DOCSLIB.ORG

PAKISTAN's FOREIGN POLICY 1947-2009 a Concise History

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
PAKISTAN's FOREIGN POLICY 1947-2009 a Concise History PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY 1947-2009 A Concise History ABDUL SATTAR Reproduced by Sani H. Panhwar P A KISTA N 'S FO REIGN P O L ICY 1 9 4 7 -2 0 0 9 A Concise H istory A bdulSattar Fo re w o rd b y A g h a S h a h i Reproduced by SaniH .Panhw ar Contents Foreword .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 Preface .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 1. The Emergence of Pakistan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 Historical Background .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 2. Foreign Policy— Beginnings .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11 The Founding Father's Vision .. .. .. .. .. .. 12 Enduring Relevance of Principles .. .. .. .. .. 14 The Shadow of Partition .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16 The Muslim World .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 18 3. The Kashmir Question, 1947-57 .. .. .. .. .. .. 21 The Dispute .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 21 At the United Nations .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 25 The Dispute Festers .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 28 4. Search for Security .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 31 USSR .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 31 Approaches to the USA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 33 Korean War .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 36 Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 36 China .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 37 5. Alliances .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 38 Four Alliances .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 42 6. Alliances— Costs and Benefits .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 49 Costs of the Alliances .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 49 US Alliance Strengthened .. .. .. .. .. .. 52 Benefits of the Alliances .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 52 Swings of Opinion in the USA and Pakistan .. .. .. .. 55 7. Relations with China and Other Developments .. .. .. .. 61 China .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 61 Pakistan-China Boundary Agreement, 1962 .. .. .. .. 63 Sino- Pakistan Entente .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 64 Oman: Gwadar Retrocession .. .. .. .. .. .. 65 Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 .. .. .. .. .. .. 65 India-China Border War, 1962 .. .. .. .. .. .. 67 Pakistan-US Relations Corroded .. .. .. .. .. 69 Negotiations on Kashmir, 1962-63 .. .. .. .. .. 70 Changing Strategic Environment .. .. .. .. .. 72 Alliance under Strain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 74 Ayub Khan's Visits to China and the USSR .. .. .. .. 75 Second Afro-Asian Summit .. .. .. .. .. .. 76 US Reaction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 76 RCD and IPECC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 77 8. The Pakistan-India War, 1965 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 78 Clash in Kutch .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 81 Operation Gibraltar .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 83 Escalation to War .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 83 Stance of Foreign Powers .. .. .. .. .. .. 85 The Tashkent Declaration .. .. .. .. .. .. 88 Bilateralism .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 92 9. Bitter Legacy of War, 1965-71 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 93 Organization of the Islamic Conference .. .. .. .. 97 10. 1971 Disaster .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 98 Bhutto's New Policy, 1971-73 .. .. .. .. .. .. 106 11. Shimla Agreement: Negotiating under Duress .. .. .. .. 108 Opening Gambit .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 110 Principles of Relations .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 111 Withdrawal from Occupied Territory .. .. .. .. .. 113 Jammu and Kashmir .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 113 Denouement .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 115 Assessment .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 117 Secret Understanding? .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 121 Normalization with Bangladesh .. .. .. .. .. .. 123 12. The Nuclear Programme and Relations with the USA .. .. .. 125 13. The Afghanistan Crisis .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 134 Revival of the US Alliance .. .. .. .. .. .. 138 Geneva Accords .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 140 14. Kashmir: The Struggle for Azadi .. .. .. .. .. .. 147 15. The Afghanistan Civil War, 1990-1998 .. .. .. .. .. 155 The Rise of the Taliban .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 156 Proxy War .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 159 Fatal Blunders .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 160 Retrospect .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 160 16. Pakistan-India Disputes and Crises .. .. .. .. .. .. 163 Sir Creek .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 163 Siachen: A Dispute within a Dispute .. .. .. .. .. 163 Salal, Wullar, Baglihar, and Kishenganga Projects .. .. .. 165 Consular Missions .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 166 Indian Plan for Attack on Kahuta, 1984 .. .. .. .. .. 167 The Brasstacks Crisis, 1986-87 .. .. .. .. .. .. 168 Re-entry to the Commonwealth .. .. .. .. .. .. 169 War Averted, 1990 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 170 Disarmament Issues .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 170 17. Nuclear Tests .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 174 Nuclear Restraints .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 177 Impact on Security .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 178 Issues and Non-Issues .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 180 Ballistic Missiles: The Threat of Destabilization .. .. .. 192 18. Increasing Isolation, 1990-2001 .. .. .. .. .. .. 195 US Sanctions Again .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 195 Support for the Taliban .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 196 Declining Prestige .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 197 Nuclear Tests .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 198 Pakistan-India Dialogue, 1997-99 .. .. .. .. .. 198 The Kargil Crisis, 1999 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 199 Coping with Isolation .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 203 The Agra Summit .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 204 19. Post-9/11 Policy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 207 Policy Planning by Pakistan .. .. .. .. .. .. 207 US Policy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 209 Consultation with Opinion Leaders .. .. .. .. .. 211 Economic Cooperation and Assistance .. .. .. .. .. 212 New Afghanistan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 216 20. Pakistan-US Strategic Partnership .. .. .. .. .. .. 220 Divergence between Pakistan and USA .. .. .. .. 222 21. Terrorism .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 228 Islam Targeted .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 230 The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy .. .. .. .. 236 22. Pakistan-India Relations, 2001-09 .. .. .. .. .. .. 239 Retrospect .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 239 23. The UN and Other Organizations .. .. .. .. .. .. 249 Human Rights .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 254 International Financial Institutions (IFIs) .. .. .. .. 256 Regional Cooperation .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 259 SAARC-South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation .. .. 260 24. Policy in a Changing World .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 266 International Politics .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 266 Global Power Hierarchy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 268 Appraisal of Pakistan's Foreign Policy .. .. .. .. .. 269 A ppen dices I. The Shimla Agreement, 1972 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 273 II. Composite Dialogue, 1997-98 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 285 III. The Lahore Declaration, 21 February 1999 .. .. .. .. .. 287 IV. The Agra Declaration, 2001 Draft Agreement .. .. .. .. 290 Foreword Gaining independence by the exercise of the principle of self-determination, the nascent state of Pakistan wished, as its founding father repeatedly said, to build friendly and cooperative relations with its neighbors. Idealistic in inspiration, the states foreign policy had soon to come to grips, however, with the reality of the challenge to its right to peaceful coexistence. The failure of its own efforts and those of the United Nations for the settlement of disputes in the wake of Partition, in conformity with the principles of international law and justice, illustrated the tyranny of power disparity in the region. In order to ameliorate the situation, Pakistan did what many other states in a similar predicament had done and began to look outwards for friends and allies to support its own efforts to safeguard the independence, strengthen the security and build the economic sinews of the infant state. Resistance to hegemony in the regional context complemented Pakistan's policy of opposition to the Soviet policy of expansionism and subversion, although Pakistan was not motivated by Cold War or ideological considerations, as illustrated by its policy to develop friendly cooperation with the Peoples Republic of China, disregarding the objections and sanctions by its partners in military alliances led by the United States of America. The failure of the allies to conic to Pakistan's assistance and the powerlessness of the United Nations to restrain India from intervention and aggression in East Pakistan in 1971, convinced Pakistan's leaders of the need to develop nuclear capability for the purpose of deterrence— an aim the Pakistani leadership pursued with single- mindedness in the face of discriminatory sanctions and pressures, the nation willingly bearing the burdens and sacrifices resulting from the cutoff of foreign assistance. Through diligent research Ambassador Abdul Sattar has recapitulated the rationale of these and other major policy decisions, including that of opposition to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, in order to write what he calls 'a plain history'. He has delineated the objective strategic considerations on the basis of which the government and its leaders made fateful decisions. He draws also on personal knowledge as an official in the ministry of foreign affairs in the 1980s when the Geneva Accords were negotiated for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and as foreign minister when Pakistan decided on a policy reappraisal in the wake of 9/11. The scholarly work he has produced accomplishes his laudable purpose of writing an objective history of Pakistan's policy. The book provides an authoritative account for students of foreign policy, observers and analysts to understand the past and benefit from its lessons in formulating effective strategies for the realization of the aims and Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2009, Copyright © www.sanipanhwar.com 1 objectives of the state: to strengthen security and accelerate economic and social progress to achieve a position of dignity and self-respect in the comity of nations. I commend Pakistan's Foreign Policy to students and scholars at home and abroad, as well as to members of the security and foreign policy establishment in Pakistan, as it will facilitate a deeper understanding of the strategic compulsions that have driven decision-making
Load more

Recommended publications
  • India-Pakistan Conflict: Records of the Us State Department, February 1963
    http://gdc.gale.com/archivesunbound/ INDIA-PAKISTAN CONFLICT: RECORDS OF THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, FEBRUARY 1963-1966 Over 16,000 pages of State Department Central Files on India and Pakistan from 1963 through 1966 make this collection a standard documentary resource for the study of the political relations between India and Pakistan during a crucial period in the Cold War and the shifting alliances and alignments in South Asia. Date Range: 1963-1966 Content: 15,387 images Source Library: U.S. National Archives Detailed Description: Relations with Pakistan have demanded a high proportion of India’s international energies and undoubtedly will continue to do so. India and Pakistan have divergent national ideologies and have been unable to establish a mutually acceptable power equation in South Asia. The national ideologies of pluralism, democracy, and secularism for India and of Islam for Pakistan grew out of the pre-independence struggle between the Congress and the All-India Muslim League, and in the early 1990s the line between domestic and foreign politics in India’s relations with Pakistan remained blurred. Because great-power competition—between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China—became intertwined with the conflicts between India and Pakistan, India was unable to attain its goal of insulating South Asia from global rivalries. This superpower involvement enabled Pakistan to use external force in the face of India’s superior endowments of population and resources. The most difficult problem in relations between India and Pakistan since partition in August 1947 has been their dispute over Kashmir.
    [Show full text]
  • Revolution in Afghanistan
    Fred Halliday Revolution in Afghanistan On 27 April 1978 the world heard that there had been a successful military coup in Afghanistan. The régime headed by Mohammad Daud, which had itself come to power through a coup in July 1973, had been suddenly overthrown by tanks and jet planes that struck in the Afghan capital, Kabul. At first it seemed as if this was yet another military intervention which, although violent and abrupt, involved no major shift in the policies, social character or international alignment of those in power: a change comparable to Daud’s own coup, or to others in neighbouring Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Arab world. Yet within days it became clear that the announcements of radical change coming over Radio Kabul were more than just the ritual demagogy of military coups: something rather more substantial had occurred. In the first place, the coup, although carried out by the military, reflected much wider political forces. It had been preceded by mass popular demonstrations in Kabul, and as thousands of people flocked to inspect Daud’s conquered palace, 3 now renamed the House of the People, it became evident that it had ousted a hated régime and at least temporarily embodied the hopes of a wide section of the population. At the same time it became clear that the coup was not just the product of a conspiracy within the military, but had been carried out on the instructions of an underground Marxist political organization whose membership was overwhelmingly civilian. This at once distinguished the new rulers from other radical military régimes in the Arab world, South Asia or Ethiopia.
    [Show full text]
  • REFORM OR REPRESSION? Post-Coup Abuses in Pakistan
    October 2000 Vol. 12, No. 6 (C) REFORM OR REPRESSION? Post-Coup Abuses in Pakistan I. SUMMARY............................................................................................................................................................2 II. RECOMMENDATIONS.......................................................................................................................................3 To the Government of Pakistan..............................................................................................................................3 To the International Community ............................................................................................................................5 III. BACKGROUND..................................................................................................................................................5 Musharraf‘s Stated Objectives ...............................................................................................................................6 IV. CONSOLIDATION OF MILITARY RULE .......................................................................................................8 Curbs on Judicial Independence.............................................................................................................................8 The Army‘s Role in Governance..........................................................................................................................10 Denial of Freedoms of Assembly and Association ..............................................................................................11
    [Show full text]
  • Dispute Over Bombay Mansion Highlights Indo-Pakistani Tensions
    Page 1 18 of 22 DOCUMENTS The Washington Post November 9, 1983, Wednesday, Final Edition Dispute Over Bombay Mansion Highlights Indo-Pakistani Tensions BYLINE: By William Claiborne, Washington Post Foreign Service SECTION: First Section; General News; A27 LENGTH: 741 words DATELINE: NEW DELHI, Nov. 8, 1983 A dispute over possession of the former Bombay home of Pakistan's founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, coupled with continuing cross allegations of interference in each other's internal affairs, has raised tensions between India and Pakistan at a time when efforts to normalize relations between the two former enemies have ground to a standstill. While the rancor over Jinnah's palatial mansion is little more than a sideshow to sporadically turbulent Indo-Pakistan relations, diplomats on both sides agreed that it is symptomatic of a fundamental lack of trust that stems from the partition of the Subcontinent in 1947 and the successive wars between the two new nations. "There seem to be second thoughts on the Indian side about normalizing relations. Maybe they think Pakistani President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq is going to be forced out, and that there's no point in talking to him now," said a Pakistani diplomat, referring to Zia's problems in controlling violent opposition protests in Sind Province. Pakistani officials said that because of the dispute over Jinnah's house, which Pakistan planned to use as a residence of the new consul general in Bombay, plans to open a consulate in India's second largest city have been scrapped. The house that Jinnah used as a base in the early days of India's independence struggle had been promised by India to Pakistan in 1976, when diplomatic relations were resumed after having been broken in the 1971 war.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan Foreign Policy with a View to Ascertaining Its Alignments with the Dream of Our Founding Fathers, Ideological Mooring and the Genesis of Pakistan
    PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY An Ideological Appraisal Prof. Fateh ur Rehman* Abstract As a rule, foreign policy of a state, is an extension or a reflection of its internal policy. Since Pakistan emerged as an Islamic State, its internal policy was deemed to be committed to the establishment of a just socio-moral order in this country (in consonance with the socio teachings of Islam). By implication, its foreign policy should likewise have been reflective of the same ideological commitment. It means that Pakistan should have only one overriding objective: Establishment of a just socio-moral order in Pakistan, and a just socio-moral order around the globe. It means that Pakistan should have been a party to those who are striving for justice and be opposed to those who are spreading corruption and exploitation at the international level. In this brief article, we will try to analyse as to how far we have been faithful to our ideological moorings. And if we have deviated, which indeed we did, then what steps should be taken to rectify this departure. Fifth anniversary of the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001 is over but the culprits responsible of 9/11catastrophe are still shrouded in mystery. The terrorist attack on symbols of American military and economic power triggered a transformation of world politics and accentuated dramatic change into the course of international affairs. Its ripples are strong, violent and are reaching far and wide. No corner or country of the world could escape from its far reaching consequences. However, events unfolded so far reveal that apart from Iraq and Afghanistan (& may be the U.S.), Pakistan is the only country that has been turned upside down because of the post 9/11 changed scenario.
    [Show full text]
  • My Memories of M a Jinnah
    My memories of M A Jinnah R C Mody is a postgraduate in Economics and a Certificated Associate of the Indian Institute of Bankers. He studied at Raj Rishi College (Alwar), Agra College (Agra), and Forman Christian College (Lahore). For over 35 years, he worked for the Reserve Bank of India, where he headed several all-India departments, and was also Principal of the RBI Staff College. Now (2011) 84 years old, he is engaged in social work, reading, writing, and travelling. He lives in New Delhi with his wife. His email address is [email protected]. R C Mody uring pre-independence days, there was a craze among youngsters to boast about how many leaders of the independence movement they had seen. Everyone wanted to excel the other in D this regard. Not only the number but also the stature of the leader mattered. I had little to report. I had grown up and spent my early boyhood in Alwar, a Princely state. Leaders of national stature rarely visited Alwar, as the freedom movement was confined largely to British India. I had not seen practically any well-known leader in person till I was in my mid-teens. When I went to college in Agra in July 1942, I hoped to meet national leaders because Agra was a leading city of British India. Alas! The Quit India movement commenced within a month. And the British government responded by locking up all the prominent leaders whom I looked forward to see. For months, we were not even aware where they were confined.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan Assessment
    AFGHANISTAN ASSESSMENT April 2001 Country Information and Policy Unit 1 CONTENTS I SCOPE OF DOCUMENT 1.1 - 1.5 II GEOGRAPHY General 2.1 Languages 2.2 – 2.5 Economy 2.6 – 2.8 III HISTORY 1973 Coup d' État 3.1 – 3.2 1978-1992 3.3 – 3.11 1992-1994: Mujahidin Government 3.12 – 3.17 Emergence of the Taliban 3.18 – 3.21 February 1995-June 1996 3.22 – 3.23 September 1996-June 1997 3.24 – 3.31 August 1997-August 1998 3.32 – 3.40 September 1998-December 1999 3.41 – 3.47 January 2000-September 2000 3.48 – 3.52 October 2000-April 2001 3.53 – 3.59 IV INSTRUMENTS OF THE STATE 4.1 POLITICAL SYSTEM Constitution 4.1.1 Government 4.1.2 – 4.1.5 4.2 JUDICIAL SYSTEM Introduction 4.2.1 – 4.2.4 Taliban Territory 4.2.5 – 4.2.7 Northern Alliance Territory 4.2.8 – 4.2.9 4.3 SECURITY General 4.3.1 Taliban Territory 4.3.2 – 4.3.6 Northern Alliance Territory 4.3.7 – 4.3.8 V HUMAN RIGHTS 5.1 INTRODUCTION 5.1.1 – 5.1.4 5.2 GENERAL ASSESSMENT Torture 5.2.1 Detainees 5.2.2 – 5.2.7 Mazar-i-Sharif Massacres 5.2.8 – 5.2.9 Recruitment of Soldiers 5.2.10 – 5.2.11 2 Religious Police 5.2.12 – 5.2.14 5.3 SPECIFIC GROUPS General 5.3.1 – 5.3.2 Religious Minorities - Introduction 5.3.3 – 5.3.6 - Demography 5.3.7 - Shia Muslims 5.3.8 – 5.3.9 - Ismailis 5.3.10 - Sikhs and Hindus 5.3.11 – 5.3.13 Ethnic Groups - Introduction 5.3.14– 5.3.16 - Pashtuns 5.3.17 – 5.3.20 - Tajiks 5.3.21 – 5.3.23 - Hazaras 5.3.24 – 5.3.29 - Uzbeks and Turkomans 5.3.30 – 5.3.31 - Baluchis 5.3.32 - Nuristanis 5.3.33 - Panjsheris 5.3.34 Former Members of the PDPA Regime 5.3.35 – 5.3.42 Women 5.3.43 – 5.3.54
    [Show full text]
  • Nation Building Process in Afghanistan Ziaulhaq Rashidi1, Dr
    Saudi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Abbreviated Key Title: Saudi J Humanities Soc Sci ISSN 2415-6256 (Print) | ISSN 2415-6248 (Online) Scholars Middle East Publishers, Dubai, United Arab Emirates Journal homepage: http://scholarsmepub.com/sjhss/ Original Research Article Nation Building Process in Afghanistan Ziaulhaq Rashidi1, Dr. Gülay Uğur Göksel2 1M.A Student of Political Science and International Relations Program 2Assistant Professor, Istanbul Aydin University, Istanbul, Turkey *Corresponding author: Ziaulhaq Rashidi | Received: 04.04.2019 | Accepted: 13.04.2019 | Published: 30.04.2019 DOI:10.21276/sjhss.2019.4.4.9 Abstract In recent times, a number of countries faced major cracks and divisions (religious, ethnical and geographical) with less than a decade war/instability but with regards to over four decades of wars and instabilities, the united and indivisible Afghanistan face researchers and social scientists with valid questions that what is the reason behind this unity and where to seek the roots of Afghan national unity, despite some minor problems and ethnic cracks cannot be ignored?. Most of the available studies on nation building process or Afghan nationalism have covered the nation building efforts from early 20th century and very limited works are available (mostly local narratives) had touched upon the nation building efforts prior to the 20th. This study goes beyond and examine major struggles aimed nation building along with the modernization of state in Afghanistan starting from late 19th century. Reforms predominantly the language (Afghani/Pashtu) and role of shared medium of communication will be deliberated. In addition, we will talk how the formation of strong centralized government empowered the state to initiate social harmony though the demographic and geographic oriented (north-south) resettlement programs in 1880s and how does it contributed to the nation building process.
    [Show full text]
  • CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION (Under Sec 19 of the Right to Information Act 2005) B Block, August Kranti Bhawan, New Delhi 1100065
    Appeal No.CIC/OK/A/2007/001392 CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION (Under Sec 19 of the Right to Information Act 2005) B Block, August Kranti Bhawan, New Delhi 1100065 Name of the Appellant - Shri Nusli Wadia, Mumbai Name of the Public Authority - Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Respondent South Block, New Delhi-110011 Date of Hearing 21.12.2007 Date of Decision 16.01.2008 Facts: 1. By an application of 6-6-’07 submitted on 12-6-07 Shri Nusli Wadia of Mumbai sought the following information from the CPIO, MEA (i) “documents, notes of meeting and file notes relating to or arising out of the letter dated July 06, 2001 sent by Mrs. Dina Wadia to the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India including notes of or documents relating to the discussion between the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India and the Hon’ble External Affairs Minister referred to in the letter no. 757/PSBPM/2001 dated July 13, 2001; (ii) copies of all documents, notes of meetings, file notings, including inter-ministerial notes, advice sought or given including all approvals, proposals, recommendations from the concerned ministers/ICCR including those to and from the Hon’ble Prime Minister; (iii) minutes of meetings with the Hon’ble Prime Minister and any other Ministers/Officials on the matter; and (iv) Opinions given by any authority or person, including legal advice.” 2. To this he received a response on 12-7-07 that the information from CPIO Shri A.K. Nag, JS, (Welfare & Information) was being collected and sought more 1 time.
    [Show full text]
  • India-Pakistan Conflicts – Brief Timeline
    India-Pakistan Conflicts – Brief timeline Added to the above list, are Siachin glacier dispute (1984 beginning – 2003 ceasefire agreement), 2016- 17 Uri, Pathankot terror attacks, Balakot surginal strikes by India Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 The war, also called the First Kashmir War, started in October 1947 when Pakistan feared that the Maharaja of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu would accede to India. Following partition, princely states were left to choose whether to join India or Pakistan or to remain independent. Jammu and Kashmir, the largest of the princely states, had a majority Muslim population and significant fraction of Hindu population, all ruled by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh. Tribal Islamic forces with support from the army of Pakistan attacked and occupied parts of the princely state forcing the Maharaja Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com to sign the Instrument of Accession of the princely state to the Dominion of India to receive Indian military aid. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on 22 April 1948. The fronts solidified gradually along what came to be known as the Line of Control. A formal cease-fire was declared at 23:59 on the night of 1 January 1949. India gained control of about two-thirds of the state (Kashmir valley, Jammu and Ladakh) whereas Pakistan gained roughly a third of Kashmir (Azad Kashmir, and Gilgit–Baltistan). The Pakistan controlled areas are collectively referred to as Pakistan administered Kashmir. Pragnya IAS Academy +91 9880487071 www.pragnyaias.com Delhi, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Tirupati & Pune +91 9880486671 www.upsccivilservices.com Indo-Pakistani War of 1965: This war started following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against rule by India.
    [Show full text]
  • Loya Jirgas and Political Crisis Management in Afghanistan: Drawing on the Bank of Tradition by Scott S
    SPECIAL REPORT NO. 457 | SEPTEMBER 2019 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org Loya Jirgas and Political Crisis Management in Afghanistan: Drawing on the Bank of Tradition By Scott S. Smith Contents The Modernity of a Tradition ......3 History and Paradoxes of Loya Jirgas ....................................4 Decisions and Modalities ........... 6 The Present Era of Consultative Loya Jirgas ........... 13 Conclusion and Recommendations ...................... 15 Delegates assemble at the Consultative Peace Loya Jirga in Kabul on April 29, 2019, to discuss an approach for achieving peace with the Taliban. (Photo by Omar Sobhani/Reuters) Summary • Loya jirgas, though rooted in tra- • The post-2001 political order is • Since 2010, three “traditional” ditional Afghan practices, are es- founded on two loya jirgas: the or “consultative” loya jirgas—so sentially modern political institu- 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga, called because of the inability to tions that are convened to address which legitimized the post–Bonn call together loya jirgas in accord- problems of great national impor- Agreement interim government; ance with the strict provisions set tance. Loya jirgas have almost al- and the 2004 Constitutional Loya out in the 2004 constitution—have ways endorsed the decisions of Jirga, which ratified Afghanistan’s been convened on an ad hoc ba- the national leader. current constitution. sis by Presidents Hamid Karzai and • Since 1915, no loya jirga has been • The 2004 constitution included Ashraf Ghani. convened under the same mo- specific provisions for convening • Should a loya jirga be required to dalities, yet they have in common future loya jirgas: the majority of resolve an electoral crisis or ratify their national composition, their delegates are to be selected from a new political order following a attempts to demonstrate broad in- among district councils.
    [Show full text]
  • Ifjf'k”V(Appendix)
    ifjf’k”V(Appendix) TERRORIST KILLED BY UNITED STATE OF AMERICA Killed in 2004: Nek Mohammed A senior Taliban commander in South Waziristan who had links to Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Date killed: June 18, 2004 Killed in 2005: Abu Hamza Rabia Al Qaeda's operational commander. He was involved with two assassination plots against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Date killed: December 1, 2005 Haitham al Yemeni A senior al Qaeda's explosives expert who also is thought to have been close to Osama bin Laden and Abu Faraj al Libi. Date killed: May 15, 2005 Killed in 2006: LiaquatHussain Second-in-command of the Bajaur TNSM. Date killed: October 30, 2006 Imam Asad Camp commander for the Black Guard, al Qaeda's elite bodyguard for Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. Asad was a Chechen with close links to ShamilBasayev. Date killed: March 1, 2006 Killed in 2007: No senior al Qaeda or Taliban leaders or operatives were reported killed during the strikes in 2007. 187 Killed in 2008: Abu Zubair al Masri Served as an explosives expert for al Qaeda as well as a leader. Date killed: November 21, 2008 Abdullah Azzam al Saudi Served as liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest. Azzam facilitated al Qaeda's external operations network. He also served as a recruiter and trainer for al Qaeda. Date killed: November 19, 2008 Abu Jihad al Masri The leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group and the chief of al Qaeda's intelligence branch, and directed al Qaeda's intelligence shura.
    [Show full text]