Ukraine, commissioned as required by the legislation. An obligatory condition to get a license to commission a unit is evaluation of environmental impact (EIA) that the Operator made for new reactors Khmelnitsky-2, Rovno-4 commissioned in 2004. For the power units commissioned earlier, their safety was assessed in document "Safety technical substantiation" (TOB), which was a part of the nuclear plant design. After a new nuclear legislation (Law of Ukraine "On use of nuclear energy and radiation safety" (Clauses 27, 29)) and the new Ukrainian safety rules and norms became effective the Operator started a comprehensive safety analysis of power units in operation using deterministic approach with involvement of Ukrainian specialists and international experts. According to the guidelines "Requirements to safety analysis report content for the existing power plants in Ukraine with VVER-type reactors", agreed by the Regulator, one of the main purpose of a safety analysis report (SAR) is to assess the actual impact of NPP on personnel, population and environment. The relevant SAR sections (DMAB, TOB) provide environment impact information during plant operation. The materials are formed on the basis of EIA (if EIA exists for the NPP). In case there is no EIA TOB is used. During SAR development there were reviewed and corrected TOB for all the nuclear power plants in operation. The review results were agreed by the Regulator - SNRIU. SAR considers the safety issues specific for nuclear power plants as a source of ionizing radiation. They analyze design solutions for their compliance to the applicable requirements and standards the implementation of which is essential to ensure the safety of nuclear power stations. SAR provide actual data regarding NPP environment impact like : chemical discharges, thermal discharge,
Ukraine NPP Safety Upgrade Program – Ecological Assessment Report – version 5 Energoatom - Date 31.01.2012 Page 337 electromagnetic interference, acoustic effects, radioactive emissions and discharges, radiation effects on personnel, population and environment, pollution of underground water, etc. As a result of a safety analysis it was demonstrated that the number of chemical and thermal discharges, gas-aerosol emissions and liquid discharges from nuclear power plants, the plant personnel dose, that of population, radiation status of environment and other indicators of environmental impact in the area of NPPs meet applicable safety rules and regulations. That is: 9 geological and hydrological conditions of NPPss meet the requirements of regulations; 9 impact of existing nuclear power plants on climate, meteorology and hydrological regime of the territory is negligible; 9 operation of power plants does not threaten the ecological regions of plant location and health of population, etc. Annual "National reports on the status of environment in Ukraine” informed of minor plant emissions and discharges into the environment, which is considerably (by several orders of magnitude) lower than the permissible limits of the levels of radionuclides in atmosphere, underground and surface water as required by the radiation safety norms in Ukraine (NRBU). During K-2 and R-4 completion international company "Mushel" audited safe environmental impact of these nuclear power plants on environment and received positive results. In 2007 at the EBRD request at the same plants, there were environmental audits of their operation on environmental protection. These audits were conducted by independent Ukrainian auditors and there were positive results. As a result of this project there will be implemented measures of the Consolidated Safety Upgrade Program. SPB is a set of measures to modernize power plants to be realized in accordance with applicable safety rules and regulations, namely: NP 306.2.106-2005 "Requirements to modification of nuclear facilities and procedures to assess their safety." Pursuant to the NP requirements one of the documents that substantiate safety of modifications (upgrades) is a local SAR, which is to be developed for each modification (upgrade). SAR must demonstrate that a modification will ensure no higher radiation doses for personnel or population, no accidents and negative impacts on environment. Such analysis needs to include assessment of impact from a proposed modification on the nuclear system safety and environment during all the implementation stages, from equipment installation to commissioning, and acceptance testing, servicing and operation. So, implementation of the safely measures from the Consolidated Program will not only have no negative impact on the environment, but will also assure higher safety of the defence in-depth of NPPs and shall reduce a likely negative impact on the environment. Given the above, implementation of this project will positively affect the formation of environmental conditions in Ukraine.
Ukraine NPP Safety Upgrade Program – Ecological Assessment Report – version 5 Energoatom - Date 31.01.2012 Page 338
12.5 Complements added to the draft EA report to the present EA report 1. Chapter 1.6.2. was added. 2. Chapter 1.7.2. was added. 3. Addings in chapter 1.8.1 concerning the early stop of power units of operating NPPs as the non program alternative. 4. Addings in chapter 1.8.1 concerning the inclusion of Decision of Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine dated 08.04.2011 “Concerning the safety upgrade of nuclear power plants of Ukraine operation” 5. Chapter 1.10.2.3 was added 6. Chapters 2.5.11.3, 3.5.11.3, 4.5.11.3, 5.5.11.3 were added for ZNPP, RNPP, KhNPP and SUNPP 7. Addings in 2.5.12, 3.5.12, 4.5.12, 5.5.12 concerning the absence of SUP impact on the forecasted changes of residual impact of NPPs resulting from the implementation of tasks set by other state programs and governmental decisions 8. Chapters 7.2.1.1 and 7.2.1.4 added concerning the process of informing on SUP beyond SUP EA. 9. Chapters 7.2-7.7 were corrected and amended in accordance with the fact undertaken measures. 10. “Questions-Answers Book” was added 11. Addings in chapters 11.4 and 11.5 in accordance with the fact undertaken measures and contacts
Ukraine NPP Safety Upgrade Program – Ecological Assessment Report – version 5