Beyond Anthropomorphism (Sue Savage
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stone age institute publication series Series Editors Kathy Schick and Nicholas Toth Stone Age Institute Gosport, Indiana and Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana Number 1. THE OLDOWAN: Case Studies into the Earliest Stone Age Nicholas Toth and Kathy Schick, editors Number 2. BREATHING LIFE INTO FOSSILS: Taphonomic Studies in Honor of C.K. (Bob) Brain Travis Rayne Pickering, Kathy Schick, and Nicholas Toth, editors Number 3. THE CUTTING EDGE: New Approaches to the Archaeology of Human Origins Kathy Schick, and Nicholas Toth, editors Number 4. THE HUMAN BRAIN EVOLVING: Paleoneurological Studies in Honor of Ralph L. Holloway Douglas Broadfield, Michael Yuan, Kathy Schick and Nicholas Toth, editors STONE AGE INSTITUTE PUBLICATION SERIES NUMBER 1 THE OLDOWAN: Case Studies Into the Earliest Stone Age Edited by Nicholas Toth and Kathy Schick Stone Age Institute Press · www.stoneageinstitute.org 1392 W. Dittemore Road · Gosport, IN 47433 COVER PHOTOS Front, clockwise from upper left: 1) Excavation at Ain Hanech, Algeria (courtesy of Mohamed Sahnouni). 2) Kanzi, a bonobo (‘pygmy chimpanzee’) fl akes a chopper-core by hard-hammer percussion (courtesy Great Ape Trust). 3) Experimental Oldowan fl aking (Kathy Schick and Nicholas Toth). 4) Scanning electron micrograph of prehistoric cut-marks from a stone tool on a mammal limb shaft fragment (Kathy Schick and Nicholas Toth). 5) Kinesiological data from Oldowan fl aking (courtesy of Jesus Dapena). 6) Positron emission tomography of brain activity during Oldowan fl aking (courtesy of Dietrich Stout). 7) Experimental processing of elephant carcass with Oldowan fl akes (the animal died of natural causes). (Kathy Schick and Nicholas Toth). 8) Reconstructed cranium of Australopithecus garhi. (A. garhi, BOU-VP-12/130, Bouri, cranial parts, cranium recon- struction; original housed in National Museum of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. ©1999 David L. Brill). 9) A 2.6 million-year-old trachyte bifacial chopper from site EG 10, Gona, Ethiopia (courtesy of Sileshi Semaw). Back: Photographs of the Stone Age Institute. Aerial photograph courtesy of Bill Oliver. Published by the Stone Age Institute. ISBN-10: 0-9792-2760-7 ISBN-13: 978-0-9792-2760-8 Copyright © 2006, Stone Age Institute Press. All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without permission in writing from the publisher. CHAPTER 7 RULES AND TOOLS: BEYOND ANTHROPOMORPHISM SUE SAVAGE-RUMBAUGH AND WILLIAM MINTZ FIELDS ABSTRACT formation, that the scientific understanding of behavior progresses. Because this work focuses upon the long- This chapter presents the perspectives of a cogni- term rearing effects of a small number of nonhuman tive psychologist (SSR) and a cultural anthropologist primate individuals, ethnographic narrative account is (WMF) in assessing and interpreting the acquisition of the appropriate research tool. skill in the stone toolmaking behavior of modern bono- Strict empiricists (MacPhail, 1987; Heyes, 1998) bos (Pan paniscus) in an experimental setting. These dismiss narrative accounts of nonhuman primate behav- perspectives are presented as personal narratives based ior, treating them as "anecdotes." They assert that such upon memory, notes, and video documentation. accounts are based on mere "interpretation" rather than "actual data." Moreover, these empiricists argue that ACOGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGIST’S any explanatory account of nonhuman primate behavior PERSPECTIVE (SSR) is inevitably infused with anthropomorphism because we ourselves are primates. This fact alone is believed This is a first person narrative account of the initia- to make objective accounts impossible. All descriptive tion and development of knapping in bonobos. It is statements regarding the motivational states of nonhu- drawn from memory, notes and video documentation. man primates are held to be inappropriate, as they It surely leaves out much of what actually happened attribute some form of consciousness and/or intention- from the viewpoint of the bonobo knappers themselves. ality to nonhuman beings. Yet it includes, from the perspective of intimately By contrast, we assert that to claim that a monkey knowledgeable, Homo sapiens observers, the salient who is engaging in a certain posture and facial expres- behavioral transitions in skill development. Like all sion is indeed threatening another monkey (or even a narrative accounts, this one relies upon the insight, intu- human observer) is a perfectly legitimate scientific ition and analysis of the observers, who are, in this case, statement when made under the appropriate conditions. participant observers in the classical anthropological The interpretation of "threat" can be validated by the tradition. Narrative accounts, by definition, describe ensuing behavior of the other monkey, or by the human events. They do not predict events, nor do they focus observer should the threat be directed toward them. upon quantitative data. Good narrative accounts serve Going one step beyond the description above, one as valuable explanatory tools, permitting hypotheses to might also say that the monkey intended to threaten the be formulated and tested, when and if events similar human observer and we might offer as "proof" the fact to those of the narration occur again. It is through that the threat was followed by attack when the threat movement between the processes of analytic and was ignored. However, the empiricist would disagree categorical description, coupled with hypothesis forma- with the term "intended," maintaining that the behaviors tion, prediction, data collection and finally theory of threat and attack could better be explained in terms of 224 The Oldowan: Case Studies Into the Earliest Stone Age stimulus and response. "Intentionality," according to Many scientists all too easily accept that we shall many radical behaviorists, must be exclusively reserved never be able to perceive the world of any non-human for human beings. being in an adequate manner. While it is certainly true, The difficulty with this view is that it is a for example, that human beings lack echo-location and "speciesist" argument. It limits the role of conscious thus are unable to perceive the world as does a bat, it is intent to one species, Homo sapiens. One can just as also the case that some human beings are deaf and blind readily explain human threat and attack as stimulus- and therefore unable to perceive the world as do others response behavior, leaving out any discussion of inten- of their own species. Nonetheless blind persons tionality. But were we to do so, human behavior frequently speak of having "seen a friend" and deaf would become meaningless, for most human beings persons will relate accounts they "heard" from others. have lent meaning through either expressed or inferred These are not mere "manners of speech," they are intent. As human beings, we tend to think, attack statements which reflect the perceived feelings of the and threaten for very specific reasons, which we speaker. That is, the blind person feels as if they have expound upon verbally. Because the empiricist does seen something and even though their sensory input is not know how to ask a monkey its intent, he or she different - and this feelings leads to a sensation they concludes that the safest theoretical position is that the term "seeing." competency for intentional behavior, and explanation The empiricist argument fails on a second count. thereof, be limited, by caveat, to Homo sapiens. It overlooks the fact that data cannot be gathered on This anthropocentric perspective overlooks two behavior that is emerging spontaneously. During these things. First, much human behavior, while explained, conditions, one cannot know what form or course emer- is not rational. The reasons given for threat and attack gent processes will take (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., behaviors are often illogical and frequently, in humans, in press). One can film the behavior -- if one knows words and actions fail to coincide. Thus revealing that when it is going to occur or when salient events in the explained "intentions" do not necessarily explain behav- emergent process will take place. However, when the ior. If they did, we would barely need a psychology of behavior is spontaneous and not produced by a desig- the human mind. We not only permit human beings to nated environmental stimulus, filming is difficult to explain their intent, we insist upon it to such a degree accomplish without cameras following the organism that individuals will offer socially acceptable explana- wherever it goes. Once a behavior has emerged and tions that have little relevance to the actual behaviors been closely observed, should this emergent process observed. In such instances, we could correctly say repeat itself in a predictable manner, plans can be made that "anthropomorphism" is present and clouds our view for data collection. of the real explanation of behavior. In this case, Such was not the case for tool production in anthropomorphism means the interpretation of another bonobos. The first knapper, Kanzi did not follow the person's behavior based upon ones own thoughts and experimental trajectory that was prescribed for him. feelings. Such interpretations of the behavior of other His younger sister, Panbanisha provided no opportunity human beings are as equally problematic and/or valid for replication, as her trajectory did not repeat Kanzi's. as are interpretations of the behavior of nonhuman This could have been the result of individual differences primates. or sex differences. Such is impossible to determine Therefore, it is important to recognize that the without a 25-year rearing study of two additional inherent fallacy of anthropomorphism is not the species bonobos. However, Panbanisha's alternative emergent to which it is applied, but the way in which a loose trajectory might not be attributable to sex or individual subjective account fails to authentically describe the differences, but rather to the fact that Kanzi's experience facts of the observed behavior at hand. Loose descrip- affected Panbanisha.