The Tories and Ireland: Andrew Bonar Law And
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THE TORIES AND IRELAND: ANDREW BONAR LAW AND CONSERVATIVE STRATEGY TOWARDS THE THIRD HOME RULE BILL 1911-1914. LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS Ph.D 1994 By Jeremy Smith UMI Number: U079502 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U079502 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 POLITICAL AND \ X -J X Nj ~n rt\ o V) o ri\ <70 GO 1/3 <5^ ABSTRACT. Bonar Law was a much more capable and tenacious leader than most previous accounts have suggested. He had inherited a very unfavourable position with the party badly demoralised and frustrated: few members had greeted his selection as leader with enthusiasm, and both Long and Chamberlain were hopeful of replacing him in the near future. Bonar Law's response was to try and regroup the party, and his own position, around a tough campaign to resist Home Rule. A campaign which he hoped would force an election, principally on the issue of whether Ulster should be forced under a Dublin Parliament. This line he pursued with great determination: though he remained sensitive to party tensions and differences, and always concerned with the public perception of party tactics. Yet it was a perilous course to follow; threatening the Government with support for civil war in Ireland if it did not hold an election before implementing the bill: an approach to opposition rarely contemplated by the party both before and since. Though one we are denied seeing the full consequences of with the sudden outbreak of war in Europe and Britain's entry into it on August 4th 1914. 2. CONTENTS. Abstract 2 Abbreviations 4 Acknowledgments 5 Introduction 6-10 CHAPTER ONE Lords, Leadership and the Return of the Irish Question to British Politics Jan 1910 to Nov 1911.....11-57 CHAPTER TWO Problems of Leadership Nov 1911 to April 1912........ 58-105 CHAPTER THREE Mounting a Challenge: Tories and Home Rule during the first Parliamentary circuit April 1912 to Jan 1913............ ••••.............. 106-155 CHAPTER FOUR Strains and Tensions of the second circuit Jan 1913 to August 1913..... 156-195 CHAPTER FIVE Attempts at Compromise Aug 1913 to Oct 1913.......196-240 CHAPTER SIX Failure of Compromise Oct 1913 to Jan 1914......... 241-314 CHAPTER SEVEN Re-assessment of positions Jan 1914 to March 1914..315-348 CHAPTER EIGHT The Politics of Stalemate March 1914 to Aug 1914... 349-387 Conclusion 388-391 Bibliography 3. ABBREVIATIONS A.C.P. Austen Chamberlain Papers B.P. Balfour Papers B.L.P. Bonar Law Papers L.L.P. Lady Londonderry Papers M.P. Milner Papers 0.P. F.S.Oliver Papers Selb.P Selborne Papers W.L.P. Walter Long Papers W de B. Willoughby de Broke Papers U.U.C. Ulster Unionist Council U.J.C. Ulster Joint Committee 1.U.A. Irish Unionist Alliance U.A.I. Unionist Associations of Ireland U.D.L. Union Defence League U.C.C. Unionist Clubs Council U.V.F. Ulster Volunteer Force H of L House of Lords Record Office B.M. British Museum Bod Bodleian Library I.W.M. Imperial War Museum P.R.O.N I. Public Record office of Northern Ireland P.R.O. Public Record office (Kew) 4. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. My main thanks are due to my supervisor, Mr Alan Beattie, for all his support and guidance over the last few years. He opened my eyes to the subtleties of Modern British Political History, and to "High" politics in particular, the fruits of which are to be found here. John Barnes gave invaluable advice and criticism along the way and the Central Research Fund, University of London, provided equally invaluable financial assistance. On a more personal note, my parents were, as ever, supportive and encouraging. While Pud, my fiancee, helped in many different ways, not least by just being herself. INTRODUCTION. This thesis is a study of the Conservative leadership and its responses and resistance to the third Horae Rule bill. It focuses upon the dozen or so Tory leaders, influential observers and pressmen (such as F.S.Oliver and J.St Loe Strachey) and powerful above-party enthusiasts like Earl Grey or Lord Milner, for it is amongst these circles, with their inter-play of competing ambitions, personalities and anxieties, that those responses evolved. It is not a study of Government policy, but a study of the reactions to that policy within the Tory leadership. It is not concerned with public opinion or the opinion of Conservative organisations in the country, but they have relevance and importance whenever they impinge upon or determine the responses of Tory leaders. Nor is it concerned with the militarisation and development of Ulster*s resistance, except where it figures in the calculations (as it frequently does) of the leaders. And it is not concerned with backbench Tory opinion, unless that opinion shapes actions at the top. What it does seek to do is threefold. First to re-examine the leadership of Bonar Law over these years, rescuing him from the shadows of the brighter lights of Carson, Balfour, F.E.Smith and Austen Chamberlain and to reveal the steps by which he successfully consolidated his leadership. Second, to chart the significant party divisions on Home Rule and Bonar Law*s ability to keep the various strains together, preventing independent action along the lines of 1911. Third, to emphasise that the struggle over Home Rule was not a struggle over Ireland or even over Ulster, but a struggle to force the Government to a General Election. Though not directly concerned with the debate on the so-called ”crisis of Conservatism”, it does come to a more positive conclusion than many other accounts, if only on the grounds that the Liberals were far worse off by 1914 than the Tories.-And, though largely ignoring international comparisons, the sense here is that the Conservative party was not heading the same way as other European parties of the right, and was in fact displaying democratic qualities and appeal, amongst many leaders with the hope of future electoral success. Three points of method also need mention. The first point concerns structure. Most Chapters will start with a brief survey of events before moving on to analyse political affairs. The purpose of this is to aid clarity and set the analysis upon a firm chronological bed. Second terminology. Labels never capture exactly the variety of political shades which make up a party. Yet for narrative and analytical reasons a degree of artificial coherence must be imposed. A basic three-way division has therefore been used which in broad terms correlate to the consistent responses towards Home Rule from within the party leadership. First Diehards or rightwing elements; secondly Federalist or Devolutionary sympathisers; and last the solid majority who tended to follow the official leader: the moderates or centrists. Yet it needs to be reiterated that these labels are artificial: Carson for instance, clearly found support from the Diehard wing, yet was recognised as a devolutionist by many of its supporters and even, after his advocacy of Ulster exclusion as a viable compromise, won some sympathy amongst moderate sections of the party who saw partition as the best means of settling the issue. Lables are not then fixed but fluid; individuals may float from one to another. Equally, within themselves, such terms produce various definitions. A Federalist is something slightly different to a devolutionist, as the differences between Chamberlain and Lansdowne show; yet enough common ground existed for them actively to cooperate with each other. The second point concerns methodology. The approach consciously adopted here is a ’High-Political1 one: a scepticism of political rhetoric; an assumption that leaders do matter, and are basically tactically orientated; that Parliament is the focus of events; and the primacy of private papers, diaries, recollections etc since they are the closest we have to the politician himself: if the "bare-bones" are anywhere revealed then it would be here. Though largely absorbed into mainstream historiography, high politics still suffers criticism. This stems largely from a misunderstanding of the approach. Sceptics berate it for diminishing the potency of ideas, values and private character in the public art of politics. But high- politics is not so exclusionist, There is no denial that political motivation can have any number of sources:- public opinion, backbench unease, friendship, personal dislike, "felt" rules or guidelines, beliefs and aspirations or even genuine concerns. Political D.N.A. is infinite and all are fair game in the search for causation as long as they can be empirically supported. To move away from the empirical to the a priori in determining political action is to inject telelogy into explanation, to sanitize with hindsight instead of rooting the politician in his own world of timing, slant, emphasis, audience-reaction, persuasion and ambition. Only high-politics reveals the full complexity of historical events. A second criticism limits the relevance of the high-political approach to specific periods of unusually fluid party relations: 1866-8; 1884-6; 1915-24; 1939-45. Party is a brake upon high-political assumptions, certainly outside "fluid" periods the accumulated baggage of party values, instincts and prejudices is a drag upon tactical option, to the extent that the audience is less persuadable.