Assyrian Period (Ca. 1000•fi609 Bce)
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CHAPTER 8 The Neo‐Assyrian Period (ca. 1000–609 BCE) Eckart Frahm Introduction This chapter provides a historical sketch of the Neo‐Assyrian period, the era that saw the slow rise of the Assyrian empire as well as its much faster eventual fall.1 When the curtain lifts, at the close of the “Dark Age” that lasted until the middle of the tenth century BCE, the Assyrian state still finds itself in the grip of the massive crisis in the course of which it suffered significant territorial losses. Step by step, however, a number of assertive and ruthless Assyrian kings of the late tenth and ninth centuries manage to reconquer the lost lands and reestablish Assyrian power, especially in the Khabur region. From the late ninth to the mid‐eighth century, Assyria experiences an era of internal fragmentation, with Assyrian kings and high officials, the so‐called “magnates,” competing for power. The accession of Tiglath‐pileser III in 745 BCE marks the end of this period and the beginning of Assyria’s imperial phase. The magnates lose much of their influence, and, during the empire’s heyday, Assyrian monarchs conquer and rule a territory of unprecedented size, including Babylonia, the Levant, and Egypt. The downfall comes within a few years: between 615 and 609 BCE, the allied forces of the Babylonians and Medes defeat and destroy all the major Assyrian cities, bringing Assyria’s political power, and the “Neo‐Assyrian period,” to an end. What follows is a long and shadowy coda to Assyrian history. There is no longer an Assyrian state, but in the ancient Assyrian heartland, especially in the city of Ashur, some of Assyria’s cultural and religious traditions survive for another 800 years. Politically and economically, the Neo‐Assyrian period is characterized by the enormous expansion the Assyrian state experienced during this time, and its transformation into what may well have been the first empire in world history. Pinpointing something like a Neo‐ Assyrian “mentality” is difficult, not the least because of the large influx of foreigners who were integrated into Assyrian society between the tenth and the seventh century BCE. A Companion to Assyria, First Edition. Edited by Eckart Frahm. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 162 Eckart Frahm Some characteristics that seem to define the Neo‐Assyrian mindset do, however, stand out. To begin with, the Neo‐Assyrians apparently had a particularly strong sense of order, manifested in such diverse features as, on the one hand, the square and regular shape of the characters of their writing system and, on the other, the well organized administration of their provinces (Radner 2006–2008) – in some respects, the Neo‐Assyrians can be described as the “Prussians” of the ancient Near East.2 The idea of order, based on a well‐established hierarchy of superiors and subjects, was actively promoted by the Assyrian conquerors to justify their imperial mission. Sargon II, for instance, proudly proclaimed that he had defeated a number of Arab tribes that, previously, “had known no overseer or commander” (ša aklu šāpiru lā ıdûmā , Fuchs 1994: 110, line 121). A strongly developed “acquisitiveness” represents another defining feature of the Neo‐ Assyrian mindset. One of its manifestations are the ambitious commercial enterprises in which Assyrians were involved. Even though they were no longer the predominant class they had been during the Old Assyrian period, Assyrian traders continued to play an important role in the Middle Assyrian and Neo‐Assyrian periods (Radner 1997). But over the centuries, the striving of the Assyrians for greater material prosperity took a new, more aggressive turn. Instead of focusing on peaceful commercial interactions with distant lands, the Assyrians resorted increasingly to the use of violent means to obtain foreign goods. Almost every year, during the summer months, Assyrian armies would now attack towns and cities outside the Assyrian heartland, rob them of their possessions, impose a regular tribute on their rulers, and eventually annex them (Fuchs 2005). Raw materials and finished products, as well as people, animals, and even trees and plants were brought to Assyria from far away places. The mercantile mentality that had originally motivated the Assyrians in their pursuit of material wealth can still be detected in the way Neo‐Assyrian royal inscriptions inventory, in the spirit of a diligent accountant’s bookkeeping, the numbers of killed, maimed, or deported enemies and the exact amount of booty and tribute delivered to the king; but the political and economic reality was now a very different one. Imperial exploitation, and a “tributary mode of production,” had to a significant extent (yet not entirely) replaced a commercial system in which merchants dealt with their trading partners in foreign lands on an equal footing. Another form of acquisitiveness lies behind Assyria’s attitude towards Babylonian tradi- tions, which strongly influenced Neo‐Assyrian elite culture (see Chapters 15–21). Many literary and religious texts and virtually all learned treatises studied by Assyrian scholars were written in Babylonian language, often by Babylonian scribes (Fincke 2003/04). Like Greek civilization among the Romans, Babylonian culture enjoyed enormous prestige among the Assyrians, who often treated their southern “brothers” more leniently than any other people in their vast empire. Yet when the Babylonians, despite the privileges they enjoyed, continued to oppose Assyrian rule, the disappointed love of the Assyrians eventually turned into hatred. Twice during the seventh century BCE, Babylon suffered death and destruction at the hands of the Assyrians before eventually defeating her northern neighbor and taking bloody revenge by ringing the death knell on the Assyrian state. Chronology and Sources The basic chronology of the Neo‐Assyrian period is well established. The final sections of the famous Assyrian King List (Glassner 2004: 136‐45) and a few additional king lists, both from Assyria and Babylonia (Grayson 1980–83: 90–8, 101, 116–22, 124–5), provide concise yet The Neo‐Assyrian Period (ca. 1000–609 BCE) 163 comprehensive inventories of the Neo‐Assyrian monarchs and information on the lengths of their reigns. Their general reliability is confirmed by various Neo‐Assyrian eponym lists and eponym “chronicles” (Millard 1994; Glassner 2004: 164–77). The former include, in chro- nological order, the names and titles of the officials after whom the Assyrians named individual years (the so‐called eponyms); the latter add (beginning with 857 BCE) some basic information on events that happened during the years in question. A reference in two eponym chronicles to a solar eclipse, datable on astronomical grounds to 763 BCE (Millard 1994: 41; Hunger 2008), has helped to establish the absolute chronology of the Neo‐Assyrian period and con- tinues to serve as an important chronological anchor for Mesopotamian history in general from the Late Bronze Age onwards. Unfortunately, there are so far no eponym lists or chron- icles for the period after 649 BCE, which means that some uncertainty remains with regard to the chronology of the last decades of the Neo‐Assyrian empire (Reade 1998). Slightly more detailed information on historical events is found in some additional chronicle‐type texts. The so‐called “Synchronistic History” (Grayson 1975: 157–70; Glassner 2004: 176–83) provides selective information, from an Assyrian viewpoint, on the relations between Assyria and Babylonia up to the reign of Adad‐nirari III (810‐783 BCE). Several Babylonian chronicles (Grayson 1975: 69–98; Glassner 2004: 193–224) cast light on the later phases of the interactions between the two states from a Babylonian perspective. Important though they are, the aforementioned sources do not allow us to reconstruct much more than a skeleton of Neo‐Assyrian history. The flesh and blood, so to speak, of that history is provided by a number of additional source types, unevenly distributed throughout the period from 1000 to 609 BCE. Most important, and available in abundant numbers from the middle of the 10th century onwards, are the “official” inscriptions written in the name of Assyrian kings (see, inter alia, the RIM and RINAP series, KAL 3, Fuchs 1994; Borger 1996; Frahm 1997). Assyrian royal inscriptions are found on tablets, prisms, and cylinders made of clay, on stone tablets and slabs, and on a number of other objects left by the kings in visible and invisible locations in palaces, temples, and fortification buildings in various Assyrian cities. Others were inscribed on stelae and rock reliefs in far away countries (Fales 1999–2001). The focus of these texts is on military campaigns and construction work. Some of the inscriptions are extremely long and detailed, comprising more than 1000 lines. It seems that Assyrian royal inscriptions do not “invent” royal campaigns or building projects, which enhances their value as historical sources. Nonetheless, using them for a reconstruction of Neo‐Assyrian history requires some caution. Often enough, the inscrip- tions provide no exact information on the date of the events they describe, or, worse, list these events in an order not based on actual chronology. Sometimes, they amalgamate in one narrative events that happened at different times (for an example, see Liverani 1981). Moreover, Assyrian royal inscriptions, as a rule, tend to focus their attention on successful endeavors, all ascribed to the king alone. Failures the Assyrian king experienced usually remain unrecorded, while royal enterprises that yielded mixed results are often presented in a more positive light than warranted. Fortunately, the modern researcher is not entirely without tools when evaluating the historicity of the events described in the royal inscriptions. Of particular significance is the critical study of the semantic “codes” applied by the scribes who composed them (Fales 1981). Thus, the statement that Assyrian troops had trapped an enemy king “like a bird in a cage” in his city suggests that they had actually failed to conquer the city and capture its ruler (Tadmor 1994: 79).