Npr 2.2: Reducing Nuclear Dangers in South Asia: A

Abdul Sattar REDUCING NUCLEAR DANGERS IN SOUTH ASIA: A PAKISTANI PERSPECTIVE by Abdul Sattar A former career diplomat of Pakistan, Abdul Sattar served as Ambassador to India (1978-82 and 1990-92) and the Soviet Union (1988-90). He was also Pakistan's Foreign Minister in the caretaker government in 1993. In 1993-94, he was a Distinguished Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C., which supported his research for this article. The views expressed in the article are those of the author alone. esisting pressures and pen- from Pakistan’s border for a mili- the security situation in the region. alties, Pakistan has declined tary exercise, code-named “Brass A constructive approach to con- Rto renounce the nuclear op- Tacks,” triggered a crisis between the taining nuclear dangers has to start tion. In practice, however, it has two countries. with a recognition of the existing demonstrated restraint and reason- Although the incipient revision of realities, then evince greater under- ableness, deferring conversion of its the earlier projections of apocalyp- standing of the security concerns acquired nuclear capability into tic consequences of Pakistan’s that drive nuclear programs, and fi- weapons, remaining willing to agree nuclear pursuit is welcome from nally develop a responsive and af- to any nondiscriminatory arrange- Islamabad’s perspective, the swing firmative strategy in place of the ment for a nuclear freeze in South of opinion to the other extreme of failed policy of censure and sanc- Asia and, meanwhile, even suspend- neglect of the nuclear and security tions selectively targeting one coun- ing further accumulation of highly- issues in South Asia does not serve try or another. Such a strategy enriched uranium. Pakistan’s re- the best interests of either of the two should be founded on the principle straint has not been ignored by in- countries involved or those of the of nondiscrimination and attach pri- formed opinion. Although the world community at large. The sub- ority to limiting nuclear capabilities Pressler law1 remains in force in the ject is too serious for the same epi- and strengthening restraints against United States, recent scholarly stud- sodic approach that was manifest weaponization, missile deployments, ies2 have taken note of the positive earlier in the acceptance of the fait and transfer or accidental loss of contribution the nascent Pakistani accompli by India following its fissionable materials and technology. nuclear capability made to prevent- nuclear detonation in 1974. It war- These objectives are likely to be ing a looming war on two occasions: rants instead a sustained policy of realized in a cooperative interna- in 1990, when India was contem- constructive engagement aimed at tional framework, designed to as- plating air strikes across the line of reducing the concomitant dangers of suage the anxieties of the countries control in the disputed state of Kash- the nuclear environment. India’s involved and of the world commu- mir, and possibly also in the winter stockpile of weapons-grade uranium nity. of 1986-87, when a quarter million continues to mount, and its buildup At issue is not only the equity, Indian troops, concentrated 20 miles of missiles threatens to destabilize but also the efficacy, of present 40 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 Abdul Sattar nuclear nonproliferation policy and grams and placing them in the con- kistan actually declined an offer by the Missile Technology Control text of the nonproliferation debate, a French company to provide a plu- Regime (MTCR). Apart from glar- this article proposes an initiative to tonium separation plant. In 1968, ing contradictions between precept associate the holdout states with the it even announced its readiness to and practice, these supply-side strat- nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty accede to the NPT, provided India egies of the industrialized states have (NPT). did the same. been proven ineffectual in prevent- Not until after 1971, when ing the spread of nuclear weapon PAKISTANI AND INDIAN Pakistan’s conventional defense ca- capabilities. The Pressler law, NUCLEAR PROGRAMS pacity proved inadequate to safe- which Pakistanis see as a “black law,” guard its territorial integrity, and is even likely to be counterproduc- The nuclear programs of Pakistan East Pakistan was militarily sepa- tive. Estrangement between tradi- and India present a vivid contrast rated by India to create Bangladesh, tional partners for peace in South of motives and commitments. Pa- did Pakistan embark upon efforts to Asia and the Gulf region aside, it kistan followed nuclear abstinence acquire the nuclear weapons option could—because it bars conventional for a quarter century; only the di- as a means of deterring the persis- arms sales—force Pakistan to place saster of 1971, when Indian mili- tent Indian threat. In early 1972, greater reliance on nuclear deter- tary intervention cut Pakistan into Zulfikar Bhutto, then-President of rence. two, necessitated a painful reap- Pakistan, reportedly met with Paki- The world community’s goal of praisal. India had dual uses in view stani scientists to discuss the possi- limiting, reducing and eventually from the inception of its nuclear bility of acquiring the nuclear op- eliminating nuclear weapons re- program. It considered nuclear tion.4 After the Indian nuclear ex- quires a consistent global approach weapons a means for attaining great plosion, Bhutto, then-Prime Minis- that carries conviction. At the same power status; rivalry with China ter, declared: “Let me make it clear time it calls for a demand-side pack- spurred its program. that we are determined not to be age that will neutralize the neces- Pakistan started its nuclear re- intimidated by this threat.” In 1976, sity for individual self-reliance by search and development program in Pakistan signed an agreement with states in zones of conflict. Mea- the 1950s. Deficient in fossil fuels France to obtain a reprocessing plant sures to strengthen collective secu- and hydroelectric potential, it pur- for the purpose of extracting pluto- rity and promote peaceful resolution sued a transparently peaceful, en- nium. It also started an indigenous of conflicts are needed for the long- ergy-oriented program. Both its program for the enrichment of ura- term. So long as the world com- small research reactor and the Ca- nium. munity is unable or reluctant to ful- nadian-assisted power plant at India considered the development fill these expectations implicit in the Karachi, completed in 1972, were of atomic energy essential for eco- United Nations Charter, states placed under the safeguards of the nomic development and technologi- threatened by aggressive and International Atomic Energy Agency cal progress, but Indian leaders also hegemonic neighbors will remain (IAEA). envisaged what Prime Minister condemned to fending for their se- Some Pakistani analysts had no Jawaharlal Nehru euphemistically curity as best they can. If that seems doubt watched India’s nuclear pro- described in 1948 as “other pur- at present like a tall order, other gram with growing concern, cogni- poses.”5 The emphasis in public practical measures can be consid- zant of the potential for blackmail statements was on peaceful uses; in ered in the short-term. Fortunately, in an asymmetrical nuclear situa- practice, priority was given to the 3 the substantial reductions in nuclear tion. But the government did not acquisition of the weapons option. arsenals being implemented by the allocate resources for plants with a Years before India built the first two superpowers and the current dual-use potential that could then nuclear power station, it set up in negotiations on a comprehensive test have been built without intrusive the early 1960s a reprocessing plant ban and fissile materials production external inspection. The industri- for the extraction of plutonium from cutoff have generated a conducive alized countries had not yet insti- used fuel. Earlier, India had ob- atmosphere. After examining the tuted stringent controls on export of tained from Canada a so-called “re- Pakistani and Indian nuclear pro- nuclear technology. In the 1960s, Pa- search reactor,” which was ideally The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1995 41 Abdul Sattar suited for the generation of weap- tinued. Other industrialized coun- tack to destroy the Kahuta uranium ons-grade plutonium. tries also slammed shut doors to enrichment plant.12 India championed the demand for transfer of nuclear technology. Overcoming obstacles and resist- the elimination of nuclear weapons Pakistan’s program for peaceful uses ing discriminatory pressures, Paki- globally, but it was even more ve- of atomic energy virtually ground stan succeeded in building a uranium hement in opposing the nonprolif- to a halt. enrichment plant and acquiring the eration proposal on the grounds of Pakistan was singled out for par- explosion technology. It now ac- discrimination. Whether or not this ticularly harsh penalties when it knowledges possession of nuclear policy was simply a convenient embarked upon efforts to acquire capability but disclaims having pro- cover, it is evident from the record nuclear capability. The United duced nuclear weapons.13 By 1990, that India went on to develop and States used its influence with France Pakistan is estimated to have accu- retain a complete, weapons-oriented to frustrate the construction of a plu- mulated enough enriched uranium nuclear fuel cycle under its own ex- tonium separation plant in Pakistan.

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