EASTEcnoo mics, Politics and PubASIAlic Policy in East Asia andFORUM the Pacific Vol.2 No.2 April-June 2010 $9.50 Quarterly

Questions for Southeast Asia

Surin Pitsuwan ASEAN central to the region’s future Andrew MacIntyre Obama in Indonesia and Australia Dewi Fortuna Anwar Indonesia, the region and the world Thitinan Pongsudhirak Thailand’s unstoppable red shirts Tim Soutphommasane From stir-fries to ham sandwiches Ingrid Jordt Burma’s protests and their aftermath Greg Fealy Jemaah Islamiyah, Dulmatin and the Aceh cell and more . . . EASTASIAFORUM CONTENTS Quarterly 4 surin pitsuwan ISSN 1837-5081 (print) ASEAN central to the region’s future ISSN 1837-509X (online) From the Editor’s desk 6 andrew macintyre Common causes: Obama in Indonesia and Southeast Asia defies simple categorisation. Among its countries Australia there are obvious contrasts: big and small, vibrant and stagnant, 8 don emmerson attractive and troubling, peaceful and unsettled, quaint and web- ASEAN and American engagement in East savvy, confronting and embracing. The contributors to this issue Asia of the EAFQ grapple with parts of the Southeast Asian mosaic, 10 dewi fortuna anwar punctuated, as ever, by domestic intrigues, national ambitions, and Indonesia, the region and the world international engagements. 11 greg fealy What ties the articles in this issue together, but never in a neat or Terrorism today: Jemaah Islamiyah, seamless way, is the position of these countries, hemmed in by the Dulmatin and the Aceh cell much larger societies of China and India, and now forced to confront 13 thitinan pongsudhirak a world where ferocious technological and cultural change tests even The unstoppable red shirts the most effective governments. On the one hand—as a crossroads, a hub and a melting-pot—Southeast Asia is well-positioned to take 14 kevin hewison advantage of its special geographical and social inheritance. On the Rebellion, repression and the red shirts other hand, the more than 500 million people of the region confront 17 nick nostitz major challenges in the years ahead. There are many questions for Reporting from Thailand’s political front Southeast Asia, and few easy answers. lines Recent history shows just how unpredictable the prospects 20 thomas kean of particular countries are. At independence in 1948 Burma was No longer the capital: Yangon today considered to have a strong chance of succeeding. Instead, its 22 ingrid jordt post-independence history has seen great tragedy, and a continuing The monks’ protest and its aftermath stalemate between pro-democracy forces and their military 24 tim soutphommasane opponents. Indonesia has weathered its own torments and is now From stir-fries to ham sandwiches beginning to take advantage of new electoral vitality and increasing 27 mahani zainal abidin and prosperity. Will that last? Thailand offers a cautious lesson; after a steven wong promising flirtation with democratic institutions, it now faces the The next step up for a Southeast Asian power challenge of establishing a new political and economic consensus in 28 gregore lopez the waning years of King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s reign. In the other Mahathir’s regional legacy most populous countries of the region—Vietnam, the Philippines and 30 rachel leow Malaysia—political, economic and social debates are not settled. All Sticks and stones in the Allah controversy are struggling to find answers to their own challenges. 32 vu minh khuong Swirling above these country-specific preoccupations is the vexed Today determines tomorrow matter of Southeast Asian regionalism itself. The Association of 34 chris urbanski Southeast Asian Nations has become one of the world’s premier Counting votes and making money regional bodies. Can it continue to lead the region? Will it be properly resourced to tackle pressing issues of democratisation, terrorism, human-rights abuses, economic growth, social harmony and corruption? These remain tantalising questions for Southeast

Asia as a whole. Published by ANU E Press The Australian National University Nicholas Farrelly Canberra ACT 0200, Australia www.eastasiaforum.org Email: [email protected] Web: http://epress.anu.edu.au

2 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 CONTRIBUTORS & STAFF

Surin Pitsuwan is Secretary General Tim Soutphommasane is a Research Chris Urbanski is a graduate of the of the Association of Southeast Asian Fellow at the National Centre for College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian Nations. He was formerly Foreign Minister Australian Studies, Monash University, and National University, who works for the of Thailand and has a PhD from Harvard author of Reclaiming Patriotism: Nation- Boston Consulting Group. University. Building for Australian Progressives (2009). Issue Editor Andrew MacIntyre is Dean of the College Mahani Zainal Abidin is Chief Nicholas Farrelly is a researcher in the of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National Executive of the Institute of Strategic and ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing University. He is in an expert on Southeast International Studies, Malaysia. She has a and Security, College of Asia and the Asian politics and Convenor of the PhD from the University of London. Pacific, Australian National University. Australia-Indonesia Governance Research In 2006 he co-founded New Mandala, a Partnership. Steven Wong is Assistant Director leading academic website concerned with General of the Institute of Strategic and mainland Southeast Asia. Don Emmerson is Director of the International Studies, Malaysia, and Southeast Asia Forum at the Walter H. concurrently Director of its East Asia Editors Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Economic Centre and the Centre for China Peter Drysdale, Head, EAF and EABER, Stanford University. Studies. Crawford School of Economics and Government, ANU. Dewi Fortuna Anwar is a Research Gregore Lopez is a doctoral candidate at Shiro Armstrong, Executive Director, Fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian the Crawford School of Economics and EAF and EABER, Crawford School of Studies, Kyoto University. She was Government, College of Asia and the Economics nd Government, ANU. previously Assistant to the Vice President Pacific, Australian National University. for Global Affairs and Assistant Minister/ Editorial Staff State Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Rachel Leow is a doctoral candidate at the Cleo Fleming, Crawford School, ANU; Indonesian government. University of Cambridge. Ben Sims, Crawford School, ANU; Luke Meehan, Crawford School, ANU. Greg Fealy is a Fellow and Senior Lecturer Vu Minh Khuong is an Assistant Professor in the College of Asia and the Pacific, of Economics at the Lee Kuan Yew School Editorial Advisers Peter Fuller, Max Suich Australian National University. of Public Policy, National University of Production Peter Fuller / Words & Pics Singapore. P/L. Thitinan Pongsudhirak is Associate Professor and Director of the Institute Original Design Peter Schofield of Security and International Studies, COVER PICTURE: Man of the moment. Students at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. a Jakarta primary school which Barack Obama Email [email protected], attended during his childhood years in Indonesia Kevin Hewison is Director of the [email protected] Carolina Asia Center and Professor in the reacted with delight on 5 November 2008 to news Department of Asian Studies, University of that the former pupil had been elected as the 44th North Carolina at Chapel Hill. President of the United States. Obama attended The views expressed are those of the local schools in the Jakarta area between the ages individual authors and do not represent Nick Nostitz is a Bangkok-based photo- of six and ten. He is scheduled to visit Indonesia journalist whose work is regularly featured the views of the Crawford School, ANU, on the New Mandala website. His most later this year. EABER, EAF, or the institutions to which recent book is Red vs Yellow: Thailand’s Picture: BAY ISMOYO / AFP / Getty Images. the authors are attached. Crisis of Identity (2009).

Thomas Kean is the editor of the English- language edition of The Myanmar Times newspaper, based in Yangon.

Ingrid Jordt is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 3 confidence and challenges ASEAN central to the region’s future

Surin Pitsuwan non-traditional threats. The questions British Charge d’Affaires sent a telex to are: Can East Asia cope? Can ASEAN London, saying ‘These countries have uring his visit to the Association cope? Should we think about the Asia failed before. We don’t have to give D of Southeast Asian Nations PacificC ommunity and East Asia them anything. We already gave them (ASEAN) Secretariat in Jakarta on Community? I don’t see these new English!’ 4 March 2010, Kofi Anan, former formulations of regional architecture Over the past 40 years we have United Nations Secretary General, as a challenge, but as further developed a ‘workable diplomatic commended ASEAN for having recognition of the importance of our sculpture’ called ASEAN. regained its profile in the international entire region. The experience of other regional arena. This profile is something that So ASEAN needs to coordinate groupings shows that they all have needs to be nurtured further. policies in any new regional a strong core. The European Union The world wants ASEAN to achieve, architecture. In 1955, Asian and has coal and steel cooperation. and become even more successful, so African Leaders gathered themselves The North American FreeT rade that it has one less region to worry at the Non-Aligned Movement Area is centred around the United about. Last October there was an Summit in Bandung. We realised back States—the strongest economy in appeal for China and East Asia to pull then that we, as individual states, the world. ASEAN is designed in the the world away from the economic needed to coexist peacefully. In 1967, reverse. ASEAN has a rather loose crisis. after the signing of the Bangkok core but draws on connectivity and As it transpired, the West asked Declaration to establish ASEAN, the dialogue to generate real partnership. us to pull the world out of the worst Everybody is comfortable with us. We economic crisis since the Second can claim that we gave rise to other World War. Their need for our support ASEAN itself also has configurations too: APEC, ASEM, ARF follows the realistic response to and the ASEAN+3. managing East Asia’s own financial to change. We need to his October, Australia and Russia crises over a decade ago. We have T will join ASEM. We have also adjusted ourselves and are now more consolidate ourselves heard keen interest from the US and integrated, and resilient, than many Russia about joining the East Asia had thought. and integrate to be one Summit. United States Secretary of ASEAN+3, which includes China, State Hilary Clinton asked me, ‘How Japan and Korea, was established market and production much do you mean to implement the because we realised that all of our ASEAN Charter?’ I said, ‘We have to countries require integration. It is base. The core must make it a living document. Much like important to remember that the your Declaration of Independence!’ economies of ASEAN itself are going be consolidated and We are not perfect but we can to grow, even during these difficult provide centrality and leadership to times, at the rate of around 5 per cent integrated more shape the regional landscape. We don’t this year. want to be central by default but by Of course, economic crisis is not effectively. strengthening our community. We are the only challenge for East Asia. so diverse, and so different, and are There are also political and other dragged down by historical baggage.

4 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 picture: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/Getty Images

President Barack Obama at the ASEAN-US leaders meeting in Singapore on 15 November 2009: US re-engagement is ‘important and symbolic for all of us’.

But as the world is watching, we are will trump cooperation if there is a can be comfortable and confident. showing our responsibility. We have sense that change is being externally ASEAN itself also has to change. gained confidence. imposed, just like in the past. We need to consolidate ourselves TheC hiang Mai Initiative Of course, we welcome President and integrate to be one market and Multilateralisation is a good example, Obama’s re-engagement with Asia. His production base. The core must be with a resource pool of $US120 billion. planned trip to Indonesia is important consolidated and integrated more It is a good sign that East Asia is and symbolic for all of us. He will effectively. showing the way in helping our own notice that the region has moved With a combined GDP of $US1.6 people. To the collective resource, forward in the last decade and these trillion ASEAN is recognised around ASEAN contributes 20 per cent, the changes must shape US engagement the world. The world knows that we Republic of Korea contributes 20 with East Asia. will be good partner for them. ASEAN per cent, while the remaining 60 per ike a ceremonial umbrella, which will provide centrality in any evolving cent are for China and Japan to settle L is not held straight overhead, architecture in this region. EAFQ among themselves. They cannot settle the US has to be symbolically behind, because they don’t want the other to not overwhelming, not imposing, but give more. This is a problem that other there to provide a sense of security, regions of the world may also want to trust and confidence to the region. For This is an edited excerpt from Surin have! that reason, the US has been playing Pitsuwan’s keynote address at the Beyond these changes, ASEAN has that role of the umbrella but not quite International Conference on Changing been enjoying evolutionary progress above, as it did earlier during the Global Landscape and Its Implications over the past 42 years. We want to Vietnam War. That sensitivity has to be on Regional Architecture, 5 March continue this evolution. Disruption taken very seriously. Then everybody 2010, Bangkok.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 5 G-20 power play C ommon causes: Obama in Indonesia and Australia

Andrew MacIntyre prospects for leveraging substantive . . . the beginnings of a results from the Jakarta-Washington nited States President Barack relationship? Indonesia has made U Obama’s planned visit to resumption of military significant progress on the counter- Indonesia and Australia will be terrorism front for some years. Can it one of the less difficult and more cooperation between now rise to a new level in the spheres gratifying international missions he of international economics and even will undertake this year. But along with Jakarta and Washington international security more broadly? the surges of goodwill that will greet The shared international economic him in both countries, there will also may prove to be the agenda relates principally to the G-20. be opportunities—in partnership with Indonesia (like Australia) can’t quite Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Kevin most significant durable believe its good fortune at being part Rudd—to advance significant common of the G-20. Under Yudhoyono’s liberal causes in the region and globally. And outcome of the visit internationalist leadership, Jakarta Yudhoyono’s separate bilateral visit to is strongly motivated to support Canberra in March gave added weight all moves to strengthen the G-20. to the diplomacy of 2010. But Indonesia ranks low among the With climate change sliding down twenty in terms of its ability to deliver the agenda in all three countries for Obama’s pulang kampung, or ‘home- consequential action. All the more so now, the big issue on which the three coming’. This is the most salient visit when the Indonesian President and his leaders find common cause is the for ordinary Indonesians by any otherwise highly capable team of top G-20. A much more difficult issue— international leader in living memory. economic aides are deeply enmeshed but important in different ways for It is also likely to be the longest in a murky political crisis about a bank each of them—is the challenge posed visit any US president has made to bailout. On the international economic by China’s continued rise. Also flowing Indonesia in decades. front, rather than any direct policy through the visits is consideration of Even after his health care reform action, it may be that the greatest the need for movement to enhance victory, Obama will want to bag some value Jakarta may offer Washington is regional frameworks for multilateral real gains to justify the political risk coordinated rhetorical support at the cooperation. of being away from Washington while G-20 summit in Seoul later this year. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect his first term agenda remains heavily urprisingly, there may be greater of Obama’s trip is the ‘diplomatic dots’ contested. The emphasis should be S gains to be had from cooperation it invites us to connect. At least at this on forging a new comprehensive in the security sphere. For more than a moment in history, there is potential partnership. This is good packaging. It decade the Leahy Act prohibiting the for these three countries to begin plays to Indonesia’s desire to move up US from training military units with coordinating their efforts in some a level in world affairs; to get beyond a history of human rights abuse has policy areas. This is not a possibility aid and development assistance. meant that security cooperation with that could have been given much It also plays to Washington’s interest Indonesia has been limited to police- serious attention previously. in forging stronger ties with key Asian based counter-terrorism efforts. Both The Obama visit to Indonesia has countries in response to Beijing’s sides now want to move beyond this. unusually strong symbolic qualities. expanding influence. Driven by China’s growing regional In Indonesia the trip is being billed as More generally, what are the weight, Obama seems prepared to

6 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 Picture: TORSTEN BLACKWOOD/AFP/Getty Images

Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd at their joint press conference at Parliament House in Canberra on 10 March 2010, during President Yudhoyono’s visit to Australia.

go further than President Bush in American investment in educational now in accelerating this cause. While finding ways to restart military- and scholarship programs to help the precise institutional form for to-military engagement. There are Indonesians study in the United States, achieving this outcome remains an signs his administration may seek the beginnings of a resumption of open question, anything that enhances to re-establish training programs military cooperation between Jakarta America’s ability to advance its core with Indonesia’s controversial elite and Washington may prove to be the interests in Asia is likely to find commando unit, Kopassus, by most significant durable outcome of favour with Obama. An upgrading engaging with younger officers who the visit. of one or more of the existing pan- could not have participated in past f course, Australia’s Prime regional institutions is perhaps the abuses. If so, this will be a major O Minister Rudd remains strongly most attainable option. Watch for change. committed to strengthening the coordinated advocacy from Obama, While much of the fanfare will institutional framework for regional Yudhoyono and Rudd as a longer-term focus on the human interest side cooperation in Asia. Explicit support outcome of these visits. EAFQ of Obama’s visit and major new from Washington would be helpful

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 7 the us and the region ASEAN and American engagement in East Asia

Don Emmerson and space. The East Asia Summit has East Asian integration, but only from a been meeting without the United distance, never as a denizen. ormer US Secretary of State States since 2005. The Obama That said, the political meaning of F Dean Acheson entitled his 1969 administration, unable to travel back East Asia has already been blurred. memoir Present at the Creation—the in time to the Summit’s creation, In 1995 Malaysian Prime Minister creation of a global order from the can only be present or absent at its Mahathir Mohamed scoffed at the rubble of World War II. Joining or maturation. inclusion of ‘white’ Australia and ignoring the East Asia Summit (EAS), Nor can the US play an insider’s New Zealand in the ‘East Asian some might say, is a comparably part, the role of a local, in the growth Hemisphere’ proposed by Australian weighty choice—between being of an East Asian regional order. Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. But present or absent at the creation of an Barring hilariously implausible Evans had the last laugh a decade later East Asian regional order in the wake continental drift, the US will never be when, alongside China, Japan, and of the Cold War. an Asian country in geophysical terms. South Korea, Australia was seated at The choice is conditioned by time Washington can speed (or impede) the First East Asia Summit—convened,

picture: USAID

US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visits a USAID water and sanitation project in central Jakarta in February 2009: countries that wish to join the East Asia Summit need to have established a record of cooperative relations with ASEAN.

8 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 ironically, in Malaysia’s own capital, to campaign openly against US Kuala Lumpur. India and New Zealand . . . an open campaign membership of the EAS. were also present at the creation of the Whereas China is in both the EAS EAS, despite their respectively South by Beijing to keep the and ASEAN + 3, India and Australia Asian and Australasian locations. belong only to the EAS. Because Notwithstanding these six Americans out would risk of this difference, New Delhi and additions, the ten members of the Canberra are more likely than Beijing Association of Southeast Asian offending those ASEAN to view the EAS as a prototypical Nations (ASEAN) formed and still Asian community. The position of form the core of the Summit. The members who want the Japan is less clear. Like China, it is a Association invented the EAS, sets full participant in both frameworks its agenda, and requires it to meet US inside the EAS and but, unlike China, it is an intimate annually inside Southeast Asia in security partner of the United States. conjunction with ASEAN’s own confirming Southeast The new Hatoyama government in summit. All of the criteria for joining Tokyo is unlikely to endanger that the EAS were determined by and Asian fears of China’s trans-Pacific assurance. Yet Tokyo linked to the association: A country would think twice before championing cannot join the EAS unless it has hegemonic intentions US membership in the EAS if doing first acceded to the ‘ASEANT reaty of so were construed in Asia as merely Amity and Cooperation in Southeast a ploy to help Washington encircle Asia,’ been formally recognised by ASEAN + 3 and thereby prevent ASEAN as a ‘dialogue partner,’ and cooperation within a conventionally it from monopolising East Asian established a record of substantial East Asian frame. regionalism on behalf of Beijing. cooperative relations with ASEAN. There is no evidence that theU S If Washington is waiting for an TheU S meets these criteria, either wants or would be allowed to invitation to join the EAS, so is but doing so does not guarantee join ASEAN + 3 and make it ASEAN Moscow, and their prospects may be admission. In a further illustration + 4. That framework does not include linked. Russia attended the inaugural of ASEAN’s centrality, it is the a few plausibly ‘East Asian’ entities EAS in 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, but only association’s ten governments—not such as Mongolia, North Korea, and as a guest invited by the Malaysian the summit’s six non-Southeast Asian Taiwan. But its thirteen members all host, and has been trying to become members—who must unanimously fit the consensus definition of East a member of the summit ever since. agree to accept or reject a request to Asia as a composite of Southeast and If and when ASEAN does take up the join the EAS. Northeast Asia. No other regional suitability of American affiliation, No Southeast Asian government arrangement is more patently East voices may well be raised on behalf has said publicly that it would Asian in character. of letting Russia in as well. Among oppose, and several have informally Ironically, the EAS lays claim to several possible motives for linking encouraged, an American application. ‘East Asia’ in its very name, whereas the two accessions is the notion that China may not welcome US ‘Plus Three’ in the ASEAN framework by making the EAS even more diverse, membership. But an open campaign could in theory refer to Ghana, Chile, it will become even less effective, and by Beijing to keep the Americans out and Iceland, or any trio of states. thus leave unchallenged the claim of would risk offending those ASEAN Nevertheless, of the two frameworks, ASEAN + 3 to represent East Asia. members who want the US inside the it is ASEAN + 3 that has a far better As long as these uncertainties EAS and confirming Southeast Asian chance of evolving into a delimited remain unresolved, the political shape fears of China’s hegemonic intentions. ‘East Asian Community’ as opposed of East Asia will remain, for better or Besides, the profile and activities of the to an amorphously ‘Asia-Pacific’ one. worse, unfinished business. EAFQ EAS pale by comparison with those If China wants to lead East Asia, it of another forum, ASEAN + 3, which does not need the East Asia Summit A longer version of this article can already includes China (along with as a vehicle for doing so. This could be found at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/ Japan and South Korea) and fosters be one reason why Beijing is unlikely publications/workingpapers/wp193.pdf

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 9 a force for moderation I ndonesia, the region and the world picture: beryl bernay

Dewi Fortuna Anwar

he visit by United States T President Barack Obama to Indonesia later in 2010 will undoubtedly put Indonesia in the limelight. Obama’s visit is seen by many as recognition of Indonesia’s international standing as the largest country in Southeast Asia, the largest Muslim majority nation, the world’s third-largest democracy, and one of the world’s 20 largest economies. Much was also made of President Sukarno, right, invests then Major General Suharto with authority to restore order on 11 March Hillary Clinton’s visit, which made 1966. Under President Suharto, Indonesian foreign policy focussed on stability in Southeast Asia. Indonesia the second country that she visited after being appointed as the though trade and investment. While majority nation with a predominantly US Secretary of State in early 2009. mostly successful in its immediate moderate brand of Islam has suddenly Recently, a number of Indonesian development objectives, Indonesia lost become an asset. The international and foreign observers have noted its profile in the international arena, community, and especially the West, Indonesia’s return to regional and even though it was still recognised as now has a higher expectation of the international activism after a period of first among equals within ASEAN. country. In a global climate marred crippling domestic crises. Indonesia, supported by the major by Islamic religious extremism and It is sometimes said that Indonesia Western powers during the Cold threats of terrorism, Indonesia, with is the most important country that War as a staunch anti-communist its claim as a country in which Islam, the world knows least about. For bulwark, was mostly known to the democracy and modernity go hand- the most part this is due to the wider international community for in-hand, is seen as a credible force of style of foreign policy implemented its holiday resorts in Bali, and for its moderation. throughout Suharto’s more than 30- military occupation of East Timor. The Within ASEAN, Indonesia’s year rule. In response to President end of Suharto’s rule was followed by resurgence has been welcomed with Sukarno’s ‘lighthouse’ foreign incessant news of riots, communal both anticipation and unease. A policy in which Indonesia strutted conflicts, regional insurgencies, revitalised Indonesia clearly helps to as the global spokesman for newly religious extremism and terrorist reinvigorate ASEAN, but an Indonesia independent nations, and confronted bomb attacks. For many people not that is strident about democracy and the Western colonialist-imperialist familiar with the country these events human rights is very different from powers, Suharto pursued the opposite summed up Indonesia: an unfamiliar the familiar champion of the ‘ASEAN course. Indonesian foreign policy and dangerous place. Way’ which upheld the principle under Suharto was deliberately Today a successful democracy of strict non-interference in each low profile, narrowly focused on has replaced Suharto’s authoritarian country’s internal affairs. Indonesia peace and stability in Southeast regime. The economy is recovering has also been basking in international Asia, and designed to bring direct from the global crisis, and Indonesia’s attention, exemplified by the economic benefits to Indonesia status as the world’s largest Muslim forthcoming visit of President Barack

1 0 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 jihadism in indonesia

Obama and invitations to participate in various prestigious forums, such T errorism today: Jemaah as the 2007 Annapolis conference on Palestine and, most important of all, Islamiyah, Dulmatin membership in the new grouping of the world economic powerhouses, the and the Aceh cell G-20. Indonesia is currently the only Southeast Asian member of the G-20. Now calls have become much Greg Fealy (JI) and other jihadist groups to louder for Indonesia to once again cultivate relations with Acehnese walk tall on the world stage, to play errorism has again dominated insurgents had been rebuffed, and the a role as a peace-broker in various T headlines in Indonesia over province was regarded as a hostile international conflicts, to act as an recent months. On 22 February 2010, site for recruitment and training. The interlocutor in the dialogue between police raided a terrorist training camp emergence of this terrorist cell in the Muslim world and the West, to be in the mountains of Aceh, leading to Aceh, which reportedly was formed a spokesman for developing countries the deaths of three mobile brigade in late 2009, represents a disturbing in the G-20, and to drive ASEAN to officers and one terrorist. Over the development in a province which has respect democracy and human rights. next three weeks another seven been largely peaceful since the 2005 At the same time, Suharto’s legacy terrorists were shot dead by police and peace agreement. of a more narrowly focused foreign 40 others have been arrested in Aceh, Second, police have blamed JI policy aimed at obtaining concrete Jakarta and Banten, on the western for the formation of this cell. The outcomes for Indonesia’s economic tip of Java. The most prominent of National Police Chief, Bambang development, given that Indonesia is those killed was Dulmatin, whom Hendarso Danuri, for example, stated: still a relatively poor country, is equally police suspect was leading the network ‘It [the terrorist cell] is purely Jemaah influential.M any have argued that supporting the Aceh terrorist cell. Islamiyah. The network is up to Indonesia’s first priority must be to Dulmatin was the most wanted of something in Aceh’ (Jakarta Globe, 17 improve the livelihoods of the people the remaining fugitive Bali bombers March 2010). This emphatic linking of and its foreign policy must, first and and the United States government JI to the Aceh cell is surprising given foremost, be aimed at achieving had posted a dead-or-alive $US10 that, in recent years, most terrorism economic benefits for Indonesia. It million bounty on his head, by far the analysts (and seemingly the Indonesian is also argued that Indonesia should highest reward for any Indonesian police, as well) have concluded that get its house in order first, including terrorist. Police have since revealed JI itself is no longer directly engaged improving its own democracy and that the Aceh cell contained at least in terrorist activities and that all the governance, before it tries to promote 40 people and they believe another 30 major bombings since 2004 have been democracy and human rights or so were part of the broader support the work of a JI splinter group led by elsewhere. network. One of those whom police the Malaysian Noordin Mohammad The push and pull between are pursuing is Umar Patek, a close Top, which is operating without the a Sukarno-style ‘lighthouse’ associate of Dulmatin and another knowledge or approval of JI’s board. international stance and a more member of the 2002 Bali bombing Moreover, sections of the media have pragmatic, economically-focussed operation, who is thought to have been reported that Dulmatin returned effort will likely mark the course involved with the Aceh cell. Patek has to Indonesia from his refuge in the of Indonesia’s foreign policy in a $US1million reward for his capture. southern Philippines in early 2009 the years ahead. Which trend will These developments are significant and had been given protection by prevail is likely to be determined by for a number of reasons. First, Aceh, JI’s central leadership to initiate new the dynamics of internal politics as despite its long and bloody separatist jihadist operations in Indonesia (Jawa competing actors seek to influence the insurgency between the late 1970s Pos, 11 March 2010). formulation and implementation of a and 2005, has not previously been So why has Aceh suddenly emerged foreign policy which can no longer be a site of Islamist terrorism. Indeed, as a terrorist site, and has JI indeed decided behind closed doors. EAFQ earlier attempts by Jemaah Islamiyah returned to active terrorism? It is

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 1 1 picture: ROMEO GACAD / AFP / Getty Images too early to answer either question categorically, as information about the Aceh cell and Dulmatin’s role remains patchy and sometimes contradictory. With regard to the ‘why Aceh and why now?’ questions, some provisional responses can be ventured. Those arrested in Aceh for involvement in this cell come from various backgrounds. Some were long-standing jihadists who had been involved in other terrorist actions. The Java-based Darul Islam-affiliated group known as the Banten Ring is one such important source of cell members. The Ring’s leader, Kang Jaja, General Bambang Hendarso Danuri displays a poster of Dulmatin after the terrorist was confirmed dead. was one of those shot dead by police in Aceh, and his brother Saptono frequented by Westerners. They were contradict much of what we know is seen as a possible leader of the eventually discovered and arrested about JI’s recent attitudes to bombings cell. The Banten Ring has for many by the police. The Palembang group and other kinds of terrorist attacks. years provided a pool of recruits for comprised mainly local members of an Since 2003, JI appears to have been led suicide bombings by JI and Noordin anti-Christianisation movement who by jihadists who believe that bombings network members, though it remains were cultivated by a few members of against civilians and Westerners organisationally separate from both the Noordin network and trained in have been counterproductive to the groups. Others in the Aceh cell were bomb-making and covert operations. organisation and its central objective disaffected local officials and former This brings us to the issue of of creating an Islamic state in Free Aceh Movement (GAM) fighters. JI’s involvement. It is clear that the Indonesia. Hence, they have sought to Their disaffection has two elements: Indonesian police are incorrect to prevent members from joining further anger at economic marginalisation state that this is a ‘purely Jemaah Bali bombing-style attacks. This is and exclusion from the rewards of Islamiyah’ operation. The presence not to rule out the possibility of JI power that have flowed to former of Darul Islam jihadists and former complicity, but rather to say there are GAM leaders after the peace deal; GAM troops proves this. But does the grounds for scepticism. and disapproval of the provincial involvement of Dulmatin and Umar The indications are that Dulmatin government’s reluctance to implement Patek, both sworn JI members, put was indeed heavily involved in this comprehensively sharia law. It is likely that organisation at the heart of this operation and he is known to have that the hardened jihadists sought terrorist operation? In other words, remained committed to militant to radicalise these Acehnese and although the Aceh cell may not be jihadism while in the Philippines. encourage them to see their struggle exclusively JI’s, was that organisation He was quite capable of using non-JI as part of a broader war against the central to its existence? The answer jihadist networks for launching the enemies of Islam, particularly the to this remains unclear at this stage. Aceh cell. The apparent speed with thoghut (infidel-serving) governments Most available evidence suggests which Dulmatin and his associates of Aceh and Indonesia. that Dulmatin and Umar Patek had were able to form a lethal terrorist This combining of hardened been operating outside the command group in Aceh, which had the capacity jihadists with local radical groups structure of JI for about six years, to inflict such heavy casualties on the to create new terrorist cells has a though Umar Patek may still consider police, is further evidence that violent number of precedents in recent years, himself part of the JI community. If jihadism in Indonesia is capable of the most notable being the so-called the JI leadership did indeed protect taking new forms and drawing on Palembang group in South Sumatra, Dulmatin and Patek and allow them to hitherto non-jihadi communities in which had planned to bomb a café mount terrorist operations, it would mounting operations. EAFQ

1 2 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 thailand T he unstoppable red shirts

Thitinan Pongsudhirak will only lead to red shirt victory and demonstrations in Bangkok less than a a return of their government as seen year after defeat suggests deep-seated he red shirt uprising in Bangkok in 2008, even though their Puea Thai red sympathies in the rural north and T has brought Thailand’s topsy- party is a third-rate successor to the northeast, where traditional passivity turvy politics to a critical juncture original Thai Rak Thai party. And this was shaken by former Prime Minister as brinksmanship and confrontation time the reds would be unlikely to Thaksin’s brand of populism and sense intensify. Since early 2009, many tens allow the PAD yellows to hijack their of upward mobility for the neglected of thousands of red shirts, nominally mandate, as in 2008. Clinging to power masses. under the United Front for Democracy under the status quo is the pro-Abhisit his time the reds have enjoyed Against Dictatorship (UDD) and coalition’s muddling way forward. T limited but unprecedented supportive of former Prime Minister The odds have now stacked against traction in the capital. The rural Thaksin Shinawatra, have agitated the reds. They can protest until they downtrodden have been joined by and mobilised against the coalition are hoarse but are unlikely to get Bangkok’s underclass, the sympathetic government of Prime Minister Abhisit their way as long as the pro-Abhisit menial workers and service providers Vejjajiva. After rioting in the streets and anti-Thaksin coalition stands its who hail from upcountry. Some and retreating in disgrace in April ground. But Abhisit and his backers Bangkokians with a conscience of 2009, they regrouped and reclaimed are mistaken in their belief that what is not right in Thailand have also their agenda with street protests in the reds can be whittled down into shown significant support. The reds Bangkok in March and April 2010, pacification and submission. That have increasingly transcended Thaksin, calling for a dissolution of the lower they have re-emerged for more mass and even eclipsed the UDD organisers house and new polls to reboot in their commitment to political Thailand’s democratic game. change and for the opportunities they As the reds ramped up their The vast majority of Thais glimpsed during the Thaksin years in rhetoric and street demonstrations, 2001-2006. their demands for a dissolution of still want to preserve To be sure, Thaksin’s corruption the lower house were set against and abuse of power are now naked, the defiance and resolve of Prime their constitutional proven in legal convictions and assets Minister Abhisit and his patrons and confiscation. The reds acknowledge his allies. Negotiations were brokered monarchy but it must be errors but tend to dismiss them as par but nothing is likely to come of them for the course in Thai politics. unless Abhisit relents. The pro-Abhisit reformed and refitted Abhisit’s patrons and allies are royalist-conservative coalition of deliberately fixated on Thaksin’s army officers, palace insiders, ruling to meet the demands corruption because they do not want coalition parties, the ‘yellow’ People’s to confront the implications of the Alliance for Democracy (PAD), and and expectations of a reds’ demands and grievances. These Bangkok’s co-opted civil society and disenchantments point to a nascent home- and car-owning middle classes, democratised society order in Thailand that can only be have closed ranks and hunkered down detrimental to establishment status for a long battle of attrition. That and vested interests. Their resistance coalition seems aware that new polls to change stands in the way of future

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 1 3 royalism and democracy reconciliation where Thailand’s constitutional monarchy will have to own up to a democratic reality in R ebellion, which victorious voters will not let their voices be denied. The hard truth and trial by experience in Thailand repression have shown that a strong monarchy is ultimately not compatible with a strong democracy. Navigating ways to and the reconcile the two and settle in a new consensual equilibrium underlines the protracted confrontation between reds and yellows. red shirts The reds have upped the ante with their growing calls for new elections but they cannot dislodge Kevin Hewison Buddhist middle paths, making them the government as long as Abhisit’s compromisers and even fatalistic coalition remains intact. As the nyone with even a passing in political outlook. From this Abhisit government’s symbiotic A interest in Thailand knows perspective, when politics matters it is relationship with the army is laid bare, that there was a military coup in handled through a pyramid of patron- underscored by the prime minister’s September 2006. The coup was meant client relations that have an apex in the periodic refuge in the barracks, the to end the political domination of monarchy. The king is said to be the pro-Abhisit coalition will not give up telecommunications tycoon and ultimate ‘good man’ who understands without a fight. former Prime Minister Thaksin and protects his people. Indeed, he can Nor will the reds disband without Shinawatra who had won the two be relied upon as a great figure above palpable concessions. Something will largest electoral victories in Thai politics. It is this ‘Thai culture’ which is have to give. The culmination of this history. The coup punctuated a period believed to be unravelling as political brinksmanship may well disadvantage of political turmoil that began in 2005 conflict deepens. the reds in the near term. But each and continues to this day. In fact, this so-called culture time they are dispersed and return Some commentators agree that this derives from a social and political for more, Thailand moves closer period of turmoil marks a political or order that has long been hierarchical to a less favourable outcome for its cultural turning point. It is not unusual and repressive. This order has for constitutional monarchy that plays to hear laments that Thailand is now decades been opposed in cycles of into the hands of a growing republican somehow ‘different’, with a politics that occasional rebellion and continual and fringe. The vast majority of Thais still is more conflicted than in the past. It quieter forms of political opposition. want to preserve their constitutional is sometimes claimed that the Thai Rebellions have arisen intermittently monarchy but it must be reformed ability to compromise is now gone. over more than seven decades, from and refitted to meet the demands and This position seeks explanations of the 1932 overthrow of the absolute expectations of a democratised society. Thailand’s politics in the deep recesses monarchy, to the 1973 student-led The establishment forces of something called ‘Thai culture.’ Not uprising and the civilian challenge to behind Prime Minister Abhisit are only is this a misleading perspective the military’s 1992 attempt to control understandably insecure and fearful that ignores a long history of political Thailand’s political future, to the of change because it can be slippery. struggle, but it ignores the ideological current red shirt movement. Concessions and reforms may nature of claims about ‘Thai culture.’ Usually derisively described in the know no bounds. But playing this More than anything else, such mainstream media as ‘pro-Thaksin,’ democratic game in a winner-takes-all conservative claims mystify Thailand’s in fact the red shirt movement fashion may mean that they end up power structures. This perspective draws on deeply-held feelings that with little left at the end of the day. conceives Thais as having been the current social order is unfair. EAFQ essentially apolitical, drawn to In a society that official figures

1 4 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 picture: nick nostitz

The Privy Council Chairman, General Prem Tinsulanonda, has been caught up in the ongoing political strife. show is highly unequal in terms of Others are politically naïve and still As a starting point, this income, wealth, land ownership others continue to build a money- conservative royalism is an ideology and opportunity, the red shirts have based politics. Despite all of this, the that rejects Western-style democracy increasingly proclaimed Thai society rise of the red shirts represents one as inappropriate for a Thai society unfair, unequal and unjust. The result of those brief periods of subaltern that is considered culturally amenable is a red shirt movement that is class- rebellion that goes beyond forms to strong authority figures who based and regionalised and inherently of everyday resistance that rarely unify the nation while upholding heterogeneous in membership and offer fundamental challenges to the Buddhist-based moral principles. The leadership. Its emotive campaigns established order. rural base of society is considered a challenge established hierarchies that his overt challenge has unsettled cultural heartland that reveres and are founded in the very inequality T the ruling elite. They oppose it maintains traditional institutions. red shirts oppose. This makes for a through the state’s repressive forces Real representation is not to be movement that is detested and feared while reasserting their rule as natural found in ‘Western-style’ liberal ideas by an essentially Bangkok-based and culturally Thai. The ideological about elections and democracy establishment. affirmation of the right to rule draws but in a leadership that guarantees The red shirts are not without on deeply conservative conceptions ‘democracy’ through patriarchal and divisions and problems. Some long of order, authority and morals. hierarchical ‘representation’ and for a return by former Prime Minister Significantly, conservative royalism moral correctness, even without Thaksin Shinawatra, a corrupt crystallised as a political ideology elections. politician and deeply flawed leader, during a period of harsh and despotic These conservative ideas initially but one who came to be seen as having military authoritarianism in the late underpinned a military dictatorship a desire to help the downtrodden. 1950s. but were also the basis for the

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 1 5 CHRISTOPHE ARCHAMBAULT / AFP / Getty Images

revival of the royalism that is now the locus of red shirt criticisms of the king’s Privy Council and, more circumspectly, of the monarchy itself. Royalist ideas were promoted by several well-known ideologues, including Kukrit Pramoj, who asserted a ‘Thai-style’ of government that brought order, peace, security and progress but was vehemently anti-liberal and anti-democratic. In this system, the role of the king was constructed in terms of benevolent and moral leadership, as a protector of the people. In this form, the monarch is portrayed as a moral check and balance on government. Only leaders who displayed the utmost respect to and loyalty for the king could be ‘good’ for the country. t the heart of this royalist A ideology is a benevolent paternalism that insists that the monarchy is indispensable for the peace, prosperity and stability of the nation and the well-being of the people. At the same time, the elite that runs the country under the king’s unquestionable moral authority and great wisdom is supposedly destined to rule. This axis of moral King Bhumibol Adulyadej: The monarch is traditionally seen as a moral check on the government. authority between monarch and political leaders is said to be tempered portion of the evening news dedicated were not only a stimulus for the by Buddhist principles that limit to the display of public royal activities military’s coup in 2006—where absolute power. It is this system that is now often longer in duration than the junta claimed Thaksin had not is said to have held sway in Thailand the national and international news shown the right veneration for the for some 700 years. In this context, combined. The claims made regarding monarchy—but buttress the military’s those commentators who pine for a royal skill, expertise and knowledge 2007 Constitution. The changes in the Thailand of yore essentially accept a have become increasingly fantastic constitution have seen an increase conservative royalist ideology that is as various royals are showered with in the power of senior state officials, inherently anti-democratic. honorary doctorates and other awards. an emphasis on appointment rather Since the 2006 coup, conservative Government ministers, judges, senior than election and a substantial effort royalism has been reinvigorated and diplomats and many more must now to reinvigorate the capacity of the endlessly emphasised. The deluge of publicly display their veneration of Ministry of Interior, the military and royalist propaganda is unrelenting, the monarchy and subservience to the various security agencies to control most especially on television, but king and other royals. the population. Several other junta- in all the recesses of the media and In terms of politics, the era laws have strengthened the official institutions, including schools. conservative and anti-liberal principles military, vastly increasing its budget On many television stations, the that underpin these royalist ideas and providing it with the capacity to

1 6 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 getting the facts intervene in a vast range of social and political affairs. R eporting from Conservative royalism has been vigorously policed. Several people have been locked up for long prison Thailand’s terms on the political charge of insulting the monarchy and no one knows exactly how many have been political charged with lèse majesté or under provisions of the post-coup Computer Crimes Act. Cyber police actively front lines work to censor web-based attacks on the monarchy and their work now totals tens of thousands of blocked pages. More importantly, the culture Nick Nostitz the abbot at a famous local temple. I of deference and adulation, combined was invited too. Several police officers with a constant dialogue that suggests n 25 October 2009 I went to and red shirt guards came along. the monarchy is threatened by evil O northeast Thailand, this time to Inside, the abbot blessed the rally, forces, creates considerable fear and the village of Nong Wua So, about 40 and presented us with rare amulets. inevitable self-censorship. kilometres outside the city of Udon One of the guards said to me, with a he red shirts carefully contest Thani, ot observe a red shirt rally: huge smile, that he had wanted this T this royalist ideology by directing village-style. When I arrived in the particular amulet for a long time. their attacks at members of the Privy early afternoon the action had not By sunset the rally site quickly filled Council and at a broader power elite yet begun. Soon after, many people with 2000 to 3000 red shirts. Entire they call amart. This is also why their began arriving from surrounding families arrived. Local politicians rhetoric emphasises fairness, equality villages. Around the rim of the rally spoke on the stage, Kwanchai made his and justice. The red shirts know that area were food stalls, and several large points, and even exiled former Prime direct political challenges to royalism trampolines where children jumped Minister Thaksin Shinawatra made are complicated by the uncertainties around for a few baht each. Kwanchai a phone-in. There were Look Thung associated with royal succession and Paipanna, the charismatic leader of the and Mor Lam singers belting out their the power of a government that owes Udon Lovers, a local red shirt group, peculiar mix of folk pop, accompanied its position to the military brass and and organiser of the rally, was already by Hang Kueang—the scantily dressed support from senior palace officials. there, sitting in a tent close to the dancers so typical of provincial Even if their rebellion is short- stage. He talked with red shirts and concerts. lived or defeated, the red shirts will police officers. The following day we went toU bon not have contested the power of the A high-ranking officer asked Ratchatani, a few hours south of Udon establishment in vain. Their campaigns Kwanchai to accompany him to visit Thani. wanchaiK Paipanna was driven and protests have re-embedded ideas by a huge police officer who served about fairness, equality and justice in as his driver and bodyguard. While the Thai political milieu in a manner . . . the rally site quickly driving he kept his gun next to his seat. that ensures that the ruling elite and, In a slightly derelict resort, about one indeed, the monarchy can never again filled with 2000 to 3000 hour away outside town, a conference believe that Thailand is exclusively of local red shirt leaders from all over theirs. Even if the establishment red shirts. Entire families the northeast took place. The hosts prevails, they will always be looking were singer-turned-politician Arisman over their shoulders for the next rising arrived. Local politicians Pongruangrong and Suporn ‘Rambo of the red shirts or a new rebellion Isaarn’ Attawong, a former Khorat that demands a fairer and more just spoke on the stage Member of Parliament under the Thailand. EAFQ deposed Thai Rak Thai government.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 1 7 picture: nick nostitz

In front of a line of Border Patrol Police troops, a Democrat Party official pours sacred water on blood left by red shirt protesters.

Kurt Pelda, correspondent of the Swiss about them; their reports led to freelance. But it was already apparent Neue Zürcher Zeitung, and I were the many discussions in the Thai political way back then that discrepancies only journalists in attendance. Nobody blogosphere. between reporting and reality existed. else was paying much attention. Today I don’t even remember Most international journalists hung More recently, on 30 January 2010, how many ‘small’ red shirt events, on the lips of yellow shirt leader a red shirt rally in Khonkaen had such as fundraisers for community Sondhi Limthongkul’s masterfully more than 100,000 protesters, and radio stations, and concerts I have prepared media sound bites about the following day an event in Ubon photographed where I was the only corruption and democracy yet ignored Ratchathani drew between 50,000 and independent journalist present. the extreme nationalism expressed on 60,000 red shirts. These events were Late in 2005 and throughout 2006, stage. not reported by the Thai mainstream until the military coup, the situation Not too many journalists made media; not on television or in the was quite different. Every People’s their way to the pro-Thaksin camp at newspapers. Only Nirmal Ghosh from Alliance for Democracy (that is Chatuchak Park in Bangkok. These Singapore’s Straits Times and Marvaan ‘yellow shirt’) event was covered by government supporters were mostly Makan Makar from IPS wrote about dozens of journalists, both local and portrayed as hired stooges, absent the events when they found out international, both employed and of political conviction. There is no

1 8 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 doubt that many such opportunists Some Thai journalists often cowed by the mostly yellow shirt were around — at the time I had academic establishment. friends from my neighborhood who have even been physically In contrast, the blogosphere is very used the camp as a welcome source much alive. Most valuable reporting is of easy income. Nevertheless, many attacked by members of done on blogs. The natural problem is others, especially those who travelled that blogs have little peer review, are to Bangkok from distant villages on both the red and yellow often anonymous, and at times openly their small tractors, argued quite side with this or the other political convincingly why they supported shirt movements, angered faction. Even the few respected blogs Thaksin. The reasons cited were such as New Mandala and Bangkok more or less the same as today: they by the blinkered reporting Pundit, and the critical news website appreciated the many programs Prachatai, are often discredited along aimed at connecting their villages by the Thai media those lines. to Thailand’s economy. These are The few people who do report on the same policies that were widely the ground, and publish without a denounced as ‘populist’ in the lead-up shield of anonymity, have to acquire to the 2006 coup. would have serious consequences for a very thick skin. I was accused of After that coup, and especially their professional future. Not many being bribed by former Prime Minister when it became clear that no blood local journalists are in the position of Thaksin with a very large amount was shed, the international media soon Pravit Rojanaphruk from The Nation, of money, for example, because of lost interest. I remember the largely who, as an Oxford graduate from what I reported about the 7 October unreported early anti-coup protests at a good family, can afford to write 2008 clash at Government House Sanam Luang, the expanse in front of according to his conscience and the between police and yellow shirts, first Bangkok’s Grand Palace. The crowds facts he gathers. published by New Mandala. My report they drew were sometimes a few For Western journalists the contradicted the official version of hundred protesters. But their protests situation differs in some important events but it was soon translated and grew and then culminated in the ways. Simply, there is no money in taken up by the Thai media. Jonathan post-coup period with the clashes at Thai political reporting. If you cover Head, the former BBC correspondent the residential compound of the Privy the conflict in depth, I’d advise you to in Thailand, ended up earning several Council Chairman, General Prem forget about earning a proper income. lèse majesté charges for his reporting. Tinsulanonda. At that time there were Western media, already in crisis Some Thai journalists have even only five foreign journalists, including with tremendous budget cuts, will been physically attacked by members me, who were present and witnessed not spend any money on Thailand’s of both the red and yellow shirt parts of the clashes. problems while there are much larger movements, angered by the blinkered Generally speaking, the media as a stories such as Afghanistan, Iraq and reporting by the Thai media. whole, with few exceptions, completely Britney Spears’ mental state. Larger Taken together this has led to a missed the beginning of what may turn networks have tried to report as well vacuum in knowledge about Thailand’s out to be the most important recent as they can, especially Al-Jazeera and ongoing political battles, and wider change in the Thai socio-political the BBC, but when there is little space socio-political conflicts in Thailand. landscape. The quality of reporting available for such coverage, there will Almost every aspect of red shirt on the red shirts still suffers from this be only a small budget to go around. grassroots support in the provinces oversight. There are, of course, reasons The academic world has similarly and Bangkok remains unstudied. for this. The local media is under ignored the red shirt movement, and Even the fact that there is ideological subtle but strong pressure. Several to a large degree still does. There has grassroots support is still highly local journalists have told me that they been no long term field study done disputed. How is it possible to analyse would love to be able to work the way on the red shirts, and only now are future developments and potentially I do, and write what I write. They have there a few students, mostly foreign, fundamental changes in Thai society said that if they did, they would be who are researching the movement. when elementary aspects go unstudied attacked as red shirt supporters, which Thai students—the few who care—are and unreported? EAFQ

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 1 9 big city burma N o longer the capital: Yangon today

Thomas Kean kings. It’s also far away from the two foreignness, population base and main perceived threats to military rule location—that it will continue to be here’s a saying in Myanmar that, and, in the words of the generals, most the country’s most important urban T roughly translated, says you go to likely causes of ‘disintegration of the area. Mawlamyine for food, Mandalay for Union’: foreign invasion and popular The shift to Naypyidaw has found conversation and Yangon to show off. uprising. little acceptance, both locally and Poor Yangon. Under the 2008 constitution, internationally. Government staff Since the military shifted the seat the 440-member Pyithu Hluttaw, forced to move have done so only of government to newly constructed or House of Representatives, must reluctantly, and local businesses, Naypyidaw in late 2005, the city convene within 90 days of the general outside of the construction industry, cannot even be described as the top election, scheduled for sometime later still see few opportunities there at place to display ill-gotten wealth this year. Both elected and appointed present. anymore. Many of its crumbling delegates—25 per cent of seats are Only a handful of embassies—the colonial and towering Chinese-style reserved for military candidates—will Chinese and the North Koreans— mansions now lie vacant, their owners meet in a 31-building parliament have moved north, while the United summoned to the new capital, and complex which should be completed Nations continues to be scattered the long government motorcades that by the end of May. across Yangon. When the UN began were once an everyday annoyance are That first session, marking the looking for a large office space late last now a rare sight. country’s return to democracy after 48 year to integrate its agencies, there was Set on the arid plains of upper years of military rule, will be another little discussion of the possibility of Myanmar, Naypyidaw has been a indicator of Yangon’s demise. But transferring to the new capital. significant drain on the country’s it is precisely because of the city’s ith no international flights to finances and is estimated to have faults in the eyes of the generals—its W Naypyidaw, Yangon remains cost at least $US$4 billion. Nowhere the centre of international trade. Its has the effect been felt more than Burma or Myanmar? five million residents represent the in Yangon, where potted roads, largest consumer market and the blackouts and weeds growing from The Union of Myanmar is country’s primary port, at Thilawa, is old government offices speak of the the official name of the country just 25 kilometres away, as are most deliberate neglect that is taking place. still widely known as Burma. of Myanmar’s industrial zones. If the The present military rulers have Internationally, and as a reflection much-anticipated law permitting always been ambivalent about this of Burma/Myanmar’s contentious Special Economic Zones, modelled ‘foreign’ city, which was little more politics, the names are used on the Pearl River Delta, is finally than a village when the British inconsistently and interchangeably; introduced, Thilawa would be the established it as the capital of lower just as they are in this issue of the mostly likely location for these, Burma after the Second Anglo- EAFQ. providing a much-needed boost to Burmese War in the 1850s. On linguistic, historical, political employment. The shift north owes more to and protocol grounds, advocates of Much of what remains of the strategy and tradition than the a specific usage offer strong reasons country’s human capital is based in oft-cited astrological motives. for their choice of presentation. Yangon and it continues to be the most Naypyidaw is centrally located and in The EAFQ has opted to retain each vibrant city in Myanmar, the only one the traditional heartland of Burmese author’s original usage. that could even remotely be called

2 0 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 picture: christopher davy

Demolition in progress in Yangon. Although the former capital has suffered from the shift of political power to the north, tourism investments and the prospect of a revitalised business sector after elections raise the prospect of a more vibrant future for the city. cosmopolitan or international. businesses and households rely heavily become a tourist destination in its own There are also signs that the decline on generators fuelled by subsidised right. in fortunes in recent years will soon diesel—or simply go without. But the greatest hope for the reverse. The elections might be the new natural gas pipeline city’s future perhaps lies in the sham that many in the international A from the Yadana offshore possibility of a post-election business community expect, but the spectre of field—operated by French company revival. Economic development and polls has at least forced the military Total—should help alleviate the opportunities are shaping up as the regime to reconsider its priorities. power outages. At an estimated crucial election issues, and among the More emphasis is now being put on cost of $US270 million, the pipeline first acts of the new, mostly civilian delivering services to appease voters in project is a rare display of government government should be sweeping the lead-up to polling day. largesse in lower Myanmar, and should economic reforms that make the One of the main gripes in Yangon, conveniently come online in the third country a more attractive place for the city most susceptible to political quarter of 2010. foreign investment, both large- and unrest, is the lack of electricity; While the city is now more of a small-scale. the government supplies only 300 transit point for up-country travel If this happens, Yangon could be megawatts a day, less than half (with a brief stop-off at Shwedagon transformed from a crumbling colonial of the estimated demand. Some Pagoda, of course), with more relic to the fulcrum of Myanmar’s neighbourhoods receive less than eight investment in a wider range of reintegration into the global economy. hours of power a day, while most get accommodation and a revitalisation EAFQ no more than 12. As a consequence, of the city’s colonial districts, it could

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 2 1 religion and power in BURMA

picture: pete turner T he monks’ protest and its aftermath

Ingrid Jordt A monk in central Burma: Monks have continued to offer discourse describing ways that religious decline begins with the evil actions of a country’s ruler. urma’s ‘Saffron Revolution’ B marks its two-and-a-half year level government office. Curfews are state monks committee issued a ban anniversary as the country anticipates still in effect for many monasteries on posters advertising religious talks national elections this year. The and in some cases monks may not go by monks. The junta continues to use monks’ 2007 protests represented the on alms rounds without government the officially sanctioned and carefully most serious threat to military rule permission or surveillance. culled state monks association to since the 1988 uprising. The regime continues to outlaw the enforce policies on the Buddhist order, Since then the regime has continued chanting of metta (loving-kindness) in or Sangha. This deployment of monks to assert control over monks by issuing public. Certain religious discourses— aligned with military authorities has them colour-coded identity cards. those deemed to be indirect critiques created fissures within the Sangha as Stricter travel policies for monks of the regime, such as describing they are regarded, especially by young have been imposed. Monks travelling the qualities of good kings or the activist monks, as corrupt government or residing outside Burma have had conditions for the decline of the stooges. their visas revoked or extensions religion—have also been banned. he regime has also continued to terminated, while monks may not Monks must ask permission to give T arrest monks believed to have travel even for a day trip without first public discourses. In Mandalay in participated in the Saffron Revolution filing a request at their local ward- December 2009, the Mahanayaka or who have otherwise criticised

2 2 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 the government. The Thailand- unequivocally shifted: there is no legitimate claim against an oppressive based Assistance Association for longer any pretence about the present anti-Buddhist regime, which has been Political Prisoners (AAPP) estimates rulership being righteously Buddhist. impossible for the silenced Sangha that 253 monks and an unknown The military rulers are seen as anti- inside the country. number of nuns remain in prison. Buddhists. This is terrible news for Perhaps the most important Thirty monks were arrested at the the government. Monks have defied contribution of these organisations two-year anniversary as the regime restrictions by continuing to offer has been to weave together multiple sought to discourage potential discourse describing the ways religious strands of discourse about political demonstrations. The regime has also decline begins with the evil actions of legitimacy: strands that the regime paid closer scrutiny to lay persons a country’s ruler. Cyclone Nargis, the once successfully kept separate. A visiting monasteries to make offerings natural disaster of May 2008, is held more unified struggle for political or pay respects to monks. Abbots up as a sign of the material destruction freedoms in Burma has emerged with of monasteries have been forced to that accompanies the moral decline of a more collective public perception sign letters affirming that they will rulers. of political oppression and the not lead the laity in protests against diminished legitimacy of Burma’s the government or join political rulers. A Buddhist, democratic as parties, and young monks suspected A more unified struggle well as minorities-focused protest of inclinations to become politically movement is finding its foundations involved are encouraged to disrobe. for political freedoms in in a single framework. Monks outside This is a well-worn pattern in Burmese the country are speaking on behalf political history, where monks are Burma has emerged with of democracy, in support of human expected to abstain from worldly, and rights in Burma, and in support of especially political, affairs. a more collective public imprisoned monks as well as refugees. All these trends contribute to an he government has lately atmosphere of intimidation and fear perception of political T officially nullified the 1990 surrounding religious practice. elections in which the National League he regime’s long-term policy oppression and the for Democracy won 392 out of 495 T for controlling perceptions of parliamentary seats. TheC onstitution the state’s role in religion is a mixture diminished legitimacy of that was pushed through in the days of maintaining the appearance of following Cyclone Nargis remains pious rulers who maintain the purity Burma’s rulers contested. But the regime continues of Buddhism and a simultaneous to use this Constitution as a means of subversive strategy of driving a wedge entrenching their power by claiming between monks and lay supporters 25 per cent of parliamentary seats for by disrobing monks accused of acting the military and banning Aung San politically, and therefore impurely. Finally, the Saffron Revolution has Suu Kyi and other political prisoners Since the 1990s the military has also created another previously under- from participating in the upcoming sought to demonstrate their political developed though incipient movement elections. legitimacy in Buddhist terms through within the Sangha. Monk unions and These actions have been widely acts of pagoda building and repair, associations have seen a proliferation condemned by the international acting as chief donors to the Sangha, of activity inside and outside the community. Only time will tell if the offering religious titles and scholarly country. The most significant of these junta’s game of seeking legitimacy examinations, missionary work and include the Sasana Moli and the All internally through ‘participation’ in other sundry pious acts befitting ‘good Burma Monks Alliance, which have religious affairs, and externally by kings’. The sincerity of the authorities’ developed strong international branch enacting democratic elections, will actions has been the subject of public organisations. Unfettered by domestic keep them in charge. EAFQ debate for some time. media censorship, these Burmese But for most Buddhists in Burma monks’ organisations have given the terms of political legitimacy have international voice to the religion’s

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 2 3 old cultures and new F rom stir-fries to ham sandwiches

Tim Soutphommasane they didn’t have ham, cheese and and pronounced rise in local house tomato sandwiches for lunch. prices. t is a cliché but one of the This was the Sydney I grew up Of course, southwest Sydney I great rituals of growing up in a in during the 1980s. The critics of was never an Asian ghetto; at least, multicultural society is to sit alongside multiculturalism at the time would not in any meaningful sense of the other children in school to compare probably have called it something of word. Violent crime, though it was a lunches. a ghetto. Indeed, when neighbouring problem during some of the 1990s, For much of my schooling I never Cabramatta — Sydney’s ‘little Saigon’ didn’t persist for long. Whether it has got too much of a chance to make – became the hub of heroin trade in been because of entrepreneurial drive, interesting comparisons. I never the early 1990s, it triggered a brief a prioritisation of education within thought twice about tucking into the crime panic across Sydney. There families, strong community support stir fried pork or chicken on rice that were echoes of old fears of the yellow networks, or a combination of all these my mother or father would prepare peril. People feared ‘triads’ and ‘Asian things, social mobility rather than for my lunch. After all, most of my gangs’ taking over the city’s streets. social disadvantage has been the norm classmates had something similar. Fuzzy closed circuit camera footage for Indochinese migrants. Even at the school canteen, it was of rampaging, long-fringed gangsters oday, Cabramatta is a thriving possible to order some fried rice—a would be replayed on tabloid evening T commercial precinct. Visitors choice that quickly became more news programs. Working-class come from within and outside Sydney popular than sausage rolls and meat Anglo-Australians took flight from the on weekends. There’s no better pies. suburbs around Cabramatta, though place to slurp on a pho, to sample I went to primary school in Canley this would be accompanied by a steady Southeast Asian authenticity; one Vale, one of Sydney’s outer southwest form of authenticity, anyway. One day suburbs. The vast majority of families The integration of a supposed ghetto, a tourist drawcard who sent their children to my school the next. came from the old French Indochina. Indochinese migrants into And to catch a train from Many of my schoolmates were from Cabramatta these days into the city Vietnam, though a good proportion of Australian life, while for on a given weekday morning is to be these Vietnamese were ethnic Chinese. surrounded by young professionals There were also lots of Cambodians the large part complete in working in finance, accounting and TI . and Laotians. Of course, there were That, and university students buried in also Yugoslavs (as they were known the realms of market and their textbooks, no doubt destined to then), Italians, Turks, Chileans and join the same professional ranks in a Argentineans. And even a handful of consumption, remains few years’ time. blue-eyed Anglos. But for the most There is even a distinctive part, my fellow students belonged to rather incomplete in the southwest Sydney accent that has families from Southeast Asia. Their developed during the last two decades. names were far more likely to be public sphere The English you overhear on the Phuong, Vong or Sothea—or for that pavement on Cabramatta’s John Street, matter, Dragan, Fatima or Enrique— or on the carriages of city-bound than David or Corey or Sarah. And trains on the south line, is more often

2 4 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 picture: peter dazeley

Chocolate doughnuts cross all cultural lines: ‘integration takes time and sometimes we just don’t notice it’. than not tinged with tonal Vietnamese For another thing, Asian- with much of the support for or Chinese. The mark, you might say, Australians remain something of an multiculturalism to date: it has valued that a minority has been successfully exoticised species in the national cultural diversity only superficially integrated into the nation. imagination. The commodification without understanding its expression Yet to declare a happy and of multicultural success – the fact as ultimately tied to citizenship. triumphant ending here for the that day trips to Cabramatta, for Yet multiculturalism, as it has been Indochinese-Australian story would be instance, are marketed as a ‘taste of expressed in public policy, has always premature. For one thing, the spectre Asia’ – should be regarded with some represented a means towards the of racism remains. The resurgence ambivalence. The underlying logic of end of full and equal citizenship for of white Australian nationalism and the exercise, that diversity is a benefit Australians regardless of background. jingoistic patriotism is cause for only because it can be consumed, It has never been about some ideal of concern, though it is being resisted might do more to get in the way of cultural cornucopia. by Australians who detect in all the regarding migrant Australians as The integration of Indochinese narcissistic flag-waving and sporting of fellow citizens. The exotic can only migrants into Australian life, while for Southern Cross tattoos a corruption of ever be marginal strangers. the large part complete in the realms national symbols. This has been one of the problems of market and consumption, remains

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 2 5 ANU College of Asia and the Pacific rather incomplete in the public sphere. Very few from Indochinese The 28th Indonesia backgrounds have successfully Update Conference entered politics at anything higher than the local council level. There is the Cambodian-born Hong Lim, a EMPLOYMENT, Labor member of the Victorian lower LIVING STANDARDS house, but he is currently the only and one. Indochinese participation in political party politics to date has been POVERTY besmirched by allegations of ‘ethnic in bosses’ engaging in sleazy ‘branch CONTEMPORARY stacking’. In the media and popular culture INDONESIA more broadly, those from Indochinese backgrounds remain largely invisible. The Australian While the streetscapes of Australian cities have been transformed by Asian National University immigration, there are few Southeast Friday and Saturday, Asian faces to be seen on the beaches 24–25 September 2010 of Summer Bay or the cul-de-sac of Ramsey Street. For now, Asian faces Links between employment, social participation and reform, poverty and inequality are major areas of public policy research. Trends in poverty and inequality are influenced by employment remain largely quarantined on SBS. opportunities, social policies and spending in areas like education and health. Job creation, education Those who are the ethnic trailblazers, and health, and direct policies to improve equity and overcome poverty are the subject of intense debate in Indonesia. such as the Vietnamese-born The conference will provide a research-based assessment of the success of Indonesian social comedian Anh Do, wield a double- policies over the past decade. Papers will identify the challenges and possible new directions for equity and poverty alleviation policy in President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s second term, in the context edged sword: they can make light of of challenges and achievements in neighbouring Asian countries. their ethnicity and difference, and Speakers will include staff and graduates from Australian, Indonesian and other universities, staff of justify it as a necessary pressure valve international agencies, NGOs and research institutions, and government and aid officials. for race relations, but they can also Sessions include: • Creating more jobs and better jobs for the poor risk being, well, ghettoised on TV. • Health and education Those first-generation and • Poverty and equality second-generation Australians from Speakers include: Indochinese backgrounds are for the Lant Pritchett (Harvard; keynote address), Peter Timmer (Harvard, Emeritus), Dirk Tomsa (La Trobe) most part unconcerned. The social and Thee Kian Wie (Indonesian Institute of Sciences), political and economic updates; Hal Hill (ANU), Haryo Aswicahyono (CSIS, Jakarta), Dionisius Ardiyanto (ERIA, Jakarta), Sherry (Tao) Kong politics of ethnicity and nation aren’t (ANU), Tadjuddin Effendi (Gadjah Mada University), Minako Sakai (ADFA–UNSW, Canberra), first-order priorities, certainly not for Lisa Cameron (Melbourne), Vivi Alatas (World Bank, Jakarta), Asep Suryahadi (SMERU Research many who have left their homelands Institute, Jakarta), Daniel Suryadarma (ANU; SMERU Research Institute), Risti Permana (Adelaide), Robert Sparrow (ISS, The Hague), John Maxwell (Canberra), Ari Permana (Melbourne). in large part to escape politics. In Conference convenors any case, integration takes time and Chris Manning, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific; [email protected] sometimes we just don’t notice it. I Sudarno Sumarto, SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta; [email protected] suspect that in many school grounds The annual Indonesia Update is presented by the Indonesia Project, Arndt–Corden Division of Economics, Crawford School of Economics and Government, and the Department of Political and today there are many Australian Social Change, School of International, Political and Strategic Studies, in the ANU College of Asia children of Indochinese background and the Pacific at The Australian National University (ANU). Support from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the ANU is gratefully acknowledged. with names such as John or Sarah or, Enquiries [email protected] yes, Tim, opening their lunchboxes to Ph +61 2 6125 3794 find not a stir fry with fried rice, but a Fax +61 2 6125 3700 EAF white-bread ham sandwich. Q

2 6 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 malaysia’s future T he next step up for a Southeast Asian power

Mahani Zainal Abidin and of governance in Malaysia where the hosts a large stock of foreign direct Steven Wong majority of political parties are ethnic- investment and is a major exporter of based. electronic semiconductors and palm or all the hype about industrial But the forging of a critical nexus oil. F development, technology and between political legitimacy and With a per capita income of markets, there are not many countries economic and social performance is $US6800, it is classified as a middle in the world that have experienced one of the key reasons why Malaysia income country but one that is at rapid development on a sustained has largely managed to side-step the the low end of the scale. Economic basis after the Second World War. fractious ethnic infighting that has growth after the Asian crisis in 1998 Malaysia is one such exception. But plagued many other countries. It has moderated; as it did in many now it has reached an inflection point was the promise of a better standard other East Asian economies. Even where the country must step up to of living that enticed the Malays to in purchasing power parity terms, become an advanced economy with share political power with the non- Malaysia’s standard of living is only an inclusive society and a mature Malays, while it was the promise of comparable to that of Turkey or democracy. non-Malays being able to accumulate Ukraine, a big step from where it was When Malaysia gained wealth that spurred them to but requiring an even bigger leap independence its main assets were cooperate. to make it to the middle rungs of its rubber plantations and tin mines, advanced economies. and much was still owned by foreign There have been dramatic social companies. A large proportion of the Ethnic and religious changes too. Absolute poverty has population was engaged in agriculture markedly declined from over 50 per and poverty was endemic. There was tensions may have been cent of households to around 5 per hardly any industry to speak of and cent. Of equally striking impact has those industries that did exist were effectively managed — been the effect of mass education. This small-scale and domestically oriented. has not come cheaply. Up to a fifth Making matters even more tenuous on occasion just of annual budgets have consistently was the multi-racial population, with gone to the building of schools and a large percentage of immigrants. Like barely — but they have universities. Investments in socio- elsewhere in Southeast Asia, but more economic infrastructure have also so, ethnic Chinese dominated most not disappeared been a focal point. Malaysia boasts aspects of commercial life and formed some of the best public facilities in a powerful urban mercantilist class. Southeast Asia, something that first Native Malays were still to be found time visitors never fail to notice. on the land while Indians mainly Fast-forward 53 years. Apart And these are not confined only to worked the rubber estates. Out of from three recessionary episodes in major urban centres. The national this diverse ethnic milieu, there was 1985, 1998 and 2009, the Malaysian preoccupation with development a political accord to be crafted and rakyat (people) have seen significant has meant that public amenities can a nation built. The accord produced improvements in their standard of be found in all but the most remote government by a coalition of the three living. Malaysia’s economy has now villages. largest ethnic political parties. This become more globally integrated and, The satiation of basic needs has grand compromise set the template as the 18th largest trading nation, it given rise to new and non-materialistic

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 2 7 fading influence ones. Most evident in society is a spiritual dimension. Increasing religious devotion spans the entire M ahathir’s spectrum, not only among Muslims but also Christians, Buddhists, Hindus and myriad others. Also rising to the regional legacy surface, especially among the urban elite, are demands for greater freedom of expression, for a less paternalistic form of government, and a more Gregore Lopez out against its perceived opponents, globalised, liberal and ultimately and provided strong support for universal value system. outheast Asia has seen its fair Palestinian and Bosnian Muslims in Running against these trends, S share of authoritarian leaders. their struggles. however, are demands for greater Malaysia’s Dr. Mahathir Mohamed His actions in the region were more ethnic cohesion, for political is one who still endures, albeit now pragmatic. Mahathir—alongside other privilege, for a return to conservative on the sidelines. Ascending to the ASEAN leaders from Indonesia, the traditional values, and for a greater premiership of Malaysia in July 1981, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand— share of the economic spoils. As and ruling until his forced retirement saw ASEAN within the framework of elsewhere, proponents of these ideas in October 2003, he reigned in regional security and as an expanding have strong political platforms from impressive fashion. Among the many market for Malaysian goods and which to make their claims. Some titles that were bestowed on this poor services. In ensuring regional security, political developments have not boy from a Malaysian backwater were Mahathir continued Malaysia’s been widely regarded as positive and ‘respected Muslim’, ‘Third World longstanding hybrid form of neutrality. there have been accusations of harsh leader’, and ‘spokesman for developing ince independence Malaysia authoritarianism, as there have been nations’. Within the country, as S has relied on Britain, Australia in other East Asian countries. Ethnic overseas, he was both loathed and and New Zealand to underwrite its and religious tensions may have been loved. In his quest to transform security but has concurrently endorsed effectively managed—on occasion just Malaysia into a ‘developed nation’ he the view that ASEAN should be free barely—but they have not disappeared. used all possible means, both domestic of big power influence.M ahathir n many senses, in defeating the and external, to achieve his grand continued this awkward tradition. It I enemy of under-development, vision. Seven years since his departure, has now been revealed that in 1984 Malaysia may have done too well and what has been his legacy? Mahathir signed a secret defence the country runs the risk of becoming Mahathir gave Malaysia a new agreement with the United States; an a victim of its own successes. profile through his larger than life agreement which he deemed beneficial So discussions about escaping personality, ambition and action. He to Malaysia. It vastly expanded the middle-income trap must go developed the role of ‘Third World military cooperation between the two beyond economic prerogatives to leader’ when he took on Malaysia’s nations. This revelation contradicts include social inclusiveness and the colonial masters through his ‘Buy the vehement public statements that sustainability of growth. The question British Last’ policy. He regularly Mahathir made about not indulging for now and the future lies not so attacked the West while encouraging foreign, especially US, influence much in the specific details, significant developing nations to work together in Malaysia or the wider ASEAN though they are, but in whether the through his frameworks of ‘Asian region. This was classic Mahathirism: nexus that was created 53 years ago Values’, the ‘Look East Policy’ and pragmatic to the point of hypocrisy. between political legitimacy, economic ‘South-South Cooperation.’ He To further strengthen ASEAN both performance and social stability, can weighed in on international issues in regional security and economic remain or whether it will unravel. such as the global environment, terms, Mahathir encouraged the EAFQ Antarctica and even what he termed a consolidation and expansion of the ‘New World Order.’ He also stood up organisation. He strongly supported for the Islamic ‘Ummah’ by speaking the ASEAN-UN International

2 8 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 picture: SAEED KHAN / AFP / Getty Images

In expanding its markets and in response to the formation of the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Association, Mahathir and ASEAN responded with another free trade agreement called the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. Notwithstanding these contributions, Mahathir’s legacy seems to be fading. This began with his treatment of Anwar Ibrahim, his able deputy whom he humiliated. Mahathir’s credibility as an Islamic leader was damaged forever with that action. Malaysia celebrated his resignation by giving his replacement, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, the biggest- ever mandate for an incoming prime minister. Furthermore, since his departure, the effects of his authoritarian rule are increasingly felt. The use of democratic institutions to protect corrupt leaders and to attack the opposition, the unprecedented rise of religious bigotry, and the weakening of the country’s economic fundamentals all point back to Mahathir’s years in charge. n the regional front, Mahathir O tried his best to keep Australia and the US out of the region to satisfy his own prejudices. While the US was too powerful to be ignored, Mahathir relished vetoing Australia’s involvement in ASEAN- Former Prime Minister Mahathir speaking at the inauguration of the Malay nationalist group Perkasa in related forums. Since his departure, Kuala Lumpur on 27 March 2010. Australia has been granted its relevant memberships and Malaysia is now Conference on Cambodia that and the rise of China, Mahathir and more closely aligned to both Australia eventually led to a negotiated ASEAN realised that a new platform and the US than ever before. settlement between the warring sides. was needed to ensure regional security While Mahathir held sway over Mahathir also played a key role in and to contain China. Mahathir domestic and global politics for 22 promoting the membership of Burma therefore took an active role in the years as a courageous Third World through the much-maligned policy shaping of the ASEAN Regional leader, his departure was welcomed, termed ‘constructive engagement’. Forum (ARF), ASEAN’s post-Cold not only by Malaysians but also by During the Mahathir era, ASEAN War regional security apparatus. The Malaysia’s neighbours. Malaysians now eventually came to include all ten ARF brought together the regional have the task of cleaning up the messes countries of the region. powers and the United States in an he left behind. EAFQ With the end of the Cold War effort to guarantee regional peace.

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 2 9 religion and identity S ticks and stones in the Allah controversy

picture: AFP / AFP / Getty Images

Rachel Leow

n early 2010, ten Christian I churches in Malaysia were firebombed, attacked or vandalised on account of a controversy over the use of the word ‘Allah’ by Malaysian Christians. A Catholic weekly, The Catholic Herald, had been ordered by the government in 2009 to cease publishing its Malay-language edition until the courts resolved the question of whether the word ‘Allah’ could mean the God of the Christian faith, rather than the God of Islam. Claims were made that such usage would confuse Muslims, who mainly spoke Malay. On 31 December 2009, the Kuala Lumpur High Court ruled in favour of The Herald. The subsequent attacks on churches represented a violent rejection of the High Court ruling by radicalised sections of Malaysian society. ‘Allah’, they asserted in the language of Molotov cocktails, was only for Malays. This semantic quibble can seem baffling to non-Malaysians, but it is wholly explicable within the context of Malaysian social dynamics. The trouble arises from the conflation of at least two factors: first, the troubling relationship that exists between ‘Malay’ and ‘Muslim’ in Malaysia, and second, the relationship that Malay-Muslims have with the rest of Malaysian society. It should be made clear that there are at least two words for ‘God’ in Police investigators inspect firebomb damage at the Good Shepherd Lutheran Church in Petaling Jaya, Malay: ‘Allah’, and ‘Tuhan’. The first near Kuala Lumpur, on 9 January 2010. is from Arabic: a Semitic word for

3 0 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 the divine, combining the definite ethnic or linguistic group is entitled article al- (the one) with the root word It’s not so much that to use the word ‘Allah’. Indonesian -ilah (god). The second and probably Christians use it without a second older word in the region, ‘Tuhan’, many Malays speak thought. shares a common etymology with In contrast, Malaysia is a much the Austronesian word ‘atua’, or ‘te Arabic, but rather that any more heterogeneous society, with atua’ in Maori, meaning ‘god’. The link Malays making up around 60 per cent isn’t surprising. Malay is a member connection to the Arabic of the population, ethnic Chinese of the Malayo-Polynesian language somewhere around 25-30 per cent and tree, and many other linguistic culture and language ethnic Indians, mostly Tamils but also commonalities run throughout the some Punjabis, around 8 per cent. This region: Indonesian, Micronesian, should be, in Malaysia, has led to a certain amount of racial Polynesian and Philippine languages insecurity. The proximity of cultural are all relatively closely related. only effected through difference has created incentives for Both words have been in use in Malays to differentiate themselves, and Malay, more or less interchangeably, Islam — which is in turn to cling tightly to those differences. throughout its written history. Even And in Malaysia, of the five on the Terengganu Inscription Stone, almost exclusively Malay. constitutional elements of ‘Malayness’ the earliest extant evidence of Islam I listed above from the 1913 definition, on the Malay peninsula, which dates only two remain which are not now to around 1303 CE, the word ‘Allah’ widely shared by all citizens since appears three times, and the word independence in 1957: Malay ‘custom’, ‘Tuhan’ twice. What has animated the and Islam. controversy, however, is the claim by Religion has therefore become the ruling government that the word that today this definition is no longer a central marker of ethnic identity ‘Allah’ is something especially Islamic, only politically instrumental; it has in Malaysia. And here is the nub of and by extension, exclusively Malay. become true for many Malays. It is an the problem. In the case of Islam, a The trouble comes at ‘by extension’. authentic description of what their religion that has historically spread nder the Federal Constitution, sense of identity rests on: geography, with its carrier language, Arabic U a Malay is defined as a person language, culture — and religion. The comes with the territory. It’s not so who, firstly, is born to a Malaysian latter figures most importantly:M alays much that many Malays speak Arabic, citizen, who professes to be Muslim, who convert from Islam are no longer but rather that any connection to the who speaks the Malay language, considered constitutionally Malay; Arabic culture and language should who adheres to Malay custom and, Malay Christians are unthinkable. be, in Malaysia, only effected through finally, is domiciled in Malaysia. This But why is Islam, more than the Islam — which is in turn almost definition comes directly from the other four elements of the definition, exclusively Malay. Land Reservation Act of 1913, which such an important part of Malay ne sees this connection the British passed in an attempt to identity? The answer here, I feel, is O embedded in the Malay define the group of people for whom demographic, and one can see that by language, where words of Arabic state protectionist policies were comparing Malaysia with Indonesia. origin often acquire an aura of intended. Visible ethnic minorities in intrinsic religiosity. The word ‘kitab’, But over time the definition Indonesia have never comprised a for example, may just refer to a normal proved both politically expedient and large part of the population; today ‘book’ in Arabic, but in Malay it psychologically central to Malay self- they are often deeply assimilated. refers specifically to religious books, perception. The British gained much The Chinese population, at 3-5 while secular books are simply ‘buku’, colonial mileage out of professing to per cent of the total, is relatively from English. Something similar is be protecting ‘the Malays’, and ‘the small. Indonesians, who speak a happening here with ‘Allah’. It may Malays’ came to see themselves as a language similar to Malay, have never ‘just’ mean ‘God’ in Arabic, but in coherent cultural entity. The result is experienced anxieties over which Malaysia, amidst identity politics and

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 3 1 positioning vietnam deep-rooted Malay anxieties, it is much more than a semantic quibble. T oday determines The claim that only Malay-Muslims are entitled to use the word ‘Allah’, and that everyone else must use ‘Tuhan’, tomorrow certainly arises out of this ingrained defensiveness over what it is to be Malay. The claim that ‘Allah’ is somehow Vu Minh Khuong stability’, Vietnam ranks well above especially Islamic is disproved at most of its Asian peers, including least by the fact that the word itself ince unprecedented economic China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, predates Islam. Any argument that S reforms began in 1986, Vietnam Thailand, and the Philippines. it has become Islamic over time is has transformed itself from a country The country’s third major furthermore disproved by the fact on the verge of economic collapse and strength lies in its human capital. that it remains in use today by Arab isolation into one of the most open The Vietnamese people are known Christians and Indonesian Catholics. and fastest-growing economies in the by many for their eagerness to The dogged adherence to this claim by world. Enabling the country’s rapid improve their lives through hard a small number of firebomb-wielding GDP growth, averaging 7.5 per cent work, for their commitment to extremists is only explicable when between 1990 and 2008, is its robust education, to entrepreneurship, and we understand how sensitively most integration into the world economy, for their willingness to seize emerging Malays are invested in themselves with an average trade growth rate opportunities. Foreign investors have as Muslims, in distinction to the exceeding 20 per cent over the same often praised Vietnamese workers for other ethnic groups and religions of period. In 2008, Vietnam was more being quick-learning and industrious. Malaysia. integrated than most its Asian peers in As evidence, Vietnam has overtaken One might observe that if Malays both trade and FDI measures. most developing Asian countries, were really interested in being more Vietnam’s impressive economic including China, India, Indonesia, ‘Malay’, they should in fact use the performance has been driven by its and the Philippines, with respect to word ‘Tuhan’, which is much more three major strengths. The first is internet penetration and number of ‘Malay’ for having deeper regional related to the country’s geographic, students studying in the United States roots, than ‘Allah’, which is, after all, an strategic, and demographic per 100,000 population. imported name for an imported God. advantages. The country is situated in Does Vietnam’s impressive past EAFQ the heart of Asia and borders China, a economic performance coupled with booming economic giant. The distance its considerable strengths suggest that from Hanoi to any other major city in it has a bright future? A ‘yes’ answer Asia, including Hong Kong, Shanghai, depends on the national leadership’s Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, Singapore, and vision, determination, and practical New Delhi, is but a two- to six-hour approach in overcoming the three flight. And with over 3000 kilometres fundamental weaknesses it is facing. EASTASIAFORUM of coastline, this S-shaped country First, although Vietnam has reaped Quarterly offers excellent conditions for all parts immense benefits in shifting from a In our next issue . . . of the country to participate in global command to a market economy, it has trade. Vietnam is the world’s 13th not entirely committed to unleashing most populous country and enjoys a the full impact of market forces. young population, which implies the Unjustified subsidies provided to state- Asia’s new country has both a large market and owned enterprises, large investments an energetic labour force. poured into commercially unviable generation The country’s second major industrial projects, ineffective support strength is its political stability. On for private sector development, and the World Bank’s indicator of ‘political the persistence of ‘market control’

3 2 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 picture: bloomberg Vietnam is at a pivotal juncture in its development journey

resources. As a percentage of GDP, foreign aid and workers’ remittances are much higher for Vietnam than for its Asian peers. With sizeable sources of foreign aid, the country can afford to pay less attention to raising the efficiency and strategic effectiveness of large projects. With large and increasing flows of workers’ remittances, the country can enjoy rapid increases in consumption and impressive reductions in poverty without the pressing urgency for efforts to make people more productive and frugal. As a result, the overall cost of Vietnam’s heavy dependence on external resources lies rather in neglecting to upgrade and to leverage the strength of its human capital: the most powerful engine of a country’s growth and critical in moves A street market in Hanoi: Vietnam has reaped ‘immense benefits’ in shifting to a market economy. towards a high performance economy. Vietnam is at a pivotal juncture attitudes (with effects across prices, rapid economic growth, it seems to in its development journey. Making exchange rates and interest rates) have paid inadequate efforts to good decisive and urgent efforts to address have caused severe market distortions governance. The poor quality of public the country’s weaknesses by upholding and investment inefficiencies. In fact, policy in the country — especially free market principles, building good the economy is beset by low capital with regards to urban planning and governance, and leveraging human investment efficiency, evidenced by management, corruption controls and capital will shift the country toward a a high incremental capital output environmental protection — is one better strategic position on its path to ratio relative to its Asian peers. of society’s most serious concerns. prosperity. Neglecting these efforts, For Vietnam, it takes more capital The rapid expansion of government due to complacency or a fear of investment per percentage point and party-sector employment may change, could cost the country and its growth in GDP than most other Asian also have been a factor that has future dearly. For Vietnam, the fact is countries. The country’s rapid growth deterred improvements to institutional that today determines tomorrow. This has been driven more by labour competence and effectiveness. The is not only a time-tested truth; it is a reallocation and expansion on a low productivity of the sectors associated national imperative. The situation has value added structure than by within- with the government, the party, and its become so urgent and so strategically sector productivity growth and the affiliated organisations, have declined important that if the country is to effort to move up the technological substantially over time. avoid the middle-income trap, it will ladder. Vietnam’s third weakness is its require inspired national leadership Second, while Vietnam has enjoyed heavy dependence on external and decisive action. EAFQ

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 3 3 politics in the philippines C ounting votes and Chris Urbanski making money he perks of office are vast in the picture: TED ALJIBE / AFP / Getty Images: T Philippines, where President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has seen her declared personal net worth grow from $US1.5 million in 2001 to $US3.2 million in 2008. This is a yearly increase of almost $US250,000: not bad for someone with a monthly salary of just $US1000. So it is little wonder politicians are prepared to go to extreme lengths to ensure that they are the next in line to serve the nation. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for example, won office in 2004 amid widespread allegations that she conspired with the Electoral Commissioner, Virgilio Garcilliano, to tamper with results from Mindanao to ensure victory over action star Ferdinand Poe Jr. This has since become known as the ‘Hello Garci’ scandal. In the 2007 Senatorial race the result of an entire municipality’s vote temporarily vanished at the hands Presidential candidates line up on a series of fruit juice cups produced to encourage people to vote in of a provincial electoral officer. When the 10 May elections. the ballots eventually resurfaced they reflected a statistically improbable Ultimately any benefits obtained security measures can be implemented result: 12 - 0 in favour of pro- through changing the electoral process to manage these risks, increased administration candidates. in this way must be weighed against complexity can undermine credibility In light of such irregularities, key risks: will automated voting deliver if electors do not understand how the the Commission on Elections a credible outcome? How will those integrity of their vote is protected. (COMELEC) has determined to intent on manipulating the result While the Philippines has sought automate the coming elections, adapt to the new electoral process? to address some of these concerns by scheduled for 10 May 2010. Could automated voting result in opting for optical scanning machines, COMELEC has taken delivery of an unacceptable level of electoral where voters feed a paper ballot into a 82,200 Precinct Count Optical violence? machine to be instantly tallied, electors Scanners (PCOS) and is confident n electoral process is only as will not be able to verify how their the machines will not only deliver a A strong as the trust electors vote has been recorded by the PCOS rapid result following the election, but place in it. Elsewhere in the world the machine. Further, while a paper trail of also make vote-rigging a thing of the fallibility of computers is leading to voter intentions will exist, it remains past. Critics see the potential for the a lack of trust in automated electoral unclear how a discrepancy between machines to be manipulated, where processes. Voting machines are precinct and aggregated results will cheating could become just as fast vulnerable to tampering at many be resolved. It is hard to believe that as the count – and harder to detect. stages in their life-cycle. While after decades of experience with

3 4 EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 electoral fraud, Filipino electors will signature, issued only to the Board to the Ampatuan political clan in immediately trust automation. of Election Inspectors. However, the Maguindanao province late in 2009— Another key issue for a credible digital signatures will be generated and is already much higher than in result is the need for electoral issued by Smartmatic, meaning that, previous elections. monitoring and certification by trusted in theory, electronic precinct tallies Voter intimidation at the local level civil society groups. With automation could be unlocked, tampered with, is also likely to increase as politicians comes the need for more technical and resealed, before being sent on for shift their efforts to changing electors’ methods of electoral monitoring, such aggregation. votes before they are cast. Again, as testing of PCOS machines and The degree of access possessed without the means to alter the ballot review of the source code. So far, civil by the system administrator is also itself, local politicians are likely to turn society groups have not been able to another major threat to the integrity to scare tactics to ensure victory— certify the integrity of the proposed of the election. The so-called ‘God’ albeit in a more procedurally clean hardware and software, while the power of the administrator to edit vote. Perversely, voter intimidation process for auditing post-ballot results results presents an unprecedented will actually become easier under remains unclear. There is concern over opportunity for widespread electoral the automated voting system, as the lack of transparency offered by fraud at the touch of a button. It is still each PCOS machine will be manned COMELEC and the PCOS machine unclear exactly how much access any by an official tasked with helping manufacturer, Smartmatic. system administrator will possess and voters to insert their ballot correctly, f even greater concern is what checks and balances are in place undermining rights to complete O that for the first time since to prevent abuse of this power. secrecy. spearheading electoral monitoring What is clear is that for those astly, there is a risk of greater in the Marcos years, The National who would seek to manipulate L post-election violence if voters Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections the results, systemic access points feel they have been disenfranchised. It (NAMFREL), which is the largest and remain. And so long as that is the is currently expected that thousands most influential electoral watchdog, case, it seems unlikely that cheating of uneducated voters may be unable to has been denied accreditation by will be totally eradicated, so much vote because they cannot understand COMELEC—meaning they will be as moved to somewhere else in the automated voting system. Others unable to conduct machine audits the electoral process. Automated are expected to lose their voice due or a parallel vote count. At a time of voting could well bring about the to the high margin of error of the such dramatic change in the electoral centralisation of electoral tampering PCOS machines, which can fail to process, it is suspicious that this where the power of local politicians read between five and fifteen per organisation will not participate in to sway an individual electoral race cent of votes. Without clearly defined monitoring the ballot. Without the is merely transferred to whoever mechanisms for independent auditing credibility of thorough civil society wields influence overC OMELEC and and the resolution of irregularities participation, it is unlikely automated Smartmatic. in the vote, electors may have voting will produce an uncontested The automation process may also no alternative to violence should outcome. lead to greater electoral violence. With they suspect widespread fraud or The next key risk is how political obvious difficulties around stealing an disenfranchisement. operators will adapt to the new election at the ballot box, a change of There can be no doubt that electoral framework. The general tactics may be required. In the words automated voting systems deliver consensus on automated voting is that of Benito Lim, a political scientist at both real benefits and real risks in while it resolves some concerns over Ateneo de Manila University: ‘The determining outcomes. While in electoral fraud at the ballot box, it automation process has changed the some countries this trade-off might be creates new concerns in other parts of rules of the game, and politicians who acceptable, in the Philippines, where the system—particularly surrounding fear they can no longer manipulate there is little trust in the government the transmission and aggregation poll results are more tempted to or democratic institutions, automated of votes. The results of individual eliminate each other’. Indeed the voting is likely to create more doubt precinct PCOS machines will be sealed pre-election death toll—including than it resolves. EAFQ prior to transmission with a digital the massacre of over 40 civilians rival

EAST ASIA FORUM QUARTERLY APRIL-JUNE 2010 3 5