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By Dennis Steele Senior Staff Writer ar Institute for the Study of W ar Institute for the Study of W 52 ARMY I April 2010 Residents attend an official flag-raising PERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN’S HELMAND PROVINCE WERE THE GAMBIT IN A CAMPAIGN ceremony in the town of Marja, Afghan- to wrest control of key population and support centers from the Tal- istan, signifying that the Taliban has been supplanted. Afghan soldiers iban that will continue for a year or longer, using the combat power along with NATO International Security of additional U.S. forces to beef up NATO’s International Security Assistance Force task forces from the Assistance Force (ISAF). U.S. Marine Corps, the Army’s 5th In the largest operation since the start of Operation Enduring Stryker Brigade Combat Team and the Freedom in 2001, about 11,000 American, British, Canadian and Afghan troops British army cleared a large area of (more than 15,000 including support forces) swept into a strategic portion of Helmand Province. Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan, with the main effort centering on the farming enclave of Marja, cited as an important Taliban power center, logis- tics point and link in the group’s southern infiltration route. Called Operation Moshtarak (Dari for “together”), the offensive was com- manded by British Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, commander of ISAF’s Regional Com- mand-South, and led by U.S. Marine Corps and Afghan army units. The con- ventional operation began February 12 and lasted two weeks until Marja was declared clear and the Afghan national flag was raised. Led by elements of the U.S. Army’s 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division, Operation Helmand Spider was conducted in conjunction with Operation Moshtarak, provid- ing support by clearing and holding a large area northeast of Marja, cutting off escape routes for Taliban forces in that direction, and protecting lines of communication from the U.S. Marine Corps’ primary base in southern Afghanistan, Camp Leatherneck, and the U.S. Army and British camp, Camp Bastion, both located near Lashkar Gah. Afghan army elements with Canadian advisors worked with the 5th SBCT. Although Helmand Spider was a large operation, far fewer U.S. civilian media embedded reporters accompanied the 5th SCBT than the Marine task force, so it received significantly less attention in the United States. Marja encompasses a string of clustered buildings along the main road— “road” being a stretch for the rutted dirt track and “buildings” being a stretch, too—from Lashkar Gah, and family farm plots radiate from it for many miles. Plots are delineated by irriga- tion ditches—many built by the U.S. government in the 1950s and 1960s— with a mud-walled family compound or two in each plot. Marja is a major agricultural area, both for conven- tional crops and for opium poppies. The terrain is tough—muddy and /Cpl. Mary E. Carlin, USMC largely open ground—and the same D Do applies to the territory cleared by the 5th SBCT. Stryker for- thousand (7,000 to more than 20,000, depending on who is mations also faced many improvised explosive devices scat- estimating) Afghan refugees from the fighting clogged the tered along the roads, but an intensive road-clearing opera- city of Lashkar Gah. Regardless of the exact number of tion preceded initial vehicle movement. (Most marines were refugees from these operations, the problem is severe inserted by helicopter during the initial assault.) enough—and could cause a high degree of negative reper- ISAF made no secret of its intentions to kick off opera- cussions—that officials plan to build refugee centers before tions against the Taliban in Helmand Province. Public an- conducting operations in major population centers in the nouncements informed citizens that it was going to hap- future. pen, openly giving Taliban forces the option of leaving Operations in Helmand embrace the classic tenets of instead of fighting. The announcements shocked conven- current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics. The tional military thinking, breaking the absolute rule of goal is to clear, hold and build. Directly following the never telling the enemy what you are going to do. Leaders clearing operation was the insertion of what was described in Afghanistan, however, believed the benefits of a pre- as a “government in a box”—a new district governor, civil pared civilian community and, hopefully, a reduction in administrators and ISAF civil affairs advisors along with enemy resistance outweighed the risks. Nevertheless, spe- Afghan police elements and other assets. cial operations surgical raids were conducted to kill or cap- GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, ISAF commander and com- ture high-value Taliban members before the initial inser- mander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, visited Marja and said, tion of conventional forces. Results from those raids were “The government of Afghanistan is in the position now of not announced. At the same time operations were being having the opportunity, and the requirement, to prove they conducted in Helmand Province, Pakistani intelligence ser- can establish legitimate governance.” vices—cooperating with the U.S. Central Intelligence A large number of Afghan soldiers are expected to be stationed in Marja to prevent the Taliban from reestablishing overt power, and a U.S. Marine task U.S. Army 2LT force is expected to remain in Marja at least through Jesse Underwood this summer. ISAF plans to split Regional Com- fires at a Taliban mand (RC)-South into two commands, RC-South- position during west (Helmand) and RC-Southeast (Kandahar). Operation Helmand The hurdles that the government in a box must Spider. overcome are many: The new governor is a return- ing expatriate. The Afghan police generally are de- spised, if not feared. The Afghan army’s perfor- mance was reported as spotty in some instances, though officially applauded as generally good. Iso- lated incidents of Afghan soldiers’ indiscipline were reported in the wake of operations. Another hurdle is that some of the local leaders DoD/Cpl. Mary E. Carlin, USMC with whom soldiers and marines were holding Agency—successfully captured Afghanistan’s second- talks to help establish confidence in their long-term com- highest-ranking Taliban leader during an operation in the mitment and confidence in the Afghan national govern- port city of Karachi. ment had been fighting against those same soldiers and Estimates of the number of Taliban fighters who stayed marines only days before. to fight ISAF forces vary widely from fewer than 300 to as ISAF officials and U.S. officials in Washington said the many as 700, or more. As of this writing, no official total of Helmand operations herald the start of a string of opera- Taliban killed or wounded during the fighting had been re- tions against the Taliban that will continue for the next leased. ISAF casualties were relatively light. Fourteen year at least. The leading target for the future operations is NATO troops, including eight U.S. marines, were killed in the area around Kandahar City, where Taliban control is the initial two weeks of the Helmand operations. Three high, but the officials stopped short of saying that Kanda- Afghan soldiers died during the same period. No number har City itself—a city of more than 400,000 people—would was given of NATO troops wounded in the action; how- be cleared. The intent appears to be to take the city gradu- ever, in addition to those wounded in action, it was re- ally, squeezing it from the outside in, as opposed to con- ported that a number of troops were evacuated because of ducting a direct and all-encompassing assault. orthopedic injuries (mainly leg, knee and ankle) caused by Regardless of whether the operation is in or around Kan- heavy loads and rough terrain. dahar City, a large ISAF force will be required, much larger Instances of civilian casualties caused ISAF commanders than that of the Helmand operations, and the bulk of the to tighten targeting approval procedures (which were al- additional U.S. Army brigade combat teams deploying to ready stringent) for indirect fire and air support to keep Afghanistan will not be operational until this spring or from further alienating the civilian population. Several early summer. ( 54 ARMY I April 2010.

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