Florida International University FIU Digital Commons FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations University Graduate School 6-27-2014 Electoral Rules and Elite Recruitment: A Comparative Analysis of the Bundestag and the U.S. House of Representatives Murat Altuglu Florida International University, [email protected] DOI: 10.25148/etd.FI14071144 Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd Recommended Citation Altuglu, Murat, "Electoral Rules and Elite Recruitment: A Comparative Analysis of the Bundestag and the U.S. House of Representatives" (2014). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1565. https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1565 This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY Miami, Florida ELECTORAL RULES AND ELITE RECRUITMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BUNDESTAG AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in POLITICAL SCIENCE by Murat Altuglu 2014 To: Interim Dean Michael R. Heithaus College of Arts and Sciences This dissertation, written by Murat Altuglu, and entitled Electoral Rules and Elite Recruitment: A Comparative Analysis of the Bundestag and the U.S. House of Representatives, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment. We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved. _______________________________________ Adrian Ang _______________________________________ Julian Edward _______________________________________ Mohiaddin Mesbahi _______________________________________ Nicol Rae _______________________________________ Markus Thiel _______________________________________ Tatiana Kostadinova, Major Professor Date of Defense: June 27, 2014 The dissertation of Murat Altuglu is approved. _______________________________________ Interim Dean Michael R. Heithaus College of Arts and Sciences _______________________________________ Dean Lakshmi N. Reddi University Graduate School Florida International University, 2014 ii ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION ELECTORAL RULES AND ELITE RECRUITMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BUNDESTAG AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES by Murat Altuglu Florida International University, 2014 Miami, Florida Professor Tatiana Kostadinova, Major Professor In this research, I analyze the effects of candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules on elite recruitment into the national legislatures of Germany and the United States. This dissertation is both theory-driven and constitutes exploratory research, too. While the effects of electoral rules are frequently studied in political science, the emphasis is thereby on electoral rules that are set post-election. My focus, in contrast, is on electoral rules that have an effect prior to the election. Furthermore, my dissertation is comparative by design. The research question is twofold. Do electoral rules have an effect on elite recruitment, and does it matter? To answer these question, I create a large-N original data set, in which I code the behavior and recruitment paths and patterns of members of the American House of Representatives and the German Bundestag. Furthermore, I include interviews with members of the said two national legislatures. Both the statistical analyses and the interviews provide affirmative evidence for my working hypothesis that differences in electoral rules lead to a different type of elite recruitment. To that end, I iii use the active-politician concept, through which I dichotomously distinguish the economic behavior of politicians. Thanks to the exploratory nature of my research, I also discover the phenomenon of differential valence of local and state political office for entrance into national office in comparative perspective. By statistically identifying this hitherto unknown paradox, as well as evidencing the effects of electoral rules, I show that besides ideology and culture, institutional rules are key in shaping the ruling elite. The way institutional rules are set up, in particular electoral rules, does not only affect how the electorate will vote and how seats will be distributed, but it will also affect what type of people will end up in elected office. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE 1. INSTITUTIONAL RULES AND ELITE RECRUITMENT 1 2. THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL RULES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 47 2.1 Elite Recruitment and Institutional Rules 48 2.1.1 Corollary to Theory of Institutional Rules’ Effect on Elite Recruitment 62 2.2 Theory of Function of Parties 69 2.3 The American case vis-à-vis Germany 75 2.4 Institutionalist and Behavioralist Theories 88 2.5 Analysis 93 3. THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CANDIDATE NOMINATIONS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING: A COMPARISON 99 3.1.1 The Political Party in Germany 99 3.1.2 The Political Party in the United States 107 3.2.1.1 Becoming a Candidate in Germany 121 3.2.1.2 Financing a Campaign in Germany 125 3.2.2.1 Becoming a Candidate in the United States 131 3.2.2.2 Financing a Campaign in the United States 135 3.3 Analysis 139 4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY 144 4.1 Theory of Institutional Rules’ Effect on Elite Recruitment 144 4.2 Analytical Approach 146 4.2.1 Data Collection 158 4.2.2 Behavioral Indicators 163 4.2.3.1 Data Collection for the Bundestag and the House of Representatives 179 4.2.3.2 Coding Scheme 180 5. STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE BUNDESTAG 182 5.1.1 Testing the Effect of Institutional Rules on Elite Recruitment: A Comparative Analysis of the Bundestag and the House of Representatives 183 5.1.2 Institutional Rules’ Effect compared to Culture and Ideology 189 5.1.3 The Effects of Institutional Rules compared to Ideological and Cultural Factors 194 v 5.2 Testing the Effect of Institutional Rules on Elite Recruitment: The Case of the Bundestag 201 5.3 Analytical Summary 208 6. THE ELITE RECRUITMENT PROCESS FROM THE ELITE’S PERSPECTIVE 211 6.1 Interviewing German legislators: Nominations as a party affair? 214 6.1.1. Christian Democrats 216 6.1.2 Christian Socials 229 6.1.3 Free Democrats 232 6.1.4 Social Democrats 236 6.1.5 Greens 245 6.1.6 Die Linke 247 6.1.7 Analysis of the German case 253 6.2 Interviewing American legislators: Nominations as private business? 256 6.2.1 Republicans 256 6.2.2 Democrats 260 6.2.3. Analysis of the American Case 269 6.3 Analytical Comparison of the American and German Cases 271 7. THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL RULES ANALYZED 278 APPENDICES 289 BIBLIOGRAPHY 293 VITA 305 vi LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE 1.1. Existing standards for assessing democratic quality 9 4.1 Summary of the empirical propositions of my research 149 5.1.1. Distribution of Active-Politicians and Passive-Politicians among members of the Bundestag and the House of Representatives 184 5.1.2 Recruitment Patterns into National Legislatures 186 5.1.3. Independent sample t-tests for years spent in local office and/or in state office for Germany and the United States 191 5.1.4. Independent sample t-tests for how many years legislators spent in their vocation, their age when they entered the national legislature for the first time, and the years they have spent since then in the national legislature 192 5.1.5. Number of legislators in the Bundestag and the House of Representatives who had either at least one relative who served in elected office or who had none 193 5.1.6. Beta Coefficients for legislators’ age when entering the national legislature for the first time, the amount of years legislators spent in their respective vocation, the years they spent in state office, local office, and in the national legislature, and the number of children legislators have 197 5.1.7 Odds ratios for legislators’ likelihood for having served in the military, having been married (or widowed), having children, having served in executive office, and for having a relative who had been elected into political office 200 5.2.1 Distribution of Active and Passive-politicians among members of the Bundestag by mandate type 203 5.2.2. Independent sample t-tests to comparing active-politicians’ (AP) and passive-politicians’ (PP) behavior with regard to years spent in local politics, state politics, vocations, age entered the Bundestag for the first time, and years spent in the Bundestag 204 5.2.3. Beta Coefficients for legislators’ age when entering the national legislature for the first time, number of years spent in their respective vocations, years spent in state and local offices and in the national legislature, and number of children 206 vii 5.2.4 Odds ratios for legislators’ likelihood for having served in the military, having been married (or widowed), having children, having served in executive office, and for having a relative who had been elected into political office 207 viii LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE 1.2. Prevalence of democratic quality in American political science research 10 1.3. Exclusivity and Centralization in Nomination Rules 27 1.4. Sources of campaign funding 29 1.5. Regime types present in this study 34 2.1 Categorization of what type of representation in parliament provides what type of incentives and opportunities for politicians 55 2.2 Decision analysis for an active-politician and for a passive-politician 60 2.3 Typology of Electoral Winners 61 ix CHAPTER 1 – INSTITUTIONAL RULES AND ELITE RECRUITMENT Problem Statement In this chapter, I outline a theoretical framework and a research design for this study, which I detail in the following chapters. Theoretically tying together this research is Zaller’s (1998) hypothesis that different electoral rules attract “naturally…a certain type of politician” (Ansolbahere 2005) and in extenso Rahat and Hazan, who hypothesize that “the behavior of individual politicians must be affected by the nature of the selection method” (Rahat and Hazan 2001: 297).1 To that end I begin by discussing the relevance and interconnectedness of electoral rules, legislators, and legislatures.