FOURTH PARTY, FIFTH COLUMN? Matt Cole the fortunes of the reminiscent of the explores the newly-merged Liberal 1950s, whilst the medium-term Democrats and their latter – in the form impact of the former allies. of Dr David Owen’s ‘continuing’ SDP The former were ‘continuing’ SDP David Owen reduced to a share – waged a campaign addressing the The years 1988–90 conference of the of the vote and against them which ‘continung’ SDP, were painful ones in September 1988. public disregard both ended in farce. 4 Journal of Liberal History 43 Summer 2004 Journal of Liberal History 43 Summer 2004 5 FOURTH PARTY, FIFTH COLUMN? he continuing SDP’s and Owen himself described interesting parallels and contrasts final demise was met the period as one of ‘knocks and with earlier rivalries and breaka- with sighs of relief humiliation’ at the end of which ways in Liberal history. across the political spec- ‘we have failed’.4 Ivor Crewe trum, but the comment and Anthony King touched Tof Robert Harris that week was upon the continuing SDP in Background both perceptive about the past their history of the party, only to The continuing SDP was born and prescient about the immedi- dismiss it contemptuously: out of the merger between the ate future: Liberals and the Social Demo- The Owenite enterprise did cratic Party. After two general I was about to write that the not merely fail – in the event it elections fought by these parties SDP is dead, but actually it is was always doomed to fail. No in an electoral and broad policy worse than that. The SDP is rational politician would have alliance, the SDP fell into an one of the undead. Every time undertaken it or even dreamed acrimonious and irreconcilable it is buried, its wounds gaping, of undertaking it. The launch dispute about how their relations it insists on crawling from the of the SDP in 1981 had been with the Liberals should develop. grave. It is a horrible, ambula- rash enough, and it had failed. One faction, appearing to repre- tory reminder of busted dreams The launch of the continuing sent the majority opinion in the and broken loyalties: better for SDP was rash to the point of party, favoured merger of the everyone if it could finally rest absurdity. David Owen began two parties as the only means of in peace.1 as Napoleon and ended up as projecting a clear public image of Baron Munchausen. leadership and policy, of avoiding Though short-lived and in some the waste of resources in negoti- respects risible, the Owenite SDP The whole project, they con- ating seat allocations and policies – like the Liberal Party itself in a cluded, ‘Could only be described and in avoiding the duplication of more sustained way in even its … as being completely potty’.5 conference and office activities. weaker periods – had a greater However, the passage of eight The other section of the impact upon the other parties years since that appraisal, together party, which included its leader, than has been recognised. Its with the reflections arising from David Owen, and two more of influence as a ‘fifth column’ the twentieth anniversary of the its five MPs, quickly refused to within other parties has been vis- Limehouse Declaration, offer an ‘I was participate in any negotiations ible even recently. opportunity to consider whether about merger or any internal Commentary on Owen’s this short-term reaction painted about to decisions about the future of the strategy at the time and after- an incomplete picture. The fol- party. Recognising the strength wards was harsh. An early party lowing is an attempt to test the write that of opinion in favour of merger, history from an SDP activist pre- impact of that apparently futile Owen argued that it was best for dicted that ‘If [Owen] continues project not only against its own the SDP is those who favoured it to join the to lead a rump SDP… he might aspirations, but also against those dead, but Liberal Party in its adapted form, just possibly be able to build up functions of political parties and for those who did not wish the SDP as a mass movement … which are the usual yardsticks: actually it to do so to relaunch the SDP as But the odds on that are very development of policy; recruit- an independent force. long.’2 A year later Stephen ment of personnel; and penetra- is worse As negotiations got under Ingle contended that ‘The SDP tion of the electorate. The picture weigh to establish the constitu- has moved to the periphery of which emerges from an examina- than that. tion and policy of the merged 3 British politics.’ Alan Hayman’s tion of the fates of the key actors The SDP is party, Owen’s supporters made Essex dissertation Dr Owen’s and the knock-on effects of the appeals to the SDP membership SDP: A Study in Failure con- party’s brief existence suggests one of the under the titles ‘Grassroots’ and firmed this tragi-comic analysis that the continuing SDP is worth ‘Campaign for Social Democracy’ as the party collapsed in 1990, a second look, and offers some undead.’ (echoing the ‘Council for Social 4 Journal of Liberal History 43 Summer 2004 Journal of Liberal History 43 Summer 2004 5 FOURTH PARTY, FIFTH COLUMN? The end: David were converging on the ground Owen arrives at of the ‘social market’, and even Braodcasting the SDP’s own heritage was a House in June matter of dispute. In this com- 1990 to announce the demise of the petitive game of policy musical ‘continuing’ SDP. chairs, the SDP was at a marked disadvantage, having few estab- lished principles or proposals to guide it. As a result, according to those involved in, or close to, the project, there was no meaning- ful strategic plan for the party. Even in retrospect its objectives are ‘difficult to disentangle’, according to a former adviser to Dr Owen who chose not to join the new party: ‘“Strategy” implies medium- to long-term aims, which is the wrong way of thinking about the continuing SDP’. In fact, many of the party’s leading figures, including Owen himself, confided to one another privately that they had had lit- tle hope of the project’s success from its outset. After the party’s collapse, they claimed that they had been misled as to the level of its membership (publicly said to be 11,000), and that it had never reached the 10,000 they had stipulated as a minimum. If the SDP had a strategic aim, it was survival, and this meant that, in Owen’s words, ‘The SDP must be ready to practise what it preaches about pacts.’7 This referred to a deal with the Democracy’ he had launched of Thatcherism. Owen argued Liberal Democrats whereby the with his colleagues whilst still in that the distinctive element of SDP would face no opposition the Labour Party), and five days the Alliance’s appeal – its ‘bold- from them in a number of seats. after the official foundation of ness and bluntness’6 brought to it There were discussions about the Social and Liberal Democrats, by the SDP – had seen the third this between the party leader- Owen relaunched the SDP, on 8 party’s vote rise from 19 per cent ships, but they were frosty and March 1988, as a ‘fourth force’ in to 25 per cent, and that this would fruitless; the Liberal Democrats British politics. be lost in a single centre party. were reluctant to give Owen The justification for an inde- In fact the chief motives of legitimacy by establishing a new pendent fourth party remained those engaged in the continu- Alliance, and would therefore somewhat vague, as it had at the ing SDP were either negative or only do so on terms of joint establishment of the SDP seven retrospective: they rejected what selection, which Owen rejected years earlier. There were differ- they regarded as the ‘unreliable’ as merger by the back door. ences of policy reflecting tensions and ‘left-wing’ Liberal Demo- Those, such as David Alton, within the Alliance over defence crats (on the grounds that they who argued for closer relations and certain matters of economic had always refused to join the at Liberal Democrat conference and environmental policy, themes existing Liberal Party), and they fringe meetings or in the press Owen struck upon in his 1988 were loyal to Dr Owen himself. were met with open hostility conference speech, stressing The SDP faced the problem by colleagues.8 Only in the seats ‘security, democracy and prosper- that it was trying to find a mar- of the two SDP MPs standing ity’, and emphasising the need to ket niche in a crowded system in 1992 did the Liberal Demo- recognise the favourable elements in which all opposition parties crats make any concession by 6 Journal of Liberal History 43 Summer 2004 Journal of Liberal History 43 Summer 2004 7 FOURTH PARTY, FIFTH COLUMN? withdrawing from the contests by-election confirm, dismiss- Bootle candidate Jack Holmes) – after balloting local activists, ing Martin as ‘a most tiresome voted against. A small group and following the withdrawal of person’ obsessed with ‘niche attempted to continue the party, the SDP from the Vauxhall by- politics’ which entailed contro- even posting candidates at elec- election in June 1989. versial attitudes to race relations. tions, but with Owen’s sympa- In the key contests of Epping Martin had been selected against thy rather than his support. In and Richmond (Yorkshire) dur- Owen’s preference for the high- South Wales, an SDP candidate ing 1988–89, the two centre profile black National Commit- fought the Neath by-election parties competing with each tee member Roy Evans.10 of April 1991, and SDP coun- other allowed the Conservatives Their 1989 Scarborough cillors retained, lost and then to keep the sort of seat they had conference was the SDP’s last, regained their seats into the late traditionally lost to the Alliance and ended with Owen address- 1990s.