Abdul Sattar

REDUCING NUCLEAR DANGERS IN SOUTH ASIA: A PAKISTANI PERSPECTIVE

by Abdul Sattar

A former career diplomat of , Abdul Sattar served as Ambassador to (1978-82 and 1990-92) and the (1988-90). He was also Pakistan's Foreign Minister in the caretaker government in 1993. In 1993-94, he was a Distinguished Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., which supported his research for this article. The views expressed in the article are those of the author alone.

esisting pressures and pen- from Pakistan’s border for a mili- the security situation in the region. alties, Pakistan has declined tary exercise, code-named “Brass A constructive approach to con- Rto renounce the nuclear op- Tacks,” triggered a crisis between the taining nuclear dangers has to start tion. In practice, however, it has two countries. with a recognition of the existing demonstrated restraint and reason- Although the incipient revision of realities, then evince greater under- ableness, deferring conversion of its the earlier projections of apocalyp- standing of the security concerns acquired nuclear capability into tic consequences of Pakistan’s that drive nuclear programs, and fi- weapons, remaining willing to agree nuclear pursuit is welcome from nally develop a responsive and af- to any nondiscriminatory arrange- ’s perspective, the swing firmative strategy in place of the ment for a nuclear freeze in South of opinion to the other extreme of failed policy of censure and sanc- Asia and, meanwhile, even suspend- neglect of the nuclear and security tions selectively targeting one coun- ing further accumulation of highly- issues in South Asia does not serve try or another. Such a strategy enriched uranium. Pakistan’s re- the best interests of either of the two should be founded on the principle straint has not been ignored by in- countries involved or those of the of nondiscrimination and attach pri- formed opinion. Although the world community at large. The sub- ority to limiting nuclear capabilities Pressler law1 remains in force in the ject is too serious for the same epi- and strengthening restraints against United States, recent scholarly stud- sodic approach that was manifest weaponization, missile deployments, ies2 have taken note of the positive earlier in the acceptance of the fait and transfer or accidental loss of contribution the nascent Pakistani accompli by India following its fissionable materials and technology. nuclear capability made to prevent- nuclear detonation in 1974. It war- These objectives are likely to be ing a looming war on two occasions: rants instead a sustained policy of realized in a cooperative interna- in 1990, when India was contem- constructive engagement aimed at tional framework, designed to as- plating air strikes across the line of reducing the concomitant dangers of suage the anxieties of the countries control in the disputed state of Kash- the nuclear environment. India’s involved and of the world commu- mir, and possibly also in the winter stockpile of weapons-grade uranium nity. of 1986-87, when a quarter million continues to mount, and its buildup At issue is not only the equity, Indian troops, concentrated 20 miles of missiles threatens to destabilize but also the efficacy, of present

40 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Abdul Sattar nuclear nonproliferation policy and grams and placing them in the con- kistan actually declined an offer by the Missile Technology Control text of the nonproliferation debate, a French company to provide a plu- Regime (MTCR). Apart from glar- this article proposes an initiative to tonium separation plant. In 1968, ing contradictions between precept associate the holdout states with the it even announced its readiness to and practice, these supply-side strat- nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty accede to the NPT, provided India egies of the industrialized states have (NPT). did the same. been proven ineffectual in prevent- Not until after 1971, when ing the spread of PAKISTANI AND INDIAN Pakistan’s conventional defense ca- capabilities. The Pressler law, NUCLEAR PROGRAMS pacity proved inadequate to safe- which Pakistanis see as a “black law,” guard its territorial integrity, and is even likely to be counterproduc- The nuclear programs of Pakistan East Pakistan was militarily sepa- tive. Estrangement between tradi- and India present a vivid contrast rated by India to create Bangladesh, tional partners for peace in South of motives and commitments. Pa- did Pakistan embark upon efforts to Asia and the Gulf region aside, it kistan followed nuclear abstinence acquire the nuclear weapons option could—because it bars conventional for a quarter century; only the di- as a means of deterring the persis- arms sales—force Pakistan to place saster of 1971, when Indian mili- tent Indian threat. In early 1972, greater reliance on nuclear deter- tary intervention cut Pakistan into Zulfikar Bhutto, then-President of rence. two, necessitated a painful reap- Pakistan, reportedly met with Paki- The world community’s goal of praisal. India had dual uses in view stani scientists to discuss the possi- limiting, reducing and eventually from the inception of its nuclear bility of acquiring the nuclear op- eliminating nuclear weapons re- program. It considered nuclear tion.4 After the Indian nuclear ex- quires a consistent global approach weapons a means for attaining great plosion, Bhutto, then-Prime Minis- that carries conviction. At the same power status; rivalry with China ter, declared: “Let me make it clear time it calls for a demand-side pack- spurred its program. that we are determined not to be age that will neutralize the neces- Pakistan started its nuclear re- intimidated by this threat.” In 1976, sity for individual self-reliance by search and development program in Pakistan signed an agreement with states in zones of conflict. Mea- the 1950s. Deficient in fossil fuels France to obtain a reprocessing plant sures to strengthen collective secu- and hydroelectric potential, it pur- for the purpose of extracting pluto- rity and promote peaceful resolution sued a transparently peaceful, en- nium. It also started an indigenous of conflicts are needed for the long- ergy-oriented program. Both its program for the enrichment of ura- term. So long as the world com- small research reactor and the Ca- nium. munity is unable or reluctant to ful- nadian-assisted power plant at India considered the development fill these expectations implicit in the Karachi, completed in 1972, were of atomic energy essential for eco- United Nations Charter, states placed under the safeguards of the nomic development and technologi- threatened by aggressive and International Atomic Energy Agency cal progress, but Indian leaders also hegemonic neighbors will remain (IAEA). envisaged what Prime Minister condemned to fending for their se- Some Pakistani analysts had no Jawaharlal Nehru euphemistically curity as best they can. If that seems doubt watched India’s nuclear pro- described in 1948 as “other pur- at present like a tall order, other gram with growing concern, cogni- poses.”5 The emphasis in public practical measures can be consid- zant of the potential for blackmail statements was on peaceful uses; in ered in the short-term. Fortunately, in an asymmetrical nuclear situa- practice, priority was given to the 3 the substantial reductions in nuclear tion. But the government did not acquisition of the weapons option. arsenals being implemented by the allocate resources for plants with a Years before India built the first two superpowers and the current dual-use potential that could then nuclear power station, it set up in negotiations on a comprehensive test have been built without intrusive the early 1960s a reprocessing plant ban and fissile materials production external inspection. The industri- for the extraction of plutonium from cutoff have generated a conducive alized countries had not yet insti- used fuel. Earlier, India had ob- atmosphere. After examining the tuted stringent controls on export of tained from Canada a so-called “re- Pakistani and Indian nuclear pro- nuclear technology. In the 1960s, Pa- search reactor,” which was ideally

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 41 Abdul Sattar

suited for the generation of weap- tinued. Other industrialized coun- tack to destroy the Kahuta uranium ons-grade plutonium. tries also slammed shut doors to enrichment plant.12 India championed the demand for transfer of nuclear technology. Overcoming obstacles and resist- the elimination of nuclear weapons Pakistan’s program for peaceful uses ing discriminatory pressures, Paki- globally, but it was even more ve- of atomic energy virtually ground stan succeeded in building a uranium hement in opposing the nonprolif- to a halt. enrichment plant and acquiring the eration proposal on the grounds of Pakistan was singled out for par- explosion technology. It now ac- discrimination. Whether or not this ticularly harsh penalties when it knowledges possession of nuclear policy was simply a convenient embarked upon efforts to acquire capability but disclaims having pro- cover, it is evident from the record nuclear capability. The United duced nuclear weapons.13 By 1990, that India went on to develop and States used its influence with France Pakistan is estimated to have accu- retain a complete, weapons-oriented to frustrate the construction of a plu- mulated enough enriched uranium nuclear fuel cycle under its own ex- tonium separation plant in Pakistan. for 10-plus explosive devices.14 clusive control. Atomic energy was In 1976-77, the United States also Meanwhile India has built up a looked upon as a means to great enacted the Symington and Glenn stockpile of weapons-grade pluto- power status that Indian leaders had amendments to the foreign aid law, nium for an estimated 100-plus long cherished as an aspiration.6 under which economic aid was cut Hiroshima-size bombs.15 The Cana- Even before independence, Nehru, off to Pakistan when it began con- dian 40 megawatt thermal (MWt) re- the mentor of the Indian defense and struction of a uranium enrichment actor alone accounts for 400 of the foreign policy establishment, envi- plant.10 over 500 kilograms of weapons- sioned India as one of the world’s The amendments to the U.S. law grade plutonium needed for that pur- four great powers and as a pivot 7 exempted India and Israel from the pose. The balance of India’s weap- in the Western, Southern, and South- aid cutoff. Inexplicably, this legis- ons-grade plutonium was generated east Asian regions with the right to lation was not invoked to cut off aid at the 100 MWt Dhruva reactor. proclaim a “Monroe Doctrine.”8 to India, even when it began to en- Also, India has begun to enrich ura- Although India’s nuclear policy rich uranium in the 1980s. Also, nium,16 which could be used in com- was conceived years before its bor- Washington evaded the U.S. Nuclear bination with plutonium to build der clash with China in 1962, when Nonproliferation Act of 197811 by thermonuclear weapons. India felt it suffered a humiliating persuading France to provide en- India’s explanation17—that it intends defeat, and the Chinese atomic test riched uranium fuel for the power to use the plutonium it has been in 1964, these events may have plant at Tarapur that the U.S. had separating as fuel—is questionable served to accelerate its timetable for sold to India. That act prohibits, because such fuel is considered un- the acquisition of nuclear weapons among other things, the export of economic, breeder reactor tech- capability. India finally demon- nuclear materials to countries that nology has been found problematic, strated its success in May 1974, do not accept the inspection and and, in any case, India can separate when it conducted the so-called control safeguards of the IAEA on non-weapons-grade plutonium from “peaceful explosion.”9 The pluto- all their nuclear plants, the fuel irradiated in its several nium for the explosive device was India, while intent on retaining unsafeguarded power reactors.18 produced in the Canadian reactor, the nuclear weapons option for it- In acquiring nuclear capability, using heavy-water supplied by the self, joined efforts to foreclose the Pakistan committed no violation of United States. option for Pakistan. Deploying its any obligation under international India conducted the test, but Pa- diplomatic leverage and propaganda law. It did not divert material from kistan paid the penalty. Angered by machinery, it canvassed against the any plant supplied for peaceful uses. the Indian breach of faith, Canada transfer of technology to Pakistan, In addition, Pakistan demonstrated immediately cut off nuclear coop- describing its program as a plan to regard for world opinion by refrain- eration also with Pakistan, although produce an “Islamic bomb,” hop- ing from any test explosion. Also, Pakistan gave no cause or provoca- ing to stoke atavistic prejudices. In Pakistan has voluntarily observed tion. Even the fuel supply for the the early 1980s, the Indian military NPT guidelines against the transfer Karachi power reactor was discon- staff even considered a plan of at- of nuclear materials and technology.

42 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Abdul Sattar

Yet, Pakistan continues to be singled its security is not imaginary; it is the capability inherent in the multi- out for penalties by the United founded in the experience of India’s corps juggernaut (with live ammu- States. recurrent use of force to impose nition) that planned to practice a Economic aid to Pakistan, which solutions of its own preference upon strategic thrust across the narrow was resumed by the United States less powerful neighbors. Moreover, waist of Pakistan’s territory to cut in 1981 in the wake of the Soviet India is continuing its military the north from the south. Its grave intervention in Afghanistan, was buildup for no apparent reason other apprehension that the exercise could again cut off soon after the with- than its aspiration to regional domi- be turned into a military operation drawal of the Soviet forces in 1989. nance. For years, India has been was natural against the background In 1990, President George Bush one of the largest recipients of arms of the Indian intervention in East declined to issue the certificate re- transfers in the third world.19 It now Pakistan 15 years earlier. Predict- quired under the Pakistan-specific “has the third largest military in the ably Pakistani forces made counter- Pressler law to the effect that Paki- world”20 and an expanding paramili- deployments, which were considered stan did not possess a nuclear de- tary force. For 1994-95, it added threatening by India, although that vice and was not trying to produce an additional 20 percent to its bud- was perhaps not the only reason why one. As a result, not only were fu- get for the armed forces. Pakistan’s the crisis was defused. South Asia- ture defense sales banned, but the concerns are aggravated by this watchers consider the restraints im- United States also withheld the growing power disparity and com- posed by the nuclear environment transfer of F-16 aircraft and other pounded by its lack of territorial to be a prime factor in the peaceful military equipment for which Paki- depth for defense by conventional ending. stan had paid a billion dollars in ad- means. The nuclear capability was again vance. Tensions in relations with India a factor in defusing the crisis that have been aggravated as a result of erupted in 1990 following the up- SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA the Indian military repression of the rising in India-held Kashmir. High Kashmiri struggle for self-determi- military officials in India were said Pakistan’s security concerns have nation. Once again India has blamed to have recommended air strikes on not been alleviated following the end Pakistan, as it did earlier when the targets in Pakistan. As tension of the Cold War. The lapse of the Sikh community revolted following mounted, fears arose that the crisis threat from the northwest is certainly the Indian military attack on their might explode into a conflict be- welcome. But the environment in holiest shrine. On two occasions in tween the two countries. The Presi- South Asia has now grown more recent years, the threat of another dent of the United States decided to anxious with the erosion of the dis- war loomed over the region. Fortu- send Robert Gates of the National cipline and restraint that superpower nately, the apprehensions did not Security Council to Islamabad and competition exercised on regional materialize. The factors that con- New Delhi. Although scholarly rivalries. The great powers are now tributed to the succesful denouement research has discounted sensational disinclined to “involve” themselves are still being probed by South Asia- reports depicting an actual nuclear in the problems of “others” and to watchers. threat as a product of journalistic bear the burdens of maintaining in- A military confrontation was pre- license,21 the decision to launch this ternational peace and security, es- cipitated in the winter of 1986-87, exercise in “preventive diplomacy” pecially in areas of marginal eco- when India concentrated an unprec- was probably influenced by the ap- nomic or strategic importance for edented quarter million troops 20 prehension that events could acquire them. For example, the United miles from Pakistan’s border. The a dangerous momentum in a region States has declined to assign forces stated purpose was a military exer- with nuclear capabilities. to Bosnia-Hercegovina, which is cise, code named “Brass Tacks,” but Whatever the role of nuclear ca- recognized by a United Nations Se- speculation has persisted that the pabilities in averting conflicts be- curity Council resolution to be a military planners, if not also the po- tween India and Pakistan in 1987 victim of the twin crimes of aggres- litical leadership, harbored ulterior and 1990, the restraining influence sion and genocide by Serb forces. designs. Whatever the intention, of nuclear weapons on the tendency Pakistan’s perception of threat to Pakistan’s preoccupation was with to resort to force is widely recog-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 43 Abdul Sattar

nized by influential opinion in the the nuclear devices once the white not worth the losses it has to risk. two countries. Not in Pakistan alone supremacist regime reconciled itself Such a conclusion is not obvious in is the view held that “it is the nuclear to black-majority rule, now only a conventional environment: lead- deterrent that has kept wars in South India, Israel, and Pakistan challenge ers may contemplate an adventure Asia at bay.”22 Answering the ques- the nonproliferation regime con- in a situation which admits of a tion, “Would India and Pakistan have structed by the major powers. Only margin of error in judgment; even refrained from the three wars they one of them—Pakistan—is under pres- if the adventure fails, the conse- fought in 1948, 1965, and 1971 had sure, mainly by the United States, quences may not be suicidal. Mar- both of them possessed a minimal to roll back its acquired capability. gins are eliminated however in a nuclear deterrence?,” a former chief Major nuclear powers and also nuclear environment. of the Indian army and a respected some political scientists27 oppose It is not necessary to conjure up analyst of strategic issues has ex- proliferation basically on the ground doomsday scenarios of annihilation pressed the view: “These wars would that the spread of nuclear weapons in a nuclear Armageddon between not have occurred.”23 Pakistani pro- would multiply the dangers of their superpowers to realize that any use fessionals agree with that assess- use in war through miscalculation. of nuclear weapons would entail an ment: had Pakistan possessed Medium and small powers, in their unmitigated disaster. Two atomic nuclear deterrence in 1971, “the dis- view, lack the resources, the mutual bombs devastated Hiroshima and memberment of Pakistan could have learning experience, and the tech- Nagasaki, forcing Japan to surren- been averted.”24 nical safeguards that help the super- der. It has been estimated that a Commenting on prospects for the powers manage crises. Particularly single 20-kiloton bomb, exploded future, a former chief of the Indian Third World states are considered over a densely populated city, could naval staff has observed that with to be unstable politically and imma- cause 130,000 instantaneous deaths. nuclear capability, “Pakistan would ture institutionally, if not also defi- In addition, over 200,000 people be able to establish a deterrent cient in prudence and rationality; for would suffer blast injuries and ra- nuclear posture against India, ren- these or other reasons, they could diation burns, and many times more dering in the process the balance of lose control over these weapons, im- would be condemned to a life worse conventional forces considerably periling their own people as well as than death due to ingestion of high less significant than it is today.”25 the world community. doses of radiation and the conse- Another senior Indian general has This view held by nuclear power quent increase in cancer, miscar- remarked: “What the nuclear capa- policy-makers is not shared, how- riages, and genetic defects. The ex- bility does is to make sure that the ever, by many political scientists, on plosion would also cause destruc- old scenarios of Indian armor cross- both historical and doctrinal tion of property in a 15-square-mile ing the Sukkur barrage over the grounds. They argue in support of area, as well as incalculable and ir- Indus and slicing Pakistan into two the efficacy of nuclear weapons as a reversible damage to ecology and en- are a thing of the past.”26 deterrent to war.28 Nuclear weap- vironment that would make the af- ons “make the cost of war seem fected area uninhabitable.30 PROLIFERATION DEBATE frighteningly high and thus discour- The awesome potential for de- age states from starting any wars that struction invests nuclear weapons The academic debate for and might lead to the use of such weap- with an unequalled power of deter- against proliferation has necessar- ons.”29 Founded in logic, the deter- rence. The possibility that nuclear ily taken place in terms of principles, rence argument is also upheld by weapons might be used in despera- but few of the participants envisage, empirical evidence. Nuclear weap- tion by an attacked state should fore- advocate, or apprehend the spread ons have helped maintain peace and close the thought of resort to war in of nuclear weapons to many addi- prevent military adventures in the pursuit of a policy of conquest and tional states. Excluding Argentina past, and there is no reason to ex- expansion. This has been the main and Brazil, which have decided be- pect that the future will be differ- rationale for the acquisition of tween them to renounce the nuclear ent. Even a powerful state is un- nuclear capabilities by states that option they were earlier developing, likely to resort to aggression if it lack the conventional power to de- and South Africa, which dismantled concludes that the potential gains are ter aggression. It is assumed that

44 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Abdul Sattar nuclear weapons “should be used and clandestine diversion of nuclear conflict by conventional means, it only if the very existence of the state materials. In the past, some states might come under pressure to raise is threatened by a conventional or were selective in their vigilance. In the stakes, coming face to face with nuclear attack.”31 This “weapon of the 1960s, 93.8 kilograms of en- the fateful “use or lose” dilemma, defensive last resort” doctrine ex- riched uranium were diverted from cutting into the time for preventive plained the nuclear policy of Brit- a U.S. plant to Israel.35 In 1968, diplomacy and precipitating a ain and France, although pride and EURATOM released 200 tons of nuclear war which could spell anni- prestige may be a reason for their uranium oxide at a chemical plant hilation. retention of nuclear weapons now in Italy, which ended up in Israel.36 The contingencies warranting that they face no apparent threat. It For over a quarter of a century a summons to the weapon of last re- was advanced as the principal argu- Norwegian firm supplied heavy sort should be clearly and carefully ment for Ukraine retaining the water, directly or through interme- defined. Deep penetration of a state’s nuclear weapons it inherited upon diaries, to Argentina, India, Israel, territory by adversary forces and the disintegration of the Soviet and South Africa.37 large scale attacks threatening to Union. These weapons, it was ar- Considering humanity’s stake in overwhelm and destroy its defensive gued, were “the only reliable deter- precluding nuclear dangers, it is ob- capability are types of situations rent to Russian aggression.”32 A viously desirable that precautions, likely to trigger consideration of use conventional defense would not be procedures, and confidence-building of nuclear weapons. What choice a viable and Ukraine would otherwise measures to reduce the dangers of victim of aggression should make remain “vulnerable to Russian miscalculation, accidents, and theft between capitulation or annihilation nuclear blackmail.” The last resort developed by more experienced and is a cruel question to which only argument has also been the Israeli resourceful states be shared with the the people of that state can give an rationale for its nuclear policy, others. Similarly, command and answer. which remains unquestioned by anti- control institutions and procedures proliferation protagonists and was in the neo-nuclear states should be NUCLEAR SUFFICIENCY probably a factor in the American improved. But the targeting of some decision to provide prompt and ef- “small” states only for expression of Nuclear powers have built arse- fective assistance to rescue Israel exaggerated fears cannot be con- nals of diverse sizes. At what level during the 1973 war when it con- structive. Only “ethnocentric views” is deterrence realized? Does it re- templated the use of Doomsday can perceive non-Westerners as main credible in case of imbalance? weapons.33 “lesser breeds without the law.”38 To be sure, a nuclear arsenal should Arguments against proliferation To be sure, nuclear weapons are not be so small as to be vulnerable fail to carry conviction because they neither a panacea for every conflict to a preemptive strike. It is desir- are advanced mostly by states that nor within the means of every state. able further to have a safety margin do not themselves practice the pre- Even with nuclear weapons, a less for confidence in a crisis and avoid- cept they preach. Nevertheless, the powerful state “will face a number ance of panic in response to a false 40 arguments should be examined on of difficult constraints in attempt- alarm. But neither do the num- their merits in order to reduce the ing to construct a survivable deter- bers have to be so large as to be dangers of acquiring nuclear weap- rent force,”39 especially if it is con- unaffordable by a medium state. ons, which are too serious to be dis- demned to live with short warning Even between superpowers, missed or ignored. Miscalculation, time, threat of nuclear decapitation, purely deterrent nuclear forces “can 41 for instance, brought the United and lack of resources to develop the be relatively modest.” Moreover, States and the Soviet Union peril- requisite infrastructure for a surviv- nuclear deterrence, unlike a conven- ously close to disaster in the Cuban able nuclear force. Inadequacy of tional one, is not decisively degraded missiles crisis in 1962. They had resources could create dangerous di- by quantitative or qualitative dispar- then to devise and institute agreed lemmas if a state ends up with an ity. So long as a state’s strategic precautionary measures to preclude unsurvivable nuclear capability, as arsenal is sufficient to survive the such perils.34 Also, procedures well as a degraded conventional first strike and still deliver “unac- should be tightened to prevent theft force. Unable to deal with a local ceptable” damage, it does not have

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 45 Abdul Sattar

to match the adversary’s arsenal.42 fully determined, taking into account to be losing, it would make conven- The Soviet Union achieved deter- the security of launchers, penetra- tional superiority irrelevant.”48 In rence when it had 300 nuclear war- tion capability of the carriers and the context of Pakistan and India, heads even though the United States reliability of delivery on preselected General K. Sundarji, former chief then possessed 5,000 nuclear war- targets. The minimum number of staff of the Indian Army, has per- heads.43 That the Soviet Union and would have to be increased in pro- suasively argued: “If a mutual the United States continued to build portion to the danger of preemption nuclear deterrent exists, I believe stockpiles to peak levels respectively and interception. If the adversary there is more scope for both coun- of 45,000 and 32,500 nuclear war- develops a capability to disable or tries to cut back on conventional heads is explained mainly in the intercept 50 percent of the weapons, forces and maintain a lower level context of extended deterrence in- the stockpile should be doubled; if balance.”49 volving their responsibility to en- 90 percent of the warheads might sure the security of their allies. be destroyed, the arsenal would have SECURITY AND NUCLEAR Partly, too, the vast buildup is at- to be increased tenfold. ARMS LIMITATION tributed in retrospect to an uncon- The economic burden of a small trolled, but not necessarily uncon- nuclear arsenal is not a decisive con- The logic of complete nuclear dis- trollable, arms race.44 straint on a medium state’s decision armament does not appeal to strate- Medium nuclear powers have not on whether or not to acquire these gic thinkers in the new nuclear-ca- considered it necessary to build weapons. The cost of designing, pable states any more than it did in thousands of warheads. Britain and building, and testing a plutonium- the nuclear weapons states. Com- France are said to maintain respec- based nuclear device was estimated menting on the proposal for elimi- tively 200 and 500 nuclear war- in a United Nations’ study in 1968 nation of nuclear weapons, heads. China’s arsenal was esti- at $100 million; the U.S. Arms Zbigniew Brzezinski is said to have mated to total 450 warheads in 1992. Control and Disarmament Agency remarked: “It is a plan to make the It was considered to have achieved (ACDA) estimated the cost at $51 world safe for conventional warfare. deterrence years earlier despite the million in 1976. If a country al- I am therefore not enthusiastic about 50 fact that its potential adversaries ready possessed the fissile material, it.” Even after the Cold War, were nuclear superpowers. Israel the figure according to ACDA nuclear powers do not consider a is believed to possess a stockpile of dropped to $1 million.47 While these nuclear-free world an acceptable “100 to several hundred warheads.”45 figures might be two to three times idea. The underlying problem per- This rather large arsenal was appar- higher in the depreciated dollars of sists: how to make the world un- ently built to deter the Soviet Union 1994, the expenditures would not safe for war, conventional or oth- from coming to the aid of Arab states greatly strain the budgets of India erwise? Conventional weapons have in a war. and Pakistan, each of which spends not historically proved effective in As between medium states, cred- billions of dollars annually on de- a deterrence role, and deterrence ible deterrence is achieved with a fense. Moreover, the infrastructure now commands an even higher pri- small nuclear arsenal. One scholar has already been built by both the ority: “nations can no longer afford 51 has concluded that “five or six” countries. to fight protracted wars.” Great nuclear warheads should be suffi- In addition, in judging the bur- powers may develop high-precision cient.46 Theoretically, even a smaller den of a nuclear force, allowance conventional weapons to provide number should suffice to deter, pro- should be made for possible con- “strategic” deterrence against conven- 52 vided the weapons can be delivered tainment of the defense budget be- tional weapons. But, this option on targets of high value. It is in- cause in a nuclear environment the is not in the sight of medium pow- conceivable that a responsible gov- conventional forces do not have to ers, which lack requisite resources ernment or leader would risk the be maintained or equipped for de- and access to the new weapons. nuclear devastation of a single me- terrence. Disparity of conventional The ideal of a nuclear-free world tropolis for the satisfaction of van- forces then loses some of its edge: will have to await a transformation quishing an adversary. The num- “if a country were forced to use the of the security environment, globally ber should, however, have to be care- nuclear option the moment it seemed and regionally. Limitation of nuclear

46 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Abdul Sattar weapons or capabilities is, however, India. In 1993, the Clinton admin- tiations are to begin in the CD on a a practical proposition. It can serve istration revised the proposal to in- treaty on cutoff of production of fis- the interests not only of humankind clude France, Germany, Japan, and sile materials for nuclear weapons. in general but also of the states in- the United Kingdom, in a confer- Pakistan supports the CTBT. A volved, saving expenditures on an ence of nine, presuming that ex- segment of political and military unnecessary nuclear arms race and panded participation would accom- opinion56 in the country has been reducing the dangers inherent in modate India’s concern for balance. advocating a test explosion in order nuclear weapons. Such a practical India, however, turned down this to confirm its design of the nuclear approach would be consistent with proposal as well. Apparently, In- device (as India did 20 years ago). the resolutions of the U.N. General dia wants an assurance in advance However, the government has re- Assembly. that any limitation proposal would jected the idea. Its willingness to The superpowers are setting a apply to all “geopolitically relevant” renounce the test option illustrates good example: under START I and countries. Not only do its “security a recognition that the qualitative II, the Russian Federation and the problems include China,”54 its con- limitation the CTBT will promote United States are to cut their nuclear cerns extend to the presence of great is in the country’s best interest: it inventories by some 90 percent in a power forces in the ocean to its will make the development of a ther- decade to 3,000 to 3,500 warheads. south. monuclear device by India more im- Clearly, the magnitude of the reduc- Faced with India’s rejection of a probable. tion is impressive, even though the regional approach to limitation of Meanwhile, it has been reported two countries will still retain over nuclear capabilities, Washington that some nuclear powers want an three-quarters of the world’s stock seems to have given up. Meanwhile, exemption for low-yield of nuclear weapons. Besides, the bowing to Congressional pressure hydronuclear explosions for improv- reduction process is likely to con- for continuation of the Pressler law, ing the design of nuclear weapons. tinue. States with nuclear weapons it has reverted to the Pakistan-spe- Such a loophole, although explained capability (such as India and Paki- cific policy. It has even withdrawn by the proponents on grounds of stan) can hardly ignore, much less the suggestion it broached in early safety, could be exploited to further rebuff this trend, if they are to re- 1994 for a one-time waiver of this upgrade the yield of weapons. Most tain credibility in demanding from “black law” 55 to facilitate the release non-nuclear states, however, oppose the nuclear powers “a genuine com- of 38 F-16 aircraft and other equip- any such exemption, and may agi- mitment with regard to complete ment for which Pakistan has already tate the issue at the NPT Extension nuclear disarmament within a paid a billion dollars. The U.S. Sen- Conference, linking the period of timebound framework.”53 ate apparently wants Pakistan to roll- extension to the conclusion of the While continuing its posture in back its nuclear program and, in CTBT. favor of nonproliferation in South effect, to give up the nuclear option Prospects seem brighter for an in- Asia, Pakistan has supported pro- unilaterally. Pakistan can hardly ternational treaty to ban the further posals also for a nuclear limitation afford to accept this in view of its production of fissile materials for regime, globally and regionally. security preoccupations. nuclear weapons. The idea was en- Limitation is preferable because it While efforts to promote a re- dorsed by the presidents of the Rus- would prevent further buildup of gional restraints regime in South sian Federation and the United States nuclear arsenals and, at the same Asia appear to have reached a dead- in January 1994. None of the other time, not suddenly detract from the end for the present, the global scene nuclear powers appears to have plans security that nuclear deterrence pro- seems to have turned quite promis- for expansion of its nuclear arsenal. vides. A proposal put forward by ing. The Comprehensive Test Ban Non-nuclear states will no doubt the Bush administration in 1990 to Treaty (CTBT) is under active con- support it enthusiastically. Only consider nuclear and security issues sideration at the United Nations some of the weapons-capable states in South Asia at a conference of five Committee on Disarmament (CD) may have to be persuaded to accept states (China, Russia, the United in Geneva. Also, in advance of the the ban because their existing stock- States, India, and Pakistan) was ac- NPT Review and Extension Confer- piles of fissile materials may be in- cepted by Pakistan, but rejected by ence to begin in April 1995, nego- sufficient for future contingencies.

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 47 Abdul Sattar

For Pakistan to accept a ban on cient before would become insuffi- Beijing, Jakarta, Riyadh, and further production of fissile materi- cient after the missiles enter the Tehran. Another missile under de- als outside safeguards would involve scene, creating the dilemmas con- velopment is a polar space launch an awkward decision. Its accumu- nected with threats to the survivabil- vehicle with an intercontinental lation of highly-enriched uranium ity of a small nuclear force. The range capability. was estimated to be enough for about threatened state would be faced with Pakistan’s missile development 10 devices when, under pressure, it the necessity of the enlargement and program is in its infancy, with in- discontinued further production in dispersal of its nuclear arsenal and significant material and manpower 1990. Any addition to it would be launchers, making the safety and resources dedicated to the program. precluded if Pakistan signs the treaty security of nuclear weapons and The indigenous Hatf missile is at freezing further production of weap- command and control over them present said to lack an adequate ons-grade material. Such a treaty more problematic and adding to dan- guidance system. However, in the could hinder the maintenance of a gers of custodial accidents and leak- absence of a limitation agreement, survivable deterrent, particularly if ages. Pakistan would be obliged by its India continues to enhance its pre- Initially explained on grounds of threat perception to try and develop emption and interception capacity technological modernization, India’s an appropriate counter to Indian mis- by the development and deployment extensive missile program59 reflects siles. Meanwhile, it has procured a of missiles. its “desire to seek or enhance inter- small number of short-range tacti- national prestige and be an impor- cal missiles from China. The ac- MISSILES: THREAT OF tant player in world developments.”60 quisition provided a basis for a pos- DESTABILIZATION India has an extensive program for sible understanding with India on the production of missiles. Apart missile limitation. A proposal was A plan for strategic arms limita- from short-range, surface-to-air mis- made by the United States in 1993 tion will be incomplete and unstable siles like the Akash, (with aircraft for Pakistan and India to defer de- if it applies only to nuclear testing interception capability at the 30- to ployment of missiles. Pakistan ac- and production of fissile materials 36-mile range), India has developed cepted the proposal. India, however, for weapons. A freeze on missiles and tested the Prithvi, a surface-to- sidetracked it, and with reports of should have to be an integral part of surface missile with a 90- to 150- deployment of the Prithvi, this 57 “three freezes.” The NPT envis- mile range, which is already American initiative, too, appears to aged “elimination from national ar- “deployable (and) should be in place have lapsed. Meanwhile, the pros- senals of nuclear weapons and the by the end of this year (1994),” ac- pects for a South Asian regional 58 means of their delivery” as con- cording to the director of the Indian freeze on missiles have become com- joint objectives. For that sound rea- missile program. The Indian armed plicated as the Indian program is son, the superpowers agreed to forces have reportedly asked for 100 continuing to gather momentum and eliminate intermediate nuclear forces of these missiles, which will make as India links its missile develop- in Europe and reduce other missiles “Pakistan’s entire territory vulnerable ment to balancing China. The sug- and aircraft even before they agreed to its lethal attack.” Meanwhile, In- gestion for a broader agreement in- to reduce nuclear warheads. dia is also developing the Agni, volving a commitment by China not As force-multipliers, missiles en- which has a range of 600 to 1,500 to deploy missiles in the vicinity of hance both offensive and defensive miles “or more if necessary.” 61 It India will further confound the is- capability. Armed with nuclear war- was successfully tested in February sue because the Chinese strategic heads, missiles make deterrence 1994. weapons and deployments are con- more credible as they are more dif- Equipped with inertial guidance nected to relations with nuclear su- ficult to intercept than aircraft. and protected against electronic perpowers. Also, missiles greatly increase the countermeasures as well as high re- Chances of a Pakistani-Indian first-strike capability of a state, de- entry temperatures, the Agni has agreement on nondeployment of grading the survivability and there- been “developed mainly to strike missiles, bleak to begin with, were fore the credibility of the adversary’s China.”62 It is capable of deliver- further undermined by the decision nuclear deterrent. What was suffi- ing nuclear warheads as far away as of the United States to impose sanc-

48 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Abdul Sattar tions on China and Pakistan in Sep- pragmatic approach. Protocol to NPT for Nuclear- tember 1993 for the transfer of mis- Nuclear weapons-capable states Capable States siles in alleged violation of the cannot be fitted into the NPT’s MTCR. With the MTCR working strictly two-tier framework of An arrangement to commit to its advantage, India has no incen- nuclear powers and non-nuclear nuclear weapons-capable states to tive to consider a bilateral restraints states. India, Israel, and Pakistan observance of nonproliferation re- regime. While Pakistan is barred claim they do not possess nuclear straints could be made through a from importing missiles, India with weapons. If they did, they could protocol to the NPT or by a sepa- its industrial and technological edge, not be admitted to the treaty because rate treaty. Amending the NPT, can continue to produce more and it limits nuclear power status to the though possible under the treaty, bigger missiles. The one-dimen- five states which had declared their would be a cumbersome and prob- sional policy of restricting sales can nuclear status before the treaty was ably an impractical undertaking. only accentuate the power imbalance negotiated. Nor are they prepared Even such a thought is anathema at and foster the tendency of more pow- to join as non-nuclear states because a time when the attention of most erful states to resort to coercion and that would oblige them to place not of the nuclear weapon powers is fo- aggression. Such a policy is bound only all their nuclear facilities but cused on obtaining an indefinite and to operate to the detriment of peace also their existing stocks of fissile unconditional extension of the treaty. and stability. materials under IAEA safeguards. The proposed protocol would call This would virtually preclude their for no change in the NPT. It would CONTAINING NUCLEAR retention of the nuclear option—a be a separate mechanism for asso- DANGERS consequence that is unacceptable to ciating its signatories with the ob- them at present. jectives of the NPT and requiring Globalization of restraints by ac- Any hope that the holdout states them to assume many of its obliga- celerating negotiations on the CTBT will accede to the NPT appears quite tions, thus achieving the purpose of and the ban on further production forlorn at present. But, that is not extending nonproliferation re- of fissile materials for weapons to say they are insensitive to the dan- straints. would help limit capabilities of gers inherent in the proliferation of The suggested protocol to the nuclear-capable states. It is not yet nuclear weapons. While constrained NPT could require the signatories certain, however, that they will join by perceived threats to their secu- to undertake to advance the funda- the proposed treaty on fissile mate- rity to develop nuclear deterrence, mental objective of the treaty, rials. It may be necessary to per- these states should be amenable to namely to avert the danger of a suade them to do so. This, and the persuasion to assume many of the nuclear war, prohibit the transfer of larger objectives of the reduction and NPT’s nonproliferation restraints. fissile materials and technology for elimination of nuclear weapons, Already they are doing so voluntar- nuclear weapons, facilitate the ap- may require a more flexible ap- ily. But for assurance and reliabil- plication of IAEA safeguards to ex- proach, calling for a review of the ity, international commitments isting and future nuclear facilities, NPT itself and the adoption of some would be more desirable. Such com- and, in addition, ban nuclear explo- appropriate measure to associate the mitments would also be more effi- sions and further accumulation of weapon-capable states with the NPT. cacious than country- or region-spe- fissile materials for weapons even The NPT was pragmatic in con- cific efforts to enforce discipline before treaties on these subjects, ception. It did not ban or currently pursued by the United which are currently under discus- delegitimize nuclear weapons, but States. It would be useful, there- sion, enter into force. Specifically sought instead to freeze the number fore, to consider whether a uniform the protocol should include the fol- of nuclear weapons powers. Its suc- treaty arrangement can be devised lowing provisions: cess has been impressive but not to- to attract the holdout states to com- • the obligation not to transfer tal. The new reality arising from mit themselves to observance of nuclear weapons technology63; the acquisition of nuclear weapons most (if not all) of the obligations • the obligation not to receive capability by some NPT nonparties specified in the NPT. nuclear weapons technology64; calls for the consideration of a new • the obligation to accept safe-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 49 Abdul Sattar

guards on existing and future nuclear sidered an acknowledgment of the tion at a time when limitation and facilities (but not on existing stock- NPT’s failure. The failure or suc- reduction of nuclear weapons have piles of fissile materials)65; cess of a treaty can be correctly as- become dominant trends. The as- • the right to receive technology sessed with reference to the actions sumption is that they would become for peaceful uses of nuclear en- of the parties. In that light, the NPT entitled to the benefits of Article IV ergy66; has been eminently successful. None of the NPT—the recognition of their • the obligation not to conduct any of the non-nuclear weapon parties right to receive materials and tech- nuclear explosions whatso- to the treaty has proceeded to de- nology for peaceful uses of nuclear ever67; and velop nuclear weapons. A rhetori- energy. The restrictions at present • the obligation to reduce nuclear cal point is made by some, pointing imposed by the industrialized coun- weapons capabilities.68 to Iraq and North Korea, which, tries on the transfer of technology The advantages of the protocol in though parties to the NPT, allegedly for power reactors and other peace- the context of nonproliferation are did not abandon the ambition to pro- ful uses would be eliminated. In obvious. It would effectively com- duce nuclear weapons. Without go- addition, cooperation in improving mit the protocol signatories to cap- ing into the substance of the allega- safety at existing nuclear plants ping their capabilities. The objec- tion, it can be pointed out that apart should be a significant consideration tive of nondissemination of nuclear from the ruling assumption in in- for India: its nuclear power plants explosion technology would be guar- ternational relations requiring par- are reported to suffer from radia- anteed. The commitment against ties to fulfill treaty obligations, the tion leakages and other defects. testing would make it very difficult NPT contains elaborate provisions In addition to the main advantage for them to produce thermonuclear for enforcement action by the U.N. of stabilizing the already-acquired weapons, as well as limit the scope Security Council. capabilities of its signatories at the for sophistication of design and min- Equally, it would be a mistake to present level, the protocol would iaturization of explosive devices. consider the protocol as a device for keep open the possibility that these The obligation to reduce weapons the legitimization of the de facto states might in the future become capability would bring them in line emergence of additional nuclear parties to the NPT and formally ac- with nuclear weapons states as they weapons powers. Apart from the cept a non-nuclear status. Of course, proceed with disarmament. Gener- questionable presumption that the de the prospect of such an evolution ally, association with the NPT would facto emergence is illegitimate, an will depend on improvements in diminish the threat that some of them objective view cannot ignore the fact their security environment. It will may abandon ambiguity and declare of the coexistence of the NPT with depend also on whether a new in- themselves as nuclear weapons nonparties that have the capability ternational order can be fostered in states, although they would retain to make nuclear weapons. The pro- which less powerful states do not the option to do so in the event of a tocol will not create any new nuclear remain relegated to “a gray area in a crisis. The assumption of the pro- weapons-capable states. Secondly, security void, a nowhere land where posal is that they are not willing at the apparent anomaly will lose its anything can happen.”69 present to renounce that option. piquancy because the protocol will The protocol, like the NPT itself, serve to limit the weapons-making Security Guarantees would testify to the wisdom of prag- capabilities of the signatories, reduc- matism. Just as the treaty succeeded ing the nuclear dangers. That in- Nonproliferation efforts might be in restraining the non-nuclear deed is a concrete merit of the pro- more effective if the Security Coun- weapon parties from acquiring posal. cil were to establish a pattern of nuclear weapons, the protocol would For the nuclear weapons-capable prompt and effective collective ac- preclude the further expansion of states, the assumption of obligations tion to frustrate aggression. Such a already-acquired capabilities. To under the proposed protocol would demand-side strategy would assuage that end, signatories to the protocol be balanced by advantages more apprehension of states faced with would assume obligations they do concrete than the vicarious satisfac- real threats to their security, neu- not at present have. tion of association with the NPT and tralizing the urge to acquire inde- The protocol should not be con- the resultant ending of their isola- pendent deterrence. This urge has

50 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Abdul Sattar frustrated the supply-side strategy: nuclear East European states has have had to make to achieve this ca- restrictions on the transfer of nuclear disappeared, the Western powers pability in the face of pressures and materials and technology have failed may be prepared to reconsider the penalties, perceiving as they do per- to dissuade insecure states from the “negative” assurance formulation. sistent threats to their security and pursuit of nuclear weapons. Even Meanwhile, the Russian position has even to their political independence. economic sanctions applied on a changed; apparently perceiving pos- For them, it is no longer a question country-specific basis have failed to sible threats in the future from non- of renouncing the weapons option; coerce targeted states. nuclear neighbors, Moscow is now the real issues now are whether to The “positive” assurance con- opposed to the “no first use” con- limit capabilities or expand them, tained in Security Council resolu- cept.74 and whether or not to continue the tion 255 of 1968 has been consid- Evidently, the “no first use” con- policy of nonweaponization. In ered insufficient by non-nuclear cept is difficult to translate into a making their decisions, Pakistan and states. Incorporating statements of precise principle acceptable to all India will no doubt consult their own the Soviet Union, the United King- nuclear powers. Only China has interests and the balance of costs and dom and the United States, declar- made an unqualified declaration: it benefits. ing their intent to seek immediate will “never” be the first to use The security environment will Security Council action to provide nuclear weapons; the assurance ap- naturally be a key factor. Unless assistance to a victim of an act or plies to any conflict with any state, the threat perceptions undergo a threat of aggression with nuclear nuclear or non-nuclear. The other transformation or a more reliable weapons,70 the resolution has been nuclear powers have not all been collective security system emerges, ridiculed as “a mere promise to con- agreeable to give a categorical as- the logic of an independent deter- vene a Security Council meeting.”71 surance of non-use even to non- rent will remain valid. The nuclear- Any proposal for action by the Se- nuclear states. In any case a decla- capable states continue to consider curity Council would be subject to ration of this type “can never be the costs acceptable. In the short veto; the promise of assistance does considered binding in case of war.”75 term, only fine-tuning may be ex- not apply if the aggressor, though a In the event of a looming defeat, the pected in order to improve the effi- nuclear power, uses only conven- doctrine of “defensive last resort” ciency of the policies, taking into tional weapons; and, furthermore, is likely to govern decisions. account the changes in the security the assistance, even if provided, Both the “positive” and “negative” environment. might be a mere token. Understand- security assurances will not assuage The existing policies of restraint ably, non-nuclear states have sought the anxiety of states vulnerable to will be more likely to continue, and more effective guarantees.72 acts or threats of aggression with might even be reinforced, if the The negative assurance is con- conventional weapons from more sponsors of the NPT act to persuade sidered even less satisfactory. De- powerful states that may or may not the weapons-capable states to under- signed to reassure non-nuclear possess nuclear weapons. The urge take specific obligations on limita- weapon parties to the NPT against to maintain independent deterrence tion and permanent members of the the use or threat of use of nuclear capability will be suppressed only Security Council to strengthen as- weapons, the assurance contained in when and if a reliable collective se- surances of effective action in the a resolution of the General Assem- curity system has been devised by event of aggression or coercion with bly, is rather “convoluted.”73 It ex- the world community. nuclear or conventional forces. It cludes use of nuclear weapons only is instructive to remember that the against those non-nuclear states PROSPECTS superpowers were successful in per- which are not allied or associated suading a number of potential with a nuclear power. A more cat- Nuclear weapons-capable India, nuclear weapons states in Europe egorical assurance of non-use against Israel, and Pakistan are no more and East Asia to renounce the op- non-nuclear states was not accept- likely than the nuclear powers to tion in exchange for security um- able to NATO countries with their agree to dispossess themselves of brellas under multilateral alliances doctrine of flexible response. Now their acquisitions; probably much or bilateral defense pacts. that the threat of an attack by non- less so because of the sacrifices they Both the motivation and capacity

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 51 Abdul Sattar of the Western powers to influence tually doing so does not significantly course if we are compelled as a nation to use it [i.e. atomic energy] for other purposes, possibly the nuclear policy evolution in South enhance the deterrent value. no pious statements of any of us will stop the Asia appear to have declined. They Self-interest, ever the most potent nation from using it that way.” cannot fail to note that attainment factor in determining the policy of 6 The dream of becoming a world power is con- jured up again and again in the pronouncements of nuclear capabilities by Pakistan states, may be expected to continue of Indian leaders: (1) In his welcoming address, and India has helped promote sta- to impel nuclear restraint in Paki- the chairman of the 1895 annual session of In- bility and prevented dangers of war stan and India. The trend could be dian National Congress, Rao Bahadur V. M. Bhide said: “[India is] destined under Providence despite aggravation of tensions. fostered through a globalization of to take its rank among the foremost nations of This refutes the perception that restraints and by linking Pakistan the world.” A. Moin and Shaheda Zaidi, eds., The Encyclopaedia of the Indian National Con- South Asia is “the area of greatest and India to a nondiscriminatory gress, Vol. II (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co.) p. near-term danger” with “perhaps the network. Limitation of nuclear ca- 506; (2) In a letter to Georges Clemanceau, Presi- most probable prospect for future pabilities may take place automati- dent of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, the Congress-appointed delegate, Bal Gangadhar use of weapons of mass destruc- cally, but reduction may be achiev- Tilak said, “With her vast area, enormous re- tion.”76 Self-interest itself should able only through the strengthening sources, and prodigious population, she [i.e. In- persuade Pakistan and India to ex- of collective security. Meanwhile, dia] may well aspire to be a leading power in Asia.” R. Palme Dutte, India Today, (London: ercise due restraint. Continuance the nuclear policies of Pakistan and Vicor Gollance, 1940), p. 549. of responsible conduct is desirable India are rational, have proven to 7 Nehru, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 406: “India...is the pivot of Western, Southern and Southeast Asia.” in order to gain greater tolerance of be beneficial in promoting security 8 Nehru, op. cit., Vol. 3, p.133. Speaking on their nuclear policies by the West- and stability, and command solid August 9, 1947, Nehru said: “The doctrine ex- ern powers. There is no substan- consensus at home. They are, there- pounded by President Monroe had saved America from foreign aggression for nearly a hundred tive reason for these two countries fore, unlikely to respond to arbitrary years...now the time has come when a similar to be treated differently from Israel. external pressures. doctrine must be expounded with respect to Asia The United States appears to have countries.” 9 Joel Ullom, “Enriched Uranium versus Pluto- accepted the reality of the nuclear nium: Proliferant Preferences in the Choice of Fissile Material,” The Nonproliferation Review 2 situation in South Asia. Acting prag- 1 An amendment to the U. S. law on foreign as- (Fall 1994), pp. 5-6. matically, Washington has redefined sistance adopted in 1985, which forbids economic 10 For more on these issues, see Leonard S. its nonproliferation policy to give aid or military sales to Pakistan unless the presi- Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Am- first priority to the capping of weap- dent certifies that (a) Pakistan does not possess bitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989- an atomic weapon, and (b) the provision of aid 1990 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), ons-oriented nuclear programs, rel- will dissuade Pakistan from aquiring such a pp. 90, 109. egating reduction and elimination of weapon. 11 Gary T. Gardner, Nuclear Nonproliferation 2 These include a retrospective study of the 1986- nuclear capabilities to subsequent (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 87 "Brass Tacks" crisis by Stephen Cohen of the 1994), p. 45. stages. The objectives of the new University of Illinois, Urbana (forthcoming), and 12 J. N. Parimoo, report from Washington, The policy have a better chance of suc- studies of the 1990 crisis by Michael Krepon of Times of India News Service, September 17, the Henry Stimson Center, Washington, D. C. 1984. Referring to news reports published in The cess in the long-run, even if the 1994, and by Shireen Taher-kheli of Princeton Washington Post and The New York Times, policy appears for the present to be University, presented as a draft at a conference Parimoo reported that “U.S. intelligence agen- in Bellagio, September 1994. cies recently briefed a senate subcommittee...that in a dormant phase. As a global 3 “If India has the bomb, that does not mean we military advisers had suggested to [Indian Prime trend, the limitation of nuclear ca- are going to be subjected to nuclear blackmail,” Minister] Mrs. Indira Gandhi that to prevent Pa- pabilities also has intrinsic merits. said , on August 13, 1966. kistan from making the bomb, India should See Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan The quantitative requirements of a launch a preemptive strike on the Pakistani (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. nuclear facility at Kahuta.” The Times of India credible nuclear deterrence are fi- 112. On another occasion, Bhutto said: “[I]f In- published the report on September 18, 1984, nite, and the costs and dangers of dia acquires nuclear status, Pakistan will have to under a slanted headline, “U.S. false alarm to follow suit....” Pak of Indian pre-emptive attack.” See also, H.K. 4 further expansion of stockpiles are Khalid Hasan, press secretary to Zulfikar A. Dua, “India concerned over US signal to Pak on both too great and unnecessary. Bhutto, reportedly made this disclosure accord- Jaguar deployment,” The Indian Express, New Similarly, conversion of nuclear ca- ing to a documentary by the British Broadcast- Delhi, September 19, 1984. ing Corporation. See Steve Weissman and 13 A Pakistani spokesman reiterated on August pabilities into weapons may continue Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb (New Delhi: 24, 1994, that Pakistan has the capacity to pro- to be deferred. So long as the ad- Vision Books, 1983), p. 18. duce nuclear weapons but has not actually done 5 Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works, Second Se- versaries are aware that weapon- so. Former Prime Minister ’s state- ries, Vol. 5 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, ment that Pakistan possesses the atomic bomb ization can be accomplished in a 1986), p. 27. Speaking in the Indian Constitu- was described, also by a U.S. State Department short time during an emergency, ac- ent Assembly on April 6, 1948, Nehru said: “Of

52 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Abdul Sattar official, as having something to do with domes- University of Pennsylvania from October 3-6, nuclear fuel processing firm....” tic politics. Reuters /AP dispatches of August 23 1993. 36 Davenport, et. al., The Plumbat Affair (Lon- and 24, 1994. 24 Beg, op. cit. don: Andre Deutsch, 1978). The book describes 4 Lewis A. Dunn, Containing Nuclear Prolif- 25 Admiral J. G. Nandkarni quoted, with refer- at length how an Israeli agent in West Germany eration, Adelphi Paper No. 263 (London: Inter- ence to Telegraph, Calcutta, March 23-25 1990, ordered the uranium ore on behalf of an Italian national Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), p. by Mushahid Hussain, “Indian Power Projection chemical company in Milan, the approval of the 17. in South Asia and the Regional States’ Reactions,” sale by EURATOM, its shipment in 560 drums 15 Ibid. in Hafeez Malik, ed., Dilemmas of National Se- marked PLUMBAT aboard a ship which was 16 Spector, op. cit., pp. 68-69. curity and Cooperation in India and Pakistan purchased with Mossad funds, the transfer of the 17 Indian spokesmen maintain that plutonium will (New York: St. Martins Press, 1993). material to an Israeli vessel in the Mediterranean be used for fabricating mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel 26 Shekhar Gupta, W.P.S. Sidhu, and Kanwar after a mock hijacking, and the sweeping of the for a breeder reactor and possibly also for the Sandhu, “A Middle-Aged Military Machine,” In- affair under the rug by EURATOM. For a sum- Tarapur reactor for which supply of enriched dia Today, April 30, 1993, p. 44. mary reference to this affair, see Hersh, op. cit., uranium fuel was cut off first by the United States 27 Dunn, op. cit.; Steven E. Miller, “The Case p. 180-181. and now by France. So far, however, India lacks Against a Ukrainian Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 37 International Herald Tribune, October 7, 1988, a fabricating plant for MOX fuel. Even when 72, (Summer 1973); Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils p. 6, report entitled “3 Scandals Oslo Must Put such a plant is established, it is unlikely to use of Proliferation,” International Security 18 to Rest,” by Gary Milhollin, Director of Wiscon- the weapons-grade plutonium. (Spring 1994) and others listed by Sagan, p. 67, sin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, and Der 18 For a list of India’s nuclear plants, see Spector, footnote 5. Speigel October 17, 1988. In 1959, Norway op. cit., pp. 83-87. Unsafeguarded plants in- 28 Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear permitted export of 20 tons of heavy water di- clude the Canadian and Dhruva research reac- Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Papers rectly to Israel for use in the Dimona reactor for tors commissioned in 1960 and 1985, with weap- No. 171 (London: International Institute for Stra- peaceful purposes. Again one ton was exported ons-grade plutonium production capacity of 14 tegic Studies, 1981), p. 3; John J. Mearsheimer, to Israel in 1970 through an intermediary. In and 30 kilogram per year respectively, plutonium “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” 1983, Norway authorized sale of 15 tons of separation plants at Trombay for metallic fuel, at Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1973); Barry R. heavy-water through the West German firm of Tarapur for oxide fuel, and at Kalpakkam for Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Con- Alfred Hampel to Romania, which was airlifted fuel from power reactors, and two 220 MWe flict,” International Security 35, (Spring 1993) instead to Switzerland and thence to Bombay. power reactors each at Madras, Narora, and and others listed by Scott D. Sagan, himself an Hampel was alleged also to have exported 70 Kakrapar. opponent, in Sagan, op. cit., p. 66, and footnote tons of heavy-water from China to Argentina 19 Congressional Research Office, Conventional 4 on p. 67. and India. Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1986-93 29 Waltz, op. cit. p. 3. 38 Waltz, op. cit., p.11. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 30 S. Rashid Naim, “Aadhi Raat Ke Baad (After 39 Miller, loc. cit., p. 73. Office, 1994). Midnight),” in Stephen P. Cohen, Nuclear Pro- 40 Waltz, op. cit. , p. 15. 20 Annual report of the U.S. Department of De- liferation in South Asia (Boulder, Colo.: 41 Ibid., p. 22. The remark was made by former fense presented to Congress in support of the Westview Press, 1991). U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown. security assistance program for 1995. 31 Wolfgang Panofsky and George Bunn, “The 42 McNamara, op. cit., p. 44. 21 Seymour M. Hersh says in a report in The Doctrine of the Nuclear-Weapon States and the 43 Robert S. McNamara, Blundering Into Disas- New Yorker (“On the Nuclear Edge,” March 29, Future of Non-Proliferation,” Arms Control To- ter (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1986). 1993, p. 56): “the world was on the edge of a day (July/August, 1994), p. 6. This doctrinal 44 Peter Gray, Briefing Book on the Nonprolif- nuclear exchange” in May 1990 when Robert surmise is based on Strategic Views from the Sec- eration of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Gates was sent to Pakistan and India to defuse ond Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of Council for a Livable World Education Fund), the crisis. This brink-of-nuclear-war character- France, Britain and China, (San Diego: Univer- p. 7. Also figures about the nuclear arsenals of ization was described as “exaggerated” by Na- sity of California Institute on Global Conflict and other countries are taken from this source. tional Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft (“Did Cooperation, 1994). 45 Ibid., p. 8. India and Pakistan Face Atomic War? Claim is 32 Mearsheimer, loc. cit., p. 50 et seq. 46 Rodney W. Jones, Small Nuclear Forces and Debated,” The New York Times, March 23, 1993). 33 The circumstances could not possibly have been U.S. Security Policy (Lexington, MA: Lexing- Perhaps to dramatize the situation Hersh also worse,” says Golda Meir in My Life (New York: ton Books, 1984), pp. 243-256. asserted: “The American intelligence commu- G. P. & Putnam Sons, 1975), p. 427, when the 47 Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics nity . . . had concluded by late May that Paki- Israeli forces were suffering heavy casualties and of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Colum- stan had put together at last six and perhaps as the Egyptians advance into the Sinai during the bia University Press, 1988), p. 28. many as ten nuclear weapons” (loc. cit., p. 56). first three days of the war. According to “How 48 Gupta, et al., loc. cit. This claim, too, was not confirmed by Bush ad- Israel Got the Bomb,” Time, April 12, 1976, p. 49 Ibid. ministration officials contacted by The New York 39, she gave Defense Minister Moshe Dayan 50 McNamara, op. cit., p. 87. Times. That a crisis did exist and that there was permission to activate Israel’s Doomsday weap- 51 Keith Suter, Visions for the 21st Century, p. a danger of a conventional war with the “likeli- ons. (The Israeli panic appears to have been pre- 28. hood” of escalation to the nuclear level was not mature. The war was still confined to occupied 52 Paul Nitze, (“Is It Time To Junk Our Nukes?,” disputed by them, however. Arab territories, with no evidence yet of a threat The Washington Post, January 16, 1994) recom- 22 General M. Aslam Beg, Indian and Pakistani to Israel’s integrity and existence.) mends that the United States should convert “its Security Perspectives, (Rawalpindi, Pakistan: 34 Robert S. McNamara, The Changing Nature principal strategic deterrent from nuclear weap- Foundation for Research on Nationali Develop- of Global Security And Its Impact On South Asia ons to a more credible deterrent based at least in ment and Security, 1994), p. 6. (Washington, D.C.: Washington Council on Non- part upon smart conventional weapons... (because 23 Krishnaswami Sundarji, “Changing Military Proliferation, 1992), p. 7. they) are safer, cause less collateral damage and Equations in Asia: The Relevance of Nuclear 35 Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option (New pose less threat of escalation than do nuclear Weapons,” p. 9. This paper was prepared for the York: Vintage Books, 1993), pp. 242-243. weapons.” Indo-American Seminar on Non-Proliferation and Zalman Shapiro was, according to Hersh, “an 53 Declaration of the Nonaligned Summit, 1992. Technology Transfer, sponsored by the Center active member of the Zionist Organization of 54 Thomas W. Lippman, “U.S. Efforts to Curb for the Advanced Study of India and held at the America who organized a publicly owned Nuclear Weapons in Peril as India Insists on Lim-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 53 Abdul Sattar its for China,” The Washington Post, July 7, 1994, 66 Accordingly, Article IV, which applies to all p. A12, quoting a senior Indian official. NPT parties, should be included in the protocol 55 This epithet has been used by Pakistani com- so that its signatories, too, will have the right mentators because of the Pressler law’s discrimi- “to participate in the fullest exchange of equip- natory targeting of Pakistan for penalties. ment, materials and scientific and technological 56 Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has said: “I information for the peaceful uses of nuclear en- conducted a poll [in Pakistan] and 90% thought ergy....” Pakistan should detonate a nuclear device. It is 67 Article V provides for sharing of potential ben- a dangerous situation. This should be recognised efits from any peaceful applications of nuclear and rewarded.” Interview with Times of Lon- explosions. The “potential” has proved to be don, November 26, 1994. illusory. Therefore no reference should be nec- 57 Jeremy J. Stone, “Four Civilizations Gently essary to peaceful explosions in the protocol. Collide at Arms Control Conference,” Federa- Instead its signatories could be expected to com- tion of American Scientists Public Interest Re- mit themselves to refraining from any nuclear port 47 (March/April, 1994). explosions whatsoever, unless the CTBT has 58 Preamble to NPT. meanwhile come into force, making reference to 59 Rai Chengappa, et. al., “The Missile Man,” the matter redundant. The preamble to the NPT India Today, April 15, 1994, pp. 38-45; Special recalls the determination expressed by the par- Reports on missiles and interviews with the di- ties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon rector of the missile program by Rai Chengappa, tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under and interviews with the chief of army staff by water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the dis- B.C. Joshi, and with chief of air staff by S. K. continuance of all test explosions of nuclear weap- Kaul. ons for all time and to continue negotiations to 60 The phrasing in the paragraph is based on a this end. draft paper contributed by an Indian scholar at 68 Article VI, relating to cessation of the nuclear the Shanghai Workshop in February 1994, which arms race and disarmament, could be modified was “Not for Citation.” For report on the Work- so that each protocol signatory “...undertakes to shop, see Stone, loc. cit. pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 61 Chengappa, loc. cit., p.38, quoting A. Kalam, measures relating to (limitation and reduction of head of India’s 10 billion rupees ($330 million) its nuclear weapons capability, in parallel with defense research program. negotiations on) cessation of the nuclear arms 62 Ibid., p. 39. race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, 63 Accordingly Article I of NPT, which defines and on a treaty on general and complete disar- the obligations of nuclear weapon states, could mament under strict and effective international be modified for protocol signatories to under- control.” take “...not in any way to assist, encourage, or 69 President Lech Walesa is quoted to have used induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manu- this eloquent phrase while pleading for Poland’s facture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or admission to NATO. The Washington Post, July other nuclear explosive devices, or control over 8, 1994, lead editorial. such weapons or explosive devices.” 70 The statements promise “to seek immediate Se- 64 Accordingly, Article II which is applicable to curity Council action to provide assistance, in non-nuclear weapon states, could be modified accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear- for protocol signatories to undertake: “... not to weapon State party to the treaty on the non-pro- receive the transfer from any transferor whatso- liferation of nuclear weapons that is a victim of ever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo- an act of aggression or an object of threat of sive devices or of control over such (transferred) aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.” weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;... 71Washington Council on Non-Proliferation, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S. and India manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear (Washington, D.C.: 1993), p. 24. explosive devices.” 72 Dunn (op. cit., p. 43) contains a comprehen- 65 Accordingly, Article III which is applicable to sive discussion on lessening the technical “pro- non-nuclear weapon states could be modified so pensity to war.” that each protocol signatories “1...undertakes to 73 Washington Council on Non-Proliferation, op. accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement cit., p. 25. to be negotiated and concluded with the Interna- 74 Panofsky and Bunn, op. cit., p. 6, based on tional Atomic Energy Agency (on all nuclear fa- remarks by Russian Defense Minister Pavel cilities whether existing at the time of the con- Grachev on November 3, 1993. clusion of the agreement or established 75 Ibid. subsequently)...with a view to preventing diver- 76 Robert A. Manning, Back to the Future: To- sion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to ward a Post-Nuclear Ethic, the New Logic of Non- nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive de- proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Progressive vices....” Foundation, 1994), p. 15. Manning also recalls “2...undertakes not to provide: (a) source or CIA Director James Woolsey’s statement: “The special fissionable material, to any nonnuclear- arms race between India and Pakistan poses per- weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the haps the most probable prospect for future use source or special fissionable material shall be of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear subject to the safeguards....” weapons. Both nations could on short notice assemble nuclear weapons.”

54 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995