Digging Deeper in El Dorado
Neutralizing the gap between CSR and practice: gold mining TNCs in Colombia
Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance of Utrecht University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Global Criminology.
Bram Ebus, 3245063
Under supervision of Dr. Damián Zaitch.
July, 2014 1
Acknowledgements
After 9 impressive months in Colombia, I can only be grateful for the time that I have spent in a country which is now so special to me. If there is somebody who needs to be thanked for all their help, support, guidance, hospitality and kindness; it is the person who is anonymized in my whole thesis, my respondents, contacts and friends.
My thesis would not have been possible without all my contacts and respondents, whether they appear or not in my thesis, I am extremely grateful for the time, risks and efforts people have put into me by providing information (which was often with considerable risks), giving me accommodation by inviting me to their homes and introducing me to their families. People often offered me a lot of help and information, without wanting anything in return. The mainly very poor population of Colombia has been most welcoming and open to me, and shared some of their most intense stories. This was an enormous help in order to realize my research and it was a great motivation to see how people more than often showed an enormous dedication in order to help me dealing with whatsoever.
Thank you!
2 Abstract
Business and social issues cross each other while the concept of CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) becomes increasingly accepted. Exactly at this intersection, corporations implement CSR policies. In the meanwhile, there is an increase in the attention given to the crimes of the powerful in criminology. The main focus lies on crimes by states and corporations. This thesis focusses on the large-scale gold mining industry in Colombia and the CSR that is promoted by the three studied companies, with a special focus on the role the Colombian state has in the emergence of this sector in the country. The research aims to answer the following question: To what extent does the CSR discourse of gold mining TNCs in Colombia and the state-corporate intentions behind gold mining match the social practices of these corporations. In the case of a mismatch, what is the rationality behind this? The thesis suggests that CSR can be used, and in the encountered data concerning three companies is used, to neutralize an existing gap between CSR and practice. Exactly in this gap exists space to manoeuvre relatively unnoticed for the state-corporate actors, while inflicting harm and conducting illegal behaviour.
Keywords: ‘CSR’ ‘gold mining’ ‘Colombia’ ‘AngloGold Ashanti’ ‘Eco Oro’ ‘Gran Colombia Gold’ ‘state corporate crime’ ‘neutralization techniques’
3 Table of contents
Acknowledgement 2
Abstract 3
List of figures and boxes 5
Introduction 8
2. Theoretical framework 11
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 11
2.2 Neutralization techniques and denial 14
2.3 State-corporate crimes 15
2.4 Green criminology 16
2.5 Neutralizing state-corporate crimes through social practices 17
3. Methodology 18
3.1 Research design and motivation 18
3.1.1 Qualitative fieldwork 20
3.1.2 Use of secondary data 24
3.1.3 Validity and reliability 24
3.2 Ethical issues & security dilemma’s 25
4. Business as usual, a history of gold and conflict in Colombia 28
4.1 (Gold) mining in Colombia; a present-day historical perspective 29
4.2 Big capitals’ mercenaries, the Colombian paramilitary 33
4.2.1 The initial paramilitary 33
4.2.2 A slight switch in paramilitary motivation 34
4.2.3 How the paramilitary continued to benefit business
after their ‘demobilization’ 34
4.3 Colombia’s internal conflict; a comfortable situation for business? 35
4.3.1 Resources and conflict 35
4 4.3.2 How the armed conflict serves the ‘macro-criminal 37
4.3.3 Modus operandi 38
5. Gold mining and foreign capital, a paradise of development promises 40
5.1 Colombia’s mining locomotive 42
5.2 The gold bonanza? Colombia’s progress after the new Mining Code 40
5.3 An uncontrollable public utility 45
5.4 Moving for minerals 46
5.5 Final remarks 51
6. FRIENDS AND FACILITATORS 52
6.1 The Canadian ‘engine-man’ starting up the motor 53
6.2 The IFC’s appetite for gold 55
6.3 ‘Multi-stakeholderism’ 56
6.3.1 The Comité Minero-Energético 56
6.3.2 The involvement of civil society 58
6.3.3 The Dutch Embassy 60
6.4 Human rights and the national army 60
6.4.1 AGA’s questionable reputation 60
6.4.2 AGA in Sur de Bolívar 62
6.5 Defensoría 66
6.6 Conclusion 69
7. Trapped in development promises 70
7.1 AngloGold Ashanti 71
7.1.1 Disseminating Information 71
7.1.2 The entrance of AGA 73
7.1.3 Public image 75
7.1.4 The social license 77
7.1.5 Development through labour opportunities 79
5 7.1.6 Work Experiences with AGA 80
7.1.6 What else went wrong? 83
7.1.7 Final remarks on AGA 84
7.2 Gran Colombia Gold 86
7.2.1 Segovia’s history of violence 67
7.2.2 Labour opportunities? 89
7.2.3 How GCG conquered Segovia 91
7.2.4 Manifestations in Marmato 93
7.2.5 The ‘Golden Opportunity’ of GCG 93
7.2.6 The social plan to displace Marmato 95
7.2.7 Final remarks on GCG 97
7.3 Eco Oro 99
7.3.1 Ecological Gold or just a Colombian Company? 99
7.3.2 Greystar’s part in the conflict 100
7.3.3 The environmental discussion 101
7.3.4 Development by Eco Oro 104
7.3.5 The future of Angostura 106
7.4 Conclusion on the development promises 108
8. Conclusion 109
Literature 112
Annex I 124
Annex II 125
Annex III 127
Annex IV 130
6 List of figures and boxes
List of figures
Figure 1 Map of Colombia 10
Figure 2 Annual Colombian Gold Production 30
Figure 3 Mining titles granted 42
Figure 4 Projects AGA 71
Figure 5 Outreach of AGA in Tolima 75
Figure 6 Projects GCG 86
Figure 7 Mining Titles and Solicitations in Colombia 92
Figure 8 GCG’s Oversight of Marmato 94
Figure 9 Project Angostura of Eco Oro
List of boxes
Box 1 Bogota 21
Box 2 Marmato – Caldas 27
Box 3 Coca Cola & Drummond 36
Box 4 Macizo Colombiano 49
Box 5 AGA in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 61
Box 6 Working the gold veins of Sur de Bolívar 65
Box 7 La Toma - Cauca 67
Box 8 The Frontino representative 88
7
1. Introduction
“The communities and societies in which we operate will be better off for AngloGold Ashanti having been there” (AngloGold Ashanti, 2012).
“Before we heard of multinational companies everything was peaceful, people were working quietly there was no problem. As soon as we heard from these corporations, the army appeared. With the corporations a new situation began” (Interview Community Representative Sur de Bolívar, 18-9-2013).
Colombia, born and grown in conflict, recently opened its doors for a new gold rush. The large-scale gold mining industry has an international track record of environmental abuses and human rights violations, but the Colombian government has made up its mind. The mining and energy sector was promoted to one of the five ‘locomotives’ of national development and both politics and the corporate sector promote good future practices of the industry.
Development and trade are becoming more connected in government discourses on a global level. An international trend which is not uncommon to Colombia. In spite of the 50-year internal conflict, the abundance of natural resources motivates foreign capital to invest in the country. The opportunities for gold mining seem not to be without risks in the country of the legend of El Dorado1. Colombia contains various fragile and highly important ecosystems, for example where the Andes mountain range and the Amazon rainforest embrace each other. The vast rural areas of Colombia still have a high presence of illegal armed groups.
In present-day criminology there is an increase of attention given to ‘crimes of the powerful’. Within the more critical ways of thinking in criminology, the focus has been narrowed down to companies and politics. Corporate crimes and state crimes overlap in the concept of state-corporate crimes. Kramer and Michalowski (2000) elaborated on the terminology and argue that: “great powers and great crimes are inseparable. When economic and political powers pursue common interests, the potential for harm is magnified further” (Kramer & Michalowski, 2000: 1).
1 The legend about ‘a mythical place full of gold’ has lured adventurers already for centuries to Latin America in their quest for gold. El Dorado-‘the golden one’, is now mostly accepted as the legend of tribal chiefs of the Muisca native people. Who as a ritual covered themselves in gold dust and let a raft full with gold and gemstones sink in the lake of Guatavita-which is located close to Bogota. El Dorado often stands synonym for ‘conquest-like’ desires to find gold.
8 The state-corporate tandem behind gold mining in Colombia developed a social image for the sector, underlining the concept of CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to counter possible (current and future) harms. The argument is that the large-scale industry will mine in a responsible manner. It seems that the industry wants to make a new start in Colombia, but the CSR concept received criticism. Dashwood argues for example that the mining industry possibly implements CSR by a profit-based calculation and as a strategic response to the bad reputation of the industry (Dashwood, 2012).
Responsible mining rather seems a challenge in the context of Colombia. To examine this challenge the following research question was developed:
To what extent does the CSR discourse of gold mining TNCs2 in Colombia and the state corporate development strategy behind gold mining match the social practices of these corporations. In the case of a mismatch, what is the rationality behind this?
The relevance of the research has various aspects. While politics and economics are often two different fields of attention, both are incorporated due to their mutual dependency and functioning. The focus on the state-corporate harm aspect deserves more attention in criminology. The traditional scope especially looked at violations of criminal law, which excluded the state-corporate angle to a great extent. Mainstream criminology as well puts a focus on what happens in the Western hemisphere. The companies in my research are owned by ‘Western’ capital but manifest themselves in Colombia. Those global North to global South transnational impact relations deserve more attention. The same goes for the concept of CSR in criminology, which so far, has been a barely touched topic.
In order to answer my research question, the following chapters have been developed. Chapter two explains the theoretical concepts which have been used in the thesis. The methodology on how the research was conducted is presented in chapter three. The more conceptual chapter four elaborates on the history of gold and the Colombian context of business and conflict. Chapter five will guide you through the state-corporate vision on mining as a development tool in Colombia, while touching upon various perceptions of this strategy. Chapter six will analyze the stakeholders who facilitate and function to be of a beneficial character for mining business, operating according to not so different agendas. Chapter seven will dive into the reality of the mining ‘locomotive’ and compare the promoted CSR with practices. The final chapter will conclude and summarize my findings accompanied by a forward looking statement
2 Transnational corporations
9 Figure 1: Map of Colombia
Source: MapasDoMundo (2014)
10
2. Theoretical framework
The research is based on several multidisciplinary theories; they converge to answer the following research question:
To what extent does the CSR discourse of gold mining TNCs in Colombia and the state-corporate intentions behind gold mining match the social practices of these corporations. In the case of a mismatch, what is the rationality behind this?
The theoretical centre of gravity is to use a criminological framework, in order to analyse a business concept. In this chapter I will present the theories and concepts which will be used in relation to the gathered information from my research. Most important are green criminology, state-corporate crimes, neutralization techniques and denial, which all fall under the umbrella of criminology. The combination which is made with CSR, seems far from strange when looking at the increased attention given to corporate crimes, while CSR starts to become a standard concept in the behaviour of large corporations.
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility
The terminology of Corporate Social Responsibility finds its origin in 1953, with the publication Social Responsibility of Businessmen by Bowen (1953), a piece written about societal expectations of business. CSR can be perceived as a corporate form of self-regulation within the discourse of good social behaviour linked to legal frameworks, ethics and international norms.
The classical theories on CSR (Bowen, 1953) define that this is a concept of business obligations to society, beyond owners or shareholders. According to Gatto (2002) this is a response to neoclassical economic views, where primarily the owners make decisions based on profits, share and values. The famous free market thinker Milton Friedman once said that “the one and only social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” (New York Times, 1970). A more modern perspective on the private sector is to broaden the relationship to the stakeholders who are affected by the conduct of business. While the idea came into being during the 1950s and 1960s, there was a more paternalistic discourse through charity and stewardship. Implying a generous attitude towards the more unfortunate and building trust (Gatto, 2002).
11 A more recent trend in the human rights debate concerns the increased recognition of the interwovenness between business and human rights issues. Not only do NGOs refer to the negative impact of global business (mis-)conducts, but it also appears on the agendas of policymakers and business leaders. This change increasingly encourages transnational companies (TNCs) to implement human rights policies (Gatto, 2002). The debates on CSR take place on the intersection of economic and commercial policies on the one hand, and development and human rights policies on the other hand.
CSR is an upcoming discourse in the mining industry. It is interesting to see that only half a dozen companies worldwide reported on CSR policies in the early 1990s, and in the mid-1990s, the majority of the global mining sector still had not implemented serious environmental and social discourses in their operations (Dashwood, 2012). In fact, in the early 1990s, fewer than half a dozen mining companies around the world were reporting on their CSR policies (Walde, 1992; Warhurst, 1992 in Dashwood, 2012: 11). However, the sector underwent a rapid change when in mids-2000s most companies (with headquarters in advanced industrialized economies) adapted CSR policies in their business operations (Dashwood, 2012: 12).
The increased implementation of CSR policies in the mining industry has a relation to strong international criticism against the sector (Dashwood, 2012). It has to be noted that CSR remains voluntary, mainly pushed by social and regulatory pressures, while governments may react when social policies are not implemented. The so-called ‘voluntary’ implementation of CSR therefore leads to better government and social acceptance, which companies can turn into (more) benefitting business. As Gatto explains:
“This attitude of enlightened self-interest may require a company to endorse a long run view of profits. This means that while a company may incur, in the short run, an increase of costs and a reduction of profits due to its responsible behaviour, in the long run these added costs will be recovered and the profits of the company will continue to grow, thanks to its improved public image and increased public confidence gained by its socially responsible acts” (Gatto, 2002: 17).
The CSR-profit motivation, is a mechanism of rational choice. If looking towards CSR policies as a profit- based mechanism; the use of CSR is a response to the bad reputation of the industry and a strategic calculation, according to Dashwood (2012: 39). When aiming to maximize profits with CSR implementations, the most likely goal is to please legislators, shareholders and (international) media. If this is the case, it is up for debate if the most important stakeholders concerning the impact of their projects are interesting when rationalising choices from a corporate perspective, profitwise. The groups that really will feel the impact of mining operations, as for example the local communities, are groups of focus which not necessarily have a big influence on profits.
There are different views on how companies calculate their behaviour and impact. The company as an ‘amoral calculator’, would do everything to secure its profits on the long run. Robert Kagan and Jhon Sholz give an alternative explanation on regulatory violations of corporations than the amoral calculator; they see the political citizen as organizationally incompetent (1984: 67-8). This corporation differs from the ones deliberately violating regulations as amoral calculators, but moreover causes violations due to incompetence. The company as an amoral calculator, bases its ‘amoral’ behaviour on
12 rational choices. This concept shares the idea of the rational choice theory on crime, which argues that crime basically is a rational choice after analysing ‘costs and benefits’: “The rational calculus of the pain legal punishment offsets the motivation for the crime” (Akers, 1990: 654).
The two possible violators demand different regulatory responses. Frank Pearce and Steve Tombs 1990) are, in their paper Ideology, hegemony, and empiricism, rather convinced of the possibility that companies act as ‘amoral calculators’ and could and should be policed and objectively audited. They give the sentiment that especially the high-capital companies can find their way around the law. It is argued that “even if a corporation wished to act with a primary commitment to social responsibility, this would entail ignoring the very rationale of the corporation and the nature of the existing economic system” (Pearce & Tombs 1990: 425). To nuance their argument, they acknowledge that not all regulations are ignored by companies and that when a company acts incompetent or as political citizen, this is still perfectly compatible with the concept of amoral calculators.
The ‘amoral calculator’ will be an important concept in this thesis, moreover when mining companies do not match their own CSR policies in reality. In the words of Dashwood: “many mining companies have reached a stage of CSR norms socialization where the validity of norms is no longer controversial, but where actual behavior is still inconsistent with CSR norms (prescriptive status)” (2012: 67). Therefore it is argued that CSR cannot be regarded as a generous form of well-doing, but can be considered a capitalist tool to increase profits (Gatto, 2002; Fooks et al., 2013; Banerjee, 2008).
The discrepancy between corporate discussions on social and environmental issues and civil society can be bridged by using CSR as a tool for stakeholder discussions. Stakeholder discussions are however no guarantee for good behaviour. In business environments, where benefits from human rights violations are apparent, they should at least be addressed by moral corporate duties in order to take reasonable steps to stop those (Gatto, 2002). Still, ‘morally’ responsible corporations can passively benefit from human rights violations. There is a shift taking place in the expansion of CSR, from the violations approach to a broader responsibility approach. This means that corporations not only should refrain from ‘harm’ or from human rights violations, they also should engage in the promotion, protection and fulfilment of human rights (Gatto, 2002). These obligations should be based on moral and ethical stance towards society, even though they still fit in the voluntary approach.
To go even further, CSR is communicated by businesses to shareholders and the international community. The question is: who controls the business practices in reality? Could CSR be a cover up tool? It is therefore important to examine if CSR strategies, especially in conflict zones, target the problems at stake instead of focussing on social practices on a complete other level. This is considered an invalid strategy according to the internationally- accepted UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) which comment that “a failure to respect human rights in one area cannot be cancelled out by a benefit provided in another” (UNOHCHR, 2012).
13 2.2 Neutralization techniques and denial
The concepts of neutralization techniques by Sykes and Matza (1957) and denial by Cohen (1993) have been combined and form an important part of the theory used in my thesis.
The South African criminologist Stanley Cohen elaborates in his book States of Denial (1993) on the wide variety in the use of denial, from genocides to petty thievery. The standard vocabulary of denial of misconducts consist ‘it does not happen here’, ‘if it does it is something else’ and ‘even if it is what you say it is, it is justified’ (Cohen, 1993). Denial could be a rational choice in order to cope with certain misconducts or when just carefully planning your actions. In relation to state-corporate motives, the statement “human rights are good for business” (Avery, 2000), suggests that every strategy to neutralize or deny human rights violations by corporate actors, can imply commercial interests or a shared unconscious sentiment of guilt.
When businesses fail to address human rights violations for which they claim to have no responsibility, they could adept neutralization strategies which are identified by Sykes and Matza (1957). Those are: denial of injury, denial of responsibility, denial of the victim, condemnation of the condemners, the inability to conceive of effective intervention and appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Sykes and Matza (1957) tend to look to the direct responsibility of actions with their concept, techniques of neutralization. In their theory they identify the neutralization techniques of delinquents who justify their illegitimate actions. Cohen in his turn, explains that “neutralization comes into play when you acknowledge or admit that something happened – but either refuse to accept the category of acts to which it is assigned (‘crime’ or ‘massacre’) or present it as morally justified” (Cohen, 1993).
Different to this thesis, the turning of ‘a blind eye’ through neutralization techniques is merely a concept that focuses on the individual OR the state perpetrator. In my argumentation, there should be a growing focus on techniques implied by state-corporate actors and collaborations between them. Therefore, I want to see if it is possible to identify any misconducts along the gold mining cases which have been studied in Colombia and analyse how the ones responsible in the state-corporate discourse try to manage these misconducts and their possible related responsibility.
Taking a critical stance towards CSR, it can be related to neutralization techniques and be analysed through the theory of Sykes and Matza (1957). Various neutralization techniques identified by the duo could be applicable on state-corporate actors. A study on the tobacco industry (Fooks et al., 2013), for example concluded that CSR is used as a neutralization technique to gain political influence, deny certain aspects of harm, and to manage control over the stakeholders which are active around their business conducts. The concept of neutralization techniques, will be used in this study to look at the CSR implementation by the gold mining industry in Colombia, for the better or worse.
14 2.3 State-corporate crimes
Kramer and Michalowski (1990) combined Chambliss his concept of state-organized crime (1989) with Sutherland’s white-collar crimes (1940, 1949). This resulted in a framework that incorporates both concepts into state-corporate crimes, an important concept in this research. The ‘mining-energy locomotive’ is a political-economic strategy pushed by a state-corporate collaboration in Colombia. The Colombian government, which is ridden by corruption, and the gold-mining industry which is causing socio-environmental conflicts on a global level, seem a powerful cocktail for problems. Especially because the small-scale gold sector in Colombia is already highly related to the groups that are active in the internal conflict, and the large-scale coal mining sector, for example, causes displacement and conflict around their already operating projects (Ramirez Cuellar, 2005).
Kramer and Michalowski (1990) offer the following definition of this concept:
“State-corporate crimes are illegal or socially injurious actions that occur when one or more institutions of political governance pursue a goal in direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic production and distribution” (Kramer and Michalowski, 1990: 3).
When analysing misconducts on the intersection of business and political institutes, a distinction has to be made between state-initiated and state-facilitated forms of organizational deviance (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006). However, we have to keep in mind that in the end, state-corporate dependencies work both ways. The development and functioning of modern-day corporations is non-independent from legal, economic and political infrastructures provided by governments (Sklar, 1988 in Kramer & Michalowski, 2006). Moreover, governments in private production systems, need the economic ‘stability’ provided by private corporations and private financial institutions when applying systems of private-production. The legitimacy of the state basically runs on the supply of goods and services needed for government proceedings, highly depending on tax revenues (Offe and Ronge 1982 in Kramer and Michalowski, 2006). This argumentation of state-legitimacy makes money an import factor in rationalizing choices and actions with a possible harmful outcome.
Corporate crimes can be explained through profit maximization and private accumulation, often associated with capitalism (Young 1981: 333). Legal and moral obstacles are often demanding higher costs, more difficult solutions or simply block the shared corporate-business interests. According to C. Wright Mills (1956 in Kramer & Michalowski, 2006) major economic and political decision makers stem from the same groups of powerful social actors that pursue the same desires of social order. Political elites rarely act without the support of certain economic elites. Legislation is often formed by political elites who regularly seem to work within corporate agenda’s. In Colombia, revolving doors in-between extractive industries and politics have been identified (Guitérrez Gómez, 2013).
Frank Pearce’s (1976) proposition on corporate-crimes concerns a Marxist analysis. Firstly, the collaboration is a rational extension of profit seeking behaviour, meant to be hidden from society. Secondly, it is an activity undertaken with relations to state and organized crime. Corporations which are looking to create a context for capital accumulation need to implement their model on certain groups and with the help of a state on the society in general. Social factors favourable to their model need to be organized and the unfavourable factors need to be disorganised. Their fidelity to democracy is dependent on profit based rationalities.
15 In general, corporate crimes are merely under addressed and should deserve special attention in its broadest sense. Various impacts need to be studied because the impact of corporate crimes is not unilateral, “corporate greed tends to trump health, environmental, and safety concerns in many cases of state-corporate crime” (Kauzlarich and Matthews, in Kramer and Michalowski, 241: 2006). According to Sutherland, victims can be chosen in a very considered manner:
“... the corporation selects crimes which involve the smallest danger of detection and identification and against which victims are least likely to fight...The corporations attempt to prevent the implementation of the law and to create general goodwill ...” (Sutherland 1983: 236-8).
Sutherland addresses victims who are considered not likely to be able to fight against state-corporate powers. This also is the case for victims that are considered non-human, which brings us to crimes against the environment. It is therefore necessary to broaden the scope of state-corporate crimes and to enter the field of green criminology.
2.4 Green criminology
The concepts of the field of green criminology will be used in line with state-corporate crimes. When addressing state-corporate crimes through the glasses of the fairly new field of green criminology, negative impacts are often described as ‘harms’. Victims should not necessarily face unlawful behaviour to be inflicted with harm. “Environmental victim implies that someone or something is being harmed through the conscious or neglectful actions of another (White, 2011: 105). This includes both humans and non-human victims. The eco-global criminology addresses the expanding ideas on environmental harm and environmental justice at a macro level. According to the criminologist Rob White: “international systems of production, distribution and consumption generate, reinforce, and reward diverse environmental harms” (2009: 230). This is a process which is hard to turn, but should receive an increasing amount of attention. Attention which should be focused on a trans-boundary level to address globalizing forces at stake. This applies for example, the North-South capital flows and the structural depletion of the resources from the global South. Especially the gold mining industry can be seen as an international player, while most of the companies stem from the global ‘West’ their projects are located elsewhere. The mayor part of the worldwide rising demand for gold, does not have its origin in Latin America, Colombia exports 99% of its currently mined gold (GFMS, 2012).
If the mining industry causes a high social impact, seemingly irreparable environmental problems, rising economical inequalities and grave human right violations; can we speak about harm? Is this harm by negligence? Environmental victims are according to Williams “those of past, present, of future generations who are injured as a consequence of change to the chemical, physical, microbiological, or psychosocial environment, brought about by deliberate or reckless, individual or collective, human act or act of omission” (Williams, 1996: 21). The so called ‘perpetrator’ whose acts or non-acts lead to the (negative) change of the environment, leads to the victim (2011, White: 105). Often, harm is not purposefully directed towards the victim but is a by-product of events (Williams, 1996: 313). Still, the
16 gold mining sector is a high risk industry for the environment, being one of the most water intensive variants of mining and due to the use of highly toxic substances (Ebus, 2012).
According to Chambliss: “Environmental victims are often, in effect, sacrificed for the benefit of a more powerful entity” (1996: 314). The paradox is that granting concessions, lowering export-taxes to an almost minimum, are not perceived as robbery due to a created legal framework around it. Making the resources of the state a source of income for political and corporate leaders, which makes it a neo- patrimonial system (Green & Ward, 2004: 22). The Colombian subsoil, which is owned by the state therefore proves an interesting case when analysing the ‘who will benefit’ from these resources, probing the system of neo-patrimoniality and analysing harm to the human and the non-human.
2.5 Neutralizing state-corporate crimes through social practices
The theories mentioned above will be the building blocks of my thesis. The main focus will lie on the generated and future impacts of the three companies which have been studied: AngloGold Ashanti (AGA), Gran Colombia Gold (GCG) and Eco Oro. The state-corporate tandem will mainly be analysed by looking into the legal framework and underlying motivations, in order to see if the communicated argumentation for the ‘mining locomotive’ can be matched by the practices in the field. The concept state-corporate crimes will be very useful to make comparisons of development vs. state-corporate intentions. The generated impact will offer a realistic view on the practical implementation of the projects and the consequences for the mainly rural areas of corporate interest. In this aspect, there will be plenty of relevance for the field of green criminology, due to the fragile ecosystems present in Colombia, the extensive agricultural sector and the high-environmental risk of gold mining.
The first more contextual chapters on history, conflict and the legislative part will give a broader connotation of the transnational and national interests and their manoeuvres. Because of the lack of large-scale gold projects in the recent history, most existing data on the extractive industry in Colombia stems from a gathering of various minerals and hydrocarbons. The chapters which are based on case information and the raw data that has been collected in the field, will clarify more on the direct impact of the state-corporate tandem, and how the affected population perceives the social strategy of the studied gold mining companies from the perspective of their experiences. In this part especially, the concepts of denial and neutralization techniques will be the framework to compare those results with the corporate interviews and the information, communicated by the state and corporate promotion machines. This all falls within the light of CSR and the discrepancy between reality and what is argued on paper.
17
3. Methodology
This chapter will elaborate on the applied methodology in the research. The choice for this particular research is motivated and a section is dedicated to encountered problems and ethical issues.
3.1 Research design and motivation
Before I was sure that I was going to Colombia and especially what I was going to research, I knew that I wanted to investigate the mining industry. In the previous years I have been studying the sector, be it for civil society, personal reasons or in previous education. The option to go to Colombia was presented when I could participate in the research project LAR which is a part of the CoCooN Programme (Conflict and Cooperation over Natural Resources in Developing Countries). The LAR project is coordinated by the Utrecht University and funded by the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
The foreknowledge I had on large-scale mining and especially gold mining, made me doubt to go to Colombia. Colombia has and has not been an obvious choice. The century long history of gold mining and the traditional presence of the small-scale and artisanal sector do make the country rather interesting from an historical perspective. But it seemed more difficult to focus on TNCs because large- scale gold mining still does not have a significant presence in the country. This means that while numerous plans already do exist, most of the physical mines still need to be developed. The artisanal and small-scale sector did not have my special interest because I did not want to emphasize their controversies. This part of the gold mining discourse already gathers enough attention, while the Colombian state and multinational corporations have an excessive focus on their problems.
The large-scale gold sector in Colombia as a topic got me preoccupied when my research was still in a preliminary stage. I was afraid to find insufficient data in the current early-stage of the sector in Colombia. Especially this concern pushed me to think in another direction. The global gold mining sector has been broadly studied in most countries where the industry is present. Most studies concern the environmental impacts and social conflicts of already existing large-scale mines. I was well aware of the implementation of CSR in the gold-mining industry and I knew this was a topic that deserved more attention. Colombia is furthermore an extremely interesting case to see how the stigmatized sector and certain companies try to make a ‘fresh’ start while the country is tainted by conflict. It seemed a good context to look into CSR. This is why I chose to use a fairly new angle in the study of the gold mining sector, especially through the glasses of criminology. This did not mean I was drawing
18 my attention away from the (future and current) environmental and social issues; those issues remain of utmost importance analysing the use of CSR.
The following research question will be answered in this study:
To what extent does the CSR discourse of gold mining TNCs in Colombia and the state-corporate development strategy behind gold mining match the social practices of these corporations. In the case of a mismatch, what is the rationality behind this?
In the process of framing my research design and choosing the cases I wanted to study, flexibility has been very important. From previous experiences with Latin America and fieldwork, I knew that a significant part of my research would be depending on the contacts and initial information I would gather when in Colombia. The topic asked for a focus on more than one company in order to identify similarities and differences in practices and the implementation of CSR. This is why I chose three companies3 and undertook a multi-sited fieldwork (Decorte&Zaitch, 2010).
The choice for AGA was not so difficult; the world’s third largest gold-mining company’s presence in Colombia has drawn a lot of national and international media attention. The company still did not mine a single gram of gold, but I identified the magnitude of their plans in Colombia and knew that this company with an international track record would make an interesting case. The second company I chose was the Canadian GCG. GCG is the only company I studied which was already mining for gold in Colombia. The already existing issues I encountered by doing a background research on their operations guaranteed my attention. Choosing the third company was a more difficult consideration. The case about Eco Oro (formerly Greystar) gained a lot of media attention, but I was not sure if the project would continue or already was blocked in an early stage. The same situation had arisen with a junior company called Muriel Mining, which had connections to the international mining giant Rio Tinto. The case of Muriel Mining triggered a lot of civil unrest in an area where indigenous communities reside. The idea was to start with the cases of AGA and GCG, and to choose a third case while gathering more information in Colombia. Only after a while it became clear that Rio Tinto withdrew its interest from the projects of Muriel Mining, which were compromised. The projects of Muriel Mining therewith ceased to exist. Eco Oro still wants to develop their Angostura project and the recent movements of all stakeholders around this case made it an easy choice.
In order to analyse how much the CSR the three companies claim to apply in Colombia is worth in reality, qualitative research methods have been used to identify the current and future harms, impacts and risks. By touching these consequences of the industry, I do not mean to only focus on the negative impacts of the large-scale gold mining sector in Colombia. The study was meant as well to look to the positive implications of CSR. The CSR strategies of the three corporations are mostly based on the same ideas and principles, but there is a clear difference in how the corporations want to distinguish themselves strategically. But in order to make a comparison between CSR and the real implications of the projects, it was clear that fieldwork and qualitative research methods were the most adequate in order to gather the mayor part of my data. The following section will elaborate on the methods I applied in during the research.
3 A short oversight of the companies is presented in Annex III
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3.1.1 Qualitative fieldwork
The use of primary data through qualitative research was the main method to gather information. The mining sector, worldwide as well in Colombia, is in general widely analysed. Although, I found that there was a lack in (thorough) understanding of the chosen cases. By applying qualitative methods I tried provide new insights which are often overlooked by the use of quantitative data (Beyens & Tournel, 2010). There exists a gap in the attention given on the social acceptance or non- acceptance for large-scale gold mining and the often sensitive local perceptions of what really happens when a gold mining company shows its interest and starts developing projects. I needed a local insider’s view and therefore I needed to visit the (by the companies) targeted areas, in order to understand the so called emic perspective (Decorte & Zaitch, 2010). The purpose of the study also was to ‘check’ certain aspects of the CSR policies of the companies, who often use numbers and figures to elaborate on their (possible) impact. What I needed, was a more thorough understanding of their practices. Numbers may be the subject of manipulation and are produced by companies themselves, who function by a corporate agenda (Andreas & Greenhill, 2010).
The research’s most interviewed respondents are the ones who will face the direct impact of the mining industry. Respondents from political and corporate stakeholders have been chosen as well, but to a lesser extent. In order to identify the relevant case-locations for my research, I have been visiting many civil society organizations working around mining (see: Annex II). In the interviews with represents of civil society (which mainly were undertaken in the capital Bogota), I gathered contact details of relevant actors in communities targeted for mining. The method I used in order to get access to most of my respondents was snowballing; recruiting new informants among existing contats (sampling) (Boeije, 2005: 271). Furthermore, some actors have been contacted after reading about them or their occupations during background research, or meetings and conferences in Colombia related to my research topic.
During my fieldwork, I have been visiting numerous communities that have been targeted by the three selected corporations. Most valuable information proved to come from local community leaders, small-scale and artisanal miners, local union representatives, peasant leaders and victims whose lives were implicated in various ways by the mining industries’ interests. By applying the snowball method, I was surprised about the variety of contacts. Civil society not only connected me with other civil actors, but as well advised me to talk with certain state, legal of union actors. As well corporate respondents advised me to talk with certain groups of civil society. Of course, in retrospective you understand why ‘certain’ contacts were given, while certain other possible contacts were ignored. But the large network I was able to develop let me identify similar actors who received various references and I ended up satisfied with the diversified respondents with whom I have spoken.
The qualitative angle I chose for my research made in-depth semi-structured interviews the primary method to conduct interviews. Respondents were chosen from all stakeholders in the mining panorama4. The local insiders who are mentioned in the previous paragraph have been interviewed, and I furthermore spoke with human rights lawyers, representatives of different state institutions, representatives from all three studied companies, ex-employees of the mining business, national and
4 For a list of all respondents, see Annex II
20 international NGOs, union representatives, other investigators, etc. In retrospect, most information came from a local level. In addition to the semi-structured interviews, a fair share of information came from informal conversations and meetings (see: Annex II).
In the end, each company was given a different amount of attention. Because the three companies had their differences in magnitude, I can say that most interviews concerned AGA, who has been granted with and solicited mining titles in 20 of the 32 Colombian departments. Subsequently, most interviews have been taken around the cases of GCG, while Eco Oro needed less attention in order to gather sufficient information.
During my research, Bogota has been my base. This was the city where I mostly resided between my field visits. One month I stayed in Medellín, in order to investigate the nearby Marmato case. The so called ‘expert interviews’ mostly took place in Bogota. They gave me an overview and good insights and ideas for particular focuses. Because I regularly returned to Bogota, those respondents were also very useful to ask for feedback and to check certain angles (Baarda, de Goede, Meer-Middelburg, 2007: 19). During my research I felt no geographical restraints. Being well aware of the security situation, I felt that with the help and information of my trusted contacts and respondents I have been able to reach every location, setting and person I wanted to visit.
Box 1: Bogota
The vibrant city of Bogota immediately offered various research opportunities as businesses, NGO’s, politics and academics seem to collide or either clash in the capital. Arriving in April 2013, I immediately became aware of the high amount of social movements. Numerous protests and marches concerning inequality, the conflict, union questions and civil solidarity were taking place in the Bogota’s big squares and boulevards. Seemingly, many rural issues found their way to the capital and gave first insights in the urban mobilizing capacity, but as well a bitter understanding of the state’s unwillingness to listen to their own population. Teargas seemed often the most appropriate answer coming from the state…
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The down and upside of la Candelaría, the historical center where I resided, is that it gives an excellent introduction in Colombia’s inequality. Wealthy government palaces, enormous museums and nightly eclectic salsa beats overshadow the numerous homeless, junks, criminals and so called ‘recyclists’. Many of the around 5 million internally displaced find an open-air home and shelter in the Bogotan urban jungle. A city which still is characterized by the United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security with a high risk concerning terrorism, residential crime, non-residential crime and political violence (OSAC, 2013). The urban dwellers try to make a living recycling waste, begging, dealing or selling whatever there is to sell from nail clippers to low-grade cocaine. In the daytime, the neighborhood is vibrant with street artists, public speakers, groups of young students and daily office commuters. But the presence of people changes after sunset.
Even after residing some time in the city, it remained hard to shake off the feeling of the dodginess of surroundings. The movements of late arriving fast walking students and office costumes differ from the bended, slow and unpredictable moving street survivors and not more than often led to zombie-like confrontations. The encountered poverty contrasts with the richer Northern neighborhoods where blinded SUVs dominate parking spots in front of restaurants, serving food often overpricing European capitals. Mega-shopping malls, palace-like Embassy residences and gastronomy restaurants where valet parkers park the sport cars of glamorously dressed couples, don’t add up to the previously named experiences.
Bogota may be the capital of Colombia’s democracy and certainly gave an impressive first glance of Colombia. The real information about the state-corporate extractive strategy as well as the battleground of the Colombian conflict, are the rural resource rich areas.
The interviews have been conducted with the help of topic lists. Most actors and stakeholders were identified beforehand; this is why I made various topic lists applicable to each type of respondent. Individual background checks were made before conducting the interviews, when it was possible to do so. Changes with case and person related information were made to the topic lists. The open character I allowed in my interviews, gave me the flexibility to change the order of topics and to add or delete some points of attention. In all interviews I have started by giving an introduction of my person and study in Colombia. If the situation allowed doing so, I used some time for chit-chat or a more informal Q&A, seemingly making most informants feel more at ease with further questions.
All 34 cited interviews have been recorded, all with the consent of my respondents. The interviews took in general between 60 and 90 minutes. To process all this information, I made summaries of the interviews, covering the most important parts. The most telling and strongest parts of the interviews have been transcribed in order to use as quotations in my thesis.
22 Besides the interviews and meeting with persons referred to in the text, I have based my argumentation on many exploratory meetings and conversations and interviews which do not need a reference.
This information came from interviews with civil society: two representatives from Agua Viva Censat (Friend of the Earth Colombia), a representative of OCMAL (Mining Conflict Observatory Latin America), a representative of Broederlijk Delen, various meetings with Red Hermandad, a representative of the Colombia Solidarity Campaign, a representative of the Peace Brigades Colombia, and non-cited representatives of CIMA and CRIC. Various meetings were held with members of environmental committees in Ibagué and Bogota. Furthermore I had informal conversations with an employee of the communication department of Eco Oro and a low-level employee of GCG. Various independent researchers and journalist who cover parts of the mining debate have been spoken to. All those informants were of essential importance in either the constructing of a network, planning fieldtrips and to gather (general) data. Those informants are not explicitly cited in my thesis but I need to stress that their information or influence on my thesis is invisibly present. Most of those ‘conversations’ were prepared and undertaken with the help of topic lists.
More information came from informal meetings with small-scale miners in the departments César Sur de Bolívar, Caldas and Cauca. Community members of Piedras, Cajamarca, Anaime and Doima in Tolima and La Sierra, La Vega and Sucre in Cauca.
The second most important qualitative research method was participant observation. This method really helped me in understanding the emic perspective. Chosen moments for (participant) observation, were moments when I felt comfortable with the security situation, when I was with people I trusted and where my time-frame allowed doing so. This happened for example when I was able to walk with various protest marches. In Sur de Bolívar, I have been able to accompany small-scale miners in their daily activities.
A great amount of understanding was gathered by daily situations and getting closer to situations of extreme poverty. Entering, for example, the deep and oxygen-poor tunnels in which small-scale miners worked and by taking the time to listen to their life histories, which were often histories of displacement and conflict, was key for my motivation and the gathering of knowledge. When visiting various congresses and meetings from civil society, I was able to see a lot of differences and conflicts of interest within the civil panorama. Rural communities I have visited in for example Tolima and Cauca, gave me insights in the fragility of existence of the Colombian farmers. Most of the observations did not even reach my thesis, but I can assure that it was essential for my understanding and in the development of most parts of my research. The boxes I made in the thesis, are mostly examples of observations or cases to explain certain circumstances. Some of the boxes are in function of an argument (being extra information or an anecdote) and some boxes are just to give an idea about a certain something. All the photos on the first page of a new chapter (and the cover page), are taken by me in the realm of my research, but mainly function to serve the lay-out.
It was important to spend time with the local communities and to show that I was really interested to understand their personal stories. After for example spending a few days (and nights) on the street with the people who blocked the roads just under the village Marmato in the department Caldas, after being with the small-scale miners while they chopped down trees and burned tires while facing conflict with the special police forces, I gained their trust and willingness to speak with me. What I learned is
23 that Colombians can be very restrained concerning sensitive topics as mining; therefore it was necessary to take time in order to build trustful relations. Participant observation has herewith been of great value in understanding the community side of the story. This does not mean that waiting in the reception of the AGA offices was not interesting…
3.1.2 Use of secondary data
To increase the validity of my data, I have used secondary data sources. Either to support my prime sources or to get additional information. Due to the closed character of the mining industry itself, I was not able to conduct more than one interview with each company. This did not cause a problem to gather sufficient data in the end. I was most interested in the way they promoted their CSR and the strategies to inform on the impact of their social projects. Therefore I have been researching their reports on sustainability, the way the companies promote themselves publicly through marketing and media and I have been analysing the documents on CSR and conducting business in Colombia in general. As well the Colombian state proved to be useful while analysing their strategic plans on how they see the mining and energy sector as motors of development. The Contraloría5 showed to be a state institute of critical value in their elaborate analysis on the mining sector. The Defensoría6 has detailed information on local stakeholders and conflict in various types of communicated documents. Especially their alertas tempranas (early risk assessments) contain very detailed information on the history of local conflict and involved actors. In its totality, the secondary data I used include: books, academic journals, documentaries, policy plans, pieces of legislation, national and international media articles, state/corporate/NGO reports, journals, sent letters and promotional material.
3.1.3 Validity and reliability
Different methods have been used to increase the validity of my research. I tried to gather most relevant opinions and actors in the Colombian mining debate by including various stakeholders (civil society, corporate, state, local etc.). It goes without saying that argumentations, visions and discourses can be exaggerated and explained in rather subjective form. I am aware that ‘me’ being a researcher can be used as a tool to communicate certain information and therefore be approached with a double agenda. In order to handle the problem of biased informants, I tried to double check information, look for more official sources and verify certain stories. In this way I could cross-check my findings through triangulation (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002: 102). By applying data triangulation, the internal validity of the research was increased. The information people provided has not automatically been adopted as the absolute truth, but has been a very rich pool of information. This information has proved to be very useful, backed up by the theoretical framework I used, which is presented in Chapter 2.
Personally, before I entered the Master’s Track in Global Criminology, I have been involved with activities and an occupation with a strong critical sentiment towards mining. Having actively opposed
5 The Contraloría General de la República de Colombia (CGR) is the general comptroller of Colombia. It has as an independent government institution the highest form of fiscal control in the country. 6 The Defensoría de Colombia – The Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia, is an agency of the national government which oversees civil and human rights within the Colombian legal framework.
24 the industry, for sure limited my objectivity. For this research, I tried to remain neutral by implementing both pro-mining and anti-mining voices in order to sketch the situation more objectively. Informants from both groups have been approached with the same dignity and given equal amounts of time in interviews to answer my questions. By hearing various types of stakeholders in the mining debate, I hoped to cancel out my subjectivity in a sufficient manner. In addition, I want to explain that I treated the CSR of the three companies in an objective way. This research never had the ambition to tackle any company, but tried to verify if the industry and Colombian government indeed have the intention and ability to match CSR with their social practices.
In order to increase the external validity of my research, I have chosen to investigate three different companies. I studied various cases of AGA, visited numerous communities in which they want to develop different projects. Two different cases of GCG have been the subject of my attention, while only focussing on the only relevant case of Eco Oro. The variety in companies and cases sketches a general image of the transnational gold mining industry in Colombia. In the expert interviews and documents I studied, my attention focussed more on a national framework and how Colombia’s gold mining context fits into a global sphere. The focus on different scopes as well gave a better opportunity to generalize certain parts of my conclusions and externalize the research.
It is very important to say that I do not give a complete overview of the practices of the three studied companies. The magnitude of their geographical scope, the numerous persons who have been implicated by the shown interest of the companies, prove the topic to be too big to conduct an all- inclusive research with the provided time span and financial resources. Still, I am absolutely confident that the many interviews I have undertaken and the scope of the analysis make a research that can conclude on the most important actors and their practices in the Colombian large-scale gold mining discourse. Of course, most presented data is based on cases, events and examples, but therewith sketches a realistic image of what is really going on in Colombia.
3.2 Ethical issues & security dilemma’s
For me as researcher, I was already familiar with (mining) conflict zones and Latin America, but not with Colombia. Not being a native Spanish speaker, I still felt that my Spanish qualities were enough to conduct the research and interviews as I wanted to. I was able to make myself understandable and did not encounter issues understanding my respondents.
The biggest issue however, was the security situation. The internal conflict entered its 50th year, and 80% of the human rights violations take place in mining regions (El Espectador, 2011a). The constant threat of armed illegal groups is still present but was reduced by the on-going peace talks between the government and the largest guerrilla groups the FARC (armed revolutionary forces). Furthermore, Colombia is known for its violence against human rights defenders and unionist (Amnesty International, 2013).
In my field trips, I tried to minimalize most risks. But to eliminate them, was simply impossible. My white skin, length and blond curly hair did certainly not help me to keep a low profile. Most of the time when I was not on a field trip, I resided in hostels or rented an apartment, of which I kept the location within a close circle of trusted people. When I entered the field, I made sure that I had contacts of
25 good trust in the communities I was visiting and that somebody received me and helped me to arrange accommodation. My rule was to stay for a few nights only, and then leave the zone. I was warned enough for not overstaying my visits, and therewith alarming local actors of violence. On the trips in conflict areas, I was either accompanied by a local trustee or I made sure that I was not going to have any problems while travelling from A to B. I never left without a signed letter from my University, which explained my occupation and provided contact details of the University in case of doubt. And just to be sure, I always informed a friend about my whereabouts and changes of plan.
The idea was to protect my identity as much as possible during the whole research. Besides the respondents, I avoided giving my name (especially during fieldtrips). My name is identifiable on the internet while various articles (critical on mining) have been written by me. Therefore I often used ‘Abraham’ instead of my normally used first name ‘Bram’. In general I used fake names when enlisting for conferences etc. Sometimes it almost felt like a game to not unnecessarily give my name. Therefore I have to say, it was kind of a letdown when I needed to give my fingerprints and a copy of my passport before entering the building where AGA’s headquarters were located. After this event, I got a bit demotivated and started to use my regular name more often.
In order to protect my respondents, I always proposed to think about the possible implications of talking to me as a researcher. Therefore I tried to enter in a dialogue with my respondents, by phone or e-mail, to discuss under what circumstances and in which location we could conduct a secure interview. Because some interviews had a more improvised character, or were arranged just minutes before, we sometimes had to be flexible with this.
Respondents were aware of my identity and occupation and I always asked permission for my voice- recorder and told them that it was only used as a memory tool. Even when informants told me I could use their identity in my thesis, I told them that all identities will remain undisclosed.
Still, I have to admit that some interviews and visits did not take place without certain risks. In my opinion, those risks had to be taken and moreover implicitly existed by just being in areas which were not too recommendable, but essential for my research. Respondents and contacts showed me their most helpful sides to provide me with security advices, information and knowledge, often without receiving anything in return. The least what I could do was to pay for drinks or a meal, but most people just wanted to be heard.
Of course the research was conducted within the framework of my studies, but as well with the idea of an emancipatory research. Emancipatory researches aim to tackle certain social problems or to raise awareness around these (Decorte & Zaitch, 2010: 85). The idea was to contribute to debates on CSR, human and environmental rights, which are highly relevant in Colombia. Therefore I confirmed, when asked, that I would make my thesis public, translate it in Spanish or at least make a Spanish summary. As well some grassroots organizations, foundations and NGOs told me that they were sometimes overrun by students who made them lose their time without getting anything in return. This is why I chose to offer certain services and when necessary helped with translations, sharing photographs or writing small articles.
After 9 months of fieldwork, I have enough anecdotal material to elaborate more on the risks I took and peculiar situations I entered. This in general is not relevant information.
26 A problem that characterizes the inaccessibility of the mining industry is maybe that it took me months to arrange an interview with AGA, harassing the company with phone calls and e-mails. GCG only gave in after a longer period, by arranging a Skype interview. However, it has to be noted that Eco Oro received me at their office in Bucaramanga just one day after contacting them.
The problem I had a few times when accessing communities, was being presented with a false occupation. In various occasions I encountered a similar situation with informants and contacts who introduced me into a local setting (gatekeepers). While I understand that a Master’s student does not compete with the status of an international human rights defender, I preferred to be transparent and honest concerning my identity. When for example a contact introduced me to a group of 30 community members, who gathered to talk about their experiences with the presence of a mining company protected by a military battalion, he knew who I was but chose to introduce me as a representative of an international court on human rights, who came to help to make an official complaint. This introduction was widely applauded. The humiliation I underwent to deny this publicly and furthermore to contradict my gatekeeper, was luckily accepted and not an obstacle for the locals to provide me with their testimonies.
The information I gathered while in the field, will be presented further on in this thesis. The next chapter will first give a more contextual overview of the history of gold and conflict in Colombia.
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4. Business as usual, a history of gold and conflict in Colombia
This contextual chapter will elaborate on two different topics which both have their influence on the current behaviour of the gold mining sector in Colombia; conflict and the history of gold. There has been an absence of a strong large-scale gold mining sector in the last decades. Therefore it is necessary to take a more general look on the context of gold, the history of conflict, and business and armed groups in Colombia now the sector wants to grow. All of those topics have their effect on the social infrastructure in which large-scale gold mining has to manoeuvre itself. The historical perspective of gold and mining offers a great deal of insight in the situation of human and territorial exploitation which started with the Spanish conquest. A system which never has stopped to exist and seems to continue under the current commercial re-colonization of Colombia. Commercial re-colonization, because of the great amount of territories which have been relatively cheap to obtain by foreign corporations through a system of dispossession, which still continues to be beneficiary to commercial interests. The system of dispossession is an on-going phenomenon in Colombia, acted out by a different pallet of stakeholders present in the internal conflict. The second part of this chapter will therefore elaborate more on the development of especially the Colombian paramilitary as a stakeholder and the mutual interests they share with multinational companies. This mutual interest will get extra attention in the third part of the chapter in which the beneficiary relation between conflict, business and natural resources will be explained through the modus operandi of armed illegal groups and multinational companies. The aspects of history and conflict are essential in understanding how the gold business is treating human rights in Colombia and how conflict and commercial interests have a cause in Colombia’s world-high internal displacement cipher.7 In the following more empirical chapters, the focus will be more narrowed down, purely to large-scale gold mining.
7 According to the UNHCR – the UN Refugee Agency, Colombia has a total of internally displaced persons between 4.9 and 5.5 million persons. Colombia is ranked first. Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c23.html
28 4.1 (Gold) mining in Colombia; a present-day historical perspective
Gold has because of its scarcity, shine and strength always been a symbol of wealth and status. No other metal appeals to the imagination such as gold. It is often used as a popular proverb by addressing ‘golden opportunities’, ‘a heart of gold’, or as the Germans for example say ‘a second woman has golden thighs’, the Hungarians think ‘a golden key opens every door’. Maybe a more adequate proverb to use is: ‘it is not all gold that glitters’, because for many, gold is a precious metal that runs as a blood- red threat through mankind’s history. When the Spanish steered their ships towards the New World in the 16th century, their main objectives were to spread Catholicism and to enrich themselves through world trade. A lot of those adventurers belonged to the poor nobility. When -in 1511- king Ferdinand of Spain saw the economic value of gold, he stated: “Get gold, humanely if possible—but at all hazards, get gold” (Bernstein, 2000: 121). Subsequently, masses of ships sailed off to Latin-America.
After the Spanish set sail towards current Latin America, it seemed that natural resources, especially gold, solely served to enrich the invader. In 1531, Francisco Pizarro moored with a crew of just under 200 Spaniards at the Pacific coastline of current Peru. Thanks to quarrels between Inca-emperors Atuhualpa and Huáscar, Pizarro accomplished to travel far into the Andes mountain-range. The Inca’s forged gold into artefacts meant for ceremonial purposes. Gold was the sacred male symbol for the sun. It had mere ceremonial and cultural purposes for the traditional indigenous than an economic value. Therefore it was not the economy, but the cultural-religious identity which became violated when the Spanish decided during the conquista to plunder the indigenous population (Vilches, 2010).
The Spanish immediately started to deplete the traditional inhabitants of current Colombia of their mineral wealth after their arrival. Many of the indigenous inhabitants were forced of their lands in the Spanish search for fertile soils, mineral deposits, water access, transportations routes etc. (Sanabria, 2006). One of the effects was that the indigenous were cut of their means of subsistence and their grounds became property of colonial elites, who turned it into haciendas or large estates. Consequently, the land-deprived indigenous became an interesting target for the colonists to enslave on the same haciendas. A useful strategy which was continued for centuries by the new elites. The expropriation of local inhabitants (which mainly consisted of peasantry) gave access to resource rich regions, but as well provided a new pool of labour; namely the landless peasants (Safford & Palacios in; Hristov, 2009: 4).
A life of enslavement not only existed for the indigenous, the same happened to the large amount of imported slaves of African origin, which were put to hard manual labour in the mineral districts of present day Cauca, Chocó, Antioquia, Huila, Caldas and Tolima. Contemporary cities as Cali and Popayán are results of colonial gold mining activities (Cremers et al., 2013: 46). Mining methods at that time were primitive and according to ancient indigenous and African methods. It was near the end of the 18th century, when German engineers were invited by King Charles III and started to implement techniques that began to have their impacts on Colombia’s fragile ecosystems (Ramirez Cuellar, 2005: 30-31).
The role of mining for the Colombian nation-state never became irrelevant. After its independence, Colombia became world’s largest producer of gold in the 19th century. Approximately 35 industrial mining companies were active in 1910, but almost a percentage of 80% of the gold production came from small-scale mining operations (Instituto de Estudios Colombianos, 1987). Since the colonization
29 era into the XIX century, gold was the primary export and enrichment product. In the 20th century, the export competed heavily with tobacco, quinoa, petrol, bananas, coal, flowers and subsequently; cocaine.
Neo-capitalism prevailed in 19th century Colombia. The local elites and large-land owners expanded their markets through expropriation, increasing problems of landlessness and inequality (Hristov, 2009: 4). The national export, based on primary resources and unskilled intensive labour goods, has been dominating the country’s foreign trade till today.
The gold production peak in the 1940s introduced an era where the dominance of the gold mining sector was overtaken by the manufacturing, livestock and agricultural industry (Poveda, 2002). Changing government policies that started in the 1950s continued to increase inequality, by for example controlling food prices and stimulating primary-sector exports (Pérez-Rincón, 2006). This simultaneously meant that a considerable share of local resources came under control of foreign enterprises, such as the United Fruit Company. The entrance of those transnational giants further developed the system of expropriation and increased inequality in the distribution of land and wealth (Higginbottom, 2008).
The following graph, given by the Unit for Planning of Minerals and Mining (UPME) shows Colombia’s gold production since 1931. The rise in the 1980s has to be explained through increasing gold prices and changes in public policies (Cremers et al., 2013: 49).
Figure 2: Annual Colombian Gold Production
Source: UPME (2012)
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The contemporary mining panorama is complex to explain, most of the current gold production comes from artisanal or small-scale mining operations, while the large-scale sector is responsible for 30% of the production. Those are only official statistics, leaving out a numerous informal or illegal mining operations often controlled by the BACRIM8 or guerrilla groups. According to a study of the Defensoría (Defensoría, 2011), small-scale mining takes place in 44% of the municipalities in Colombia. It is necessary to state that the Colombian government makes a division between artisanal mining and small-scale mechanized mining operations. As well the local communities make this distinction, even though it is depending on varying standards. While the government only describes panning (the baqueros) as artisanal mining, there is a more elaborate understanding of artisanal mining communitywise (Cremers et al., 2013: 55). Most techniques based on the knowledge African slaves brought with them, depend on manual labour and some on the use of water. Most artisanal mining techniques do not need chemicals, while the large-scale and non-artisanal small-scale sector often rely on the use of mercury and cyanide (Cremers et al., 2013).
When looking to the gold production in the last few years, Colombia produced 47.837 kilograms in 2009, almost 53.000 kilograms in 2010 and in 2011, 56.000 kilograms (UPME, 2012). The rise of the precious metals’ price is an obvious reason for this trend, but it should not be neglected that the large- scale sector founds its way relatively late to Colombia. Most mega-projects are planned for the next decades while some operations already have started. The now dominant small-scale and artisanal sector will be overshadowed by prospected future large-scale operations. Their geostrategic planning often overlaps with resource rich areas that already are full of artisanal and small scale-mining operations, therefore causing conflicts of interest (see chapter: 6.4 and 7.2)
Box 2: Marmato – Caldas
In Marmato – Caldas, gold is already mined for more than 520 years. The village of Marmato, which is located at a mountain top covered with mining shafts, still contains one of Colombia’s largest gold reserves, but is painted with conflict. A representative of the small-scale and artisanal miners association of Marmato (Interview Representative ASOMITRAMA, 16-7-2013) elaborates on how the history of exploitation developed when the Spanish deceived the indigenous population during conquest times. The Spanish tried to impress the traditional population just before slavery was introduced:
“They enslaved the labour force; they deceived them in all that matter. Because when they came conquering, they came and conquered with small mirrors, little stuff and nonsense. The people did not know what all this was and why they came. When they gave a beautiful mirror, the people loved it. Those instruments were exchanged for gold and their territory.” (Interview Representative ASOMITRAMA, 16-7-2013).
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8Bandas criminales emergentes (translated, emerging criminal gangs). Neo-paramilitary groups, emerged from the paramilitary demobilization. The BACRIM can be seen as heirs to the paramilitaries, but have a more mafia like structure in their operations.
31
European diseases taken by the invaders caused illness and death under the local population that was not immune to for example the measles, smallpox and yellow fever. When the Spanish introduced African slaves in Marmato, mining methods changed towards African customs and Marmato became a community of mixed Afro- and indigenous descent. In the war of independence in the early 19th century, the mines of Marmato and nearby Supia and Rio Sucio served as a ‘guarantee’ to finance the advancing independence campaign of Colombia’s liberator, Simón Bolívar. The gold of Marmato was used to arrange his war-debts with the British. It were the British , that exploited the mines at that time and aided Simón Bolívar financing the independence war, and continued to exploit the mines after the origin of the former country, Greater Colombia.
The union representative described the style of mining before the British took over as ‘rudimentary’, it became a more intensive and automated type of mining under the British (Interview Representative ASOMITRAMA, 16-7-2013). This was the beginning of the commercial and foreign exploitation of Marmato, where the scope and production enlarged. While the original population of Marmato still continues to mine their shafts for gold, their current conflict lies with the Canadian company Gran Colombia Gold, which has targeted the historical gold miners’ community.
32 4.2 Big capitals’ mercenaries, the Colombian paramilitary
The contemporary situation of gold mining and business in Colombia is to a great extend determined by the situation of conflict and its stakeholders. One of those stakeholders is the Colombian paramilitary, which always has been close to ‘where the money is’. This section will discuss the origin and functioning of the Colombian paramilitary.
4.2.1 The initial paramilitary
The interlinkedness between state politics, the Public Forces and the paramilitary in Colombia has been evident since half a century. The initial phase of ‘paramilitarism’ took place in the 1960s and has to be explained within the context of the Colombian internal conflict. The state thought its military needed more room for manoeuvres than what was offered within the legal framework. Because the state forces could not target civilians with terrorist actions, there was need for a useful tool of violence. “The deployment of paramilitary forces has allowed for a distancing between official state policy and the unofficial use of terrorism directed against the civilian population” (Hristov, 2009: 58). The paramilitary as a method to secure certain state ambitions, seemed useful as a strategy when avoiding direct responsibilities, linking the civil population to armed actions with the objective to cover up the initiating role of the state. However, the paramilitaries were not only present in the ambitions of the state.
One of the main reasons of paramilitary existence in Colombia, can be found in the US-Colombian strategy to combat guerrilla groups. A field manual of the US army explained that: “Paramilitary units can support the national army in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations when the latter is being conducted in their own province or political subdivision” (Stokes, 2005: 64). This has to be understood within the context of the Cold-war and the war against communism, applied in Colombia’s conflict against insurgency groups. The second reason, is according to the historian Hristov (2009: 61), to create an instrument to structurally control and monitor rebels, their civil supporters and social organizations throughout the country. To implement this ‘monitoring’, a large network of support was created nationwide.
In accordance with the foregoing, we find the words of the former captain of the national police and director of SIJIN (Judicial Investigations and Intelligence Service) in the Urabá region of Antioquia (1996-1998), Gilberto Cárdenas. Before a group of UN representatives and state authorities, he stated:
“The paramilitaries were created by the Colombian government itself to do the dirty work, in other words, in order to kill all individuals who, according to the state and police, are guerrilla. But in order to do that [the government] had to create illegal groups so that no one would suspect the government of Colombia and its military forces” (CINEP, 2004: 6).
33
4.2.2 A slight switch in paramilitary motivation
While the paramilitary in character stayed the same, their incentive took a slight shift in the decades ahead the 1980s. Colombia’s capitalist elite; mainly large-scale landowners, cattle ranchers, mining entrepreneurs (mainly the emerald business) and narco-lords encircled themselves with ‘self-defence’ groups (Hristov, 2009: 63). Those self-defence groups were the same actors as the paramilitaries and mainly functioned as a ‘guerrilla-protection’, while the Colombian state was incompetent to eliminate the insurgency. In reality, this protector had to be feared. Paramilitary groups obtained large and valuable territories for themselves during years of terror campaigns, and showed why they would be interesting for actors hungry for land. Most paramilitary groups were organized under the name AUC (Las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) and presented themselves as “a political-military which uses the same irregular methods as the guerrilla. Its members are no terrorists, nor common criminals, but rather persons who have found it necessary to violate the law because the Colombian state penalizes the legitimate right of self-defence even though it’s incapable of providing that defence” (Zárate-Laun, 2001).
This actor, who found it necessary to violate the law, can be seen as the biggest victimizer in the Colombian conflict. To offer some insight into the numbers of victims by the paramilitary: according to ANNCOL’s (New Colombia News Agency) report Silencing the Opposition (2004), the paramilitary is responsible for 80% of the human rights violations against the civil population and according to Carlos Gutiérrez (in Hristov 2009: 110) responsible for 14.476 deaths between 1988 and 2003 and millions of internally displaced. A Colombian government-commission reported that since 1958, the Colombian internal conflict claimed at least 220.000 lives. The report was made by the National Centre of Historical Memory (2013), created to indemnify victims of the conflict and returns stolen lands. Of the 1.982 massacres reported between 1980 and 2012, the paramilitary was the main responsible party with 1.166 massacres. The rebel groups were responsible for 343 massacres and the government security forces for 295. Unknown armed groups caused the remainder. Four out of every five victims were reportedly civilian non-combatants (National Centre of Historical Memory, 2013).
4.2.3 How the paramilitary continued to benefit business after their ‘demobilization’
Colombia’s former president Álvaro Uribe started negotiating with the country’s main paramilitary group, the AUC, in order to begin a demobilization process in July 2003. A process which theoretically finished in August 2006. The seemingly important step in the Colombian internal conflict did not achieve the goal of diminishing the violence. According to a report of Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2010), the paramilitary groups which were reclassified as ‘criminal gangs’ - BACRIM, went on to regularly commit massacres, killings, forced displacement, rape, and extortion, and create a threatening atmosphere in the communities they control. Often, they target human rights defenders, trade unionists, victims of the paramilitaries who are seeking justice, and community members who do not follow their orders. As well the internal displacement rate kept increasing. The 2012 HRW report stated that: “Paramilitary successor groups continue to grow, maintain extensive ties with public security force members and local officials, and commit widespread atrocities” (HRW, 2012: 228).
34 In a present day perspective, a key aspect to the BACRIM is how they serve multinationals and already are connected to gold mining companies. The name BACRIM was not badly chosen, in reference to former paramilitary groups, in respect to them functioning as organized crime. Captain Cardenas, the former director of SIJIN-Urabá expressed that: “The paramilitaries … favour the interests of the multinationals in Colombia, and they are in charge of cleansing the terrain of people who represent a challenge to their interests, such as unionists or popular leaders, who disappear or are killed” (CINEP, 2004: 6). Events which took place concerning two of the three studied cases. One main point made by Ramírez Cuellar’s (2005) is that forced displacement caused by the paramilitary, has a high correlation with resource rich areas where mining companies settle and develop plans. According to a respondent from Justicia y Paz (Interview Respondent JyP, 9-5-2014), there has been a territorial strategy behind paramilitary land grabbing which he calls “la nueva estrella cardinal” (the new cardinal cross). An appropriation of Colombian territories takes in his vision place according to a national division in four. This strategy is undertaken in order to secure territories and commercialize them for resource extraction. In his argument, the last targeted zone is now under pressure to secure territory for megaprojects. Expropriation through sangre y fuego (scorced earth) tactics makes place for new capital. In theory, the law should provide the displaced farmers with legal help. Displaced farmers should receive reparation and restitution through the ‘Victims and Land Restitution Law’, implemented by current president Santos (Interview Respondent JyP, 9-5-2014). In reality, the victims often face the entrance of TNCs on their (former) territories. A research paper of the think-tank TNI explains: “for example, where victims return to their land to find a business operating, they are obliged to become part of the government’s economic model for rural areas, based on resource extraction and agro- industry. This impunity for the “displacers” is matched by ever more obstacles to justice for the displaced; particularly peasant farmers who may want to reclaim their land” (Tenthoff & Eventon, 2013).
4.3 Colombia’s internal conflict; a comfortable situation for business?
4.3.1 Resources and conflict
An almost general contributor in the cause and protracting character of civil wars, is the importance of natural resources (Bavinck et al., 2014: 36). Various case studies elaborate on how armed conflict and the presence of natural resources have a strong correlation, although varying between different types of natural resources and conflict situations. Gold more than often seems to mean trouble (Switzer, 2001; Ross, 2004; Michael, 2004; Auty, 2004; Ganesan and Vines; 2004).
The rise of commodity prices seemed more than interesting for the present (il)legal armed groups in Colombia. The rising gold prices in the last 10 years made small-scale mining immensely attractive for the ones aiming at a complementary income increase. The FARC generates 20% of its income through illegal gold mining (LaSillaVacía, 2012a). As well money laundering through minerals is a lot easier in comparison to the illegal production and trafficking of cocaine, which is a common practice amongst Colombian armed illegal groups. Furthermore, the entrance of multinational (gold) mining companies opened up a whole new spectrum to raise funds through various forms of extortion. But the
35 advantages of those conflict zones, where the rule of law seems more absent than present, not only apply to the illegal armed groups while corporations as well appear to find their benefits.
Box 3: Coca Cola & Drummond
Coca Cola: A lot of international media attention has been given to the case of Coca Cola in Colombia. The managers of a Coca Cola bottling plant in Colombia contracted paramilitary forces to handle union problems the company was facing. The lawsuit that was filed charged Coca Cola with the crimes of using the paramilitary to murder, torture, threaten and kidnap unionists (The Guardian, 2003). Curiously, the case got little attention in Colombia itself, which according to the president of the labour union (the plaintiff ) has to do with the present culture of impunity. Coca Cola refused to support an independent human rights research and reacted with a public relations campaign. In the end, Coca Cola was not held accountable for what happened in their bottling companies while being the major stakeholder. In its own documents the company retained the right to control workplace practices and stated to “ensure that local mangers abide by human rights conventions and domestic laws.” (Hristov, 2009: 77)
Drummond: The coal mining giant Drummond also found their way to Colombia’s paramilitary forces. A paramilitary leader testified in a Colombian court that Drummond paid the AUC to protect their railroads. Large sums were paid to kill unionists. An amount of 1.5 million USD was paid to Alcides Mattos, alias ‘El Samario’ to kill company unionists. The Northern block of the AUC was to be paid over 100.000 USD on a monthly basis for their services. While Drummond still is denying its role in the murders, various paramilitaries have been sentenced for murder. “With the beginning of the company’s explorations in the department César the massacres started, the first forced displacements, selective homicides and destruction of the social fabric organized around guilds, unions, political movements, NGOs, etc. (Ramirez Cuellar, 2005). According to a report by PAX, about 3000 persons got displaced and murdered by the paramilitaries hired by Drummond (PAX, 2014).
What is key in the understanding of business and human rights, is that the massive violations of human rights in 50 years of internal conflict can be beneficial for (non-legitimate) socio-economic interests. The importance of the armed conflict goes beyond purely military strategic interests, and economic ‘agents’ have causal or functional relations to the conflict (Contraloría, 2013: 61). Therefore, due to the necessary territorial control for large-scale mining operations and the money that comes with it, mining can be considered as an underlying factor of the armed conflict, mainly being a cause of displacement. If this is the case, it is a breach with the Constitution according to the ECI (State of Unconstitutional Affairs)9, by the Constitutional Court (with judgement T-025 in 2004). The decision to
9 The Colombian Constitutional Court declared the existence of a State of Unconstitutional Affairs (ECI) in 2004. The ECI served to highlight the contradiction that existed between the government’s formal recognition of the rights of the victims of the internal conflict, and the lack of financial and political capacity to ensure real solutions.
36 allow mining should be preceded by the identification of impacts on communities affected by the conflict. This should prevent territorial intervention and the start, or expansion of violence (Contraloría, 2013: 62).
Still, the Colombian government opened their gates for large-scale mining companies, regardless the ongoing conflict situation in their country. The internal circumstances in Colombia seem to create a situation which is beneficial for certain corporations. Only practices will prove if the three investigated companies, that proclaim to act in accordance with implemented own social policies and signed international treaties and guidelines, will not take advantage of the conflict situation in the country.
4.3.2 How the armed conflict serves the ‘macro-criminal
For the Colombian Constitutional Court, the development of licit and illicit economical activities are one of the underlying causes of the internal conflict, and one of the reasons the conflict keeps protracting.10 Within these activities, macro projects of the mining industry are included as well by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court implies that when the control of resource rich territories leads to legal or illegal economical activities, it is related to the present stakeholders in the Colombian armed conflict. The impact and harm which is created to achieve control of those resource rich regions, as well as exploiting those, can therefore not be separated from the on-going conflict.
The strategies of violence adopted by actors of violence (for themselves or contracted by ‘economic actors’ as multinationals), generate conflict within communities or displace the local population, often in order to implement certain projects. The business interest in those areas, by actors linked to the internal conflict, are in various regions of Colombia the prime cause of displacement (Constitutional Court, 2009; Contraloría, 2013: 62). The functionality of the ‘macro-criminal’ (as the Contraloría puts it) could serve non-armed social, economic and political actors or use those actors for territorial control being a ‘macro-criminal’.
A ‘macro-criminal’ can be perceived as an actor which benefits from grave human rights violations in order to achieve their goals. The macro-criminal operates throughout a network of armed and non- armed actors. The paramilitary, the guerrilla and certain state agents can be considered macro- criminals, but as well corporations can adopt similar violent strategies used for gain. The low pressure of legal consequences seems to rationalize law breaking behaviour when corporations apply violent strategies, making them function as amoral calculators (Pearce & Tombs, 1990). Within conflicts which are caused by macro-criminals, the vulnerability of impacted communities increases. An impact which in Colombia often is massive and systematic in character, when looking to the numbers of victims. Especially the involvement of the army (which often operates on account of those companies), makes the violence used for their interest enter a grey zone between legality and illegality (Garay Salamanca & Vargas Valencia, 2012). While the conflict diminishes the level of self-sustainability rural communities often rely on, it also limits their possibility to the use of territory and often leads to forced displacement.
10 In Ruling 004 of the Colombian Court in 2009, the court documented cases where mining and macro-criminal acts had functional relations.
37
4.3.3 Modus operandi
The modus operandi of the illegal armed groups in Colombia give some insights in their current behaviour around the mining multinationals present in Colombia. It is necessary to explain their history with the extractive industry. This history teaches how examples of mutual dependency can be continued with the new arriving gold mining multinationals.
In the seventies, several extractive (oil) companies became victims of extortion by present guerrilla groups, while in the 1980s and 1990s, various companies as BP, Drummond and Pereco established linkages with paramilitary groups (CITpax Colombia, 2012: 9). Those are both practices of illegal company behaviour. The current president Santos stated in March 2011, that multinational enterprises that make extortion payments would be expelled from the country (El Espectador, 2012a). Nevertheless, it is common that extractive companies pay illegal armed groups (Interview Representative Arco Iris, 11-6-2013). The extortion of multinational companies already belongs to the modus operandi of armed groups for over 30 years in Colombia CITpax Colombia, 2012: 9).
The vacuna (injection: extortion payments) that companies pay to armed groups in order to operate without any problems in territories that they control, seems a common practice. In other words; companies pay money to not be harassed, to have a ‘permit’ to exploit and explore in certain zones, and to prevent their employees from being kidnapped or their infrastructure from being blown up. There are no exact ciphers, but it is reported that 10% of the value of extracted oil, is paid as vacuna to illegal armed groups (CTIpax, 2012: 9). While large-scale oil exploitations have a longer history in Colombia than the contemporary mass interest shown by gold mining multinationals, those newcomers are most likely a new apple the fruit basket. In this line of thinking, Los Rastrojos (which can be considered BACRIM) declared in a public communication that everybody who stands in the way of the interests of AGA (amongst other companies) will be declared as a military objective.11 AGA dissociated itself from this message12, but Los Rastrojos made their interest known.
The royalties which have to be paid by the extractive sector are redistributed to a local level, a money flow which can be captured by illegal armed groups (CITpax, 2012: 6). In every municipality where companies will extract minerals or oil, the municipality receives a percentage of the royalties. With or without contracts, illegal armed groups demand the authorities of those municipalities to hand over certain amounts of those royalties. The ingression of those royalties can be increased by artificially pumping up the gold production op paper (CITpax, 2012: 10). While this is already a common strategy, the increase of extractive projects and commodity prices makes this strategy even more interesting for illegal armed groups.
The benefits of the on-going internal conflict not only lay with the armed actors. As well multinationals can make use of the presence of those actors, in order to facilitate a ‘smooth’ arrival in the regions where they want to develop their projects. This can happen through threats, intimidations, selective homicides and illegal armed groups conduct campaigns of ‘social cleansing’ in the zones of interest for multinationals (CTIpax, 2012: 19). According to the union representing workers in the state-owned
11 See Annex IV 12 The press communication by AGA can be found on: http://www.anglogoldashanti.com.co/saladeprensa/Lists/Comunicadosprensa/DispForm.aspx?ID=64
38 mining companies, Sintraminercol (Sindicato de trabajadores de la Empresa Nacional Minera Minercol), 87% of the displaced persons in Colombia come from mining-energy municipalities, that cover 35% of the national total. The NGO CODHES states that next to protection provided by the public forces, the paramilitary has a complementary role to prevent social protest and cause displacement (CODHES, 2011).
According to a human-rights lawyer of SEMBRAR, who focuses on AGA in Sur de Bolívar, it is a common practice that the paramilitaries prepare certain regions for multinational companies (Interview Lawyer SEMBRAR, 12-9-2013). He states that this is already happening at large around the gold mining industry.
“The paramilitary annihilates or just finishes the social movements that resist to their regional interests. Or they weaken them as much as they can, operating in-between the public forces and the companies. This makes people think they open the road for the entrance of multinationals” (Interview Lawyer SEMBRAR, 12-9-2013).
This is so to speak a social-cleansing, with methods that are not allowed in the regular army. In his vision, the paramilitary is the force which deals out the harshest blows to present opposition against mega-projects. When the opposition is weakened, the army can enter a zone to control what is left of it and protect the companies which want to enter.
The information presented in this contextual chapter is a build up to my further argumentation on the social responsibility of the gold mining sector, in theory and reality. A holistic overview of the social impact the gold mining industry futurewize will have and arrived companies already have, cannot be made without taking the history of gold and gold mining (especially since colonial times) into account. The current situation around the existing extractive industry (coal, petrol, emeralds etc.) and the stories of violence and displacement, are indicators for future impacts of industries as gold mining. These indicators and examples have to be taken into account, when looking to the state-corporate promotion of yet another industry internationally linked with conflict: large-scale gold mining. The history of gold mining in Colombia offers a dangerous context in combination with the current situation of violence. The arrival of gold mining TNCs gives the sector a new incentive for better practices in Colombia, but offers as well new opportunities for state-corporate crimes and illegal armed groups who already caused an enormous amount of harm in the country. The high absence of regulatory control provides possibilities for corporations to cross the lines of the legal framework. This legal framework and the discourse the government has built around large-scale gold mining, will be discussed in the next chapter.
39
5. Gold mining and foreign capital, a paradise of development promises
Entering the last week of February 2014, I am processing data for this thesis and finishing up my analysing process in order to put my conclusions down on paper. After all the experiences in Colombia, it is surprising and not surprising at the same time when I read the following statement from current president Santos, made on the third congress of Responsible Mining in Colombia: “Mining does not destroy the environment nor impoverish communities” (Semana, 2014). His statement is interesting because of various reasons. Sure, his words have to be placed within the correct context. Santos did not refer to small-scale or non-formalised projects, but intended to refer to ‘responsible’ large-scale projects, projects that fit into his ideas of the mining-energy locomotive, that will take Colombia on a train to economic prosperity. Curiously enough, Santos should know about the immense social and environmental impacts of the coal mining giants in Colombia and should know about the numerous socio-environmental conflicts around gold mining in other Latin American countries. Still, he chooses to deny the two biggest arguments against large-scale mining. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that “for different circumstances we have left space for the ones who disbelieve in mining and do not distinguish between responsible and criminal mining” (Semana, 2014). Criminal mining is a rather subjective terminology to use. There are certain boundaries within the legal framework, which can objectify the mark you want to put on certain mining projects. It is also a clever use of terminology, that will allow certain practices, facilitate some business strategies and criminalize others; the informal smaller mining variants in this case. This was a strategic speech to give. The Colombian mining strategy -currently promoted by Santos- will be discussed and explained in this chapter, with a focus on how the argumentation for this strategy (which can be explained as a political current: extractivism) is constructed.
40 5.1 Colombia’s mining locomotive
Colombia wanted to put itself on the map again as administrator of their mineral wealth, and put it to use in order to build a strong national economy. A strategy which proved to have little success in the decades previous to 2001. In the year 2001 a new ‘Mining Code’ was developed and implemented as a “...facilitator and supervisor in the development of mining projects, at the same time it encourages private investment both efficiently and categorically” (MME, 2001). Some reforms were made to the Mining Code in 2010 as a response to the disorganized expansion of the sector (Cremers et al., 2013).
In a document of the Mining-Energy Planning Unit (UPME, the legal entity to develop the mining sector), called -Colombia mining country, national plan for mining development, vision towards 2019- it is explained how the government clearly understands that private initiatives are the only ones capable of generating and fostering the country’s mining development (UPME, 2006: 15). This explanation is given with the statement that the inclusion of those mining plans obeys the vision and expectations of each department, respecting its own economic and social development (UPME, 2006). Ambiguously, mining is declared of national importance and the state is the one and only owner of the Colombian resource-rich subsoil. Most decisions are therefore made by the central government.
The 2001 Mining Code was implemented by president Pastrana to be further ‘materialized’ under the two terms of president Uribe, pushing through some important changes in the sphere of mining politics. For example: the responsibility of the ministry of mining to participate as a ‘member’ was eliminated while the entrance of big capital was facilitated. Herewith the state lost monitoring capacity as for example the royalties are exclusively calculated with information provided by the companies (Rudas, 2014). According to a respondent from the Contraloría, a lot of functionaries from the UPME were moved to sell the country in all parts (Interview Senior Official Contraloría 11-6-2013). Next to implementing a lot of tax exemptions for the TNCs, more fiscal benefits were given with tax deductions on the paid royalties. Those benefits are sometimes of higher amounts than what is paid by the companies. “Contrasting what the state receives for royalties with income tax, we are surprised to see that during this price bonanza, for every 100 USD of royalties paid by the companies to the state, they receive income tax deductions and discounts to the tune of 130 USD” (Rudas, 2014: 42).
The amount of mining titles and solicitations that the current government received only gave them the necessity to continue facilitating the TNCs. On a fiscal level, this has not been an overwhelming success. A study from the Contraloría already calculated that with every 100 pesos mining TNCs pay for the rent of mining titles, the fiscal ‘discounts’ resulted in a loss for the Colombian state representing more than the double amount of 200 pesos (Contraloría, 2013). In accordance with this information, the historian Hristov argued on the incapability of Latin American countries to benefit from foreign multinationals: “The neoliberalization of Latin American nation-states themselves is evident in their lack of interference in profit –making processes to redistribute surpluses and the absence of regulation over transnational capital in their territories” (Hristov, 2009: 15) The current policy based on extractivism, so far seems to have some flaws when parts of the mining legislation already appear to make the country lose money.
41 5.2 The gold bonanza? Colombia’s progress after the new Mining Code
The massive increase in mining titles and solicitations should in the governments discourse be an indicator for development and make Colombia’s economy more internationally important. The country of the legend of El Dorado needed a bonanza. A bonanza is often related to gold, a sudden increase of wealth, good fortune and profits. Although, the indicators for the increase of development can be chosen subjectively. A short analysis of statistics, which concern the expansion of the mining sector and the situation of poverty in Colombia, show that there is no gold Bonanza for everybody in Colombia.
Figure 3: Mining titles granted
Source: INGEOMINAS (2011)
The current mining-export numbers are dominated by coal, but it is the expectancy that the gold mining sector will be of big importance on the medium and long-term (Alvarez, 2013). Gold mining TNCs entered Colombia at an increasing rate and many projects are under development. The launch of the 2001 Mining Code fell together with an increase of the world gold price and made sure that Colombia was the place to make investments when planning to develop gold mining projects.
The development discourse of (gold) mining is a heavily debated topic (Martínez Alier & Gunter Pauli in El Espectador, 2013a). Exporting raw materials, does not build a long-term national economy when a foremost foreign sector is developed and based on a strategy which depends on finite resources. The terminology ‘resource curse’ is often heard in relation to gold mining (Van der Ploeg, 2011). So to say; the wealth for a few causes misery, environmental degradation and conflict for the many. The so called Dutch Disease is for example a possible effect when a country receives large amounts of foreign currency for its natural resources, increasing the value of the national currency. In a macro economical perspective, the country will become increasingly dependent on natural resources, leading to a de- industrialization and worsened international position of competition. While mining projects are
42 temporary and do not build an economy on the long-term, the future depleted mines can cause a decrease in mineral exports, therefore leaving the country with an overpriced currency (Karabegović, 2009).
In despite of the existing doubts about the development character of (gold) mining, the mining locomotive is a well promoted machine. In a presentation of the Ministry of Mining and Energy, their message is clear: “Colombia is an excellent destination for mining investors! We invite you all to not miss this opportunity” (MinMinas, 2011). The presentation furthermore underlined the “attractive economical investment circumstances and its improved security situation”.
In reality, it seems that not all relevant data is included to claim this position for Colombia. Looking into other numbers, which can be considered characteristics for progress, there is no such thing as development nor a bonanza for all since the 2001 Mining Code. Colombia is the seventh most unequal country in the world (World Bank, 2012). Colombia is currently rank 91th on the Human Development Index, while it already has fallen from place 68 to 77 between 2002 and 2007, during the period of president Uribe’s reign (UNDP, 2013). Data from 2010 (World Bank, 2010) estimates that 49% of the population has to live with 5 dollars or less a day, while 8,2% needs to survive with the same or less than 1,25 dollar a day. In rural areas 22,8% lives in extreme poverty (DNP, 2012). A research by the UN shows how Colombia’s inequality is growing faster than in any of the other 18 Latin American countries (UN, 2013). “Colombia is the only Latin American country where inequality is growing in all of its cities” stated by the report’s director Eduardo Lopez (El Espectador, 2013b). A large part of the population -32%- lives in poverty.
In general terms, the overall poverty is reducing in Colombia. Despite this development, the people suffering from extreme poverty in rural areas rose from 22,1% in 2011, to 22,8% in 2012. This happened while the gap between rural and urban poverty kept growing. Rural poverty has risen 1.7 times between 2002 and 2012, and extreme poverty increased 3.5 times in the same period (DNP, 2012). The inequality in rural Colombia is causing the further uneven distribution of land. The largest concentrations of land remain in ownership by large landowners who prevail at the expense of small- scale farmers; 0,4% of the landowners own 61% of rural land (ABColombia, 2012a).
It should also be taken into consideration that the Colombian Government methodologies on the collection of poverty statistics changed in 2001, reducing the amount of people living in poverty. According to the former methods, the poverty rate in 2010 would be 44,2% but was calculated by the new method as 37,2% for the same year (DANE, 2011).
These numbers do not add up to the biggest mining promise: economic development. The previously presented statistics offer no evidence that the development promise by the state, as well as by multinational companies, pushed the country towards progress. Mainly the royalties should cause regional development, while a significant percentage of the royalties should flow back to the producing region. Regions that in reality often do not see anything in return. This is not so strange when more than the amount of paid royalties return to companies through tax exemptions. Various studies already ringed the alarm bell, according to the for Colombia non-beneficiary royalty framework. Most companies still conceal or miscommunicate financial figures (Colombia Reports, 2014). Even the Colombian Government’s Mining Information System (SIMCO), did not release any new statistics since September 2012.
43 Still, the Colombian inequality functions as a motivation for the mining locomotive in its own way. Kramer and Michalowski see the state as a class conflict managing mechanism and argue that the following is often the case in countries with class dilemmas: “In doing so, the political state must resolve conflicts and dilemmas that stem from underlying structural contradictions in the political economy. The contradictory nature of these structural arrangements, however, can force the state to adopt deviant strategies to achieve what cannot otherwise be accomplished” (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006: 23). And: “Attractive and legitimizing though it may be, the idea that economic inequality plays no role in shaping political governance overlooks a fundament social reality. What is economic is always political; what is political is always economic.” (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006: 2)
Not benefitting from their mineral wealth and the presence of large-capital multinationals, seems nothing recent for Colombia. Andy Higginbottom (2008) argued that Colombian governments have driven through policies favourable to foreign direct investment since 1990. Political agendas were pushed by neoliberal economic policies of privatization, deregulations and ‘flexibilization’ (Munck and O'Hearn, 1999: 13). Higginbottom states that despite the 1991 Constitution, the Colombian authorities failed to protect their citizens against multinational interests or the associated paramilitary violations:
“[The contemporary] welfare’ situation is not improving and a consequence of foreign direct investments. In spite of World Bank theories, Colombia is becoming a rentier economy in which multinational corporations are the principal rent takers obtaining surplus profits especially through the extraction of raw materials. The alliance between state authorities and multinationals, supported by a tacit involvement of paramilitary forces and bolstered by US intervention, has provided both motive and opportunity for crimes of the powerful. There is a de facto regime of impunity for multinational corporate crimes in Colombia. Multinational corporations have access to and/or benefit systematically from informal systems of violent social control” (Higginbottom, 2008)
Higginbottom herewith sketches the Colombian government as incompetent to gain the benefits of its natural recourses and argues that a situation prone to violence is generated by the ones showing an interest in the control of natural recourses. The next paragraph will continue on how the government tries to manage mining as a public utility.
44 5.3 An uncontrollable public utility
The Colombian government has declared mining an “activity for public utility and social interest”, therewith allowing the unilateral expropriation of the ones using or owning the land under which minerals are supposed to be located.13 Because mining is declared as a national development project, a lot of territories will be the property of the government. This paragraph will explain how the country so far is administrating its mineral wealth.
Law 685 of 2001: Art. 5 includes: "The minerals of any kind and location, found on the soil and subsoil thereof, in any natural physical condition, are the exclusive property of the State, without considering that the property, possession or holding of the relevant land be of public entities, individuals, communities or groups”.
The respondent from the Contraloría has many concerns about the current mining politics (Interview Senior Official Contraloría, 11-6-2013). According to him, it would be a more coherent policy to slow down with the extraction of resources, while the world’s population is growing. Mineral prices will only rise by demand and be far more profitable ahead. Strangely enough, the government does save a part of the earnings from royalties for rainy days ahead, while commodity prices most likely will be rising faster than the national inflation. This would make the saved royalties a less interesting investment compared to putting the brakes on mining. The respondent laughs with this presumption and affirms it is a short-term strategy. He says it simply does not cover any public interest. “Mining of public interest? This is wrong. The one who really benefits is the owner of the project, not the state as a whole...”. The respondent thinks that a country should make decisions on which type of mining they want, depending on gathered knowledge of the present resources. The mining-energy decisions should be made within a long-term strategy which should have been discussed elaborately. The wish of the involved communities should be respected by the companies. But first of all, there should be a long- term strategy behind it, to benefit as well on the long-term. “It should not be done as Colombia did, which was to open the gates for everybody’s arrival and to start exploiting!” (Interview Senior Official Contraloría, 11-6-2013).
The only actual role for the state which concerns the mining sector, seems to regulate and maintain oversight. But Colombia so far appears to be impotent to do so (Interview Senior Official Contraloría, 11-6-2013). It appears that the available resources are limited. The president of the National Mining Agency, Maria Costanza Garcia, stated in an interview with Northern Miner (2013) that the agency is used to have few people available, but works at the moment with 200 million USD and two auditing companies with each over 700 people. In 2011 there were 16 public officials to control 6000 mining titles. Which implied an impossible task of 375 visits a year for each official (Alvarez, 2013). Maria Costanza Garcia furthermore stated that all titles are being reviewed, concerning compliance and the payments of royalties and leases. Out of 1.700 reviews, 60% is in non-compliance. The problem according to the respondent from the Contraloría is institutional. His argument is that the national government does not have control over large multinationals. Especially regional governments have less control over the local present companies. Local authorities do not have the economic or technical capacity to control corporations that sometimes have the financial capacities of a small country. A
13 Colombian Congress Law 685 of 15 August 2011, which addressed the Mining Code and other provisions, Bogotá: Congress, 2011
45 study of the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo (2011), revealed various practices of corruption in INGEOMINAS (the ministry of mining and energy). It appeared that employees of INGEOMINAS have been very sensitive for corruption when dealing with mining titles. To quote one of their ex-employees: “Everything here has a price. You want to expedite a mining registry, you want a delay, you want to right to exploit in a zone in which it is prohibited? Pay. This is your card to play. Everything is possible” (El Tiempo, 2011).
The previous examples show that Colombia does not have the continuing institutional capacity to control all their mining titles. Various titles and licenses are sold in a corrupt and illegal manner and the government shows to have insufficient capacity to structurally monitor the sector. If Colombia wants to govern the foreign mining sector in their country in a responsible manner, it should have invested in their controlling capacity, as well to prevent state-corporate crimes. Kramer and Michalowski argue that “organizational goals, opportunity and lack of social control (a lax regulatory environment) are all contributing factors in state-corporate crimes (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006: 102)”. In the opinion of the respondent from the Contraloría, the state’s discourse does not make any sense, the mining titles should never have been transferred by the government.
“So the issue is a total disruption of an unconsidered policy. Including the mining sector has no control over itself.” .. “Therefore you should not develop an activity which generates that many affectations on the terrain, you do not do that and you do not have the form of governance, it does not make sense” (Interview Senior Official Contraloría, 11-6-2013).
5.4 Moving for minerals
Mining (as of public interest) implies the expropriation of Colombian citizens when their existence interferes with mining interests. Which will be discussed in this paragraph. A respondent from the environmental organization CIMA, almost has to laugh with the public utility of mining: “Public utility means water, food, the earth… Gold is not something we can eat” (Interview Respondent CIMA, 8-5- 2013).
When he continues to elaborate on the implications of this ‘public utility’, the respondent’s face changes into a strong and serious expression. Because of the Mining Code, it is possible to expropriate people from their territories. The owner of a mining title has the right to negotiate with the rightful owner of the properties, to exploit in his interest. If the owner of this property is not able to settle or does simply not want to agree on this, a TNC has the legal power to commission public forces to evict owner of the property; since mining as public utility trumps for example agricultural purposes. This leaves the owner of the property without a choice (Interview Respondent CIMA, 8-5-2013).
According to Art. 186 of Act 685 of 2001: "Since the mining activity is for public benefit and social interest, expropriation of property by nature or permanent adhesion may be requested and of any other rights over these properties, which are necessary for buildings and facilities needed for the infrastructure itself and the installation of the mining project, to carry out the extraction and collecting of minerals during the period of operation and the total time worked on the project. Exceptionally expropriation will proceed for the benefit of exploratory work. "
46 This violates the fundamental rights of the property owners. The declaration promotes mining, which not has such an obvious social and public character and implicates a change of land use and possibly generates consequent environmental, social and economic effects. In the words of Alvarez (2013), the legal structure around mining has created a “perverse collateral effect” and has a direct potential to affect property rights over the lands where mining projects will be developed.
The Respondent from the Contraloría (Interview Senior Official Contraloría, 11-6-2013) calls these expropriations irregular, because of a ‘constitutional blockade’. There are different conflicting laws within the same hierarchy. Colombia keeps on granting mining titles without taking the serious environmental and social adverse effects of mining into account, based on the principle first come first served. He says that there is no qualification of the exploiter and therefore no process of selection of the highest bidder. According to the Mining Code, the granting institute has to go through an objective selection process, which does not take development sufficiently into account (Contraloría, 2013: 23). In addition, international laws which are signed by the Colombian state, have a supremacy above national legislation. The for example (often ignored) ILO convention 16914 on the previous consultation of indigenous communities, has a hierarchical higher position. Notably the fundamental right to be previously consulted by ethnic communities, has not been performed prior to the granting of mining titles, nor the declaration of indigenous mining zones and afro-communities, as well not in strategic mining zones. All this is in clear disregard of the ILO Convention 169, which forms a part of the constitutional blockade (Contraloría, 2013: 41).
The Colombian government also failed to implement citizen participation in the management of natural resources, the conservation of the environment and important ecosystems. In the declaration of public utility and the social interest of mining, the (environmental) authorities ignored article 1 of the law Decree 2811, stemming from 1974 (Contraloría, 2013: 43).
Article 1 of the law Decree 2811 states: “The environment is a common heritage. The state and individuals must participate in its preservation and management, which is of public utility and social interest. The preservation and management of renewable natural resources are also of public utility and social interest”.
Therefore, mining activities should only be developed in areas where the environmental impact can effectively be prevented, mitigated, corrected and compensated. The study of the Contraloría furthermore explains that the mining and environmental authorities have overlooked the fact that the subsoil is not only composed of extractable minerals for financial gain, as well the vast majority of vital processes that occur on the surface depend on the composition of the subsoil. Those same minerals define the habitat of living organisms, next to being the infrastructure of groundwater and therefore should receive special protection (Contraloría, 2013).
14The ILO Convention 169 is a mayor binding international convention concerning indigenous peoples (of which the Afro-Colombians). The convention has a clausule on the right to prior consultation, which must be carried out in good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures; such as mining projects. For more information:
47 This special protection is not given, even though farmers have the legal arms to defend themselves when a mining title on their territory has been sold (Interview Senior Official Contraloría, 11-6-2013). The abuse of legal power and the sown confusion by bending the use of legal frameworks is facilitating the displacement of the peasant population, which is already a historical victim in Colombia. The threats for the agricultural sector and the environment also put a threat on the food and water security for Colombia as a whole. It is of high importance to look into various judgements ruled by the Constitutional Court, in order to understand various interpretations of the relevant legislation.
In judgement 339-02, it is argued that mining is of such a high risk that it should not be at the same hierarchical level as other laws protecting rights, and therefore offers a false paradigm. The judgement underlines the concept of sustainable development which is mentioned in article 80 of the Colombian constitution and defined through jurisprudence of the Court as a development which “satisfies the needs of the present, without compromising the capacity of future generations to satisfy their own needs”.
In addition, Article 34 of the Law 685 of 2001 and the second paragraph of Article 61 of Law 99 in 1993, allow officials of the Ministry of Environment, without previous studies and without participation of the community, to leave out communities with a subjectively abusive and dismissive form in the process. Communities are not able to decide if they want or do not want to have mining projects. Which remains completely invalid.
The judgement 339-02 furthermore argued, “it is very clear that when legislation refers to article 35, paragraph a, of Law 685 of 2001.. According to those rules… refers totally clear on municipal regulations within the city limits. It is common sense that within the urban limits of a city and logically after having repealed the second paragraph of Article 61 of Law 99 from 1993, municipalities will make a team of officials from the Ministry of Environment and Mines as well with communities, to democratically resolve the destination and use of land within its municipal perimeter”.15
When represents of the Ministry of mining (and energy) visit rural areas and show parts of the national legislation to farmers, farmers do often not know about various judgements, international laws and the constitutional blockades and are often easily intimidated by the state represents who only tell a small part of the relevant legislation. “The communities do not know the topic and remain very vulnerable as they feel to not have the right to fight with mining companies”. Which partly shows the inability of the state to inform their own citizens of their rights (Interview Senior Official Contraloría, 11-6-2013). This is as well in line with Rob White’s claim (2011, 111): “It is the social, economic, and political characteristics of the victim populations that make them vulnerable to victimization in the first place”.
15 The full judgement C-399/02 can be consulted on: http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2002/C- 339-02.htm
48 As green criminology intents to look further than harm inflicted to the human and tries to include the impact on the non-human, this is something that can have its effect on our future generations (Williams, 1996; White, 2011). The construction of mining as ‘public utility’ fails to take a lot of things into account. The implemented legal framework is not fit to protect Colombia from medium- to long- term environmental and social effects, that compromise the ‘human’ in a negative way, while it focus seems to underline short-time economic advantages for just a few. Especially the creation of the legal framework around mining, legitimizes the impactful industry of which the social and economic benefits are far from obvious.
Box 4: Macizo Colombiano
Without yet having a physical presence, the mining industry –in particular AGA- has a psychological presence in the Macizo Colombiano. The Macizo Colombiano is an area containing various, but utmost fragile ecosystems. It can be considered as the ‘sponge’ of Colombia, supplying more than 70% of the freshwater which is consumed in the whole country (El Espectador, 2013e). In 1979, Unesco declared the zone a biosphere reserve. According to the CIMA (Comité de Integración del Macizo Colombiano), it contains 362 bays (cuerpos lagunares), 13 cloud forests, high Andes forests and glaciers. The five most important rivers of Colombia originate in the Macizo: the Magdalena, the Patía, the Putumayo, the Caquetá and the Cauca river (El Espectador, 2012b).
In the department of Cauca, which partly overlaps with the Macizo, 51% of the territory is solicited for mining exploitations (CIMA, 2012). AngloGold Ashanti has the biggest share in mining titles with 42 granted titles and 65 solicitations still in request (INGEOMINAS, 2012).
The communities feel under threat by the massive mining interests. For example in the community of La Sierra, AngloGold Ashanti already owns mining titles for 9.808 hectares of the 11,765 granted hectares in total. While concessions for 13.656 hectares are under solicitation. As many as 90% of their municipality is already compromised by mining, a percentage which is not only common for parts of Cauca (El Espectador, 2012c)
In an interview with various inhabitants of la Sierra, they claim to have an enormous fear for the gold mining multinational. The gold which will be exploited from their soils is their last worry while displacement by force and environmental degradations are widely feared.
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49
Another mining problem in the Macizo is illegal mining. A representative from the environmental organization CIMA (Interview Respondent CIMA, 8-5-2013) speaks about certain ‘mafia’ like groups which often belong to the paramilitaries or guerrillas. Groups that own newly bought equipment and mine in certain areas. They displace the locals who are often small-scale miners themselves and act without regard for the environment and threaten local leaders. A respondent of the Defensoría of Cauca confirms that the region is characterized by a ‘historical’ presence of guerrilla groups, hence an ever high presence of the national army, which also is protecting the interests of AGA (Interview Senior Official Defensoría Cauca, 10-5-2014).
The Defensoría does not expect that a lot of megaprojects will be implemented in the department Cauca. The respondent argued that the strong presence of the indigenous, especially the CRIC (Consejo Regional Indigena Cauca), often is more than successful as a resistance movement (Interview Senior Official Defensoría Cauca, 10-5-2014). In several of their actions, they blocked the Panamerican highway for extended periods of time, they are known for pushing out the national army and expelling the paramilitary. Therefore the respondent from the Defensoría thinks that large-scale projects will be easier implemented in “weaker” departments as neighbouring Nariño and Valle de Cauca. The opposition against AGA still find themselves in a threatened position. Delinda Goméz Gaviria, a female employee of CIMA who initiated a public hearing against AGA, was killed in the municipality of Almaguer on 30 September 2013 (LaSillaVacía, 2013). The victim’s entire municipality is the subject of an application for large-scale mining concessions (National Mining Agency, 2013) and she had spoken out publicly against the company’s interest in the region.
50 5.5 Final remarks
When putting all previous arguments together, the mining locomotive seems a strategy that is hard to defend. The economic advantages are not yet as clear as promised by the Colombian state, which keeps underlining the importance of the locomotive and denying the impact of the sector. The heavily criticized legislation seems to have been implemented by a state which is still incapable to monitor and audit its own mining sector. In the many conversations I have had with Colombians, somehow related to the effects of the multinational mining industry in Colombia, three reasons are mentioned almost unanimous, when explaining to me why it is possible that the current mining discourse is continuing with all that we know. Those reasons are: corruption, corporate power vs. weak governing and the influence of Colombia’s debt to, for instance, the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For example, Colombia still had 277.9 million USD external debt stocks to the IMF in 2011 (IMF, 2012).
While economic arguments are the most important ones behind the mining-energy locomotive, it is hard to see the logic in them. Especially while the gap between the few rich and many poor is on the increase in Colombia. It remains harsh to see that the moreover poor rural population receives the worst of the mining-energy locomotive, while their mainly agricultural purposes are toppled by the interests of the mining sector as ‘public utility’. The increasing rates of displacement, caused by the mining sector, makes them a vulnerable group while it is often argued that the extensive agricultural sector of coffee and food crops is the ‘heart of Colombia’. The social injurious actions, which either result from forced displacements or the future impacts on livelihoods that the mining sector will have, make the state-corporate pushed mining locomotive, enter the discourse of state-corporate crimes. As Kramer and Michalowski argue: “State-corporate crimes are illegal or socially injurious actions that occur when one or more institutions of political governance pursue a goal in direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic production and distribution” (Kramer and Michalowski, 1990: 3).
The mining industry still needs legitimation. Without being acknowledged by other actors, especially in the debates around CSR, it remains hard to argue on the public utility. In the next chapter, several key actors that are of beneficial and aiding character for the mining industry will be discussed.
51
6. Friends and facilitators
Corporate America found its way to Latin America throughout the nineteenth century. Mining railroads, sugar and subsequently electricity, oil and agriculture were the reasons to invest in the Central and Southern parts of the Americas. Greg Grandin describes in his book Empire’s Workshop (2006) how the Christian missionaries had two (in their eyes mutually dependent) goals in Latin America: extending American power and bringing the world closer to the Second Coming of Christ. This opened opportunities for corporate leaders, who started to sponsor religious and civic organizations that “preached the virtues believed to be most conducive to successful free enterprise: individualism, competitiveness, innovation, self-discipline, respect for private property, and, as a reward for such commendable behaviour, consumerism” (Grandin, 2006: 18).
When this foundation was laid, US corporations in Latin America have been fiercely criticized for causing widespread poverty and labour unrest because of their projects. US politician Nelson Rockefeller (grandson of the oil-tycoon John D. Rockefeller) recognized the problems and informed his peers that “we must recognize the social responsibilities of corporations and the corporation must use its ownership of assets to reflect the best interest of the people” (Colby, 1996: 82). The big fear was to lose ownership, especially to European competitors. Nelson Rockefeller therefore called for a “socially responsible capitalism” (Grandin, 2006: 35), which was mainly pushed by “an emerging power bloc of capital-intensive industries, investment banks, and internationally-orientated investment banks” (Ferguson & Rogers, 1986: 52).
The ‘mining-locomotive’ in Colombia fits into terminology of ‘socially responsible capitalism’ while the government opened up its borders, liberalized the tax climate for the extractives and at the meantime wants to promote social and sustainable large-scale projects. The locomotive is not a machine which was solely started and solely operated. Just as US capital made use of Christian missionaries, and US corporations needed to recognize corporate’s social responsibilities and financial back-up (not to speak of territorial control), the mining industry in Colombia as well has its friends and facilitators.
This chapter elaborates on how the mining industry used various actors from outside the sector, in order to develop their discourse, and how this possibly fits into the concept of CSR. It has to be stressed that this chapter is moreover based on examples, incidents and cases, while it is impossible to identify all relations between the mining sector and a spider’s web of interested and interlinked actors, stakeholders and initiatives. Still, the data that will be presented gives a characterizing view on mining- related collaborations and accompanying consequences.
52 6.1 The Canadian ‘engine-man’ starting up the motor
Companies use their financial assets to sponsor and therewith influence a large variety of possibilities. Cave and Rowell (2014) wrote a book, A Quiet Word: Lobbying, Crony Capitalism and Broken Politics in Britain, where they elaborate on how (British) corporations use a wide range of tactics to manage media relations, fund think-tanks and ‘fake grassroots groups’, all within the strategy to influence regulation and government policies to their will. The history of the 2001 Mining Code as well shows an important role for non-mining and non-Colombian actors in the facilitation of this piece of legislation.
Chapter 4 argued that the implementation of the Mining Locomotive primarily benefits multinational companies, while its advantages to Colombia as a whole remain debatable. The 2001 Mining Code cannot be seen as a pure Colombian invented piece of legislation; in fact it was pushed by the Canadians who have a strong mining lobby and a high stake in the international mining sector. The Mining Association of Canada informs that almost 60% of the world’s public mining companies are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX and TSX-Venture Exchanges) and raises 70% of the equity capital for mining companies. One of the reasons they call themselves a ‘global leader’ for (Mining Association of Canada, 2014). This position is pursued abroad while the Canadian government and their multinationals function as a state-corporate tandem to implement their plans elsewhere. In this line of thinking, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (now DFATD; Canada’s International Development Assistance Program), helped to write the legislation for the 2001 Mining Code.
In 1997, CIDA formed a team with the law firm (which was representing several multinational companies) Martinez Córdoba and Associates and the CERI (Canadian Energy Research Institute, an industry think-tank based at the University of Calgary) in order to rewrite the Mining Code of Colombia (IPSnews, 2007). This resulted for example in the fact that mining companies pay far less royalties in Colombia than in Canada. Furthermore, formalisation for small-scale miners became a difficult necessity and environmental regulation was lowered. Not adding up to the image of aiding Colombia in developing a profitable and sustainable mining sector with Canadian expertise. According to Ramírez Cuellar (2005: 38), it is known that the TNCs provide financial support to the CIDA and the CERI, therefore creating a conflict of interest. It seems the sector wrote its own legislation. The same goes for the Colombian lawyer involved in the 1996-1998 Mining Code, who had linkages to the Canadian company Corona Goldfields (Ramírez Cuellar, 2005). This Mining Code as well, was driven by the CIDA- CERI. The development of the two Mining Codes, makes both the development agency and the think- tank active ambassadors, for not only the Canadian mining industry in Colombia, but for all mining multinationals in the country. Just as Cave and Rowell argued (2014) how money was spent by British companies to influence politics, the example of the Colombian Mining Code shows how this piece of legislation is a corporate setup, initiated in Canada and pushed by different actors through corporate sponsorships.
One of the losers of the 2001 Mining Code were the indigenous communities. The lawyers who wrote the code later acknowledged to never have fulfilled their obligation to carry out a consultation in order to negotiate an agreement (Ramírez Cuellar, 2005). The chapter on ethnic groups was directly sent to Congress, according to Ramirez-Cuellar not fulfilling; their contract, nor upholding the law, nor the constitution and the ILO Convention 169 which was ratified in Colombia in 1991 with Law 21 (Ramírez Cuellar, 2005: 40). He furthermore stated in an interview that the Mining Code is a “Canadian
53 manipulation to benefit foreign companies to the detriment of Colombians” and “The new code flexibilised environmental regulations, diminished labour guarantees for workers and opened the property of afro-Colombian and indigenous people to exploitation” (IPSnews, 2007). Because of a lack of international regulatory control on various aspects of the mining industry, there is little incentive for the Colombian state to ignore the economic motivation in favour of an environmental and social consideration. Therefore the implementation of the Canadian pushed Mining Code is in line with the argumentation of Kramer and Michalowski: “Since there is no mechanism for nations to act collectively, individual state action is critically weakened. In all nation-states, then, there is tremendous ideological and economic pressure for corporate harms to be ignored, tolerated, and even, at times, embraced “for the good of the country” (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006: 101).”
While most of the contemporary mining production in Colombia still is dominated by artisanal and small-scale miners, this is this sector which is heavily victimized by the Mining Code. As a small-scale miner in Sur de Bolívar tells:
“They want to deprive the poor and hand over everything to a multinational”. … “With the current mining legislation, called the Mining Code, the state wants to remove the small-scale mining sector. They don’t want the small-scale miner to participate. This is also one of the demands here in the mobilization. The inclusion of small-scale and traditional miners by the government, into the new Mining Code reform.” (Interview Small-Scale miner Sur de Bolívar, 17-9-2013).
The Mining Code was advocated by the Canadian mining lobby and therefore partly explains its negligence towards, for example, the small-scale miners and indigenous communities, while its main focus lies on multinational companies. It furthermore characterizes Canada, that the country did not want their companies to be held responsible abroad. The country is known for the protective attitude concerning their industries. An example is how the Canadian Parliament voted against the proposed Bill C-300 in 2010, The Corporate Accountability of Mining, Oil or Gas in Developing Countries Act: a bill designed to hold Canadian TNCs responsible to human rights violations and environmental breaches abroad. According to the commission Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada, their companies are guilty of the worst violations on an international scale. The Bill was voted out in the House of Commons (which is a component of the Parliament) with 140 against 134 votes. A representative from MiningWatch Canada even said in an interview with the VICE magazine, that there are only two Canadian laws that apply internationally to mining practices: one against having sex with children and another one against bribery and corruption, which is something they almost cannot control. “It’s just kind of, cross your fingers and hope that they act responsibly” (VICE, 2013). In Colombia, 43.41% of the mining companies are Canadian (PBI Colombia, 2011).
54 6.2 The IFC’s appetite for gold
It is evident that the Colombian Mining Legislation is mainly facilitated by Canadian actors. Now that the legal ground was laid for mining companies, obtaining financial assets is one of the next steps to develop their plans. There are mining companies who are relatively new in the field and need an extra financial injection to realize their projects. The IFC (International Finance Corporation) is no stranger to investments in the extractive industry. The IFC, which is a member of the World Bank Group, was established to advance economic development by investing in commercial and for-profit projects. Their official purpose is to reduce poverty and to promote development. In Colombia, the IFC invested in the (Canadian) Angostura project of Eco Oro in March 2009. They did so through the purchase of company shares, with a total amount of 11.4 million USD (CAO, 2012). The involvement of the IFC in the Angostura project got them an official complaint (CAO, 2012), but the IFC’s choice was, according to Eco Oro, initiated because of their good human rights and environmental management (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013). The complaint was accepted in July 2012 and the investments of the IFC in the Angostura Project are being re-evaluated (Carbonell, 2012).
The complaint against the IFC has two important arguments, concerning violations of their own IFC procedures and policies. Firstly, the IFC violated the provisions of its Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability. There was no EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) when the investments were made, while this is a requirement: “It failed to perform an adequate assessment of the client’s capacity and commitment as required by the IFC Social and Environmental Policy” (CAO, 2012: 15). According to the complaint, the project has been categorized wrongly, given the scale of future impacts of the project. The second point, concerned a negligence on the part of the IFC, in their due diligence. It was not ensured that the Angostura project complied with the IFC performance standards. The IFC failed to verify if (current) Eco Oro included and identified affected communities in their review process.
The IFC made a big mistake according to the action committee, when the company unsuccessfully presented an EIA to the Colombian state, which was subsequently denied (Interview Representative Action Committee, 21-10-2013). The IFC did not withdraw from the project afterwards and still is an important shareholder. The signees of the complaint felt it was therefore necessary to make the claim. Eco Oro responded to the EIA failure by contracting a Colombian engineers firm, Ecodes, to conduct an ecosystem biodiversity and socioeconomic study, “to a degree of detail not previous undertaken in Colombia” (MiningWeekly, 2013). Ecodes was financed by Eco Oro and had the positive conclusions the company needed. According to a respondent of a local action committee; Ecodes is “the little horse of Eco Oro, their business card”. Their study is, according to the respondent, the document Eco Oro always mentions in discussions on the viability of the project (Interview Representative Action Committee, 21-10-2013). The IFC seems not to be restrained to invest in an industry with a history like gold mining, nor if located in a region tainted by conflict as Santander. More surprising is that the IFC seems to have violated its own requirements, and only started investigating if this happened when the external pressures started.
This example shows how Eco Oro got support and therefore some kind of legitimation by the IFC. The IFC widely promotes the message of development and reducing poverty, but still supports a project which is not approved by the Colombian government, because of the environmental risks. In the next paragraph an analysis will be given of a multi-stakeholder platform, which merely focuses on the
55 human rights aspect of business, and herewith provides legitimation in the aspect of conflict and security.
6.3 ‘Multi-stakeholderism’
The debates on CSR have a strong focus on inclusive discussions and the participation of the relevant involved stakeholders in all phases of the relevant project. According to Gatto (2002) the internal dimension of a company’s responsibility involves its shareholders, owners and employees. The external dimension extends beyond the involvement of various stakeholders as business partners and suppliers, customers public authorities and NGOs representing local communities and the environment. Gatto (2002) sees the involvement of those stakeholders as a moral justification for the existence of a corporation, productive in its contributions to a society. Dashwood (2012: 5) identifies emerging political spaces with the devolution of the state authority. In this space, NGOs and the company in question, can participate in governance initiatives and therewith causing multi-layered, more complex governance processes, containing varying stakeholders. In the Colombian context, regions which are tainted by violence and have a high absence of the state, give opportunity to alternative processes of governance. Multi-stakeholder platforms can prove to be a good practice when contributing to bridge the gap between human rights and the business community. The ‘multi- stakeholderism’ approach as Buxton (2014) writes, is the idea that different stakeholders (governments, corporate, citizens) combined, develop policies at best. This idea has found a lot of positive resonance among civil society, while having the intentions to democratize and legitimize decision-making through a more accountable form. Belonging to those multi-stakeholder platforms is often an integral part of the promotion of CSR (Buxton, 2014).
6.3.1 The Comité Minero-Energético
The CME (Mining-Energy Committee) is one of the most interesting examples on the functioning of multi-stakeholders platforms in Colombia, in this case concerning the extractive industry. The CME was initiated under the name ‘International Initiative’ in the year 2003 by various oil-companies active in Colombia. The main reason to start the business initiated platform was to officially help Colombia in the sphere of human rights, public security and human security (Interview Executive CME, 12-9-2013). At the moment, the CME is open for companies from various sectors who have a relevancy to implement the Voluntary Principles.16 AGA is one of the members, just as the Dutch Embassy, those to actors will be discussed later in this paragraph.
According to a respondent from the CME, the platforms can offer new insights and contributions to the human rights debate in which Colombia still has a dubious role:
“In Colombia we recognize –the government and companies- that there are problems with security and human rights in relation to the public and private security” .. “We recognise that there fortunately is a tool which is useful for those contexts. The Voluntary Principles on Human
16 Since 2013, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
56 Rights” .. “Thirdly we recognize that there is a job for all the embassies, the national government and companies, which help us to articulate answers of better quality than each of us can do individually” (Interview Executive CME, 12-9-2013).
It has to be stressed that the VPs (Voluntary Principles) remain absolutely voluntary in character. On the webpage of the CME17 we can find information on what the CME is and is not. Most interesting, what it is not.
It does not issue binding norms for business (that power resides in the Colombian state) It is not a tri-party space, but a public-private alliance, which advances in its relationship with organizations of civil society It does not judge the behaviour of companies It does not sanction the companies (this competence resides with the state) It is not a civil societal organization
Being a part of the CME, seems to legitimize the participants in their aspirations to respect human rights and in their intention to apply private and public forces, for the security and wellbeing of public and private interests. One of the main weaknesses of the CME is that it does not judge the behaviour of the participation companies, therefore it lacks the power to hold companies responsible while mainly serving as a platform for discussion and looking into the future.
“The CME cannot, in not a single way, formulate anything that links the juridical sense of the corporations, nor the government. The CME makes recommendations along the appropriate practices. How a corporation should proceed to do the things well. Of course, within the legal framework. But as the law has a lot of spaces it is possible to do the things one way or another. In the CME we identify how to do it well. Within the law, without making modifications to the law. But at least till today, we did not see anything we needed to change, in the law” (Interview Executive CME, 12-9-2013).
The statement had an ambiguous character, because the respondent also acknowledged the weakness of Colombian law, as well as the present problem with human rights.
The CME respondent has more than two decades of experience in the oil sector, while the current president of the CME works for AGA. The hierarchy of the platform is dominated by corporate representatives. But, the respondent does not see a conflict of interest. “If the president of the CME cannot be of a company, so from where should he be?” In his opinion it would be equally objective/subjective if somebody formerly represented an NGO, the government or was an academic. Even people from outside of the sector are not an option. “A company which does not participate [in the CME], is a company which does not has an interest in the topic!” .. “From where do we get somebody who knows of mining, of oil, of electricity, of security and human rights? Out of the coffee cultivating sector? No. Of the –let’s say- educational sector? No. The people who make cars? No!” Especially because there is no judgment in the platform, there no conflict of interest according to the respondent: “This is a strengthening” (Interview Executive CME, 12-9-2013).
17 Consult this webpage for more information on the CME: http://cmecolombia.co/que-es-hace-y-aporta-el- cme/
57 The role of civil society in the platform remains unclear. The respondent (Interview Executive CME, 12- 9-2013) explained that there was a selection process by the members to choose the first NGOs to participate. A few NGOs were selected to participate in the platform, based on inter alia common interests and their tendencies to have a critical, but not too critical character. This choice can be rationalised from different perspectives:
“In Colombia and other parts of the world, there is a huge radicalization regarding, say, between business, government and NGOs. Then there are NGOs who believe that companies in general, or in particular are (characterizing just a bit) satanic or the devil. The manifestation of evil in the world, right? Some companies believe that there are NGOs that incorporate evil, and there are governments who think the same of some NGOs. Some NGOs in turn think the same about the government. I mean, there is a radicalization, corresponding to very strong and clear prejudices. This means, it’s a dialogue between two or three, who consider each other as the incarnation of evil? That is very difficult. So part of this careful process we have undertaken in the CME is aimed at solving this problem. Meaning, how to build this kind of dialogue between actors. So what happened Abraham... Just as there are very careful companies medium careful, radical and non-radical companies. There exists a wide variety of companies, as with NGOs” (Interview Executive CME, 12-9-2013).
Literature on multi-stakeholder platforms offers a different possible explanation. Choosing NGOs on the characteristic of not being too critical, is according to Buxton (2014) the exclusion of conflicting civil society groups in favour of more consensual ones. This means that the often better funded civil society groups are allowed, who are more willing to make deals. The CME respondent used his explanation to show how he legitimizes the platform, but as well eliminates factors that might be too critical to the state-corporate interests.
The state-corporate stronghold which chooses the NGOs to participate, is not the most convincing way to show the platforms’ democratic character. Fauset (2006) argues that in either case, civil society is constantly outgunned by corporations in terms of resources. The inequality of capacities prevents effective monitoring and evaluations on the commitments corporations have made.
6.3.2 The involvement of civil society
There seems to be a paradox on the level of commitment in the CME. In the eyes of one of the groups ‘representing’ civil society, the NGO called PAX (formerly IKV Pax Christi), the CME cannot be seen as a multi-stakeholder initiative (Interview Representative PAX Christi, 14-10-2013). “Listen, the CME is an initiative from oil, gas and mining companies in collaboration with the Colombian government. NGOs are not allowed! So we [PAX] neither. Thus NGOs are not allowed. An initiative where NGOs are not allowed has no credibility to us.” It seems that the ‘participating parties of civil society’ are only allowed to take a role in panels, by providing information or presentations on certain topics. According to the respondent from PAX, NGOs do not have a voice in the platform and are not allowed as permanent members. She visited the CME two times, to give her recommendations on a protocol the CME wrote on kidnappings and extortion, of which just a few points were adopted. It appears that the CME promotes itself as a multi-stakeholder platform, while civil society has no serious saying in the committee itself. By promoting the participation of civil society, the CME tries to legitimize itself while
58 in remains a state-business ruled platform in reality. The participating companies are therefore able to neutralize criticism on their human rights implications, to a certain extent. “Well look to the CME, it’s a platform for business, for the sector. They are working on self-regulation. Well, as every sector which is under attack, they try to regulate their selves to remain in front of legal regulation.” If the platform pursues this self-regulation in a too obvious manner, it will lose its legitimacy, civil society is simply needed to objectify their role. To neutralize the state-corporate power aspect, which regulates the platform, they promote their multi-stakeholder identity which is according to the respondent from PAX, based on a lie.
“The argument of the CME is already the same for years, this is that there is too much mistrust between NGOs and companies to operate on an equal base. If they want to create a multi- stakeholder platform, well... I think a multi-stakeholder dialogue should be a real multi- stakeholder dialogue. Every participant should have the same voice... Well, here it is different, as an independent CSR initiative it is not credible, it is just a self-regulating instrument, no more and no less” (Interview Representative PAX, 14-10-2013).
The vision of PAX is shared by Buxton (2014) who argues that multi-stakeholder platforms could legitimize exploitation, while diverting regulatory action, which could prevent or stop negative impacts that benefit market-based solutions.
In the meanwhile, PAX receives a lot of criticism from certain local civil society groups in Tolima, where the NGO focuses on the La Colosa project from AGA. The local groups feel a mismatch with the internationally operating NGO, while PAX seeks to dialogue with AGA and has visited or participated in the CME. Now the local wish is to block the entrance of the company, by whatever means, they feel that PAX does not address their wishes and legitimizes the company by for example conducting a risk analysis. In their vision, PAX tries to regulate a sector which is not welcome under any circumstance. Therefore giving only recommendations, which are communicated by PAX on the La Colosa project and do not elaborate more than one page (El Nuevo Día, 2013), is received as an offense by various groups in Tolima.
The conflict in vision between representatives of local civil society vs. PAX, is analysed in the concept environmentalism of the poor by Joan Martinez-Alier (2002). The local agents rarely see themselves as environmentalists, their concerns lie with their livelihoods. While NGOs struggle for environmental justice or conflict resolution, various groups in Tolima struggle to protect their livelihoods, which can be seen as the defence of (legal) community property rights. Intermediary NGOs give new explicit (environmental) meanings to questions as these, connecting communities in broader networks to influence international policies. The intermediary NGOs have given an explicit environmental meaning to such livelihood struggles, connecting them into wider networks and proposing new policies of worldwide relevance. Still, this does not mean that, especially with voluntary guidelines, NGOs can guarantee any form of protection. (Traditional) communities face difficulties accessing international litigation possibilities, for them it is hard to hire expensive law firms and as Martinez-Alier argues, they predominantly speak ‘the language of the Third World’ (Martinez-Alier, 2002). Communal ‘Not in my back yard!’ (NIMBY) politics differ from objectives of international civil society, whom often are seen to chase different goals, as for example PAX in this case.
59 6.3.3 The Dutch Embassy
The Dutch Embassy is co-financing the CME platform. The participation of Embassies is according to the respondent of PAX a part of their CSR promoting strategy. PAX criticized the Dutch Embassy various times for financing the CME which proclaims to be a multi- stakeholders platform, without really being this (Interview Representative PAX, 14-10-2013). In an interview with the Embassy, they not only acknowledged financing the platform, as well the participation of PAX was confirmed among other NGOs. The main reason the Embassy is participating concerns the dialogue with the coal mining giants in the CME, of whom The Netherlands is the biggest big importer (SIMCO, 2013). While this is claimed and the importance to monitor and regulate the coal mining sector is underlined, the Dutch Embassy as well is involved in the promotion of the infrastructural developments (a port on the North coast of Colombia) where Colombian coal is exported, something unavoidable according to the Embassy (Interview Representative Economic Department Dutch Embassy, 4-12-2013).
Most weaknesses of the CME are confirmed, but the Embassy respondent wants to give an additional comment on their reason to participate: “Not always raise your finger, but extend your hand”. According to him this is not only a hand with money, but the Dutch Embassy tries to push the CME to implement more of civil society. “You will put yourself in an offside position within a development [the CME initiative]. If you want to manifest your influence, it is better to enter the dialogue. It is good to take fierce positions, remaining with the idea to dialogue” (Interview Representative Economic Department Dutch Embassy, 4-12-2013).
6.4 Human rights and the national army
The CME focuses on the linkages between business and human rights, business and protection services provided by the army and private security. AGA (which is a member), publicly promotes its concern for human rights, has adapted the Voluntary Principles and relies on the platform on how to relate to the Colombian public forces.
6.4.1 AGA’s questionable reputation
AGA already has a questionable reputation on a global level (see box below) and is achieving the same reputation in Colombia. Representatives of the Defensoría, environmental authorities, and the Contraloría already expressed their concerns about adverse economic and environmental impacts, and human rights problems which are beginning to emerge. In September 2013, an adversary of the La Colosa project was killed front of his children (Colombia Reports, 2013). This case led to an Early Day Motion (a tool to draw attention to the issue), which was issued in the British Parliament to move the Colombian authorities to organize an independent investigation on the murder (British Parliament, 2013). Another case of death concerned a woman who was killed in Cauca on September 30, 2013 (LaSillaVacía, 2013). The municipality of the victim was under application for large-scale mining concessions, in its total surface (National Mining Agency, 2013). It is still unknown who killed the woman, but it is known that the victim spoke out publicly against AGA’s interests in the region, whilst being active for an environmental organization. AGA’s prior relations with paramilitary groups (HRW, 2005) and the mining industry in Colombia which has a track record in the killing of activists (Ramirez Cuellar, 2005), make a dangerous combination.
60
Box 5: AGA in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
AGA dominates in the ownership of Colombian mining titles and tries to promote their business in an ethical and responsible manner. Examples from their recent history do show otherwise in fox example the DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo). It was proven that AngloGold Ashanti established a relationship with the FNI (Nationalist and Integrationist Front), “an armed group with an atrocious record of human rights crimes who continued to carry out serious and widespread abuses” (HRW, 2005: 65). By financially helping the FNI, AGA supposedly violated an UN (United Nations) arms embargo which states that: “no direct or indirect assistance, especially military or financial assistance, [be] given to the movements and armed groups present in the DRC” (UN Security Council resolution 1493, 2003).
While a group of UN experts investigated breaches to the arms embargo, AGA explained by e-mail to HRW that “There has been no intention on the part of AngloGold Ashanti to violate the embargo either acting by itself or in concert with any party” (HRW, 2005: 67). Still, not having the intention to violate the embargo did not mean that AGA took a significant risk to work as an extractive company in a region known for violence and conflict. HRW reported that AGA had various meetings with the FNI, meetings which have been addressed by AGA as “unavoidable contact”. AGA added that it is not the policy or practice to establish continuous working relations with militias in conflict zones. As well on various occasions, AGA made payments to the FNI, FNI members used the company’s vehicles and planes hired by the company (HRW, 2005: 73). AGA was therefore delivering “material benefits and prestige to the FNI” (HRW, 2005: 65), therewith providing means that possibly were used for grave human rights violations and territorial control.
The FNI leader at that time (2004), Njabu, received payments by AGA. This was admitted by Lassen (Consultant and AngloGold Ashanti’s head of office in Uganda). Lassen told HRW that: “We [AGA] know how to deal with people like him”. (HRW, 2005: 72).. “We don’t want to cut Njabu out,”.. “He needs to feel included. He just wants money and then he will go away.” Later that same year, payments were denied by another AGA representative. While ignoring its responsibility to respect human rights, AGA kept underlining their support for a local hospital and school and contributions to road repairs. In the letter they wrote to HRW on December 7th, AGA stated that “steps have been taken to ensure that human rights will be upheld at all times” (HRW, 2005: 77). According to the UN; companies “shall not engage in nor benefit from war crimes and crimes against humanity” nor “torture, forced disappearances, forced or compulsory labour” as defined by international law (UN, 2003). By the established relationship between AGA and the FNI, AGA failed to uphold its obligations. Being a company with a propagated CSR strategy, they did not secure that their operations had a negative effect on the local human rights situation. HRW did not identify any effective steps to ensure that their activities did not have this effect, therewith choosing for business interests, instead of preventing their involvement in human rights abuses.
61 Victims seem to appear in the zones where AGA showed its interest. In theory, it can be true that a company did not seek involvement or did not assist human rights violations. However, they can benefit from such events.
According to Gatto, companies also have an indirect responsibility (2002: 29):
“When companies act as indirect perpetrators of human rights abuses it is difficult hold them legally responsible, although they can be held responsible on an ethical and political basis. Beyond law, the idea that companies are morally responsible if they passively benefit from violations has gained ground. Even if it has not actively helped the perpetrators, a company that voluntarily enters a business environment or stays there, when they know or should know that they are somehow benefiting from ongoing human rights violations, has, at least a moral duty to take reasonable steps to prevent or stop the violations” (Gatto, 2002: 29).
This means that companies in some cases do not have the intention to directly commit human rights violations, but their mere presence in certain areas, contexts and environments, is just enough to cause violations on the hands of other actors.
6.4.2 AGA in Sur de Bolívar
The case of Sur de Bolívar seems an excellent example of how AGA’s relations to the army seriously compromise human rights in the region which is dominated by small-scale miners.
First of all, AGA stated the following on the small-scale and artisanal miners:
“AngloGold Ashanti takes seriously our obligations to protect our assets and therefore oppose illegal artisanal/small-scale activity on our sites. As we recognize that so many depend on artisanal/small-scale mining for their livelihood, we support steps taken to create and build the legal, formal artisanal/small-scale sector. This support includes the promotion of artisanal/small-scale formalization, support to health and safety regulation, and innovative solutions to land use and economic development” (AGA, 2012: 86).
In the same document, the 2012 sustainability report, a following statement is made on security and human rights:
“AngloGold Ashanti acknowledges and supports the rights of governments to uphold the requirements of the law and to prosecute where individuals or groups of people trespass on company property, including the act of illegal mining. We also support taking action that is appropriate in terms of the law and in accordance with established international norms of human rights including the Voluntary Principles on Security and HumanRights (VPSHR)” (AGA, 2012: 86).
AGA has signed various agreements with the Ministry of Defense. Numerous battalions have been deployed for the protection of AGA, which is according to Goodland (2011) not the way to solve security issues: “At the moment, a full 30 percent of the budget of the Ministry of Defense is spent on protecting foreign mining corporations from impacted communities. This waste of money could be greatly reduced by following Colombian law and best practices to prevent damaging impacts that lead
62 to conflict and violence. Prevention is better than cure.” The same worries are shared by Ivan Cepeda, a representative in the Colombian Chamber. His preoccupation concerns the military aid for foreign multinationals. He calls it a paradox that communities who reside in the same zones as mining multinationals, were excluded from extra military help while being under threat from illegal armed groups. In return, those communities do not pay extra money for more state protection, while AGA pays 1.9 million USD to the Ministry of Defense (El Colombiano, 2014a).
The Colombian Public Forces can be seen as a facilitator and friend of mining business in Colombia, provided by the Ministry of Defense. As Eco Oro (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013) needs the protection by the Public Forces to further develop their projects, they state that the security of a zone remains the responsibility of the state. The same argument is valid for AGA, of which the respondent (Interview CEO AGA, 18-6-2013) claims as well that the entrance of AGA will be an improvement of the security situation of a certain region. He underlines that the army functions for the regional security and not only for the company and that the army operates outside the operation and not inside. Basically in AGA’s words, “It serves to protect the chicken, the cow! Well, it is for security and that there will not be a presence of illegal groups” (Interview CEO AGA, 18-6-2013). Especially with this rhetoric and a strategy of criminalization (with which AGA is no stranger, see chapter 7.1), the army can be quite useful for more than only a protective role for the companies against illegal armed groups.
The Battalion Nueva Granada has its base in Sur de Bolívar and serves to protect the mining titles which have been obtained by AGA (amongst others) and shows that the public forces not only serve to ‘protect the cow and chicken’; the security for all in the region, but can adept a more profound role to defend the interests of the company. As well in Sur de Bolívar, AGA entered the region with the name of Kedahda S.A. in 2003 (see chapter 7.1). The arrival of the company did not fall in good grace with the local population, which consists of an extensive group of small-scale miners. The development discourse of current AGA, leads to little confidence with the local miners, according to them (Interview Union representative small-scale miners Sur de Bolívar 17 September 2013) large-scale mining does not have anything to offer for them at all. They saw their job-security being threatened by the implementation of the 2001 Mining Code, which facilitated the increased acquisition of their territories by foreign multinationals, such as AGA.
A local miner stated:
“Multinational corporations are interested in these mountains. They are currently playing an active role so that the small-scale miners leave. They are trying to force the government to move us, using the Public Forces, or by whatever means. They are playing politics, changing the Mining Code, so that there is no option left for us to continue.” .. “It just does not make sense for the government to keep us here. Its interest is to give these lands to multinational corporations. To move us, and install them.”.. “The battalion is not looking for subversive groups in the San Lucas mountains. The real reason according to the soldiers themselves, being here on the top of the mountain which is a strategic spot, is to look after the multinational companies. When the government will decide it, they will displace the small-scale miners. This is their strategy. They are not looking for guerilla, if they would do so, they would be out in the field but they don’t move from their spot” (Interview Small-Scale Miner, 23 September 2013).
The presence of AGA not only pressured the job-security of the local miners, as well the human rights situation for the miners did not seem to improve after the arrival of the public forces to protect the
63 company’s interest. The case of a community leader and miner from Sur de Bolívar, who was murdered by the Battalion Nueva Granada in 2006, is one of the strongest examples of human rights violations committed by state-corporate pressures and actions related to the transnational mining industry in Colombia. A first-hand witness gave his testimony (Interview Community Leader Sur de Bolívar, 18-9- 2013) on the murder of a community leader, who was shot to death under the false assumption of being a member of Colombia’s second largest guerrilla group, the ELN (National Liberation Army). Various respondents claimed that the victim had no relations with the ELN, but admit that he was known for his public local role in the opposition to the entrance of multinational corporations in the region. It was the army itself that constructed a non-existing relation between insurgency movement and the victim. This started with an incident a month before the assassination, when the army killed a guerrillero from the ELN. This happened, in an according to the witness, staged fight. The victim’s body was left in front of the community leader’s door. This symbolic act was accompanied with the threat, “next time it will be you”, which was not an empty promise (Interview Community Leader Sur de Bolívar, 18-9-2013).
A document (Informe Inteligencia Batallón Nueva Granada, 2006) from the Battalion Nueva Granada, which specifically refers to the victim, gives more support to the claim the locals have made about the assassination. The document names the victim’s presence in a community meeting in March 2006, organized to block the entrance of AGA and Kedahda in the area. It further referred to the involvement of the victim with the ELN. On 19 September 2006, half a year later, he was murdered.
The respondent, who witnessed the incident, walked 100 meters behind the victim when he encountered a group of soldiers from the battalion which was based nearby. He saw how the soldiers staged a fight and the victim was abused but not killed. The witness ran to the first house to alert a family, when he heard the sounds of 7 or 8 shots and knew immediately what happened. The body of the victim was taken by his family on the next day from the military base (Interview Community Leader Sur de Bolívar, 18-9-2013). In the official statement of the battalion, the target was killed in a combat with members of the ELN, to which was referred as a ‘narco-terrorist organization’. The crime committed by the army, was denied by inventing a legitimate reason, which is related to combatting insurgency groups. A human rights lawyer who is been involved with the regional matter, claims that the battalion Nueva Granada is known for its protective role for the interests of AGA (Interview Lawyer SEMBRAR, 12-9-2013). This was confirmed by various other respondents.
It is not possible to blame the violence directly to the multinationals that entered the region. AGA has agreements with the Ministry of Defense and it is true that battalions are deployed for their protection. But hard evidence does not exist. In the end, it will probably never be proven who directly gave orders for the murder of the community leader in Sur de Bolívar (and similar cases), but: “Crimes resulting from elite decisions are committed rarely, if ever, by the officials who authorize them” (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006: 8). In this manner, if there will be justice, it will only be given under in the chain of command.
The company should in Gatto’s (2002: 33) argumentation move away from the limited violations approach to human rights, where a company just refrains from directly causing harm, but move towards a responsibility approach. Herewith a company tries to promote, protect and fulfill human rights in an active manner. The evidence against the army, shows a deliberate killing, giving them another +1 on the list of killed guerrilleros, while knowing that they as well protected the interests of
64 AGA. The argumentation they used denied the real status of the victim as a community leader, and made the murder look like an act of self-defense. This argumentation perfectly fits the way in which Stanley Cohen explains how institutions are able to use a vocabulary of official denial; neutralizing and denying the true content of their actions (Cohen, 1993). Additionally it seems that the government (in this case: the Ministry of Defense) provides a part of the state’s (theoretical) monopoly of violence as a service to a commercial AND foreign actor. Especially in Colombia, which is in a war-like situation, this is a delicate decision. As Bebbington et al. (2008: 899) claim: “the expansion of mining has come coupled with changes in the way in which security is provided, with the state willingly delegating (or contracting out) the use of force to private actors”. The agreements between AGA and the Ministry of Defence should resolve a security situation, but as well show to offer occasion for human rights violations of which the cause is state-corporate in this case.
Box 6: Working the gold veins of Sur de Bolívar
The simultaneous gold rush of Colombian small-scale miners and multinational capital merges together in the remote area of San Pedro Frío, Sur de Bolívar. Two cab rides, a trip with lancha rápida passing over the Río Magdalena and a final three hours of slippery, bumpy first class off-road action by a Toyota Land Cruiser brings you to the miners’ communities of the Serranía of San Lucas, Sur de Bolívar. The violent civil war between 1946 and 1958 as an effect of rural settlements related to the conflict between the Colombian Conservative and Liberal parties –better known as La Violencia- triggered mass internal migration. Many migrants from the departments of Cundinamarca, Caldas, Tolima, Santander and Antioquia found a home in the South of the department of Bolívar. Cruelly, certain geological characteristics made sure that Sur de Bolívar was not the best safe haven.
Since the 2001 Mining Code, artisanal and small-scale miners have faced a strong political and military crackdown on their operations. One of their biggest concerns is the criminalization of their sector. The lack of government aid in their formalization process makes the small-scale miners believe the Mining Code is not designed for them.
Most of the miners are connected with the Federación Agromineros Sur de Bolívar (Federation of agro-miners of Sur de Bolívar) and work on their legally obtained titles. In San Pedro Frío, a small-scale miner says that after he got displaced in 2000 by the paramilitary in the department of Antioquia, he came to work as a miner in Sur de Bolívar. Since mining is all his family knows, he is glad to be able to work in Sur de Bolívar, although that life is hard. To provide for his family he has to work 7 days a week inside small tunnels, where it’s often hard to breathe. Working days of 8 hours does not always prove sufficient to provide, sometimes he needs to continue at night to make ends meet for his family. His biggest fear is the threat of multinationals; to be displaced and be without work again (Interview Small-scale Miner Sur de Bolívar, 23 September 2013).
He has no trust in the government and the power of law, claiming that “they displace us and want the multinationals to enter”. Other opportunities besides mining are scarce for him.
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65 Being under the national poverty average, according to DANE (National Administrative Department of Statistics), Bolívar is still one of the poorest regions of the country. Families of small-scale miners often work for generations in their gold mines without being able to leave circumstances of extreme poverty. El Dorado-like ambitions do not dictate the miners’ motivation, it is all about making a normal living. An ambition which seemed even harder to fulfill after the implementation of the 2001 Mining Code, aimed at the formalization of the sector.
With over 5 million internally displaced, a large part of the rural migrant population finds a home in urban jungles such as Bogota. A lack of city experience and opportunities forces them into a life of street misery. Another displaced miner explains me why the city is no alternative: “The miners don’t know anything more than mining. Arriving displaced in a city, the first easy thing to do is bad things. He does not know what to do.” (Interview Union representative small-scale miners Sur de Bolívar, 17 September 2013)
The effects of Colombia’s internal conflict manifest themselves on the miners in Sur de Bolívar. After a history of displacement, working gold veins seemed a better opportunity than taking a chance in the unknown big Colombian urban zones. The current threat of mass displacement, as an effect of the arrival of multinationals interested in the minerals of their current region, seems just a new chapter of an ongoing history for them. Structurally played, harassed and violated by guerrilla and paramilitary groups, the last year’s pressures by state and public forces make the community fear for new displacements.
6.5. Defensoría
The Ministry of Defence is not the only state-actor that is connected to TNCs in the human rights discourse. As well the Defensoría shows to be connected, through sponsorship in this case. The following part will elaborate on how the Defensoría of Cauca accepted money from AGA in order to investigate human rights violations.
The Defensoría is the Colombian state institute charged with overseeing the protection of civil and human rights within the Colombian legal framework. As their website states, it provides “a public and free service to defend the rights and to undertake a judicial or extrajudicial representation" (Defensoría, 2013). Especially in the department Cauca, the Defensoría seems of utmost importance. In the offices of the Defensoría in the capital of Cauca, Popayán, a respondent from the Defensoría tells that there is a high presence of the FARC and the ELN in his department. Other departments often have to deal with just one front, while there are more than 10 in Cauca (Interview Senior Official Defensoría Cauca, 10-5-2013). This is why he speaks about a historical guerrilla presence.
Cauca not only has to worry about the presence of illegal armed groups in the department. According to various local groups of civil society, the arrival of mining TNCs, as AGA, put the local population as well under threat (Interviews JyP, CIMA, ONIC & CRIC). According to the Defensoría, the Defensor (the departmental Ombudsman himself) has a different opinion, and warns about the unsubstantiated opinion of socio-environmental organizations, denying their claim (Interview Senior Official Defensoría Cauca, 10-5-2013). The respondent acknowledges the displacements, often caused by the extractive
66 industry, and states that this is why the army sends personnel with the workers of AGA, so they will not have any problems doing their jobs. Leaving space for suggestion in who the Defensoría actually is protecting. The respondent claims to have no relation with the owners of the mining titles. When questioning more on the sponsor projects of AGA; a bell rings “aaah si”. He starts to talk about AGA’s voluntary involvement in ‘global pacts’ concerning human rights, corruption and the environment (Interview Senior Official Defensoría Cauca, 10-5-2013).
Together with the Procuraduría18 and others, the decision was made to allow AGA to make a financial contribution to a Mobil Unit on Human Rights, which forms a part of the Defensoría. According to the respondent of the Defensoría, there was no criticism against the acceptance of AGA’s contribution, something which is not true according to CIMA (Interview Respondent CIMA, 8-5-2013) who criticized AGA’s involvement. AGA contributed with an amount of around 180 million Colombian pesos and proposed to do likewise in the second year. This was subsequently not accepted by the Defensoría and caused a break for the Mobil Unit on Human Rights (Interview Senior Official Defensoría Cauca, 10-5- 2013).
In contradiction to their sponsorship, AGA itself has been linked to human rights violations in Cauca. This happened for example in the municipality of Suárez.
Box 7: La Toma - Cauca
Before mining a single gram of gold, AGA has created quite some controversy in the Cauca department. This happened for example in the community of La Toma, in Northern Cauca. The local (mainly) afro-Colombian population descends from their enslaved African ancestors, who got settled in 1637 to mine the local gold veins (Pulitzer Center, 2011). The slaves -according to a local respondent- started a revolution in 1851 (Interview Community Leader Suárez, 28-6-2013). Subsequently they worked 16 years to buy the mines they have been working as slaves before. The practice of mining continues while 85% of the locals are currently depending on small-scale gold mining.
Arriving to La Toma, in the municipality of Suárez, sketches the situation in which the locals struggle with armed groups for over years. Before entering the municipality by motor, the army checks my driver’s and my equipment for security reasons. While we drive away and while I yell at my driver what the checkpoint was about, he responded by only yelling the words “the FARC”. The local respondent in La Toma explains that the area is roamed by violent groups for as long as he knows, claiming that paramilitary groups are without any doubt in a conceivable distance, today (Interview Community Leader Suárez, 28-6-2013).
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18The Office of the Inspector General of Colombia is a public institution which oversees the public conduct of te public offices and oversees the functioning of government institutions and agencies.
67 One of the recent biggest fears of the locals was the interest of AGA. An individual called Hector Sarria bought a concession with the plan to turn it over to AGA in a later stage. The company retired from La Toma in November 2009 after opposition from the community, foremost because the Afro-Colombian population was not consulted in the obligatory way according to ILO Convention 169 (New Internationalist, 2009). One month later, community leaders started to receive death threats, alluding to AGA’s exit. Eight local miners have been killed in April 2010, allegedly by paramilitaries. Authorities refused to investigate the case while linking the murders to a dispute between rival mining groups (Colombia Solidarity Campaign, 2013: 28).
Continuing the trip within the zone, my driver (who is active for an environmental organization) admits (yelling again) to feel uneasy because he is on a blacklist of the paramilitary, according to himself.
The respondent of the Defensoría claims that it is not totally fair to accept money from AGA for human rights investigations, but it should not discredit one of both parties: “I don’t think that you lose your impartiality for one lunch” (Interview Senior Official Defensoría Cauca, 10-5-2013). The money AGA contributed was more than just lunch money, but the data collected by the Unit could according to the respondent as well be used against AGA, if an investigation needs to focus on the company. He explained that the contribution for AGA is just a part of their CSR, because they will not gain tax benefits or investment opportunities with the contribution. He makes a mistake on AGA’s promotion by stating that AGA did not want to draw attention to their investment in corporate presentations and reports. In their 2010 public sustainability report, a whole page was dedicated to the Mobil Unit (AGA, 2010). The interview brought something forward that gives food for thought, the respondent stated that one of the reports of the Mobil Unit on Human Rights presented information on informal local miners killing other miners, as the authorities for example concluded without proper research in the case of La Toma.
68 6.6 Conclusion
When Greg Gran Grandin wrote “the US began to shift the balance of its Latin American diplomacy away from development toward the interests of private capital” (Grandin, 2006: 49), he argues that economic reforms in Latin America did not led to industrialization or socially responsible investments, but mainly facilitated financial and tax benefits for the (corporate) US:
“For their part, corporations, starting in the mid-1960s, despite their nominal support for a socially responsible capitalism, increasingly opposed any serious effort by Latin Americans to implement a humane model of economic development, supporting coups, dictators and even, in some cases, death squads, to quell labour unrest” (Grandin, 2006: 50).
Around 50 years after the US started to increasingly capitalise their Latin America diplomacy (according to Grandin, 2006), I tried to select my examples for this chapter in an objective manner. But I found how most of the actors associated with the mining industry used their characteristic powers for their own benefits and self-enrichment of the mining sector. The power of the state seems subverted by initiatives based on volunteerism. There is more need for enforceable (international) frameworks and ‘hard law’, but in the meanwhile, the processes I identified in Colombia clarify the ‘who are the ones’ that will receive the harm of the gold mining industry and how they have to compete with a system of self-implemented governance by a profit-driven sector.
As the information in the chapter shows; state-institutions, the public forces and parts of civil society get involved with the industry, without taking local problems serious and causing serious harm. This more than often happens under a veil of CSR. The CME, which should be a multi-stakeholder platform, proves otherwise and mainly offers the companies a tool for legitimizing through association, in the context of human rights. This counts for all the participants, as well the various European, US and Canadian embassies. As for example AGA seems to neglect at least its indirect responsibility, the Defensoría of Cauca, seems willingly to neutralize the company’s impact by funding, as this chapter shows, a human rights investigative team of the state in one of the departments where AGA already has a questionable name. In another department, the Public Forces show to be a good friend of mining business, and to commit human rights violations that benefit the extractives. The Colombian army and Ministry of Defence herewith show to value the interests of the mining sector more than the interests of the Colombian citizens, who are displaced and whose rights are violated. Those various examples show that the Colombian mining panorama proves to generate serious conflicts and harm, of which the cause should be defined as state-corporate. In the next chapter the development promises by the companies self, that often have a different or more elaborate scope than the Colombian government, will be compared with reality.
69
7. Trapped in development promises
The development discourse of the Mining Locomotive in Colombia seems to be built on various presumptions which currently do not fit with reality, as explained in chapter 5. Based on the three studied companies, an analysis of the practices has been made in comparison with the CSR presented by the companies. In this study, CSR is considered as a corporate form of self-regulation within the discourse of good social behaviour, linked to legal frameworks, ethics, international norms and the social function of a company. The comparison has been made along the topics that often seem most relevant in the social and development discourses of the corporations, such as labour opportunities, education and livelihood improvements and the integrating the small-scale mining sector.
Next to legal and ideological responsibilities of the state, the studied corporations theoretically take their responsibility for good practices and voluntarily promote their social development. While manoeuvring in Colombian regions with a high absence of the state, corporations often have the liberty to act without the necessary government control. In this gap, which is kind of a grey area. A company is able to take up different functions of the state under the dominator of social development, but is also able to almost act as he pleases. This is when we see a certain switch in the functioning of a company, by not only pursuing their commercial interests, but as well by doing so, taking over certain functions of the state. This will be explained further on in this chapter.
The ‘para-state’ is an almost alternative authority which dominates in a certain area. The corporate giants who have the means to encircle their projects with social development projects as educational centres, hospitals, infrastructural networks, sport facilities etc. are able to take this role. The para-state becomes more apparent while those companies have the legal power and financial means to also deploy protection around their projects, as for example the national army can be contracted. The social control a para-state exercises in a region, allows very little space for local resistance. This can happen through tactics of intimidation as well as through the creation of social friction in communities. Social friction can be created by implementing certain benefits for certain groups while covertly marginalising others.
In this chapter, a comparison is made between the promised intentions on the corporate side vs. local experiences, and if one of the two actually walks into a ‘trap’ of development promises. This chapter will guide you through some of the most exemplary cases.
70 7.1 AngloGold Ashanti
AGA holds the lion’s share of mining titles in Colombia. To exemplify the magnitude of their presence in the country; the company has titles and solicitations in 20 of the 32 Colombian provinces. The around 1.2 million hectares the company already obtained, do not weigh up to the additional millions of hectares the company has requested (LaSillaVacía, 2011). The CSR of AGA manifests itself in various aspects. The following part will first focus on how AGA disseminates information on their projects and subsequently special attention will be given to what working on the projects of AGA really means.
Figure 4: Projects AGA
Source: AGA (2014)
7.1.1 Disseminating Information
The Colombian Constitution -Article 20- guarantees the freedom of all persons to receive truthful and impartial information. Consistent with the constitution, it should be expected that the information companies present must be based on the truth. Communities in future project zones are often approached by mining TNCs, or organizations advocating for them, with the goal to promote their projects. In this part of the chapter, data will be presented in order to analyse the open or closed character of the dissemination of information by AGA, to the ones who will reap the benefits or will suffer from the impact of their future projects.
AGA organizes meetings and reunions with local communities to disseminate information and to win trust from the same local communities. The people who have been interviewed about their experiences with reunions organized by AGA, or either their former subsidiary Kedadha, respond with the similar information. In various communities in the departments Cauca and Tolima (La Sierra, Sucre, La Vega, Piedras, Doima and Cajamarca) community representatives claim that the company (either AGA or their subsidiary Kedahda) intended to organize community meetings, in order to inform the
71 local population about their presence and upcoming projects. All informants claim that this was nor a consultation or a dialogue, but a one-direction communication of information (Informal meetings and interview with community representatives from La Sierra, Sucre, La Vega, Piedras, Doima and Cajamarca). They also felt that there was little reason or evidence to trust the information given by the company. There was too little elaboration on the future impact of the company, while the respondents felt that most given information concerned social projects which in character had nothing to do with mining itself. The information which was given on mining, did not correspond with the knowledge they had gathered themselves on large-scale mining. There was never any disclosure on the environmental impacts, and the tons of waste that would be generated with possible future impacts. The devastating impacts of cyanide, which is one of the biggest fears of the local population, were denied.
In the respondents of La Sierra’s understanding, it was the company who told them that topsoil and mountain caps (that in their region will be removed with a possible implemented mining project), will be replaced in its original state when a mine is exhausted. Something considered impossible (Interview Respondent CIMA, 8-5-2013). The promised schools, sport centres, improvements in the local hospital will be paid with the obligatory royalties, of which the locals are aware. Moreover it felt strange for the locals that when Kedahda visited, they were often accompanied by the military. According to a report by CIMA, representatives of AGA contributed a pig and a cow in reunions (CIMA, 2012). In this manner the company tries to simplify and ignore their future impact on a region, while trying at the same time to be well received by sponsoring (with for the company cheap) basic goods to impoverished rural communities.
The data and information which is claimed to be given by the company on for example the environmental impact, the generated waste, the method of mining and the location of the processing plants keeps on varying. The often feared extensive water use by the company is downplayed or explained in numbers. Something that is hard to argue on the side of the company, because fair knowledge of this impact does not yet exist in for example the case of their mayor project, La Colosa. A respondent from AGA, stated on the information provided to the communities, that indeed, the use of water was not something they can provide the communities with. The data is based on ‘similar’ exploitations elsewhere in the world; the geological circumstances of Tolima could however change all the quantities (Interview CEO AGA, 18-6-2013).
Still, AGA does intent to claim that the company is trying to be clear about the impact:
"The subject, well, the issue and the concern of the people is on the table, the people we're bringing [to the communities] and people of the government went to explain about the... better said, about the laws and the points of reference. We have international experiences, so that they can find their rest. Without any doubt we don’t know what we are talking about. But it is important, really important to respond to the community so they can sleep well and find their tranquillity” (Interview CEO AGA, 18-6-2013).
His statement clarifies that the community meetings organized by the company mainly function to assure the local population that there will be no problems, without knowing the future impact for sure. By stating “Without any doubt we don’t know what we are talking about”, he acknowledges the fact that false or unsubstantiated information is given to the communities. It is also interesting to see that AGA visits as well with government officials or the military. This is a clear example of the state and corporation conjointly working together to promote their projects of yet unclear harm and impact.
72 AGA breaks more than moral boundaries when they broke article 20 of the Constitution by not giving honest information on their projects (which are of a high-risk industry and moreover of ‘national interest’), while the state does not seem impartial when aiding the company in community approaches. It is moreover interesting to relate this collaboration to the words of the respondent from the Contraloría (see chapter 5.4) who states that “The communities do not know the topic and remain very vulnerable as they feel to not have the right to fight with mining companies” (Interview Senior Official Contraloría 11-6-2013). This statement was made in reference to visits of state officials to communities. Those visits only seem to take place to inform the locals of certain parts of applicable legislation beneficiary for mining companies interested in their territories. In the meanwhile, others parts of legislation which have a more protective character for the communities, are withheld.
Kramer and Michalowski argue: “Under the current corporate form, moral boundaries are defined by a combination of profit potential and law, not the personal morality of corporate leaders. As economic institutions, corporations have little incentive to serve the well-being of any moral community unless doing so either serves the interests of its small society of “owners” or is mandated by government.” (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006: 178)
AGA deliberately fails to play open card about their specific project plans and about the possible future impact of their operations. The impact might be huge and might cause harm to the human and non- human. AGA neutralizes the future impact by denial and misrepresentation. Stanley Cohen explains that “neutralization comes into play when you acknowledge or admit that something happened – but either refuse to accept the category of acts to which it is assigned (‘crime’ or ‘massacre’) or present it as morally justified” (Cohen, 1993). The use of ‘neutralization’ by Stanley was not developed for companies per se, but is in my argumentation highly applicable. It appears that AGA applies this neutralization technique in a proactive manner, by applying it before their projects take off and herewith not only seeks social acceptance, but as well a future justification for their operations. Denial could be a rational choice in order to cope with certain misconducts or when just carefully planning your actions. It certainly is important for AGA to at least assure that there will not be a huge impact on for example the freshwater sources and there will be no displacement for the locals, if they want to get local acceptance and prevent preliminary problems in obtaining the necessary environmental licenses.
7.1.2 The entrance of AGA
AGA did not always manoeuvre publicly in Colombia, and was not conducting high level promotional campaigns when they arrived in the country. To understand how AGA conducts business, it is necessary to know a few of the strategies they used in their approach. When AGA entered Colombia they tried to be rather unnoticed, while using various subsidiaries in the acquisition of mining titles. The subsidiaries were used to primarily buy the titles and to transfer them in a later stage to AGA. At the moment, AGA still has three subsidiaries in Colombia and at least 39 shell corporations worldwide, of which 16 are linked with subsidiaries in Colombia (Colombia Solidarity Campaign, 2013).
When Uribe’s government announced the discovery of the gold deposit in the department Tolima, it was clear that AGA was the one to develop their project, La Colosa. The country was officially informed of the company’s activities in December 2007, which apparently had already been in the country for
73 five years. The news surprised many of the region’s inhabitants. In the meanwhile this was not the only case in which AGA has carried out operations covertly and without the consent of communities. AGA employees had to leave a village of the municipality of Cajamarca. It was discovered in late 2009 that the company had been carrying out explorations at the water source that supplied the population’s aqueduct.19 Although the company has tried to overcome the mistrust that was generated, the population in Anaime continues to reject any mining activity. Another example is a village in Tolima, Doima, in the municipality called Piedras, where three hundred people blocked the road in early 2013. The road was used by AGA to transport its machinery into the project zone and blocked due to the rejection and mistrust that was generated when it was discovered that AGA was operating without the community’s knowledge (Informal meeting with community representatives Doima, 2-6-2013).
Besides using subsidiaries, another strategy to enter a zone is to use private persons (often familiar with the community). Local land owners and farmers in Tolima have sold their territories to front men, who obtained the titles by methods of coercion and intimidation. These titles were passed on to the company in a later stage (Guitérrez Gómez, 2012). As well in La Toma (Cauca), AGA has used individuals to obtain large titles and inform the community of the benefits of mining, to subsequently transfer the titles to AGA (Interview Community Leader, 28-6-2013). They not only misled the local communities, but as well the Colombian state by doing so. Those methods were unnoticed by the national government, which never intended to sell so many titles to a single party. At least, this is claimed by the president of the National Mining Agency (The Northern Miner, 2013). As a consequence of this, public resistance got no change to be aware of the magnitude of AGA’s entry in Colombia.
How AGA’s entry confused local communities is shown in the community of La Sierra, in the department Cauca. A group of local peasants came together to answer questions about their concerns with the current interests of AGA, which entered the region under the name of Kedahda in the year 2003 (Informal meeting with community representatives La Sierra, 12-6-2013). The foremost agromineros are farmers who supplement their income with the activity of artisanal mining (panning) in the local riverbeds. Represents of Kedahda came to visit their communities in various occasions, to explain that they had an interest in their territories and that the subsoil of their area belonged to the state. Those visits were accompanied by the public forces. In the year of 2006, the titles of Kedadha became property of AGA, which worried the local population even more.
The feeling of being played with, was not only triggered by the undercover entrance of AGA, but as by the character of the reunions. When Kedadha arrived for the first time, food was given to the population of La Sierra. According to the respondents, sweets and sandwiches were taken in the second meeting while everybody was obliged to sign for the food. According to them, this resulted in a document which was used to show the local support for the company’s interests (Informal meeting with community representatives La Sierra, 12-6-2013).
The regional organization CIMA took its responsibility to inform the local populations through its councils. While understanding the threats of megaprojects as such, the respondents feel deceived by the vague promises of social development. The only thing they fear is displacement and environmental degradation. “They [the state and company] have a lot of strategies to deceive the farmer, they never arrive with the truth itself” (Informal meeting with community representatives La Sierra, 12-6-2013).
19 For more background information on the reunion: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jIxQp1y3rqM&feature=youtu.be
74 According to CIMA, 70 families will face displacement. One local leader already left the area after getting various threats through text messages, phone calls and pamphlets because of his opposition against the multinational. The report states that 80% of La Sierra is against the project, while 10% is in favour, leaving 10% without opinion (CIMA, 2012).
In the meanwhile, the company has already started with explorations (according to the respondents). AGA has 9 solicitations pending in their municipality (Ingeominas, 2012) having been granted with 5 already. The next part of the chapter will elaborate on how AGA promotes their project on a broader scale.
7.1.3 Public image
The publicity campaign of AGA has a national character, the main focus lies on the benefits the company will generate, on which will be elaborated in this part. An example of the achieved local outreach around their La Colosa project in Tolima, is presented below.
Figure 5: Outreach of AGA in Tolima
Source: AGA (2013)
75 In the vision of the company, the division of information is of utmost importance for to locals to understand the benefits of their business. AGA’s 2012 sustainable development report contains a subheader stating that: “The communities and societies in which we operate will be better off for AngloGold Ashanti having been there” (AGA, 2012).
AGA publishes a brochure called Caminando por Cajamarca (Walking around Cajamarca), which is distributed in the region and available online. The brochure informs on the benefits of their project La Colosa and offers quotes from satisfied employees and beneficiaries. A small museum in Cajamarca - ‘The Miners Helmet’- offers more information, provided by local students and workers who are deployed by the company. The huge billboards of AGA around and in Cajamarca show pictures of smiling children and happy miners, while explaining that you are ‘On the road to development’.
The whole media-campaign of AGA aims for local and public acceptation, but their media-machine seems to be used in a persuasive way. A full report on La Colosa called, La Colosa, a death foretold, by the Colombia Solidarity Campaign (2013), investigated more on the (local) news concerning the company. They encountered an incident of censure when a former radio journalist was unable to cover the demonstrations against AGA’s mining projects. This was simply forbidden by his director, while AGA was one of the big advertisers. The company got their hands on various well-known journalist by buying lots of advertisement space, giving out VIP football tickets and all expenses trips to Brazil (Colombia Solidarity Campaign, 2013). AGA as well targets events with symbolic value, as music festivals and the company appeared as a sponsor with their name on the shirt of the Tolima’s main football team, Deportes Tolima.
It is claimed by respondents of the Colombia Solidarity Campaign that the “asphyxiating publicity” by AGA blocks the transparent and broad debate on the desirability of AGA and large-scale mining in Tolima (Colombia Solidarity Campaign, 2013, 80). The report states that AGA’s “corruptive” stance towards journalism leads to a clash between economic interests and ethics. It appears that this kind of promotional actions are not respected by all members of the community. A respondent from a local environmental organization, who works on the La Colosa case, states that AGA gave baseball caps to the children of a local school in Cajamarca, 'obliging’ them to walk around with those. Several of the students, as well as the professors of the school, refused to use the caps. The in his eyes “perverse” promotion through sponsored clothing was as well applied to a local music band, but abolished when a new director entered (Interview Representative Environmental Organization in Tolima, 13-6-2013). Those promotional activities by AGA can be seen as a profit-based calculation: “corporate philanthropy is often used to earn public “goodwill” or to increase corporate name recognition in ways that will ultimately improve corporate revenues.” (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006: 179)
On the other hand, more critical and public voices towards the company appear from time to time in the media. This is not accepted by AGA. The corporate vision on public opinions against the interests of AGA, is clearly described by the Vice-President of Corporate Affairs in Portofolio, the national business newspaper: “The opponents to mining, some fundamentalist environmentalists and those who are ‘eco-gullible’ or ignorant on the subject, do not recognise the benefits that transcend to the economy, and they reproduce inaccurate or false stories which misinform and construct imaginary situations that connect with sentiment but not reality” (Portofolio, 2012). As well some local peasants who oppose to the company became the subject of AGA. An exchanged text-message between two
76 (former) high company officials was revealed during an environmental citizen board in Tolima, referring to the farmers on the project location as a group of guerrillas (El Espectador, 2013c).
While AGA claims to take everybody somehow related to their projects ‘on a road to development’, they seem to apply an aggressive campaign of publicly, promoting the company with an image they cannot account for. Companies need their CSR policies according to Dashwood (2012) in order to meet expectations from different stakeholders as are insurers, investors as well as the community. CSR is a strategic consideration. The implementation of (social) development would therefore be an attempt to manage a company’s public image according to this logic (Dashwood, 2012: 40). Most of the CSR expenditures have a positive effect on their profits as well. AGA’s CSR is not their true nature, according to a representative of a local environmental organization: “CSR is a mask, they will get all the money they put into CSR back in declarations and tax discounts” (Interview Representative Environmental Organization in Tolima, 11 June 2013). In the meanwhile, AGA seems to adapt a parallel strategy which resembles a smear campaign against a part of the local farming population, which is known to be reluctant to their project, La Colosa. (Publicly) relating them to rebel groups is not only an unsubstantiated statement, but as well puts the population at risk by criminalizing them and pushing them in a corner sensitive to violence, in the situation of internal conflict. Having said this, the next section will discuss how AGA tries to achieve a construct, called the ‘social license’, for their operations.
7.1.4 The social license
AGA claims in their yearly sustainability report to engage in/and build social partnerships to secure their social licenses in the communities where they operate. The social license can be perceived as a form of local acceptance and an existing mutual beneficiary relationship. The importance of the license was more than clearly underlined by the respondent from AGA on various occasions during the interview. “The social license is something that we need to win every day again”.. “We cannot commence without this social license.” .. “The social license is not a document. The social license is the construction of a possible relation in the future. So we can have a social license today, we can work happily at this day. Tomorrow, we don’t know. But the most important for us is the social license” (Interview CEO AGA, 18-6-2013).
Curiously, at the 5th of June 2013, thousands of people gathered on the streets of Ibagué-Tolima, to march against the project La Colosa. This was not the first march undertaken against AGA, but it does not seem to endanger the obtainment of a social license. This is well illustrated during the interview with AGA itself:
R: “Well, the idea is to continue working with the community to create or pursue, or maintain the license. So it is not that if we have had some opposition today, we will leave tomorrow. No, this is a mutual job of continuous construction...”
I: And if the people do not want your project?
R: “We will say okay, we will organize some meetings and we will try to meet with them, this is what we are doing constantly.”
I: And if they do not want to talk?
77 R: “We have arrived with dialogue; the proof is that only 35.000 people are not all the persons in Tolima.”
I: Of course...
R: “We have taken a measurement in Cajamarca right? For us, because special companies in Cajamarca need an important approval. The zone of direct influence is Cajamarca and we can say that we have a ‘good’ acceptation in Cajamarca. Where they do not accept us, what we are seeing in our diagnostics, is that there are a lot of people who are informed and are having fear. So we need to continue working.”
I: So the social license is only necessary in the direct impact zone or in the total zone of impact?
R: “Exactly, you know it. You have said it! There is a zone of direct impact and a zone of indirect impact. We – at this moment- are working in the zone of direct impact and we are in exploration, we still need four years of work and we will not deny, let’s say that the opposition against mining is not a theme against AGA, it’s a global topic. So there are people who do not believe in, or want mining. Our work, the work of the company, is to convince them that we can work and show the benefits of mining. This is what we have seen in other operations...” (Interview CEO AGA, 18-6-2013).
Understanding this interview, it seems that AGA will continue to socialize the project until there is a social license, or possibly if there is no social license at all. Obtaining this social license remains voluntary. There is a fair group of locals in favour of the project, but the project as well clashes on heavy resistance. On the 28th of July 2013, a Consulta Popular20 was organized in the municipality of Piedras-Tolima, where AGA wants to develop a processing plant. The population of Piedras unified to vote in the first ever Colombian Consulta Popular related to a mining project. The turnout was higher than normally in the Colombian presidential elections, 98% of the votes delivered an almost unanimous and enthusiastically celebrated ‘No’ to the project AGA wants to develop.
According to the respondent from AGA, the Consulta Popular did not give a finite conclusion on AGA’s plans in Piedras. AGA reacted just after the Consulta Popular with the message that the population of Piedras is not well informed on the benefits and impact of their project, and that the company will continue with the ‘socialization’ process (El Espectador, 2013d)
The social license is a sort of ‘consent’ with the communities where a project is developed. Achieving the social license remains voluntary. This is in contrast with the environmental license, which is an obligation and given by the National Authority of Environmental Licenses (ANLA), as well as the Environmental Management Plan. The social license seems a corporate construction, but it should be able to achieve by trust and good practices. The Consulta Popular in reality asked the question to the community of Piedras: do you want to give AGA a social license or not? While the ‘No’ was almost unanimous, not only the company refused to accept the result, it showed to be more than stubborn and the denial of the Consulta Popular can be considered everything but a good social practice.
While the organization of the Consulta Popular claims that Law 134 of 1994 states that local decisions should be respected by the national government, the decree 0934 of 9 May 2013 regulated in article 37 of the Mining Code states that no local or regional authority has the power to exclude any mining activity. This meant that AGA could continue with their plans, while there was no state pressure to follow up the decision of Piedras. Kramer and Michalowski argue that companies often will not tend
20Local referendum
78 to good social behaviour and lack a structural motivation to expand their moral horizon, if they can see no economic benefits or regulatory obligations to do so (Kramer en Michalowski, 2006: 197). The company formulated a response they found adequate to neutralize the decision of the people of Piedras. According to Dashwood, the choice a firms makes when reacting to societal pressures is not always according to how to benefit from CSR, but what is appropriate along conflicting rules and norms (Dashwood, 2012: 44). In this case, it gives AGA the opportunity to ignore the wish of Piedras and continue with their profit based discourse.
Nevertheless, while AGA tries to dress their projects in a ‘social character’, the fierce community reactions will deliver a blow in the public image of the company and cause some ethical problems (related to at least the social license) to further develop their projects.
Now that AGA’s vision on the social license has been discussed, the next sections will provide information on the labour opportunities the company wants to create.
7.1.5 Development through labour opportunities
The provision of labour is one of the most promising parts of the large-scale mining industry for local communities. Mining companies promote the direct employment they offer, meaning jobs with the company itself at their physical projects. The big myth with this job-creation is that it will be a structural form of employment. Of course, probably all vacancies will end when a mine closes after depletion, but it is fairly unknown that the company only generates a high number of employment when the mine is in its construction phase. After completion, the extraction process is highly automated and will not generate the high number of employment when constructing the mine, which is the number communicated most enthusiastically. It is important to know that a lot of jobs require special experience and education, causing a demand for specialised employees which often are not present in the project areas. The indirect job creation is related to other sectors that will be included by the presence of a large-scale mining project, which creates corresponding demands.
AGA claims to create 10.000 direct jobs and 50.000 indirect jobs in the construction phase of their mega-project La Colosa, planned between 2019 and 2021. Only 1.500 direct and moreover specialised jobs will remain once the mine is in operation (AGA, 2013).
While a lot of people are happy with the jobs that AGA has to offer, the community judgement can be hard to bear for them while there is a strong opposition against the projects of AGA. Still, the rural and often very poor population sometimes sees little choice when job positions are opening. An inhabitant from Sucre (Cauca) explained how he made an average of 7.000 pesos a day, being a farmer. When he was offered 25.000 pesos a day by AGA (for a temporary function), he could not refuse this increase in wage, averaging a total of 9,50 euros (Interview Farmer Sucre/ex-employee AGA I, 12-6-2013). This relatively low wage which was offered by the company, still seems an offer which is difficult to refuse, especially for the extremely poor population. It is argued that AGA offers many temporary jobs, often between two weeks and three months, in order to raise employment statistics (Informal meetings with community members in Doima and Cajamarca).
79 A community leader from Sur de Bolívar tries to explain his version of what happened when multinational companies (among them AGA) entered his zone, and herewith explains how only a temporary workforce was created:
“Before we heard of multinational companies everything was peaceful, people were working quietly; there was no problem. As soon as we heard from these corporations, the army appeared. With the corporations, a new situation began. They started watching us, we could not walk after sundown, which used to be normal for us. They simply started watching us. When corporations arrived in some zones, what did they say? “We’re moving here and we are bringing some jobs, we are going to improve your standards of live, build schools, health care centers, jobs, social security; all the optimal conditions for a worker!” But it was a big scam. They gave us work for three months in order to make dirt roads. But to work with big machinery, they brought in own people from their company. Therefore they eventually displaced us. And the story about the schools and stuff, were snake oil remedies, because we nearly got nothing” (Interview Community Representative Sur de Bolívar, 18-9-2013).
AGA tries to communicate a different image of what working for their company means. The brochure AGA prints, Caminando por Cajamarca (Walking around Cajamarca), is issued on an almost monthly basis. The content consists of local social projects, parts of local history, events and the solely positive opinion of employees and beneficiaries. The magazine has a section called ‘Ellos y Ellas’ (Them and They), where the AGA employees respond to work and project related questions. The employees moreover seem to underline the improvements in the quality of their lives. A security official is quoted to give an example (AGA, 2011):
“I think the project is good. The company has shown that it wants to help and I feel the improvement of life quality. With this project there has been a change in this area, we receive a better payment and we are offered things which were never possible. As well the relation with my family has improved because of the no alcohol and tobacco policy. Therefore we can invest the profits we have in our families.”
This quote is communicated through the media of AGA, the data that was encountered in this research and a part of the data that was collected by the Colombia Solidarity Campaign (2013), will be discussed in the next section.
7.1.6 Work Experiences with AGA
As previously shown, AGA spreads a message of beneficiary circumstances for the ones near and involved in their projects. In order to do so, they use the voice of the local population. The ‘local voice’, channelled through the media of AGA, does not necessarily mean that all employees are happy employees. An investigative report from the Colombia Solidarity Campaign came to a different conclusion while interviewing (ex-) employees of AGA or subcontractors. Often, employment is sought by contracting personnel from different agencies.
“AGA’s business strategy of subcontracting from employment agencies is weakening its obligations to workers of the project. In the cases observed, the workers did not have guarantees, or the necessary support, to stand up for their rights and put forward grievances
80 effectively. AGA seems to have enough power to be able to avoid the legal responsibilities it has towards its workers” (Colombia Solidarity Campaign, 2013: 72).
The information that the Colombia Solidarity Campaign received, consisted of a number of alleged violations of labour rights, which are just examples of the situation of employment at AGA, sketching a totally different image than the company communicates publicly.
Interviews with two ex-employees, charged with security positions around AGA’s La Colosa project, elaborate on the work they do for the company. Their stories are similar with the content of the research by the Colombia Solidarity Campaign on the (ex-) employees. Working circumstances are hard with seven day working weeks, containing eight to ten hour shifts (in their turn, AGA denies to contract people for more than 6 working days a week (Interview CEO AGA, 18-6-2013)). The intensive work rate took a large toll on the life of the second respondent (Interview ex-employee AGA II & III, 12-6-2013), who stated that his social life disappeared when he worked for AGA. His wife woke up around two o’clock in the morning to prepare food for him, while he was readying himself for work, to be back around seven or eight o’clock in the evening, to catch the necessary sleep. This situation existed for six years. According to the third respondent who worked for AGA, this was an exceptional situation, contracts were never fixed and most people left at the end of the year. Contracts often were for three months (Interview ex-employees AGA II & III, 12-6-2013).
Another complaint was the verbal abuse by the supervisors: “There was a lot of humiliation for the people. Between the directives and us, the workers”. The respondent stated that the verbal abuse was especially directed against a few of the local employees “We from Anaime, Cajamarca, they did not want us”. The days were too long, sometimes there was no food arranged for the workers. While being contracted for security, they were given other tasks including hard physical work. They speak about a mountainside on the project location, “with 1000 steps”, where the security personnel needed to lift heavy equipment on their backs and walk it uphill. This was the equipment to construct the platforms for the perforations of AGA’s exploratory phase (Interview ex-employees AGA II & III, 12-6-2013).
Providing protection to a company that is not wanted by a large part of the local population, is not a thankful job, especially belonging to the same local population yourself. Both respondents had problems while being charged with the protection of AGA’s operations, knowing that there are some environmental threats for the moreover farming population of Cajamarca. “When there are manifestations, it gives me a lot of sadness, I want to be the last one involved” (Interview ex-employee AGA II & III, 12-6-2013). The day that AGA asked to take pictures of the people who participated in a demonstration in Cajamarca, one of the respondents tried to abstain himself from this task. He did not want to be identified by the other inhabitants, as the one making pictures for the multinational (Interview ex-employees AGA II & III, 12-6-2013). A local farmer and activist (Interview Community Leader Cajamarca, 12-2013) commented that an army helicopter threatened one of those marches in Cajamarca against AGA, in 2012. A message was broadcasted through a speaker on the helicopter, that the participants would be treated as guerrillas. Respondents in the research of the Colombia Solidarity Campaign, who worked for AGA, stated that it was mandatory for them (and their families) to participate in marches with the workers of the La Colosa project, to celebrate the project’s existence (Colombia Solidarity Campaign, 2013).
The social implications that working for AGA has for the members of local communities, are not addressed by the company. The company states in their sustainable development report that the
81 security mission is very simple “it is to protect people, assets and the reputation of the company. The security landscape is becoming more and more challenging globally. The issue for us is that, in security, our action or inaction can negatively affect our licence to operate” (AGA, 2012: 93). While trying to secure their ‘license to operate’, a part of the human aspect of business gets lost when labour rights are denied.
In the end, both employees (the respondents who worked for the La Colosa project) were removed from their positions (after one and six years) and had to try their luck again. Commenting on the work situation took some courage. Both acknowledge that they needed to sign a paper with a sort code of silence. “A card where they say if I am going to diffuse information about the work, they can send me to jail”. It seems ex-employees are required to withhold information about their work period, they acknowledge to know that the company can take legal actions and they have been informed that they can end up in jail for 3-5 years. Not knowing the legal value of this paper, the often unschooled population of the project region sees it as a “threat and paper of fear” (Interview ex-employees AGA II & III, 12-6-2013).
The changes in ‘life quality’ mentioned in the magazine of AGA, are affirmed by the respondents, be it as a negative change. The respondents claim that the wage of AGA was not a good bargain for the social position the work gave them in the community, the hours they could spend with their families and the humiliations they underwent. The moreover farming population was used to have a modus of sustainability, getting a lot of their basic needs to survive from their own cultivations. In the opinion of the third respondent, the earnings at AGA did not weigh up to losing their independence and family time. One of the ex-employees speaks about his current position, after working in AGA’s security: “As it is now I earn less, but I live happy” (Interview ex-employees AGA III, 12-6-2013).
AGA tries to counter negative experiences (former) employees and subcontractors had or have at their projects. By publicly quoting personnel on their good experiences, the company tries to discredit the labour problems it creates. In both the conducted interviews with the company and in their published reports, they claim to apply codes of conduct, train the personnel and respect labour rights. The data encountered by the Colombia Solidarity Campaign and the interviews from this research, show that this is not the real situation, which the company tries to deny and neutralize through their promotional capacity.
The report by the Colombia Solidarity Campaign states as well that the workers they interviewed suffered a lot from their team leaders and coordinators, who all worked for subcontractors of AGA. Out of fear for losing their jobs, workers did not unite and there were no unions. Workers who suffered from health problems, needed to leave their positions without compensation (Colombia Solidarity Campaign, 2013). This situation was as well encountered by one respondent in this research.
A woman who was working for one of those subcontractors (Interview ex-employee AGA IV, 1-8-2013) saw her health and the health of her babies seriously endangered. When she left the university in 2006, she got contracted by Kedahda to do moreover statistical work. In total she worked at Kedahda for a period of 3 years, with bi-monthly contracts. Subsequently she was working for two subcontractors, contracted by AGA. When she needed to leave her job in the beginnings of 2011, she suffered from nausea, fatigue, dizziness and had problems with her equilibrium. This happened while she was pregnant. A brain tumor was diagnosed in her pregnancy period and in the end she lost her twin babies. In her last position, she was assisting on the perforation platforms of AGA (part of the exploration
82 process). She was working with the samples they got from the subsoil, without knowing the actual materials they got out the subsoil with the drillings. “I don’t know with what materials I was working, I cannot confirm those. And I cannot say that they gave me classes in substances”. Possibly, there was mercury in the subsoil, a substance they found in her body. AGA never gave information about the substances with which they were in contact. The hospital told her that she furthermore matched all the symptoms of mercury poisoning. AGA never responded to her efforts to communicate: “The company never responded to any communication, even as I continued to try...”. Her contract with the subcontractor of AGA was ended, because she was not functioning at her job anymore due to her health situation. The departmental office of the subcontractor was closed two weeks after she spoke with human resources, while maintaining an office in Bogota (Interview ex-employee AGA IV, 1-8- 2013).
While she has signed a contract of confidentiality, she needed to clarify certain aspects of her job in the hospital. She felt it was her life or her obligation to the company. Still, she fears what might happen with her case, but so far she has not received a single threat to maintain her silence. After losing her babies lives and almost her own, she sees that the people working for AGA are not getting the necessary information nor support. “I’ve almost died and they have done absolutely nothing for me”. .. “I want answers concerning their irresponsibility. Since the first day I have been sick, nobody has responded to me...” (Interview ex-employee AGA IV, 1-8-2013).
7.1.6 What else went wrong?
In the previous part of this chapter, problems with the provision of information, social acceptance and the labour force have been identified, but there is more. The adverse impacts of future mining operations of AGA in Colombia are already manifesting themselves in various ways. AGA states, “We respect the environment”( AGA, 2012), in their 2012 sustainability report, but illegal drillings in forest reserves have been reported during AGA’s exploratory phase (Ministerio de Ambiente, Vivienda y Desarrollo Territorial, 2010) as well as the illegal use of water (Colombia Solidarity Campaign, 2013), which shows that the company is already neglecting the law in the pre-exploitation phase. This is confirmed by one of the ex-employees: “We are not aware of the situation that is happening uphill, they are giving us work but...” .. “The damage they are doing up there, is immense” .. “by all means, there is a high level of contamination”. He states that AGA is already undertaking perforations for eight years (Interview ex-employees AGA II, 12.6.2013). The provincial environmental authority, Cortolima communicated that the water resource had been exhausted in 2011 (Cortolima, 2011); therefore an extensive use of water by AGA would impact the capacity of the local farmers to perform their work. When Cortolima visited the project site to conduct inspections, it was prohibited for the workers to speak with the representatives of Cortolima. “The people of Cortolima visited, they got their lunches and left afterwards”, furthermore explaining that only a small insignificant part of the exploration sites were showed to Cortolima, as well as a result of the difficulty to access the other platforms. “They [AGA] are taking all the water from the mountain. They did not have permission to use this water, especially not for the perforations. Cortolima never went far enough on the terrain” (Interview ex- employee AGA II, 12-6-2013).
As well the Defensoría of Tolima is preoccupied about the environmental impacts AGA already has and will have in their department. Especially the future processing of gold with highly toxic substances
83 concerns a respondent of the Defensoría, while the nearby (active) volcano Machín is not far away of the planned La Colosa project (Interview Senior Official Defensoría Tolima, 27 July 2013). Apparently, AGA’s disregard for the law is not limited to drilling and water use. Colombia’s Contraloría has raised red flags about the mining company, pointing out that AGA has not paid surface levies in the amount of 3.9 million USD, which would make the company guilty of tax evasion (Contraloría, 2013).
It appears that AGA is breaking regulations in various aspects, but as well the ‘non-illegal’ impact can have similar impacts as the ones that are defined illegal and therefore never should be underestimated and require further research. “Although these offenses may have been legal according to national laws, we suggest that they and many other elite wrongs can be evaluated according to the laws and human rights standards established in the international arena, and therefore also fall within the legitimate purview of criminological inquiry” (Chambliss, 1989; Kramer and Michalowski, 2005: 5). Most of those impacts, especially by an environmental impactful industry, should be addressed by the framework that is offered by green-criminology. This framework offers a more inclusive image on the impacts and consequences to humans by looking into damages done to the environment, the ‘non-human’. Therefore there should be notion of a different type of offender, otherwise no ‘guilt’ can be assigned and no prosecution undertaken in relation to various kinds of environmental harms (White, 2011: 89).
7.1.7 Final remarks on AGA
AGA already shows to be rather reluctant towards environmental standards, labour issues and social acceptance. Critics to the mining industry might find this not so surprising, seen its international track record of controversies. Still, it is in AGA’s own concern to at least show that their current business practices in Colombia are in line with their CSR policies, especially while not a single project yet has reached the stage of exploitation.
In the discourse of transparency and providing accurate information, AGA proves to deliberately fail to do so. The possible harmful impact of their projects is denied while communities are approached in a deceiving way. Just because these harmful projects are essential in economic development policies and the strategy of both the state and the corporate appears to have a rather profit based ideology, there exists a mutual interest in neutralizing the historical, current and future impacts. The whole implementation of CSR policies and programs seems to be based on a rational choice. According to Dashwood, firms are motivated by their desire to maximize their profits and shareholder value, which is dictated by the institution of the competitive market place (Dashwood, 2012: 39). CSR is a profit maximizing, cost-saving strategy (Dashwood, 2012) and AGA shows that they mainly want to show their good intentions in order to get a social public imagine, while their internal situation and the implementation of their projects on a local level no necessarily needs to be in line with their CSR.
In order to downplay anything that can contradict their promoted image of CSR; techniques of neutralization are applied. This is shown by the current movements of AGA; as the denial of the victim by not admitting the possible future harms of the projects for the communities in their project zones. The example of the Consulta Popular in Piedras shows how the company acknowledges the wish and preoccupations of a whole municipality, to subsequently ignore the results of the consultation. In this action they were aided by the state implemented Mining Code, which became an important tool to overrule the wishes and preoccupations on a local level, related to the use of land and mineral wealth.
84 The denial of health implications, in the case of one of the ex-employees of a subcontractor, and the case of the contracted security personnel, which needed to sign a contract to abstain from making comments on their (non-satisfactory) work situation, are just examples on how AGA wants to conduct business in Colombia. They not only ‘turn a blind eye’, but anticipate as well to force employees to refrain from making comments on the circumstances of working for the company
The strategies AGA used to enter the country, to obtain a ‘social license’ and to get people involved in their projects, furthermore seem to be applied in order to avoid attention, draw attention away or prevent criticism. The strong public campaigns and elaborate social projects seem a way to diffuse the attention from past, current and future impacts, while trying to position the company publically with a social face. The ones who oppose the interest of AGA face (and probably will face) public smear campaigns, covert intimidations, and even violence as chapter 6.4 showed.
The concept of neutralization techniques (Sykes and Matza, 1957) and denial (Cohen, 1993) are in conclusion both applied by AGA. The company appears to already cause various types of harm, while there impacts are denied by a strong marketing machine that as well tries to distract attention. Their CSR is manifested in different aspects, but mainly tries to gather acceptance for their projects on different levels and herewith must be considered as a profit-based tool.
85 7.2 Gran Colombia Gold
After having debated AGA, this section continues with GCG (Gran Colombia Gold). The Canadian company GCG is currently the largest underground gold- and silver-extracting company operating in Colombia (GCG, 2013). In 2013, GCG extracted 102.792 ounces of gold (GCG, 2014). This part of the chapter will mainly focus on their social projects which concern the small-scale miners in Segovia and Marmato and will show whether there exists a gap between CSR and practice.
Figure 6: Projects GCG
Source: GCG (2014)
Segovia and Marmato are two municipalities in which GCG develops their projects, their communities, are considered ‘host communities’ to GCG. Gran Colombia Gold shows their dedication to their Colombian host communities on their website21 by stating that:
“Our social and community programs are designed as catalysts to make positive, lasting contributions in the communities where we do business, while working in partnership with host governments, local community groups, non-governmental organizations, contractors and suppliers, with a focus on human rights and maintaining a principled, conscientious approach to corporate citizenship.”
Their flagship project focuses on the artisanal miners which are present in the areas of their projects, called ‘The Artisanal Miner Partnership Model’. To quote their website again:
“By integrating artisanal miners into our mining operations, Gran Colombia has created a social and economic model that has attracted attention from business, governmental and social/humanitarian organizations around the world.”
21 For further information, consult: http://www.grancolombiagold.com/
86 In order to first understand why Segovia is such a particular place for the extractive sector, it is necessary to take a look at a part of its history.
7.2.1 Segovia’s history of violence
GCG is mining most of its gold from the gold veins of Segovia, which is located in northern Antioquia. The same gold veins have already been exploited since the Spanish conquest (Echeverry Castañeda, 2009). The mayor part of the inhabitants of the municipality Segovia can be defined as miners or are indirectly related to mining, therefore Segovia can be considered a traditional mining community. Their means of survival and way of life are defined by gold mining. In the evolution of the mining process, the implementation of the poisonous mercury, to extract gold from ore, brought about negative environmental and health consequences. The extensive history of mining with the irresponsible use of mercury, in especially Segovia, make Colombia the world’s largest per capita mercury polluter (Veiga, 2010). A situation GCG tries to improve for the community: “There are significant environmental benefits to the people and the community of Segovia because the Gran Colombia Gold operated processing plant eliminates the personal and environment exposure to mercury” (GCG, 2013). Together with the Artisanal Miner Partnership Model and the creation of legalized employment for the miners, the company wants to show it is a blessing for the community.
In an attempt to understand the recent history of Segovia, it seems that the region is tainted with violence. The high concentration of gold caused a high level of conflict in the region, as various armed groups tried to gain control over the local natural resources. Especially the paramilitary made themselves known in Segovia, with an act of extreme violence in 1988. An indiscriminate daytime attack by one of the many paramilitary groups that still roam Colombia, took 43 lives in the central village square of Segovia. This massacre was directed against the growing local influence of the legalized political party UP (Patriotic Union, in Spanish: Unión Patriótica), which has its origin in the FARC. According to Uekert (1995), the massacre was “an attempt to physically eliminate UP members and by doing so, to create an atmosphere of terror among all persons associated with the UP party.” This act of violence cannot be separated from the conflict over the Segovian gold reserves, for territorial and political control, on which the following section will continue.
In the contemporary situation of Segovia, paramilitaries still roam the area, be it for a different motive. According to the Colombian magazine Semana (2013), various miners who work in the area under the control of GCG, made payments to criminal groups linked to the paramilitary chief ‘El Macaco’ Carlos Mario Jiménez, who currently is incarcerated in the US (United States Department of Justice, 2011). In the research done for the TV-documentary Por Todo el Oro de Colombia (Langlois and Mariani, 2011), it is shown how ex-president Uribe formed a team of four experts to advise on the takeover of the former British Frontino mines in Segovia. Three of the four experts had relations to the former local paramilitary chief El Macaco. One of them was Raul Lalinde, the financial advisor of El Macaco. Lalinde laundered cocaine money of El Macaco, while being an advisor for ex-president Uribe at the same time. In the documentary, Lalinde acknowledges having worked with both of them (Langlois and Mariani, 2011). In the end, the Frontino mines were passed on to GCG. A respondent of the local Frontino syndicate (Interview Representative Frontino Syndicate, 12-7-2013) stated that the
87 paramilitaries continue to threaten the local population, but according to him, they currently act on behalf of the Canadian mining multinational in order to pressure the syndicate.
This statement seems a complete contrast with the image the company tries to construct for itself. The president of GCG wrote in an open letter, which appeared in a communicated document by GCG called Proudly Miners (GCG, 2013), that the company is compromised to act with ethical and transparent practices in relation to human rights, in order to be a positive force in the economic development of the communities where they operate.
Box 8: The Frontino representative
It is still morning when I try to meet with the union representative of the former Frontino mines in Segovia. Because of the impossible security situation, the representative decided to take shelter in a distant city from his home town Segovia. After looking for a while, two men, casually dressed, eyes covered with sunglasses, seem to be the ones I am supposed to meet. My plan to undertake the interview in a bar is waved aside, while they prefer to stay on the streets. His ‘friend’ has accompanied my respondent for security reasons. During the interview he keeps his head straight in the opposite direction of my respondent, so that both men keep the overview of what is happening on the streets. Still, he felt that for this occasion, he could leave his bulletproof vest in his bulletproof car.
“With the entrance of the multinational in our territory, the assassinations started to increase. The intents, the displacement in fact made me take away my family from Segovia. I, literally cannot go back to Segovia... If I go back, they will kill me...” (Interview Representative Frontino Syndicate, 12-7-2013).
Still, hours away from Segovia, he is unable to maintain a social life. The threats continue while my respondent changes from accommodation every two or three days.
He tells me that more than 200 murders took place in 2012, only in Segovia. A number way below the amount of displacements of the region. He is sure that the displacements and a part of the murders are connected to the arrival of GCG, which in his vision has relations with the paramilitary. The representative of the syndicate of the previous owners of the Segovian mines—Frontino S.A.—explains how several of his co-workers were abducted and murdered in the last few years. One of his colleagues is still recovering from the consequences of a 2010 shooting, in which 5 bullets hit him in the stomach. “It is certainly the case that groups outside the law pressure us small-scale miners to not continue working within the titles of Gran Colombia Gold. If we continue to work without a permit of Gran Colombia Gold; they will kill us” (Interview Representative Frontino Syndicate, 12-7-2013).
88 7.2.2 Labour opportunities?
The company reports that the labour force in the operation area of Segovia, consist 970 direct employees and more than 5.048 indirectly employed (GCG, 2013). Still, the direct employment offered by the company, does not seem to compensate the 10.000 small-scale miners who were operating in Segovia before the entrance of GCG. Of those 10.000, 4.000 are more or less able to continue with their work (Interview Representative Frontino Syndicate, 12-7-2013). The respondent claims that the small-scale operations of many miners are destroyed by the National Police. GCG points out the ‘illegal’ operations on their territories, which subsequently have to be ‘closed’ by the National Police. The implementation of the Artisanal Miner Partnership Model is according to the union represent a part of the “legal robbery”. The company offers to buy mine shafts from the local miners, based on the present concentration of gold. According to the respondent (Interview Representative Frontino Syndicate, 12-7-2013), GCG manipulates the gold concentration studies, so that the results show less than half the value of the mines. If the miners choose not to accept the offer, the company enables the state forces to evict the miners. The sharp contrast with the company’s Partnership Model is rather explicit. Still, this can be considered as a rational choice by GCG, while their practices remain pretty much unknown. So far, there is no serious threat to the operations of GCG. There are, for example, no state pressures according to their harmful behaviour against the small scale miners. Their CSR is well promoted, but in discrepancy with the reality.
The advantages for the ones who find employment with GCG, are not a certainty. Contracts are often of temporal character, unions are prohibited and a week offers 7 days of hard work. For all this, a GCG miner makes around 1 million to 1.2 million pesos a month, while a small-scale miner in Segovia easily could make between 3 and 5 million pesos a month. The union respondent understands the advantages of a more regulated, environmental safer and more mechanised gold mining sector, but heavily resists the foreign exploitation, the human rights situation and the breaches he sees with the constitution. “There is no balance between what they are exploiting and what they are investing [GCG], there is no social security nor security for the environment” (Interview Representative Frontino Syndicate, 12-7-2013). Pearce (1976) argues that in order to prevent corporate crimes, companies should be more accountable to workers and their communities by strengthening the power of unions. GCG seems to understand this argument, they focus on those stakeholders in their CSR strategies. But in contradiction to this, the company fails to respect exactly the same stakeholders in practice, especially the members of the Frontino syndicate are the victims of the presence of the company.
The GCG slogan “Be a positive agent of change for our communities” (GCG, 2013) is hard to take in when knowing that state agents are ordered to forcefully evict miners from their operations and knowing that union representatives who campaign against the interest of GCG, have been facing death threats and extreme violence. The document Proudly Miners (GCG, 2013), GCG argues that the presence of the company has a positive influence on the persons who live in the communities in which they operate. Having said this, the company should know that the area of Segovia has been dominated by armed groups, from the paramilitaries of the ‘Bloque Central de Bolívar’ under command of Macaco, to their heirs of the post-demobilization structures (CITpax, 2012). Those groups have had a strong relation to the presence of natural resources, especially gold. According to Dashwood (2012), the implementation of CSR policies can largely be understood as a strategic calculated response to the bad reputation of mining companies and to control the viability of the sector. In the case of GCG, the company shows their intention to uphold a social image, but in reality continues to prove the opposite.
89 GCG personnel accompanies the police in a large operations of mine closures, which often came as a surprise while the miners were at work (Langlois and Mariani, 2011). Without previous notion, the workers are displaced from their mines. In their turn, the company states that:
“We have not taken aggressive steps pursuing miners that are still on the GCG property, who aren’t part of a small miner group. There are still several organizations that are mining on what’s part of our land now and we’re not doing anything about it. There are occasions when new mines are starting up. When we hear about them, when its one or two people doing it, we tend to just look the other way. If it gets to be a larger operation where, you know, many people are starting to show up and equipment is being moved in, then we’ll work with the local government and the mayor’s office and get the required paperwork and approvals and the local government people will close that particular mine down” (Interview Senior Officer GCG, 5-12- 2013).
Even if the company has no direct responsibilities for the violence and threats directed at the local miners, they are not actively opposing those events and should acknowledge that they have a role in the conflict. This particular conflict is locally driven by the motivation to achieve or retake control over the gold veins. In the meanwhile, the company benefits from the human rights violations directed at their adversaries. To go a bit further, Bebbington et al. argue that: “risky contexts can also be perversely attractive to investment because (…) they offer environments in which tax manipulations, income remittances and other practices of extra-legal profit maximization are far easier to enact” (Bebbington et al., 2008: 899).
Companies who benefit from human rights violations sometimes undertake little action to prevent or stop those reprehensible activities (Gatto, 2002). GCG seems to benefit from the activities of armed groups operating outside of the law. Small-scale miners are chased out to their benefit, and Frontino unionists face harsh threats and violence. In the context of CSR and a company which claims to give significance to this concept, one should feel responsible as a company to investigate whether violent groups are violating human rights in their interest. GCG not only fails to do so, but as well made the following comments in an interview to deny their responsibility:
“We know for sure that there was a lot of conflict before we arrived. You know, there was, also there is today. But there is still a lot of money to be made from gold mining. And I guess the statistics are proving that there’s more to be made from gold mining than that there is cocaine nowadays” (Interview Senior Officer GCG, 5-12-2013).
Another corporate representative stated:
“I don’t think that a company has to be in charge of fixing a problem that the government has to resolve… The government has to be the one to take care of that. We can help indirectly but we cannot solve this as a company.” To summarize the answer again in: “Our responsibility is not to take care of a problem that Colombia has been facing for so many years” (Interview Mid- level Officer GCG, 5-12-2013).
Instead of accepting the shifts in the by violence characterized Segovian mining panorama, the company claims their influence on a more secure situation:
90 “Because a multinational company has come in and is operating a business in the area, it makes it harder for those people to make money and exploit workers. I mean, miners are now being paid a pay-check in a bank account instead of pesos in their pocket. It is harder to exploit those people, and there is a lot of other easy money elsewhere in the country. So a big portion of that criminal element if you will, has left the Segovia town and gone off somewhere else to win their fortune. Just because there is easier money than bumping up against an organized business” (Interview Senior Officer GCG, 5-12-2013).
Because of this position, GCG appears to lack a moral responsibility. Kramer and Michalowski (2000) describe the ‘plausible deniability’ of crimes, when direct responsibility for specific crimes is denied. Nevertheless, they argue that a political culture and organizational framework can be created that ultimately leads to heinous acts, that would not occur without that culture and those frameworks— exactly the case in Segovia.
7.2.3 How GCG conquered Segovia
The security situation for the (former) small-scale miners in Segovia seems to have diminished significantly. The few and lesser paid job positions do not make GCG a desired change for the region. The discrepancy between the social discourse of the company and the reality is especially hard to see while understanding how the company accessed Segovia.
The administration of Colombia’s ex-president Álvaro Uribe Vélez, gave the mining titles of the former British mining company Frontino S.A. to GCG. The Frontino mines went bankrupt in 1979, which made the company unable to pay their employees. As a way to compensate the former miners and retirees of Frontino, an act was drawn in New York to transfer the mining rights to the Frontino labour union and its (former) workers. The Colombian consulate, the Ministry of Labour and the superintendent of Frontino all approved this act, but the nature of it was concealed until a trade unionist by surprise discovered the existence of the act in the year 2000 (Langlois and Mariani, 2011). The discovery of the document triggered the former employees to claim their rights as legal owners of the Segovian mines. A claim which was confirmed by the labour court in Medellin and the Supreme Court in 2007. Still, GCG owns the mining operations in the area.
When former President Uribe transferred the rights to mine to GCG, he denied the claim of the small- scale miners and retirees of Frontino (Langlois and Mariani, 2011). Subsequently, a few of Uribe’s former government employees began working for GCG (LaSillaVacía, 2012b). Former campaign manager Mario Pacheco, Hernán Martínez, ex-minister of Mines and Energy, and María Consuelo Araujo, ex-minister of Culture, all found high-placed positions within GCG (LaSillaVacía, 2012b). Those examples show how politics and the arrival of GCG in Colombia became intermingled and suggest a conflict of interest while the company created a beneficiary situation for the ones who wanted to change politics for the private sector.
Uribe himself is still under investigation by the Colombian congress, he faces several accusations for his relations with the paramilitary (InsightCrime, 2013). Uribe grew up in Antioquia, the province where Segovia is located. As previously stated, the Frontino Union representative claims that Uribe has had his voice in the Frontino-GCG transfer (Interview Representative Frontino Syndicate, 12-7-2013).
91 Figure 7 (below) shows the given mining titles (red) and the solicited titles (brown) until August 2010. The graph shows that between 1990 and 2010, 58% of the mining titles have been handed over by ex- president Uribe.
Figure 7: Mining Titles and Solicitations in Colombia
Source: geoactivismo.org (2013)
The syndicate’s workers and pensioners feel they missed out on already more than 30 years’ gold production in Segovia, caused by the non-implementation of the Act of New York. Those decades were accompanied by an increasing displacement rate and numerous threats and human rights violations. The new period of human suffering in Segovia is related to the ‘legal robbery’ by the company. As a local unionist said:
“Gran Colombia Gold has also had a history of poor socially responsible practices on its mining site in Segovia, Antioquia. The multinational’s presence has contributed to the instability of the area by outsourcing the production process and avoiding its responsibility to provide effective protection measures for local miners, who are blackmailed and threatened by local paramilitaries” (US office on Colombia, 2012).
92 7.2.4 Manifestations in Marmato
As well in Marmato – Caldas, GCG seems an unwanted guest. The company tries to develop a project on the ‘golden mountain’ of Marmato which contains 14.4 million ounces of gold (at the current price of gold valuing 18 billion dollars) and is already mined since colonial times. The village contains just over 9.000 inhabitants, almost all of them (with a moreover male population) are miners or offering services to miners. In 2008, the Canadian company Medoro bought over 80% of the mines, to change its name two years later into GCG. GCG claimed the ownership in 2011 and began the closure of local mining shafts. The local population saw the promises of employment change into the threatening reality of forced displacement by the implementation of a mining type they are not familiar with (El Espectador, 2011b).
Marmato has been targeted by various mining companies before. Ecominas (The Colombian Mining Company) took charge of the upper zone of the mountain in 1970, to be transformed into Minercol (National Mining Company Ltda.). When Minercol abandoned the processing mills and installations in 1990, Mineros de Caldas S.A. took over 87 small mines which were closed down just afterwards. This left over 800 workers without occupation (El Espectador, 2011b).
After Mineros de Caldas sold their rights to Colombian Goldfields, who negotiated the rights in turn to Medororo Resources, it was the same Medoro Resources which finally merged with GCG in 2011. GCG is the company that puts a contemporary threat on the subsistence of the traditional miners of Marmato (El Espectador, 2011b). They feel they have been toyed with for several decades and to be currently on the frontier of total displacement by GCG’s new plans. Most of the miners function through a system of cooperatives and privately owned mines (Interview Representative ASOMITRAMA, 16-7-2013).
Just as the miners in Segovia, the traditional miners of Marmato prove to be an unwelcome delay for GCG on their way to profits. A local representative of the union of small-scale and artisanal miners states that the start of forced closures of their mines issued by GCG already led to various confrontations between miners and the police. In his vision, this is one of the strategies to get the social cohesion of the community out of balance (Interview Representative ASOMITRAMA, 16-7-2013).
7.2.5 The ‘Golden Opportunity’ of GCG
The ‘mountain’ of Marmato can be divided in an upper part (Zona Alta) and a lower part (Parte Bajo). GCG aims at the development of an open-pit mine in the Zona Alta (GCG, 2013), but has to deal with the local miners who continue to work their own mining shafts.
93 Figure 8: GCG’s oversight of Marmato
Source: GCG (2013)
The (already started) closure of mines makes the population fear that their five-century history of subsistence mining will be changed for a large-scale mining project that will deplete the mountain of its resources in 20 years. Company representatives have been visiting Marmato with the intention to close various mines, backed up by the public forces, but without any legal authorization or order of competent authorities, in 2011. When various mining shafts were closed and their entrances were blocked, it has to be noted that several miners were still inside. The association of small scale miners collaborated with the indigenous community of the municipality, to prevent these closure of the mines (Interview Representative ASOMITRAMA, 16-7-2013).
One example of violence reached the national media. This was the assassination of Pastor José Reinel Restrepo, and most likely was generated because of the corporate vs. community conflict. The pastor declared a while before his death, that he only would leave Marmato by force and if the government or the company appealed to violence. He was found dead with two bullets in his back on September 3, 2011 (Minesandcommunities, 2011). The real reason of his death will probably be never found.
GCG knew it needs to get rid of most of the inhabitants and active miners in Zona Alta, in order to develop their project. To violently close down all the active mines and displace the local population, would probably trigger a great amount of resistance. The initial plan of choice was to win the will of the inhabitants and workers. GCG called in the help of the CETEC (Corporation for Interdisciplinary Studies and Technical Assistance) which tried to developed subsistent projects for mining, mainly
94 agricultural. The community reacted reluctant and the project remained unsuccessful. Next it was up to the SCG (Social Capital Group), which already had experience in Chile and Peru to socialize extractive projects. The work of SCG was according to the local miners’ respondent a big failure (Interview Representative ASOMITRAMA, 16-7-2013). They went from house to house to shine a light on the labour opportunities offered by GCG and the plan to relocate the people. In the end, the socialization project was unsuccessful because they were ignored by the mayor part of the village, SCG chose to leave.
The promotional campaigns of GCG, on a local level, encountered a lot of resistance and were badly conceived by the community. When the president of GCG visited Marmato in collaboration with the local government in 2012, notebooks and bags with the GCG logo were distributed among local students. Those methods led to astonishment in the community, who felt to be used as ignorant targets in GCG’s promotional campaigns (Interview Representative ASOMITRAMA, 16-7-2013).
There is also reaction on the socialization of the project by a ‘foreign’ expert who has visited Marmato, and speaks on a local news channel about “social work starting from the bottom up, not showing an institutional face but going directly to the people”.22 He stated that GCG’s most important points of attention are; transparency and to share all the information GCG has on their projects with the people and authorities. Furthermore, he claims that GCG wants to do everything with and for the community, in order to give an example for responsible and sustainable mining in Colombia. In the television broadcast, the corporate representative states as well that everything has to be done in consultation. In the meanwhile, the company is mostly absent in the community.
The indigenous ‘mayor’23 of Marmato confirmed in an interview, that there has not been an obliged consultation of the 2.800 indigenous inhabitants of the municipality (Interview Indigenous Mayor, 17- 7-2013). She, amongst many others, is concerned by the proved effects of large-scale mining and fears that the community of Marmato will face total displacement by the megaproject. The public socialization of the project by ‘foreign’ experts does not win the respect from the locals, who do not see themselves in the words of the company. The ASOMITRAMA union representative as well wanted to react on the public communication of the company’s social discourses: “Corporate Social Responsibility? Here, it has been a complete lie. This because responsibility with displacement, responsibility with the public forces, responsibility with the closure of the mines and leaving people unemployed… This is not responsible!” (Interview Representative ASOMITRAMA, 16-7-2013).
7.2.6 The social plan to displace Marmato
The fights of the small-scale miners’ union, as well as the indigenous mayor, are undertaken to protect the small-scale subsistence mining of the inhabitants of Marmato. The company plans to relocate the main part of the village, which is currently located in the Zona Alta. This idea does not build trust in the community, which moreover wants to continue with their current form of life.
22 To see the broadcast: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nISfgpkbRlM / https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QyYfvQcC9-4 / https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c26Y-mG31Uc 23 A function which is different than the legal mayor, the indigenous mayor mainly functions as a community representative for its indigenous inhabitants.
95 GCG achieved to obtain around 120 titles in the Zona Alta, a zone that is defined by law for small-scale mining. The suspicion of the small-scale miners’ union, is that GCG wants to use all their individual titles together to develop one open-pit mine with a strategy called, ‘integration of areas’ (Interview Representative ASOMITRAMA, 16-7-2013). The company itself states in an interview that in their current plans, due to money reasons, there will be no open-pit but an expansion of the underground mining operations, which are cheaper. But, “eventually it will happen as an open pit, from a GCG perspective, in the medium term I guess” (Interview Senior Officer Gran Colombia Gold, 5-12-2013). The mountain of Marmato simply seems a ‘golden’ opportunity, which should be fully exploited. In the meanwhile, the company is constructing a new village called ‘Llano’, in the lower part of the mountain. This village is according to the union representative, the construction of a “facade and a lie” (Interview Representative ASOMITRAMA, 16-7-2013). The plans to totally remove the upper village to a different location seems power play from the company, but is as well a strategic move in accordance with the rumours of total displacement. Llano is built on a title of GCG, which means that the company is able to displace the inhabitants of current Marmato and probably future Llano; again.
But so far, GCG tries to create a social environment in Llano. GCG is constructing schools and a hospital in the new village. This appears to be a strategy to topple the emotional and the ‘close-to-work’ arguments, wherefore miners want to stay at the mountaintop (Interview Representative ASOMITRAMA, 16-7-2013). GCG says, “we try to work with the people up on the hill” and “the plan is to build houses in the new town, and to offer them to the people on the hill” (Interview Senior Officer GCG, 5-12-2013). In the meanwhile, the syndicate of the ‘people on the hill’ has no communication with GCG and is opposing all their plans.
A moment for the small-scale miners to make their claim noticed, was the national Colombian mining strike, which was organised on July the 17th, 2013. One of the strike’s hotspots, was the main road just at the foot of the golden mountain of Marmato. The miners and their families descended to block the road in order to pressure politics, claim their territorial rights, while facing displacement by company pressures.
After clashes on the road with the ESMAD (mobile anti-disturbance squadron), which reached the front pages of national media, the miners were anxious for further state criminalization. To show the real intentions of the roadblock, a pacified march was organised on July the 24th, participated by thousands. In the end, union representatives from Marmato did not succeed to form agreements on 4 crucial points with the Colombian authorities. The mining roadblock in Marmato continued a few weeks more to pressure the national government, but the position of the small-scale miners in Colombia remained fragile.
In the position of the artisanal and small-scale miners, the obliged formalization due to the 2001 Mining Code is a process which needs guidance, guidance that is not offered by the government nor the company. The miners are for example not informed on the requirements, the use of the (in Marmato) so necessary dynamite is prohibited and the titles are simply too expensive (Interview with the lawyer of ASOMITRAMA, 25-7-2013).
Those are just a few points of discussion, promoted by the miners of Marmato. They fear further state criminalization while they are unable to legalize themselves. This is a problem, which companies that are backed-up by the state as GCG, do not have. While seemingly the whole village sympathized with the protests, the company reacted on the roadblock in the conducted interview. The respondent
96 blamed “the guys who employ others to work under harsh conditions and enrich themselves” of participation, while the “family miners are not the ones behind the protests” (Interview Senior Officer GCG, 5-12-2013). Herewith, the corporate respondent intended to delegitimize the nature of the participators in the protest and to neutralize their claim, while there was no presence of GCG when the protests took place.
7.2.7 Final remarks on GCG
The image that GCG tries to create, are in reality two projects which are enforced on local communities, who do not agree with the presence of the corporation. GCG’s most important arguments to promote the GCG way of mining, seem to be based on lies over the backs of the group they victimize the most: the small-scale and artisanal miners.
The documentary by Langlois and Mariani (2011), shows a large demonstration in the town centre of Segovia, where the local miners protest against the seizures of their mines. They went to the streets, just as the small-scale miners of Marmato and denounced the same problems, caused by GCG. Those events are results of an aggressive corporate way of conduct, to deal with mining issues and contradict the words of the president of GCG, who stated in an interview24 at the 2012 Mine Latin America Conference, that GCG is not the traditional aggressive mining company. She argued that GCG conducts business differently than common mining TNCs: “the obvious answer from a mining perspective is to put up big fences, hire a bunch of security guards and chase people of the property. Invest a lot in drilling and then show the financial markets a large project that has been developed”. In the meanwhile, this seems almost exactly what they are doing. On their website, GCG informs on the Segovia project: “Since taking control of the assets, Gran Colombia has initiated an extensive exploration and drilling program to identify new resources and to explore new areas of its concession”, and furthermore inform on their work to date in Marmato: “The historical drilling carried out at Marmato by different exploration and mining companies comprises 379 diamond drilling holes for a total of 80.894m. Gran Colombia Gold completed a 120.000m exploration and in-fill drilling program that began in January 2010. In June 2012, the Company provided a resource update based on 216.000 metres of drilling completed up to March 24, 2012” (GCG, 2013).
GCG does not have acceptance or a social license, neither in Marmato nor in Segovia. The miners face forced displacement, possibly the whole village of Marmato will disappear in the future, while human rights violations already took the lives of various opponents of GCG in Segovia. The practices of Colombia’s current most exploiting mining company, seem to give the most evident examples of the impact that large-scale gold mining can have in the conflictive situation of the country. GCG causes more life threats, more displacement and exactly the group they try to benefit in their flagship ‘Artisanal Miners Partnership Model’, shows how their CSR strategy is at odds with reality and mainly appears a strategy to contradict the problems they are causing for the local communities. Just as the promotional campaigns of AGA, GCG tries to neutralize the impact they have on a local level by promoting their social projects on both local and national levels. By reaching out to the media, promoting their social projects at congresses, GCG tries to lure the little attention which is given to the impact of their operations away. An impact which is an effect of state-corporate relations; not only in
24See the interview at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FfHb4M-0yLo
97 the illegal obtainment of the Segovia mines, as well as the forced evictions of small-scale miners in Segovia and Marmato. The denial of the responsibility they have in the conflict, which is triggered in both zones, cannot be cancelled out by promoting social projects (which prove to fail) on another level (UNOHCHR, 2012).
98 7.3 Eco Oro
One of the other main gold deposits of Colombia can be found in the subsoil of the department Santander. The so called Angostura gold deposit was already targeted in 1995 by the Canadian company Greystar, which tried to develop the project for a period of 15 years, but got no further than the exploration phase (Carbonell, 2012). This third part of the chapter will discuss the issues that encircle the project and how Eco Oro deals with CSR.
Figure 9: Project Angostura of Eco Oro
Source: Eco Oro (2014)
7.3.1 Ecological Gold or just a Colombian Company?
After a change of stakeholders and an internal ‘restructuring’, the company Greystar continued in August 2011 with the name Eco Oro Corp. One of the main points of discussion on their project Angostura is the location, which covers an area of páramos (alpine tundra ecosystem), containing various water sources and lakes. The plan is to extract the 11.5 million identified ounces of gold and 40 million ounces of silver in around 15 years. In order to realize the current and future steps of the project, two military bases are deployed near to the project (EJOLT, 2014).
Before discussing the bigger controversies around the project, it is interesting to have a look at the name Eco Oro. The name suggest that the company named itself after ‘ecological’ gold, triggering an interesting discussion about the possible existence of ‘ecological’ mined gold. Moreover, two corporate respondents could not give the finite answer. A representative from the social department (Interview Officer Social Department Eco Oro, 22-10-2013) giggles that it could mean Empresa Colombiana (Colombian company), but as well could mean both Empresa Colombiana and ecological, I should check it with a CEO. He as well does want to give an ‘official’ message, but in his eyes it should mean Empresa Colombiana (which it technically speaking is not), while “we [Eco Oro] are hoping and working that it could be interpreted as ecological as well” (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013).
99 The word ‘ecological’ does not fit in the history of the Angostura project as such, according to a representative of a local action committee (Interview Representative Action Committee, 21-10-2013). In his vision, “their extreme change is green washing”, while the company and its intentions in reality remain the same. Green washing is the tendency from business to “pronounce their green credentials with little evidence” based on basic dishonesty. This corporate misconduct may be misleading and may be a form of fraud (White, 2011: 49-50).
The main reason behind the restructuring and the name change, was the submitted EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) by Greystar, in 2009, and public pressures in the period that followed. The EIA stated that the project would have a protective character for the páramos, subpáramos and Andean forest ecosystems, but the Ministry of Mines and Energy found it necessary that the company made certain changes to the project in order to receive an approval. The newly presented EIA in 2011 as well was denied.
7.3.2 Greystar’s part in the conflict
The Angostura project is located in the area of the municipalities in northern Santander: California and Vetas. The municipalities have been zones of subsistence-mining since colonial times (CDMB, 2001). The presence of precious metals has made the area an interesting case for illegal armed groups and inhabitants have been facing extortions and displacement. This was according to a research of Inter Pares (2009) beneficiary for the ones interested in buying territories for mining operations. Locals have been offered good money, by unknown persons or agents, to sell their lands. In the story of Eco Oro, it was an individual who did his research and bought up the titles, that have been presented to and bought by Greystar in 1996 (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013).
Both the corporate respondent from Eco Oro and the interviewee from the opposing action group, elaborate on the decade of extreme violence in the region in the 1990s and the in 2000, by the Public Forces, started operation Berlin (with (financial) support of Greystar). The operation was undertaken against the presence of the FARC in the zone but had civil victims as well. Rural and indigenous communities have been the victims of aerial bombings by the army in Operation Berlin (United Nations, 2004).
The perforations that Greystar undertook in its exploratory phase have been difficult, because the presence of insurgency groups. Encampments were burned and Greystar personnel was even kidnapped. Their manager Norbert Reinhardt was abducted by the FARC, who demanded 2 million USD for his release. Greystar that insisted not having paid the money in accordance with company policies, ended up paying a larger sum for his release (El Tiempo, 2003). Herewith underlining the efficacy of abductions and drawing the attention of armed groups.
The abduction caused the company to abandon the project from 1999 till July 2003. It is known that the company had communications with the insurgency before this period. Its former vice-president stated that: “at that time, there were in fact communications with the FARC... in these areas, there was no State presence... [and the guerrillas] were in control” (Inter Pares, 2009). During Greystar’s absence, operation Berlin took place and a new Mining Code was implemented. The (under newly installed) president Uribe improved security situation and the rising gold price made Greystar return
100 to their project in 2003. During the obtainment of more mining titles in Colombia, Greystar has been complimented for their CSR policies by the Canadian Embassy and Uribe gave the company’s vice- president Frederick Felder an award for company performance, at the Second International Mining Fair in Medellin, September 2006 (Inter Pares, 2009).
Despite the compliments the company received for its CSR, they still had entered a conflict zone and there was still not one single gram of extracted gold, nor an approved project. Greystar and current Eco Oro have been protected by two High Mountain Battalions, securing their operations, infrastructure and personnel, but serious problems of security have not been reported in the last few years. “What we can say is that we have the necessary help of the public forces to conserve the tranquillity in the zone” and “in the theme of security, it is a responsibility of the government through its public forces” (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013). What has to be said is that in spite of Operation Berlin and the army presence around the Angostura project, paramilitary violence has been reported (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2004) as well as a return of the insurgency: “The new risk scenario has to do with the interest of illegal armed groups to regain control of the territory and the population in this region; and to use violence and intimidation to do so. This is related to the strategic reorganization of the guerrilla forces and regrouping of paramilitary structures to take over control of formerly held areas and gain access to revenues generated by socio-economic endeavours”, as a report by the Defensoría writes (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2007). It can be concluded that Eco Oro did not bring much more security in the region, nor did the battalions which seem to function till date as necessary protection. Still, it has to be said, the company had its troubles, but in the end seemed to have benefitted of the conflict situation when acquiring land. The same is the case for GCG and AGA and it seems that the multinationals in conflict zones, especially dealing with gold, remain a magnet for illegal armed groups.
7.3.3 The environmental discussion
The IFC (International Finance Corporation), a member of the World Bank Group established to advance economic development by investing in commercial and for-profit projects, has the purpose of reducing poverty and promoting development, invested in the Angostura project in March 2009 through the purchase of company shares (CAO, 2012). The involvement of the IFC in the Angostura project got them an official complaint at the Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (as explained in the chapter 6.2). According to Eco Oro, they received aid from the IFC because of their good human rights and environmental management (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013).
The Colombian Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development denied the companies first EIA and requested another, because it had only included a limited area of the proposed mine. It was and is prohibited to mine in a páramo. The environmental license was finally denied in May 2011, but the follow-up project was still planned in a páramo. Eco Oro now changed its plans for an open-pit mine into an underground project. This change of plans has according to Eco Oro nothing to do with the license, but has to do with financial motives (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013).
The páramo of Santurbán has a surface of 438.800 hectares with approximately 441 hectares of drainage basin, herewith providing water for 2.5 million people and containing a potential for 10 million people (ABColombia, 2012b). According to information of INGEOMINAS, 40 mining titles have
101 been granted in Santurbán’s surroundings, of which 23 in the páramo, covering 22.971 hectares. Besides this area, 148.296 hectares are under threat by 39 requested mining titles of which 29 directly in the páramo (Rodríguez & Urrea, 2011).
The Project has created national and international commotion along the arguments of the future imposed environmental risk. The main argument against the project, is the threat it will generate for the ecosystem. According to the Colombian law 1382 (sanctioned in February 2010), which modified the 2001 Mining Code, all types of mining are excluded from páramos. Law 1382 was approved but had to be signed into law by the Uribe administration, who took around eight months to do so. In the meantime, 1.900 mining contracts were signed between July and October 2009, of which ironically a large amount of mining titles in the páramos. This was the majority of all titles sold under Uribe’s reign, with a total amount of 122.000 hectares (of which a total 6% in páramos). Most of those titles were approved. This allowed Greystar to continue with those exact titles (LaSillaVacía, 2010). The weak spot of Law 1382 is the judgement in Article-34, which requires a páramo to have a geographical definition by the environmental authorities: ‘‘to produce these effects, these zones must be defined geographically by an environmental authority based on social and environmental technical studies”, according to the judgement. Those definitions still have not been published by the competent authority.
What is of high importance for the protection of the páramos, is that they already were receiving special protection by Law 99 of 1993, and the Council of State C-399 of 2002, which prohibits mining in certain ecosystems such as the páramos. This was not mentioned in the Mining Code of 2001 and therefore the Council of State ruled that article 36 of the Mining Code was partially unconstitutional. This because of a contradiction between laws, which excluded mining activities from areas other than national parks (Fierro, 2011).
Because of the legal complications of mining in a páramo, Interbolsa, a company who gives consultations to investors, recommended Greystar that Law 1382 would not be applied retrospectively. For this reason, the company should be able to continue with the Angostura project in the páramo of Santurbán (Interbolsa, 2010).
Besides entering the páramo, the company will cause the environmental impact it would have in any ecosystem. The EIA of Greystar already stated that the company needs around 1.200 tons of cyanide on a monthly basis for their lixiviation process and would leave 745 tons of mining waste behind, which will generate highly toxic water. The acidification of water is an important topic, especially when their study states that there is 100 times more arsenic in the extraction zone than gold (Rodríguez & Urrea, 2011). Conflicts around water and mining concern both the pollution and the extensive use of water, both generating an environmental and social impact, while the region is highly dependent on the use of its freshwater sources.
Greystar distributed two brochures titled, The Truth About Cyanide and The Truth About Water, which inform that “20% of the cyanide is used in the mining and metallurgical industry while 80% of the production of hydrogen cyanide is used in the production of nylon, plastics, resins, dyes, pharmaceuticals, adhesives, paints, cosmetics, electronics, rocket propellant, etc.”. The company herewith tries to enter a discourse of comparison with other sectors, without explaining that microscopic doses of cyanide can be lethal. The company will work with large loads of cyanide in their livixiation baths, informing in their EIA that it will work with a closed system. This should not be a
102 reassurance knowing that cyanide spills with the same system happened before. In the case of the Angostura project, it is more than dangerous knowing that the toxic waste and lixivation baths will be constructed in a zone of high seismic activity (Rodriguez & Urrea, 2011).
A concept paper on the project, by the local environmental authority, claims that the industrial treatment system and possible future open-pit exploitation cause environmental losses in water, landscape, biodiversity and decreases quality and quantity of environmental supply. The downstream inhabitant’s lives will be significantly affected (CDMB, 2011). The water ‘privatization’, the quantity of water use, will cause a heavy competition for the rural communities and it’s moreover farmer population. This is something that puts a threat on their food sovereignty and will especially weaken the situation of the poorest of the poor.
The complaint which was made against the IFC focused on several environmental issues of which the water impact (related to the impact on agricultural and forest resources) has the most weight. Furthermore, it expresses concerns for when the company violates minimal standards for treating acid water, drainage from its tunnels and leachates from dumps, waste water, erosion control, stabilizing embankment and mitigation measures for soil saturation and landslides. The future impacts can have an influence on a far greater zone than just the páramo. According to the IDEAM (Colombian Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies), the páramo Santurbán is an ‘fluvial star’ which is formed by Caribbean, Magdalena–Cauca and Orinoco hydrographic areas, and is divided into the areas of the Catatumbo, Medio Magdalena, and Arauca rivers, and into seven hydrographic sub-zones, especially those of the Zulia, Lebrija and Chitaga rivers (Morales et al., 2007). The existence is of high importance, the páramo belongs to the Surata and Velans river basins which supply water to the urban centres of 23 municipalities (of which Bucaramanga), in total benefiting more than two million people.
The páramo as well has a role conserving the biodiversity; Santurbán conceals unique species of which several considered endemic. The whole functioning of the páramo is dependent on the distribution and dynamics of water, on the surface as well as underground. The páramo of Santurbán contains watersheds which give rise to international water bodies. The system is extremely fragile because it functions as a ‘big island’, it is not a continual ecosystem. It functions as a sort of isolated sponge, cleaning the water while it drips through the ‘foam’ and is filtered at a continues rate. It allows a certain quantity of water to continue to flow out of the sponge, in this manner, 70% of the Colombian population is dependent on water coming from sources in the páramos present in the country (Morales et al., 2007).
Allegations against the mining sector in Colombia, differ from environmental impacts and social consequences, which can be described from ‘harm’ to harsh human rights violations. Therefore it is more solid to speak about state-corporate ‘misconducts’, where harm and crimes have to be differentiated from case to case. In order to address not only environmental, but as well related social impacts, the field of green criminology is highly relevant when dealing with the mining industry. In the case of Eco Oro, the company trivializes and denies its future environmental impact while these consequences are widely feared. By avoiding consultations and serious objective assessments of their project, the company seems to seek a neutralization through their social discourse, which not tries to address the widespread preoccupations. The company even developed a greenhouse frailejon, which is the symbolic plant of the páramos, and herewith tries to neutralize the use of the symbolic plant in protests against the company’s project. The contra-Eco Oro argument is that the company puts the
103 páramo and herewith the frailejon under threat. Eco Oro tries to prove nothing more than the possibility to create a frailejon outside of its natural habitat which does not signify anything in relation to large-scale gold mining in Santurbán. The CSR of Eco Oro will be further discussed in the next section.
7.3.4 Development by Eco Oro
The high environmental risk of the future open-pit or underground operations poses a threat on especially the water supplies, which face possible contaminations by a high demand of the company. This can irreparably affect the fragile ecosystem. The social impact moreover affects the food security and livelihoods of the local population. The population of the project zone has been terrorised by violence of all present actors in the Colombian internal conflict and seemed in survival mode when former Greystar tried to develop their project. The local environmental authority CDMB acknowledged in its Environmental Concept Paper on the Project (2010), that there is a probability of “indirect socio- environmental impacts on the population.” The CDMB states their concern according to their observations, the company’s assessment “does not reflect the people’s feelings and opinions regarding its implications and ways to prevent, mitigate, restore, correct, or compensate these damages” (CDMB, 2010).
In the meanwhile, Eco Oro tries to further develop their social character. The corporation keeps underlining the function of the Angostura project for the region, which is historically determined by small-scale mining.
“The future of the region is not Eco Oro. Eco Oro is only a temporal accident when the region waits for sustainability. So, in the future the region will be a chain of modernized small-scale mining”.. “Eco Oro is a part of the progress of the region” (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013).
The company wants to pull the small-scale and often informal sector on their train to development through different projects, as for example a shared use of processing plants and the development of (an almost non-existent Colombian) jewellery market in the provincial capital Bucaramanga.
The public opinion is according to Eco Oro already changing more positively towards the company (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013). This is affirmed by the respondent from the action committee:
“In general, they [Eco Oro] have undertaken a lot of propaganda, using a battalion of social workers for their social projects” .. “They convince the people that their luck is related to the luck of mining” (Interview Representative Action Committee, 21-10-2013).
In his opinion, those campaigns and different opinions among the people of Santander, have led to a lot of social tensions. The pro and contra Angostura groups are certainly targeted by both the company and civil society. The respondent as well claims that the company tries to get the political support of local mayors. According to him, the company has already won the support of the governor, who was in favour of protecting the páramo in his election campaign. “The governor took of his mask” by sending a letter to the Colombian president on June 25th 2013. The letter was a request to match the borders of the páramo, with the borders of the PNN (Natural National Park) (Interview Representative
104 Action Committee, 21-10-2013). If this would be done, the official páramo would be smaller than in its current delimitation and less of a threat for the project.
While there is no contact between the action committee and the company, Eco Oro feels the pressure. “For some reason the people have begun to deiform themselves. They think that the Angostura project will destroy their páramo. This is physically impossible. The area of discussion corresponds with 0,08% of the páramo. In which way is this going to terminate an ecosystem which recharges the water of more than 30 lakes at kilometres distance? And it would be nothing new, there is already more than 400 years of artisanal mining with more than 200 mine shafts surrounding the zone” (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013).
The CSR department of Eco Oro divides her social program in three areas: social (communities), communications and enterprise protection. The community part is divided in direct and indirect communities, the provincial capital Bucaramanga is for example concerned as an indirect ‘community’. In the words of the CSR representative, the indirect communities are the ones who will not face an environmental impact (Interview Officer Social Department Eco Oro, 22-10-2013).
The social projects that target the communities aim at the establishment of a bond of trust. Eco Oro tries to avoid common social problems caused by the mining industry, through a permanent dialogue. In these dialogues, mainly information about the project is communicated, which seems more as a preparation for, than a prevention of problems. In order to get local acceptance, they try to activate local leaders in order to socialize their project. The possible impacts are according to Eco Oro not something they can ignore, and the information sessions are indeed to “prepare them” (Interview Officer Social Department Eco Oro, 22-10-2013). The CEO is sure they can obtain a social license through local acceptance, but is unable to explain why this exactly would happen (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013).
Their local CSR projects collaborate with local educational institutions; Eco Oro claims to not have a dominant role in those collaborations. In the communities in the project zone, the company promotes certain educational programs such as counselling and workshops in the sphere of family relations and parenting. Additionally, a new nursery school is supported, a scholarship is created and as well communication workshops are given. It turns out that a lot of the Eco Oro educational projects have the objective to ‘in some way’ prepare individuals from the local communities for a job at Eco Oro. The respondent from the social department was born in one of the local communities, just as the majority in the administrative department. Especially the courses in ‘leadership’ prepare the locals to possible work for Eco Oro. Most of the social programs are realised by the foundation of the company that is named: Eco Oro. Eco Oro, “the figure behind Eco Oro” seems the one socializing the project, which also happens through their radio show, where local mayors appear to promote the social projects of Eco Oro (the respondent affirms that local mayors get financial help from the company). After a short explanation, the difference between the company and the foundation seems non-existent and besides the argument “to be able to separate it a bit [business and the social function]”, the foundation is fully dependent on the company (Interview Officer Social Department Eco Oro, 22-10-2013).
Eco Oro tries to dive into the governance gap of ‘limited statehood’ which is left by the Colombian state, but the deployment of two military battalions, the educational projects etc., are no functional equivalent of all-inclusive development. While there is more attention in literature for private governance by international business (Borzel and Risse 2010; Haufler 2010), the ambition of Eco Oro
105 to bring development to the region and to function as a ‘para-state’ seems a rational choice. Borzel and Risse (2010: 4) argue that: “In areas of ‘limited statehood’ contributing to governance becomes a matter of self-interest, as it pays off if a firm can set the industry standard with regard to environmental or human rights standards.” Which the company for example tried to do with the Ecodes ecosystem biodiversity and socioeconomic study (see chapter: 6.2). The discourse of Eco Oro mainly tries to counter environmental criticism and to provide development in other aspects. The company so far has not been able to give sufficient proof that their project will not implicate the fragile ecosystem of Santurbán and furthermore has the disadvantage of the doubt, while they already were incapable (twice) to gather the necessary environmental license.
7.3.5 The future of Angostura
The company promises to make investments in the preservation and conservation of the fragile páramo ecosystem, where they hope to develop their Angostura project. In the meanwhile, the company has nothing to assure that it will not have an impact on the freshwater sources on which a high number of people are depending. The flora and fauna of Santurbán seems one of a kind and the possible large-scale project (of one of the most water intensive industries) triggers resistance on all levels. Although the companies CSR projects seem more honest in intentions compared with the findings of AGA and GCG, it cannot be ignored that the company manoeuvred itself into the region in a period of violence, benefitting from the threats and displacements the local population was suffering from. Eco Oro claims to be the new face of modern and responsible mining, but this is an often heard story. The examples on how the company tried to influence politics on a municipal level, downplay its future impact in Santurbán (which became a symbolic páramo to defend in the Colombian mining debate) and chose to operate in a conflict zone, already made this an empty promise.
On the other hand, getting in touch with Eco Oro was a more promising piece of corporate communication. While trying to get access as a researcher to respondents of AGA and GCG, I was delayed for months. The whole communicative process gave me an insight in the defensive and closed structures of the corporations. Eco Oro almost received me within a day and their somewhat sloppy office in Bucaramanga gave me a different reception than the AGA office on one of the top floors of a flat in Bogota’s business quarter. I could not enter the building of AGA’s office without giving my finger prints and a passport copy, while GCG only was able to give me a Skype interview while promising me otherwise for months. When I arrived at the office of Eco Oro and needed to wait for a while, I was arranged an improvised interview with a representative from the social department, until my appointment had time for. This gave me over an hour for my unexpected extra interview. The more informal approach by Eco Oro and the state of their office has maybe more to do with the current state of the project. That is, if there will be a project.
One share of Eco Oro was worth more than 11 dollars in 2006 but fell to the price of 30 cents on the TSX (Toronto Stock Exchange).25 In the current situation, it is unclear if the company has the financial means to continue with the project, causing speculation. A respondent from the action committee names Eco Oro ‘a developer’, who is speculating on the stock market, but with the intention to sell
25For the accurate value of Eco Oro, check: https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=EOM.TO
106 their project. The only problem is that the value almost has hit rock bottom, because of delays and negative public and media attention (Interview Representative Action Committee, 21-10-2013).
According to the respondent of Eco Oro: “the intention of the project and the company is not to sell. I think that we needed to take advantage from another moment to sell... This is not a moment for selling. Eco Oro is not prepared to sell; it prepares to develop a mine, a phase of production and closure. It is not the intention. The investors aim at the long-term” (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013).
The obtainment of further licences and studies will define if investors want to put more money in the project, because Eco Oro also needs to calculate the costs of environmental liabilities, for which it only calculates 3 million dollar:
“At this moment we have sufficient money for the environmental restoration of what we have undertaken till today, we don’t have a mine.” .. “We don’t have the money to initiate the project. Yes? We are in exploration and we develop other activities. We have some environmental liabilities because of the perforations, which are different to the [costs] of the mine closure. So for this we have the money present.”.. “First we need to gather money to build the mine. This is money we don’t have”. .. “We don’t have money for the mine closure, because we don’t have money to open it” (Interview CEO Eco Oro, 22-10-2013).
Eco Oro still remains positive that the project will continue, when the necessary licences are obtained. The official delimitation of the páramo of Santurbán is one of the essential pieces of information the company needs to have in order to know if the Angostura project can continue.
This delimitation has partly been made public on the 2nd of April 2014, when the Colombian Ministry of Environment announced the delimitation of the Páramo of Santurbán. Most important, without the coordinates. The current protected area grows with 11.000 hectares to a total of 42.000 hectares. The Colombian institute which defines the páramos, the Humboldt Institute, defined the páramo of Santurbán with a surface of at least 82.000 hectares.
The mining companies with concessions and environmental licenses will remain in Santurban, according to the Ministry. The demarcation should only affect 10 of 29 mining titles, without providing further details (MiningWatch, 2014).
After this news, critiques from civil society seem to arise. For example, a lawyer from the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA) stated: “We do not know if the protected area covers the total area of the páramo in both departments. Nor do we know which coordinates or what mining titles will be affected. We do not even know if there is a written draft of the official decision. This seems incompatible with the right to access accurate and impartial information, as enshrined in the Colombian Constitution” (MiningWatch, 2014). In the meanwhile, the company itself proclaims to remain patient through a message on their website (Eco Oro, 2014), but the company already seems to pressure the Colombian government with legal consequences. The company wants a compensation for the made investments if the delimitation blocks the project, 240 million dollars (El Colombiano, 2014b).
A harsh civil opposition keeps on combatting the project. In November 2013, 12.000 marched against the project in the departmental capital Bucaramanga (Caracol, 2013). In the same period, almost
107 16.000 signed a petition to urge president Santos to block the project (AIDA, 2013). While the civil protests against the project keep going on, the state-corporate mining locomotive which is determining the fate of Angostura, only seems to lack a few coordinates.
7.4 Conclusion on the development promises
The three studied companies all implemented CSR strategies in their business operations and underline their beneficial character for the local communities, concerning (local) development. The areas where they chose to operate are mostly areas with an absence of the state, that gave the companies the opportunity to sign conventions with the Ministry of Defence for the services of the Public Forces, but as well allowed them to set a certain (social) standard in the regions. This means that the companies developed social projects for their host communities, which mostly were accompanied by their visible logos. The social projects will have their effects, but often do not seem to target the issues at stake. Those issues are caused by the mere presence of the gold mining TNCs; implicating social and environmental harms. While hearts and minds are bought with the CSR projects, it seems that a ‘development trap’ is set, whereby companies are able to claim a responsible image aiming to increase profits.
The three studied companies face (local) resistance, but a social division is created by different public opinions on their presence. By the imbalance in power, the companies are able to construct their own social ‘face’, while criticism is neutralized through the promotion of CSR, which appears a cover-up tool while the project’s impacts are often denied. This is why the concept of neutralization techniques by Sykes and Matza (1957) and denial by Cohen (1993) are not only applicable on a single or individual violators, but as well apply to corporations, who in this case are moreover supported in their social development discourse by the Colombian state.
Especially the companies AGA and GCG already have a clear impact, be it for different violations of regulations, or the displacements and deaths which are somehow related to their presence. Their CSR so far seems to fail when for example the interviewed ex-employees of AGA’s projects see a deterioration of life quality and the company communicates false information on their projects. The group GCG tries to target with their ‘Artisanal Miner Partnership Model’, seems to be most affected in a harmful way. Eco Oro tries to create an environmental responsible image for the company, but so far fails to gather the necessary environmental licenses, wherefore their pursued image gathers little credibility. Eco Oro develops several social project, which as well appear to aim for the necessary (local) acceptation in order to continue developing their project which means they remain interesting for investors; a profit-based calculation.
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8. Conclusion
The mass entrance of the large-scale gold mining in Colombia has been dressed in a jacket of (social) development by the state-corporate actors involved. At first sight, it is hard to verify the beneficiary circumstances the sector tries to generate along its projects, because most of the information is generated by the state-corporate actors themselves, who promote the industry and therefore lack objectivity. This research was designed to test the CSR of three of the most important corporations in the Colombian gold mining panorama, according to the following research question:
To what extent does the CSR discourse of gold mining TNCs in Colombia and the state corporate development strategy behind gold mining match the social practices of these corporations. In the case of a mismatch, what is the rationality behind this?
A new angle and herewith new theoretical framework has been designed to approach the state- corporate collaboration where theories from criminology try to address the business concept of CSR. The concept of state-corporate crimes by Kramer and Michalowski (2006) has been used, while especially looking towards techniques of neutralization by Sykes and Matza (1957) and denial by Cohen (1993).
In the analysis of CSR and the gold-mining industry in Colombia, it can be concluded that the history of the ongoing internal conflict might have initial political causes, but remains of protracting character because of the importance the relevant actors attach to control Colombia’s natural resources. Therefore it remains at least doubtful if gold mining TNCs at all should consider to start operating in Colombia, while this situation is not yet resolved. The development character of the industry as well cannot be proven, while the social benefits the TNCs proclaim to implement are denied on a local level. The research not only identifies harm by the social friction, which is triggered within communities as a consequence of the presence of a gold-mining company. There are numerous cases where the presence of gold-mining TNCs caused various illegal armed groups and the military to act in a violent way. Threats and displacements prove to be a common effect around the presence of gold-mining TNCs, but as well various murders can be (at least) indirectly related to the presence of the companies.
On a national level, the fiscal benefits that are promoted by the state-corporate tandem behind large- scale gold mining; are so far negligible. It has to be said that most of the projects still have to be developed, but mining in general already proves to generate various problems in this context. Fiscal benefits and tax exemptions already show to generate a loss for the Colombian state on various levels. The government furthermore shows not to be prepared to control the magnitude of the gold-mining TNCs, who chose to operate in Colombia. The extensive agricultural sector, which is often referred to
109 as the ‘heart of Colombia’, seems furthermore under threat by the industry which is known for its extensive water use and tendency to pollute according to the use of chemicals and the possible release of heavy metals and toxic substances. The employment that the sector claims to generate mainly appears to be temporal and ex-employees already claim that working for the sector only compromises the quality of their lives.
None of this seems of a beneficial character or has anything to do with development. Still, large-scale gold mining is heavily promoted in Colombia and according to the companies’ CSR; the Colombians are figuratively on a ‘road to development’. The CSR of the sector only partially addresses the problems it already is causing, or most likely will cause. Concerning development questions, the three companies structurally deny or downplay their impact. The mayor part of the identified CSR strategies seem to focus on completely different aspects, than what really is at stake with large-scale gold mining. But it remains obvious that the problems the industry causes, cannot be cancelled out with social or development projects on a completely different level. Moreover, a large part of CSR seems a promotional strategy and has more to do with marketing than with development. In various cases, the CSR policies do show to target the problems at stake, but appear to be a complete contradiction in practice. As GCG for example focuses on the small-scale gold miners, this seems the group which is victimized the most by the company. As Eco Oro tries to create an image where they will be a frontrunner in (social and environmental) responsible mining, two environmental licenses were denied to the company while they intent to mine in a protected ecosystem. And AGA, they actually try to manifest themselves in many aspects but their nationwide interest as well seems to generate problems in most of them.
The risk of CSR is that it is often regarded as a tool for inclusive, sustainable and ethical conduct of business, but fails to focus on the possibilities it offers for misconduct. CSR is herewith used as a neutralization technique for the harm and illegal acts, conducted by the industry and facilitated by the Colombian state. Now the sector in Colombia is still in its early days, various CSR initiatives seem to have a proactive character by tackling criticism, problems and impacts while they not yet have been caused. This should not be a problem, be it that the sector lies about the impacts, implementations and risks which makes it a (preventive) cover-up strategy.
The encountered negative consequences of the industry often remain within a legal framework, which proves to be beneficial to the companies. Therefore it is necessary to speak about harmful or impactful behavior, instead of illegal or criminal behavior. Still, there are enough cases and incidents where the studied companies break the (non-voluntary) regulatory framework, which pushes their acts in the criminal and illegal sphere.
The information encountered in the Colombian gold mining panorama and the situation of conflict in Colombia, create a context for crimes of the powerful. Colombia is already one of the most unequal countries in the world and has the highest absolute cipher of internal displacement, where especially the most vulnerable parts of the population are suffering. It appears that exactly this part of the population will be victimized again.
This research shows that CSR is a tool which can be and in this case moreover is used as a profit-based strategy, based on a rational choice where TNCs function as amoral calculators. The relative high absence of the Colombian state and the privileges it gives to TNCs, creates a gap where the mining industry is often allowed to almost act as it pleases. CSR as well proves to be a tool to externalize a
110 social image to international politics, sponsors as financial institutions, shareholders and international media. Especially this social image is a creation that is important for the profits of a company. The functioning of the industry is often a state-corporate collaboration, where the Colombian government (often through corruption) seems to be more than a facilitator. The mining ‘locomotive’ furthermore seems to be aided and legitimized by various actors different than the state-corporate, when for example research institutes, think-tanks, international financial institutes and parts of civil society are inflicted in their discourse of CSR. It remains the question if these actors support the non- complementary character of the TNCs, related to (moreover) voluntary regulation on purpose, or that they are too good of confidence or too easily deceived. The unbalance in power and financial capacities of the corporate vs. the state and the corporate vs. civil society is often underestimated
References to a ‘second colonization’ should not be considered as a joke and the need for further research cannot be stressed enough, while Colombia is on the verge of become a country highly dictated by the mining industry. Especially the deceiving aspect of CSR needs more attention from academics, where critical and green criminology can be of high importance. Because the magnitude of (gold) mining TNCs in Colombia, the future impact can be enormous. An example can be taken of other Latin American countries in which already developed mining industries cause a lot of controversy. The current status of the transnational mining sector in Colombia still gives time, be it limited, to pressure companies by objective, independent and capable monitoring to operate according national and international laws that are enforceable. The current Mining Code offers too much opportunities for (foreign) TNCs to implement projects which are non-beneficial for the inclusive development of Colombia. A country that furthermore lacks governmental capacity to enforce the applicable laws and as well has ambiguities by conflicting regulations. If the imposed threat by the mining development discourse is not taken seriously, the extractive sector has the positional to become a nationwide problem along the current internal conflict.
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122 Internet
A list of the most important websites which have been consulted for information.
AngloGold Ashanti. http://www.anglogoldashanti.com.co/saladeprensa/Paginas/Inicio.aspx
CEPAL-statistics. http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp
Comité Minero Energético (CME). http://cmecolombia.co/
DANE. https://www.dane.gov.co/
Defensoría del Pueblo. www.defensoria.gov.co/
Eco Oro: http://www.eco-oro.com/s/NewsReleases.asp?ReportID=646314&_Type=News- Releases&_Title=Colombian-Authorities-Respond-to-Eco-Oros-Enquiries-Regarding-the-Pramo-of-...
Gran Colombia Gold. http://www.grancolombiagold.com/
SIMCO (Sistema de Información Minero Colombiano). www.simco.gov.co/
World Bank. http://worldbank.org/ / http://povertydata.worldbank.org/
123 Annex I: abbreviations
AGA AngloGold Ashanti
AUC Las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – The United Autodefense of Colombia
CERI Canadian Energy Research Institute
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional – National Liberation Army
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia – Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia
GCG Gran Colombia Gold
GCN Contraloría General de la Nacíon – General Comptroller of the Nation
SIJIN Judicial Investigations and Intelligence Service
TNC Transnational Corporation
UN United Nations
UP Unión Patriótica – Patriotic Union
UPME Unidad de Planeación Minero Energética – Mining and Energy Planning Unit
124 Annex II: respondents
Interviews
1. Representative of human rights and environmental organization CIMA. 8 May 2013 2. Representative from the CRIC (Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca). 8 May 2013 3. Representative of Justicia y Paz (Interchurch Comission). 9 May 2014 4. Senior Official Defensoría (Ombudsman) Cauca. 10 May 2013 5. Representative Arco Iris which is a think tank on the Colombian conflict. 11 June 2013 6. Senior official of the Contraloría (Comptroller). 11 June 2013 7. Community Leader Cajamarca. 12 June 2013 8. Ex-employee AGA II. 12 June 2013 9. Ex-employee AGA III. 12 June 2013 10. Representative Environmental Organization in Tolima. 13 June 2013 11. CEO AngloGold Ashanti. 18 June 2013 12. Representative from the ONIC (National Indigenous Organization of Colombia). 20 June 2013 13. Community Leader Suárez. 28 June 2013 14. Farmer Sucre/ex-employee AGA I. 29 June 2013 15. Representative Frontino Syndicate. 12 July 2013 16. Representative of ASOMITRAMA (Association of Traditional Miners in Marmato) and small- scale miner himself. 16 July 2013 17. Indigenous Mayor Marmato. 17 July 2013 18. Lawyer of ASOMITRAMI. 25 July 2013) 19. Senior Official Defensoría (Ombudsman) Tolima. 29 July 2013 20. Ex-employee AGA IV. 1 August 2013 21. Lawyer of the human rights and environmental organization SEMBRAR, 12 September 2013) 22. Executive CME (Mining-Energy Committee). 12 September 2013 23. Small-Scale miner Sur de Bolívar. 17 September 2013 24. Union representative small-scale miners Sur de Bolívar, 17 September 2013) 25. Interview Community Leader Sur de Bolívar, 18 September 2013 26. Community Representative Sur de Bolívar, 18 September 2013 27. Interview Small-scale Miner Sur de Bolívar, 23 September 2013 28. High-level employee of PAX. 14 October 2013 29. Representative action committee, who works on the case of the Angostura project. 21 October 2013 30. Officer Social Department Eco Oro. 22 October 2013 31. Interview CEO Eco Oro. 22 October 2013 32. High-level employee of the economic department of the Dutch Embassy in Bogota. 4 December 2013 33. Senior Officer Gran Colombia Gold. 5 December 2013 34. Mid-level Officer Gran Colombia Gold, 5 December 2013
125
Informal meetings
Informal communication with community leader La Vega, Cauca. 26 June 2013 Informal meeting with community representatives Doima, 2-6-2013 Informal meeting with community representatives La Sierra, 12-6-2013 Informal meetings with community members in Cajamarca. June 2013
126 Annex III: selected TNCs
Eco Oro
“Our priority is to adopt and implement values, principles and guidelines to develop a gold mining project that generates lasting positive economic and social impacts” (Eco Oro, 2013).
Eco Oro is based in Vancouver, Canada and listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX).
The main focus of Eco Oro is to develop its wholly-owned Angostura project in the department of Santander. Angostura is ranked as one of the 50 underdeveloped deposits of more than 1 million ounces in the world.26 The company has four ‘key’ satellite prospects: Móngora, La Plata, Armenia and Violetal.27 Eco Oro has only explored 10% of their concessions, licenses and permits and is not yet mining for gold.
The company changed its name in August 2011 from Greystar to Eco Oro28, Greystar entered Colombia already in 1994. The major shareholders of Eco Oro are Amber Capital 20.8%, Paulson & Co 12.8% and the IFC (International Finance Corporation) 10.7%.29
26 http://www.nrh.co.il/i/pdf/NRH_Research_2012%20World_Gold_Deposits.pdf 27 http://www.eco-oro.com/s/Projects.asp 28 http://www.miningweekly.com/article/with-new-leadership-greystar-rebrands-itself-as-eco-oro-minerals- 2011-08-18 29 http://www.eco-oro.com/i/pdf/Presentations/EcoOro-Corporate-Presentation_AGM2013.pdf
127 Gran Colombia Gold
“The company is committed to being a responsible steward of the environment, to respecting communities within which it works, and to maintaining industry best practice health and safety standards” (GCG, 2013).
Gran Colombia Gold is headquartered in Toronto, Canada and is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX).
The company was formed in 2010 and is currently the largest gold and silver producer in Colombia and has its main focus on two projects in Marmato and Segovia. Gran Colombia Gold merged with Medoro Recourses (Canadian) in 2011. The Marmato project is ranked in the top 2 percent of all gold projects in the world based on resources.30
While the main focus of Gran Colombia Gold is on Colombia, a few of their assets are located in Venezuela. The company has furthermore a 60% ownership stake with CIIGSA, a group which owns a refinery in Medellin. Therefore Gran Colombia Gold has control over the mining productive chain from exploitation to commercialization.31
Gran Colombia Gold produced 102,792 ounces of gold in 2013, of which 80,226 ounces coming from Segovia. The company expects only growing resulting for the upcoming years. Most shares are held by two Venezuelan directors and US Global Investors Inc. and the Blue Pacific Investments Group Ltd.32
30 http://www.grancolombiagold.com/about-us/why-invest/default.aspx 31 http://www.grancolombiagold.com/operations-and-projects/other/default.aspx 32http://grancolombiagold.com/files/Notice%20of%20Meeting%20and%20Management%20Information%20Ci rcular.pdf /http://quote.morningstar.ca/Quicktakes/owners/MajorShareholders.aspx?t=GCM®ion=CAN&culture=en- CA
128 AngloGold Ashanti
“The communities and societies in which we operate will be better off for AngloGold Ashanti having been there.” (AngloGold Ashanti, 2012).
AngloGold Ashanti was formed in 2004 by the merger of AngloGold (based in South Africa) and the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (based in Ghana).
The company is headquartered in Johannesburg, South Africa where it has its primary listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). AngloGold Ashanti is also listed on the New York, London, Australia and Ghana stock exchanges. In total only 31% of the shareholders are from South Africa, while 44% of the shareholders are from the United States and 8% from the United Kingdom.33
AngloGold Ashanti is the current third-largest gold mining company in the world and is actively mining in 10 countries. More than 96% of the revenues stem from the sale of gold produce in the company’s operations. AngloGold Ashanti has 39 shell corporations in countries as Gibraltar, Malta, British Virgin Islands or Isle of Man. Subsidiaries in Colombia are linked with 16 of them.34
There are three main projects in Colombia: La Colosa (100% owned) and Gramalote and Quebradona (51% owned in partnership with the Canadian B2Gold). Those are the three most advanced projects in Colombia, of which La Colosa is potentially the largest gold mining project in Colombia and the seventh largest underdeveloped gold project in the world35. The company has mining titles and pending solicitations in 20 of the 32 Colombian departments.36
The former CEO of AngloGold Ashanti announced in 2012 that the gold projects in Colombia are one of the key priorities of the company and that it has used its first-mover advantage in “the world’s most prospective new gold district”.37
33AngloGold Ashanti. Annual Integrated report 2012. p13. www.aga-reports.com/12/download/AGA-annual-integrated- report-2012.pdf 34Colombia Solidarity Campaign (2013) La Colosa: a Death Foretold Alternative Report about the AngloGold Ashanti Gold Mining Project in Cajamarca, Tolima, Colombia.London, Colombia Solidarity Campaign.
35http://www.mining-technology.com/projects/la-colosa/ 36 http://lasillavacia.com/historia/las-preguntas-detras-de-anglogold-ashanti-25503 37 http://www.mining.com/anglogold-ashanti-sees-colombia-as-the-hottest-new-bullion-district-85308/
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