GONNA PARTY LIKE IT’S 1899 PARTY SYSTEMS AND THE ORIGINS OF VARIETIES OF COORDINATION Cathie Jo Martin Professor, Department of Political Science Boston University Boston, MA 02215 (
[email protected]). Duane Swank Professor, Department of Political Science Marquette University Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881 (
[email protected]). Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2009 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, and of the 2009 International Meeting of the Society of Socio-Economics, Paris, France. 1 INTRODUCTION At the beginning of the Twenty-First Century, varieties of business representation across the capitalist democracies seem worlds apart. Despite pressures associated with post- industrialization, the “macrocorporatist” Scandinavian countries maintain highly-centralized, national employers’ peak associations that engage in wage and policy-making negotiations with highly-centralized labor unions and government bureaucrats. In Germany and other continental European countries, national employers’ associations have lost power in both political representation and collective bargaining. But employers’ industry-level groups continue to coordinate collective firm activities and to negotiate sectoral (often private) cooperative agreements with their workers, or what we might call “sector coordination.” Finally, an aversion to cooperation appears bred in the bone in the Anglo-liberal lands of Britain and the United States: highly-fragmented or “pluralist” associations organize employers and workers, and the representation of business interests remains a highly individualistic affair (Martin and Swank 2004; Martin and Thelen, 2007; Hicks and Kenworthy, 1997; Hoepner 2007). This paper explores the origins of peak employers’ associations around the dawn of the Twentieth-Century to understand why countries produce highly-centralized macro-corporatist groups, weaker national associations but stronger industry-level groups, or highly-fragmented pluralist associations.