Sinai Disengagement Agreement - Vol

Scanned from the Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions (Box 5 - August 21 - September 1, 1975 - Sinai Disengagement Agreement - Vol. III (3)) at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library ~\)!!E~ ",«? ,= 0' ~ - Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov Library: 1000 Beal Ave., Ann Arbor, MI48109 (734) 205-0555 fax (734) 205-0571 Museum: 303 Pearl Street, NW, Grand Rapids, MI49504 (6/6) 254-0400 fax (6/6) 254-0386 The documents in this folder continue from the previous folder. A Presidential Library Administered by the National Archives and Records Administration MEMORANDUM \ THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON ~i!!6R:i:1? /NODIS/XGDS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS: Israel Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the U. S. Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff Amon Eran, Director General, Prime Minister's Office Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Professor Barak, Attorney General Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs United States Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Malcolm Toon, Ambassador to Israel Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State . .,. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of rE~~,;,:-::~c;D ~~~ State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs [:J >:,:--- _-"Sr-_"ll(!f Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary ,-01 - for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff DATE AND TIME: Friday, August 29, 1975 11 :52 a. m. - 6:40 p. m. PLACE: Prime Minister's Office Jerusalem CLASSIFIED BY HENR Y A. KISSINGER L J<:XEMPT FROM GENERAL DECl.AiiIFICA110N ~B6RET/NODIS/XGDS SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDEll 116S2 EX~MPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3),. • AUTOM.A.TICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det. -8ECRE'r/NODIS /XGDS 2. [Photographers were adm.itted and then ushered out. ] Rabin: Can we start? Kissinger: Yes. Let m.e m.ake a general corn.rn.ent of where I think we are now in this process. I think we are at a point where basically there is no realistic choice to an agreem.ent because everyone has gone too far. The only one who has a chance of pulling out is us -- on the ground that the price is getting too high, in m.y judgm.ent. And I think therefore we should stop fencing and get to the points that should be settled, on which there is a history that they m.ust be settled. When we are in practice so close to an agreem.ent. I would like to stress one other thing, in addition to what I said. Everyone now seem.s to be at a point where an agreem.ent m.ust be m.ade; everyone has an urgent need -- and that includes us -- to get back to its dom.estic structure before it disintegrates. And if this agreem.ent is to be sold in Am.erica, there is no place where I can do m.ore than in Am.erica, and the sam.e is true of Dinitz or anyone else you m.ay want to get over there. Because I have a very uneasy feeling about the way this \~ thing is being perceived in Am.erica. I don't know whether you have seen the Harris Poll, where only 9% of the Protestants, 53% of the Jews and 40% of the Catholics are in favor of what we are doimg. And 49 to 20% of the public believes that by interposing Am.erican technicians, the risk of direct involvem.ent of Am.erican m.anpower in the future of the Middle East increases sharply. Atherton thinks this is a typo. Oakley: It is 39% of the Protestants. Kissinger: Well, that m.akes m.e feel a little better because the gap between Protestants and Catholics startled m.e. But be that as it m.ay. Let's not play this gam.e. We now have Jackson com.ing out in public against it, in the Washington Post, not just at a Jewish rally. And he will perform. the great feat of appealing to the anti-Jewish and anti Corn.rn.unist sentim.ents in the nam.e of protecting the Jews. And again I say I am. not concerned with Jackson as a pre sidential candidate; I am. concerned with Jackson as the legitim.izer of feelings that no one would dare to express unless Jackson, with his record, had done so. You [Eran] will as an expert on the Hill agree with that. That is m.y worry about Jackson. Presidentially it will hurt him. again, because he's been fluc tuating on Vietnam. and everything else. I am. worried about him. on the___ .... FOR/) ". ( L Q ~. II 1 .:c ,", -eEC~/NODlli/XGDS 3. Hill, particularly if they can tie it to a Soviet presence. So we don't have to go into the fine points, although we ought to discuss it if there is an agreem.ent, before I leave, how we are going to handle the Congress. Som.e have com.e out for it, like Hum.phrey, and that is positive, and Sparkm.an. Stennis will support it if the Pre sident wants it. But we will have m.ore of a battle than I thought. And it will get worse with every passing day. Once we are back and can explain the positive elem.ents we can handle it. But the longer this thing siInm.ers in a state of suspense, the worse it will be. That is another thing. On the Egyptian. side, and on our side, and in our relationship, on every side, how this agreem.ent gets m.ade is also im.portant, not just what is in the agreem.ent. And I think we ought to begin thinking now of not squeezing the last drop of blood out of everyone at every stage, so there isn't such a feeling of hostility when it all ends that m.any of the paragraphs are defeated. Now let m.e state the Egyptian views. The procedure was that I first talked to Sadat alone. Then to Fahrn.y and Gam.asy on the agreem.ent• .~ Then to Gam.asy on his m.ilitary considerations, then to Sadat again alone. So we have different levels of views here to represent. Let m.e first go through the agreem.ent. My point to them. was the sam.e as the point to you the night before. I don't care if they like or dislike it. If they want to get it finished, they will have to confine their com.m.ents to an absolute m.inim.um. or we will never finish. Now, going through the agreem.ent. They agreed to Article I, just as it is. They say it is the weirdest drafting they have ever seen, but if it pleases you, they agree. They agreed to Article II. Article III they agreed. In Article IV they want to rn.ake two changes, which don't seem. to be significant. In paragraph 5, they don't want to say "inaccessible to the parties." But "The zone between lines designated on the attached m.ap as lines E and J will be a buffer zone. In this zone the UN Em.ergency Forces will continue to perform. its fWlctions." They say "buffer zone" will take care of it and it is less offensive to them.. They first wanted to say "zones of disengagem.ent, 'I but on the theory that you didn't want the word "disengage m.ent'l in there, we argued with them. and got them. to say "buffer zone. II L -SEGREJ!./NODlli/XGDS SECl':E'f /NODIS/XGDS 4. Allon: That is good. Rabin: How would it read? Kissinger: liThe zone between lines E and J on the attached map will be a buffer zone." This is the central front. "In this zone the UNEF will continue to perform its functions •••• " No change. In paragraph 6, where it says the "land connection between the city of Suez and the line terminating at the coast south of Abu Rudeis, " they say that is inexact because from the city of Suez to some point down the coast it is a zone of limited armament. Gur: That is true. Kissinger: And therefore they want to say, "In the area from line E " Rabin: They defined it first. This is the way it happened. We didn't try to•••• Kissinger: They were not complaining, just pointing it out. For once they weren't saying it was a chisel. [Laughter] They just said it is badly drawn. Let me explain what they wanted to do. They didn't want all this stuff, the long version. They wanted the short version, which you predicted. But I added to the short version something you didn't have in there, saying "in the area from line E to the line terminating at the coast south of Abu Rudeis on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached annex. 11 I thought it was helpful to you to put into the signed agreement something about "no military forces. " In (B), there is no change. Peres: Then the fallback positions fall out. Rabin: There were two options. They took the short one. Kissinger: I'm now talking about capital B. Rabin: After such long acquaintance with us, you doubt our understanding of what we agreed? L -SE€RK'F-/NODIS /XGDS SECRE'r/NODIS /XGDS 5.

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