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76-8306 KRAIRIKSH* Vlnlta* 1936- THE POLITICS OF PIBUL: THE NATIONAL LEADER. 1932-1944. The American University* Ph.D.* 1975 Political Science. International law and relations

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281

UMI

THE POLITICS OF PIBUL i THE NATIONAL LEADER

1932- 19^

Vinita Krairiksh

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

International Studies

Signature of Committeej

Chairman 1 1

Dean the School

-7 S ' Date 1

1975 The American University

Washington,D.C. 20016

THE AMEBICAIT UJTIVEHSITY LIBRAHY 5- 115- "The constitution does not grow in a day, nor does the flower of the constitution bloom overnight. The government say the flower is there. The press says: It is not. The truth is half way between the two. The flower is there but it is not yet a natural flower with its charms of freshness and fragrance, but an artificial flower with its beauty only of form and color. The plant has still to grow."

H.S.H. Prince Wanwaitayakorn Worwan "The Future of Siam," Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, February 27, 1934.

ii INTRODUCTION

The period between 1938-1944 or the time of the first

government of Pibul was considered by the West to be the most

aggressive and expansive period of Thai irredentism. It was because

during this time Thailand had made major foreign policies and

decisions which affected her relationships with western powers namely

France, Britain and the United States. First of all it was the

decision to ask for the return of parts of Cambodian and Laotian

territories from France as a condition for the ratification of the

Mutual Non-Aggression Pact. Secondly, it was the decision to join the Japanese, the enemy of the West in declaring war on her allies—

Britain and the United States.

Any judgements on the decisions without considering the complex internal and external political situations which gave the

policies their rationale tend to be unfair and inaccurate. In order

to understand the policies and politics of Pibul's government it will

be necessary to remind the reader that only in 1932 had Thailand

overthrown a system of absolute monarchy which had dominated the

country for 150 years. This abrupt change brought forth a

transitional period which was filled with political struggles and

instabilities. This period coincides with a world wide atmosphere of

political and economic crises in the late 1930's and early forty's.

These two factors heavily influenced Pibul's policies and the

future of Thailand.

This dissertation proposes to study the interactions between iii foreign policies and domestic politics of Thailand during the first

government of Pibul by briefly comparing them to the policies in the

transitional period (1932-1938). In particular the author wants to

explore the following interactions:

1. The interaction between domestic politics and foreign

policies. Two hypotheses are involved:

A. If there is no dominant leader in an unstable do­

mestic situation then foreign policies tend to be less aggressive

because none of the leaders can afford to have external conflict.

B. If there is a dominant leader but the country lacks

unity then aggressive foreign policies are needed.

2. The effect of an external environment especially the rise

of Japan as a dominant power in Asia, on a small nation like Thailand.

The hypothesis is that when the external situation is polarized then

there is a tendency for the country to ally with a power which would

sustain the power of the ruling elites.

This dissertation will focus on the key political figure and

perhaps the sole national decision maker in his period— Pibul. It will deal with his methods of gaining power, his personal charac­ teristics and ambitions, the national and international environments which enhanced his leadership and led to his initial fall from power. This study will consider the related questions of Thailand's embarkation upon irredentism, how and why the country allied itself with Japan during World Wat II and the adjustment towards Japan

Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The reader should also note that despite Pibul's methods, he brought Thailand through a turbulent period in world history and the

country remained uncolonized and physically intact. Leading national

figures who succeeded him have continued to follow his policies of military support and strong expansionist hope. On the other hand,

some historians would argue that Pibul's extreme methods to arouse

support did not justify the gains to the country. It therefore is a worthwhile venture to analyze the hypotheses.

This presentation will be an analytical study and will be

supported by documents and research materials from the British

Public Records Office, the U.S. National Archives, Thai sources some of which were not published and the documents from the Tokyo

Trial.

The dissertation will be divided into five chapters. The

first chapter will deal with the study of the leaders of the Coup d'etat of 1932, political factions and instabilities owing to the lack of a legitimate leader. Chapter two will deal with the rise of

Luang Pibul to the position of the Prime Minister. Chapter three will look at the foreign policies of the period between 1932-1938 when the country was unstable and the period under Pibul's government (1938-

1944) when the country needed consolidation. . This was an attempt to see the interactions between internal situations and foreign policies.

Irredentism which was a negative kind of nationalism was encouraged to satisfy the military and to unite the people. In chapter four the author will deal with the allignment with Japan. The decision to give the Japanese the right of passage might be made from the lack of choice but the decision to declare war on the allies was opportunistic. Pibul had an inclination toward Fascism though outwardly he kept paying lip services to democracy. In Thailand where the people were used to authority, authoritarian method was the most workable method of control.

In the process of cooperation with Japan, it is likely that the country tries to maintain their own identity by introducing certain cultural programs to counter Nipponization so that the country would not be completely dominated by the Japanese.

Chapter five will touch briefly on the fall of Pibul. To commit the country to one ally instead of maintaining the balance between two countries which had been the traditional Thai policies for centuries make Pibul's fall related to the fall of Japan. TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTIONS...... ii

Chapter I THE COUP D'ETAT OF 1932: POLITICAL

FACTIONS AND PROBLEMS OF LEGITIMACY ..... 1

Chapter II THE RISE TO POWER OF LUANG PIBUL ...... 68

Chapter III THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN FOREIGN

POLICIES AND INTERNAL POLITICS

(Part One 1932-1941) ...... 105

Chapter IV THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN FOREIGN

POLICIES AND INTERNAL POLITICS

(Part Two 1941-1944) 172

Chapter V THE FALL OF PIBUL ...... 226

Chapter VI CONCLUSION...... 236

APPENDICES ...... 241

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 277

vii LIST OF APPENDICES page

1. King Prajadhipok's Abdication Announcement...... 241

2. Military Expenditure of Thailand 1932-1950 ... 244

3. Government Expenditures by Ministries 1910-1950 ..... 246

4. Pibul's Letter to "Siam News" Newspaper...... 248

5. Notification Concerning the Name of the Country ...... 251

6. First State Convention...... 253

7. State Convention No. 2 ...... 254

8. State Convention No. 3 ...... 256

9. State Convention No. 4 257

10. State Convention No. 5 ...... 259

11. State Convention No. 6 ...... 261

12. State Convention No. 7 ...... 262

13. State Convention No. 8 ...... , 263

14. State Convention No. 9 ...... 264

15. State Convention No. 10 ...... 266

16. State Convention No. 11 ...... 267

17. State Convention No. 12 ...... 268

18. Thai Nation Honor Its Premier for Services to State .. 270

19. Samples of the Newspapers' Headlines during "Follow

the Leader" Period ...... 273

20. Text of the Treaty of Offensive/Defensive Agreement.. 275

viii CHAPTER I

THE COUP D'ETAT OF 1932

Political Factions and Problems of Legitimacy

The July 24, 1932 Coup d'etat in Siam'*' was widely acclaimed

because of its peaceful nature. The institution of absolute monarchy

which had ruled Siam since the thirteenth century was overthrown

within three hours without any bloodshed. The coup was the second

attempt to get rid of the existing system but it was the first one to 2 succeed.

The name of the country was officially changed to Thailand in July 24, 1939. The two names will be used interchangeably. 2 The first attempt to change the system of absolute monarchy oc­ curred during the reign of King Wachirawut (Rama VI). Nearly one hundred men were involved, the majority of whom were junior officers in the army. The leader was Prince Chakrapong's personal physician, Khun Thuahanpitak (Leng Si Chan). The Prince was an heir to the throne. The reason of the involvement of so many army officers was directly related to the process of modernization which the army had undergone in the fifth reign. Around the end of the nineteenth century the army was the first government division to pursue moderni­ zation without foreign assistance. This was due to tlte fact that princes and commoners who had been sent abroad to study Military Science returned home and began to institute their ideas. The Army relied on its Academy (Rong-rien Nai Roi) to produce the many officers it required. Boys at the age of 12-14 would enter the pre-academy school (Rong-rien Nai Roi Chan Prathom) and spend three years there before moving to the Academy. Three years later, after passing their final examination, they would graduate as Lieutenants. Most, if not all, of the army officers involved in the plot were the products of this system. The group thought that the process of modernization was not rapid enough and the government officials were inefficient. Most of all they disliked the Wild Tiger Corps, a semi military organization, set up by the King. Its members consisted of civilians, businessmen and some of the members of the forces. The Coup group was convinced that the organization was a duplication 2

The Coup was initiated and carried out successfully by a

group of civilians and military officers who called themselves the

"People's Party." Their aim was to alleviate the social and

political systems which they thought were unfair by using a

democratic system. Instead of the thinking of one man--the King, an

Assembly, which would include the best thinking of many minds, would

be set up. The King, however, was invited to continue to rule under

a constitution.

The Coup was perhaps the most significant of all turning points

in Thai political history. It was the first change organized by

commoners. For the past one hundred and fifty years, new movement

and significant changes always came from above, meaning from the King

and princes but never from the people.

This chapter will familiarize the reader with the key members of the promoters of the coup and their ideas on why they 3 wanted the change. Only Pridi Banomyong or Luang Pradit Manudharm

rather than a complimentary one to the regular armed forces. They also disliked the King because he showered his favorites with ex­ pensive gifts. The King even showed his partiality when he ordered a young soldier to be whipped because he quarreled with one of the King's page boys. The lesson which the 1932 Coup learned from the former Coup was that it was difficult to rid the country o£ the institution of the King immediately. In addition they learned that the plan had to be kept strictly among restricted members whom they could trust absolutely and that in order to succeed the plan had to be swift. See Rian Si Chan, Prawat Patiwat Khrang Rak Khong Thai R.S. 130 (the First Thai Coup 1912) (Bangkok: 1946) 3 Luang Pradit Manudharm was the title given to Pridi by the King. Titles for government officials ranking from the lowest rank to the highest rank were: Pan, Mun, Khun, Luang, Pra, Praya Chao Praya and Somdet Chao Praya. 3

knew what path he wanted the country to follow once the coup was

successful. The rest of the group did not know his plan. They only

knew that they did not want to recognize anyone among themselves to

be the sole leader. The only legitimate institution which they

recognized, owing to its long tradition, was the institution of the

King. Hence the King remained the symbol of unity.

As the People's Party was united for only one purpose to change the existing system, not even a year had passed when the new

elites felt that their security was threatened firstly by the 4 5 aristocrats, secondly by the royalists, lastly and most surprisingly by the assembly itself. The author calls this distrust

and disagreement among the three factions a legitimacy crisis. Each

group supported its own leader's ideas. Sometimes the factions

split and regrouped with other groups. There was no definite party

line. Thus the reader will note the split after Pridi presented his economic plan,the second coup, the counter coup and finally the abdication of King Prajadhipok. A new symbol of legitimacy was proclaimed in the person of a ten year old prince as the new King.

An Introduction to the Key Members of the Promoters Group

The idea to organize the 1932 coup originated in France in

the year 1925. One of the important members of the People's Party

By 'aristocrat' I mean a group of people from old established families who had served the absolute monarchy for a long time. Usually they possessed higher rank and higher status than the new elites.

^By 'royalists' I mean members of the royal family as well as those who had worked for them for a long time and were still loyal to them. 4

said that:

"our education in France was virtually responsible for our shaping our outlook and the final agreement that we would organize the Coup."6

Two young students, one a law student in Paris, Pridi

Banomyong and the other Lieutenant Prayoon Pamornmontri decided that

absolute monarchy could not work in Siam any more and if they could

find enough friends they would try to change the system to that of a

constitutional monarchy.

"It was our conviction that under the system of absolute monarchy the people might have no com­ plaints if the King was benevolent, intelligent and active; but they suffered terribly when the King lacked these qualities. The destination of our country must not be left to the accidental virtues of an absolute monarch."

The two friends arranged the first meeting in Paris at number

nine, Rue de Sommerand. There were seven participants in all. They were the core of the People's Party.

1. Pridi Banomyong, a law student who was working on his

Doctorat en droit.

2. Lieutenant Plak Ketasangka, a graduate from Siam Military

Academy. He was on a government scholarship to study artillery methods in Fontainebleau.

3. Lieutenant Prayoon Pamornmontri. Born of Thai and German

parents, Lieutenant Prayoon was a reserve officer who was once a

commander of King Prajadhipok's Royal Guard.

4. Sub Lieutenant Tasanai Mitpakdi, a reserve officer who

^Jayanta K . , Ray. Portraits of Thai Politics. (New Delhi: Orient Longman Ltd., 1970), p. 63. 7Ibid. used to command the Fifth Cavalry School in Paris.

O 5. Nai Tua Lapanukrom, a science student from Switzerland.

He used to be a sergeant in the Thai expeditionary force sent to

Europe in the first World War.

6. Luang Sirirajamaitri, an attache to the Siamese legation

in Paris.

7. Nai Naeb Pahonyodhin, a well to do LLB student.

At this first meeting which lasted for five days, the par­ ticipants agreed on two basic principles. Firstly, to set the basis for democracy under a Constitutional Monarchy. They had no desire to 8 turn the country into a republic.

Secondly, by realizing the fact that Siam was a buffer state between the British and the French colonies who could decide to divide Siam among themselves anyday, the People's Party agreed on the coup d'etat technique where the authorities would be faced with a 9 fait accompli.

All the original participants would constitute the central committee of the People's Party. Each one would be a leader of a division whereby more members would be found. They decided that the new members should be divided into two groups:

(a) The most loyal group would be those who could be asked

g Prayoon Pamornmontri. "Recollection of a Coup d'etat," Bangkok Post. December 27, 1971. Pridi Banomyong, Bang Rueng Kiew Kap Kan Tung Khana Ras Lae Rabob Prajathipatai (Writings Concerning the Organization of the People's Party and Democratic System). (Bangkok: Pramoj Pungsuntorn Publisher, 1972), p. 22. to join the Party a long time before the coup. These persons should

be ready to sacrifice their lives if necessary and should be capable

of keeping a secret; they would be known as the Vanguard of the

Party.

(b) The second best group would be those asked to join when

the Party was ready to start the coup.

Known among the Vanguards were Lieutenant Sindhu Kamolnavin

R.N. who finished his naval study in Denmark: Nai Thawee Bunyaketu, an agricultural student in France: Nai Bunjong Srijaroon, a Thai

Muslim. Later on when the seven original members returned to Siam, more Vanguard members were asked, for example M.L. Udom Debhasdhin Na

Ayudhya and Nai Leng Srisomwong, all of whom were students from

England.

Even though most of the Vanguard group seemed to be young and uninfluential, when they were home they spread out in different fields.

Each was out to organize the conspiracy in his own particular way.

Pridi became an official in the Ministry of Justice and a

professor of law at Chulalongkorn University. Many students

worshipped him and his ideas. Pridi has been called even among his

friends in Paris as Acharn (professor).

Lieutenant Plak was given a title by the King and became

Luang Pibulsonggram. Western writers used to refer to him as Pibul.

Later on he was promoted to be a major in the General Staff Division.

He also became an instructor of military science. Luang Tasanai

became a captain in the Cavalry Division as well as an instructor.

Subsequently in the junior military faction both Luang Pibul and Luang Tasanai were considered as leaders with about twenty-three men

who agreed to join the Coup.

In the Navy, Lieutenant Sindhu Kamolnavin became Luang

Singhu Songgramchai, a Lieutenant Commander as well as an instructor in the Navy. He was regarded as the leader of the junior navy faction

with about eighteen followers. Another important leader in the naval

faction was Luang Suphalssai. He was a Lieutenant Commander in the

General Staff Division of the Navy. Unlike other leaders he had never been educated abroad.

Despite the fact that the original People's Party had grown to a certain extent, it did not possess enough force to accomplish its

purposes. Therefore, it needed some senior members, especially in the military. Lieutenant Prayoon was the liaison who succeeded in winning over Praya Pahon Ponpayahasena, whose original name was Pote

Baholyodhin. He had finished his studies in the Thai Military Cadet

Academy with academic distinction; in 1904 he was awarded a scholar­ ship to study military science in Germany. Coming back home from

Germany and a year in Denmark, Praya Pahon was assigned as a lieutenant in the Fourth Artillery Regiment in Rajburi province. After a few years, he was transferred to the Artillery Section in Bangkok.

For his remarkable progress in rank, he was sent to Japan on a tour to study the Japanese cannons which were being bought by the

Siamese Government. In 1926 he was appointed the Inspector of the

Artillery Training School at Kok Katiam in Lopburi province and a year later was appointed a professor in Army Intelligence in the

Educational Section. In 1928 he became a colonel in the Army as 8

well as a Royal Guard Officer of King Prajadhipok. In 1930,

shortly before the Coup, he was transferred to be Deputy Inspector

of the Artillery Section in Bangkok and he remained in that position

until the Coup took place.

The brain behind the senior military group was not Praya

Pahon but his friend Praya Songsuradej. His original name was Thep

Panthumsen. He was also a graduate of the Thai Military Cadet

Academy. Because of his academic accomplishments, he was sent to

further his study in Germany. Coming back to Bangkok, he was later promoted to Colonel and became the Director of the Education Section in the Thai Military Cadet Academy. This position proved to be most beneficial to the Coup because he could order cadets and officers on a mock preparation. He was widely respected in military circles. Another leader of the senior faction was Pra Prasas

Pittayayudh whose original name was Wan Chutin. After his graduation he went to study military science in Germany where he met Praya Pahon and Praya Song in the same school. At the outbreak of the First

World War he went to Switzerland where he completed his scholastic work. Back in Bangkok, he became a professor in the education of the

General Staff Division. At the time of the Coup he was a Lieutenant

Colonel and the Director of the General Staff School.

Another military leader who joined reluctantly was Praya

Rittiakanay. Unlike most of the other members of the group Praya

Rit had never been abroad. His education was through the Military

Training School. At the time of the Coup he was a Colonel and the

Commanding Officer of the First Guard Artillery Regiment in Bangkok. Of the four senior leaders, later known as the "Four Tigers," Praya

Rit was the only one who actually commanded troop units.

It should be noted that most of the key military and

civilian leaders were all Acharn (professors). One is even tempted

to say that the Coup was organized by French brains and German muscles.

Individual Motives of the Coup Leaders

It remained to be seen whether the Coup was organized largely

to promote the social and economic well being of the country or to relieve personal discontentment. The fact that the idea of the Coup was born in a foreign land was not so strange. People inside the country were familiar only with their own way of life and were generally humble and waiting for fate to help them.

"But, when one goes out to live in a foreign country, he is quick to realize the backwardness of his country-one compares it, thinks about it and finally wonders why his own country stays in the mud.

"We needed to have a firm democratic system, to serve as a master key for the country's progress in the centuries ahead...especially when we studied about the history of fighting for liberty and freedom by the people in Europe, many of whom lost their lives in the pursuit to protect i t . " ^

Praya Pahon

Praya Pahon gave an interview to a newspaper saying that in the beginning he had a feeling that the high ranking officials, aristocrats and princes had never paid any attention to the opinion

^Prayoon Pamornmontri, "Recollection of a Coup d'etat," Bangkok Post, February 27, 1971. Ibid. 10

of any younger officials. Good or bad opinions were unimportant in 12 themselves unless the high officials liked them. Praya Pahon told

the reporter about his own experience when the French tried to sell used guns to the Siamese Government; Praya Pahon gave his opinion that the guns were outmoded to Krom Singhavikrom Kriengkrai, the

King's brother, Minister of Defence and the Chairman of the Committee 13 but no one listened to him. He said that later on he asked the

French Minister himself about the guns; the French Minister admitted the fact but said that the guns were good enough to use inside the 14 country and Siam did not have any outside enemy anyway.

One can see that Praya Pahon, the military leader, had only a vague idea of why he wanted the Coup. His main belief was that by changing from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy the country would progress faster. He did not spell out any long term program on how the People's Party would act if the Coup would succeed.

Praya Pahon omitted one important point that he was demoted

and his salary was cut without any reason being given. Actually,

many officers were demoted and their salaries cut in connection with

the King's retrenchment policy. These demotions occurred only a few months before the Coup of June 24, 1932.^

12 Kulap Saipradit, Buanglang kan Pratiwat B.E. 2475 (Background of the Coup 1932). (Bangkok: Chamlongsarn Press, 1947).

Ibid., ^T h a i Noi (pseud.). Praya Pahon. (Bangkok: Prae Pitthyia, 1954), pp. 47-48. 11

Dr. Pridi Banomyong

Pridi Banomyong or Luang Pradit Manudham, the leader of the

civilian faction, on the other hand, was the only one in the People's

Party who had a clear idea of what he wanted for the future. Pridi

was born in Ayudhya in 1886. He grew up knowing well the condition

of the poor, the farmers, etc. He had his primary education in the

same province and was brought to live in one of the Wats (Temples) in

Bangkok to study. Unfortunately he did not stay long because of

family difficulty. He came back to Bangkok again in 191.5. This time

he lived with Praya Wichitmontri. Pridi studied law and passed with

top marks. This enabled him to win a scholarship to study at Caen

University in France. In Paris, rumors had it that because Prince

Charoonsak, Thai Minister in Paris, did not give Pridi and his

friends enough monthly allowance, Pridi took it as the main motive

to undo the whole royalist system. The truth was that Pridi, as the

President of the Thai Students Association, had organized the annual meeting in which he had persuaded the students to fight the Minister by sending a petition to the King in the name of all the students.

The King replied to the students through his Royal Secretary that

"the Students Society has deviated from the purpose for which it was formed. The objective of the Society should be entirely social among students under the care of the Paris Legation. It seems that the Society has now become a sort of Syndicate of students, in which the students meet to discuss the action of the Minister and to form resolutions and take action contrary to the wishes of the Minister."16

16Thai National Archives, Copy letter No. 14080, received October 22, 1926. 12

At the end of the letter the King wrote that Pridi must be

held chiefly responsible for the Society deviation from its original

purpose and for inciting a feeling of indiscipline and mistrust of

the Minister among the students. His Majesty, therefore, commanded

that Pridi Panomyong be immediately recalled.^ Later on, on

November 25, 1926 Pridi's father had petitioned the King so that

Pridi could finish his Doctorate of law degree. His Majesty granted

the petition on the condition that Pridi should tender a written

apology to the Minister. In a letter dated April, 1927, King

Prajadhipok speaking through the Royal Secretary made the following

comments:

"This Nai Pridi is intelligent but inclined to be a little brash, as is common among the young. Once he enters the Government in a responsible position he will probably work well, and I don't much believe that he will become a 'serious danger to the Government' as Charoonsak has reported. If the Government does not use him in a manner com­ mensurate with his knowledge, then things might develop in an undesirable w a y . " * 8

Pridi wrote in his new book "ma vie mouvementee et mes 21 ans d'exil en Chine populaire" that he had been interested in politics

since he was eleven years old. His History teacher in Ayudhya, the province where he was born, told him about the parliamentary system in

Western Europe. His teacher told him that before the Revolution in

China there were three absolute Kings left in the world. Between

^Thai National Archives, Copy letter 14080. 18 Thailand, Thai National Arcives, Seventh Reign Records, Royal Secretariat 10/1/7 Chao Praya Mahibhon to Chao Praya Phichaiyat. Siam and Russia he did not know which one would be the first to go.

Pridi recounted how he learned about the abortive 1912 Coup. He

discussed the failure of the Coup with his friends in the Law School

set up by the Ministry of Justice even before his departure to France.

In 1918 there was the Bolchevik Revolution in Russia. It seemed to

answer his teacher's question. Russian Monarchy was abolished. This

was what Pridi wrote in his book:

"Comme celle de la Russie venait d'etre abolie j'esperais ardemment qu'il en serait de meme pour le Siam."20 (As the Monarchy in Russia was abolished, I ardently hoped that the same thing would happen in Siam.)

Pridi set his mind to change the system of absolute monarchy

even before he went to Paris and it seemed that he wanted to follow

the Russian model even then.

Pibul or Major Luang Pibul Songgram

Pibul, at that time, did not give any kind of reasons for why he joined the Coup or whether he had a particular grudge against the Royalty. At that time he had a bright future ahead of him. He was promoted to the rank of Major when he was thirty-three years old. Looking back on the 1932 Coup in 1947, when the military made another Coup in which Pibul came back to power for the second time, Pibul said that he joined the 1932 Coup because he was

Pridi Banomyong, Ma Vie Mouvementee et Mes 21 Ans d'exil en Chine Populaire (Paris: l'imprimerie Varap, 1974), p. 28. 14

irrational and young*^

Praya Song Suradej

Praya Song Suradej wrote a short memoire while he was in

exile in 1939 that the leaders of the senior military faction, Praya

Pajion, Praya Rit, Pra Prasas and himself did not know about the

civilian factions.until much later. The senior military faction was

discussing the changing of the system two or three years before the

actual Coup.

He ruled out that the people were behind the Coup because

of their hardship.

"Thai people are afraid of their princes and their masters just like a mouse being afraid of the cat. Only the people alone will be unable to liberate themselves. They dare not organize. They prefer to starve because of p o v e r t y . "22

Praya Song said that the main reason came from the ineffi­

ciency of the King to bring about progress. Instead of the King being

responsible alone for the country, a group of people should be re­

sponsible in the name of the King. The new system had to start even 23 though there might be difficulties in the beginning.

^^Damri Pattamanon, Nailuang Anan kap Pridi (King Anan and Pridi) (Bangkok: Rachadarom Press, 1950), p. 40.

^^Noranit Setabut and Chanvit Kasetsiri, Buntuk Praya Song Suradej mui wan Patiwat Yisip si Mitunayon 2475 (Memoire of Praya Song Suradej on the Coup of July 1932) (Bangkok: Aksorn Thai Press, 1971), pp. 24-25. 23 Ibid. 15

Publicly, the key promoters stated that they staged the Coup

because the King was a weak leader. Actually, however, the main

reason behind the Coup was: the effect of the retrenchment and budget cutting, owing to the depression, which prevented the promoters

promotions. The most important government posts were occupied by 24 close relatives of the King. In addition, members of the royal

family filled up most of the less important positions. Thus the officials from aristocratic and common families discovered that even with their higher education there were few openings for advancement in government service.

Legitimacy

As the change did not come from above, as had been the case for the past hundred and fifty years, the question of legitimacy became a central problem. Legitimacy in this case involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the 25 society. Legitimacy thus can be given and taken away if the people see that the political system is unfit. Closely related to the concept, 26 then, are allegiance and support of the people to the system.

The four most important ministries were Defence, Interior, Finance and Foreign Affairs all of which were controlled by the King's close relatives. 25 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political-Man (USA: Anchor Books Edition, 1963), p. 64. 26 Warren F. Ilchman and Norman T. Uphoff, The Political Economy of Change (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 77. 16

In the past, the sources of legitimacy of the King came from

the divine right of kingship and the law of Dharma. An ideal monarch

was supposed to follow the ten kingly virtues according to the

Constitution of the Thammasat which the Thai got from the Mon.

These virtues are: almsgiving, morality, liberality, rectitude,

gentleness, self restriction, non-anger, non-violence, forbearance and 27 non-obstruction. The degree of benevolence was the basis for

justifying the reigni.

From the time of King Mongkut onward, the sources of

legitimacy changed with the encroachment of the West. The King's

policy was to absorb western influence from various nations which

was why Rama V sent his sons and the sons of his officials to different

countries in Europe. At the same time, the King himself should be an

educated man and so should be his government officials. Legitimacy

therefore implied education in addition to everything else.

The coup which aimed at curbing the power of the King

introduced military strength and the constitutional parliamentary

ideology as a basis for power and legitimacy. Both of which replaced

reverence for a quasi-sacred authority still in the symbol of the

King as the head of state. These two new ingredients were added to

education. The People's Party wanted the people and especially the

elites in Bangkok to accept them.

What the group did not foresee was that when the King and the

27 Dhani Nivat Prince, "The Old Siamese Conception of the Monarchy," Collected Articles (Bangkok: The Siam Society, 1969), p. 94. 17

princes were placed above politics, only the coup group became the

focus of political power. They were too small a group to fill all

the important posts. Subsequently they were compelled by circumstances

to cooperate with the selected aristocrats and royalists who were

liberal enough in their opinion. The short coming was that they did

not know each other well enough. They were united primarily to

overthrow the system of absolute monarchy and with that accomplished

they began to suspect one another's ambition. They had to prevent

any member who wanted to become first among equal at all costs.'

The Constitution

The first move after the successfulness of the coup was to

beg the King for forgiveness in which the King graciously did. This

could be translated as the King giving them legitimate power to rule

on his behalf.

The transition period between the changing of power did not

come as smoothly as the People's Party had hoped. Three days after

the coup, the representatives of the Party with Pridi as the leader

went to have an audience with the King. They presented him with the

draft of the Provisional Constitution which Pridi had drawn after the 28 British model.

The document began with the central ideological aspiration of

the group. Article one stated that "the highest power of the country

belongs to the entire people." However, the following individual and

groups of individuals will exercise the power on behalf of the people:

Thai Newspapers Association ed. Buangrak Prachatipatai (Beginning of Democracy) (Bangkok: Thairat Press, 1973), p. 95. 18

the monarch, the National Assembly, the People's Committee and the 29 law courts. The King was recognized to be "the highest personality

of the country" although in fact he was vested with virtually no 30 power. Article seven made it clear that any action taken by the

King in order to be lawful must be countersigned by at least one member of the People's Committee. The King was also denied his veto power because even if he could ask the National Assembly to reconsider the acts which he disapproved they could override his disapproval by simple majority vote.

The National Assembly was upheld as the highest organization

of the state with legislative authority. Its most distinguished

members would subsequently be elected to the People's Committee,

the equivalent of a Cabinet.

From the document one can detect that the real power did not

rest with the mass as the People's Party had claimed. Instead of

establishing a truly representative Government as soon as possible,

the Provisional Constitution stipulated that democracy could be achieved through three successive stages. In the first stage, the

Military Controllers of the country would appoint seventy Assembly men. However, the first stage would end within six months or "until the time when the affairs of the country are well in order." During the second stage, the Assembly was to be composed of two categories

29 Duen Bunnag and Pairote Jayanam, Kham Qatibai Kodmai Ratthathemanoon Pak Song (Lecture on Constitutional Law, Part II), (Bangkok: Nitisan Press, 1934), pp. 35-43. 30 Article 3-7 of the Provisional Constitution of June 27, 1932. 19

of members. The first would be elected indirectly by the people, one

representative per 100,000 population in a province. The second

category members were those elected by the People's Party. The two

categories would have an equal number of representatives. However,

the Constitution took care that the first category members would be

those with the right kind of political ideas. The aspirants must pass

an examination on politics set up by the Assembly.

The political tutelage of the People's Party would be ended

in the third period. The constitution stipulated that Assembly men

would be directly elected by the people when more than half of the

population of the country had completed their primary education or at

the latest within a period not exceeding ten years after the constitution came into force.

After the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution of

June 27, 1932, the seventy members of the Assembly were appointed.

There were about 25 non-promoters who were senior officials with outstanding backgrounds and education. The Assembly met on June 28,

1932 to choose the President of the People's Committee and fourteen other members of the committee. Two names were being suggested as the President of the People's Committee, one was Prince Baworadej, ex-Minister of War suggested by Praya Pahon and the other name was

Praya Manopakorn Nithitada, a judge in the Court of Appeals, proposed by Pridi. At the end Praya Mano was appointed as he was a commoner and was never a member of the People's Party. Nai Thawee Bunyaketu

said that a more important reason was that "we did not want the

people to have an impression that we had seized power for our own 20

31 benefit." Praya Mano had the reputation of being a learned man with

a lot of administrative experiences. Besides, his wife used to be a

lady in waiting of the Queen. All of these made Praya Mano a person

who was accepted in every faction be it the princes, the civilians or

the military.

It should be noted that even though a civilian was put in

charge of the situation, the People's Party knew full that the

movement owed much of its success to military strength. It was only

natural that the military leaders should place themselves at the head

of the Navy and Army. The Ministry of Defence was thus reorganized,

and a large number of senior military and naval officers, of whose

loyalty was doubtful were retired on pension. Among them were four

Lieutenant Generals, twelve Major Generals, twenty two Colonels and 32 five naval Captains. Colonel Praya Pahon assumed the position of

Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Colonel Praya Song assumed the

position of Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Director of the Military

Operations Section. Colonel Praya Rit was promoted to General

Officer Commanding the Artillery, with Major Luang Pibul as his deputy. Colonel Pra Prasas was appointed to be Director of the

Military Education Department. Major-General Praya Prasert Songgram

was made Acting Minister of Defence pending the return of Vice

Admiral Praya Rajawangsan, an elder brother of Luang Sindhu who had

represented Siam at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. When he

31 Jayanta K. Ray, Portraits of Thai Politics (New Delhi: Orient Longman Ltd., 1972), p. 69. 32 Ratchakitchanubeksa (Royal Thai Government Gazette) Vol. 49, Part 24, July 17, 1932, pp. 1343-1346. 21

returned in August he was immediately appointed Minister of Defence.

The draft of the new constitution was completed by the middle

of November, when it was submitted to the Assembly. The discussion

was short. The new constitution did not change the main theme of the

provisional one. It only added three articles to guarantee the rights

of the people and their freedom of belief, freedom of speeches and

freedom in writings, etc. The formal signing of the constitution and

its presentation by the King to the President of the Senate were

carried out with elaborate ceremony on December 10, 1932. A three day

holiday was proclaimed and everything was done to make the occasion a

memorable one.

On the day that the Constitution was promulgated, the King

appointed the Minister of State, confirming the former holders of

office in their position. The new cabinet was composed of twenty

members, fifteen of those were former members of the Executive

Committee now known as the "State Councillor." Included in the

Council were the leaders of the People's Party namely: Praya Pahon,

Praya Song, Praya Rit, Pridi, Pibul, Luang Sindhu, Prayoon, Tua and

Naeb.

Soon after the coup, representatives of the People's Party

began touring the provinces, explaining the new constitution, and

emphasizing the doctrine that power of the people was henceforth

, supreme. The Bangkok Times, February 6, 1933, made a comment as

follows:

"these emissaries have probably been themselves taught and slightly saddened in the process. It 22

is not easy to teach those whose energies are spent in the mud of the rice fields and in the thickness of the jungle that liberty and equality are things for which it is worthwhile to sweep kings from their thrones.

The Royal Family

Under the new Constitution, nobody of the rank of Mom Chao 34 upwards could hold a political post, be a member of the State

Council, or become a member of the Assembly. Henceforth, to use

the words of the Constitution, the princes were above politics.

Prince Paribatra or the Prince of Nakonsawan, an heir to the throne

and his son Prince Chumpot were "invited" to leave the country. The

former let it be known that he would never return to Siam and went with the members of his family to Java where he resided until his

death. Prince Damrong, the key figure in the great reform of King

Rama V also took leave. The exceptions to the rule were Prince

Aditaya who later became the President of the Council of Regency; and Prince Wan Waitayakara who later became Chief Advisor to Praya

Pahon and an advisor in foreign affairs when Pibul became Prime

Minister.

Problems Facing the Promoters

A. The Issue of Party Politics

On July 24, 1932, when the People's Party took control of the

government, they established the following platform:

33 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail (from now on, it will be referred to as BTWM), February 6, 1933.

34 The rankings of the Princes from the highest rank to the lowest are: Chao Fa, Pra-one-chao, Mom Chao, Mom Rachahong, Mom Luang. 23

1. The freedom and equality of the people in politics, in

the law courts, and in business, must be maintained.

2. Peace and quiet, with no harm to anyone, must be assured.

3. A national economic policy must be drawn up to guarantee

remunerative work to everyone.

4. Equal privilege for everyone must be guaranteed. No one

group shall enjoy special privileges at the expense of others.

5. The people shall have freedom and liberty except in those

cases where freedom and liberty disagree with the above four points.

6. The people must be given the most complete education

possible.

In order to conform with the platform number one, a new attempt

was made to form another political party. At the moment the only

party in existence was the People's Party which at first had not been

set up as a formal political party. It was in 1933 that the People's

Party decided to set up its affiliated offices all over the country.

A member was supposed to make a vow that he would safeguard the constitution and uphold it as his life. He would never think of destroying it and moreover he must pay respect to the constitution as 35 a sacred and almighty God. There was no doubt that the People's

Party wanted to make the constitution sacred and legitimate in the

eyes of the members. Later on, it had registered itself as a formal

political party under the name of Samakon Kanarat (Association of

People's Party). An attempt to form a new political party started

35 Chamlong Itarong, Lakqn Kan Mueng (Political Play) Vol. 1 (Bangkok: Sahapakon Press, 1949), p. 157. 24

not long afterward. The leaders of the new group were Praya

Dhonavanik, Commander Praya Sarapaipipat, R.S.N., Nai Louis Kiriwat,

Luang Wichit Wadhakan and some of the princes and former members of

the old regime. The main purpose was to promote full democracy with

the King as head of the country under a constitution. This new

political party would be named "Khana Chart" (Nationalist Party).

Luang Wichit Wadhakan was to be the party secretary. According to him, he went to talk to Pridi about it first. The latter seemed to agree with his idea and even Praya Mano, the president of the State 36 Councillors, did not object. In the end, however, Praya Mano changed his mind and urged Luang Wichit to give up the idea and as a quid pro quo he would do away with the People's Party as well.^

There was a great deal of criticism of the government's objection to the establishment of a new political party. Praya Mano, who did not belong to the People's Party, gave a simple reason. He

said that the situation was far from normal and the majority of the people did not understand political parties. If a new one was allowed to be set up, the government was afraid that the members of each political party would be inclined to think of the interest of their own political party without thinking of the interest of the majority. If this happened it might lead to the disunity of the 38 population as a whole.

36 Wichit Wadhakan, Khana Kan Mueng (Political Party) (Bangkok: No Publisher, 1932), pp. 19-20. 37 Report of the National Assembly, Verbatim Report from the National Assembly Meeting. 2nd Regular Session, 1934 (Bangkok: Daily Mail Printing Press, 1936), p. 941. 38 Chamlong Itarong, Lakon Kan Mueng, pp. 160-161. 25

Praya Mano's reasons came mostly from the King's letter to

him on January 31, 1933 where His Majesty said in one part that

political parties would be beneficial when the people have more knowledge of politics. "But," said the King

"the government has permitted the association of the People's Party to operate; thus it is more difficult to limit the right of other political groups. The best thing to do, I think, is to dissolve the People's

Party and other parties as w e l l . " 3 ’

Praya Mano's decision had a negative effect on the future of

the Siamese political life. It monopolized the position of the People's

Party without permitting other groups to be heard. Moreover, censorship of the newspapers made public opinion non existent. Thus although a constitution had been made it was as a house already built but wanting a foundation to support it.

B. Pridi's Economic Plan

According to point three of the original six-point platform, the People's Party promised that "a national economic policy will be drawn up to provide remunerative employment for everyone." Luang

Pradit (Pridi), as the brain of the party, presented his economic plan for the State Council to be discussed. In the meeting Praya

Song and his followers who were supposed to be in the new elite group siding with the senior aristocrats, opposed the plan on the grounds that it was borrowed from communism. The civilian faction, on the other hand, applauded the program. With the split in the Council, the King decided that a committee should be set up to discuss the

39 The King's Memos and Suggestions to the Government and National Assembly (Bangkok: Sri Krung Press, 1935), p. 88. problem thoroughly. A committee of fourteen was promptly set up and

the discussion started on March 12, 1933. Pridi pointed out that the

main problem of the Siamese economic system stemmed from the fact that

both land and labor were not fully utilized. On top of this, there

was not enough capital which led to an insufficient amount of tools

and machinery. The peasants would work in the fields for only six

months a year— the duration of one crop. To eliminate this waste,

Pridi suggested that the government should step in to administer the

economic system and provide for the necessities of life for the

people. First of all, the government was to issue bonds equivalent

to the amount of the value of land to the land owners. Pridi thought

that they would be glad to sell their land because they had not

earned enough anyway. Then the farmers would become government

employees working in cooperative societies. Pridi believed it was a

well known fact that they preferred this profession to anything else.

In return for their work, the government would pay them a salary and

pension. The plan would automatically eliminate the middleman who is

usually a Chinese. The Government budget would be raised through

indirect taxation, lotteries, borrowing money and securing credit.

However, Pridi was optimistic to think that not much money was needed

because the workers would be required to buy from government stares.

By doing this the profit motive would be eliminated.

In the meeting Luang Pradit had some ardent supporters: Nai

Thawee Punyaketu, Luang Kahakambodi, Nai Vilas Osathanon, Nai Naeb

Baholyodhin— all of these were old friends from his Paris days. They

still respected him as their 'Acharn.' The rest of the committee were aristocrats who did not agree with the plan. They were: Praya Mano,

the Chairman of the State Council, Praya Rajawangsan, the State

Councillor of Defence who spent a long time abroad as Siamese

Minister; Praya Song Suradej; Praya Srivisarn Waja, State Councillor

for Foreign Affairs.

Praya Mano, realized that if the government adopted the Pridi

Economic Program it would be tantamounted to the "nationalization of

land, labor and capital, and subsequently the government will under- 40 take to administer the whole economic system. Being the President

of the State Council, Praya Mano could not accept the plan which might

discredit him in the eyes of the people. He asked Praya Song for his

views. The latter replied:

"It seems to me that it would take fifty to a hundred years to carry this plan out fully. Would it not be better to agree not to promulgate it and just go ahead and do as much as we can?"

Praya Rajwangsan in turn suggested that they publish the

entire scope of the policy step by step, and in the meanwhile educate

the people so that they would understand it. Praya Srivisarn said that he would not accept the policy as a whole but would accept it in parts.

At the end of the meeting, Praya Mano admitted that the majority of this committee approved the economic policy of Luang

Pradit but he could not, why?

"Because we lack experts, we lack reserve funds, we

^Kenneth P. Landon, Siam in Transition (New York: Greenwald Press, 1968), p. 311. 28

lack the confidence of the people at large. For I am convinced that this policy is unacceptable to the people... But if we agree to announce merely that we are going to enlarge the credit facilities of the co-operative societies of the sort that are now serving the farmers, or that we are going to enlarge the credit facilities of the co-operative stores, I am willing to agree to that m u c h . "^2

However, they decided to allow Luang Pradit to publish his

economic policy using his own name provided the Government agreed with

the opinion of Praya Mano.

In spite of the fact that the aristocrats and the royalists groups insisted in blocking the economic plan, in the People's Party and the National Assembly, the majority accepted Pridi's program.

Comments on Pridi's Economic Plan

When Pridi wrote his economic program, he was in his early thirty's. The main influence on him was his own personal experience in Ayudhya when he was young and the theories which he acquired when he was in Paris. His ideas came partly from the lectures of Professor 43 Deschamps, Thomas Moore, Karl Marx, the Soviet experience and Thai

Buddhism. He never expressed the influences behind his utopian idea until in 1957'when his essay on Kwam Pen Anicang khong Sangkhom (The

Impermanence of Society) appeared in Thailand. This essay was the key behind his whole idea. In summary, he saw that political change would not be complete without social and economic change.

^^Duen Bunnag, Than Pridi Ratthaurut A-Wuso (Pridi: Elder Statesman) (Bangkok: Sermwit Bannakan Press, 1957), p. 395. 43 See detail analysis in Pierre Fistie, Sous Development et Utopie au Siam (Le Haye: Paris Mouton et Cie, 1969) 29

"In fact, if a social system advances without too great a disparity between living conditions and availability of the necessities of life between the rulers and the ruled, an evolution (wiwat) is the usual bearer of change. In the case of the 1932 coup, society's adoption of a new system came too slow; therefore a decisive change (Apiwat) erupted rather than evolved.

According to Pridi, the 1932 coup was not complete without the

abolition of the landowner class. Consequently, instead of

nationalization of all the lands, Pridi suggested that the Government

buy the lands with bonds. All the lands would then be transferred to

the State as the owner and not belong to the King or private landowners

anymore.

There was no doubt that Pridi's economic plan was Marxist

oriented and Pridi himself was idealistic. The plan was the first

economic plan the country had ever had. It was not wrong to paint a

glorious picture of a Thai society where the government was to provide work for everyone and where there would be a welfare state for the people. The problem was that the picture was intended for a much more politically and economically advanced country than Siam. In 1932, Siam was a poor traditional society which had just started on the path of democracy. Most of the people had never heard of the word 'constitution' and many who had thought constitution was the son of Praya Pahon. The country had a small number of educated people which meant there were not enough administrators and personnel to carry out the program. There were not enough roads, means of transportation, electricity and

44 Pridi Panomyong, Kwam Pen Anicang Khong Sangkhom (The Impermanence of Society) (Bangkok: Nithiwate Publishing, 1970) pp. 65-67. David Morell and Susan Morell translated some parts in "The Impermanence of Society," Southeast Asia, Vol II, No. 4, Fall, 1973, pp. 397-427. 30

irrigation systems. In short, not enough infra-structures to make

the plan work. Even without such a plan Siam had to hire foreign 45 experts to help run her country. It was estimated that in 1932 Siam had one agriculturalist who graduated from England— Nai Thawee

46 Bunyaketu and a few graduates in the same field from the Philippines.

In 1931, the King hired an American expert, Carl C. Zimmerman to survey the rural economy. His report was published by the Bangkok

Times Press Ltd.; Zimmerman related to the land ownership as follows:

"In the central plains 36 out of each hundred people owned their own land; in the North 27% were landless, in the South 147o and in the Northeast 18%. The average rai owned for all families were 28 rai in the center compared with 10 rai in the North, 8 rai in the South and 6 rai in the East. The percentage of the people who rented land varied from 5-30%..."47

Pridi's plan for government ownership of all the land might reduce the incentive of the farmers which would in turn affect the economy of Siam which depended heavily on rice.

Moreover, Pridi wrote in Article 9 in the Law on Insurance that

people from the age of 11-18 and from 55 upward did not have to work

except in case of an emergency. This was extremely unrealistic as the

statistics revealed in 1937 that in Siam 52.18% of the people were

^William A. Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1966), p. 97.

^^Duen Bunnag, Than Pridi Ratthaburut A-wuso, p. 395.

^Carl C. Zimmerman, Siam Rural Economic Survey, 1930-1931. (Bangkok: The Bangkok Times Press Ltd., 1931), p. 18. under the age of 20 years; 7.36% were over 55 which would leave only 48 40% of the population at work. 49 After Pridi had left the country, Praya Mano published the

King's comments on Pridi's plan as a supporter for his government's

action. It was known as Samut Pok Kao (Book with White Cover) while

Pridi's plan was known as Samut Pok Lueng (Book with Yellow Cover).

The King particularly resented allegation that his subjects were

starving by saying that "in Siam, even a dog does not starve to death.

Then he made a sarcastic comment that he did not know whether Stalin

copied Pridi or vice versa.

The King admitted however that it was a waste of energy if

people worked only six months a year but he added:

"Don't forget that we have not pursued or have not taught them to do anything else...if we had, it might not be necessary for the Government to dispense the people of the jobs and recruit them as workers because to let people work for other people by the command of the Government within a set time limit, I think, even if you can do it you would have to use a lot of pressure... To be the one who commands and to be the ones who are under the command are quite different."

Without Pridi's plan, Praya Mano's government announced a project to raise the number of public utilities. More mills and silos would be set up under the control of the government, more cultivated lands would be assigned to the poor. The government declared that it

48 Pierre Fistie, Sous Development et Utopie au Siam, p. 111. 49 The government advised Pridi to leave the country but they would pay him f1000/year. Pridi left the country on April 12, 1933.

^ D u e n Bunnag, Than Pridi Ratthaburut A-wuso, pp. 389-390. 51 32

would preserve the principle of private ownership and property. This

was an effort to be in contrast to Pridi's plan. The whole govern­

mental effort amounted to the fact that even though there would be no

change from the old system, the government would increase its effort

to improve the existing conditions.

C. Praya Mano Prorogued the Assembly

As the result of the economic plan, the rift between the

People's Party, the aristocrats and the royalists was widened. Late

in March 1933, an executive order was announced forbidding all govern­

ment officials from joining any political party. This was instituted

to cut down the members of the People's Party who were mostly govern­ ment officials. Such an action led to a heated debate in the Assembly

on March 30, 1933. In this meeting, some members, in a rage, pulled

out their guns while others engaged in fist fights.

On the next day, Praya Mano, with the help of Praya Song, ordered a platoon of soldiers to the Assembly hall to keep peace and

order. It was widely suspected that Mano's main intention was to prevent members from coming to vote on the issue as there was a possibility that the conservatives might lose. Khuang Apaiwong, a member of the Assembly, condemned the President of the State Council 52 because he was using dictatorial power. Some members even said that

Mano established a new system called "Manocracy." On the whole, the aristocrats felt that they might be ousted from power by a vote of no confidence.

52 Minutes of the National Assembly, First Session, March 31, 1933, pp. 974-975. 33

On April 1, 1933, King Prajadhipok, on the recommendation of

Praya Mano, issued a royal decree to prorogue the Assembly as well as

to repeal the enforcement of some provisions of the Constitution. The

reason given was that the minority of the members had attempted to

establish a new economic policy in Siam of a communistic nature. The majority deemed such a policy contrary to all the traditions of the

Siamese people and certain to bring disaster to the people and under- 53 mine the security of the State. The decree was countersigned by

the leading members of the People's Party including Praya Pahon and

Pibul. Only five ministers did not sign, they were:

1. Luang Pradit Manudharm (Pridi)

2. Nai Naeb Baholyodhin

3. Nai Tua Lapanukrom

4. Luang Det Sahakorn

5. Praya Pramuan Vichapul

All of these five members were pro-Pridi and were in favor of his economic plan.

While he was in exile in 1948, Pibul wrote a letter to

Pridi telling him why he had signed the decree and who was actually behind the incident:

"...perhaps you have misunderstood that I helped proroguing the Assembly and helped sending you into exile in connection with the communist charge. The fact was that I did not. Regarding the prorogation of the Assembly, it was Praya Mano who called me in and persuaded me to sign as the last one. At that

53 Great Britain, Public Record Office Diplomatic Papers FO 371 Henceforth will be referred to as FO 371. File 3109/42/40, April 3, 1933. 34

time I was young in politics, when 1 saw that everyone had signed, I was afraid that some peril might occur if I did not. I, therefore signed my name after Praya Pahon. About Acharn's exile [he still called Pridi by the name he used to call him in Paris], please ask Luang Adul about who was behind it. The fact is that it was Praya Song..."

On the same day that the Assembly was adjourned, a law on

communism was passed. Article three defined communism as "the

economic system or theory which rests upon the total or partial

abolition of the right of private property, actual ownership being 55 ascribed to the community as a whole or to the State." Communistic

doctrine means any doctrine which implies the advocation of nationali­ zation of land, or nationalization of industry, or nationalization of capital or nationalization of labor.

Advocates of the doctrine shall be punished according to

Article four which is to be imprisoned not exceeding ten years and to be fined not exceeding 5,000 ticals.

A new Cabinet of 18 members was formed on April 3, 1933, noticeably absent from the list were the five persons who did not sign the Royal Decree. New to the Cabinet were Commander Luang

Supachalasai, a leader in the Navy faction in the People's Party; Praya

Manavarajsevi, Major General Praya Pichai Songkram and Colonel Praya

Srisithisonggram.

54 Panomyong Pridi, "Kwam Pen Pai Bang Prakan Pai Nai Kana Phu Samret Rachakan Tan Pra-Ong (Some Inside Incidents in the Council of the Regents." Bang Rueng Kiew Kap Pra Borom-Wongsanuwong Nai Rawang Songkram Lok Krung Thi Song (Some Occurences Concerning the Royal Family During the Second World War) (Bangkok: Nithivet Press, 1971), p. 76.

55FO 371 File 3109/42/40, April 3, 1933. 35

C. The June Resignation

The month of May passed by quietly, everything seemed to be

calm until June 10, 1933 when the four military leaders of the coup

"The Four Tigers," Colonel Praya Pahon, Colonel Praya Rit, Colonel

Praya Song and Pra Prasas submitted to Praya Mano their resignation

letter which said:

"It has been almost a year since the coup took place to the present day, I have worked hard for the nation without seeking personal pleasure. Now I come to see that the works of the govern­ ment have been progressing without any obstacle and I have been sick frequently which makes me unable to work effectively. For these reasons I beg to submit my resignation from State Councillor to be effective as of the twenty-fourth of this month.

Praya Mano accepted the four resignations without any

reconsideration. The government announced the new appointments of two

senior army officers. They were Major General Praya Pichai Songgram,

the former Commander of the First Army and Colonel Praya Srisithi

Songgram who declined to take part in the coup. Major General Praya

Pichai was to replace Praya Pahon as the Commander-in-Chief of the

Army and the latter would take over one of Praya Song's positions as

Director of Military Operations. The position of Deputy Commander-in-

Chief of the Army which Praya Song was holding would be filled by Luang

Pibul who was the star in the junior military faction, a person whom

Praya Mano would like to court.

After the departure of Pridi, Praya Mano realized that support

from the Army was necessary for his position. The army was the only

"^Videskoranee (pseud.) Prawatsart Chart Thai (History of Thai Nation) (Bangkok: Rungwatana Press, 1969), p. 281. 36

organized group which controlled real power— the shift in the Army

from the Government would mean' a real danger. On April 19, 1933 a

sweeping promotion for 82 army officers was made. Most of them were

members of the junior military faction who had remained somewhat

passive during the presentation of Pridi's economic plan. As a result,

Luang Pibul and Luang Tasanai were promoted to a Lieutenant Colonel

and a Major respectively."^

D. The Second Coup of June 20, 1933

Four days before the resignation of the Four Tigers was ef­

fective, a second coup occurred early in the morning of June 20, 1933.

The technique was an exact duplicate of the coup a year earlier. Only 58 this time it was not a bluff, but a real force was used. Trucks

loaded with soldiers were rushing to control strategic places in

Bangkok. The houses of the leading members of the State Councillors—

Praya Mano, Praya Rajwangsan, State Councillor of Defence, Praya

Srivisarn Waja, State Councillor of Foreign Affairs were under heavy

surveillance.

Later in the morning, it was announced that the leaders of the

coup were Colonel Praya Pahon, Lieutenant Colonel Luang Pibulsonggram

and Commander Luang Suphachalasai R.N. An official communique was

issued to state the reasons of the coup. It runs as follows:

"As the action of the State Councillors in charge of the administration of the country is contrary to the

"^Ratchakitchanubeksa (Royal Thai Government Gazette) Vol. 50, April 21, 1933, p. 260. 58 During the Coup of 1932, Praya Song ordered the troops to meet for mock war preparation. He used them to back up the Coup without their knowledge. 37

provisions of the Constitution, by first closing the National Assembly and then refraining from utilizing the Constitution in a large measure, the Army, the Navy and Civil Service therefore find it necessary to take over control of the Government for the purpose of re-opening the Assembly in accordance with the Constitution..."^

H.E. Praya Mano, the President of the State Council was handed a letter which read:

"The combined party of Army, Navy and Civil Service are in complete agreement that since the change in the administration of Siam brought about by the People's Party till the present time— now almost one year— the State Councillors, having Your Excellency as their chief, have held the reigns of Government all along. Some of your work has been very well carried out, in accordance with the channel of right, resulting in much benefit to the country... However, there are also a number of other works of the State Council which do not meet with the entire approval of the general public, or that of the Army, Navy and Civil Service. When careful consideration had been given, it was perceived that such measures of the administration brought about by the State Council would only lead the country to disaster as the ultimate end.

Therefor, in consideration of the independence and peace of the country, the Army, Navy and Civil Service request Your Excellency together with the other State Councillors to relinquish your present positions. They also request Your Excellency as President of the State Council to submit a petition to the King, asking His Majesty to reopen the Assembly, and to appoint a new State Council. If this should meet with any obstruction, so that Your Excellency may not be able to carry it out in effect as requested, then the Amy , Navy and Civil Service will invite me, Colonel Praya Pahol Polpayuhasena, to take charge of the country's administration henceforth.

~^The Bangkok Times, June 20, 1933.

^The Bangkok Times, June 20, 1933. 38

A telegram was sent to H.S.M. Prince Vipulya, His Majesty's

Private Secretary:

"It has now been found necessary for the Army, Navy and Civil Services to take over control of the administration of the country only with the view of reopening the People's Assembly. Therefore, please inform His Majesty that both the Army and Navy are and will always remain royal to the King."

Signed: Colonel Praya Pahon Lieutenant Colonel Luang Pibul Colonel Luang Suphachalasai, R.S.N.61

Without any resistance, Praya Mano resigned and went into voluntary exile in Penang until his death.

On June 22, 1933, the Assembly was re-opened. In this meeting

Praya Pahon was proposed to hold the position of the president of the

State Council. Reluctantly Praya Pahon accepted on the condition that

he would be in the position for only ten or fifteen days during the

transitional period. When the time was over he sent in his resignation

letter saying:

"When I ponder my legal and political knowledge I realize that I lack these very much, thus finding that I am not experienced enough to lead the country to success."62

The King recognizing the sincerity of Praya Pahon, did not accept his resignation. The King wrote:

"I consider that the most important quality in the Premier is the confidence the public places in him and also his ability to lead the hearts of the people together in a joint spirit of cooperation. ...At the present juncture it is indeed very hard to

61Ibid. ^ The Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, henceforth, will be referred to as BTWM, July 6, 1933, p. 17. 39

obtain the services of another who is so gifted with such qualities as your good self."^

It should be noted that during the meeting of the Assembly on

June 22, 1933, which was attended by fifty members, Praya Pahon proposed

to the Assembly that it legalize the action taken by the members of

the second coup, and the Assembly voted unanimously to pass a law to

acknowledge the change of administration by the coup d'etat to be 64 lawful. Formal legitimacy was then given by only fifty people in the

Assembly— a sad fact in Thai politics.

The new State Council, headed by Praya Pahon, was composed of

fourteen members. Seven were members of the People's Party. Besides

Colonel Praya Pahon there were two leaders of the second coup namely

Lieutenant Colonel Luang Pibul, Commander Luang Supachalassai. Pra

Sitthi Ruangdejpon, Praya Song's close friend who was well known among

the Army became Minister without portfolio. The rest of the

Councillors were well known senior officials during the old regime.

Absent from the list of Councillors were three military leaders namely

Colonel Praya Song, Colonel Praya Rit and Lieutenant Colonel Pra

Prasas— three of the "Four Tigers."

Throughout this changing period, the name of Pridi was mentioned frequently by the Press. Well aware of the charge against

Pridi, Praya Pahon said in an interview that Pridi was a good man who worked hard but he could not be recalled until after the new People's

Assembly was elected. "I want the new People's Assembly to investigate

64 The Bangkok Times, June 21, 1933. 40

whether he is a communist or not first.

The new indirect election occurred on November 15, 1933.

Seventy-eight first category members were elected while the second

category members were equally selected by the King with the advise

of the State Councillors.

However, the new group did not wait until the new People's

Assembly was in session. They wanted Pridi back because they needed him. He was their friend and they knew that he would be valuable for the country. Needless to say, Pridi was summoned back from France.

On September 29, 1933 he arrived in Bangkok. A big reception was waiting for him. Pridi was in "exile" for five and a half months.

With Pridi back, the government declared that Pridi had given his word that he would abandon his program of "nationalization of land and labor." Three days later on October 1, 1933, Pridi was appointed a minister in the government amidst the suspicion of his opponents.

Thus in a way the second coup had brought Pridi back to the lime light again. A question could be asked whether that was the main reason for the coup beside the issue on constitution. The letter which Pibul wrote to Pridi gave a little bit of the reason. It ran as follows:

"When Praya Song had resigned, I was on duty one night at Cafe Norasingh. I remembered I went with Luang Adul. I learned afterwards that Praya Rajawangsan, Praya Rit and Praya Mano were planning to ask the Navy to imprison me there. I understand

Videskorani (pseud.) Kwam Pen Ma Hang Prachathinatai Kong Thai (The Origin of Democracy in Thailand) (Bangkok: Pan Fa Pataya Press, 1968), Vol 1, p. 270. 41

that Commander General Kamhiran was being asked to participate...

From this letter it would seem that despite the promotion which

Praya Mano had asked for Pibul he did not really trust him. The

second coup occurred as the result of precaution, the coup group had

reason to believe that forcible proceeding would shortly be taken

against them and so they chose to act first. Political struggle had

taken place even before Pridi's economic plan or the prorogation of

the National Assembly came into being.

The problem came primarily from the nature of the People's

Party itself. As mentioned before, there were two factions in the

Party which in itself was not a political party in the real sense. To be more meaningful we can first of all divide the two factions into a civilian group and the military group but only one civilian's name came up frequently - Pridi. Thus the military faction was more im­ portant because they helped the civilians to accomplish their goals.

The senior military even claimed that they had thought of the coup 67 first. However they let the civilian group, especially Pridi do the paper work - drafting the constitution, the communique and the economic plan. It turned out that they did not check the contents of the materials before the presentation. The outcome was that the military disagreed with the wordings especially the part which at-

66 Panomyong Pridi, "Kwan Pen Ma..." in Bang Rueng.... p. 77. 67 See Noranit Setabutr and Charnvit Kasetsiri on Praya Song and Sukum Wwttana Chamras, Pan kan Patiwat; Lao Doi Pontri Pra Prasas Pittayayudh (The Coup Plan as Told By Major General Pra Prasas Pittayayudh) (Bangkok: Ratpakdi Press, 1948), pp. 46-47. 42

tacked the King. Then came the economic plan which brought about the

final blow to the People's Party.

Within the military group itself, there were three leading

members, Praya Pahon, Praya Song and Luang Pibul. Praya Pahon was

sincere, loyal to the King and, to say the least, too nice to be a

politician. Praya Song, on the other hand was a brilliant soldier and

prided himself in being the one who made the 1932 Coup possible. After

the Coup, he was promoted to be second in command of the army. With

his position and his egotistic manner, Praya Song did not have much

contact with the lower ranking officers. He was admired and respected but he was not liked by men of his profession. Pibul, however, had a

pleasingly polite manner; his position was neither too high nor too low.

The fact that he was advancing so fast in his career brought him a lot of admiration and popularity. Praya Song once wanted to transfer him from Deputy Commander of the Artillery to an insignificant staff position, a plan to get rid of his future opponent. Owing to several oppositions, Praya Song's plan did not come through, but Pibul found out and never forgave Praya Song for the attempt.

Regarding Pibul's move to power, Nai Thawi Bunyaketu, one of the Vanguard in the People's Party, told us a different story. He said that it was Pibul who was behind every significant change at that time. Pibul was jealous of Pridi's success, but he hid it very well.

All through the presentation of Pridi's economic plan, Pibul took care not to take part in either group. Nevertheless, when Praya Mano sent

Pridi into exile, Pibul was supporting him behind the scene.

Accompanying Pridi to Singapore was Lieutenant Tasanai who was very popular in the Army and who worshipped Pridi. Not too long after

Tasanai returned home, he was found dead under mysterious circumstances.

Rumors had it that Tasanai wanted to organize another coup. Thawee said that it was speculated that Pibul was behind the whole incident.

His scheme was to eliminate those whom he thought would block his

acquisition• of * power. 68

According to Thawee, the resignation of the 'Four Tigers'

was originated by Pibul's suggestion. Pibul vented his idea to Praya

Pahon, Praya Song and Pra Prasas that their resignations might be a

shock to Praya Mano and provide a way out of the stumbling block at

that time.^ They felt that the King would not accept the resignation and would force Praya Mano to compromise. It turned out that Praya

Mano prevailed upon the King to accept the resignations. All through this impasse, it was significant that Pibul himself did not resign.

By retaining his post as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, he staged a coup that forced Praya Mano into exile. This time the post of

President of the State Council had to be accepted by one of the

People's Party. It would not be right to deny themselves this position for the second time. Praya Pahon was chosen because 'he was neither so brilliant as to exite Pibul's jealousy nor was he so strong and power-loving as to pose a danger to Pibul.

Interpretations of Thai political situations were like putting

68 Jayanta K. Ray, The Portrait of Thai Politics, pp. 70-71. jig-saw puzzles together. The most important piece in Thai politics was probably the second Coup of June 1933. If the Coup blamed Praya

Mano for not acting in accordance with the constitution, Praya Mano had the consent of seven of the key members of the People's Party,

all of them Ministers (The Four Tigers, Luang Sinthu, Luang Pibul and

Nai Prayoon) to prorogue the Assembly. Besides, there has always been a convention accepted in countries under parliamentary rule that in case there is a grave disagreement which the government cannot con­ trol, it could dissolve the parliament and call new elections. Praya

Mano, being educated in England probably followed that example. The

action taken by the second Coup was far from the right action advocated by the constitution. In reality it was the first Coup using real military force under the constitutional regime and it gave Siam her

first military rule under constitutional monarchy.

Baworadet Counter-Coup

Keeping a secret in Siam is not an easy thing to do. As the capital of Siam, Bangkok has always been full of numerous sensational rumors. As early as July, 1933, a few weeks after the second coup was

over, rumors spread that another coup would erupt in the near future.

Out of this uncertainty, two military leaders decided they had to act

first. Without telling Praya Pahon, Luang Pibul and Luang Supachalasai,

at their own discretion, circulated a letter to prominant persons and

princes. Among those who received the letter were: H.H. Prince

Baworadet, H.H. Prince Thossiriwongs, H.S.H. Major General Prince

Vongsnirajara, H.S.H. Prince Khaisang Rabi, H.S.H. Prince Sophon

Bhradaya, Praya Atikan Prakas and Praya Sarapai Pipat. 45

* The letter in question was to this effect:

"In acquiring control of the administrative powers on both occasions, the promoters of the Coup d'etat have always abided by the principle of smoothness of action for the benefit of the public peace and independence of the Thai race. Now, however, it has been discovered by investigation that you have held meetings and have in mind to bring about a state of unrest in the country, thus causing anxiety to the Government which also hampers the advancement of the administration of the country. As we have accepted full responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the country, we wish to caution you to exercise peace of mind. If you still persist in your attitude this party will be forced to bring stringent measures to bear on you. The peace of the country is the first requisite, and this is our reason for this action. This statement is not to be taken as a threat but as a caution, made with the best of intentions. With best compliments, (signed) Luang Pibul Songkram. Luang Supa Chalasai

All the recipients, with the single exception of Prince

Baworadet, who was at Hua Hin, were in Bangkok at the time. Most of

them acknowledge the receipt of the letter but Praya Sarapai requested

that a public trial in his case should be held. He was willing to be

put under arrest if found guilty.

It is debatable whether the counter coup would exist at all

without the return of Pridi and his appointment as a new Minister.

Rumors had it again that the government would accept Pridi's economic

plan and probably would go communist. Commander Khun Rengronachai, one

of the rebels who fled to Indochina, wrote to Praya Pahon that:

"the significant cause which brought about the great

71BTWM, August 2, 1933, p. 9. 46

split, casualties and the lives of the fellow citizens came from the return to Siam of Luang Pradit Manudharm. There were rumors that he would become Prime Minister. Some said that he would be Minister of Interior, etc. People were more afraid that communism would come. The fear which had been there had erupted at last with the intention of suppressing communism..."72

In the same letter Khun Reng told Praya Pahon that the plot for

the counter-coup got started by some low ranking military officers.

Captain Luang Homeranron wrote a book called Mua Kapachao Ko kan ka~bot

(When I Started a Rebellion) in which he mentioned the names of the

officers as Lieutenant Colonel Pra Pajjanuk Pinat commander of the

troops at Nakorn Rajasima (Korat) Major Senanattikan, Major Luang 73 Homchingchai; all were from Korat. According to Khun Reng, Prince 74 Baworadet was asked to join three weeks before the coup started.

In Saraburi they had the cooperation of Captain Luang Homeranron, in

Ayudhya Major Luang Badan, in Bangkok two high ranking officers,

Colonel Praya Srisith Songgram who was to take Praya Song's position

when the second coup started, and Major Luang Hansonggram. Korat was

chosen to be the strong hold of the counter-coup because the

instigators of the counter-coup were there: besides Prince Baworadet

was once the commander of the Korat troops before he became Minister

72 Rengronachai Khun, "A Letter from Khun Rengronachai to Praya Pahon from Qiadinh, Indochina, February 19, 1933" in Chaianan Samudwanit Kana Ras kap Kabot Baworadet (The People's Party and the Baworadet Rebellion) (Bangkok: Aksorn Sampan Press, 1973), pp. 29-30.

^ \ u a n g Homeranron, Mua Kapachao Ko Kan Kabot (Bangkok: 1950) 47

of War in 1930-31.

On October 11, 1933, the troops from Korat under the leadership

of Prince Baworadet began their march on Bangkok. The army was joined

by garrisons from Saraburi and Ayudhya. On the next day, the counter­

coup successfully seized the airport at Don Muang and guarded the

suburbs of Bangkok. An ultimatum signed by Praya Srisith field commander of the counter-coup was sent to the Government demanding its resignation within an hour. Failing to do so, the rebel troops would overrun Bangkok and seize the administration by force.^

At first, the government panicked at the rapid movement of the counter-coup. It was not only that the Air Force at Don Muang was in the hands of the rebels but the Navy had decided to be neutral in the fight. Rear Admiral Praya Wichit Cholthi, the Commander in Chief of the Navy, had ordered all battleships to withdraw from Bangkok. Even more depressing was the fact that within the clique of the leaders itself, there was no unity. Colonel Praya Song and Lieutenant Colonel

Pra Prasas left the country a few days before the civil war got started. The purpose of the trip was a study tour. Praya Song probably disliked the idea that Luang Pibul was now in power while he was out. In Colombo, Ceylon, they received a telegram from Praya

Pahon asking them to return to the country to help suppress the rebellion. Praya Song replied: "This is a small matter and you can manage it."7** This reply was interpreted as a sarcastic remark from

75BTWM, October 13, 1933. 76 Thailand, Government, Kham Pipaksa S a m Pises, 2482 Ruang Kabot (Special Court's Decision on the Insurrection of B.E. 2482) (Bangkok: Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 28. 48

Praya Song's enemies. It was disclosed by Nai Thawee much later that

Praya Song probably meant it that way. He knew that the counter-coup

army did not have enough ammunition to fight for a long time. It was

he who shortly after the 1932 Coup called back the ammunition from the

garrisons in the provinces, on the ground that they were old and had to be replaced. In this way the bulk of the ammunition was in Bangkok.

Prince Baworadet had some ammunition for the guns and pistols, but almost nothing for the cannon. The bombs he possessed were largely practice-bombs.^

Praya Song's decision not to return was undoubtedly another of his miscalculated moves as it gave Pibul a great chance to exert himself as the great military leader. Pibul was appointed field commander of the government troops with Colonel Pra Sithi Ruangdejpol, Praya Song's close friend, as the Commander of the Artillery.

The ultimatum expired without any military action taken on

either side. Prince Baworadet's tactic was to use a large number of

soldiers to scare the government into yielding. He did not want it to be a real civil war. Luang Pibul, however, had another idea: he had

to show his ability as a leader.

On the next day a second ultimatum was sent by the Prince demanding that the government comply with the following conditions:

1. The Government should do everything to make Siam a country under the rule of Constitutional Monarchy forever. The reason behind

this demand stemmed from the fact that Nai Tawat Ritdet, a leader of

^Ray, Thai Politics, p. 73. 49

the organized streetcar workers was known to be prepared to sue King

Prajadhipok on a libel charge. This was the result of the King's criticism of Pridi's economic plan. Pridi said that the weakness of capitalism can be seen from a strike organized by the streetcar workers. The King argued that the strike was not the result of a real dissatisfaction on the part of the workers, but rather the agitation of the leaders. These leaders, wrote the King, wanted to create the workers' union as well as to justify the salaries and positions given to them. A leader of the streetcar worker was enraged. He went to consult lawyers for a libel charge against the King. As this became known to the public, the counter-coup group used it as one of the weaknesses of the government to defend the King.

2. The Government should strictly observe the Constitution.

Appointment and dismissal of the cabinet members should be made by majority votes without having to rely on force as had been done in the past. Therefore the Government must allow political parties within the limits of law to operate.

3. Government officials either civilians or armed forces should refrain from active politics except those whose duties are directly involved.

The above statement would not deprive the government officials from believing in any political system, operating under the limits of law. It is prohibited, however, to use force or position to support or to propagandize one's own political belief directly or indirectly.

4. Promotions of Government officials should be based on ability and experience rather than on political considerations. 50

5. The King should be given real power to select second

category members of the national Assembly.

6. Administration of the Army must be done according to the

strategic High Command. There should be no concentration of armed

forces in any particular region, the modern and powerful weapons

should be distributed equally among various armed units.

Judging from the tone of the second ultimatum, this was a

backdown from the original demand to the extent that the Government

could actually stay in office if they agreed to accept the demands.

The fact was that the rebels had hoped for the support of the

garrisons inside and outside Bangkok. To their disappointment, no

single army unit in Bangkok revolted and the provincial garrisons besides those mentioned before still showed their loyalty to the

Government. The troops from Nakorn Sawan led by Major Praya Sena

Songgram were rebuffed from the Lopburi garrison which was still loyal

to the Government. Praya Sena had to flee and later on came to join the main counter-coup troop at Don Muang with empty hands.

Thus by October 1933, the Government had regained their confidence. Thereafter, the ultimatum was rejected. Instead of a general pardon the government offered a large sum of money as a reward for capturing the prominent leaders - 10,000 bahts for the capture of Prince Baworadet and 5,000 baht for Praya Srisith, Praya

78 Sena and Praya Thep Songkram.

^ The Bangkok Times, October 13, 1933. 51

In the meantime, the Government made an appeal for popular

support, emphasizing that the counter-coup had acted against the King's

wish and Praya Pahon was the head of the legitimate Government. It

was reported that a great number of volunteers showed up including 79 students, boy scouts and workers.

On the same day, Luang Pibul as the field commander of the

mixed unit launched an all out attack on the counter-coup troops. To

him they were enemies against his survival. It was revealed that while

the fighting was going on,Pra Sithi Ruengdejpol, the Commander of the

Infantry who did not want to shed more Thai blood, tried to stop the

government troops from being sent to the battle front. Enraged by Pra

Sithi's action Luang Pibul drew out his pistol to shoot Pra Sithi on

the spot. After the incident, Pra Sithi was transferred to a non­

combat duty.

The decisive battle occurred around the area between Bang Sue

and Bang Khen. On October 16, most of the rebel artillery and guns

were destroyed. They had to retreat to Korat which was their last

stronghold. The Government sent forces led by Major Luang Wira Yotha

up to Korat. There Praya Srisith was killed in combat and the fate of

Prince Baworadet was sealed. He fled from his men and his country into

Indochina.

The Aftermath of the Baworadet Rebellion

Two important developments in Thai internal politics after the

Baworadet rebellion were the passing of two laws on October 30, 1933.

^The Bangkok Times, October 24, 1933. The first law originated from the proposal of Praya Pramuen Wichapoon

at the 10th regular session of the National Assembly (August 3, 1933).

In his proposal, Praya Pramuen wanted to have the National Assembly

decide whether or not Praya Mano's prorogation of the Assembly was

rightful. If it were wrong, then a new law should be promulgated to 80 prevent future recurrence. A committee of nine was set up to study

the problem. At the 15th meeting, another proposal came up by Luang

Wichit Wadhakan, asking the Assembly to find a way to prevent any 81 violation of the constitution. This time a committee of nine, with

Luang Pradit as the Chairman, was set up and the law to preserve and

protect the constitution was promulgated as a result of the discussion.

The key article was Article three which read:

"Whoever does any action which is hostile to the public or which causes the public to become less con­ fident or become fearful toward the constitutional system of Siam, whether the said action will be a getting together or an agreement or a preparation is considered against the law. The penalty for such action is imprisonment from three to twenty years or a fine of 500 baht to 5,000 baht, or both. ^

Eight persons were judged guilty according to this article and were sent to the provinces of Tak and Mai Hong Son on October 6, 1944 by the order of Luang Pradit as Minister of Interior.

Another law which was passed was the law to set up a Special

Court to decide the fate of the rebels. A large number of prisoners

80 Siam, Minutes of the National Assembly, 10th regular session, August 3, 1933, p. 310. 81 Slam, Minutes of the National Assembly, 15th regular session, August 24, 1933, p. 412. ^Prachachart, October 9, 1934. 53

were captured by the Government. Among these were Rear Admiral Praya

Winai Soonthorn, Rear Admiral Praya Wichit Cholthi, Commander-in-chief

of the Navy. They were accused of conspiracy because they pledged a

neutral stand during the fighting. In fact Praya Racha Wangsan, ex-

Minister of Defence was among the neutralists. He was not touched

because he was the brother of Luang Sinthu, a good friend of Luang

Pibul and one of the original Vanguards of the People's Party. Praya

Wichit was stripped of his rank and Praya Winai was put into prison

for a short term.

The initiative to set up the Special Court came from Praya Pahon,

the Prime Minister. According to the Minutes of the Meeting, the

Premier suggested that if the Court was set up, the prisoners would not

have to be detained too long. The Court would use the same proceedings as the Military Court set up under a Martial Law. As things turned out,

the defendants in the Military Court did not have the right to hire a

lawyer. They could not ask those who were under the court jurisdiction

to help them. This in effect meant that the defendant could only ask

a friend who was also a defendant to help prepare his case. Praya

Winai once practiced law so he was a great help in the trials. On the

other hand, the Government could choose anyone to become the

Prosecuting Attorney. However, at the trial, there would be five

judges sitting at the same time. Praya Prida Narubet was the only member who protested the adoption of this procedure. Being a prominent

lawyer himself Praya Prida pleaded that at least the Government should 83 give the defendants the same right to defend themselves. The

^Siam, Minutes of the National Assembly, 23r<* Regular Session, November 2, 1933. 54

majority disagreed with him, most of them including Pridi, thought

that the Special Court was the most appropriate means to deal with the 84 rebels.

Ten months after the suppression of the Baworadet counter-coup,

another attempt to overthrow the government was discovered by the

police. Sixteen persons were arrested and put on trial. Because at

that time, the Act to Protect the Constitution was in operation, the 85 leader, Praya Winai Soonthorn was sent into exile for seven years

while five persons were sent to be detained in a sparcely habitated

area in the north.

Pridi was Cleared of Communistic Charges

A commission was set up with Prince Wan as Chairman to inves­

tigate Pridi's economic plan. There were two foreign experts included:

Sir Robert Holland and Mr. R.C. Guyon. The commission met several

times and Pridi was invited to attend. On February 27, 1934, the

commission resolved unanimously that Pridi was clear of the stigma of

communism. rd At the National Assembly meeting, 23 session, November 2, 1933,

Pridi made a vow that he would never follow the communistic practices.

The Chairman of the Assembly then asked the members to raise their hands

if they had confidence in Pridi. All hands were raised promptly.

The Abdication of King Praiadhipok

When he ascended the throne in November 1925, King Prajadhipok

84Ibid.

Qt See previous section on Praya Winai. 55

had never thought that one day he would be crowned King of Siam. Being

educated as a soldier, the King thought of himself as unfit for the

job. Contrary to his brother, Rama VI who used to spend lavishly, King

Frajadhipok had aimed at strict economy from the start. To help him

in his decisions, the King set up a Supreme Council which consisted of

his closest relatives. No commoner, regardless of his ability or

experience, was ever appointed. Originally the Council was designed to

assist the King in supervising his cabinet of ministers; but gradually

some of the new councillors were themselves holding ministerial port­

folios. Thus it was attacked as an inner cabinet exclusively made up

of Princes.

The King’s physical health was also very delicate. Four years

after his reign, the King discovered that he might go blind. He was

suffering from cataracts in both eyes and one was ripe for operation.

This led to his first trip to the U.S. where he had his operation.

There in the States the King hinted for the first time that he was contemplating giving the Siamese their first constitution.

Not too long after his return home, the King faced the grave

result of the economic depression. The clique that was in possession

of remunerative offices was discredited and had to be ousted.

Afterwards came the coup and the constitution which the King did not

really approve of but he was weak and agreed to promulgate the consti­

tution as it was. It would be recalled that the constitution vested

in the monarch every kind of formal authority including the right to

convene or close down the National Assembly according to the advice of

the President of the Council. But when the King actually prorogued 56

the Assembly, the result was disastrous as it led to another coup which alienated the King from the Government. The King accused Praya 86 Mano of being singularly ignorant of popular feeling. He further

added that Praya Mano refused to employ propaganda to explain his aims and policy and he disregarded warnings as to the dangers which 87 threatened his administration. The King said that Praya Mano con- 88 suited him but did not take his advice.

The final strain came from the Baworadet counter-rebellion.

The King blaimed the failure on Prince Baworadet. He said:

"No movement which had for its apparent objective the restoration of the old regime could possibly succeed. It was fordoomed to failure and for that reason 1 was strongly opposed to Prince Baworadet or any member of the princely order heading such a movement."

The King further explained his position as follows:

"My own part was one of great difficulty. 1 was bitterly reproached for not having come to Bangkok and place myself at the head of the so-called royalist party. What good would that have done? 1 should have been a pawn in the hands of any party that could control my movements. 1 should have descended into the arena of politics. I might have imperilled the existence of the monarchy. My decision to go to Singora was taken at a moment's notice. I think events have proved it right, but it has been a most trying and wearing time. I have been reproached on all sides, both for what I have done and for what 1 have not done. In

88Public Record Office, F.O. 371, 18206 File 9705, Notes on Sir Holland's Audience with his Majesty the King of Siam.

87Ibid

88Ibid

89Ibid 57

England they say the King can do no wrong. In Siam it appears he can do nothing right."®®

What the King resented most was that when he came back from

Singora (Songkla), he was given twelve hours in which to agree to the

appointment of the nominated members of the People's Assembly. In

short there seemed to be many things that the King disliked but he

could neither change nor could he support the Government wholeheartedly.

The burden of the situation led to his second trip abroad for his second

operation.

After his departure to stay in England, his concealed conflict

with the Government came into open dispute.

During the period of His Majesty's stay abroad for the treatment

of his eyes, H.R.H. Prince Narisra was acting as the Regent. The

Government was in regular communication with the King until the Govern­

ment submitted the draft of an Act amending the Penal Code, the draft

of an Act amending the Penal Procedure, and the draft of an Act amending

the Penal Code of the Army. All of these three drafts had been approved

by the Assembly but they needed the King's signature before they could

be promulgated as law. The King was not satisfied with the principles

involved in some particulars and used his veto power to return the draft to the National Assembly. The Assembly stood by its former

resolution. The King sent the draft back for the second time.

In the meantime, it was learned that the King wanted to abdicate.

The Government then arranged for a mission consisting of Chao Praya 58

Sridharma Dhibes, President of the Assembly and Lieutenant Commander

Luang Dhamrong Nava Svasti, R.S.N. the Secretary General to the State

Council, to proceed to England in order to seek an audience with the

King and to persuade him to return to Siam. The King thus presented

his demands as summarized:

1. The King did not think that the Coup had brought about a

real 'Democratic Government'. Most of all he objected to the second

category members who would be in power for at least ten years. If there

is an absolute necessity to have them they should meet special

qualifications such as that they should be thirty-five years of age

and have a lot of experience in public affairs. They may be elected by

the public officials of sanyabatr rank who formed the intelligentsia

of Siam. What His Majesty wanted to see was that the second category members were not elected by the Government. According to the King the

people did not mind an absolute King: they were used to the system.

But they do object to a body of men holding absolute powers. They were

kept quiet through the fear of tanks and machine guns.

2. The King's Veto Power. The House can by a simple majority, override the King's veto. His Majesty said that he would use the power only when the law affected the people, thus the veto was not used in order to safeguard the people. Where the law is vetoed by the Crown, a three fourths majority should be required to override that veto or else the question might be made the subject of a plebiscite. A simple majority was not fair as the House consisted of two categories of equal members: one single vote could override the King's veto easily.

3. Political Liberty. His Majesty desired that the 59

Constitution be respected by action, not merely by word of mouth.

There should be (a) freedom of speech and liberty of the press;

(b) liberty to hold a meeting and to form political parties.

The King held the above opinion because he had learned that newspapers were stopped merely for criticizing the Government. Besides, the King objected to the soldiers on active service being allowed to join political parties.

4. The Law for the Protection of the Constitution. This Law should be repealed since it violated the principle of personal freedom.

Trial not by a Court of Law but by an executive committee was an oppression.

5. Amnesty. A general amnesty would help towards internal tranquility. Thus, all political prisoners should be dealt with as follows:

(a) Those sentenced to death should be placed under "restricted residence for ten years."

(b) Those sentenced to ten years should be placed under

"residence for five years."

(c) All others should be pardoned.

6. Official Pensions. All officials who have been dismissed on suspicion or for criticizing the Government should be given pensions or gratuities.

7. Suspected Officials. There should be no more prosecutions or arrests.

8. Palace Guards. The King wanted to have a written insurance

from the Government that the Palace Guard would not be reduced below 60

its present strength except at the King's request. To insure his

safety the guards were to be armed in the same manner as the other

infantry units.

If the Government and the Assembly agree to the said conditions

the King would return. The King's demands was dated December 26, 1934.

The Government sent a reply to His Majesty the King on January

9, 1935 (B.E. 2477).

1. The method of appointing the second category members was,

according to Praya Mano, fully approved by the King. Out of a total

of 78 only 47 were promoters of the Coup.

2. The question on three fourth majority concerned the House not the Government. But the Constitution must be revered by all. It

should not therefore be amended.

3. Full liberty already existed in Siam.

4. The Law for the Protection of the Constitution was lenient.

Abolition of the law will involve the setting up of special courts or court-martials as in foreign countries.

5. The Government was prepared to consider the question of an amnesty.

6. All officials who had been retired from the service were

given pensions or gratuities according to law.

7. Suspected officials were no longer prosecuted but where proceedings had been instituted, they must be carried on to a finish.

8. The question of the Palace Guard was a matter which con­ cerned the budget.

The King replied again on January 16 and explained his objections 61

one by one. This time the Government replied to His Majesty in the

House, but did not send the reply to him. Finally the House voted

unanimously to pass the issue. With this kind of attitude, the King

decided to abdicate (see Appendix I) on March 2, 1935.

The Assembly of the People's Representatives, in its meeting

33/2477 held on Wednesday and Thursday, the 6th and 7th of March 1935

acknowledged the abdication of His Majesty. Chao Praya Vorapongpipat,

Minister of the Palace, announced that in accordance with Section nine

of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Siam and according to the Royal

House Law Section eight and Section nine dealing with Succession, B.E.

2467 Prince Ananda Mahidol was the first on the list of succession.

The Assembly passed a resolution on the 7th of March B.E. 2477

approving the invitation to H.H. Prince Ananda Mahidol to take the

Throne, according to Section nine of the Constitution.

Some of the opinions in the memorable session should be heard. First Luang Dhamrong Nava Svasti, the Secretary General who went to see the King, told the Assembly of his visit to Prince Ananda as follows:

"...because he was only ten years old, he could not say anything with substance. His physique is a bit below standard, that is, he is small for his age, but he does not have tuberculosis or other disease. He has a smaller and narrower chest than he should. I talked to him about becoming a King and he said that he did not want to be one. He gave six or seven reasons which I beg not to tell here."91

The Royal House Law B.E. 2467, Article ten said:

"Any Prince who will succeed to the throne should be one whom the public could fully respect and rely upon wholeheartedly. Therefore any Prince whose

^Siam, Minutes of the National Assembly, 33r(* Session, March 6 and 7, 1935, p. 2348. 62

behavior the public found objectionable should be out of the succession line. This would cut down the ^ anxiety of the Royal Family and the people as a whole."

Nai Tai Panikabutr representative of Bangkok said:

"The main point rests with the Assembly...I think having a bov king at this moment is like a boat without a rudder... * if we have a minor king we need a regent who will be a king instead."9^

Later on Luang Dhamrong told the Assembly that number seventeen

on the list of succession, H.H. Prince Aditaya Dibbyaaba came to see him. His Highness expressed his wish clearly that even if the Assembly 95 suggested his name as the future king he could not accept it.

The representatives of Patalung and Lampang supported the

Royal House Law. The former said that there could be many regents.

The representative of Roi-et said that the Assembly should not accept 96 a Prince who was under age. Finally there was a vote and the majority of 127 to 2 voted for H.H. Prince Ananda Mahidol as the King of Siam.

The Council of Regency composed of three members. The President was H.R.H. Prince Anuvatana Chaturonta, who was a son of Somdej Krom

Prah Chakrabarti, a full brother of King Chulalongkorn. Prince

Anuvatana was born a Mom Chao but after the death of his father he became a Prah Ong Chao, then towards the end of King Chulalongkorn's

93 Ibid., p. 2352. 94 Ibid., p. 2354.

95Ibid.. p. 2355. 96Ibid. 40

63

reign he was made a Royal Highness, and during King Vajiravudh's

reign he became Krom Muen. He was trained for the Army, and when the

Princess of Petchaburi went to Europe in 1922, he accompanied her.

He stayed some time abroad, mostly in England, before returning to Siam.

The second member of the Royal Family on the Council of

Regency was H.H. Prince Aditya Dibayaabha, eldest son of the late

Prince of Chumporn and Mom Chao Dhiba Sampan. Prince Aditya was born

Mom Chao and was raised to Prah Ong Chao the year his mother died. The

Prince was educated in England. He was a private secretary to King

Vajiravudh. Prince Aditya was governor of Nakon Pathorn at the time of the first coup.

Chao Praya Yomaraj, the third member in the Council of Regency was in his early seventies. He had served at the Court of St. James, heading a delegation to receive relics of Buddha from the government of India. Later he rose from a High Commissionership to be the

Minister of Interior before he went on pension. Chao Praya Yomaraj was made a Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of The British

Empire.

The young King was the middle of the three children of the late

H.R.H. Prince Mahidol of Songkla and Mom Sangvalya, a graduate nurse from the late Queen Mother's Midwifery School at Siriraj. Following graduation, Mom Sangvalya was chosen by H.R.H. Prince Jainad and sent to America with two other graduates. Her marriage to H.R.H. Prince

Mahidol was celebrated quietly by King Vajiravudh in B.E. 2463. Soon afterwards Prince and Princess Mahidol returned to America. All the children were born outside of Siam. 64

Following the long illness and death of the Prince and his

cremation in 1930, Mom Sangvalya Mahidol na Ayudhya and her family

left for Europe and up to the time of succession resided in

Switzerland.

At the time of the announcement, King Ananda was ten years old.

Conclusion: A Legitimacy Crisis?

The main purpose of the Coup of 1932 was to modernize the country along Western lines. However, modernization calls for more than just the building of state authority and the weakening of parochial bonds.

It requires a substantial rise of the total level of political participation of power in the system.

It is most common to hear that the aim of a coup or a revolution or a political development was to bring about democracy.

This formulation sounds appealing but obliges one to clarify the meaning of 'democracy'. The Promoters defined it according to the famous words of Abraham Lincoln. But we can safely say that democracy is the op­ posite of autocracy which is a social system whereby power is highly centralized and unilateral. According to the Permanent Constitution of 1932, Pridi who drew it up had in mind the British System, the supreme power of the land resting with the people through the National

Assembly. To say the least, the British and the Siamese situations were vastly different. The British had gone through a long experience in order to arrive where they were while the Siamese adopted the

British form of democracy without any appropriate preparation. The fact that the National Assembly could be prorogued easily showed that the power did not rest with the people but with the new ruling 65

group who came to power as a result of the Coup. Then when the military found out that they could survive even without the help of the civilians, they made another coup to be the sole master of the system.

The downfall of the monarchy and the creation of a 'democratic' form of government involved the concept of legitimacy, again since legitimacy is an attribute of the political system. It is associated particularly with the performance of the governmental structure and it is fundamental in determining the capacity of the system. In the

Siamese case we are dealing with a legitimacy crisis which arises from a change in the fundamental structure or character of a govern­ ment, a change in the source from which it claims to derive its ultimate authority, or a change in the ideals it professes to represent. Basic to a legitimacy crisis is a change in the way in 97 which government authority is conceived or itself acts.

Lucian Pye identified four principal causes or sources of legitimacy crises. First, there is the breakdown of governmental institutions that occurs because of conflicting or inadequate bases for claiming authority in the society. Second, governmental structures may disintegrate because there is excessive and

uninstitutionalized competition for power. Third, national leaders

and the governmental divisions of authority may collapse because

the justification for their ideological or pragnatic claims to

97 Lucien Pye, et. al. Crisis and Sequences in Political Develop' ment (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 136. authority have been based on unacceptable readings of history or faulty predictions of future developments. Finally, and probably most basically, a legitimacy crisis may arise because people have been inappropriately socialized and their feelings about authority are not 98 functional for the efforts of the current leaders.

The development considered here seemed to fall in partly with

Pye's causes of legitimacy crisis. First there was a breakdown of the absolute monarchy because the promoters thought that the King was too weak and some of his relatives were inefficient. Then after the coup there was a competition for power between the factions which exacerbated by the extreme ideas of Pridi. The reader could see that the new elites split over the economic plan, Praya Song turned to side with the aristocrats and the royalists. With the departure of Pridi,the confidence of the young promoters lessened. Throughout this time the King, who was unaccustomed to being a real figure head,passed his judgements on the economic plan with the help of

Praya Mano. Each group tried hard to undermine the other. It might be a blessing for the Siamese case that the public themselves did not know or understand politics enough to involve themselves in the

"Bangkok politics." They have been improperly educated and though they adored their king they did not know what was happening tohhim.

The problem of legitimacy was the concern of the elites in Bangkok more than anywhere else.

Once Praya Pahon, the senior leader of the Coup group became 67 the President of the State Council, he was weak and incapable of controlling the young faction of the military group under Pibul. The deliberate actions taken by Pibul and Luang Suphachalasai to send out letters of warning to different people without the knowledge of Praya

Pahon showed their lack of confidence in him. It also showed that the younger group aimed at suppression of their opponents without wanting to reconcile which was probably what Praya Pahon wanted to do.

King Prajadhipok was the victim of the whole episode.

Being attacked by both the royalists and the educated new elites in

Bangkok, the King was torn between trying to be nice and trying to be efficient as a leader. In any case, the institution of the kingship was the symbol of unity. It was the only legitimate institution which people recognized. Kingship and Siam seemed to go together and they have worked well in the past. The promoters knew this fact; therefore the institution had to stay. The fact that they agreed on

King Ananda, a ten year old boy as the next king seemed to say that they were loyal to an institution rather than to a particular person.

The issue of legitimacy grew more acute once the king finally abdicated. The promoters were left to compete among them­ selves without having a 'scapegoat'. It was a cannon knowledge among the new elites that Praya Pahon did not want to take the responsibility because he wanted power. He was actually their choice of leader, a leader who depended on Pridi as the brain and Pibul as the muscle. The reader will see next that between the two, one will become the next leader. CHAPTER II

THE RISE TO POWER OF LUANG PIBUL

In this chapter, we are looking at a transition period between absolute monarchy and leadership by commoners. Praya Pahon, the Prime Minister, was a weak leader but a good man. Younger and stronger men grasped leadership from him. The three contenders were

Pridi, Pibul and Praya Song. It is a well known fact that Pibul

"came out on top" as Premier from 1938-1944. After his fall in 1944, he was put in prison as a war criminal, but he came back to power again in 1947 and remained there for another seven years. It is worthwhile to look behind his success to see what kinds of techniques he used to win over his potential rivals, a military man, Praya Song and a civilian, Luang Pradit. In particular, we should see how he attempted to create an air of legitimacy. A general background of internal politics is pertinent in tracing

Pibul's acquisition of power. 99 With the advent of King Ananda in 1935 , the Cabinet did not resign but created a precedent for itself by remaining in office after it had applied for, and obtained, a vote of confidence from

the People's Assembly. A reconstruction of the government was,

however, effected when the Assembly met later, in the month of

August, Praya Pahon remained in charge as Premier, but a small

See about King Ananda on pages 61-62. 68 69

number of changes were made. Praya Manavaraj Sevi, the Minister of

Finance, resigned his portfolio; Chao Praya Vorabongse Bidhahna

likewise resigned from the post of Minister of the Royal Household

and the Department was thereupon reduced supposedly for the sake of

economy, to the status of a "Dhabuang" or under secretariat under

the control of the Premier. Actually it was probably an attempt to

undermine the importance of protocol, ceremony, and court tradition,

as well as eliminating a good number of royalist officials employed

within it. At the same time there were two more resignations from

the State Councillors. The first was from Luang Narubesr Manit

while the second one came from Pra Siddhi Ruengdejpol.The

former had involved himself, in his capacity as Director General of

the Excise Department, in an opium scandal while the latter was a

friend of Colonel Praya Song and he was presumably discarded on that

account, if he did not prefer to go on his own initiative. Praya

Pahon himself relinquished the portfolio of Affairs and took over

that of Finance, a subject about which he was admittedly so ignorant

that an Assistant Minister was appointed to help him. Prah Sarasas

Prabandh, the Minister of Public Instruction was transferred to the

Minister of Agriculture, and was succeeded in his old department by

Luang Sindhu Songgramjai, the Chief of the Naval General Staff who

had not relinquished his position in the Navy. Praya Srisena

assumed the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs. The following

persons were added to the State Council without portfolio being

* ^ S e e about Pra Siddhi Ruengdejpol on pages 50-51. 70

assigned to them: Colonel Praya Abhai Songgram (Chief of the General

Staff of the Army); Colonel of Police Luang Aduldej Charas (Deputy

Director of the Police); Captain Praya Vicharn Chakrakij, R.S.N.

(Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Navy); Luang Kovid Abhaiwongse (a

nominated member of the Assembly); Lieutenant Colonel Luang Jamman

Yudhasilp (a nominated member of the Assembly); Luang Nath Nethitada

(an elected member of the Assembly). The first three names were

Pibul's friends and it seemed that he had succeeded in bringing his

friends into the Council to strengthen his position.

The Assembly

In 1935, the People's Assembly was still half nominated.

The deputies, especially those belonging to the elected category, continued to demonstrate their lack of knowledge and experience in the quality of their discussion. Nevertheless, quite a few of the

Assemblymen began to develop parliamentary techniques and gifts for

speaking. They did not lack courage to criticize the Government and

even to assail individual members. When the Cabinet of August 1935

asked for a vote of confidence, the resolution was passed but not without difficulty. Representatives from Ubol, Nai Liang Jayakan,

Nai Tongin Bhuribadhana, the representatives from Nakon Sridhamaraj

Nai Sanit Charoenrat and the representatives from Nakon Sawan, Nai

Yai Sawitchart in particular wanted to know why a 'Taharn' (Soldier) was appointed as Minister of Public Instruction and why the

government found it necessary to appoint more State Councillors to replace the four who had resigned.

In the ensuing month af October there was a debate in the

House which was tantamount to a resolution of no confidence in the

administration. When the votes were counted, it was found that the

Government had secured a majority of only eight votes. The

significance of this narrow margin should not, however, be exag­

gerated. From the total number of 156, 132 were presented at the meeting and only 48 of these actually voted. The Government was

thus not in real danger at all. One can safely say that the State

Council had dominated the Assembly just as it dominated the bureaucracy. Siamese tradition of patronage and subservience to superiors still predominated in Siamese politics as in the old days of the absolute monarchy.

In spite of its democratic facade, the Bahol regime just

like the Mano Government, did not permit popular government. There

were no political parties and no united opposition group because the

Government was unwilling to tolerate serious resistance to its

policies. Therefore, any attempt on the part of the Deputies to

group themselves would be actively discouraged by the Government in

power. This was the cause of individualism in Thai politics up to

the present days where the people vote for a person more than a

political party.

To revert to the question of party government, such a

system is hardly possible without a free press. The public press in

10IBTWM, August 5, 1935. 72

Siam was continuously censored from the time Praya Mano's Government.

The Law which was in effect on September 29, 1932 was still in use

in 1935 and later on.

As one can see, the continuance in power of Praya Pahon was

not due to the following out of any consecutive line of policy by

himself or by his colleagues. It was due to the nature of the

Cabinet itself. There was a Left Wing headed by Luang Pradit which

favored the adoption of a variety of advanced systems of local

government in the still primitive districts of the interior. But

the influence of this Left Wing was neutralized by the existence of

a Right Wing under Luang Pibul, who repudiated the doctrines of

socialism altogether and concentrated on strengthening the armed

forces of the Kingdom. A government made up of elements so dis­

parate as this could not hope to come before the country with a

definite and convincing program, and it was the chief merit of Praya

Pahon that he had succeeded in keeping these elements together.

Personalities of the Leaders

In the la.tter half of 1934, Sir Josiah Crosby was appointed

British Minister to Siam. It was his second assignment as he was in

Siam for the first time in 1904 as a student interpreter. Except for

eleven years which he served as Consul General in Batavia, the rest

of his twenty-nine years were spent in Siam. Due to his personal

aquaintance with many of the leading personalities and his long

term assignment to the country it seems appropriate to quote his

impressions on the Pahon regime. Despite his arrogance, there is

some value in examining how Crosby contrasts the three major 73 contenders for Thai leadership in 1934.

Referring to Praya Pahon, Crosby had this to say:

"... kindly, obese, slovenely in his attire and slow witted to the point of stupidity, it seems incredible that he should have been in himself the successful instigator of one revolution and the no less effective agent for supporting another... This is not to say that Praya Pahon wields no influence over his fellow countrymen, on the contrary, the majority of them both like and trust him. His enemies may and do call him a 'buffalo' but he is something more than that. 1 take him to ge a good-natured, simple soul, the type of the 'bon papa', in fact, with a disarming sense of loyalty that keeps him faithful at one and the same time to his monarch and to that monarch's principal opponent, the Councillor of State for the Interior (meaning Pridi)... He is in reality lacking in those qualities which are a requisite for the exercise of genuine leadership."102

The following month, Crosby met Luang Pridi, the State

Councillor for the Interior. He wrote this comment:

"A perusal of Luang Pridi's well known program of social and economic action...already warned me that I could not expect to find an intellectual giant in the man who is regarded as having been the chief among the spiritual authors of the revolution of June 1932. But I did at least look forward to meeting a man of maTked character with a personality sufficiently magnetic to account for the extraordinary influence which he is said to wield over young Siam - or at any rate over that portion of it which can lay any claim to being educated. As a matter of fact I met with nothing of the kind. Luang Pridi turned out to be a youngish Siamese of rather insignificant appearance with a strong dash of Chinese blood in his vein and little more than an affable address to recommend him at the first encounter... He was very cordial during our talk which lasted

102 F.O. 371, File 18206, September 24, 1934. Crosby to Sir John Simon, Superintending Under-Secretary of State. 74

over half an hour... He went on to speak of his schemes for improving the economic condition of the people. They must learn thrift, he declared; the paddy cultivator was nearly always complaining «of hard times, not as a rule, because nature had failed to provide him with an adequate crop, but because he was in the habit of squandering his earnings as soon as he came by them... But Luang Pridi was sanguine enough to believe that such defects and prejudices in the make-up of his fellow countrymen could be corrected without too great difficulty. He expressed himself with the same optimism, and with the same failure to appreciate the practical obstacles in the path of the social reformer, as are to be discerned in his program of action. The enthusiastic schoolboy mentality, in short, was distinctly in evidence, as also, I think, was a capacity for hard work, which, in a Siamese, must be quite exceptional. But, when every allowance has been made for this virtue, as well as for a certain charm of manner and, presumably some faculty for administrative organization when all allowances have been made, one is still unable to detect in Luang Pridi the signs of that quality of leadership which is a requisite for the effective conduct of any Government, let alone a revolutionary one, and for which, as you are aware, I have been looking in vain among those who are in charge of the destinies of Siam today."103

Two months later Crosby met Pibul. It was Pibul's assumption of Minister of Defence which gave Crosby a good excuse for wanting to see him. Crosby wrote to Sir John Simon, Superintending Under

Secretary of State:

"He (Pibul) proved to be a charming little man. Still young, of slight build and refined almost effeminate in appearance, he impressed me particularly by his perfect manners...I could detect in Luang Pibul, notwithstanding the favorable impression he made upon me, no sighs whatever of the autocrat or of the ruthless man of action. Debonair, even diffident, and, in

103F.O. 371, Volume 18204, File 9718, Doc. no. F6274/21/40 October 22, 1934. Crosby to Sir John Simon. 75

externals at least, a gentleman. I imagine that his hold over his fellow officers must be due as much as anything to his agreeable manner. As a strong ruler, or as the savior of his country, I cannot conceive him, he appears, rather, to fit perfectly with his colleagues into the picture which has endeavored to draw in previous dispatches."

Absence from the reports in 1934 was Praya Song Suradet who was rarely in the capitol. From the report of Major H.W.M. Stewart

O.B.E., M.C., in the Military Attache of the British Legation his impression of Praya Song was as follows:

"He is of medium height, smart, well set up, clean looking, and in appearance not unlike Noel Coward, with keen intelligent eyes. He is one of the few Siamese officers I have met who seemed not to suffer from an inferiority complex as far as soldiering is concerned, and to all appearance he is possessed of a good and quick brain. He was thorough in all he did, which I attributed to his German training."105

Unfortunately the Major did not talk to Praya Song about politics and Praya Song did not want to volunteer his opinion.

If we admit that the clique was drifting as Crosby had said, the picture was more complicated because firstoof all the military

itself was not monolithic. Behind Praya Pahon was Luang Pibul but

the shadow of Praya Song was there even though he seemed to take no

interest in politics. Secondly, each leading personality had a

group of followers who tried to push their leader forward so that

they themselves would be in power.

104 F.O. 371, Volume 18207, File 9718, Doc. no. F6886/21/40 November 19, 1934. Crosby to Sir John Simon.

105F.O. 371, Report from Major H.W.M. Stewart to F.O. March 25, 1937. 76

Pibul's Means of Gaining Power

1. Charismatic Trait

The author feels that Pibul's rise to power was due, in part, to his charisma. This particular word will be defined as a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with super natural, superhuman or at least specially exceptional qualities.

One nice quality about Pibul was that even though he was a key leader of the soldiers, people who met him could only see a nice gentleman. Prince Chula Chakrapong recounted the first time he met

Pibul:

"he is handsome; his manners are extremely smooth; he speaks slowly with a nice voice. All of these do dot fit the character of the tough leader..."107

Kukrit Pramoj, a famous Thai editor and the present Thai

Prime Minister, made one of the best comparisons between Pibul and

Pridi as follows:

"Those who love Pridi must admire his knowledge and his noble spirit but it would be better if they did not catch up with Pridi's every move. But, if they started to think that Pridi did not have as noble a spirit as they had anticipated, the admiration would fade away. There is nothing left for the personal tie. Thus Pridi has a lot of people admiring him and an equal number disliking him at the same time. M.R. Seni Pramoj is the same

Max Weber, On Charisma and Institutional Building, ed. by S.N. Eisenstadt (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 12.

^^Chula Chakrapongse, Prince, Kird Wang Parus (Born in Parus Palace), Vol. II, p. 406. 108 Kukrit's elder brother who was Thai Prime Minister in 1944-45. kind of person as Nai Pridi. He speaks the truth and speaks with authority which makes people admire and look up to him. But talking to Seni is like reading a book of Proverbs. No one has ever been infatuated by that kind of book or sacrificed his life for it. Those who love Pibul, on the other hand, even if they do not agree with him, a special tie still exists. By this way, Pibul occasionally but uncon­ sciously behaved like an autocrat. The reason why the Field Marshal (Pibul) was 'the leader' was because he had a special ability to make people who saw him feel that they were the leaders instead. It is strange that Pibul does not know that he has this ability."109

Besides his charm, during 1935-1938, Pibul escaped from three

attempts on his life. The first attempt took place in February 1935.

On that day, Pibul, as the Minister of Defence, went to preside over

a football match at the Pramane grounds. When the match was over the

Minister presented the trophy to the winners and took leave. It was

while he was stooping to put down his sword in the car that a man rushed up and fired three shots at him, two of which struck him in

the head and neck. In addition to the assailant, a former Colonel

of Police and two other persons were duly sentenced. The common

assumption was that the attack must be laid to the door of the

partisans of Pridi. Some persons went so far as to hint that Luang

Pradit (Pridi) may have countenanced the attempt in order to have

someone else succeed as Minister of Defence who was more amenable to his ideas. Even Pibul himself believed that it was an attempt

109 Kukrit Pramoj, Chompon Nai Tasana Kong Kapachao (The Field Marshal in My Opinion) ed. by Ngen Hongsladarom (Bangkok: Ratchadamnern Press, 1949), p. 9. 78

110 initiated by Pridi and his adherents.

The second attempt took place in the Minister's home on

November 9, 1938. While Pibul was getting dressed to go to a farewell party, his own gardener Nai Lee Bunta tried to shoot him. Several shots were fired at the Minister but all missed him. The man was then arrested and was sent to prison.

A month passed and another attempt occurred in his home on

December 9, 1938, a few days before Pibul became Prime Minister. This time he was poisoned. Present at the same luncheon table were his wife and his daughter, Commander Luang Yudhasas Kosol R.S.N.,

Squadron Leader Khun Rhonnapakas, and Captain Pao Sriyanon. Everyone was saved in time.

Besides these two attempts there were other attempts but all

of them were prevented in time. All these attempts on Pibul's life were testimony to his power as they showed that the enemies of the

Government felt he was the most important man to get out of the way.

According to the man in the street Pibul was a "phu mi bun" (a man with lots of merits) which made him escape the attempts miraculously.

With all his merits he should be awarded the most important position - that of the Prime Minister.'

2. Pibul and the Army

While Pibul and Pridi remained friendly toward each other,

each tried to attract his own followers. Charisma alone could not win

110 Testimony of Luang Adul Aduldetjaras given to the Committee set up to investigate War Criminals, December 13, 1945 (Unpublished document), p. 2. 79

Pibul the support of the mass: therefore every move had to be planned carefully. Pibul knew that the people admired a successful person, especially one who could become famous overnight. Since the

Coup of 1932, Pibul had never made any wrong move. He did not criticize Pridi's economic plan at all. As a good friend, he even went to see Pridi off when he was in exile. But Pibul knew that he could not compete with Pridi in the field of knowledge. His main interest was in the Army and his supporters were the military men and the only rival was Praya Song. Then his chance came with the

Bawaradej Coup. He proved that even without Praya Song he could squelch the rebellion easily. After the incident, Pibul was promoted to full Colonel.

Since 1932, Pibul had been a continual State Councillor without portfolio. On June 25, 1934 he resigned. Asked to explain the reason for his resignation, Pibul was reported to have said that he already had his hands more than sufficiently occupied. In any case, he considered that the time had come for the withdrawal of military elements from the government. Despite what Pibul said to the reporters, the reader will note that he contradicted himself not long afterwards.

Only two months later, in October 1934, the State Council resigned en bloc after a failure of the Assembly to ratify an agreement entered into by representatives of Siam to join the international rubber restriction scheme and to accept an annual quota of 15,000 tons of rubber for export. Sentiment of the Assembly was that the quota of Siam should be at least 25,000 tons, based on 80 productive capacity rather than actual exports in the preceeding years. But as Praya Pahon was the only person who could balance between the two factions, he was asked to come back again. In the new Cabinet, Luang Pibul succeeded Praya Pahon as State Councillor for the Defence. At that time he was thirty-seven years old.

Realizing full well that military support was essential to his future, Pibul played up the significance of the military to the masses. His first speech after assuming the new position was on

November 14, 1934. Pibul told his hearers that, of the four elements upon which the security and well being of the realm was based, namely, the Monarch, the People's Assembly, the State Council and forces of

Siam, only the last were at all abiding and permanent. The Monarch may be changed in accordance with the law of succession, the State

Council may be forced to resign, the Assembly may be abolished through the vote of no confidence, but the army, the navy, the air force and

the police, like Heaven itself, will never pass away. On the contrary, they will always be necessary for forming the power which

"preserves the peace and independence of the land, which assists to make easier the task of negotiating with foreign countries; which

ensures that all Thais will be treated with respect and consideration

by aliens.

Without the armed forces the Siamese nation "would be effaced

from the world. Thanks to them, foreign countries are made to realize 112 the fact that Siam is not to be molested without impunity." In

* ^ BTWM, November 14, 1934, p. 10. the end, Luang Pibul admitted that the Siamese "cannot perhaps be 113 successful in a fight with others." But what does that matter?

If only "we try to improve our men and constantly support our army, our country and nation will continue to live in happiness and bliss 114 and will long maintain their independence."

It is difficult to imagine a more naive justification than the above considering the small army and almost obsolete ships. At any rate, that was the first attempt to openly arouse public interest and in a way to ask for public donations for the modernization of the forces which metaphorically were compared to fences of the nation.

In 1933 enlisted men in the army stood at 16,000 while the navy registered only 4,800 men. In the following year, the number of the army sharply increased to 24,486 but there was no similar increase in the navy. In 1932, the figures for the air force personnel were unavailable but in 1934 the total manpower was only 2,486.

Since 1934, when Pibul assumed the position of State

Councillor for the Defence, the budget of the Ministry was always on the increase (see appendices II, III). A comparison between the budget of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Education caused some doubts as to whether the government really wanted to improve the percentage of literacy.

In the year 1935, the draft of the Navy Bill was proposed

for the expenditure of Tcs. 18 million to be spread out over six years. The whole idea came from Luang Sindhu Songkranjai, Chief of

the General Staff of the Navy and a close friend of Luang Pibul.

At the Assembly meeting, H.E. Luang Pibul spoke at length

in support of the measure. He gave Japan as an example, He said

that because of the might of her defensive force, Japan was able to

expand her trade. In this country, he said "the forces are

individually resolved to support Siam in her administration according to the democratic regime under the constitution, without allowing her to follow any other course... There was no desire in any way to 115 maintain the forces with a view to bringing about any change."

Only two representatives mildly protested the draft, one was Nai Tong-Indra of Ubon and the other was Prah Pinich Dhanakan of

Chiengmai. The former said that primary education did not receive financial assistance in B.E. 2478 (A.D. 1933) in any manner. Agri­ culture and other industries needed help as well. According to him the navy should come afterwards. The latter claimed that at the moment over five hundred farmers had signed a petition which they

submitted to the Premier to voice their grievance. With tcs. 70 million standing as reserve in the Treasury, some should be used to assist the poor farmers in some way.'^ The supporters of the Navy

Bill besides Pibul were the Premier himself and Luang Dhamrong

Navasawat, Secretary General to the State Council. At the end, the

draft passed by unanimous vote. 83

Setting the naval budget aside, the Ministry of Defence

presented the budget estimate of the Ministry of the year 1935 to the

Assembly on April 5, 1935. It was the highest budget, amounting to

21,412,912. The Ministry of Interior came second at 19,190,880.

Another method which Pibul used was propaganda. The slogan

"the country is your house, the military is its fence," was well

known. A film was made under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence.

Its title, literally translated, was "Blood of Siamese Soldiers,"

but this was officially anglicized into "Undaunted Sons of Siam."

It was given all possible publicity and attracted crowded houses,

though it did not seem to have quite the effect intended on its

audiences. The middle class people were interested in recognizing

the actors, many of whom were young officers and ladies well known in

Siamese society. The proceeds were donated to "the funds for the modernization of the national defence."

At the end of 1935, donations invited from the general

public for the same purpose came up to the total sum of 481,148 tcs.'*'*’7

(One tical equals $.45.)

In addition to the effort to make known to the public the

indispensibility of the armed forces of Siam, the Ministry of Defence was engaging in industrial projects such as setting up the Paper and

Weaving industries with a view to finding employment for local labor

as well as to consume the cotton produced in the country. On top of

all these engagements, the Ministry was sponsoring an Elephant Hunt in

117F.O. 371/19372, F 507/507/40, December 20, 1935. 84

Lopburi. The money to organize this exhibition was obtained from

certain mining enterprises carried out by the Ministry of Defence in

the southern provinces in order to teach military officers something

about minerals.

Pibul was not the only one who tried to portray the most

respectable portrait of the army. His effort was echoed by several

of his followers. Notable among these were Major Prayoon Bamornmontri

who made his "come back" after the fall of Praya Mano. In defense

of the Ministry of Defence's budget for the year 1935, Major Prayoon made a special broadcast on the radio. He praised the army and re­ minded his audience that the fact that Siam could change her form of

government was through the action of the troops. He added that "the new Constitution flourishes only because it is under the protection

of the soldiers who greatly assist the country as regards its power

and strength.

Commander Luang Yuddhasas Kosol R.S.N. wrote an article in

the vernacular "Sri Krung" that only when Siam's forces are sufficient can we be able to defend our neutrality and to secure for 120 ourselves a breathing space...

Praya Song Suradej

During this campaign for the advancement of the military,

118 BTWM, February 21, 1938. 119 BTWM. March 24, 1937. 120 Sri Krung, June 28, 1936 Praya Song, the popular military leader of June 24, 1932, had resolutely declined to fill any office of the administration. There were many speculated reasons for his withdrawal from politics. He might be genuinely uninterested in political gains as he repeatedly claimed or he could not get the only position he craved, the State

Councillor for the Defence. Another version was that he had come to realize that an attempt at another coup would have no hope of success.

The mastery of the situation in Siam those days rested not so much with the Army as a whole, as with that particular section of it numbering no more than two hundred persons or so, which was in control of the mechanical means of waging war, i.e. the tanks, the artillery and machine guns. If Praya Song wished to organize another coup, it was not enough for him to secure a following among the officers and soldiers in general, but it was a prime requisite that he should be able to rely upon the cooperation of this small body of men. He probably had no sufficient assurance that he could count upon these people.

Whatever Praya Song did, his name was always involved in some kind of a plot against the government. At the end of 1934, there was the case of Lieutenant General Praya Devahasdin, a former vice- president of the People's Assembly who had been charged with conspiring to disturb the peace of the country. Praya Devahasdid was freed but he told Colonel Roux, the French Military Attache, that 121 Praya Song was actually involved in the plot. Unfortunately, the

121 F.O. 371/1937/9862, December 7, 1934, Crosby to Sir John Simon. 86

woman they hired as a go between was caught. The Government dared not lay a hand on Praya Song on account of his popularity with the military cadets. There was only one thing to do: Praya Song was persuaded to leave the country for the second time. On the pretext of going to study agricultural methods, Praya Song was sent to Burma.

Another well known fact in Siam was that before carrying out the Coup of 1932, the band of brothers (the promoters) swore a solemn oath that never in the future would they betray one another or lift a hand against one another's life. This probably explained many things, such as why Pibul did not come out into the open against

Pridi or why they let Praya Song get away with the plot.

Praya Song returned from Burma in 1935. After having resigned from the army on the pretense of bad health, he resumed his quiet life as a farmer on the outskirts of Bangkok. There he remained, an object of interest and speculation to all. Many hoped that he was biding his time and that he planned to seize the reins of Government after the members of the Cabinet had become exhausted by quarrels among themselves. On the other hand, since his return from Burma, he had twice refused to accept a ministerial portfolio although Luang Pradit was ready to transfer the portfolio of Interior into his hands. Praya Song, none the less, preferred to remain as he was, studiously in retirement but a potential challenge to the existing regime.

Within the military itself, there was a movement against

Pibul by a battalion commander named Lieutenant Colonel Luang Jamman

Yudhasilp, an officer commanding the Military District of Bangkok. 87

His scheme died down when he was appointed as State Councillor

(see pagevj). It was also reported that forty members of the First

Category had made a representation to the Premier to ask Praya Song

to join the administration. Rumors even had it that in a secret

session, before the retirement of Praya Pahon, selected members were

asked to vote for the next Prime Minister. Praya Song got 18 votes 122 while Pibul got only 5 votes.

The climax of the whole matter boiled down to the indecisive­ ness on the part of Praya Song himself which made everything unworkable. In January 1936, he left the country again for the third time, to China, thus leaving his supporters in the lurch. Coming back from China, Praya Song declared that he would not accept any

"political position." However, he would accept only employment which he was qualified to fill and it must be away from Bangkok. Finally with a great deal of persuasion, Praya Song agreed to become Director of the Training School for the Officers of Chiengmai. It was a strange decision because once he accepted the position, he reported

as an officer under the Ministry of Defence where Luang Pibul was the

State Councillor.

On July 9, the Ministry of Defence appointed four Advisors

of National Defence and a Quartermaster General of the Army: Praya

Song was one of the four. In the following month, Praya Song came to

Bangkok for the purpose of attending the first meeting of the Committee

122 Sangop Suriyin, Prawat Nayok Ratamontri Thai (Bibliography of Thai Prime Ministers) (Bangkok: Prachak Wittayanipon Press, 1972), p. 102. 88

of Advisors. He had startled the public by resigning immediately from his new appointment on the ground that he was "not competent to fulfill it."

In an interview which he granted to the press, he came out strongly for a democratic form of government. He attacked the band of promoters who engineered the Coup d'etat and who now made up the

Junta which really governed the country. He would not accept a

Cabinet position again unless he was invited by the people. Praya

Song recalled the decision for the Coup:

"We brought off the Coup with the desire of causing the various powers to be transferred to the people and not with any idea of transferring the power of the Monarchy to ourselves (the promoters)."123

Praya Song strongly emphasized that it was wrong to set up a dictatorship. First and foremost a dictatorship carried a power not unlike that of the Monarchy. Finally, he said that he had insisted upon the promoters furnishing a promise that they would not be parties 124 to the setting up of a government by dictatorship.

This interview must be taken as directed chiefly against the

Pibul faction. It was a well known political scandal when Pibul contributed an article to the anniversary of "Siam News" in May 1936.

It was the first time Pibul talked about the merits of a dictatorship.

One could see how little he really believed in the democratic system

(see the full text in Appendix IV).

123 BTWM, August 12, 1938. 89

Pibul's speech was the talk of the town. On June 16, 1936

Commander Luang Yudhasas Kosol, Secretary to Luang Pibul gave an

interview which could only be Luang Pibul's apology for the indis­

creet message which he had sent to the "Siam News." Luang

Yudhasas offered an explanation that Pibul would limit the grant of

dictatorial powers to the executive and that he would be content to

leave the decision on questions of national policy to the people.

"However, extraordinary circumstances may call for extraordinary

,,125 measures."

The explanation was perhaps worse than the original version since it was a more definite challenge to the constitution. The reactions were strongly felt among the elite. Luang Pradit, at that time as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was embarrassed to answer this question of dictatorship to foreign envoys. He made it clear that if it came to a choice of evils, it would be better to restore the absolute Monarchy rather than to acquiesce in the rise to unlimited power of a person who was not a member of the Royal Family, and who was only too likely to be the target of attacks from others no less ambitious than himself. After all, the ex-King Prajadhipok had in his favor experience and the traditional respect felt by the people of Siam for the historic Chakri Dynasty; neither of these factors were 126 present in the case of a soldier like Luang Pibul.

125 BTWM, June 16, 1936. 126 F.O. 371, Vol. 20299, File 4478. Crosby to Mr. Eden 90

Prince Vanvaidya and the Premier put up a sort of defense for Pibul, saying that the trouble was due to the young men behind

Pibul who were trying to force him to break with the civilians. The general impression was that the prospect of Luang Pibul's attempting to set himself up as a dictator was something of a possibility. But 127 Praya Pahon was more in favor of Luang Pradit.

There was no doubt that by the end of 1936, the military elements headed by Luang Pibul were definitely in the ascendancy.

His hold over the important section of the army which controlled the mechanical means of warfare was almost complete.

Only a few people understood what a dictatorship was and disliked it, but they represented a tiny section of the population.

Pridi Banomyong

As State Councillor for Interior, Pridi had his own plan to appeal to the elites. He wanted to get funds for the implementation of the new Local Government Act. It appeared to be another one of his idealistic schemes for it provided for the establishment of no less than 5,000 deliverative assemblies for the purpose of carrying on the work of local administration throughout the country. Advisors would be required to instruct all these assemblies as to the operation of the Act. Fourty had been appointed and seventy more were being asked as of 1935. Granted that Pridi had all the good intentions, it was not hard to see that he was trying to consolidate

and restore his popularity. Using his position, he was creating

political adherents in the provinces by promising to give the people 91

better administration and facilities. In June, Commissioners of the different Changwat (provinces) numbering over seventy met in conference in Bangkok under the presidency of Luang Pradit (Pridi).

The agenda of the conference was impressive: the constitutional system, crime suppression, local government, the joint responsibility of Kromakan (officials) of Changwads and Amphur (districts), the allotment of work through the kromakan changwad, the matter of rewards to Kamnan and Phuyai Ban (district officers), renumeration to those who assist the Government.

Pridi went another step further to spread his ideas among the youth. He became the Rector of the University of Moral and

Political Science (Thamasart University) which was opened on July 27,

1934.

Even though Pridi himself was well known for his intellect, it was his economic plan which made him a radical in the eyes of some of the people in Bangkok. This might be the reason why his partisans were blamed for the attempt on Pibul's life in February,

1935 (see page ).

A similar suspicion rested upon Pridi's clique again regarding the second manifestation of unrest organized by a number of non-commissioned officers in the army for the alleged purpose of

overthrowing the government and of recalling King Prajadhipok to the throne. This second attempt was called the Rebellion of the

Sergeants and Corporals. Thirteen of the leaders were convicted and one was sentenced to death.

It may be a coincidence that Pridi suddenly departed for 92

Europe immediately after the affair had come to light. In any event,

it was not beyond the bounds of possibility that some of Pridi's

followers may have been involved in the two plots without Pridi's knowledge but Pridi himself did not seem to be a person who would

engage in contradictory attempts such as these. In fact, wherever he was he had a name for himself. As State Councillor of Foreign

Affairs, Pridi took the initiative in negotiating for reciprocal treaties in trade and jurisdiction. His accomplishment was recognized among the elites but it was probably too complicated for a common man to understand.

The Crown Lands Scandal and the Cabinet Resignation

On March 29, 1937, a bill was introduced to the People's

Assembly providing for the classification of the King's properties into three categories: crown, state and personal property. The government asked that the first two categories be exempted from taxation. The Privy Purse Department, who managed these properties under the Ministry of Royal Household before 1935, was now trans­ ferred to work under the Ministry of Finance. The bill was passed two days later and the final promulgation was printed in the Royal

Gazette on July 19, 1937. Between this interval, a considerably large amount of the King's Crown property had been sold to more than

thirty persons at lower than market price. Those who purchased the

lands were high government officials such as Praya Rhidhi Aganey,

Minister of Agriculture; Luang Pibul, Minister of Defence; Luang

Dhamrong Navasawas, Minister of Interior. As the King was a minor,

the transactions were done with the consent of the Council of Regency 93 128 with Prince Aditya-Dibya-Abha as the President.

The representative from Ubon, Nai Luang Jayakan, raised the question at the twelfth sitting of the External Session of the

Assembly on July 28, 1937. He wanted to know why the properties were sold cheaply and why the purchasers were high officials of the Govern­ ment. Nai Mangkon Samsen, a second Category member, wanted to know why the King, as a minor, had discriminated against poor people and preferred to sell only to the rich. The Prime Minister's attempt to justify these purchases failed to convince the Assembly members. This led to the interpellation raised by Nai Tai Panikabutr of Bangkok.

When the Assembly met again on the next day, it was announced that the President of the Council of Regency had tended his resignation which was followed by the other two members of the Council on the principal of collective responsibility. Then there was a letter of resignation of the Cabinet en bloc.

Luang Pibul issued his communique through the radio that as soon as he had learned of the scandal he had returned all the five plots of land. To save the military from disgrace, he also tended his resignation.

The Assembly met at once in secret to consider these resig­ nations and to appoint a new Council of Regency and new Premier.

Before the Assembly could decide on the new personalities, on

July 31, 1937, they received a letter from the President of the

Council of Regency. The Prince asked to withdraw the previous letter

The Prince succeeded the position from Prince Anuwatana Chaturon who had committed suicide in 1936. 94

of resignation because the defence forces wanted him and the rest of the Councillors to stay. After a stormy debate, the Assembly voted to accept the letter of resignation instead.

The first ten days of August passed without any solution.

During this impass, secret negotiations were going on between political cliques. Finally, Praya Pahon agreed to come back temporarily. He would not accept the position again until he had received the final support of the Assembly and until the investigation of the scandal was completed.

In the meantime, H.H. Prince Aditya, who had resigned, was elected by the Assembly again to be the President of the Council of

Regency. His former colleagues were also elected. It was hard to understand this decision of compromise, but it was said to be the 129 best of the Siamese tradition. The outcome proved that the State

Council or the military backed-Cabinet still dominated the People's

Assembly. They wanted a weak president for the Council of Regency and so Prince Aditya was re-elected.

On December 16, 1936, Luang Pibul invited representatives of the Bangkok newspaper to meet him at the Ministry of Defence. He told them that the Council of Regency had asked him to entreat Praya Pahon on their behalf to accept the Premiership.

"Accordingly, I then had occasion to convene a meeting of my colleagues at the civil building of the R&rusakawan Palace yesterday afternoon which was at­ tended by Captain Luang Sindhu Songgramjai, R.S.N., Lieutenant Commander Luang Dhamrong Navaswas, R.S.N.,

_ . . Virginia Thomson, Thailand the New Siam (New York: Paraeon Book Reprint Corporation, 196/)',~ p. 95.------95

Luang Pradit Manudharm, Luang Narubes Manit, Colonel Luang Jamnan Yudhasilp, Luang Kovid Abaiwongs, Lieutenant Colonel Luang Aduldetjaras, Commander Luang Subhajalasai, R.S.N. and myself, being nine in all. We unanimously agreed to re-elect Praya Pahon as Premier..."

From the names above, one could see that all the partici­ pants were the key personalities of the promoters with the absence of Praya Song. Two questions could be asked:

1. Why should the Council of Regency ask Pibul in par­ ticular to invite Praya Pahon back if it did not think of him as the most powerful man?

2. Why should a group of six military men and three civilians have to "unanimously agree" to re-elect Praya Pahon?

The new cabinet was thus formed with Luang Pibul retaining his old position and Luang Pradit as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

There were nine military men in the cabinet of 20 ministers.

The year of 1937 also saw a newly elected Assembly. For

Siam, this was the first time that the candidates for the Assembly were elected by direct vote. Most of the former members were not re­ elected but both members from Ubol were returned. 40.22% of the voters went to the poles whick meant an increase of about one percent over the first election. The total membership of the People's

Assembly increased from 156 to 182.

Pibul's Maneuvering of the Cliques

Pibul was a graduate of the Military Academy in the year 96

1914. At that time boys of approximately twelve to fourteen could

enter the pre-Acadfemy School (Rongrien Nai Roi Tahan Bok Chun Pratom)

and spend three years there before moving to the Academy. Three

years later, after passing their final examinations, they would

graduate as Second Lieutenants and begin serving a six-month provi­

sional period of service. However, those who had graduated with high

grades could choose the brigades where they wanted to serve. It was

considered a high honor to be able to serve the Brigades of Artillery.

The Siamese Array, in those days, was comprised of seven Brigades of

Artillery, twenty-one Infantry Battalions, four Regiments and one

squadron Cavalry, two Battalions of Engineers, one regiment of Anti-

Aircraft Artillery, one Battalion of Searchlights. The rest were 131 tanks, armored cars and aircraft units.

Second Lieutenant Plaek Kitasanga (Pibul) was the twelfth

in his class. He chose to be with the seventh Artillery Brigade in

Pitsanulok while Second Lieutenant But Pungprakun (later known as

Luang Aduldetjaras) was the tenth of his class and he chose the third

Artillery Bridage in Lopburi. In fact, Pibul and Luang Adul had known each other since the pre-Academy School. There he also met two more lifelong friends, Nai Prayoon Pamonmontri (later known as

Lieutenant Colonel Prayoon) and Nai Jit (later known as Colonel Jira

Wijit Songgram).

Luang Adul joined the vanguard group of the 1932 Coup. In

the beginning, he did not play any significant role. It was not until

131 F.O. 371, report from Major R.G. Ray, R.A., the British Military Attache from Crosby to Viscount Halifax. 97

Pibul was planning to overthrow the Mano Government that the two close friends came to an agreement. In the future, whatever position

Pibul would get,the second position of importance would be for Luang 132 Adul. During the Bavoradet Rebellion Luang Adul was on guard for his friend's safety. In 1932, he became Deputy Director of the

Police and in 1936, he was the Director himself. Luang Adul was well known for his honesty, his dedication to his work and his loyalty to his friend, Pibul. During the second World War the two bosom friends split in their opinions but they were still friends. During Pibul's preparation for power, it was Luang Adul who uncovered the various plots against him.

In August, three months before Pibul assumed the premier­ ship, there was a reorganization of the High Military personnel.

The most important changes were:

1. Colonel Luang Jamnan Yudhasilp, Commanding the First

Military District who also holds the position of Deputy Minister of

Economic Affairs, was transferred to the General Staff and shortly proceeded to Europe for the purpose of observing military matters there for a year. He was succeeded as Commander of the Garrison at

Bangkok by his Assistant Commanding Officer, Colonel Luang

Kriengsakdi Bijit.

2. Colonel Luang Jira Wij.it Songgram, Director of Military

132 Prayoon Pamonmontri, Qnuson Nai Ngan Praratchatan Pleng Sop Police Colonel Adul Aduldetjaras (A Cremation Volume in Memory of Police Colonel Adul Aduldetjaras) (Bangkok: 1970), no page number was listed. 98

Operations became Assistant Chief of the General Staff which combined

that office with his former one.

3. Colonel Prah Prachon Pachanuk, Inspector General of the

Army, was transferred to the General Staff.

4. Colonel Luang Srist Yudhasilp, Commanding the second

military district of Prachinburi, became Inspector General.

5. Colonel Luang Prom Yothi, Assistant Inspector General

of the Army, was appointed Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

(Number 1 was a pro Praya Song man, numbers 2, 4, and 5

were Pibul classmates from the Military Academy.)

With respect to the General Staff of the Forces, the fol­

lowing appointments were announced:

1. Commander Luang Yudhasas Kosol R.S.N., Naval Staff

Officer to the Ministry of Defence, to be Chief of the Navy Section.

2. Major Luang Sura Narong, Army Staff Officer, to the

Ministry of Defence and acting Chief of the Army Section.

3. Squadron Leader Khun Ron Napakas, Air Force Officer

to the Ministry of Defence, to be Acting Chief of the Air Force

Section. (The Commander-in-Chief was Luang Atuk Tevadet, his class­ mate.)

4. Lieutenant Colonel Prayoon Pamonmontri was appointed

"Senior Staff Officer" to the Ministry of Defence, thus ranking above

the three "Staff Officers" already mentioned. At the same time he

did not relinquish his previous post of Chief of the Sixth Bureau,

section of the Inspector General Staff.

(Number 1 and Number 3 were with Pibul when he was poisoned.) 99

On top of all these strategic changes, Pibul announced

Air Raid Practice on November 2, 1938. Bangkok was blacked-out and

airplanes were flying above the Bangkok sky. This was to be an

exercise in preparation for future warfare. The practice was pro­

nounced a big success. It probably served as a successful warning

against his potential rivals as well.

Everything was ready for Pibul's accession to power and the

People's Assembly gave him the final opportunity. A proposal was

put forward that the rules of procedure should be amended in order to

compel the Government to give a more detailed explanation of the

budget. The Minister of Finance, Praya Jaiyos Sombat tried to explain

that the details were always given before the discussion was closed but to publish all the estimated numbers in advance would lead to

profiteering by some persons. The Premier and the whole cabinet

agreed with Praya Chaiyos. When the vote was counted, the Govern­ ment lost by fourteen votes and the Cabinet had to resign.

According to the testimony of Luang Adul Aduldetcharas,

there was a meeting between military and civilian supporters of Pibul

at Bang Kunprom Palace. They wanted to ask Praya Pahon to resign and

let Pibul become the next Prime Minister. At any rate Praya Pahon probably knew what was going on: he refused to come back and Pibul's

supporters had their wish granted.

Thus on December 16, 1938 Luang Pibul Songgram became the

third Prime Minister of Siam. He retained at the same time the port­

folio of Defence and Interior. Pibul even asked his rival Pridi to

move from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to take over the Ministry 100 of Finance. It was a challenge for Pridi as he could put some of his

original ideas of tax reform to work. He therefore accepted the invi­ tation.

The Final Purge

Around 4:30 a.m. on Sunday, January 29, 1939, sixty persons were taken into custody. They were accused of conspiracy against the government. Six persons were members of the People's Assembly. The most important personality was Praya Song who was brought down from

Chiengmai. His principal followers who were arrested were Colonel

Khun Sithiruengdejpol, Colonel Luang Chamnan Yudhasilp, Captain Khun

Kliponplin, Captain Sumruat Khanchanasithi. Praya Devahasdhin and his two sons were among the arrested. The most unlikely person to be arrested was the King's uncle, H.R.H. Prince Rangsit of Jainad who was accused of collaborating with Praya Song to overthrow the govern­ ment. The official communique stated that two persons were killed during the activities of the police. Later on, Praya Song and

Captain Sumruat were released only to be sent into exile in Indochina.

Praya Song died a few years later. It was clear that the new Prime

Minister was determined to get rid of those elements that were not wholeheartedly supporting him.

A new law was submitted for the approval of the Assembly in order to set up a special court to try the prisonners. Nai Chamlong

Daorueng and Nai Indhorn Singhaneti, representatives from Mahasarakam and Chiengmai respectively, strongly protested the said law. At the

end of the session, however, the law was passed. The Special Court

was set up in February, 1939. 101

The verdict of the court was made known in November of the

same year. Twenty-one persons had been condemned to death including the King's uncle, Luang Chamnan Yudhasilp and Praya Devahasdhin but the sentences of these three persons were commuted to life im­ prisonment. Colonel Pra Sithiruengdejpol and Captain Khun Kliponplin,

Praya Song's disciples were among the ones sentenced to be executed.

M.R. Nimitmongkol, one of the prisoners later wrote about how the court operated. He said that the trial was unfair because the accused could not get anyone to be their witness. Luang Chamnan asked Pibul to be his witness but the court objected to his request saying that 133 he should not ask such an important person to be a witness.

Moreover, the accused had to be their own lawyers: most of them did not know how to question the government witnesses.

The Prime Minister in November delivered a broadcast speech to the people explaining the verdict. According to him the accused were planning to place three heavy machine guns outside the railway station and it was arranged that after having accomplished the shooting, they were to mount the gun carriages and then to work the 134 said machine guns on the people in that neighborhood. It was hard to believe that the group of educated military and civilians who were accused could think of such an unrealistic plan.

Later on Pibul blamed the whole verdict on his friend Luang

133 Nimitmongkol Nawarat, M.R. Chiwit Hang Kan Kabot Song Khrung (My Two Coups' Involvement) (Bangkok: Aksorn Charoen, 1946), p. 159. 134 BTWM, November, 1939. 102

Adul who at that time was head of the police. Luang Adul, sur­

prisingly enough, has never denied the charge. He was loyal to Pibul

on this particular matter until the end.

Conclusion

Among the three contenders to Thai political power during

the transitional period, Pridi, Pibul and Praya Song, Pridi was probably the brightest of the three. He knew exactly what he wanted

but the stigma of being communist oriented hindered his popularity.

He was unacceptable to many of the elites in Bangkok. The changing

from the portfolio of Interior to Foreign Affairs, though it brought

him recognition from the government and foreigners, did not increase

the number of his supporters. Praya Song, on the other hand, was

probably the most likely person to control power owing to his

seniority and experience but he was reluctant to persue what he wanted.

His indecision made him lose his followers to a more determinant

candidate, Pibul. The latter knew where his base of support was and

he set out to expand it and build up its confidence in him. To the

public Pibul attracted them with his charisma, to his acquaintances

and friends he charmed them; to the military officers and cadets he

was their leader; to his enemies Pibul was ruthless. Thus in December

1938, Pibul assumed the position of the Prime Minister. It was the

start of his leadership career. Pibul did not anticipate that during

his first period of premiership the fate of the country would depend

on his decisions.

In connection with the rise to power of Pibul, several critics

wondered why Pibul had waited so long to become Prime Minister of Siam. 103

Why during the absence of Pridi did Pibul not take advantage of the situation? Why did he let Praya Song go into exile while all his close friends were executed? All of these questions can be answered if one looks back to the day before the Coup took place. Every promoter had to take an oath of honor before a statue of Buddha as follows:

"I... swear in front of the sacred Statue of the Lord Buddha whom I highly respect that I will be loyal to my friends and I will keep the secret of the group with my life. If I betray or think of destroying my friends who are working with me to change the present government, let me die torturously from a sharp weapon such as a sword or let me and all the generations of my family parish or both."135

The oath perhaps explains a number of things about the at­

titudes of Praya Pahon, Pridi, Pibul and Praya Song. The taking of

this oath by the promoters of the Coup passed as a matter of common

knowledge among the Thai. Had Pibul betrayed Pridi or executed Praya

Song, he would have relinquished the legitimacy of his national

leadership in the eyes of the people.

Before ending this chapter, it would be interesting to com­

pare Pibul with the kings in the early Bangkok period. At that time,

the kings had real power only within the Bangkok vicinity. The whole

country was divided between the spheres of influence of the Ministers

of the North and the South who controlled the military and interior

matters of the country. Later on the kings were under the influence

135 Sawai Suthipitak, Dr. Pridi Kap Kan Patiwat (Dr. Pridi and the Revolution) (Bangkok: Siridharm Nakon Press, 1960), p. 78. 104

of the powerful Bunnag family who besides controlling the military 136 supervised the finances of the country. But Pibul, of whom Pridi said if it came to a choice of two evils, it would be better to restore the Absolute Monarchy rather than to acquiese to the rise of a person who was not a member of the Royal family,had risen to the top. He was actually the real King of Siam who controlled an un­ precedented power over the North and the South (military and interior).

For a plain commoner, what more can one ask?

136 see Tej Bunnag, "Provincial Administration of Siam from 1892-1915" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1968). CHAPTER III

THE INTERACTIONS

BETWEEN

FOREIGN POLICIES AND INTERNAL POLITICS (PART ONE)

(1932-1941)

This chapter will examine the foreign policies in the

transitional period (1932-1938) and the first two year period under

Pibul's government (1938“1941). The aim is to see the interaction

between foreign policies and internal politics. During the

transition period, the reader can see from the first two chapters

that the new elites faced a challenge from the Aristocrats and the

Royalists. In the process of suppressing the opposition, Pibul paved his way to power. During this time of internal instability, the post

of the State Councillor for Foreign Affairs shifted from one person to the other. The leaders had to deal with internal problems; they could not afford to change from the traditional foreign policy of recognizing Britain as the dominant power in the Far East and the

French as the secondary one. However, since 1907, Japan had emerged

from the Russo-Japanese War as the third power in the area. The

leaders of Siam recognized that Japan was trying to challenge the two

powers in the Far East and tried to use Japan to her advantage.

Pibul's first government was a period of consolidation

where Pibul was the sole leader who controlled all the key cabinet

positions: Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs. Foreign policies

105 106 in this period tended to be more aggressive depending on the premier's perception.

Throughout the two periods the term 'nationalism' was used frequently. It will be defined as the policy of asserting the interests of one's own nation, viewed as separate from the interest of other nations or the common interest of all nations. As Thailand has never come under Western colonization, Thai nationalism is dif­ ferent from her neighbors. It was expressed in both positive and negative terms. Positively, the new elites expressed the desire to assert their ability to be independent of foreign interference and the desire to modernize their country. Negatively, the elites thought of directing their power against economic and political in­ justice which their country had suffered at the hands of the Chinese and the West. This chapter also is concerned with 'irredentism' which is an extreme form of nationalism. It specifically was the strong desire directed toward incorporation of territories his­ torically or ethnically related to Thailand but which were subjected under the rule of the French and the British.

The Chinese minority problem was a common factor in both periods. It was the target of nationalist leaders all along. In­ ternally, the government used economic nationalism against the

Chinese to gain domestic support and internal unity. Externally, the suppression of the Chinese was used as a suggestion of friendship

toward Japan. 107

The Transitional Period

The traditional Thai foreign policy is based on the recog­ nition of a dominant power in the Par East who is capable of in­ fluencing the foreign and domestic policies of the small nations in 137 the area. Up until the middle of the 19th Century, Siam regarded

China as the primary political force in Asia and she tried arranging her foreign policies and practices in accordance with the Chinese.

The shift of Thai policy from China to Great Britain came with the accession to the throne of King Mongkut in 1851. The king realized the peril of European imperialism and admitted the fact that Britain had already 'nibbled away' the edges of the Thai Empire in the Malay

Peninsular. In contrast to China who exercised little if any control over Thai affairs, being content with tribute paid at irregular in­ tervals, the King realized that Britain acquired the rights to be con­

sidered the first state in Asia with a gun in one hand.

In the 19th Century, most of the Malay States were considered by the Thai as her tributary states which would send the "Bunga Mas" to Bangkok at stated intervals. With the arrival of the British East

India Company the rulers of the different states, in particular Kedah,

saw the English as a means of freeing themselves from the sovereignty of Bangkok. Through a series of disputes and armed clashes, Siam

gradually lost the suzerainty of Malaysian states to Britain. Finally,

by the Bangkok Treaty of 1909, Siam transferred to Great Britain all

137 Kenneth P. Landon, "Thailand's Foreign Policy" U.S. National Archives, Document No. 892.00/9-3044, p. 1. 108

rights of suzerainty, protection, administration and control over

Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perils in return for a modification of British extraterritorial jurisdiction which had been granted to the British in 1855. By the treaty of 1909, England relinquished her extraterritorial rights over her subjects, European and Asian alike to Siam.

The loss of so much territory, aside from the loss of face did not hurt the Thai feeling extensively. What Siam lost to England was not part of her natural kingdom socially and culturally speaking but part of her political and economic empire and economically they were a source of expense rather than profit. Even King Chulalongkorn

(Rama V) on his visit to these states in 1891 stated:

"We hav no particular interest in the states. If we lose them to England we would miss only the "Bunga Mas" (Golden Flower). Apart from this there would not be any material loss."138

The French came into Asia after the British and acquired the territory in Indochina. Among her acquisitions, were Laos and

Cambodia which have always had a special place in the Thai's mind owing to the identity in race, language and culture. As for Laos, she was a vassal state of Siam after the 17th Century. During the reign of Rama I (1782-1809), Laos was divided into three small states:

Luang Prabang (North), Vientiene (Central) and Champasak (South).

Siamese military expeditionary placed the three states under the

Chulalongkorn, King, Rayathang Sadet Praratchadamnern Praehart Thang Bog Thang Rob Laem Malayu, r.s. 109 (Royal Tour of the Peninsula in 1891). (Bangkok: 1932), p. 323. 109

control of Bangkok. Vientiene and Champasak tried to regain their

independence through rebellion but were suppressed. The rebel capital

at Vientiene was destroyed and the ruling family of Vientiene was

eliminated. After 1827, Vientiene and Champasak were incorporated

into Siam proper. Only Luang Prabang was left as a vassal state.

The same pattern developed in Cambodia's relations with Siam.

At the beginning of the 18th Century, Cambodia was forced to accept

Siam and Vietnam as their overlords. Cambodia had to pay tribute to

Bangkok as well as to Hue. The two northern provinces of Siemreap and

Battambang were given to Bangkok in return for the help given by the

Siamese King in setting a succession dispute.

The status quo changed with the French penetration into

Southeast Asia. To escape the threat from the two neighbors, the

Cambodian King, in 1863 decided to put his country under French

protection. Four years later Siam and France signed a treaty by

which Siam renounced her claim over Cambodia but retained the two

richest provinces; Siemreap and Battambang. This treaty was the

result of peaceful negotiations.

When France established her protectorate over Cambodia she

pushed westward toward Laos. The French objective was clear: to

expand as far west as possible until that extension was checked by

someone or other against whom France could not challenge without

unnecessarily risking war. France, therefore, continued to force

ahead her endless claim against Thai territories. With each successful

advance, her appetite for territorial expansion was whetted. In

1893, she moved too far. With two French gunboats, she entered the 110

Manam River. At that time Great Britain decided to intervene 139 diplomatically on behalf of Siam. The latter gave in to the French demands, sacrificing a part to preserve the whole. A treaty was signed whereby Siam gave up all claims to territories on the left bank of the

Mekong River, i.e., the whole of present day Laos except for Sayaburi and Champasak, which are on the right bank of the river. In order to force the Siamese to comply with the treaty France stationed her troops in the eastern region of Siam. In 1902, after the Siamese had ful­ filled all the obligations, the French troops refused to leave unless

Siam renounced her claim to Sayaburi and Champasak. When these areas

were surrendered, the French broke their word and demanded the cession

of Siemreap and Battambang as the price of their final withdrawal.

The memory of the 1893 incident was always fresh in the

minds of the Thai. However, since that date Siam had refashioned her

foreign policy to suit the changing situations. She still recognized

Britain as a dominant power in the Far East, but she also developed

the technique of balancing a secondary power against the first.

Without France, Siam would have been unable to bargain with the British.

Without the latter, Siam would have been unable to prevent the French

from occupying Siam. Each was a necessary evil.

In line with her recognition of Britain as the primary power

in the Far East and France as the secondary, Siam rapidly altered her

139 This incident is known in history as "The Siamese Question" which brought Britain and France to the brink of war and which almost precipitated a formation of the Quadruple Alliance with England be­ coming a partner of the hitherto Triple Alliance, see William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (2nd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951) p. 49. Ill

internal life to match the British pattern. Since it was not British policy to interfere with native religious customs more than necessary

Siam's swing to the British way of life was not extreme. The edu­ cational system was a copy of the English system. Later on, students were sent to England and the other countries in Europe. At the same time, Rama V hired foreign advisors to help reorganize the civil service. Consequently, foreign advisors penetrated into almost every department, the Ministry of Finance and Commerce, the Ministry of

Interior, the Ministry of Education and the local government. Of all the different nationalities, British foreign advisors ran the highest number.

The Attitudes Towards the West After the Coup of 1932

The Coup of 1932 was not only a significant turning point in the political history of the country but, to a lesser extent, it was also the turning point in the attitude of the Siamese towards the

Western world. After the Coup, the atmosphere changed, the feeling of

nationalism emerged. As Siam had never been under colonial rule, the

feeling was quite different from the existing feelings of her neighbors.

The new elites wanted to show the "new Siam" to the world. In

In 1907, the total number of foreigners employed in the Thai service was as follows:

British 126 Danish French 5 Swedes 39 American 4 Norwegians German 36 Japanese 9 Italian 12 Dutch 11 Belgiam 5

Great Britain, British Foreign Office Papers, No. 371/333, No. 976. 112

contrast to the Siam under absolute monarchy, the new Siam was able

to run her own household without foreign interference. Thus there was a strong feeling to get rid of the foreign advisors even to the

point of sacrificing them for the less competent natives.

Another reason which led to the feeling of anti-Westerners

was the fear of British and French intervention on behalf of the monarchy. Right after the Coup, Bangkok was full of rumors that

troops were being mobilized in Singapore and on the Burmese frontier

ready to set foot in Siam. Apparently, the rumors must have occurred

again after the Coup of 1933 to oust Praya Mano. The Japanese recorded that Praya Pahon and Fibul went to the Japanese Legation to ask the Japanese to furnish them with military supplies to equip an

armed force in case of the intervention. Japanese Minister Yatabe

Yasukichi was very anxious to use the situation to his country's best advantage but he had to take a second thought. He knew that the

Japanese could not risk a confrontation with Britain by providing military aid to the Coup group. Accordingly, he informed Pahon that 141 he was in no position to provide arms to Siam.

This incident showed that in the eyes of the new elites,

Japan had become a formidable competitor with the British and French

in both the political and military spheres. The emergence of Japan

as a modern and powerful nation came after her remarkable victory in

the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. The result of it was a reawakening

^^Thaddeus Flood, "Japan's Relations with Thailand, 1926- 1941" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1967), p. 59. 113

of Asian nationalism and a gradual undermining of a hitherto white

supremacy. The very fact that the French and British were neighbors

worked to the latter's disadvantage as the past acquisitions of ter­

ritory were brought up frequently against them. There was also a

disposition to look upon Britain and France as the most dangerous

Westerners because of the closeness of Singapore and Indochina. For

this reason, the Japanese held good trump cards; they were Asiatic

people just like the Thai. They had passed through the same ex­

perience of freeing themselves from an extraterritorial system. Most

of all they had demonstrated to the world that an Oriental nation was capable of meeting the Western nations upon their own grounds if

they were well developed in military strength and industrial achieve­ ment. Thus the new elites admired Japanese strength. They hoped that

Japan, with its anti-Western influence, could help the Thai to counter

Western influence. By so using Japan, perhaps Siam's position, bound on both sides by the British and the French, would improve.

The threat of foreign intervention was real enough so that it

was not difficult for Fibul to use the issue of national security as his main propaganda theme to raise his support and expand the military budget as the readers have been informed in the last chapter.

The Ministry of Defence under Pibul's guidance did not

hesitate to show the British what they thought of Japan. Under the

absolute regime it was the Siamese custom to send quite a number of

their military officers to be trained in England. Crosby made the

following observation in 1936:

"As far as 1 was aware, since the coup d'etat 114

which put an end to the old regime nearly four years ago, the Ministry of Defence had sent no one to England at all for a full course of naval or military training, and a very few of­ ficers indeed, even for a brief period of study. Why had the practice now been discontinued? On the other hand, the Siamese naval and military officers who had been dispatched, and were still being dispatched, to Japan for their technical education under the present regime were numerous, and now the Ministry of Defence was apparently seeking a fresh place of training in Italy."142

Crosby did not get his answer from Pibul but from Prince

Wan Waidhyakara, a special advisor attached to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. The Prince said that the Ministry of Defence thought that

training in Japan was cheaper.

Owing to the internal instability during 1932-1936 there

was no significant change in the basic Thai foreign policy. The

country was under a period of readjustment internally; therefore no

key leaders were thinking of making overt changes. In fact, they needed foreign support, be it from the British or the Japanese to make their position in internal politics more secure.

With every change of the cabinet, a new state councillor of

Foreign Affairs was appointed which showed that the country preferred

status quo in foreign relations. During the government of Praya Mano,

or the first government of Siam, it was Praya Srivisarn Vacha, a

graduate from Oxford University and a senior aristocrat. During the

reign of Rama VII, Praya Srivisarn and Raymond B. Stevens, the

142 Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 371. Sir Josiah Crosby to Mr. Eden, June 16, 1936. 115

American Advisor, were asked by the King to draw up a constitution

which was submitted to the Supreme Council of State in great secrecy

in March 1932. The draft called for the appointment of a prime minister and the king to be under the law. The prime minister was

to preside over a cabinet responsible to a legislative assembly,

the members of which would be equally divided between appointed and

elected ones. The elected members would be chosen by an indirect

method. In fact, Praya Srivisarn's and Stevens' draft constitution

bore a great deal of similarity with Pridi's constitution. Sur­

prisingly enough, both Praya Srivisarn and Stevens made a separate

comment that the establishment of a constitutional monarchy was

inevitable. Both, however, expressed doubts on the timing because

of the level of education of the Siamese people. They suggested a

gradual approach, starting by setting up local municipal assemblies.

When the Coup occurred in 1932, Praya Srivisarn was blamed as one who

advised the King against giving the constitution. The fact that he was appointed as a State Councillor suggested his ability and

familiarity with the work in that particular field for a long time.

However, he was in the position for only a year. He shared in the fall of Praya Mano at the second coup (June 20, 1933).

When Praya Pahon became President of the State Council, he ap­

pointed Praya Apibarn Rajamaitri, ex-Minister to Great Britain to

take over the post of the State Council or of Foreign Affairs. How­

ever it was a well known fact that since the Coup of 1932, there was

a key personality who was a special advisor in the Ministry, Prince 116

Wan Waidhyakara Varawan. The Prince is a nephew of the late King

Chulalongkorn. He was educated in England at Balliol College, Oxford,

and subsequently spent some time in France. He had been Siamese

Minister in both London and Paris and had represented Siam with the

League of Nations at Geneva. After the coup of 1932, he associated

himself with the new elites, to the disgust of the members of the

Royal family. Through the period under study in this presentation,

Prince Wan played a significant role behind every Thai State Coun­

cillor from 1932-1944.

Praya Apibarn held the post of Foreign Affairs for a year

before Praya Srisena Sombatsiri replaced him as the new State Coun­

cillor in 1935. The latter was previously an Under-Secretary in the

Ministry of Interior. He had a reputation of being an honest and

well-intentioned official who was not afraid to speak his mind.

Owing to his education in England, he showed his friendliness towards

Britain. Praya Srisena was in the position for a year when in 1936

Pridi relinquished the portfolio of the Interior to Foreign Affairs.

His timing gave him more advantage than each of his predecessors.

Until then, Siam was still under the last vestige of extra-territorial 143 systems which had operated since 1855. When Pridi took over the position, British relationship with Siam was governed by the Treaty of

Commerce and Navigation of 1925 which was about to expire in 1937. By

143 By the treaty of 1855, called the "Bowring Treaty," Siam agreed that all British subjects in Siam should be exempt from the jurisdiction of Thai courts and that Siam would never raise the import tariff on British goods beyond three per cent. At the time of the signing of the Treaty, neither of the provisions was felt burdensome. 117

the terms of the Treaty the Siamese Government could not raise the amount of import tariff on some specific goods and products. Another treaty signed on the same date dealt with the jurisdiction applicable in Siam to British subjects. The protocol attached to the Treaty stipulated that the British consul had the right to evoke any case in which a British national was the defendant from Siamese court and put it on trial in his own court.

In accordance with the mood of the new elites to assert their own independence, Pridi approached the British Minister, Sir Josiah

Crosby. The negotiations for a new equal treaty was underway since

October 9, 1936. Subsequently, a new Anglo-Siamese Treaty on the desired basis of full reciprocity was signed on November 3, 1936.

The British Treaty was the first equal treaty and the Thai government used it as a model to negotiate with other countries. Moreover, to show the Thai of her friendliness, the British took the initiative regarding the abolition of the right of evocation. The British government agreed to relinquish it simultaneously with the conclusion of the new Treaty of Commerce and Navigation on the condition that the Thai government should submit "an act on the Conflict of Laws embodying the normal principles of private international law, including the law of nationality in matters of personal status."

Thus Britain was not only the country to use the system of extra-territoriality in Siam, but was also, eighty years afterwards, the first foreign country to agree to its complete abandonment. By using the British example the Thai government was able to persuade other powers to follow suit. 118

For his accomplishment, Pridi was given the highest medal of merit from the President of the Council of Regents acting on behalf of His Majesty the King.

Irredentism

Side by side with the positive side of nationalism which

showed itself in the form of self assertiveness, there existed a

feeling of irredentism. A group of the new elites was aiming at re­ covering the territory on the East ceded to France over a long period of years as well as reacquiring the Malay States from Britain.

The first person who talked about the return of the land was a representative from Lampang who inquired from the government whether

it was possible to seek the assistance from the League of Nations for

the return of certain territories which were taken by foreign powers 144 in the past. The Prime Minister, Praya Pahon replied in the

negative.

Another attempt to remind the people of the lost territory

came at the anniversary of the death of King Rama V. A special wreath was placed at the foot of the statue of King Rama V. It con­ sisted of a map of Siam and adjacent countries, the part in the South and the East were deleted in different colors from the rest of the

map and marked "ceded to England" and "ceded to France" in such and

such a year. In addition to the map, there was this note attached

to the wreath saying:

"You must love the Siamese race; you must help

ILL BTWM, February 15, 1935. 119

and support the Army of Siam, Siamese should think and remember."145

The French Charge d'Affaires, M. George Picot reported on

the incident to Paris. He had done so because the Siamese government had a treaty obligation with France to have mutual respect for the treaty. An obligation which the Charge d'Affaires thought implied that further agitation on the ceded territory should not be en- 146 couraged. The French made a formal protest to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. The protest also mentioned the printing of the map in question by the Ministry of Defence. The maps of the lost ter- 147 ritory were distributed all over the country.

On the date of the first protest, the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs said the wreath was done by a private enterprise, a pharmacy called "Pra Chandra Osoth" but the Ministry did not know who put the 148 wreath in the national museum for public display.

Luang Pibul as the State Councillor for the Defence, replied

on the map question that the maps were printed so that officers in the

145 F.O. 371 Sir Josiah Crosby to Sir Samuel Hoare. December 14, 1935. 146 Article Two of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of February 14, 1925 is as follows: "Les hautes parties contractantes confirment, en s'en garantissant le respect reciproque, les frontieres etablies entre leurs territoires en vertu et en conformite des stipulatoins des accords anterieurs, maintenus par 1'article 27 du present traite." 147 Luan Sarapaiwanit, Fan Rai Khong Kaphachao (*fy Bad Dream) (Bangkok: Bangkok Banakan, 1959), p. 242.

14^bid. 120

Siamese Army might be properly instructed in the history of their native land. There was no intention of arousing in them the ambition to violate the existing treaties with Britain and France.

There seemed to be no doubt that the Ministry of Defence was behind the irredentist movement. The wreath incident came at the time when Pibul was expanding his base of support.

Crosby had this for comment:

"The study of such a map cannot but tend to inspire the younger and more thoughtless elements among the military..., and it is a matter of regret to discover that the so-called 'irredentist movement' should have been fathered in this way by the Defence Ministry."149

When asked by Crosby about his opinion on irredentism Pridi, as State Councillor for Foreign Affairs had this to say:

"For one thing, the Cambodians equally with their neighbors the Annamites, would never willingly consent to be subjected to the Siamese and, for another, even if Siam were able to annex Cambodia and adjacent country, she would find herself gravely embarassed by such an addition to her territory. At present, French Indochina served as a buffer between Siam and China, but if that buffer were to be removed Siam would run a great danger of becoming the cockpit of future wars. Why should Siam be called upon in that event to defend with their blood the liberty of Cambodian people?"l50

Referring to 'the imperialist friends' in Siam, Pridi made

this comment:

"if they were requested (by the Cambodians) to send out doctors, or engineers to make roads, or

149 F.O. 371 Crosby to Sir Samuel Hoare, December 14, 1935.

150F.O. 371, Crosby reported to F.O. conversation he had with Pridi, March 15, 1938. 121

veterinary officers to suppress disease among cattle, they could supply none of these experts since they disposed of all too few of them themselves. Siam was unable to do for them (the Cambodians) one half of what the French had

previously been performing on their b e h a l f . "151

Praya Pahon did not agree with the idea of the irredentist movement. He was reported to give the following opinion:

"We must not forget that ours is a small country with more than enough surplus land, which cannot as yet be fully developed. There­ fore, foreign countries should not suppose that we have any thought in the direction of more territory, apart from what we already possess at present."152

In the Thai tradition the making of foreign policy depends either on the initiative of the Foreign Minister with the agreement of the Prime Minister or the initiative of the Prime Minister from the beginning, in this case the Foreign Minister worked out the

detailed plan. The Cabinet would act as an acknowledgement body.

Thus in the transition period, with Pridi and Praya Pahon against the

irredentist idea, there was no concrete policy outcome.

The Problems of the Chinese Minority in the Transition Period

Up to the beginning of the 20th Century, Chinese immigrants were welcomed in Siam. They were regarded by the Thai court as bringing in profit and wealth to the Kingdom. During all this time

Chinese assimilation was encouraged. The mainland government did not

have a legal claim on their compatriots overseas and at first they

152 BTWM, March 11, 1937, "The Premier and the Political Outlook." 122 were not interested in their own offsprings until the first Chinese

nationality law came out in 1909. The law was based upon the jus

sanguines and not upon the jus loci. The law insisted accordingly

that all individuals of Chinese race, wherever born were Chinese

subjects and entitled to Chinese diplomatic and consular protection

wherever they might be. The Thai law on nationality of 1910 stressed

on a person born in the country as Thai. The fact that the Chinese

immigrants did not bring their wives to Siam up to the 19th Century

but married Thai women helped the process of assimilation to a certain

extent. Besides, in order to draw rich and important Chinese into

the interest of the country, the Thai King ennobled them. This course

of action worked for the benefit of both sides. The Chinese conceived

of the Thai status as attractive and seemed to enjoy both position and

wealth. On the Thai side they successfully assimilated the creme of

the Chinese elites to their society.

The gradual Chinese control of the Thai economy did not come

to the Thai attention until 1910 when the Chinese staged a general

strike to protest the raise of the poll tax. It was clearly visible

the immediate effect of the strike. The price of rice increased 153 3-4 bahts. Both fresh and dry food were hard to find in the market.

The fact that the Chinese became an important part of the

Thai economy resulted from tradition in the Thai society more than

anything else. Under absolute monarchy, the Siamese population was

153 Thailand, Thai National Archives, T21, File 21. Report by Pra Pisutasa to Prince Damrong. 123

154 divided into two broad categories: the rulers and the ruled.

In the broadest sense, the rulers included the King, the princes and

a hierarchy of officials. The lowest class of the rulers was the

"phu di (good people)." Then there were two categories of people

below the "phu di," they were called phrai and that (slaves).

These last two groups of people had been forced to work hard for their

Nai (Master). As a result, the Thai looked down ontthose who worked hard with their hands and on their knees because they associated it with being phrai and that. Another weakness was to be found in the

Buddhist values and ethic which teach people to be satisfied with what­ ever they have.

"Where there is no desire, there is no suffering. This is the Noble Truth of the Extinction of Dukkha (suffering): it is the complete fading away and extinction of this craving, its forsaking, giving up, the liberation and detachment from it."156

Buddhists believe in merit making; they believe that merit accrues to the individual in accordance with the extent to which he participates in a merited act. Kingship, high government positions and the prestige which one holds are the result of past merit making; likewise, the maintenance and enhancement of status depend on continued merit making.

154 H.Q. Wales, Ancient Siamese Government and Administration (London: Bernard Quaritch, Ltd., 1934), pp. 40-50.

*"^Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society on the Early Bangkok Period (Cornell University, 1968),pp. 20-21. 156 Robert L. Lester, Theravada Buddhism in Southeast Asia (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1973), p. 31. 124

This kind of philosophy can justify a people's failure to

be active. People accept that this world is full of sorrow, that

those suffering are compelled to do so by their previous incarnation.

The only hope of peace for the soul is not to improve this world, but

to escape from the sufferings all by oneself. Accordingly, the Thai

are easy going people who always believe that there are fish in the water and rice in the field. The Chinese, on the contrary, work hard at any kind of job. They came to the country with a pillow and a mat and in not too long, they were rich.

The new elites, once they were in power, had a special

concern over the problem of the Chinese. They knew that in 1930, not only did the Chinese provide between 70% of all the non-agriculture skilled and unskilled labor in the entire country,they dominated

in the processing, distributing and exporting of rice, rubber, tin and

teak to the degree that it was estimated that they constituted 85% of 158 Siam's commercial class and controlled 90% of her commerce and trade.

If the new elites wanted to find the equal economic opportunity for

the Thai as they had pledged in the six principles, they knew they had to work in both directions. Concerning the Chinese, they had to

either reduce the rate of Chinese immigration into the country or try

to assimilate the Chinese inside the country. On the Thai side, they

had to correct the traditional attitudes of the people.

157 James M. Andrew, Siam, Second Economic Survey (Bangkok: The Bangkok Times Press, 1935), p. 17. 158 William G. Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 220. 125

The readers should be reminded that the Siamese refused to enter into treaty relations with China. In addition, the Siamese with held from China the right to station diplomatic or consular officials in Siam. As a result of this state of affairs, the Siamese were free to deal as they pleased with the local Chinese community.

Regarding the policy against the Chinese, one can say that there was nothing yet to suggest that Pridi or any of the civilians in the government were less enthusiastic than Pibul. Pridi, even

though of Chinese ancestry, worked to keep economic power out of the hands of the Chinese. In this, he cooperated with Pibul...to the

159 extent that they were called the "Siamese twins."

The Chinese not only were considered a threat to the Thai

economy but on the political side as well. Following the election of

Sun-Yat-Sen as president of the Canton Government in 1921, the

Chinese community became increasingly politicized. A branch of the

Kuomintang was organized as an underground political movement as

early as 1925. By 1928, it claimed to have a membership of 20,000 160 divided into a total of 138 'cells'. ° In the cities, the KMT

operated through the organizations known as Chung Hua (Chinese

Association and the Ch'iung Hui-so (Hainanese Association) and in the

provinces through the Shu pao-she (Book and Newspaper Societies).

In connection with the Sino-Japanese war there was a

159 Net Khemayodhin, Ngan Tai Din Khong Pan Qek Yothi (Colonel Yothi's Work in the Underground) (Bangkok: 1957), Vol. 3, pp. 622-623. 160 Skinner, Chinese Society, p. 236. 126

mounting nationalistic sentiment in response to the Tsinan Incident

161 of May 1928. The Chinese merchants organized to the extent of

combining to engage railway cars and refusing to transport goods by

rail to any merchant, regardless of nationality, suspected of

handling Japanese products. Subsequently, in June the KMT organized

a 'coordinating' committee to direct the boycott and an underground

secret society, the Iron and Blood Corps (T'ieh-hsuch-t'uan) to

enforce it. The strike wore on until October and it was reported that more than 60 Chinese were deported.

The first boycott during the transitional period occurred in

the summer of 1937 after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7,

1937. It was directed in Bangkok by Chinese government official trade representative Chan-shou-ming who worked closely with the Chamber of

Commerce in Bangkok. In January 1938, fifty Chinese agents came to

Bangkok from Singapore. The boycott went on and off through the year

1938. The Chinese in the north, in Chiengmai province, also joined

in. Thus the government had to step in and severely suppress the

Chinese news media, the boycott group in Bangkok and elsewhere.

The government was concerned not only with internal insecurity

resulting from suppression of the Chinese but also with its external relationship with Japan. The government could not risk having the

Chinese break up the friendship. Subsequently, when the number of

This was a clash between Japanese troops and the Army of China's Southern government over the nationalist liberation of Tsinan. 127

Chinese merchants killed because they were dealing with the Japanese increased rapidly, in July 1938, the government made a mass arrest of the members of the Chinese secret society and opium addicts. It was reported that almost six thousand Chinese were arrested and a majority 162 of them were deported for violating Alien Registration Laws.

It was in the same month that Luang Wichit Wadhakan,

Minister without portfolio and Director of the Department of Fine

Arts, made a speech at Chulalongkorn University in which he made a comment that the Chinese were worse than the J^ws in Germany. As he was a cabinet minister and a committee member of the Japan-Siam

Association, his speech was taken as the government policy to help the

Japanese and to be anti-Chinese. As a matter of fact, Luang Wichit was half Chinese whose Chinese name was Kimliang, meaning Gold

Dragon.

Another problem which the new elites were concerned with was the problem of remittances reported by Mr. William Doll, Financial

Advisor in 1937. In the report, he mentioned that the Chinese in Siam

sent their remittances back home at no less than 20 million Baht a year. The Thai elites thought that this sum of money should be used to reinvest in Siam instead.

What the government of Praya Pahon had done to restrict the

manner of the Chinese immigrants was to raise the fees for the issue

^^Flood, "Relations with Thailand" p. 212. 163 See the comment on Luang Wichit's lecture in Sayam Review, August 6, 1938, pp. 5-6. 128

of an Identification Paper on the passport from 4 Tcs to 30 Tcs. In

1933 an ability to read and write was added as a new qualification to

apply for immigration visas and the fee for the issue of a certificate of residence was increased to 100 Tcs. The final raise of the fee came in 1937-38 when it was at 200 Tcs. This meant that within the past ten years the government had raised the fee by 50%. The measure was successful because in December 1938, 1,263 Chinese entered the 164 country as opposed to 2,574 who left.

In the field of education, the government still followed the

Primary Education Act of 1921 which said that all children from the ages of seven to fourteen were required to attend primary schools which adopted the syllabus of the Ministry. Strict interpretation would mean that if the Chinese schools wanted to teach Chinese to their students they should admit the students older than fourteen.

However, the enforcement was very lenient and the Chinese could dis­ regard the rules.

After the coup in 1933, the government imposed a twenty- eight hour school week on all schools, twenty-one hours of which were to be devoted to studies done in Thai language and one hour to physical education. Chinese was considered a foreign language and could be taught only six hours a week. Alien teachers would be allowed to teach if they had passed an examination in Thai equivalent to the fourth grade. Inspectors were sent out frequently. Between 1939-1945,

164 Siam Chronicle, April 1, 1939. 129

seventy-nine Chinese schools were closed.

Thus throughout Praya Pahon's premiership, the Chinese were

the target of Thai nationalism. Unlike its counterparts in the rest

of Asia, Thai nationalism was directed against an internal Asiatic

minority more than any other nationality. At this time, it was con­

templated toward an economic aspect of the Chinese rather than against

Western imperialism. The measures aimed at gaining more support from

the people internally and at the same time externally, the anti-

Chinese policy fitted in well with the government's aim of trying to

have close cooperation with Japan.

The Period Under Pibul's First Government (1938-1944)

Pibul's accession to the premiership represented only a few minor changes in the Cabinet. Out of its twenty-four members all but five were promoters of the coup of June 1932. Twelve members were not in the previous cabinet and twelve members were from the fighting forces.

The post of the State Councillor for foreign affairs was

given to Chao Praya Sri Dharma Dhibes who was a member of the British bar and was Minister of Justice at one time under Praya Pahon's government. The Chao Praya was a well known aristocrat who had a moderate viewpoint. Under the old regime, he was President of the

Final Court of Appeals. After the coup he kept aloof from politics for a while. Later on, he felt it was his duty to cooperate with the promoters for the sake of the country. He accepted the post of the

165 Kenneth P. Landon, The Chinese in Thailand (New York: Russell and Russell, 1973), p. 273. 130

State Councillor of Finance for a while and later on that of Foreign

Affairs. With this kind of background, there was no doubt that the

foreign policy would not be drastically changed. The Chan Praya

declared that Siam would be friendly to every nation. However, when

not even a year had passed, he resigned the post giving ill health as his reason. Pibul took over the post of Foreign Affairs. He was the

first Thai who held three posts at the same time: the post of Prime

Minister, State Councillor of Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs.

As seen in Chapter II, ten days after his assumption to the

premiership, Pibul's Chief of Police Luang Adul made the big arrest.

The purge was the talk of the town for a long time. A writer compared 166 it to the reign of terror in France. Pibul probably knew the mood

of the public and he tried to divert their thinking to something else.

One of his themes was to emphasize the fact that they were now in a different age, an age where they could speak their minds without being punished.He told them that under the old regime they were poorer every day and they could not find anyone to help them: under the new

Siam, they "are equal, there are no slaves, no princes; the government 168 officials are behaving as relatives of the people."

166 Vitheskorani (pseud.) Yuk Tamin (Reign of Rerror) (Bangkok: Odeon kan Prachakom, 1958). 167 Prachamitra, December 14, 1939. Speech of Pibul on the Constitutional Day Anniversary. 131

His eloquent speeches were far from the true situation. In

Siam, the press was still under strong censorship and public opinion

was still non-existent.

To make the people united behind him, Pibul resorted to

using nationalism. It was Pibul's technique to legitimize his ideas

to somebody else and in this case it was King Rama VI. He was con­

sidered to be the father of Thai Nationalism. There were certain

similarities between his reign and that of Pibul's. The King faced

the same problem of Chinese minority inside the country and externally, there was the outbreak of the first World War.

The King wanted to remind the people of the danger of the

Chinese. His people took it for granted that they had the Chinese working at a lower level for them but they did not realize the power of the Chinese on the economy. As the King was a great writer, he wrote many books and essays. Two of which dealt specifically with the

Chinese. They were Jew Hang Burapatit (Jews of the East), and Mai

Chop Thai (Not Like Thai). The King criticized the Chinese for their

love of money, their refusal to accept Thai culture and their restric­

tive, trade practices. In "Muang Thai Chong Tun Terd" (Thailand Wakes),

he asked whether a Chinese can really be counted as a Thai. Then he

explained that the Chinese who lived in the provinces were more

friendly to their neighbors than the Bangkok Chinese because they

knew that there were only a few Chinese living there. In Bangkok, if

the leaders of the Secret Societies did not indoctrinate the Chinese

they would listen to reason. What really mattered was that every 132

169 Chinese wanted to go back to China. Could the Thai survive then?

Even the peddling jobs which once were done by the Thai were at present being done by the Chinese. The same was true with the handi-

170 craft work.

The King concluded that the Thai should wake up. They should help the country by buying Thai made products. Most of all, they should stop their old beliefs that Thai and Chinese were the same kind of people.'*-7^

The key concepts in the King's philosophy of nationalism were one country (chart), one religion (sasana), one King

(Pramahakasat). These three elements might not sound original for the western mind as they were probably adopted from the English version "God, King, and country." The Thai version formulated by

the King meant that the monarchy was the rightful government who 172 could best govern the people. The King was also the personi­

fication of the Thai state which was one element to which all Thai, 173 to be Thai, had to be loyal. On top of everything else was

Buddhism which would bind the Thai together psychologically.

169 Rama VI, "Muang Thai Chong Tun Terd" (Thailand Awake) reprinted in Prayut Sithipan, Pramahateraratchao (Bangkok: Siam Press, 1972), p. 482.

170Ibid., p. 430.

171Ibid., p. 446. 172 The King's idea on monarchy was "Chao Thai cha di Proh mi nai"(The Thai will be good because of their Master). 173 Rama V I , "On Becoming a Genuine Nation" in Pramuen botPrarajanipon (Collections of the King's Work) (Bangkok: 1965), p. 88. 133

The King used the word "Thai" very often and he inter­

preted it to mean "free and sovereign." For the country he called

it "Muang Thai" (Land of the Thai). This can be interpreted as his

idea of nationalism. For him, the Thai nation began with a group of

people who were determined not to be subjugated and oppressed by

others. They separated themselves from all others, and established

a distinct community. They named their community "Thai" because 174 they possessed full sovereignty. They were not anyone's slaves.

Nationalism, though a western concept when used in Siam,

will be defined as the policy of asserting the interest of one's own nation, viewed as separate from the interests of other nations or the common interest of all nations. The nationalism of Thai leaders was expressed in both positive and negative terms. During Praya Pahon's regime, it was expressed positively as the desire to assert the

elites' ability to run their own house without foreign interference.

Negatively, it was directed against the Chinese. The elites believed

that their countrymen suffered from poverty owing to the Chinese control of the economy.

The most important move toward emphasizing the nationalistic theme under Pibul's regime was to change the name of the country from

Siam to Thailand, the government issued a notification as follows:

"Whereas the country is called by two names viz., 'Thai' and 'Siam', but the people are in favor of the name Thai, the government deems it

174 Rama VI, Pluckchai Sua Pa (Wild Tiger Corps Lectures) (Bangkok: Privately printed, 1914), p. 28. 134

expedient to establish the official name of the country to correspond with the name of the race."

Actually, the name "Siam" was officially used from the reign of Rama IV. Philologists disagreed as to the origin of the word

"Siam." Sinologists claimed that it was of Chinese origin. Sanscrit scholars traced it to an Indian word meaning "brown." Indochinese experts said that the word was derived from a Cambodian name of a province. The Thai called themselves Thai which King Rama VI translated to mean free. The name and the meaning suited the spirit of the leader at that time. The government spokesman explained that the word "Siam" was used to call the Thai one sidedly. It seemed like "we were a colony of the country who named us, which was not appropriate.Luang Wichit, Director of the Department of Fine

Arts, said that the Thai should call themselves after their race which 177 is "Thai."

The Problems of the Chinese Minority During Pibul's First Period

When Pibul became Prime Minister, out of a total population in Thailand of about 14 million people, approximately 3 million, or more than one-fifth, were of Chinese origin, but about half a million of them had been born in China and possessed exclusively a

Chinese nationality. The remainder had been born in Thailand, and the Thai government maintained firmly that they were Thai subjects,

^■^See the full text in Appendix I. See also Luang Wichit's article in BTWM, May 29, 1939.

^ ^ Prachamitra, May 23, 1939.

^ ^ Prachamitra, May 24, 1939. 135

and to be treated as such as long as they were in Thailand. The

Chinese, on the other hand, claimed as their nationals all persons

of Chinese race wherever born. As long as the Chinese insisted on

laying claim on the right of protection, the Thai authorities refused

to accept diplomatic or consular officers from China.

Pibul expressed his feeling concerning the Chinese very

clearly to Dr. Duen Bunnag, a Minister without portfolio in March

1944.

"My main concern is to prevent the Chinese from setting up a state within a state. In the old days there was no nationalistic policy or the policy which would encourage the Thai to unite, to the extent of being called a nation. Now I feel that the govern­ ment must lead the Thai to find new occupations instead of letting the individuals do it on their own."178

Pibul was very much concerned when he noticed that the 179 Chinese were selling Thai food. In the speech on the National

Day, 1939, Pibul said:

"Have you ever observed the Thai as being the master of some form of commerce? Nearly all kinds of trading in our country are in the hands of aliens. Even in small trade, it is the same. If you wish to prepare a small cup of nam-prik, you still have to depend on the aliens, for if they do not stock the necessary ingredient, you are almost powerless in preparing such a dish."180

178 Thailand, Office of the Secretary of the Prime Minister. Pibul's letter to Dr. Duen Bunnag, File - "Memo on Chinese Problems." 179 From an interview with Lady La-iad, September, 1973. 180 Thailand, Department of Publicity, Pramuan Kum Prasai lae Suntorapot Khong Nayok Ratamontri (Collections of Speeches done by the Prime Minister) (Bangkok: 1940), p. 35. 136

From these speeches, Pibul's aim was to replace the Chinese

with the Thai in anything possible. As the nature of the Thai was

non extreme, Pibul thought it would be more fruitful if the govern­ ment would intervene for the sake of the people. Under Praya Pahon1s

regime, the government limited the number of Chinese immigrants into the country and tried to assimilate those who had already been in the country. Pibul added one more measure, that of Thai influence which would call for the gradual replacement of the Chinese by the Thai.

A. Major Industries

1. Rice. Even though Thai farmers are the ones who grow rice, it was a well known fact that the Chinese acting like middlemen, money lenders, exporters, were the ones who amassed all the profit. To replace the Chinese with the Thai, the government had made a series of programs. First of all, the government controlled

Thai Rice Company which was formed in 1938 through the purchase of ten Chinese rice mills. The second step to help the rice growers to be freed from debt to the Chinese middlemen was to set up credit cooperative societies. The third step to rid the Chinese control of the export market was to set up a Thai Rice Company who would buy directly from the rice growers and would act as an exporter. The final step was to build the Port of Bangkok. This was a necessary measure as the entry of the port was obstructed by a bar where only shallow draft vessels were engaged in the lighterage business. Rice and other goods were subsequently sent to Hong Kong and Singapore which became the re-shipment ports for Siam. The Chinese usually would handle the problem of carrying rice over to Hong Kong and 137

Singapore. With the advice of James M. Andrew, who made a survey of

Thai economy in 1935, the government dredged the bar so that deep

water ships up to 12,000 tons could dock and load Thai rice and the

Thai could control the transactions of rice.

2. Tin. Tin was the second major industry controlled by

the Chinese and it was the second most important export commodity in

Siam. About three fourths of the mines were controlled and funded by Europeans. The average mine employed three or four Europeans to 181 supervise, but the Chinese formed the majority of the workers.

By the end of 1939, the government issued new regulations requiring that both public and private industry should employ not more than 25% alien laborers. Moreover, the government announced that it would begin its own mining operations in the south of Thailand.

3. Rubber. This industry was largely in the hands of the

Chinese who migrated from Malaya, after 1927. The hold of the

Chinese on the third largest export was almost complete as they not only formed the majority of the labor force but the Chinese were the financiers for and the exporters of rubber at the same time. The fact that the Thai accepted the national rubber quota agreement in

1939 set the government in control of the rubber industry. The amount of rubber that could be sold was controlled by coupons issued

in accordance with individual quotas. Indirectly, it meant that the

government had a final authority in giving permission for anyone to engage in the industry.

^Hjandon, The Chinese in Thailand, p. 253. Minor Industries

The control of Chinese business had been inaugurated in the

Business Registration Act which required all commercial firms to

register with the Thai government and demanded that every signboard

carry a Thai name or at least the transliteration of a foreign name

into Thai. However, the real blow came in 1939 with the passage of

laws that in a very short period saw the Chinese deprived of their

bird's nest concessions, their salt and tobacco monopolies as well as 182 the role of butchers, food vendors, taxidrivers and fishermen.

The Control in the Field of Education

Pibul followed Pahon's policy concerning the 1933 regulations.

Throughout his period every school had to follow strict enforcement.

At the beginning of August 1939, thirty schools were closed; five of

them were Thai and the rest were Chinese. In the provinces, several 183 Chinese schools were closed down as well.

With four years compulsory education, some of the Chinese

found out that the Thai language is easy to understand and so they were drawn into the Thai community. Only the sons of rich families would go to China or Malaya to have higher education. Thus Pibul succeeded to a certain extent in assimilating the Chinese in Thailand.

Reactions from the Chinese

The Chinese response to the Thai-ification measures assumed two forms: on the one hand, it forced the Chinese merchants and

1 Q O Skinner, Chinese Society, pp. 262-264. 139

shopkeepers in nearly every trade to organize into seme business

association. On the other hand, it forced a revival of the old

secret society and assassination. In 1939 when the situation was at

its worst, Hia Kwang lam, the president of the Chinese Chamber of

Commerce was assassinated. The wave of terror resulted in the in­

volvement of the Thai authorities and precipitated a wave of police

raids. One reason for the raids was that the Chinese started to

boycott Japanese goods again. Of the twelve Chinese newspapers in

Bangkok, eleven were forced to suspend publication for various

reasons, chief among reasons were alleged advocacy of the boycott and

encouragement of the activities of Chinese secret societies.

On the whole, the attempt to Thai-ify the people was un­

successful because the Thai lacked readiness to take over the jobs

formerly done by the Chinese. The case of the Thai rice Company was

a good example. After the Company had purchased ten Chinese rice

mills they could not find a Thai manager with enough experience to

run them. Finally, the Chinese who sold three rice mills to the 184 government became the manager after his speedy naturalization.

It is safe to say that restrictions on the economic activities

of aliens did not after all produce Thai-ification. Only in such oc­ cupations as taxidrivers which does not require a long period of

training did the Thai take over completely.

Thus before the outbreak of the war, the Chinese were used

as a target to gain popular support of the people internally. The

government wanted to show the people that they cared for them and

^^ I b i d ., p. 411, note 2. 140

were willing to help them compete with the Chinese. Externally, it

was to save the friendship with the Japanese; both of these objectives

were exactly as Fraya Pahon had done although the latter's measures

were not as aggressive.

Pibul's Foreign Policy Before the War (1939-1941)

The foreign policy of the first two years of Pibul's regime

had a connection with the irredentist movement which occurred during

Praya Pahon1s regime. It was mentioned in the first part of this

chapter that the Ministry of Defence was behind the movement. If the

irredentist movement was primarily connected with the military, the

second movement was known as a Pan Thai movement. It was aimed at

incorporating into the Kingdom of Thailand all the regions which were

occupied by the Thai extraction. However, these populations are to

be found almost entirely in the Laos and Cambodian Protectorates of

French Indochina and in the Shan States which belonged to the British.

The third movement was called Khana Luat Thai (Thai Blood Group) which

had the same aim as the second movement.

In connection with the Pan Thai movement was a man who was

the author of many patriotic plays, books and articles. In the reign of King Rama VI, the King liked to write plays which would

arouse the audience's patriotic feelings; in Pibul's period Luang

Wichit was the most well known playwright. He was responsible partly

for the irredentist movement.

Luang Wichit Wadhakan

Luang Wichit Wadhakan was half Chinese. He was born into

a lower middle class family. Before he started his career as a 141 clerk in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he had been ordained as a novice for several years. During the time when Pridi and Pibul were students in Paris, Luang Wichit was a third secretary in the Royal

Thai Legation in Paris.

At the time of the Coup of 1932, Luang Wichit's name was not included in the list of the promoters. Later on he was named as

the Secretary of Khana Chart which was supposed to be a new political

party, but Praya Mano did not permit its being formed. As Luang

Wichit was a self educated man and a born writer, he could make him­

self known through his writings which covered various fields: a

fifteen volume world history, patriotic plays, novels, grammar books, etc.

In January, 1933, Luang Wichit wrote a pamphlet on nationalism.

He interpreted it as a political theory which upholds the nation more 185 than anything else. He laid down four ingredients for any Thai who wants to become a nationalist: First of all, he must be faithful to

Buddhism which is the religion of the nation. Secondly, he must up­ hold the nation as the most sacred thing. Thirdly, he must respect the King and the constitution. Fourthly, he must never be a com­ munist.

Luang Wichit analyzed that the Thai had never been nationalists because they were too adaptable. During the Ayudhya

period the Thai had almost become Cambodian because they copied the

Cambodian Court system and used their court language. What the Thai

185 Wichit Wadhakan, Luang Latti Chuchart (Nationalism) 2nd ed.: Bangkok: 1933,), p. 1. 142

should do to correct the problem was to re-educate the people. New

history books should be written so that children six to seven years

old could understand their own history. Thai words should be used

besides reviving old Thai customs and ceremonies. Moreover, the Thai

should use products made in Thailand and buy things Thai made.

Here are the lists of the plays vdiich were very popular and

at present are frequently seen on the stage. Some of his songs from

the plays are still heard on the radio. From the description the

readers can see what the government was campaigning for.

Luat Suphan (Suphan Blood) was first staged in 1936, the

year when the Ministry of Defence was campaigning for a larger budget.

It was a story of people in Suphan province who fought

against the Burmese invasion. The hero was a Burmese who fell in love

with a Thai captive. The hero helped free all the Thai prisoners.

When his father, the commander of the troop, found out, the hero was

executed. The heroine led the Thai force to fight the Burmese even

though they did not have enough weapons, and finally they were all killed.

At the end of the play, a Burmese said:

"Thai blood is not bad at all. The Thai are courageous, they love their country, they are not afraid to die. It is difficult to find another nation like this. The only thing they lack is arms...Fighting without enough weapons is like sending flies into the fire...If they have enough weapons as other nations, the enemies can not beat them."

This play was a great hit. The Fine Arts Department of

which Luang Wichit was the Department head was able to build a new 143

theater on the basis of the tickets sold. The script of the play was sent to all government schools so that they could perform for local audiences. The play also helped a great deal in making the people sympathize with the cause of the military and their appeal for con­ tributions to buy more arms.

2. Rajamanu, 1936. This play was based on history when

Cambodia was conquered and reduced to the status of a vassal to Siam.

Luang Wichit added his ideas in the play that the present Cambodians are not the descendants of the ancient Kom. There are people in Siam who believe that Kom were the ancient Cambodian race who built the great Angkor but they were extinct. The present Cambodian race was a Kamen who had Thai ancestors just like the Thai. This would add to the cause of the 'Pan-Thai' movement.

3. Prachao Krung Thon (The King of Thonburi), 1937. In

1776, the Thai Kingdom with Ayudhya as the capital was sacked by the

Burmese. Praya Tak was the man who restored Siam and moved the capital to Thonburi. He was known as King Tak Sin or King of

Thonburi. The theme of the play emphasized the fact that the King was half Chinese, born in Siam. In the period where the Chinese were organizing a boycott against Japanese goods, Luang Wichit tried to calm down the anti-Chinese feeling and vice versa by writing a

song called "Thai-Chin Samuggi" (The Unity of the Thai and the

Chinese). It's aim was to stress the fact that Thai and Chinese were related as brothers and sisters.

4. Suk Thalang (The Battle of Thalang), 1937. The theme was about the 19th Century Burmese invasion. Two Thai women led the 144 resistance in the Island of Phuket. Later on these two women were awarded titles as Tao Suranari and Tao Srisunthorn. This play was based on history and its aim was to arouse the patriotic feelings of the mass.

5. Nanchao, 1937. Nanchao was believed to be a Thai

Kingdom in Yunnan before the 13th Century. This play is about how » the Thai Kingdom in South China was driven out of their homeland.

The play has a strong political effect because it makes the Thai public believe that their ancestors were driven out of Yunnan by the

Chinese.

6. Chaoying Senwi (The Princess of Senwi), 1938. Senwi is one of the British protected Shan States in the North of Thailand.

The Thai race in the Shan States is called Thai Ya (Big Thai) while

the Thai race in Thailand is called Thai Noi (Small Thai). Both races migrated together to the south away from the Chinese oppression.

He implied of course that the two races should be united into one Thai

Empire.

7. Maha Devi (The Great Queen), 1938. Maha Devi was the

queen of Chiengpnai, a northern state in the 16th Century. In the

play, she helps unify Siam into one country.

8. Anusawari Thai, 1939, This is the only contemporary

play where the hero talked about the state conventions. It is a

story of nation building which very much reflects the mood of the

government. It also deals with the threats from an unidentified

outside enemy.

9. Poh Khun Phamuang (The Lord of Fha Muang), 1940. This 145

was the last play written under Pibul's first period because Luang

Wichit, the author was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

after Thailand had joined the military pact with Japan. This is a

story of a Thai prince under the Cambodian rule in the 13th Century

who was about to set up the Kingdom of Sukothai.

People often called Luang Wichit an opportunist because he

would adapt himself to the one in power. When Pibul was out of

power in 1944, Luang Wichit suffered the same fate. He was put into

prison as a war criminal where he spent the time writing books. When

Pibul came back to power for the second time in 1947, Luang Wichit

came back too. The difference was that when Pibul was out of power

for good, Luang Wichit was appointed as a special advisor to Field

Marshal Sarit.

Luang Wichit's idea and the plays supported Pibul's

nationalistic move a great deal. However, in an interview With Lady

Ia-iad, Pibul's wife, she refused to admit that the two were close

friends and that Pibul had never taken any of Wichit's ideas.

Khun Ying Prapaphan, Luang Wichit's wife, on the other hand, con­

tended that Luang Wichit was really close to Pibul.

For the public, Luang Wichit's plays aroused the patriotic

feelings to such an extent that when the issue of the Non-aggression

Pact came up, it was not hard for the government to make propaganda

about how the French mistreated the Thai in 1893. As the people had

already had an anti-French feeling from the beginning, it did not

take the government long to have a solid support for their actions. 146

Non-Aggression Pact

In the beginning of 1939, the possibility of the second

World War was eminent. Pibul admired the Japanese economically and militarily, but he had a perception that once the war started in

Europe, Japan might seize Hong Kong and Singapore. To embark on a

frontal attack against Singapore would be more difficult because the

British defence line was strong. So Japan might seize Siam first 186 and attack Singapore base from the rear. Therefore, he wanted to use Japan to counter balance the influence of the British and the

French in Thailand. The French and the British representatives knew of the growing Japanese importance in Thailand but they also knew that Pibul was afraid of the Japanese invasion in case war came.

The French Military Attache, Monsier Marcel Ray, was the first person who mentioned the Non-aggression Pact to Crosby in 1936.

Ray told Crosby that:

"their (Thai) fears of Japan might be allayed, and their good will towards the French and the British enlisted, if a pact of Non-aggression and mutual security could be concluded between Britain, France and Siam."187

Crosby however had another idea. He pointed out to the

French envoy that the Thai entertained such a healthy respect for

the military strength of Japan that he could not conceive of their

entering into any pact of mutual security to which the Japanese 188 was not a party.

186 F.O. 371, Crosby reported to F.O. concerning Pibul's speech on March 31, 1937. 187 F.O. 371, Crosby to F.O., June 20, 1936. 188Ibid. 147

The French did not drop the idea of the Pact altogether.

In late August 1939, just a few days before the outbreak of war in

Europe, the French Minister M. Paul Lepissier called on the Thai

Premier and suggested a non-aggression pact. On the fifth of

September, to the surprise of Crosby, Pibul told him that he was in

favor of Thailand's entering into a pact of mutual non-aggression 189 with Britain and France. Pibul said that he was worried about the

French military preparations in Indochina. He thought that a non­

aggression pact between Thailand and France ought to bring about some

advantages.

Neither the British nor the French envisaged a change in the

Thai's attitudes on the pact. In October, the idea of non-aggression

was reviewed by Prince Wan, the advisor to the Cabinet and to the

Foreign Minister. The Prince hit on the bright idea that probably

the Thai could use the pact to get some kinds of bargain from the

French. It was a known fact that the Thai had always been dis­

satisfied with the second paragraph of Article 3 of the Franco-Thai

Convention of June 29, 1927 concerning the delimitation of the

frontier between Thailand and French Indochina. The said paragraph

read as follows:

"Dans les parties de son cours ou le Mekong est divise en plusieurs bras des fleuves separees de la rive Thai an un moment quelconque de l'annee, par un bras d'eau courante, la frontiere est constituee par le thalweg du bras du fleuve le plus proche de la rive Thai."

"Where the course of the Mekong River is

189 F.O. 371, Crosby to Viscount Halifax, September 7, 1939. 148

divided into several channels of running water which separate the Thai mainland (from French Indochina) the frontier is made up of the thalweg of the channel which is the closest to the Thai bank."

The above provision was hard on the Thai in the case of

certain so called islands in the Mekong River which were in reality

no more than sandbanks separated from the Thai mainland during the

season of high water but joined to it when the river was low and the

intervening channels had dried up. By administrative grounds the

Thais thought that these islands or sandbanks should be regarded as

forming part of the mainland and placed under Thai administration,

instead of under that of the French as was the case.

The Prince thought that if the Thai could present to the

French the revision of the provision as a condition for the pact

which M. Lepissier was known to be anxious to secure, the govern­ ment would become more popular. The Prince had accordingly suggested

to M. Lepissier that the two countries should make a deal. An ad­ vantage of this scheme was that it would eliminate any alarm or objections on the side of Japan for the French would be presented as having asked the Thais for a non-aggression pact as a guarantee of

the maintenance in the future by both parties of the new frontier.

M. Lepissier was sympathetic with Thailand. As a French representative of the Quai d'Orsay, he was under no obligation to communicate the matter to the French Indochina colonial authority

since the two administrations were quite independent of each other.

However, as a good friend of General George Catroux, Lepissier told 149

him in late 1939.

The colonial administrators were critical of Lepissier for

suggesting such a treaty at all. The Direction des Affaires

Politiques in Hanoi was particularly upset as it used to counsel the

Governor General. On the other hand, a special representative of

the French Minister of Colonies passed through Bangkok. He endorsed

Lepissier's plan. This allowed Lepissier to notify Pibul in early 190 March 1940, that the French government agreed on the readjustment

of the frontier. The idea was that in order to facilitate the task of administration, a deep water channel which would be navigable all year

should be assured to the Thai. The islands between that channel and the Thai mainland should be held to belong to Thailand. In order to implement this arrangement, a committee would be sent out from France as soon as an understanding in principle had been reached. Pibul, in learning the French proposal agreed to sign the treaty as soon as possible. Subsequently, on June 12, 1940 the Treaty of Non-Aggression was signed with France, Britain and Japan. The latter showed little interest until April, 1940 when negotiations with the french and the 191 British were nearly completed. The Japanese, however, refused to describe their Treaty as a Treaty of Non-Aggression since they did not want their friends, the Germans and the Italians, to think they as­ sociated themselves with Britain. The Pact was entitled a "Treaty

190 F.O. 371, Crosby to F.O., March 16, 1940.

^^Direk Jayanam, Thai Kap Songgram Lok Khrang thi Sone (Thailand and World War Two) (Bangkok: 1966), Vol. 1, p. 46. 150

Between Thailand and Japan Concerning the Continuance of Friendly

Relations and the Mutual Respect of Each Other's Territorial

Integrity." This instrument differed from the Anglo-Thai Treaty

chiefly through the inclusion of a vaguely worded clause providing

for the maintenance of friendly contact "in order to exchange in­

formation and to consult one another, on any question of common

interest that may arise." The agreement was signed in Tokyo at

10:00 a.m. Tokyo time on the 12th of June. Tokyo time was one and a half hours ahead of the time in Bangkok where the Treaties were

signed by the French and the British representatives.

In addition to the treaty signed with France, there was an

exchange of confidential notes in which the two parties resolved to

correct problems involving the Mekong by recognizing the deep water channel. "Any territory whatever its form on the right of the line would be Thai territory and territory on the left of the line would 192 be French territory."

Two days after the signing of the Treaty, Paris fell to the

Germans. Three days later, on June 17, 1940, the French surrendered.

The new government was headed by Marshal Henri Philippe Petain.

On June 22, 1940, the French notified the Thai government as follows:

"Due to the circumstance beyond her control, France is unable to send government officials of ambassadorial rank for negotiation. The French

192 Quoted from the appendices in Jayanam, Vol 2, pp. 773-776. The meaning of this rather vague language was soon to become the source of considerable dispute between the Thai and the French. 151

will therefore submit a list of names of officials from Indochina who will come to negotiate instead."

The French attitude regarding the boundary between Thailand and Indochina was completely changed. The new head of the Quai d'Orsey was the former head of the Banque de l'Indochine, Admiral

Jean Decoux who was made new governor of Indochina. Decoux did not approve of Lepissier's plan at all. With the change in attitudes, the Thai postponed the ratification of the pact further.

External circumstances forced the Thai to reconsider her position concerning Indochina. Five days after Paris fell, the

Japanese demanded that Indochina temporarily open its border with

China to their troops and allow their inspectors to determine whether or not the Chinese were getting allied aid by way of Indochina.

On August 15, 1940, Direk Jayanam, the Deputy Minister of

Foreign Affairs, told the American Minister in Bangkok, Hugh Grant, that the Thai government believed and feared that Japan was about 194 to annex Indochina.

In the deteriorating French position in the Far East, the

Thai saw both an opportunity for recovering earlier territorial losses and the danger of the Japanese succeeding to rule all of

French Indochina. Thus Pibul moved quickly to implement the pro­ visions contained in the exchange of notes. The French resisted:

193 Jayanam, Thai Kap Songgram. Vol. 1, pp. 74-75. 194 U.S. Department of State, The Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. 1940, Vol IV, The Far East, p. 74. Dispatch from Grant to the Secretary of State, August 15, 1940. 152

they wanted to secure her flank in Southeast Asia through ratification of the non-aggression pact. At the same time the Thai sought to use the situation as a lever for extracting French concession. Deputy for

Foreign Affairs told Crosby that the Thai government would observe loyally provisions of the recent treaty of non-aggression if the

French would remain mistress of Indochina. But should Indochina pass out of French hands they would feel obliged to advance certain ter­ ritorial claims.

In order to sound out the world opinion, Luang Pibul sent two missions, one to Europe under Luang Sindhu and one to Japan under

Colonel Luang Promyodhi. The former mission was to induce the govern­ ment at Vichy to surrender the territories, the latter was to secure a Japanese agreement to such a surrender.

What the Thai government wanted can be seen clearly from the following Aide Memoire, dated September 13, 1940 in answer to the

French request to let the pact come into force without the formal ratification.

Aide - Memoire

"His Majesty's Government would be happy to accede to the request of the French Government that the Pact of Non-Aggression be considered as coming into force without waiting for the exchange of ratifications, but would point out that the Pact was concluded in view of a normal situation in Indochina, which unfortunately is not the case today. Under the circumstances, His Majesty's Government trusts that the French Government cannot be indifferent to the fate of the Thai population in the territories concerned. Before

1QC F.O. 371, Crosby reported to War Cabinet, July 3, 1940. 153

putting the Pact into force, therefore, His Majesty's Government would propose that an agreement be reached on the questions which await formal negotiations as follows: 1. the fixation of the Mekong frontier by following the deep water channel and the set­ tlement of all other outstanding administrative questions as provided for by the Exchange of Letters under the date of the 12th of June last and 2. the adoption of the Mekong as the frontier between the two countries from the North to the South as far as the frontier of Cambodia, in­ volving the retrocession to Thailand of ter­ ritories on the right bank of the Mekong op­ posite to Luang Prabang and Pakse. The Pact will be put into force as soon as such agreement is reached. His Majesty's Government would also be grateful if the French Government would be so good as to give them a letter of assurance to the effect that in the event of a change from French sovereignty, France will return to Thailand the territories of Laos and Cambodia. In that event, His Majesty's Government would give due consideration to the treatment of the French officials in the ter­ ritories concerned. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 13th September, 1940"196

The Vichy government rejected all of the Thai requests

except the one dealing with a redelimitation of the frontier so as

to follow the deep channel of the Mekong River. Without an

adequate quid pro quo the Thai declined to ratify the treaty.

Japanese Involvement in the Indochina Conflict

Japan's policy and scheme towards Indochina and Thailand were part and parcel of the strategy of southern advance. This ex­ pansion plan was based on the concept of Hakko Ishiu, which,

196 F.O. 371, Report from Crosby to F.O., September, 1940. 154

according to Dainihon Shochoku Kinkai of 1934, meant an extension of

the Imperial System to the rest of the world, with Japan as the

center.- 19?

Japan's plan for world conquest envisaged the world's

division into four distinct blocs: the Greater East Asia bloc, the

European bloc, the American bloc and the Soviet bloc. Africa would

join in with the European bloc, India and Iran in the Soviet bloc.

Australia and New Zealand would be left to Great Britain and would be

treated on an equal footing with Holland. It was expected that the

Japanese Empire would bring about the fulfillment of this policy at

the peace conference counting, of course, on Japan's victory in the

World War that was yet to come.

The importance of Thailand in Japan's New Order can be seen

from a top secret document put together in 1939 by the East Asia

Bureau entitled "Recent Japanese-Thai Relations." The paper outlined

four key aspects which were at the very core of Japan's future diplomacy vis-a-vis Thailand.

1. It noted that Thailand occupies a key position in

Japan's southward expansion. The navy was planning for an operation against Singapore and it was necessary to gain Thailand's assent for this venture.

2. The necessity of bringing Thailand into the Japanese

Manchukuo economic bloc. It was told that the Thai would increase

1Q7 International Military Tribunal for the Far East,herein- after referred to as IMTFE, Cross Examination: Hideki Tojo, Transcript of the Records, Vol 82, p. 3677. 155

their exports by taking in the Manchukuo market.

3. The expressed intention to win the Thai over to the

Japanese side by putting more pressure on the British. Japan would

impress the Thai that Japan is the leader of Asia.

4. In dealing with Thailand in the future, Japan would have

to bear in mind "the effect her ascendency there would have elsewhere'.'

Japan wanted to make a favorable impression on other adjacent coun­

tries giving aid to Chiang Kaichek's force such as Burma, Indochina, 198 Dutch and East Indies.

The policy of greater East Asia was announced publicly by

Prince Konoye, Japanese Prime Minister, on November 3, 1938. The

expression "Co-Prosperity Sphere" came into use on August 1, 1940, when the second Konoye cabinet declared it as Japan's basic national policy, and on the same day, Foreign Minister Matsuoka spoke at a press conference of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

On this policy, Tojo later testified:

"The Greater East Asia policy was enunciated out of the necessity for economic cooperation between and among neighboring countries...Japan's basic policy was the establishment of peace and stability in East Asia by fostering friendly relations with China through the means of anti-communistic and economic cooperation...and the fundamental of her East Asia policy was the settlement of the China Incident... but America and Britain adopted a policy of strangulation against Japan thereby forcing her on the one hand to strive for economic cooperation with French Indochina, Thailand and the Netherland Indies... Once hostilities of its East Asia policy and steps were taken to establish a sphere of common prosperity among the nations of East A s i a . . . " ^ 9

19 8 Flood, "Relations with Thailand," pp. 244-247. 199 3MTFE, Transcript of the Record, Vol. 82, p. 36427. / 156

The creation of the new order had as its inner core Japan

and the Nanking puppet regime. It was in partial fulfillment of

this grandiose policy that Japan stepped up her plans for southern

advance. The first important step toward an implementation of this

strategy was to intervene diplomatically in Indochina as a prelude

to some more forcible measures in case the first attempt failed.

Japan went into Indochina with a pretext that France had

been supporting China in her conflict against Japan, despite the

French avowed policy of neutrality. France was charged with sup­

plying arms and ammunition to China through Indochina. The

Japanese demanded that these supplies be halted immediately. The

French authorities agreed to the demand. The Japanese, nevertheless,

pressed on for positive verification of the agreement, charging still

that there was smuggling via the Bay of Kwangchow. Japan thus sent

three Imperial Officers to the area in question.The French

governor met with Major General Nishihara, head of the observation

party, and proposed to him that if Japan would pledge to respect the

territorial integrity of French Indochina, it would be ready to con- 201 elude with Japan a defensive treaty against Chiang Kay-Shek.

The Japanese took up this question at a meeting between the

army and the navy. A draft on Political, Military and Economic

Agreement was drawn. Under this plan, French Indochina would have

200 IMIFE, Excerpts from a Business Report of the South Sea Section in 1940. Document No 1411, Exhibit No 618A, p. 6852. 201 Ibid., Exhibit No 626, p. 6857. to cooperate in the construction of a new order in East Asia and

especially to recognize Japanese passage of troops and utilization 202 of aerodromes in French Indochina. Article IV of the draft

stated clearly that "should, by any chance, the French government

reject our demands...we shall, obviously, have no reason to give 203 her any pledge respecting the integrity of her territories."

After lengthy negotiations, the French Ambassador to Japan,

Arsine Henry, on August 25, 1940, presented a French draft concerning

vaguely military, political and economic cooperation. For reason of

prestige, among other things, the French Ambassador declined to

embody any stipulations for passage of Japanese troops and their

utilization of airfields. These matters, added Henry, should be

discussed later on. On August 30, 1940, the Matsuoka-Henry Agreement

was signed.

By that time, the dispute between Thailand and France had

come to an uneasy stalemate. The European mission headed by

Luang Sindhu Songgramchai and the Japanese Mission headed by Deputy

Minister of Defence Luang Bromyodhi came back without any significant result. Late in September 1940, the French insisted that the negotiation committee meet in Bangkok at the same time as the ex­ change of ratification. The French administration wanted the non­ aggression treaty in force before any talks on border revision bore fruit. 158

During all this time, both the British and especially the

American Minister put pressure on Pibul. They said that their

governments were of the opinion that status quo should be maintained.

They were anxious that the Mission to Japan would commit the country

to the "New Order" in Asia in return for Japanese assistance.

"My United States colleague and I have reinforced our arguments by pointing out that such a bargain must entail the passing of Thailand into what would be tantamount to a state of vassalage to Japan..."204

In all of the foregoing diplomatic exchanges with France,

the Thai had never had any special liaison with Japan. It was a

fact which upset the Japanese officer closest to Pibul, Colonel 205 Tamura Hiroshi. His memoires showed that Japan knew nothing of 206 the negotiation between Thailand and France.

By the end of September 1940, it was clear to Pibul that

nothing would be gained through more diplomacy. He could not hope

for any support from the west.

On September 28, 1940 Pibul's private emissary Nai Wanid

Pananonda, Director of the Economic Department of Commerce and a pro-Japanese, secretly approached the Japanese Naval Attache in

Bangkok, Commander Torigoe, and informed him on behalf of Pibul that

the latter had made the decision to rely on Japan. As Torigoe1s

subsequent inquiries showed it meant the Thai Premier's readiness

^^F.0. 371, File 24757/4977, Crosby to FO, Dated September 21, 1940. 205 Flood, "Relations with Thailand" p. 322. 159

to make a firm commitment in favor of Japan's New Order in

Southeast Asia in return for Japanese aid for the territories in question.

On October 1st, Torigoe sought Pibul out to confirm what

Wanid had said. Pibul explicitly told Torigoe that he would permit

Japanese troops to cross the Thai territories if necessary. He also 207 agreed to supply Japan with raw material it needed.

The September 28th Wanid-Torigoe talk and the October 1st,

1940, Torigoe-Pibul talk, signified a commitment on the Thai part

to join in the New Order fourteen months in advance of the actual

decision on December 5, 1941. However, no other Thai besides the

two knew of this secret. The Imperial Headquarter asked Torigoe to try for a secret treaty with Pibul because verbal agreement would not be enough for such an important matter. Pibul declined saying that he would like to keep the secret between himself and 208 the Japanese Army and Navy.

On October 14, 1941 the Japanese military and Naval

Attache and the Charge d'Affaires went to see Pibul again to press for the secret treaty. He argued that it would have to go through his cabinet which he was sure would leak the matter to Britain. He was afraid that he might be forced to accept British good office in 209 which the Thai might lose territory to Britain.

207 * 'ibid., p. 324. 208 Ibid., p. 326, reconstructed from "Torigoe Taisho Chinjutsu" 209 Ibid., p. 334. I

160

Looking back on the American records, Grant sent a tele­

gram to the Secretary of State on October 4, 1940. He reported his

meeting with Pibul where he wondered whether Japan would let a large

slice of Laos and a small slice of Cambodia to Thailand. When

Pibul said he would be glad to receive Laos, Grant inquired: "From 210 Japan?" Pibul replied, "Yes, from anyone."

What made Pibul so determined to recover the territories

to the extent of risking the country to the probability of Japanese

domination? There seemed to be several possible reasons. First of

all, it was his perception of the internal instability. There was

always the problem of a Chinese threat to boycott the government in

retaliation against the economic pressure. In addition there was

Pibul's fear of another coup against his regime. This can be seen

when Khun Buratsakan Kitti-Khadi with the support of 60 members

proposed a motion to amend the constitution. They wanted to extend

the period of transition which would end in 1942 for another ten

years. Khun Buratsakan said that it was a means of prevention

"if there is a change in the present form of government at time

stipulated by the Constitution, the country will be placed in a 211 dangerous position and along with it, the people."

When Pibul was invited to give his opinion, he said he felt

that if the period of transition was over, there would be a clash

210 Foreign Relation 1940. Vol 18, p. 164, Grant to Secretary of State.

211BTWM, August 16, 1940. 161

between the party supporting the Monarchy and those supporting 212 democracy.

The voting was done by roll call: 164 members were in favor of the motion which was more than a three fourths majority required by the constitution. As a consequence, Thailand had to wait for another ten years before the people would have a chance to fully elect the people's representatives.

With the possibilities of internal instability and the coming of the second World War, by Pibul's initiatives the Department

of Publicity intensified their propaganda to arouse the public unity.

When the issue of the Non-Aggression Pact came up, the propaganda was against the French. The history of the 1893 French gun boat

policy was brought up repeatedly. Two government officials were

responsible for the campaign. They were Pra Rajadharm Nithes and

Nai Sang Patthanothai. The former was the Head of the Department of

Public Relations. They used fictitious names in the program: Nai

Sang was called Nai Mam Chuchart (meaning Mr. Firm Nationalist) and

Pra Rajadharm was called Nai Kong Rak Thai (meaning Mr. Kong Loves

Thai): the two names combined to Mankong (meaning stability). Ac­

cording to Nai Sang, Pibul would send a letter in a yellow envelop,

hinting to them about what he would like them to say. 2 1 3 The

program was an excellent testing ground for public opinion before

212 Ibxd._. . . 213 Sang Pattanothai, Khwamnuk nai Krone Khang (Thoughts Behind Bars) (Bangkok: Klangwitaya, 1956), p. 71. 162

Plbul would embark on certain projects.

It seemed that the nationalistic propaganda had backfired

on him. To Crosby, Pibul told of public pressure being exerted on 214 him over the question of the lost territories. To Mr. Grant,

U.S. Minister, Pibul told him that the people and particularly the

army officers were demanding action. "They might kill me if I do 215 not follow their desires." By October, 1940, Grant was convinced

that Pibul was "virtually a prisoner and certainly a puppet of a 216 military clique which (had) the power... Six weeks later he in­

formed the State Department that the Thai government was "dominated by a powerful military clique which (was) linked with the Japanese and encouraged by the Germans" and that "the handful of liberals,

217 led by Luang Pradit... (had) been pushed clear of the boards...

It might be possible that since the campaign to increase 218 the military budget, the military had the French as a target,

^^F.O. 371, Crosby to F.O., September 28, 1940. 215 U.S. Government, Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1940, Vol. IV, p. 165. 216 Ibid., p. 164, dispatch from Grant to the Secretary of State, October 4, 1940. 217 Ibid., p. 189, dispatch from Grant to the Secretary of State, November 21, 1940. 218 In an interview with Luang Sindhu Songgramchai, he con­ firmed this point that the military wanted to get even with the French since 1936. F.O. 371, Crosby to F.O., September 28, 1940. Adul said, "Thai army was spoiling for a fight and that sane of­ ficers had declared their wish for one." *

163

four years later, they wanted to prove that they could beat the

French. The loss of the Thai territories was a humiliation for the

fighting forces in Thailand which they were eager to erase. Pibul

probably would not be able to survive as a Prime Minister if he

backed down from the original demands. Thus even with the pressures

from the British and the U.S. representatives, Pibul remained adamant.

The last motive stemmed from Pibul's personal ambition as

well as patriotic considerations. Pibul visualized himself as going

down in history as the modern statesman who restored to his country

the lands which she surrendered in the past.

The Indochinese War

The month of October saw several demonstrations in support

of the government. The students from Chulalongkorn University where

Pibul was the Rector marched to the Ministry of Defence on October

8 , 1940. Pridi, the rector of the University of Moral and Political

Science tried to prevent his students from doing the same thing but

to no avail. The students held a demonstration on the tenth of the

same month. Teachers, students from secondary schools, government

officials and citizens of Bangkok and Dhonburi numbering more than

twenty thousand demonstrated in front of the Ministry of Defence on

the twelfth. At the youth rallies, the head of the Krom Yuwachon

(Department of Young People), Colonel Prayoon Pamornmontri, announced

to several thousand young people that the government did not "ask 219 for territories which had never belonged to Thailand." Even

219 BTWM, October 4, 1940. 164

the Samlor (tricycle) drivers demonstrated their support of the

government.

During this time Luang Wichit wrote several articles trying

to prove the cultural unity of the Thai and Khmers despite some

linguistic differences. Pibul himself turned more aggressive: he

declared over the radio that the only way to cleanse away the sin

of the "territory taken by French forces in the old days" was for

France to give it back . ^ ^

The culmination came in an exchange of bombing raids and

artillery barrages between the Mekong River towns of Nakon Panom and

Thakhek on November 28. Nonetheless, for nearly six weeks there­ after, despite daily skirmishes all along the frontier, the most

dramatic battle was between the official radios in Bangkok and Saigon.

The Japanese, however, were not reluctant in their decision.

On the first of December, thirteen air craft arrived at Bangkok.

Twenty-five more arrived a week later. The Thai decision to buy planes from Japan came after the U.S. refusal to forward ten North

American dive bomber airplanes which had already been paid for and were waiting to be shipped from Manila to Bangkok. This final step was the result of the U.S. disapproval of the Thai attitudes re­ garding Indochina. Since the beginning of the conflict, the U.S. government had adopted the policy of strict maintenance of status quo and it regarded the Thai demands of French territories as against their principles. Therefore, the U.S. proceeded to treat

220 BTWM, October 20, 1940. 165

the Thai as an aggressor state and refused to allow the sale to her of any armaments or ammunitions of war.

Shortly after the new year, Thai forces began to move across the border and had soon occupied much of the present day provinces of Sayaboury and Champasak in Laos and Battamgong and

Sisophon in Cambodia. Although the Thai won the land battles, they lost the naval engagement in the Gulf of Thailand. The French navy destroyed two Thai gunboats (Dhonburi and Sri Ayudhya) and three

Italian-built torpedo boats.

Japanese Mediation

When hostilities broke out, Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign

Minister unofficially stated to Ambassador Henry in Tokyo that Japan intended to propose a peaceful arbitration. As the Thai had made it evident that they would only negotiate with the French on the condition that the latter agreed to recognize the two pieces of territory on the right bank of the Mekong besides the recognition of the deep water channel. Vichy made it plain too, that they would not give up anything. Japan, however, put the French attitude on record as:

"We only requested the French government to reconsider her unwise 221 firm attitude as it would not be to her advantage."

On the 20th of January, Matsuoka renewed to the French

Ambassador in Japan the offer of mediation. This time, Matsuoka

221 John L. Christian and Nobutake Ike, "Thailand in Japan's Foreign Relations," Pacific Affairs. Vol. XV, No. 2, June, 1942, p. 214. 166

warned the ambassador in violent terms that Japan could not tolerate

British intervention: if France refused mediation by Japan, the 222 latter would be obliged to "take pledges" in Indochina. Faced

with this threat, Vichy had had no alternative but to agree. Thus

Japan announced her formal offer to both parties on the same day.

On the next day, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in his speech

in the Diet, reminded his listeners of the Thai abstention in the

League of Nations from voting to condemn Japan in connection with

the Lytton Report in 1933. "This," declared Matsuoka, "is still 223 fresh in the memory of our people."

Meanwhile, toward the end of January, the Japanese High

Command drew up an "Outline of Policy Concerning French Indochina

and Thailand." Two major objectives as envisaged by the "Outline"

were: to bring about immediate peace between Thailand and French

Indochina in order to facilitate Japanese operations in the Southern

regions; to induce both sides to pledge not to conclude any agreement 224 with a third power that might be directed against Japan.

Delegates from Thailand and France assembled in Tokyo on

February 7, 1941, to commence peace settlement. Matsuoka came to

the first meeting with a clear authorization from the Imperial

Command that both disputants would be compelled to accept the set­

tlement Japan would propose. Japan would decide in favor of Thailand,

222 F.O. 371, Crosby to Mr. Eden, February 24, 1941. 223 Op. Cit. 224 BfEFE, Telegram to the Reich, February 6, 1941, pp. 6985- 6986. 167

but not to the full extent of Thai demands. As far as French

Indochina was concerned, force should be used if necessary to com­

pel its acceptance of the peace terms.

The French delegation was headed by Ambassador Arsene

Henry. He realized even before the conference that its possible

chance was not to reject the demands but to minimize their magnitude.

The Thai delegation under the leadership of Prince Wan, presented

its demands for the retrocession of the whole of Cambodia and Laos.

The conference proceeded slowly until March 11, 1941.

Minister Matsuoka handed a note to the French Ambassador pointedly

stating that the Imperial government "...has drafted a mediation

proposal as per enclosure, which we expect the French government to 225 accept unconditionally."

At last, the moment that Henry had been expecting had ar­

rived. In reply to the blunt note of Matsuoka, the French

Ambassador announced that:

"The French government, although neither the local situation nor the fortune of war compel it to renounce the benefit of treaties freely negotiated and concluded with the government of Thailand, is pre­ pared to yield to the insistance of the Japanese government."226

The peace settlement was signed on the same day.

The Franco-Siamese Peace Treaty of May 9. 1941

The outcome of the Japanese negotiation was the Franco-

2 2 5 IMTFE. Exhibit No. 633, p. 6994. 168

Siamese Peace Treaty of May 9, 1940. The Thai obtained Sayaboury,

Champasak, Siemreap and Battambang, an area of about 90,000 sq. kilometers. However, she did not get Luang Prabang a section which

she had demanded and which she claimed that her armies had occupied at the time of the armistice. Furthermore, while there was to be no demilitarized zone on the French side of the new Cambodian boundary, there was to be one on the Siamese side, embracing all the territory to be ceded to Thailand. The last condition which Thailand was reluctant to agree to was to pay France a sum of six million piastre, spread over a period of six years, as compensation for railways and roads built by the French in the ceded area.

For the French side, the Treaty of Non-Aggression signed at Bangkok on Jule 12, 1940 was to be ratified and exchanged simul­ taneously with the Peace Treaty just concluded. One Thai concession to Japan for its efforts had been agreement to a protocol that obliged Thailand "not to enter into political, economic or military agreements or understanding with third countries in opposition to 227 Japan either directly or indirectly."

A certain note of disappointment could be seen in the press comments after the Treaty was signed. The Bangkok Chronicle of the

12th of March, 1941 made this comment:

"though it may be felt that the extent of ter­ ritorial concession is slightly below expectation, particularly in view of the military situation at

227 Jayanam, Thai Kap Songgram, Vol. 2, p. 807. 169

the time of the armistice, this is an occasion for national rejoicing for it means the recognition of justice and righteousness of Thailand's case."228

The success in Indochina was of great benefit to the Pibul

government. It emerged stronger than before. Never in the history had the people given the government this much support. Donations and gifts for the soldiers were pouring in everyday. Just to show how successful Pibul was, here is the Radio Bulletin of the

Publicity Department:

"The Prime Minister's birthday on July 14th was marked with the presentation of various types of war material to the Defence Forces purchased at a cost of about 750,000 bahts by government officials and people throughout the kingdom. Baht 106,300 was also received in gifts from firms and 2 2 9 individuals to be devoted to charitable purposes."

In recognition of Pibul's work, seventy first category

(elective) members of the Assembly petitioned the Council of

Regency to raise the Prime Minister's military rank from Major

General to Field Marshal skipping the two ranks of Lieutenant

General and General. The President of the Council of Regency wrote back to the Council of Ministers granting their wish in the name of the king. (See Appendix XVIII.)

Conclusion

The basic Thai foreign policy since the end of the 19th

Century had been to recognize Britain as the dominant power in the

Far East and France as the secondary one but the second World War

228 Bangkok Chronicle. March 12, 1941. 229 Thailand, Department of Publicity, Radio Bulletin. July, 1941. 170

changed the whole picture. It proved that the French could no longer

maintain her prestigeous position and the fate of the British was un­

certain. The weakness of France coincided with the consolidation

period in Thailand and the rise to power of Japan in the Far East.

The Thai government, in addition to the previous negotiation with the

French to accept the deep water channel of the Mekong River as a de­

marcation line, a precondition of the acceptance of the Non-Aggression

Pact, requested further assurance. In the event of Laos and Cambodia

ever passing out of French hands, they would recognize Thailand's right of reversion to those portions of Indochina. These claims had some historical justification as the territories concerned had been wrested from Thailand by France at a previous period. The Vichy government refused the demands but insisted that the Non-Aggression

Pact he ratified first. Finally, things reached such a point that hostilities broke out between the Thai and Indochina forces. The fighting continued until the intervention of Japan under whose auspices an armistice was signed as a preliminary to a peace con­ ference in Tokyo. The result was that the French lost more than what she had refused to yield in the original Thai demand. The Thai were not fully satisfied with the outcome of the Treaty, because she did not get as much as she had anticipated. Out of the three parties in Tokyo, the Japanese rose in full triumph. She had dictated a peace term for the two controversial countries concerning

Indochina. This meant more than simply the two accepting her

predominant position in Indochina: it meant that the weakness of the British was more definite. The latter allowed Japan to act as the negotiator in an area where her interests used to be incon­ testable. In the future, if Japan wanted to challenge the British position in the Far East, one way to do it is to start in Thailand where the dominant British position had been secured for more than eighty years. CHAPTER IV

THE INTERACTIONS

BETWEEN

FOREIGN POLICIES AND INTERNAL POLITICS

(Part Two 1941-1944)

This chapter is a continuation from Chapter III. It is an attempt to see the effects of the external environment, meaning the attitudes of foreign powers, Britain, Japan and the United States on Thailand and how Pibul adapted and prepared the country and the people to meet the possibility of the war.

The decisions which the Pibul cabinet made on December 8 and December 10 were two crucial policies. This chapter will try

to see whether the government had any alternative to siding with

Japan at that particular time and to explore further what kind of measures Pibul used to unite his people against Nipponization.

When the second World War started in Europe, Pibul had been

Thai Prime Minister for about nine months and had just assumed the 230 position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Realizing that

Thailand might be a pawn between two fighting elephants, the govern­ ment declared a policy of neutrality on August 4, 1939.

230 Chao, Praya Sri, Dharma Dhibes resigned in August, 1939.

172 173

"All Thai authorities and subjects, and all persons residing in Thailand, are ordered and commanded to observe strict and impartial neutrality in and during the said state of war, and to observe the laws of this kingdom, her treaty engagements 2 3 1 and the law of nations in respect of neutrality."

Once the war started, Pibul faced the same problem which

King Rama VI had encountered before: what to do if the Chinese re­

fused to work? What was to be done if the Japanese used Thailand

as a base to attack Singapore? This last question had been on

Pibul's mind since 1937 when he made a speech hypothesizing the

problem. He believed that the Japanese would not like to risk a

frontal attack against the Singapore base but she would come through 232 Thailand and attack it from the rear. There were three alter­ natives: one was to choose the winner and side with that power, another was to prepare the people for war, or the third was to adopt both the first and the second alternatives.

Internal Preparation

Writers about Pibul could not avoid mentioning his leaning towards fascism although he was not a hundred percent one. He ad­ mired great personalities of his contemporary period: Hitler,

Mussolini and Mustapha Kemal. As for the Japanese, there was no particular person involved. It was because she was the most powerful

Asian nation close to Thailand. However, the fact still remained the same, Japan was also a fascist country.

231 BTWM. August 4, 1939. 232 F.O. 371, Crosby to F.O., the speech was made on March 3, 1937. Ebenstein defined 'fascism' as the totalitarian organization of government and society by a single party dictatorship, intensely 233 nationalist, racist, militarist and imperialist.

In fascist countries like Germany and Japan, the clue to

the understanding of fascist tendencies lay in broad social forces and traditions. In those countries, the authoritarian tradition 234 had been predominant and democracy was still a very frail plant.

The same atmosphere existed in Thailand where the society had been accustomed to authocratic rule for 150 years. In Thai society, children were taught to 'wai' (putting the palms of their hands together and bowing down toward the hands) to say 'phu yai' (a person who is older in age, rank and title) since they were very young. A proper respect for elders was very important to the child's

future. A child ought to know which 'phu yai' he should 'wai' and which one he should 'krap' (to prostrate oneself down on the floor and wai).

Even today, the Thai believe that a 'phu yai' will be kind to a person who shows proper respect. Besides a child is taught not

to argue with 'phu yai', not to give unasked for advice, etc. When the child grows up, if he goes to school, the same idea of 'phu noi'

(one who is younger in age and rank or title) paying respect to 'phu yai' comes up every often. One of the textbooks says:

233William Ebenstein, Today's Isms (7th ed.; New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 110. 175

"It is natural for a 'phu noi' to depend on someone who is more powerful. The aegis of a powerful man can protect you from being molested and you will get help when you are in need."235

With this kind of long tradition of submissiveness, the mass of the people took to the "comfort of irresponsibility." They loved the feeling of being sheltered and secure behind the benevolent power and authority, be it from their parents, their nai (master, or someone superior in command), their princes or their King. Richard

Ross had this idea to add to the problem:

"Socialization process within the family that leave people with an expectation of authoritarian ways generally will undermine the individual's sense of self-respect. The result is that sub­ sequently those who do gain positions of power will feel driven to act in autocratic ways while those who remain common citizens are likely to have a sense of anomie.

Pibul was a product of absolute monarchy which he helped to overthrow. It was difficult to avoid what he had been accustomed to seeing half of his life when he had such a strong backing of the military who thought of themselves as the most powerful establishment in Thailand. If the military admired strong fascist leaders, it was quite natural that they wanted to have one. Although Pibul kept paying lip service to 'democracy' or called himself 'a democrat', the author would like to call him 'a democratic dictator' or a Thai

235 Education Department, Bab Sorn Arn Lem Sam (Reader, Book 3) (Bangkok: 1907/08), p. 95.

236Richard Ross, "Tradition and Modernization in England's Political Culture" in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. by Lician Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 59. 176

style dictator. With his charming personality, Pibul treated the

members of the People's Assembly with exquisite courtesy as long as

they did not oppose him on important issues. Thus the Assembly did

not hesitate to vote extending the transitional period which would

end in 1942 for another ten years. With half of the Assemblymen

being selected by the government, there would be no problem of con­

trolling them.

The press was still under strong censorship. Luang Adul

Detcharas, as the chief of the police department and later on the

Deputy Minister of Interior, was responsible for the measures. On

August 25, 1939 the 'Krungtep Varasap' daily newspapers' rights of

publication was evoked for ninety days because it printed as the 237 headline "Hitler Invited Luang Pibul Officially to go to Germany."

The Morning Express and the Bangkok Chronicle rights' were evoked in­

definitely because they published false news about the possibility 238 of a large number of forced retirements from post service. The

Thai Nikon newspaper was closed indefinitely too as it was run under

the same owner as the Bangkok Chronicle. The Siam Review and the

Bangkok Review suffered the same fate.

A new system of launching decrees, or pronouncements

without reference to the Legislature was devised perhaps by the

brilliant mind of Luang Wichit. This system was called in Thai

"Rathaniyom" and was being given an English translation of "State

237 Kao Kosanakan. IX (October-rNovember, 1939), p. 57.

2 3 8 Ibid.. p. 58. 177

Convention."

The government explained the meaning of the term as follows:

"The duties of the Government are numerous and lie in different directions. The Government has been entrusted with the task of building up per­ manent and progressive benefits for the country and the nation. The building up of permanent benefits had first to be carried out but progress cannot be neglected. Since Thailand has been brought under the new regime the Government has tried its utmost to build up a permanency which it has succeeded in doing in various directions such as the revision of treaties. Then followed the building up of national strength, developing the financial and agricultural position, and promoting the peace and the health of the people, etc. In order that the work of the past and that of the future shall be fruitful and permanent, the Thai people should improve the quality of all things. This being the case the Government is interesting itself in the building of progress to go hand in hand with permanency of development. But the development of permanency and progress cannot be effected by similar methods for the building of the former has to depend on legislative acts; but in the case of progress it cannot be in­ duced by such acts. Therefore, the Government has launched State Conventions. State Conventions may be regarded as similar to "Rajaniyom" in the former regime with this dif­ ference, that "Rathaniyom" concerns the State established with the approval of public opinion, a popular custom of the nation. All Thai who look up to the progressive per­ manency of the nation ought to combine in respecting and carrying out public acts according to State Conventions and as notified in the Government Gazette."239

This was in fact a dangerous method of governing the people.

By ignoring the People's Assembly, the Cabinet set itself up as the sole arbiter of what public opinion was supposed to be.

239 BTWM, July 4, 1939. 178

The first of these promulgations was issued on June 24,

1939 substituting the word 'Siam' for 'Thailand' and the word 'Thai' for 'Siamese'. The second one was about the safety of the nation.

The government reminded the Thai nationals that among other things, they "should not act as agents or mouth pieces of aliens without being satisfied that it is of benefit to the nation." (See the full text in Appendix VIII.) The third State Convention concerned the name of the Thai, one should not call the Thai in the North as

Northern Thai or the South as Southern Thai, as in fact they were all

Thai (see Appendix IX). The fourth State Convention concerned the proper respect for the national flag, national anthem and national song (see Appendix X). Conventions number VI and VIII were about the correct wording of the National Anthem and National Song (see

Appendix XII and XIV).

The first step toward economic independence was a campaign for kitchen gardening. In October 1939, a Kitchen Garden Act was passed by the Assembly. The cooperation of individual citizens was encouraged by means of contests and the award of medals. People who did not have kitchen gardens were considered unpatriotic. A com­ mittee to promote kitchen gardening and animal breeding was set up.

All government officials must set examples to the people by having their own gardens. In the provinces, district officers, teachers, etc. should cooperate, even students were expected to work with . 240 their parents.

240 Kao Kosanakan, IX (October-November, 1939) pp. 223-224. 179

It was Pibul's idea that in case of war, people at least

could depend on themselves for a while.

By the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, Pibul started

on his nation building campaign. People were encouraged to consume

food produced in Thailand, wear clothing made from Thai material,

support agricultural and commercial, industrial and professional

undertakings of the Thai. (See Appendix XI, State Convention Five.)

As a result the Chinese food hawkers were forbidden to sell snacks

and food in certain places and the Thai were encouraged to sell

Kuaiteo (Chinese noodles). A slogan was coined "Thai turn Thai Chai

Thai kai Thai sue," (Thai made (it), Thai used (it), Thai sold (it),

Thai bought (it).

In the State Convention Seven, the government asked every

Thai to find an honest job for himself and his family. "Every Thai

must help in nation building. Everyone who is physically fit must

work or have a stable occupation. Those who do not work do not help

the nation and should not be respected by the general Thai public."

(See Appendix XIII.)

Cultural Nationalism

The above programs were part of Pibul's positive aspect of nationalism. Included in the above campaign was the intention to

improve the cultural aspect of the people. "Culture" is defined in the National Culture Maintenance Act of B.E. 2489 (September 1940)

as"any form which shows development, orderliness, unity and progress 180

241 of the nation, and the good morals of the people.

The campaign to improve national culture got started even

before the Indochinese border conflict. At the height of the

nationalistic propaganda, Pibul decided that the foreigners should

not think of the Thai as barbarians. He thought that uncivilized

countries fall under western colonization. The West would cite

humanitarian reasons for an excuse. Therefore, Thailand must be

civilized. The fact that people enjoyed wearing sarongs with no tops was definitely uncivilized. Subsequently, a decree was issued to

tell the public the kind of 'culture' the government wanted to see.

"The Thai must safeguard the honor of the nation when appearing in public places or in public gatherings within the municipalities, no one should dress in a way that would lower the nation's prestige,for example wearing sarongs, underpants, pajamas, short sarongs, for men or no tops or women wearing only camisole or breast- cloth, etc."

This decree was later made into the Tenth State Convention

(see Appendix XI). The enforcement was not so strong until after the war. The dress reform will be mentioned later on in the dis­ sertation.

Policy Adoption Toward the External Environment

As seen in the last chapter once the Thai accepted any power as dominant in the area, she would adapt her internal policies to accommodate that power. Though the government proclaimed

241 On the subject of culture, Luang Wichit gave a lecture on Sukothai culture in March, 1939. He said that in those days the Thai worked hard and did not depend on aliens. Once they started to accept the foreign influence, they forgot the Sukothai culture. 181

neutrality, the military group had a bias towards the Japanese.

They thought they had picked the winner. On the other hand, there

was the Pridi group and those who had their education in Britain who

did not give up on Britain. In any event, Western influence, and

particularly that of the United States in Thailand, reached a very

low point in the early part of 1941 and the Japanese appeared to

have gained a decisive edge.

In the days when the Thai accepted Britain as the sole

power in the area, the British keynote had been laissez faire and

consequently, the Thai transition to a British pattern of life had

been slow. But the axis keynote is blitz, and, as a consequence, 242 the transition to the Japanese pattern of life had to be rapid.

The reason why the Thai were reluctant to side with the Japanese

completely was the attitude of the Japanese. They tended to look

down on other Asians. In Bangkok, Lieutenant Colonel Tamura, the

Military Attache to the Japanese legation, told a Thai friend of

Crosby's that Western influences in Asia should be eliminated and

the Siamese should unite with Japan in putting an end to it. "Why" he had enquired arrogantly, "don't you bring yourself up to our 243 standard?" Thai missions, which were sent to Japan, met with the

same arrogance.

The general attitude of the Thai toward the Japanese may be

summed up as follows: the Thai respected the Japanese greatly and

feared them even more, but they did not particularly like them. The

242u.s. National Archives, Kenneth P. Landon, "Thailand's Foreign Policies," Document on Foreign Relations No 89.00/930.44, p. 32. 243 F.O. Crosby to F.O., May, 1936 182

foreign policy therefore was to play the British against the

Japanese. As long as the two countries were capable of counter­

balancing their positions in Southeast Asia, Thailand would be safe.

Meanwhile, the Thai would acconanodate both if the interests were not

in conflict.

It was since 1935 that Pibul, as the Minister of Defence,

started to indoctrinate the Thai youth with the idea of militarism.

The idea was to train youths to learn to use light weapons and dis­

ciplinary training from the time they were in the secondary schools.

They could start the training any time and at different levels of

education, secondary level, pre-university level or the university

level. If they passed the university level, they could start their career as a Sub-Lieutenant if they so desired. This movement was called in Thai "Yuwachon Movement" (Youth Corps). The whole idea was

probably adopted from the German and Japanese system by Colonel

Prayoon Pamornmontri, a half Thai, half German head of the Yuwachon

Movement. A slogan was invented to encourage the boys to join the military when they grew up:

"The boy of today is the man of tomorrow. He who makes investment in time and money in the lives of the boys today writes his name in large letters tomorrow. Whose name will be written in letters of gold by the historians of tomorrow?"244

Girls were encouraged to help the country in time of need

244 Thai Chronicle. July 20, 1939. 183

by joining the "Yuwanari" group. They would be trained as nurses

aids. There were also different levels as the boys but the girls

would not have military rank once they passed the training.

On the whole, the relationship between Japan and Thailand

could be described as superficially friendly. Streams of Japanese

came into Thailand acting as tourists, some were officials on leave of study, some were merchants in search of openings for trade. There were indications that the Japanese started to come to collect intel­ ligence about Thailand. A good example was the Cinema Department of the "Yomiuri Shimbun" which came to Thailand for the production of

cultural films under the sponsorship of the Japanese government.

They presented a long list of what they had planned to film, for example: a film to encourage tourist activity, both domestic and abroad, etc. The British happened to get the list of the real films which the Japanese had made and they were for example: Gold

Mining in South Thailand, British Firms in Thailand, Coal and Iron

Ore in Thailand, etc.^^

Cultural exchange programs were in fashion: the boy scouts exchaning tours, lectures, tours and Thai newspaper men were

invited to Japan. Miss Thailand was invited for a free tour of

Japan. The Japanese also set up a free school in Thailand to teach the language. A Siam Chamber was set up in Tokyo under the auspices of a Japanese ex-Minister of Finance and of a Baron Mitsui. The

F.O. 371, report from Consul Whittington to F.O., dated July 7, 1941. 184

purpose was to gather statistical reports and news about Siam and to

set up a library consisting of Siamese books on literature, history,

and collections of daily newspapers, periodicals and various reports

for free distribution to interested government establishments or

commercial undertakings.

On the government officials level, decorations were being

exchanged quite often. Prince Aditya, the President of the Thai

Council of Regency, received the Japanese Royal Family Order of the

Chrysanthemum in return for the Thai Royal Family Order of Chakri

conferred upon Prince Chichibu.

In the field of economics, the Japanese were trying to

strengthen their commercial position in Thailand and at the same

time to evade the boycott of their goods by the Chinese small dealers

by replacing the Chinese with Japanese petty traders and shopkeepers.

It was also in the field of economics that the British took

great concern. Since 1933, trade between Thailand and'Japan was one

sided. In 1935 for example, while the Thai bought from Japan 24fi 40,158,136 Yen, the Japanese bought only 5,457,551 Yen from Thailand.

Starting from 1939 onward, the Japanese reversed the trend by starting

to buy rice, tin and rubber extensively. Then there was an oil

problem in Thailand. Up until 1939, two foreign oil companies

monopolized the trade in petroleum and petroleum products in the

country. Of these companies, one was British (The Asiatic Petroleum

Company) which owned a larger share of trade over the other American

246 Krungdeb Varasab, November 21, 1936. 185

owned company (The Standard Vacuum Oil Company). The Thai govern­

ment had for some time previously aimed at securing a part of this

trade for themselves. In 1939, the government passed the Liquid

Fuel Act which gave the government the control over the importation

of oil and let the government share the existing market between the

two existing oil companies. The government set up its own agency

to provide all of the liquid fuel needs of the government aside

from controlling the distribution and price of the companies. By

July, the two companies, in resentment against the action, terminated

their activities in Thailand. The Japanese seized this opportunity

to help the Thai. In connection with an oil refinery, a large number

of engineers and artificers from Japan were in Bangkok to put up the

installation.

The oil problem which the Thai faced was the necessity of

satisfying the whole requirement of the kingdom in the matter of

petroleum and petroleum products before the Fuel Department of the

Ministry of Defence was ready. Not too long afterwards, the

Japanese agreed to provide a certain amount of oil to Thailand.

A month after the Peace Treaty in Tokyo, Pibul was telling

Grant that the Japanese were constantly reminding him of what they 247 accomplished for Thailand and they would expect something in return.

Initially, that 'something' was the increase in demand for the Thai

supply of rubber and tin. As a matter of fact, Japan asked for the

whole Thai rubber output estimated at 45 to 48,000 tons in May 1941.

247 The Foreign Affairs of the United States. Vol IV, 1941. Dispatch from Grant to the Secretary of State, July 17, 1941. 186

Japan would supply oil, war materials and machinery in return.

The demand caused a great deal of alarm to the British

Ministry of Economic Warfare. The whole British attitude towards

Thailand had to be reconsidered. Apparently, rubber was one of

Germany's chief deficiencies. It was believed that to meet her re­

quirements in 1941, Germany expected to consume the whole of her

21,000 tons of stock and to import about 40,000 tons. Apart from

some 4,000 tons which she hoped to get from Brazil, the remainder of

her imports must reach her via Japan.

Japanese minimum requirements of rubber, civil and military

were about 50,000 tons a year, though her imports might be higher.

In 1941, up to the end of April, she received the following quantities

from British and allied sources: Malaya, 3,300 tons; British Borneo,

700 tons; Netherland East Indies, 9,000 tons. In her anxiety, the

Japanese tried to force Indochina and perhaps Thailand to sell them

their output. From Indochina, the Japanese received 40,000 tons out

of 65-70,000 tons. The total amount which the Germans wanted from

the Far East according to the Ministry of Economic Warfare was 36,000

tons while the Japanese domestic requirements were 50,000. The

British estimated that any import above that amount was for Germany

and it had to be blocked.^®

Tin also held a high place among Axis deficiencies. Japan's

own requirements were estimated at about 1 0 , 0 0 0 tons of metal per

248 F.O. 371, memorandum by the Ministry of Economic Warfare, May 26, 1941. 187

annum. Therefore, any imports above the said number were likely to 249 be for Germany.

The Foreign Office reviewed what the Thai wanted and what

the British could do to pull the Thai away from the Japanese in­

fluence. They considered that the Thai wanted four things: arms,

oil, jute and a loan.

On the question of arms, the British could not spare any at

the time (May, 1941) while they were sure the Japanese could. Con­

cerning oil, the British had a problem of shipping while the Japanese

could supply the Thai easily. The Thai demand for jute was not much

in 1941. Only concerning the request for a loan could the British help the Thai more than the Japanese as the Thai currency was tied

up with the sterling.

Finally the British decided that they would try to help the 250 Thai in oil, hence cut the Japanese influence in this matter. At

the same time they would buy half of the Thai supply of rubber. It

was to be understood that the Thai would try to resist the Japanese

pressure as much as possible.

The intention of the Japanese to bring Thailand closer to

the yen bloc came in August. The Japanese representative, Mr. Ono came to negotiate on a new deal. Ono stated that Japan expected to buy a very large amount of rice, rubber, and tin from Thailand and

249 F.O. 371, Copy of Foreign Office telegram to Bangkok No. 78, May 20, 1941. 188

though Japan would endeavor to Increase her exports to Thailand,

the balance of trade in Thailand's favor would amount to 100 and 150

million yen per annum. The deal was to ask for 25,000,000 ticals,

against a sale of gold, and a formal renewal for another 1 0 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0

ticals of credit granted on August 2nd by Thai Process Banks

Consortium to Yokohama Specie Bank, the original 10,000,000 having

been exhausted by August 16th. The Japanese tried to stipulate that

gold sold should remain earmarked in the Bank of Japan, to be ex­

ported to Thailand only in case of urgent need and then only in

amounts sufficient to satisfy that urgent need. Pridi, Minister of

Finance, through the Consortium, resisted tenaciously, insisting

that Thailand had other trade balances than that with Japan to

consider. In order to counteract the effects of over inflation of credit caused by such a huge addition to the note circulation without any real attention of national wealth, he must be in a position to

sell gold. He subsequently demanded that never more than 10 million ticals worth of gold should remain earmarked in Japan and that the balance of 35 million ticals worth of gold must be delivered against the credits. Within ninety minutes of the refusal, the Japanese sent a complaint to the Prime Minister calling Pridi a "cantankerous obstructionist."

The Japanese broke off the negotiation and threatened to close down the Bangkok office of Yokohama Specie Bank. The Thai cabinet entirely supported Pridi's action. The Prime Minister's last

words were "quite right! No gold, no ticals."

Two days later, the negotiation started again. This time the 189

meeting was held in the Premier's office at which the Premier, Pridi,

Nai Vanich, Nai Direck, Japanese Minister and Mr. Ono were present.

The straight sale of 25 million ticals worth of gold was arranged on

the basis of one fine ounce equaled 35 United States dollars and one

pound sterling equaled 4.03 United States dollars, equalling 10 ticals

80 stangs. The transport of gold to Bangkok was at the option of

the Minister of Finance who asked for 13 million ticals worth im­

mediately, the remainder to be earmarked in the Bank of Japan. The

cost of transport was to be paid by Yokohama Specie Bank but re­

payable to the Yokohama Specie Bank by Currency Department within

the limit of 2 0 satangs per one pound sterling worth of gold.

The Thai accommodation to the Japanese financial demands

in 1941 by the investigation of the British came to 80 million

ticals against 70 million in cash and ticals ten million payable in

gold delivery in Bangkok. The Thai received full consent from the

Minister of Finance, Tokyo to free use of gold.

The reason behind this agreement was probably the result of

the United States decision to freeze the Japanese assets. The loss was about one million of fine ounces of gold production. The Thai,

in receiving the gold, would send part of it to London, some of which

the British would send to the U.S. to repay the U.S. credit.

Meanwhile, the attitude of the United States remained the

same. The Thai order of steel bars and galvanized iron pipes was blocked in Hong Kong and the Thai took it badly. On this matter,

the British tried to persuade the United States to change their

outlook. The British were realistic enough to understand that 190

without the United States cooperation, she could not help Thailand

as much as she had intended.

The German decision to attack Russia hastened the Japanese

Southern advance. The navy insisted on that policy for the advance

should be pursued even more vigorously while the Army wanted to

join in with German forces. At that time Japan had already signed a Neutrality Pact with the Soviety Union. This Pact, in the view of the navy, provided an even better opportunity for Japan to operate freely, in the south, without worry of a Soviet attack in the north. Tojo, the Minister of War, was convinced by the navy's view.

On July 3, the Japanese Privy Council witnessed the rati­ fication of the Franco-Japanese Protocol on Guarantee and Political

Understanding. France accepted the terms for Japan's "stabilization"

of East Asia and declared that she had no intention of concluding with a third power any agreement or understanding concerning French

Indochina which would be directly or indirectly in opposition to

Japan. The Council proceeded to discuss Japan's policy toward

Thailand, Thai attitude toward Japan, the Nanking government and

Great Britain. It was widely recognized that British influence was still very strong there. Tojo added that from various reports it was well-established in Japanese planning groups that several im­ portant persons in Thailand had been in close liaison with British 251 authorities in Singapore. On the whole, the Japanese might have

251 IMTFE, Tojo's testimony, transcript of the record, p. 36249. 191

over-estimated the strength of British influence in Thailand. In

any case, Japan decided that she would rather exercise circumspection

in regard to Thailand. Forcible measures were contemplated only for

French Indochina.

Late in July, the Japanese Army moved into Indochina con­

trolling all strategic places: air bases, naval stations, Camranh

Bay and important means of transportation. The Japanese gave as the

reason for this occupation that they were for "the defence of 252 Indochina from British attack."

The Thai Prime Minister was very much perturbed over the news. The Japanese occupied the territories which they had denied

the Thai on the ground that such territories must, in justice, be retained by France. On the whole, the Thai were afraid that the next Japanese move would be toward Bangkok. They wanted a firm commitment from Britain and the United States to help them in such a situation.

To satisfy the Thai, on August 6 , 1941, Mr. Cordell Hull,

Secretary of State, speaking at a press conference stated that:

"A Japanese move into Thailand would be considered a step menacing American security and endangering American territory in the pacific."^53

The American announcement in fact amounted to nothing if the

Thai had seen a telegram from Tokyo to the United States Foreign

252 The Foreign Relations of the U.S. . 1941, Vol. V, p. 229. Despatch from Consul Reed to the Secretary of State, July 24, 1941.

253 Telegraph and Morning Post. August 7, 1941. Office. Here the United States made it clear that "a Japanese in­

fringement of British territory or the Netherlands East Indies would

in view of the administration lead to war between the U.S. and 254 Japan." On the other hand, if Japan were to occupy Thai territory

without proceeding forthwith to attack British territory or the

Netherlands East Indies the British could not expect the United 255 States to make this a casus belli.

With this understanding, the British had made her decision

about Thailand. Her objective was to avoid war with Japan as long

as possible in order to concentrate on defeating Germany. What con­ cerned the British most in Thailand was whether the Isthmus of Kra would be taken by the Japanese. In such a case what should Britain do? The Isthmus would be the best stepping stone toward Singapore.

On this point, the British War Cabinet even contemplated seizing Kra 256 Isthmus first before the Japanese moved in. However, Britain

decided in October, 1941 that she could give Thailand some arms but

not the airplanes which the Thai Prime Minister wanted.

Pibul asked Grant on August 9, 1941 if he "would welcome

positive action by the United States, such as economic pressure

against Japan," and that Thailand itself "would oppose with force

any military aggression" but doubted that such opposition would be

P.O. 371, Telegram from Tokyo to Foreign Office, August 13, 1941. 193

257 successful "without outside assistance."

In August, after the Japanese had occupied the southern

part of Indochina, the United States was willing to reconsider its

position. First, however, Hugh Grant, who became convinced that

Thailand was hopelessly in the clutches of the Japanese and who had been identified in Thailand with American insistence for status quo

and the cancellation of the North American bomber shipment in

October 1940, had to be got out of the way. On August 6 , Bangkok was informed of a new American Minister, Willys R. Feck, a career diplomat with long service in China. The Thais, who were anxious 258 to see Grant go, accepted the news with alacrity.

Within a short time of his arrival, Peck reported to the

Secretary of State on November 6 , 1941 that "whatever may have been the Thai feeling toward Japan during the Indochina incident, the government and people dread and desire to escape Japanese domination 259 in any form." later on, he added:

"The public and private utterances of officials here incline me strongly to believe that if we assist the government to acquire the aviation gasoline, lubricating oil, and fighter planes for which it is pressing there will be no surrender until forcible resistance has been tried and has failed."260

257 The Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1941, Vol. V, pp. 266- 267. Despatch from Grant to Secretary of State. 258 Jayanam, Thai Kap Songgram, Vol. 1, pp. 169-171. 259 The Foreign Relations of the U.S. , Vol. V, 1941, p. 335. Despatch from Peck to Secretary of State.

26°Ibid., p. 335. 194

Stanley K. Hornbeck, State Department Advisor on Political

Relations, in a memorandum to Under Secretary Sumner Wells, argued

that he strongly favored a direct Anglo-American approach to the

Japanese.

"I would rather," he wrote, "that we and the British with weapons in our hands, tell the Japanese that they are not to invade Thailand than to have the Thais, with our weapons in their hands, tell the Japanese that."261

On November 22, 1941 the hope of Thailand to get "aid" from

the United States was sealed. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State,

instructed Peck to notify the Thai government that the United States

could not grant its request for anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and

ammunition "in view of the tremendous needs of (the United States)

defence programs as well as very urgent needs for such materials in .,262 other areas."

Concerning the weapons, finally the British were willing to

release twenty-four 4.5 Howitzers and 24,000 rounds of ammunition and

twelve field guns in October. Then as late as the first of December,

the War Cabinet announced that they could offer the Thai three or

four fighter aircrafts with the quid pro quo of sending technical 263 instructors with them.

In the midst of the threat of war, the Thai tried to put on

a brave front. An Act to Prescribe the Duties of the Thai People in

Time of Hostilities A.D., 1941 (B.E. 2484) was promulgated. The most

2 6 1 Ibid., p. 328.

2 6 2 Ibid., p. 346. 263 F.O. 371, Cabinet distribution to J.C. Sterndale Bennett. 195

important of all was section 5 which read:

"Every Thai national must resist the enemy in every way, by arms, wealth or other means, in ac­ cordance with the orders of the military authorities. "When placed, however, in a position where he is prevented from knowing the orders of the military authorities, he must continue his resistance by such means as are possible, to the end. If resistance is impossible, he must obstruct or create difficulties of various kinds, with a view of denying facilities to the enemy, and shall totally destroy all implements, utensils, furniture, provisions, dwellings, beasts of burden, and goods of all kind, whether belonging to himself, to other persons of 2 5 4 the government, which would be of use to the enemy."

A communique concerning the duties of the Thai in time of

hostilities was equally impressive. In one part it said:

"However mighty the enemy's strength, to be born Thai must mean to fight to the end of our strength. The Thai nation knows that it is a small nation and that its strength and power are not great, but it prefers to die free than to live in slavery..."265

The people were told to prepare themselves for the wax

1. By obeying the laws and following official advice and

instructions;

2. By working hard and being thrifty because the income

saved would be useful in case of an emergency;

3. By raising crops, breeding animals for food for one's family and for sale to the military authorities when needed;

4. As the stocks of imported goods were greatly reduced,

264 Thailand, Government Gazette. September 11, 1941. Note: This policy was adopted from Stalin's "Scorched earth policy in the war between Russia and Germany."

265Ibid., p. 2. 196

and prices were high, to use only those which were really necessary;

5. By training to be fighters in accordance with the

facilities given by the authorities;

6 . By trusting only such news as was issued by the au­

thorities, and never to listen to other news;

7. To he patriotic to Thailand to the highest degree, and 266 not to favor any other nations in the least at the present time.

Despite all the preparations, the public and even the cabinet

were divided, one group inclined toward the west and the other group

toward Japan. Among the pro West group were Pridi, Minister of 267 Finance; Nai Direck Jayanam, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Luang

Dhamrong Navasawat, Minister of Justice. A pro-Japanese group was

chiefly represented by Luang Sindhu Songgramchai, Minister of

Education; Luang Wichit Wadhakan, Deputy of Foreign Affairs; Colonel

Prayoon Pamornmontri, Deputy Minister of Education; the rest were non partisan.

The final blow to the dream of the British military assis­ tance came on December 7, 1941, when the Thai Premier received the

"most immediate and most secret" telegram from British Prime Minister

Sir Winston Churchill that:

"There is a possibility of imminent Japanese invasion of your country. If you are attacked, defend yourself. The preservation of the full

2 6 6 BTWM, November 18, 1941. 267 He was promoted on August 20, 1941. Pibul also relin­ quished the portfolio of Defence for Luang Promyodhi who was Deputy Minister of Defence. 197

independence and sovereignty of Thailand is a British interest and we shall regard an attack on you as an attack on ourselves."268

The Japanese Ultimatum and its Aftermath

On the evening of December 7, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador,

Tsubogami, and a party of Japanese officials came to see the Thai

Premier at the Suan Kulap Palace, the office of the Prime Minister. 269 As Pibul was away to inspect the military preparations in

Frachinburi and Srisophon, Luang Adul Aduldejarat, Deputy Prime

Minister, asked Nai Direk Jayanam, the Minister of Foreign Affairs

to meet with the Japanese representatives on his behalf.

The Japanese Ambassador informed Direk that his country had

declared war on the United States and Great Britain. He had been

instructed to seek permission for Japanese troops to transit Thailand

so that they might attack the territories of Japan's enemies. Direk reminded the Japanese of Thailand's neutrality but added that in any event only the Premier could grant such a request. At that point, the Japanese Military Attache, Colonel Tamura, inserted that any delay

268 F.O. 371. Telegram from Foreign Office to Bangkok, dated December 7, 1941, 1:40 p.m. 269 Pibul said in his testimony that he thought the Japanese would come via Prachinburi, but he had alerted all the troops: 1st Division to defend Bangkok and Cholburi; 2nd Division to defend Aranya Prades; 3rd Division for the Northeastern part; 4th Division for the North and the 5th Division for the South. Thailand, Testimony of Field Marshal Pibulsonggram given to the Committee set up under War Criminal Act (not in print) October 30, 1945. Henceforth, this testimony will be referred to as Pibul's testimony. 198

would mean more loss of Thai blood because at that very moment

Japanese forces were landing at several points in Thailand.

The Cabinet met in an emergency session but they preferred

to wait until Pibul came back at 6:50 a.m. (December 8 , 1941). Two

central issues were discussed. The first was whether or not the

government should order a cease fire; the second was what kind of agreement should Thailand make with the Japanese. At that time the

Japanese proposed four alternatives. The first was for Thailand to

sign the offensive-defensive treaty with Japan. The prize for such an agreement was the return to Thailand of all the territories taken by France and Great Britain. The second was to join the Tripartite

Pact. The third was to allow the Japanese to pass through the country and to provide all the necessary military measures for that

purpose. The fourth alternative was to sign a Treaty of Common 271 defense in addition to signing the treaties in option one and two. 271 The majority agreed that Thailand should not fight. The

Minister of Defence had a different opinion. He preferred for

270 Thailand, Verbatim report of the Special Cabinet Meeting, December 8 , 1941, p. 19 (not in print). Other published sources available are Luang Wichit Wadhakan, Tu Tong (The Gold Book Case) Vol. 1, October, 1970. Direk's own account in Thai Kap Songkram Loh Krang Thai Song (Thailand and the Second World War), Peck's dispatch of December 8 , 1941, in the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. V, pp. 378-79; Sir Joseph Crosby's version in Siam's the Crossroads (London: 1945), pp. 129-130, and Nicol Smith's record of a conversation with Direk in 1945 in Smith and Blake Clark, Into Siam: Underground Kingdom (New York: 1945), PP. 261-265.

Ibid., p. 19. Many records said that Pridi advocated fighting which as a matter of fact he did not. 199

272 Thailand to help Japan militarily. Luang Wichit thought that 273 joining the axis would give Thailand maximum benefit.

Pridi raised the case of Sweden and asked whether only the

right of passage could be given. He reminded the government that

once the cabinet had decided not to fight with the Japanese, they

should not fight with the other side either.

In the end, the cabinet decided to draw a new plan by

joining option number three with number four but they discarded the

territorial concession. They did not want to appear in any way an

"opportunistic."

Nai Direk Jayanam, Prince Wan and Nai Wanid, the Director

General of the Department of Commerce who was fluent in Japanese,

went to negotiate with the Japanese. At 10 a.m. they came back.

The Japanese agreed on the following version of the agreement:

"The undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, agree as follows: 1. In order to cope with the urgent situation in East Asia, Thailand shall give Japan the per­ mission of passage by the Japanese forces through the Thai territory and giving of all immediate execution of measures to avoid every possible conflict which may arise between the Japanese and the Thai forces. 2. The particulars for the execution of the precedent paragraph shall be agreed upon between the military authorities of the two countries. 3. Japan will guarantee that the indepen­ dence, sovereignty and honor of Thailand be respected. Done, in duplicate, at Bangkok on the 8th

272 ‘“ ibid., p. 2 0 .

2 7 3 Ibid., p. 2 0 . 200

of December, 1941."

Sd. Direk Jaiyanam The Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs

Sd. T. Tsubokami 2 7 4 The Japanese Ambassador

Pridi asked Nai Wanid to go over the agreement with the

Japanese again, to confirm with them that the agreement was for

military passage only. The Japanese would not get economic and 275 financial preferences in the agreement.

On the next day there was a secret session of the National

Assembly where 122 members attended. Pibul did not attend but asked the Minister of Justice to relay the government decision to the

Assemblymen. A representative from Lampang asked why the government did not continue the fighting when the military had spent so much money on improving the armed forces. Another representative from

Chiengmai asked whether the Japanese had promised to give more ter- 276 ritory. Some of the Assemblymen were concerned about the economic implications and some about sovereignty. The Minister of Justice could not answer all the questions on the grounds of national security.

2 7 S?hailand, Special Cabinet Meeting, December 8 , 1941 C-n°t in print). Copy of the letter attached to the Report of the Meeting.

2 7 5 Ibid., p. 23.

2 7 6 Thailand, Proceedings of the National Assembly, Irregular Meeting No. 1/2484, No. 3, Second Session, December 9, 1941, pp. 5-6. What the public did not know was that on December 10, 1941,

another cabinet meeting took place where the Premier expressed his

feelings. He confirmed that the decision to give the right of pas­

sage was the best he could think of. At one point he had this to

say:

"To survive at the moment, we have to show that we are friends of the Japanese even though it may not be true. We let them go, let them have the right of passage. Whatever they did we will let them. We want to save our nation, if we are stubborn, our nation will die and never will resurrect. But if we give to them gradually, it will be something like when wind blows hard we bend with it, the tree will not break..."277

Later on in the same meeting he said:

"At this time whoever acts aggressively toward the Japanese is a traitor not a nationalist. This is not to say that I like them..." 278

Nai Kuang Apaiwong said that the government should explain

to the people as much as they possibly could so that the public would not have any misunderstanding. To this, the Premier said that he had talked a lot and he could not communicate with the people any more because they had no understanding at all. They listened too

much to the Farang and the Chinese. They did not understand what survival was. "Survival is the best policy..." said the Prime 279 Minister.

277 Thailand, Report of the Cabinet Meeting. Wednesday, December 10, 1941 (not in print), p. 4. 202

It was at the next special cabinet meeting, December 11,

1941, that the Premier told the 22 cabinet members present that the 280 Japanese had demanded from Thailand full military cooperation.

They set the deadline for the Thai decision at 11:00 a.m., December

11, 1941. Pibul mentioned that he was afraid the Japanese would

disarm the Thai army which would mean the loss of sovereignty. Then

he said, "In my mind, if we join them we should do it on a 100%

basis."281

At this point Pridi, Minister of Finance said,

"the other day I told you that if we don't fight the Japanese we should not fight the other side as well because we'll lose our reputation. If what we are talking today is the name of the country...we should think of the way to let the Japanese keep their promise and if they don't they are in the wrong..."

The Premier:

"...there is no other way, they said they could not let us stay like this, for the sake of their safetiness, they are in our country and we are fully armed."

Pridi:

"If we don't join them what will they do...as far as they told you?"

28Q Pibul's testimony, p. 7. He said the Japanese Ministers and 20 other Japanese officials came to see him at the office on December 10, 1941. Nai Wanid was with the Japanese group. Not counting Wanid, Pibul was the only Thai. Flood says that the Japanese records mentioned that the meeting was on the 9th. 281 Thailand, Special Cabinet Meetings, December 11, 1941 (not in print), p. 3. Flood says that according to the Japanese source on December 9, 1941, Pibul told the Japanese officials that he was ready to declare war on the allies any time. See Flood, "Relations with Thailand," pp. 716-720, 735. 203

Colonel Prayoon:

"...they did not say definitely but we can guess what they will do: (1) disarm our military (2) change the government. 2 3 2 The rest we really don't know."

From then on, Pridi did not say anything else. The Minister

of Justice and the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that the thought had occurred to them before that the Japanese would increase their demands like this. Both did not want to concede but did not have any other alternative. The Minister of Defence, on the other hand, was willing to join the Japanese. Luang Wichit surprisingly enough kept silent all through the meeting.

Pibul went out to see the Japanese at 11:00 a.m. with the

Cabinet's decision to cooperate. The decision to move from passive acceptance to active military participation caused the final ideological split between Pibul and Pridi: the latter was "promoted" to become a member of the Cabinet of Regency and not too long after­ wards Direk was sent to Tokyo as the new ambassador. Luang Wichit

Wadhakan replaced him as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luang

Apaiwong and Thawee Bunyaketu resigned from the cabinet subsequently.

Events proceeded apace. On the 21st of December, the "of- 283 fensive-defensive" alliance with Japan was signed. Four days later, the Thai formally declared war on the United States and

282t... , Ibid.. p. 4. 283 See Appendix XX. 204

Britain.„ ^ 284

After the declaration of war was submitted to the National

Assembly for acknowledgement, Nai Wuthi Suwanarak, a representative

from Surattani, proposed that the Assembly should have full con­

fidence in Pibul as "the leader (phu num) of the Nation, to lead

this nation through hardship to final victory." The members unani­ mously raised their hands in agreement with the proposal.

Thus Pibul became officially 'the leader' of the nation

following the fascist model. His power in Thai was absolute as the reader has seen in the decision to let the Japanese have the right of passage. None could decide until Pibul arrived.

Reactions From Inside and Outside the Country

The following is the report of the feeling of the Thai people in Bangkok as reported by an American eye-witness:

"The Thailanders, shocked by news of the sur­ render, wept as they stood dazed in the street."

Resistance outside the country started in Washington. M.R.

Seni Pramoj, Thai Minister, made the following announcement on

December 12, 1941.

"News has just come through this morning at 8:53 a.m. from the Japanese occupied Bangkok that an agreement has been concluded whereby Japan and Thailand shall enter into an offensive and defensive alliance. In view of the announcement which I have given out to the press yesterday afternoon to the effect that I shall work only for the re-establishment of free and independent

284 Direk, Vol. 1, p. 203. At that time Pridi as one of the members of the Council of Regents went to Ayudhya. As a result he did not sign the declaration which made it according to Thai law "null and void." Thailand, and in view also of a telegraphic message 1 dispatched to Bangkok at the same time that henceforth I shall carry out only those orders which, in my opinion, represent the Thai government's free will. In the name of the Thai people, therefore, whose officially designated representative I am, I hereby repudiate any such alliance upon Thailand at the point of the bayonet."285

The Minister withheld the declaration of war and did not

hand it to the United States government. By so doing no declaration

of war toward the United States has ever been made. In fact the

American government continued to recognize the Thai Minister in

Washington as the Minister of Thailand. The Free Thai Movement was

thus organized by students and officials in the United States. The

American government released the previously frozen fund for their organization under the leadership of M.R. Seni Pramoj.

The British, on the other hand, regarded the Thai decision

as double crossing them. In the paper released under the title

"Future Relations Between the United Kingdom and Thailand," the

British mentioned the indications that the Thai Prime Minister had been inclined to play with the Japanese more than he had admitted to 286 them. Mr. Anthony Eden sent a letter to the Thai Minister in

London on December 22, 1941. He wrote:

"His Majesty's government are willing to believe that this agreement (meaning the agreement to give the right of passage to the Japanese) was concluded under duress, but all the indications since then are that

285 U.S. National Archives, Foreign Relations Records. Document No. 711.92/31. 286 F.O. 371. Paper written by J.C. Sterndale Bennett of the Far Eastern section, December 9, 1941. 206

the Thai government are now following the path of willing and active cooperation with the Japanese forces, and it is now reported that they have con­ cluded a treaty of alliance with Japan. While unwilling to believe that this policy has the support of the freedom-loving people of Thailand, His Majesty's government has no option but to regard Thailand as enemy-occupied ter- 2 3 7 ritory and its government under enemy control."

Only Sir Josiah Crosby blamed the declaration of war by the

Thai on the inability of the British and of the United States to withstand the initial onrush of the Japanese forces.

Mr. C.W. Orde, ex-Department Head of the Far Eastern section did not agree with Crosby's view at all. He declared that unlike

Crosby, "1 shall personally feel no hesitation in looking a Siamese in the face after the war and shall indeed expect the boot to be on the other leg."^^

Japanese-Thai Relations During the War

Thailand's immediate cooperation was of inestimable value to

Japan because it meant that the Japanese could exploit the complete and undamaged railways, highways, and airports. The peak of the collaboration came on January 25, 1942 when Thailand declared war on the Allies, in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty of

Alliance.

On April 22, 1942, the Thai government announced that the

Japanese government had proposed, and Thailand had accepted an agreement whereby the ticals were to be reduced to parity with the yen. This forced the devaluation of the ticals from 38.5% 60, to 287 P.O. 371. A letter from Mr. Eden to the Thai Minister, December 22, 1941. 4 0 O F.O. 371. Report dated November 1, 1942. 207

the Japanese advantage. Economic measures taken under Japanese

supervision greatly undermined the Thai economy. Inflation started

and was worsened by increased hoarding of goods by the Chinese. The

value of the tical decreased rapidly. On June 18, 1942, the

Japanese agreed to lend 200 million yen to Thailand at 3 1/2%

interest rate in order to bolster the Thai currency. Six months

of war had emptied the Thai treasury and made Thai solvency dependent

upon Japan. Furthermore, the Japanese destroyed printing of the

Thai currency by providing non-reserve backed banknotes without serial numbers and by forcing her to recall Thai nickel, silver and copper

coins in order to get metal. This situation accounted for rising hostility against Japan. Moreover, the Mitsubhishi Company mo­ nopolized all exports of Thai rice. The export duties for rice, tin, and rubber to Japan were relinquished in return for a similar waiver 289 on Japanese goods other than food and liquor.

The joint control of Thai industries was shortly set up whereupon the Thai government could no longer have a voice against the command of Japanese capital, machinery, technical skill, shipping and other control measures.

In the strategic field, alliance with Thailand was vital to

the southern advance of the Japanese. Immediately after their in­ vasion, the Japanese military leaders set up their headquarters in

the Bangkok Chinese Chamber of Commerce, stabled their cavalry mounts at the Royal Bangkok Sports Club, quartered infantry in the

289 U.S. Government, Office of Strategic Service, Japanese Domination of Thailand (Washington: Office of Intelligence Research, 1944), p. 29. 208

National Park of Lumpini, occupied Donmuang airbase, Bang Sue air­

plane assembly plant, the National Stadium and the Sam sen Rifle

Range. The Japanese troops in Thailand were under the command of

Lieutenant General Aketo Nakamura. Nevertheless, it is interesting

to note that the Thai army was left under the Thai High Command and

they would operate only under its order.

The Thai had five army divisions. Pibul sent three divisions

to the northern part of Thailand, one stayed in Bangkok and one was

sent to the south. According to Pibul's testimony, Nakamura asked

the division in the north to proceed to the Shan state. Pibul, as

the Commander-in-Chief, said that he pretended to cooperate because

he had a secret plan to contact the KMT troops in China. Neverthe­

less, his plans succeeded late in March 1944, only a few months

before his fall from power. Colonel Netkhemayodhin was sent as

Pibul's delegate to southern Yunan to meet the representatives of 290 the Kuomintang. He was one of those few who knew of Pibul's

underground movement from the beginning. He reported that in 1942

Pibul asked him in front of Army Chief-of-Staff, General Chira

Wichitsonggram, "Who do you think is going to lose the war?" He

290 Net Khemayodhin, Ngan Tai Din Khong Phanek Yothi (The Underground Work of Colonel Yothi) (Bangkok: 1957) Vol. 2, pp. 22-25. This claim is substantiated by Captain David W. Parson, USA, who in the course of an interview with Pibul in 1947 was shown the minutes of the April 2, 1944 meetings in which Colonel Net met officers of the KMT, 23rd Division (see the Bangkok Post May 24, 1947). 209

then answered the question himself, "whichever side it is, is our

..291 enemy."

As the world saw it, in May 1942 the Thai troops in the north

marched into the Shan States and occupied the area around Kengtung

easily. There was practically no fighting.

In the beginning of the year, 1943, the Japanese authorities

in Bangkok began to detect that certain elements in Thai circles had

been organizing resistance to Japan and the Japanese forces in the

country. The fear that Thailand was breaking away from effective

alliance brought the Japanese government to a modification of its

policy toward Thailand. Kuoki Aoki, Minister of Greater East Asia,

was sent to Bangkok. He had a private discussion with Premier

Pibul and Foreign Minister Wichit. Shortly after Aoki's return to

Tokyo, it was announced that the four Malay states of Perlis, Kedah,

Kelantanand and Trenganu which Great Britain had secured from

Thailand in the past would be returned to Thailand. Tojo testified

that the reason why the Imperial Conference on May 31, 1943 decided

on these areas was because they were the newest of the areas to be 292 plundered by Britain. He further declared that Japan was sym­ pathetic to Thailand's aspirations and was prepared to give her further 293 cooperation in securing those territories.

291 Net Khemayodhin, Chiwit Kan Toe Su Khong Phan Qek Yothi (The Struggling Life of Colonel Yothi) (Bangkok: 1957), p. 1. 292 IMTFE, Vol. 83, p. 36460. 293 Syonan Sinbun, June 19, 1943. 210

About the four Malay States, Pibul testified that Luang

Wichit who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1943 suggested

the idea to the cabinet first but he and some cabinet members did

not like the idea of adding more problems to the country. However,

he did not stop Luang Wichit, and instead he said, "If you want 294 them go ahead, do it your own way." Luang Wichit, on October 9,

1943 gave an interview saying that the Prime Minister had complimented

him in writing that he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs who had

best served the nation. He added:

"In regards to the Premier's remark on the radio on Jyly 11, 1943, that I was the key initiator for the return of the four Malay States, I considered it to be the highest certificate which I have re­ ceived in my life."295

The public did not feel enthusiastic about the newly acquired

territories as much as they had been initially. They had suffered

from the flood in 1942, there were food shortages and on top of

everything, there was the inflation.

The Greater East Asian sphere also had its cultural aspects.

In October 1942, Thailand signed a Cultural Relations Treaty with

Japan whereby each country would supply the other in as large quan­

tities and as frequently as possible with public information, films, photographs, etc. Following the ratification of the Treaty, the

Tokyo Radio broadcasted that the Japanese government had allotted

294 Pibul's Testimony, November 1, 1945, p. 12. 295 Prajamitra, October 9, 1943. 211

296 nearly 3 million yen for a cultural exchange program with Thailand.

The cultural program dealt with religion between the two countries. Despite a significant difference in Buddhism as it was practiced in Japan and in Thailand, the Japanese tried to make frequent propaganda of mutual cooperation for the impact of this religion. The International Buddhist Society was set up. Thailand gave seventy copies of the Tripitaka to Japan through the Ambassador in Tokyo. In June, 1943, the Dai Nippon Buddhist Association sent four monks led by Baron Koji Kibe on a good will mission to

Thailand.

Pibul's Programs to Unite the People

Starting from the beginning of the war, Pibul issued a circulated letter to every Minister, Department Head and provincial and provincial administrator to tell the people that

"if our Thai brethren do whatever we ask them to do, the world will see that the people are obedient to the state and our nation has good unity. If the people follow what the government requests it is equivalent to training themselves to follow an order which is an important quality in nation building and safeguarding the nation in time of crisis."297

What Pibul meant was the revival of the cultural programs which had already started before the war but had never been enforced.

With the Japanese army inside the country, Pibul needed to prevent

U.S. Government, Office of Strategic Services, Japanese Domination of Thailand, p. 39. 297 Thailand, Krcm Prachasamphan Khwamsamkhan Nai Kan Bamrung Watthanatham Khong Chat (The Importance of Promoting National Cultural) (Bangkok: 1941), p. 76. 212

the effects of Nipponization as much as possible. There was no way

for him to communicate to the people frankly except indirectly

through Nai Man and Nai Kong. As a result the officials were asked

by a letter written by the Secretary of the Council of Ministers

dated October 13, 1941 to tune in to Nai Man and Nai Kong programs

on the radio every day and to follow the guidelines given by them.

The slogan "Follow the Leader; the Nation Will Be Safe" got started.

Every newspaper had to provide a space on the front page and print

the slogan (see Appendix XXI).

The cultural nationalist program which is one of the positive

aspects of Thai nationalism had the support of four persons besides 298 Luang Wichit. Pridi called them sarcastically, "chatusadom," a

term used in the past referring to the four key Ministers under absolute monarchy. These four persons were sometimes called by their

original names as Nuan (Luang Saranupraphan), Thian (Luang Wichian

Pattayakom), Pian (Pra Ratchatham Nithes) and Yong (Praya Anumarn

Ratchadhon).

Luang Saranupraphan was a colonel in the army. He was known

as a great teacher and a good writer. He wrote the lyrics of the 299 new national anthem. He wrote an article called "Behind the Leader”

He was the one who made the slogan which said: "Leader of the Thai

(meaning Pibul), we must love him and be loyal to him.V Relieve our

leader; the nation will be safe." This was the beginning of the

298 Pridi Banomyong, "Chong Pitak Chetanarom Prachathipatai Somboon Khong Wirachon Sip Si Tulakom" (Preserve the Objectives of the Perfect Democracy of the Heroes of October 14th) Prachatipatai, November 23, 1973. ^^Nuan Saranupraphan, "Langchak Phu Num" (Behind the Leader) Apalakitasamai (Bangkok: 1942), p. 41. 213

"Follow the Leader" slogan.

Luang Wichian Pattayakom (Thian) was a psychiatrist and a

good speaker. His speeches were on a variety of subjects— health,

child psychology, sex and mariage, etc. He was perhaps behind the

slogan "A Child of Today is the Man of Tomorrow." (see page

Pra Ratchatham Nithes (Pian) was the Head of the Department

of Publicity before and after the war started. He wrote the con­ versation pieces and acted as Nai Kong.

Praya Anuman Ratchadhon (Yong) was an authority in reviving

old Thai customs. He made an extensive study of Thai customs and

traditions. His books and articles have been well known all over

the country. He was one of the most important forces behind the changing of the Thai alphabet and the other cultural and educational

reform programs.

During the war, the cultural nationalist programs which

Pibul had invented were curiously enough, not a pure revival of

Thai culture. Parts of them were an adoption of the western style

of dressing. Before the war, Pibul was concerned that the Thai

people did not like to wear tops, but during the war he noticed that

Thai men liked to wear colorful Chinese pants everywhere. These

pants were imported from China, which did not support the 'Buy

Thai Campaign', Pibul sent a letter to Pra Ratchatham asking him

to help change this habit. It was Pibul's habit to hint to Pra

Ratchatham what he wanted to see and the latter would write out 214

the details.300 Consequently Man and Kong started their campaign

that Chinese pants were considered pajamas by the West. They were

used only inside the house, and whoever wore them did not support

Thai made material. The campaign went on to recount how the Thai

were pushed southward by the Chinese. A new slogan was invented

that if "we were defeated by the Chinese again, the whole nation 301 will die because we have no space but the sea to fall back on."

The campaign worked wonders because the Thai did not trust the

Chinese any more than the Japanese. In the next six months, people

rarely wore colorful pants in public places; they wore western

style pants as the government had advocated. After this the cam­

paign went to shoes and hats.

The next phase concerned the Thai women. Pibul's ideas re­

sembled those of Rama VI who disliked women cutting their hair

short, chewing betel nuts and wearing the traditional phanung (a

long wrap around skirt). The campaign started off by comparing

women to flowers. Women are considered national flowers who should

dress as civilized as men. They should stop wearing breast cloths

or camisoles, and wear a skirt and blouse instead. Subsequently, the shoes and hats followed.

The hat campaign was adopted from Turkey. The Turkish were 302 considered civilized because they wore hats. A new slogan was

300 Sang Pattanotai, Khwamnuk Nai Krongkhanig (Thoughts Behind Bars) (Bangkok: Klang Wittaya, 1956), p. 248. 301Ibid. 302 Prajamitra, "Tanon Wattanatham" (A Road to Culture), 1943. 215

invented for hat wearing. The most popular one was "Hats will

lead Thailand to become a major power." It was based on Pibul's

article of the same name.

An elaborate set of official rules was issued from the

end of 1941 to 1945 prescribing fashion for Thai women for court

as well as every day wear, in which the length, design, color and

material of dresses were minutely described, as well as the acces­

sories such as shoes, hats, stockings and handbags.

It was reported that the Prime Minister himself took real

interest in matters of dress to the extent that he would visit the

government department to observe whether the rules were being

observed by government officials who should become good examples to

the people.

The campaign was intended to show national solidarity in

which everyone was to play a part. Prem Chaya wrote about it rather

amusingly. He said that elderly women in particular, were often 303 seen wearing superb hats on their heads but nothing on their feet.

On the other hand, "...so intent are some on upholding the law to

the letter that they even go to their bath in the canal fully dressed

and with a hat on, solemnly stripping when their destination is

u j ..304 reached..."

The ladies made no objection at first. In various provincial

centers the women held mass meetings and were addressed on the subject

303 Prem Chaya and Alehtea, The Passing Hours (Bangkok: Chatra Books, 1945), p. 23. 304 BKTW, September 30, 1941. 216

of clothes by local commissioners. Some village women petitioned

the Premier that skirts were not convenient to wade in the rice

fields and to ride on buffaloes. Some said that when it was windy

it was quite hard to keep the skirts from blowing and keep the hats

on at the same time.

Realizing the role of women in the society and in cultural

programs as a whole, the government devoted one section of the new

National Institute of Culture to women. The aim was to raise the

status of women to that of men. The first of the examples of

equality was to promote Lady La-iad Pibulsonggram to the rank of a

special Lieutenant Colonel of the Artillery. She would be a special

military officer under the Army and under the king's Royal Guard as

well.

The office of the President of the Council of Ministers made

an announcement that a man should treat his wife as an equal. Duties

of husbands and wives were put down in detail following the teaching 305 of the Lord Buddha. If a couple decided to get married they

should follow the detailed plans which the National Insitute of

Culture set up. They should dress properly, For example, the bride

should wear a long white dress with veil, white gloves, beige

stockings, white high helled shoes and should hold an orange blossom

as a symbolv i of * purity. •_ 306

305 Thailand, "Announcement From the Office of the President of the Council of Ministers on Arrangement Between Husband and Wife," Government Gazette, Vol. 60, March 16, 1943. 306 Thailand, Office of the President of the Council of Minister, "Announcement on the Thai Marriage Ceremony," Government Gazette. Vol. 60, June 23, 1943, pp. 607-612. 217

Pibul wrote many articles during 1943-1944 using pen names

such as Samugkichai and Samugkithai (Unity Will Win and Unity of

the Thai). In one of these articles, Pibul asked Thai women to

put a flower in her husband's buttonhole every morning while he

should kiss her before going to work.

What affected the old generation most was the government

decision to make them stop chewing betel nuts, a century-old habit.

Betel nuts were considered harmful for health and a degradation to

the country. Those who chewed them were not part of the culture

because no civilized people do it. "If they see us chewing betel 307 nuts they might think we are barbarians." The government asked

the people to give up this bad habit by December 1943. When the

date line was met people who chewed betel nuts or who did not have

their hats on could not get onto the bus or get anything done at any

government offices.

Further, the Thai were taught proper manners for eating.

They should stop eating rice with their fingers but they should sit 308 down properly at a table and use a fork and spoon. In fact, the

government even interefered with everyday life by suggesting to the

people what they should do with their free time, how many hours they

should sleep and how many times they should eat per day (see

307 Thailand, Department of Publicity, Pramuan Watanaturn (Collections of Cultures) "An Explanation of the Bad Effect of Chewing Betel Nuts," pp. 75-82. 308 Thailand, National Institute of Culture, "Notification on Table Manner and Rules," Government Gazette, Vol. 60, June 1, 1943, pp. 975-976. 218

Appendix XVII). Moreover, there were seven table manner rules

which a cultured Thai should follow. For example:

"Before going to the table, a Thai national should wash their hands and dress properly."309

An Effort to Simplify Thai Writing

The government considered that the Thai language was a

symbol of culture, therefore, it should be made more simplified for

easier learning. A committee of twenty-four members was set up with

the Prime Minister as Chairman, Praya Anumarn Rajadhon and Pra

Ratchatham Nites were Vice-Chairmen. The Committee decided that out

of the forty-four alphabetical letters, thirteen should be deleted

because they had repetitive sounds and tonal quality. Five vowels

were deleted for the same reason. A new set of rules on grammar

and spelling was published in 1942. The Ministry of Public

Instruction printed new school books using the new spelling.

The government considered this effort as urgent in view of

the fact that large masses of Thai remained illiterate. What the

government had in mind besides the mass was the illiterate conscripts

in the armed forces. Every soldier was ordered to learn to read and

write basic Thai in six months, or suffer from being confined in the

barracks until he could.

In addition words like Nang (Mrs.) and Nangsao (Miss) which

were used since King Mongkut's time were changed to Mata and Matari.

The Prime Minister did not like the word Nai (Mr.) because it implied

there was a bao (servant) in the society, but he could not think 219

of a new word to replace it.

People were asked to use the word Sawaddi (hello) for greeting and words like Kobchai, Kobkun (thank you), Khotot (excuse me) for every day use.

On the problem of religious belief, Pibul made it a rule that new civil servants had to be Buddhists. The slogan was that

"since Buddhism was the state religion, no Thai could be loyal to his country unless he became a Buddhist." Although officially, there would be no compulsion, a group of poor village Christians were routed out of bed by the police who told them they had to sign 310 a paper renouncing Christianity. The Muslems surprisingly were not attacked. Christianity, however, was associated with the West.

Throughout his cultural programs, Japanese influence was felt on the Thai society. A national way of paying respect "wai" was replaced by the Japanese bow. Civilians were encouraged to accept military style discipline, for example, they were required to salute the national flag at eight o'clock every day (see Appendix

X). Another obvious imitation of the Japanese model was the promulgation of the Vira Dharma or the code of the Brade, along the

U.S. National Archives, Diplomatic documents. A letter from Dr. E.C. Cort to Dr. Corum. 220

311 Bushido line, the traditional feudal samurai ethic.

Why did Pibul intentionally impose the cultural programs

on the people?

Pibul explained in an open letter to newspaper editors when

he was out of office. First of all, he said that he had to impose

the new dress code because if he did not the people might use 312 kimonos. The people were asked to use forks and spoons in order

to prevent them from using chop sticks. He further explained that

he simplified the Thai writing because the Japanese had set up many

free schools. They even asked the government to let Japanese be

taught in schools. Because of the new Thai simplified writing,

the government could tell the Japanese that Thai students needed

Every morning the students had to repeat the following: 1. The Thai love their nation more than their lives. 2. The Thai are excellent warriors. 3. The Thai are good to their friends and bad to their enemies. 4. The Thai love Buddhism more than their lives. 5. The Thai are sincere. 6. The Thai are peace-loving. 7. The Thai are grateful. 8. The Thai are industrious. 9. The Thai are an agricultural people who grow their own food. 10. The Thai bequeath good things to their children. 11. The Thai enjoy a good life. 12. The Thai are well dressed. 13. The Thai have respect for children and elders. 14. The Thai are united and follow their leader. The code was immediately abolished when the new government came into power. 212Pibulsonggram, Open Letter to newspaper editors, p. 13. It was translated in the diplomatic file in the National Archives. Lady La-iad in an interview with the author said that the Japanese wanted to force the Thai women to use kimonos. 221

more time to study their own language first.

The restrictions of some occupations during the war such

as forbidding the Chinese from selling pork, rice, carbon, etc.

were aimed at preventing the Japanese from obtaining those products.

His idea was that without the Chinese merchants and not enough

Thai merchants to replace them, the Japanese could not get those

products easily. In addition Pibul explained that the reason he 313 established forbidden zones for the aliens was because he did

not want the Japanese to have facilities in the area.

As a matter of fact, Pibul listed all the attempts to

resist the Japanese in his 'Open Letter' but they were so trivial

that they sounded unrealistic. Seni, however saw in Pibul's in­

sistence that people should pay respect to the national flag as an

attempt to show Thai patriotism to the Japanese who were accustomed 314 to the practice of flag-waving and of shouting Banzai.

What were the public reactions to the cultural appeal?

On the whole, the people took them light heartedly. Prem

Chaya reported that "it is admirable that there should be such a 315 spontaneous response to the appeal for sartorial improvement."

31\ h e forbidding zones were Lopburi, Prachinburi, Chonburi, Ubol, Nakon Rajasrima. Aliens were prohibited from residing in these areas. 314 Seni Pramoj, "Thailand and Japan" Far Eastern Survey. Vol XII, No 20, October 20, 1943, p. 207. 315 F.O. 371. Intelligence material given by Sarah Ann Davies to the Foreign Economic Administration interrogators, September 29, 1943. 222

In the provinces, the people laughed when they heard on the New 316 Delhi radio program mention of the dress reform in their country.

They even enjoyed the new kind of dance called the "Ram Wong" which was popularized by the Fine Arts Department. Everywhere in the street Ram Wong songs were playing. Alethea reported it amusingly:

"Boys and girls in the streets, clerks and shop assistants at their jobs, all seem to let themselves go, and sing, hum or whistle these songs whenever they have the opportunity...Five year olds imitate their elders and sing ditties inviting each other to 'sit down and make love.1 Tram conductors become songsters, asking their passengers to 'move a little further in, get a little closer.'' Even pork vendors, cutting up joints for their customers, ask poetically, 'Dearest, do you love me?'"317

Conclusion

The efforts to balance Japan on one side and..the British and the United States on the other was not successful. In the end the Thai sided with the former. The United States did not change her attitudes about the Thai until the end of the struggles while even if she wanted to help, she could not because of her limited sup­

plies. As a matter of fact, at the last moment, there was no choice but to give in to the Japanese demand for the right of passage -if the government wanted to preserve national integrity and safety. The author doubts if the decision would have been different if Pridi had been the Prime Minister.

Would the Japanese have let the Thai alone if Pibul had not

317Ibid. 318 Prem Chaya and Alethea, The Passing Hours (Bangkok: Chatra Books, 1945), pp. 46-47. 223

made the previous agreement with them? It seemed that even if

Pibul had not made the verbal commitment the Japanese would have put Thailand in her co-prosperity sphere long before that. Pibul fell into the trap and made things easier for the Japanese. However, the Japanese hesitated to use force on Thailand because she was not sure of the British reaction. Of all the countries in Southeast

Asia, Thailand was the only country which the Japanese did not in­ vade outright.

At the time Pibul decided to declare war on the Allies, the

Axis were in an advantageous position. The Germans reached

Stalingrad and were about to come down toward India while the

Japanese were successful in Burma and were about to meet the German front. The pro-Japanese group in Thailand thought that they had picked the winner. The following account will clarify whether the

Allies were right in blaming Pibul as an opportunist.

In the final meeting on January 25, 1942 Pibul told the cabinet members who were present that the Thai had to choose the best alternatives. The Japanese had helped the Thai in the Indo-

Chinese war by sending arms and airplanes. The Americans, on the

other hand, decided to block the arms shipment in Hong Kong.

Moreover, Pibul thought that the Japanese had given the Thai a great honor by inviting the Thai Minister in Tokyo to dinner with the

Emperor. If they honored the Thai representatives the rest of the nations would surely follow. Pibul also felt that the Japanese were grateful to the Thai for the Manchurian crisis when the Thai representative abstained from voting against the Japanese. He con- 224

eluded his decision by saying:

"We should not let them build Asia alone, we should help them build Singapore, Java, Malay aside from building Bangkok. It is better than allowing Tokyo to build everything. They will appreciate us. There may not be any harm in declaring war. They hope to defeat Rangoon in t .February; we will be more secure. Speaking plaingly among the Thai, it is about time to declare war with the winner."319

In the official declaration the government cited only the

Western oppressive measures, the British and the American bombing

the "neutral" Thai territory. In the official explanation the

government recounted the British imperialist methods to control

Thailand in the past and the United States decision to withhold 320 arms during the Indochinese War.

Luang Adul Aduldetcharas testified that before the

declaration of war, both Luang Wichit and Nai Wanid had gone to see

the Japanese quite often. Later on, he found out that they went to

ask them to agree to the Thai declaration of war. He heard that the

Japanese agreed though they did not think that it was necessary for 321 the Thai to do so.

Pibul was wrong in thinking that the Japanese would treat the Thai nicely. Dr. Cort recounted what he witnessed as follows:

319 Thailand, Special Cabinet Meeting, January 25, 1942 (not in print), p. 2. 320 BTWM, January 25, 1942. See also Jayanam, Thai Kap Songgram. 321 Luang Adul's Testimony, December 18, 1945, p. 14. 225

"It was common for Japanese to beat or kick ricksha pullers, etc. when they either refused the small sums offered or refused to accept yen. Mer­ chants were threatened or attacked for the same reason. It got so bad that the Japanese ambassador had to warn the Japanese that they must not treat Thailand as a conquered country as they had not conquered it yet."322

The cultural programs which Pibul used to "resist" were

partly valid and partly one of his excuses. Pibul perhaps used them

to test the compliance of the people. In a way their cooperation meant a reassurance for his power. Pibul was ambitious and he did not hesitate to show it. He evidently wanted to go down in history as the first Prime Minister who simplified the Thai alphabet after

King Ramkamhang had invented it in the twelfth Century. In the matter of dress reform, Pibul visualized himself as a Thai "Attaturk."

Positively speaking, the programs might have been one effective way to show the people that the government was not under Japanese rule.

They still hold a strong control over the way of living of the people and the people could see it with their own eyes. The question which came next was whether it was necessary to choose these "strange ideas." Pibul seemed to think it was. As he was the "Leader" every one seemed to follow him without any overt resistance.

322 U.S. National Archives, Diplomatic Papers, Letter from Dr. Cort to Dr. Corum, August 16, 1942. CHAPTER V

THE FALL OF PIBUL

The fall of the Pibul government was closely connected with

events in Japan. On July 20, Premier Tojo resigned; two days

later the Thai National Assembly defeated two government proposals,

one for the reorganization of the administration of Petchabun and

the other for the construction of the Buddhist center at Saraburi.

Pibul resigned. His wife claimed that he did not have to, "for

indisputably, Pibul had the power to remain in office and to dis- 323 solve the Parliament." However, as a good "democrat," "the

thought of dissolving the Parliament was always repugnant to him,"

therefore, Pibul chose his own way out of Thai politics on July 22,

1943.

This chapter will trace briefly the reasons behind Pibul's

resignation.

The plan to move the capital to Petchabun was announced in

November 1943. The general idea behind the evacuation was to use

Petchabun as the last stronghold to fight the Japanese. All the troops would be there so that the Japanese could not disarm them.

By secret orders, every department and every Ministry had to be prepared to move their papers to the new capital. The new complex was to include a temple which would house the Emerald Buddha. Some critics, however, thought that Pibul was planning to build himself

323 Ray, Thai Politics, p. 205. 226 in

a new capital. Rumors had it that Pibul was planning to revive the

title of Somdet Chao Praya for himself. This was the title which

the head of the Chakri dynasty was holding when he was asked to

become king. News leaked out that historians were trying to relate 324 Pibul to King Naresuan the Great.

The Buddhist Center at Saraburi was announced in July 1943.

Actually, the government planned to build a World Buddhist Center, 325 something equivalent to the Vatican.

While the National Assembly was not in session, the govern­ ment issued two emergency decrees providing for the reconstruction and ungrading of administration of Petchaburi and for the construction of the Buddhist Center in Saraburi. The last decree was issued on

Visaka Day because it would be an auspicious moment to initiate the

program. As a matter of fact, the government thought that by issuing

the decrees, the chance to get the approval from the Assembly would be much greater.

The debate on the Petchabun bill took place on July 20, 1944.

Representatives who attacked the bill came surprisingly enough from

the northeast, chief among them were Nai Tong-in Puripat, represen­

tative from Ubol; Lieutenant Colonel Nitayasut a representative from

Nakon Rajasrima; Nai Tun Prommittikul, a representative from Burirum.

The points that they raised were first of all that the government should not issue emergency decrees for the case. The nature of the

324 Khuang Apaiwong, Kan Tq Su Khqng Khapachao (My Struggle) (Bangkok: 1958), Chapters 5, 6. 325 Bangkok Chronicle, July 29, 1943. 228

plans did not require immediate action. Secondly, the area itself

was a malaria infested province even though it might be selected

from its strategic reason. Out of 127,281 workers who were sent 326 there, more than 4,040 died and 14,316 were sick. Somehow, most

of the laborers came from the northeast, the rest came from the northern part of the country. Thirdly, the representative from

Ubol objected to the way the government wanted to upgrade the province of Petchaburi to the level of Nakonban. The government explained that if a large number of people moved to Petchabun, the province should have a commissioner as the head of the province. But, according to

Nai Tong-in, the whole cabinet would move there; then there was no need to set up a Nakonban type of administration.

When the vote was counted, the government was defeated by a 327 margin of 48-36.

Two days later, the Assembly discussed the bill to establish the Buddhist City at Saraburi. The main objection rested on the fact that the government used Article 52 of the Constitution too often.

This Article gave the power to the government to issue emergency decrees when the Assembly was not in session. In addition, the objection was in terms of inconvenience. People had to travel a

326 Thailand, Report of the National Assembly, Irregular session, Report of the meeting 9/1487, pp. 5-6. The statistics are not com­ plete because some of the provinces did not send in the final report. 327 Bunchuai Sisawat, Pantri Kuang Apaiwong, Nayok Rathamontri si Samai (Major Kuang Apaiwong, Four-Time Prime Minister) (Bangkok: no date), p. 202. 229

long distance to make merit which was unnecessary when each province

had more than two temples. The project was a costly one; in time

of war it was quite impossible for the government to raise a large

sum of money: even if they could do it, the money should be used

more productively. 328 The bill was defeated by 43-41. Thus within two days the

government was defeated twice. The government representatives ex­

plained that it was because the two issues involved military strategy

which the government could not disclose to the Assembly. They were

afraid the Japanese would know the truth of the plans. As the

representatives did not understand these facts they defeated the two

bills.

With two loses in a row, Pibul had two options— either to

dissolve the Assembly or to resign. Pibul chose the later thinking

that he might be elected again to form a new government or if the

Assembly did not elect him, he still could hold the post of the 329 supreme commander of the forces. According to the law specially promulgated during the time of war, the supreme commander had the power to order any "military officer" to report himself at the =• i

Supreme Commander's office. Military officer during the time of

war is defined to include all the government officials who worked in

the areas which had been declared to be under a state of emergency.

^*Vitheskorani (pseud) Khwam Pen Ma Hang Prachatipatai Rhone Thai (The Origin of Thai Democracy) (Bangkok: Charoen Dharm Press, 1968), p. 746. 329 Pibul's Testimony, November 5, 1945, p. 18. 230

As a result of this decree, Pibul had the special power to issue a

transfer of any official to work in the supreme commander's head­

quarters. In this case, Pibul thought that as a supreme commander

he could still conduct the military operations and still literally

have the supreme power over the administration of the country.

In regards to this special decree, Pibul originally proposed

it in the form of a law which would give the Supreme Commander a

power to decide on any issue on behalf of any Ministry. It was a

real attempt to be a legal dictator. Unfortunately the Council of

Regency vetoed his proposal and some of his colleagues, Luang Adul

for example, strongly disagreed with the proposal. Pibul was afraid

to resubmit the proposal. He changed the wording which in effect

amounted to the same thing and issued it in the form of a decree. If

no one objected to the second proposal within a certain period of time,

it would become a decree. No one objected and Pibul's decree became

law.

Thus when Pibul submitted his resignation, he still maintained

the position of the Supreme Commander of the forces under which he could, among other things, command the military operations.

There seemed to be many reasons behind the two defeats in the

National Assembly. On the face of it, it was almost impossible for

the government to lose when the National Assembly was still half elected and half appointed. However, in the beginning of the year

1944, rumors going around and broadcasts from Kandy stressed that

members of the Parliament might be treated as war criminals at the

end of the war, because they supported the pro-Japanese policy of 231

Pibul. Sometimes names of those close to Pibul were mentioned from

Kandy. It was really Pridi who played an important role in engineering

these rumors and broadcasts in order to pressure the members of the 330 Parliament to oust Pibul. The plan worked just like Pridi had

hoped. The Assembly members realized that the danger was personal as

well as national. One way to stop it was to oust Pibul. They also

believed Pridi that a new government would be in a better position to

negotiate with the Allies.

Pibul's temperamental attitude was another reason behind his

defeat. Thawee talked about Pibul's decision to resign in 1943 over

a family matter. He submitted a letter of resignation to Prince

Aditaya, President of the Council of Regency. The Prince in turn called Luang Adul and asked him what to do next. Luang Adul went to

see Pibul who confirmed his decision for the second time. Apparently

Prince Aditaya asked Thawee to see Pibul to confirm the decision too.

Pibul wrote a note to Thawee confirming his decision. Thawee, as the

Secretary General of the Prime Minister's Office, then instructed the

Director of the Public Relations Department to make a radio announcement.

After the announcement, Pibul changed his mind. He wrote a letter to

the Director General (Pra Ratchadharm Nithes) asking him to cancel

last night's announcement as a result of a misunderstanding. Pibul

called a special cabinet meeting and told them of his decision to stay.

Thawee submitted a letter of resignation and so did Khuang Apaiwong who felt disgusted about the whole episode.

^ 0 Jayanta, Thai Politics, p. 83. 232

Pridi, as one of the regents, decided that he could use both

Khuang and Thawee for the Free Thai Movement in Bangkok. By per­ suasion he could get the Parliament to nominate Thawee as the Speaker of the House and Khuang as the Deputy Speaker. The aim was that the three of them could tap the resources of the Parliament, the cabinet and the King to back the Movement.

Pibul did not like the nominations at all perhaps because

Thawee had resigned from working with him, he should not get such an honor from the Parliament. Pibul forced Thawee to resign which the latter absolutely declined. Finally Pibul decided to write to the

Parliament fabricating a lie that Thawee wanted to decline the nomi­ nation. Thawee knew of the plan so he came to the meeting while everyone was expecting him to be out of town. There Thawee exposed

Pibul's plan to force him not to accept the position of the

Parliament. However, the Parliament was panicked because the Deputy

of Defence read a letter to them that the Japanese did not trust

either Thawee or Khuang: they nominated someone else for the 331 positions. A few days later, Pibul sent for Thawee and asked him

to become Deputy Minister of Agriculture. What happened to Thawee was well known and the members of Parliament began to distrust Pibul.

In addition to his temperamental behavior, Pibul did not pay respect to the institution of the King. As a Supreme Commander of the forces he used his power indiscreminately. Even Prince

Aditaya and Pridi were called to report themselves to the head-

331Ibid., pp. 92-99. 233

quarters. This was the ultimate show of power because both men

were acting on behalf of the King. On top of this, as he was born

in the year of the cock, on his birthday, a special flag with the

cock in the middle was made to fly together with the national flag.

Later on he changed his mind and ordered a flag with a special code

of arms instead. The symbol of Pibul, a rooster, was everywhere.

The Government Office was called Samugkichai (his pen name). Later 332 on his birthday was declared a national holiday. In the theater,

the audience had to pay respect to his picture after the show was

over. Rumors had it again that two thrones were made for him and

his wife and that some of the crown jewelry which was moved to

Petchabun, the new capitol, was stolen. Rumors did not mention

any names.

None of the above factors would have led to his demise if

Pibul had not been overly confident of himself. He did not think that the Parliament would elect Khuang Apaiwong to be the next

Prime Minister. Nai Khuang Apaiwong was the sone of Chao Praya

Apaipubet, the last Bangkok appointed governor of Battambang. When the French took over Battambang in the late nineteenth Century,

Khuang moved to Bangkok. He was Pibul's friend in the Paris days, hence one of the promoters. Khuang was however a good humored person who liked to make jokes. He looked like he was incapable of

being serious which was not true. Thus Pibul could not believe

that such a person was elected in his place.

332Thailand, Ministry of Interior, Letter No. 49/2489, dated July 1st 2485. Usually only the King's birthday was considered a

national holiday. 234

The person who suffered most from the resignation was

Prince Aditaya, the President of the Council of Regency. He did not

believe that Pibul had actually resigned. After the first fake

resignation the Prince did not want to take the risk again. He

did not want to accept the nomination of Khuang feeling afraid that

he might offend Pibul. Finally the Prince decided to resign. The

Parliament accepted his resignation. From then onward, Pridi was

the sole Regent who immediately accepted Pibul's resignation and

accepted the nomination of Khuang as the next Prime Minister.

However, as long as Pibul held the position of the Supreme

Commander of the forces, Khuang and the new cabinet were not sure

of their destiny. With Pibul, were the commanders of the first and

second troops: both were powerful enough to march to Bangkok at

any time for Pibul*s sake. The Khuang cabinet was aware of this and

hence Praya Pahon's name was added to the list of cabinet members

without portfolio. Khuang even went to see Pibul and asked him to

resign the post, but he declined. Finally the cabinet decided to abolish the post of the Supreme Command and named Praya Pahon as the

Commander-in-Chief. Pibul was named as a special advisor of the

state. Meanwhile, Luang Adul talked with the two commanders and

let them know that the police were not siding with them nor would

the navy. He reminded them of the situation, and the danger in- 333 volved if internal fighting got started.

333 Luang Adul's Testimony, December 25, 1944, p. 28. Conclusion

The replacement of Pibul's government by that of Khuang

was interpreted by the Allies and by the Thai as a result of

Japanese military deterioration. The Khuang government, however,

could not break from the Japanese even though it was known as a

pro-Ally group. Pridi was identified as "the strong man of the new government," and the spirit of the new government was said to be "a renaissance of the democratic movement which framed the 334 Constitution in 1932."

334 United States, Office of Strategic Services, "Trend Toward Democracy in Thailand" Washington, mimeographed, pp. 1-2, 13. CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Two important foreign policy decisions were made during

Pibul's first period of Premiership (1938-1944). One was the de­ cision to wage war on French Indochina in 1940 and the other was

the decision to side with the Japanese and consequently declare war on the Allies. Considering the fact that since the 19th Century,

the traditional Thai foreign policy had been to accept the pre­ dominant position of Britain in the Far East and that off France as

the secondary. The two decisions mentioned earlier completely broke a long line of tradition. The aggressiveness of the decisions, however, stemmed from the nature of internal situations and from the perception of the key decision maker, Pibul.

The author proposed in the introduction to study three related hypotheses:

1. If there is no dominant leader in an unstable domestic situation then foreign policies tend to be less aggressive because none of the leaders can afford to engage in external conflict.

2. If there is a dominant leader but the country lacks unity then aggressive foreign policies are needed.

3. When an external situation is polarized then there is a tendency for the country to ally with a power which would sustain the power of the ruling elites.

Throughout the study of the period between 1932-1944, the 236 237

author believed that the origin of the contemporary Thai political

problems stemmed from the Coup of 1932. The decision to organize

the coup came from a group of people who were later known as the

promoters or the "new elites." Once the Coup was successful, the

new elites with their western outlook, applied western democratic

concepts to Thai society which had been under the rule of absolute

monarchs for 150 years. Without adequate preparation on the part of

the people and without an acceptable plan on the part of the promoters,

they found that there were several groups among them who did not

agree with each other's ideas. There were a group of aristocrats

and royalists who were conservative, a group of civilians under Pridi

who were inclined toward socialism and junior and senior military

groups who realized the fact that without them the Coup would not be

successful.

As the coup did not settle the vital problem of who got what,

when and how, Thai politics of the thirties saw both legal and un­ constitutional competition for power among the groups. The author called the situation a legitimacy crisis, which was the result of the abrupt change brought about by the coup. It was a situation where the key leaders would not recognize anyone among them as the sole leader. During this time, the King remained a weak symbol of unity.

He was actually the victim of circumstances where every group tried

to use him to their advantage. His judgement about Pridi was used to back up Praya Mano's decision to oust Pridi from Thai politics.

Once Pridi was in exile, the military clique realized that they were probably the next victims .To survive they had to act first. 238

The Coup of 1933 was in fact the first coup aiming toward

the control of power by the military: Praya Pahon was chosen as the only honest but weak person who could balance each group. It did not

last long when the counter coup under the leadership of Baworadet got started. The result was Pibul*s assuming the position of the State

Councillor for the Defence. People began to recognize that he was

the power behind the throne and so there were several attempts on

his life. On top of all this, the King decided to abdicate and a

young king was chosen to fit the situation.

Thus during the period between 1932-1938, the internal

situation was unstable. With every change of the cabinet, a new

State Councillor of Foreign Affairs was chosen which showed that

there was a set policy pattern and anyone could follow it. In fact, with the internal instabilities, the government could not afford to

engage in external conflict. The only beneficial policy which coincided with the mood of the new elites to assert their independence was the new treaty of Friendship and Navigation which was initiated by Pridi. This treaty abrogated the vestiges of the "unequal treaty," which had been in use for eighty years.

With Pibul at the helm, the situation was different. Im­ mediately after his assumption of power, Pibul staged the final purge whereby he got rid of his opponents, Praya Song among others.

The country henceforth underwent a period of consolidation. Amidst

the feeling of self assertion, the French Minister proposed the

Treaty of Mutual Non-Aggression. The Premier saw the opportunity with the prompting of Prince Wan to set as a condition for the treaty, 239

the revision of the border line between French Indochina and Thailand

along the principles of International Law. The tone of the nego­

tiations changed with the fall of France and saw Pibul pressed for

the return of the territories taken by France in the 19th and 20th

centuries. The public was aroused to back the government action to

such an extent that in spite of foreign pressure put on him, Pibul

could not back out of the situation,he wanted to remain in power.

He thus turned to Japan as the only nation who could sustain his

power and the only foreign power who could force the French to agree

with Thailand. From then on, the nation headed toward the path of

World War II.

In the middle of 1941, Pibul seemed to have a second thought

about the Japanese and he tried his best to balance Britain and the

U.S. against Japan. To his disappointment, the United States did not

change her attitude against Thai aggressive policy in Indochina

until too late while Britain, who wanted to help could not do so because of her limited supplies. With no choice left, Pibul decided

to give the Japanese the right of passage. However, the decisions which followed: the signing of an offensive and defensive treaty

and the declaration of war on the allies were done out of his op­

portunistic inclinations with the counsel of Luang. Wichit and Colonel

Prayoon.

Pibul defended his actions in his "open letter" to the

papers after the war as follows:

"If the people were to know of the pressure which the Japanese exerted in forcing me to join in the defensive and offensive treaty and, later 240

on, to declare war on Britain and America, 1 am sure they will fully sympathize with me and my government. It would take too long to relate the story in full, allow me therefore to point out briefly that I tried to argue and stubbornly refused to do anything till I got a headache. The Japanese who packed my residence at each occasion comprised of military officers as well as diplomats, all of them screamed to have their demands carried out... We had to yield in the end as they threatened to follow instructions from Tokyo by disarming our army...I thought then that it would be better to suffer our grief in silence by letting the Japanese have their way until opportunity allowed us to take revenge on them later on... The fact that we agreed to collaborate with the Japs as well' as declare war on the Allies was simply a trick to enable us to preserve our strength..." 335

By abandonning the traditional policy of balancing one power against the other for the policy of total commitment to Japan made Pibul's position connected with events in Japan. Thus two days after the fall of Premier Tojo, Pibul followed suit.

The Thai case seems to prove the three hypotheses which were set up as the aim of this dissertation. The internal and external situations interacted against each other. In the Thai case the roles, personality and perceptions of the sole decision maker played the most important part.

335 pibulsonggram, Pibulsonggram1s Circular Letter. September, 1944. (English translation). U.S. National Archives, Diplomatic Papers, p. 6. The translated version was not the same as the Thai version.of an open letter. In Thai, Pibul mentioned the cabinet decisions instead of his own. Appendix I

King Prajadhipok1s Abdication Announcement

When Praya Pahon and his associates seized power by military

force on June 24, 1932, they invited me to remain as a constitutional

King. 1 accepted that invitation on the understanding that Praya

Pahon and his associates would establish a Constitution on the same

lines as in all other countries with a constitutional government, so

framed that the people should by right have a voice in the administration and in matters of policy which affect the general

welfare. I was already in favor of this, and was considering how a

change of this kind in the administration in Siam could be effected

without an unheaval. Since a coup d'etat had been made, and the

promoters represented that they intended only to establish a

Constitution, which, in fact, was my intention also, I thought it

right to meet their wishes.

In the hope of achieving stability in the State, 1 tried to

assist in maintaining good order, so that the changes could be made

as smoothly as possible. My efforts were fruitless, as the

promoters of the change failed to give political freedom, nor did

they consult the true wishes of the people. From the two

Constitutions it can be seen that the power to carry out various

policies rested with the promoters and their supporters, not with

the representatives elected by the people. Thus the temporary

241 242

Constitution made it clear that anyone not approved by the promoters' party was debarred from being a people's representative.

The Permanent Constitution was an improvement owing to my repre­

sentations, but there were still members chosen and controlled by the

promoters in the Assembly to the extent of half its numbers.

1 agreed to the proposal for members of the second category

because I expected that these members to be appointed by me would be

chosen from persons with knowledge and experience of administration,

not from any particular party, so as to assist and guide the elected members. When the time came for appointing members of the second

category, I had no opportunity to advise in the selection, and the

government chiefly selected members of its own party irrespective of

their experience. Moreover, some of the promoters planned to

introduce fundamental changes in the economic programme of the country, with ensuing disagreement. The Assembly had to be closed and the Constitution suspended regarding certain clauses, on the advice of the government then in power, all of which caused unrest.

Then Praya Pahon and his party seized power again by force for the

second time, and from that time any hope that changes could be affected smoothly diminished.

I consider that the government and its party have employed

methods of administration incompatible with the personal liberty of

the subjects and the principles of equity according to my

conception and belief. 1 am unable to agree that any party should

carry on administration in this way under cover of my name. I am 243

willing to surrender my former power in favor of the people

generally, but I refuse to surrender it to any individual or party

so that power can be wielded in an autocratic way without' the people

having any voice. But now that I feel that my intention that the

people should have a real voice in the policy of the country has been

ineffective, and since I realize that 1 can no longer assist or

protect the people, 1 hereby renounce all the rights which 1 enjoyed

before my accession.

I have no wish to exercise my right under the Succession Act

to nominate my successor. I have no wish that anyone should create

any disturbance in the country on my behalf; if any one uses my name

in this connection, it must be understood that he will do so without

my agreement, approval, or support. It is my deepest regret that 1

am no longer able to serve my people and my country in accordance with the intention and hope which 1 inherited from my predecessors.

1 can but pray that Siam may have prosperity and the Siamese people

happiness.

The official translation of the text of King Prajadhipok's abdication announcement as published in the Times, March 4, 1935. APPENDIX II

Military Expenditure of Thailand

1932-1950

(in millions of baht)

1950 Total Million Navy 1950 % of total =100 expenditure =100 million ex penditure

1932 9.1 8 70 2.8 6 21 1933 13.6 12 74 3.0 6 16 1934 9.9 9 59 5.7 12 33 1935 11.1 10 47 7.9 17 34 1936 11.1 10 47 7.8 17 33 1937 12.3 11 46 7.9 17 29 1938 13.1 11 47 8-2 17 29 1939 12.1 10 63 4.0 8 21 1940 26.9 23 57 13.2 28 28 1941 24.9 22 56 12.0 25 27 1942 35.9 31 67 10.0 21 19 1943 36.1 31 64 11.7 25 21 1944 50.8 44 67 14.7 31 19 1945 23.2 20 49 11.0 23 23 1946 26.7 23 18 14.3 30 10

1947 30.0 26 22 21.4 45 16 1948 84.1 72 57 41.2 87 28

1949 94.2 81 54 52.3 111 30 1950 116.2 100 56 47.2 101 23

Jin Vibatakarasa, "The Military in Politics: A Study of Military Leadership in Thailand" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1967.) pp. 144-145. 244 245

Air 1950 7* of total Total 1950 % of total Year Force =100 million ex- million =100 expenditure penditure expen­ diture

1932 1.7 5 13 13.0 6 19 1933 1.7 5 9 18.3 9 25 1934 -- - — 16.8 8 22 1935 3.4 11 15 23.2 11 27 1936 3.9 12 17 23.6 11 24 1937 6.0 18 22 27.0 13 27 1938 5.8 18 21 27.9 13 25 1939 3.0 9 16 12.2 9 32 1940 6.4 19 14 46.9 23 34 1941 7*5 23 17 44.8 22 26 1942 6.8 21 13 53.4 26 37 1943 6.9 21 12 56.6 27 39 1944 7.9 24 10 75.4 36 30 1945 10.3 31 22 47.1 23 18 1946 8.5 26 6 144.7 7.0 30 1947 11.1 34 8 135.0 65 25 1948 15.6 47 11 147.2 71 9 1949 22.8 69 13 176.0 85 10 1950 33.1 100 16 208.00 100 10

Ibid. APPENDIX III

Government Expenditures by Ministries

1910-1950

Total Ex­ Defence Interior Year penditure Ministry Ministry Million of Expen­ 7o of total 1950 Expen­ 7o of total 1950 diture expenditure =100 diture expenditure =100

1910 56.9 13.7 24.08 7 14.9 26.19 11

1915 67.1 17.0 25.34 8 15.0 22.35 11

1920 80.4 21.5 26.74 10 18.1 22.51 14

1925 94.7 22.4 23.65 11 14.6 15.42 11

1930 96.3 18.4 19.11 9 19.1 19.83 14

1935 85.1 23.2 27.26 11 18.5 21.74 14

1940 27.3 6.6 24.18 3 6.0 21.98 4

1945 264.2 47.1 17.83 23 38.6 14.61 29

1950 2078.7 208.0 10.01 100 133.7 6.43 100

Chai Anan Samudavanij, "Polities and Administration of Thai Budgetary Process," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconcin, 1971), p. 41. 246 247

Education Agriculture Year Ministry Ministry

Expen­ 7. of total 1950 Expen­ % of total 1950 diture expenditure =100 diture expenditure =100

1910 1.3 2.28 1 2.2 3.87 4

1915 1.8 2.08 1 1.9 2.83 4

1920 2.3 2.80 2 2.5 3.11 5

1925 2.7 2.85 2 4.1 4.33 8

1930 4.6 4.88 4 3.7 3.84 7

1935 9.4 11.05 8 3.8 4.47 7

1940 3.5 12.82 3 1.3 4.76 2

1945 21.6 8.18 18 8.5 3.23 16

1950 121.7 5.86 100 53.9 2.59 100 Appendix IV

Ministry of Defence

May, 1936

The Management of the "Star News",

Gentlemen,

With reference to the request conveyed to me by your representative that I should contribute an article to the anni­ versary number of your newspaper, I have much pleasure in accepting this honor, for I greatly appreciate good newspapers. I like to be able to read sound opinions in the daily press, so as to keep informed of the thoughts of the majority of the people. By so doing,

I avoid mistakes in my undertakings, or at all events reduce them to a minimum. But I do not like newspapers which engage in private feuds, or print indecent articles and pictures, for such must pervert their readers and make them a future danger to the Siamese nation which we love.

I ask leave to make the article which I am writing for you today brief, but hope it will be of some use to you.

"At the present day,there are many conceptions of democratic government, but most people tend to view it as a path toward the attainment of full liberty, some even think that liberty must overstep

the restrictions of the law, for there are those who habitually propose amendments to the law, arguing that certain laws are in restraint of liberty. My opinion is that one may adopt any form of

248 249

government, be it democracy or dictatorship, if it secures the

independence of the State, effects progress, establishes content and

happiness and offers the citizen a good standard of living, these

being the desiderata of all good patriots. I consider that for our

purpose doctrines of government should be regarded from two aspects:

"1. the first regards policy; policy is determined after

hearing the opinion of the majority of the people, and designed to realize the wishes expressed in that oninion; thus, the government may think it necessary to go to war while the people do not want war,

in which case the country must not go to war, and so on;

"2. the second regards the executive; if democratic methods are adopted in the executive, the State will not realize the progress of which it is capable, while if circumstances are unfavorable, it may even completely collapse. For their parents or seniors, those under orders do not fear their superiors in command; in circumstances such as these, how are those in command to get anything done? We

Siamese are as a rule inclined to give a foremost place to ease and

comfort; work is an evil which disturbs our ease, yet hardly any business can be carried out without effort and the will to work.

When we find people who dislike work and like their ease, or people who look at others doing honest work but are not prepared to do it themselves, preferring to preserve their comforts and to stand by and

get what they can out of the government, resorting to dishonest

expedients, we have there the real enemies and destroyers of

prosperity. If our undertakings are to prosper and we are to effect 250

real results in our work, then it is essential that discipline be maintained; to be quite blunt, one must employ the methods of dictatorship.

"In writing this article I have in mind only the welfare of the country and that of your newspaper. But if fault should be found in it, I beg to apologize.

"In conclusion, I wish all prosperity to the newspaper the

"Siam News". May it achieve fame and flourish in Siam always.1"

From the vernacular newspaper, "Siam News", May 20, 1936. Appendix V

In the Name of his Majesty King Ananda Mahidol

The Council of Regency

Notification of the President of the Assembly of the People's

Representatives dated the 4th of August, B.E. 2480.

Aditya Dibabha

General Chao Phya Bijayendra Yodhin

Enacted on the 3rd day of October, B.E. 2482

Being the 6th year of the Present Reign.

WHEREAS the Assembly of the People!s Representatives has

passed a resolution that it is expedient to designate the name of the country in consonance with the name of the race and the appreciation

of the people;

BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED BY THE KING, in Constitution Amendment concerning the name of the country, by and with the advice and consent of the Assembly of the People's Representatives, as follows:

1. This Constitution shall be called the "Constitution

Amendment concerning the Name of the Country, B.E. 2482".

2. This Constitution shall come into force on and from the day of its publication in the Government Gazette.

3. The name of this country shall be designated as Thailand

(in English), and in the provisions of the Constitution or of any

251 252 other law in which the word Siam is used, the word Thai shall be used instead.

Countersignature

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers Appendix VI

Notification of the Office of the President of the Council of

Ministers concerning the First State Convention on the name of the country, the people and nationality.

As the name of this country has been called in two different ways as "Thai" and "Siam" but the people prefer to call it "Thai", the government deems it fit to issue a State Convention to use the name of the country in accordance to the nationality and preference of the Thai people as follows:

A. In Thai Language

The name of the country, the people and the nationality should be called "Thai".

B. In English

1) The name of the country is Thailand.

2) The name of the people and nationality should be

"Thai".

The changes above will have no effect on cases which the laws have used the word "Siam".

Given on the 24th day of June 1942.

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers

Thailand, Government Gazette. Vol 56, June 24, 1939, p. 810.

253 Appendix VII

Notification of the Office of the President df the Council of

Ministers concerning the Second State Convention on Safeguarding the

danger which might occur to the nation.

The government, after due consideration, has arrived at the

conclusion that the Thai nation should be placed on the highest

elevation of respect and reverence by all Thai people. The duty of

safeguarding the nation therefore falls on every member of the race

who is expected to prevent danger or discredit falling on their

nations. The manner of so doing is detailed as follows:

1. Members of the Thai race should not undertake any sort of

• business without first thinking of the benefits accuring to or the

safety of, their nation.

2. Thai nationals should not reveal anything to foreigners

that is detrimental to the nation.

3. Thai nationals should not act as agents or mouth pieces

of aliens without first being satisfied that it is of benefit to the

nation. They should not express opinions indicating that they side

with other nations when an international problem or question arises.

4. Thai nationals should not buy land on behalf of other

nationalities in anyway which may be considered as harmful to the

nation. Such action is held to be dishonorable and treacherous.

254 255

5. Whenever it is known that a person is treacherous to the nation , it is the duty of the Thai to suppress his further actions.

Given on the 3rd day of July 1939.

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers

Thailand, Government Gazette. Vol 56, July 10, 1939, pp. 1010-1011. Appendix VIII

Notification of the Office of the President of the Council of

Ministers concerning the Third State Convention on the Name of the Thai.

The government deems that the practice of naming persons belonging to certain divisions of the Thai race in a manner not in accordance with their race or contrary to the wishes of the people who are so called and the designation of the Thai people by separate groups such as Northern Thai, North-eastern Thai, Southern Thai and

Thai Islam, is not in accordance with the status of Thailand which is one and inseparable.

Therefore a State Convention is notified as follows:

1. The practice of designating persons of the Thai race in a manner not in accordance with their race or contrary to the wishes of the people who are so called shall be discontinued.

2. All Thai people shall be called Thai without exception.

Given on the 2nd day of August 1939.

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers

Thailand, Government Gazette. Vol 56, August 7, 1939, p. 1281.

256 Appendix IX

Notification from the Office of the President of the Council of Ministers concerning the Fourth State Convention on paying respect

to the national flag, the national anthem and the national song.

As the government has considered that the national flag, the national anthem and the national song are so important that they should be revered by all Thai, the government therefore announced the

State Convention as follows:

1. When the flag is raised or is lowered from the govern­ mental office flag pole according to the schedule, or when a bugle or a whistle is blown as a signal that the flag is raised or is lowered, everyone should pay traditional respect or appropriate respect depending on the uniform which one is wearing.

2. When the Royal Army Flag, Royal Navy Flag, Yuvachon Flag, or Scout Flag pass by or if they are posted in front of the troops,

Yuvachon Corp or appropriate Scout troop, everyone should pay

traditional respect depending on the uniform which one is wearing.

3. When the national song is heard whether it is played in

the government office or if it is played in a theater or at a party,

let everyone in the gathering or in the theater pay traditional

respect or appropriate respect depending on the uniform.

4. When the national anthem is heard whether it is played in

the government office or if it is played in a theater or at a party,

257 258 let everyone in the gathering or in the theater pay traditional respect or appropriate respect depending on the uniform.

5. If any one is seen not paying respect as said above in number 1, 2, 3 and 4, it is your duty to remind him of the importance of paying respect to the national flag, the national anthem and the national song.

Given on the eighth day of September 1939.

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers

Thailand, Government Gazette. Vol 56, September 9, 1939, pp. 1611-1612. Appendix X

Notification of the Office of the President of the Council of

Ministers concerning the Fifth State Convention on influencing Thai people to endeavors to use products and provisions raised or manufactured in Thailand.

Because of the world situation, the countries are in the midst of war, either as partners in the war or as neutrals, it is necessary to support especially agricultural and industrial products which are produced at home. The Cabinet has considered that it should persuade the Thai to do so. Therefore, it unanimously agreed to notify a

State Convention as follows:

1. The Thai people shall endeavor to consume only food produced or manufactured in Thailand.

2. The Thai people shall endeavor to wear clothing made from material produced in Thailand.

3. The Thai people shall cooperate in and support agricultural and commercial, industrial and professional undertakings of the Thai people.

4. Any business to supply the public which has been organized by the government or by the Thai shall be patronized by the Thai.

5. The Thai people who are engaged in agricultural, com­ mercial, industrial and professional undertakings and who enjoy the 259 260 benefit of the support of this State Convention, shall endeavor to maintain and improve the standard or quality of their products and carry on their business faithfully to the best of their ability.

Given on the first day of November 1939.

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers

Thailand, Government Gazette, Vol 56, November 6, 1939, pp. 2359-2360. Appendix XI

Notification of the Office of the President of the Council of

Ministers concerning the Sixth State Convention on the melody and the wording of the National Anthem.

After a long consideration, the government has reached a con­ clusion that the melody and the wording of the National Anthem are popularly known but a new wording is needed because the country is now known as Thailand rather than Siam. Notification was issued inviting the public to send in new wording. The compositions which were screened by the committee were sent to the Council of Ministers for final decision. With minor adaptation the Council agreed on the lyrics composed by the Army.

The following State Convention was announced:

1. The melody of the National Anthem, which was composed by

Pra Jenduriyang and accepted by the Department of Fine Arts will be used.

2. The wording which was composed by the Army will be used henceforth.

Given on the tenth day of December 1939.

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers

Thailand, Government Gazette, Vol 56, December 10, 1939, pp. 2653-2654. Appendix XII

Notification from the Office of the President of the Council

of Ministers concerning the Seventh State Convention on persuading

the Thai to help build the nation.

The government has considered that to become prosperous our

nation depends on the industry and the consciousness of the officials

to encourage the Thai brethrens in every way to find occupations in

the hope that everybody will have a higher economic position.

However, nation building is a tremendous job which needs total cooperation from everyone. If every Thai brethren tries to find an honest occupation for himself and his family, he should earn enough money to support his family in a more than adequate fashion. All of this will help our nation to grow rapidly and the way our Thai brethren cooperate in their work is known as nation building. The

Council of Ministers therefore unanimously agreed to declare the following State Convention:

"Every Thai must help in nation building. Every one who is physically fit must work or have a stable occupation. Those who do not work do not help the nation and should not be respected by the general Thai public."

Given on the twenty first day of March 1939.

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers

Thailand, Government Gazette, Vol 56, March 25, 1940, pp. 3641-3642. 262 Appendix XIII

Notification of the Office of the President of the Council of

Ministers concerning the Eigth State Convention concerning the

National Song.

Since the name of the country has been officially changed to

Thailand, the government deems it necessary to correct the lyrics of

the national song to eliminate the word Siam and cut down the wording and the melody to make it briefer. The Council of Ministers unanimously agreed to issue the following State Convention to change

the full version of the National Song as follows:

II • • •

The shorter version of the Song remains the same as that

given on the twenty sixth day of April 1940.

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers

Thailand, Government Gazette, Vol 57, April 30, 1940, p. 78. Appendix XIV

Notification of the Office of the President of the Council of

Ministers concerning the Ninth State Convention on language, ability

to read and civic duties.

The government, after due consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that if the nation is going to prosper, Thai language and

books are important factors. Therefore, the government unanimously

notified the State Convention as follows:

1. The Thai ought to uphold, respect and revere Thai

Language and ought to feel honored in speaking and using it.

2. The Thai ought to believe that to learn to read Thai, the

language of the nation, is first of all a duty. One should at least

learn how to read and write. Secondly, the Thai ought to hold it as an important duty to help advise and persuade those who are illeterate or those who do not know Thai language to be able to read and write Thai.

3. The Thai ought not to think that birth place, locale or regional accent of different localities signifies the disunity of the people of Thailand. Everybody should think that if one is born as a

Thai, one should have the same Thai book and same language without any distinction as to the birth place, locale or different accents.

4. The Thai ought to hold it as a duty to be a good citizen

264 265

to help persuade and to teach those who do not understand civic duties to be able to understand them.

Given on the twenty fourth day of June 1940.

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers

Thailand, Government Gazette, Vol 57, June 24, 1940, pp. 151- 152. Appendix XV

Notification of the Office of the President of the Council of

Ministers concerning the Tenth State Convention on proper dress for

the Thai.

As the government has noticed that the Thai do not dress

properly in gatherings in public places, or in public according to the

Thai culture.

The Council of Ministers unanimously agreed to notify the

following State Convention:

1. The Thai national ought not to appear in public gatherings

or public places within the municipality without being properly

dressed for example wearing only underpants or wearing no tops or

wearing only Chinese pajamas.

2. Proper dress for the Thai is as follows:

a) use the appropriate uniform according to individual

status;

b) use polite western style; and

c) use polite popular dress.

Given on the fifteenth day of January 1941.

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers

Thailand, Government Gazette. Vol 58, January 21, 1941, p. 113.

266 Appendix XVI

Notification from the Office of the President of the Council of Ministers concerning the Twelfth State Convention on the help to

protect the young,the old or the disabled.

The government has considered that living together in a com­

munity, generosity to the young, the old or the disabled is a trait

which a person ought to have.

The Council of Ministers has unanimously agreed to issue a

State Convention as follows:

1. In public places or in a public road, one ought to help

protect the safety of the children, the elderly or the disabled who

use the road or help them to avoid danger.

2. Anyone who can help to protect those mentioned in No. 1

should be considered as one who possesses culture and this person

deems the respect of the Thai.

Given on the twenty eighth day of January 1942.

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers

Thailand, Government Gazette, Vol 58, February 3, 1943, p. 331‘ 267 Appendix XVII

Notification of the Office of the President of the Council of

Ministers concerning the Eleventh State Convention on the subject of

the daily duties of the Thai people.

Whereas the government is of the opinion that a proper

knowledge of the daily duties is a matter of importance affecting the

cultural prsperity of the nation and capable of enduring the Thai

people in general with health, vigor and stability as a perpetual

source of national strength.

Now therefore the Council of Ministers has unanimously

resolved that notification shall be made as follows by the Eleventh

State Convention:

1. The Thai people should divide each day's time into three

parts, one for work as a means of livelihood, one for personal

activities and one for rest and sleep, as a fixed practice and with

properly appointed times, until a habit is formed.

2. The Thai people should normally carry out their daily

duties as follows:

(a) meals should be taken at not more than 4 fixed meal-times.

£b) sleep should be taken for from 6 to 8 hours.

3. The Thai people should devote themselves to their appointed

268 269

tasks without demur on default, and should stop work at midday to eat

and rest for not more than one hour. After work is over in the

evening, physical exercises should be taken by means of open air

sports for at least one hour a day, or other work done, such as

kitchen-gardening-animal-breading, or planting trees. After this a

bath should be taken before eating.

4. The Thai people should employ their free time at night for

any necessary work remaining to be done, or for conversing with

members of their families or with friends, for studying by means of

listening to the wireless news bulletins or of reading, or in enter­

tainment or the arts, as occasion offers.

5. The Thai people should employ their free days in the

interests of physical and mental welfare, in religious activities,

for example, or the hearing of summons, merit-making, study, travel,

sport or resting.

Given on the 8th day of September 1941.

Pibulsonggram

President of the Council of Ministers

Thailand, Government Gazette, Vol 58, September 9, 1942, pp. 1132-1133. Appendix XVIII

Thai Nation

Honor Its Premier

For Services to State

The following is a rough translation of the letter written by

the Council of Regency to the Secretary-General of the Council of

Ministers, in connection with the honors His Majesty the King has bestowed on the Premier, Major-General Luang Pibulsonggram:

The Ministry of Defence on the 17th instant submitted a dispatch mentioning the good work carried out by Major-General Luang Pibulsonggram during the period His Majesty the King appointed him to be Supreme Commander-in-Chief leading the Thai armed forces, consisting of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force in action during the conflict with French Indo-China, and which resulted in the return of the ceded territories. The Thai armed forces wished to see their leader befittingly honored by His Majesty the King, by promotion to the ranks of General, Admiral and Air Chief Marshall.

Important Victory

The Council of Regency in the name of His Majesty the King

have unanimously agreed, after careful consideration, that the

petition submitted by the Ministry of Defence would be exceedingly

befitting in the ordinary course of events, but the Council of

Regency have themselves arrived at the conclusion that the victory

gained by Thailand in the border dispute with French Indo-China is

very important to the Thai people, because it concerns the honor of

270 271

the nation.

Territories Regained

Thailand had had returned to her considerable portions of her

lost territories, and the Thai forces had gained great honor by having

such a diligent and capable man as their leader. Therefore Luang

Pibulsonggram deserves high praise and should be suitably rewarded

for his distinguished services.

The Council of Regency are well aware of the fact that

Major-General Luang Pibulsonggram has made known his decision that he

would not accept any reward in connection with the execution of his

duties during the border conflict. But the Council of Regency in His

Majesty's name have arrived at a decision that the honors granted by

His Majesty the King on this occasion do not serve as a personal reward to Major-General Luang Pibulsonggram alone, but also an honor to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force which have won the victory.

Leader Should be Honored

It is therefore befitting that these forces should have as their leader a highly distinguished personality and again the honor will serve as a memento to the victorious Thai forces, and it will also serve as a fine example to the great men of the nation in the future.

Therefore it is hereby announced that His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to bestow on Major-General Luang

Pibulsonggram the rank of Field Marshal, Admiral of the Fleet and

Marshal of the Air Force also bestowing on him the Field Marshal's 272

baton, and a gold chain befitting the honor of this highest military rank.

The letter is dated 28th instant.

Another notification issued by the Council of Regency dated the 28th instant, and counter-signed by the Lieutenant-General Luang

Phromyothi, Minister of State, announces the conferment on Field

Marshal Luang Pibulsonggram, by His Majesty the King, of the Ancient and Auspicious Order of the Nine Gems, and the First Class of the

Most Illustrious Order of the Chula Chom Klao, with gold chain for meritorious service to the State.

The notification also gives a brief record in the advancement of the country's Defence Forces and the country's progress in general, under the able guidance of the Field Marshal.

From the Bangkok Times, Tuesday, July 29, 1941. 273

§->Mfe

||l , - ? , ¥ '•• 1 net ngi msi

"Believe in Pibulsonggram the nation will not be destroyed"

From Sri Krune Newspaper, 1942.

"Have full faith in the leader the nation will be safe"

From Suparbburut Newspaper, 1942. "Believe in Pibulsonggram the nation is safe"

From Thaimai Newspaper

"The safety of the nation lies in believing and following the honorable leader."

From Prachachart Newspaper

"The safety of the nation lies in believing the leader"

From Suwanapum Newspaper APPENDIX XX

THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THAILAND

The Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of

Thailand, in the firm belief that the establishment of the New

Order in East Asia is the only way to (two groups) of East Asia

and is absolutely essential to the restoration and promotion of world peace, and with a steadfast and immovable determination to eradicate and extirpate all that has in the past obstructed this, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Japan and Thailand, on the basis of respect for the inde­ pendence and sovereignty each of the other, conclude an alliance between the two countries.

Article 2

Should an armed conflict arise between Japan or Thailand and a third power or powers, Thailand and Japan will at once support the other as an ally and will give assistance by all political, economic and military means.

Article 3

The particulars for the execution of Article 2 shall be

agreed upon between the competent authorities of the two countries.

Article 4

Should Japan and Thailand be at war together against a

common enemy they undertake not to conclude an armistice or peace 275 276

except by complete common agreement.

Secret Agreement Annexed to the Treaty

of Alliance Between Japan and Thailand

Japan and Thailand will cooperate with a view to realizing

the territorial claims of Thailand.

As a state of war exists between Japan on the one hand and

the United States of America and Great Britain on the other,

Thailand will immediately assist Japan on the lines laid down in

Article 2 of the Treaty of Alliance. It is understood that such

assistance will include the measures of cooperation on the part of

Thailand referred to in the first paragraph of the Agreement of

the 8th of December.

The two governments agree that, in view of the fact that the

provisions of the Arrangement of the 8th of this month are wholly

covered by the terms of the Treaty of Alliance and of this Entente,

that Arrangement will not sic be considered to have expired with

the coming into force of the Treaty of Alliance; and they further

agree that the Arrangement shall not be made public even in the

future.

In proof whereof the undersigned, having been duly authorized by their respective government, have signed this Entente.

Done in duplicate at Bangkok on the 8th of December, Showa

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Thailand, Krom Kosanakan, Pramuen Ratthaniyom (Collections of Ratthaniyom). Bangkok: Krom Kosanakan, 1940.

Thailand, Krom Yutthasuksa Thahan Bok. Naeson wicha Chanya Nai Rongrian Nai Roi Thakan boh (Guidelines on Manners in the Military Academy). Bangkok: 1938. 285

Thailand, Krom Yutthasuka Thakan Bok. Samut Ku Mue Nai kan son Thakan (Manuel on Subjects Taught in Military School), 3rd ed. Bangkok: Krom Pan ti, 1936.

Thailand, Samnuk Njan Kosanakan. Ku mue Ponlamuang (Civic Manual). Bangkok: Aksornnithi, 1937.

Thailand, Thai Samai Sang Chat (Thailand in the Nation-building Period). Bangkok: Panichsupapol Press, 1941.

Thai Niyom Panit. Bot Sonthana Rawang Nai Man Chuchart kap Nai Kong Rakthai (The Series of Conversations Between Nai Man Chuchart and Nai Kong Rakthai). Bangkok: Sophonpatthanakon, 1941.

Thai Nqi (pseud.). Praya Pahon. Bangkok: Prae Pittaya, 1954.

. Yisip ha khadi kabot (Twenty Five Rebellion Cases) Bangkok: Pramuan san, 1970.

Thqongthammachart, Kamon. Ratthasapha Nai rabop kan Pokkhrqrg khong Thai (Parliamentary System in Thai Administration). Bangkok: Sanghom Sat Press, 1971.

Trinarong, Praphat. Chiwit lae ngan khqng Sathian Koset (Life Accomplishments of Sathian Koset). Bangkok: 1965.

Vitheskorani (pseud.). Kwam pen ma hang Prachathipatai Kqng Thai (The Origin of Thai Democracy), 2 vols. Bangkok: Charoendharma Press, 1968.

______. Mua Chompon pq li pai (When the Field Marshal Went on Exile). Bangkok: Pibul kan pim, 1962.

. Prawatsart Chat Thai (Thai History), 2 vols. Dhonburi: Ruang Watana Press, 1969.

______Thai kap satanakan songgram loh krung thi song (Thailand and the Second World War). Bangkok: Selapa Bunakan Press, 1972.

______. Yuk Tamin (Reign of Terror). Bangkok: Odeon kan prim, 1940.

______. Yuk Torarat (The Age of Tyrany). Bangkok:Samnuk pim Prachakom, 1958.

Wachirawut, King of Thailand. Phra Ruang . Bangkok: Sophon Phiphatthanakan Press, 1924. 286

______. Plukchai Suapa (Wild Tiger Corps Lectures). Bangkok: Privately Printed, 1914.

______. Pramuan bot Pra Ratchaniphon Nai Phrabat Somdet Pra Mongkutklao Chaoyuhua (Collection of Royal Writing of King Rama VI). Bangkok: Department of Fine Arts, 1955.

______. Thetsana suapa 17 kan (Seventeen Wild Tiger Corps Sermons). Bangkok: Department of Fine Arts, 1961.

______. Yiu kaeng Buraphathit (Jews of the Orient). Bangkok: Nangsubphim Thai Press, 1914.

Wichian Pattayakom, Luang. Ruam Patakata (Collection of Lectures). Bangkok: Ongkan ha Kurusapha, 1961.

Wichit Wadhakan Qanusqn (In Memory of Wichit Wadhakan 1898-1960), 2 vols. Bangkok: Khana Rattamontri, 1962.

Wichit Wadhakan, Luang. Latti Chuchart (Nationalism), 2nd ed. Bangkok: 1933.

______. Prachum Patakatha Kiokap Ruang riak khun Dindaen Khon Thai (Collection of Lectures on the Retrocession of Thai Territories). Bangkok: Ta Prachand Press, 1941.

______. Lung Ehak Prakat Songkram (Behind the Scene of the Declaration of War). Bangkok: Rong pim Thai Panich Saka, 1947.

______. Ruam Patakatha (Collection of Lectures). Bangkok: 1939.

. Sayam kap Suwanaphum (Siam and the Golden Peninsular). Bangkok: Rong Pim Thai Mai, 1933.

______. Niphon Bangreang (Some Writings), Cremation Volume. Bangkok: Khrom Silapakorn, 1962.

. Tu Tong (Golden Book Case), Vol 1, Bangkok: Mongkol kan Pim, 1970.

Watthanaset, Sawai. Kiattiphum Pra Mongkutklao (The Fame of Rama VI). Bangkok: Thai Wattana Press, 1957.

Wqthqng, Bunyen. Mahawitthayalai wicha Thammasart lae kan Muang (Thammasart University). Bangkok: 1969.

Wutthichai, Song. Kan Tangkai Samai Sangchat (Dress in the Era of Nation Building). Bangkok: 1941. D . Books - English

Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney. Civic Culture. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1965.

Andrew, James. Siam: Second Rural Economic Survey, 1934-1935. Bangkok: 1935.

Bangkok Times Press. The Directory for Bangkok and Siam. Bangkok: Bangkok Time Press Ltd., 1932.

Banomyony, Pridi. Ma Vie Moirvementee et Mes 21 Ans d'Exil en Chine Populaire. Paris: L'imprimerie Varap, 1974.

Benedict, Ruth. Thai Culture and Behavior. Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University Press, 1952. x

Blanchard, Wendell. Thailand, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. New Haven: HRAF Press, 1966.

Bowring, Sir John. The Kingdom and People of Siam, 2 Vols. London: John W. Parker and Son, 1857.

Bunbongkarn, Suchit. "Higher Education and Political Development in Thailand." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1968.

Bunnag, Tej. "Provincial Administration of Siam from 1892-1915." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1968.

Carr, Edward H. Nationalism and After. London: Macmillan, 1967.

Chandruang, Kumut. My Boyhood in Siam. London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1968.

Chaya, Prem and Alethea. The Passing Hours. Bangkok: Chatra Books, 1945.

Chula Chakrapongse, Prince. Lords of Life. New York: Taplinger, 1960.

Clech, Guy. Le Siam et Ses Relations Avec La France. Saint Pierre et Miquelson Imprimeur du Gouvernment, 1947.

Collet, Octave J. Etude Politique et Economique sur le Siam Moderne. Bruxelle: Hayes Imprimeur, 1911.

Coast, John. Some Aspects of Siamese Politics. New York: Inter­ national Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953.

287 288

Cooray, Francis. The Thai our Neighbor. Kuala Lumpur: Kyle, Palmer and Co., 1941.

Crosby, Sir Josiah. Siam: The Crossroads. New York: Arms Press, Inc., 1973.

Coughlin, Richard J. Double Identity: The Chinese in Modern Thailand. Hongkong: University Press, 1960.

Deutsch, Karl W. Nationalism and Social Communication. 2nd ed. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966.

Emerson, Rupert Mills, Lenox A. and Thompson, Virginia. Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942.

Finkle, Jason L. and Gable, Richard W., ed. Political Development and Social Change. 2nd ed. New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: John Weley & Sons Inc., 1971.

Fistie, Pierre. L'evolution de la Thailande Contemporaire. Paris: Armand Colin, 1966.

______. Sous-developpement et Utopie au Siam. Paris: 1969.

Flood, Thaddeus. "Japan's Relations with Thailand 1928-1941." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1967.

Greene, Stephen L.W. "Thai Government and Administration in the Reign of Rama VI (1910-1925)." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1971.

Gurney, Natalie. "History of the Territorial Dispute Between Siam and French Indochina." Unpublished M.A. Thesis, John Hopkins University, 1950.

Hall, D.G.E. A History of Southeast Asia, 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1955.

Holland, William L . , Col. Asia Nationalism and the West. New York: Macmillan Co., 1953.

Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968.

Ilchman, Warren F. and Uphoff, Norman Thomas. The Political Economy of Change. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1969. 289

Jacobs, Norman. Modernization Without Development. New York: Fraeger Publisher, 1971.

Jayanam, Direck. Thailand, The Frontiers of a State. Bangkok: Department of Publicity, 1941.

Johnson, Chalmers. Revolutionary Change. Boston: Little Brown & C o., 1966.

Jones, F.C. Japan's New Order in Asia, Its Rise and Fall, 1937-1945. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.

Jumsai, Manich M.L. Compulsory Education in Thailand. Unesco Studies on Compulsory Education VIII.

Lafuze, G. Great Britain, France and the Siamese Question. Urlana: 1935.

Landon, Kenneth P. Siam in Transition. New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.

Landon, Kenneth P. The Chinese in Thailand. New York: Russell & Russell, 1973.

Langer, William L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 2nd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

Laswell, Harold D. Politics Who Gets What When and How. New York: Whittlesey House, 1939.

Lester, Robert C. Theravada Buddhism in Southeast Asia. Ann Arbor Paperbacks: The University of Michigan Press, 1973.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man. New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1963.

Mokarapong, Thawat. History of the Thai Revolution. Bangkok: Siva Fhorn, 1972.

Mosel, Hames Norman. Thai Administrative Behavior. Bloomington, Indiana: 1955.

Pye, Lucian W. ed. Communications and Political Development. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972.

Pye, Lucian W. ed. Crisis and Sequences in Political Development. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Pye, Lucian W. ed. Politics, Personality and Nation Building. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962. 290

Pye, Lucian W. and Verba, Sidney, ed. Political Change and Political Development. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Rabibhadana, Qakin. The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period. Cornell Data Paper No. 74, Ithaca, New York: 1969.

Rama VII, King of Thailand. The King's Memos and Suggestions to the Government and National Assembly. Bangkok: Sri Krung Press, 1935.

Ray, Jayanta K. Portraits of Thai Politics. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972.

Riggs, Fred W. Thailand: The Modernization.of a Bureaucratic Polity. Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1966.

Samudavanija, Chai-Anan. "Politics and Administration of the Thai Budgetary Process." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971.

Siffin, William J. Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development. Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1966.

Siwaran),N. Mekong Clash and Far East Crisis. Bangkok: Thai Commercial Press, 1940.

. The New Siam in the Making. Bangkok: Stationer Printing Press, 1936.

Skinner, George W. Chinese Society in Thailand. Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1957.

______. Chinese Leadership in Thailand. California: Berkeley University Press, 1960.

Smith, Anthony D. Theories of Nationalism. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1971.

Smith, Nicol and Clark Blake. Into Siam: Underground Kingdom. New York: 1945.

Somvichian, Kamon. "The Thai Military in Politics: An Analytical Study." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1969.

Sutton, Joseph L. ed. Problems of Politics and Administration in Thailand. Bloomington, Indiana: Institute of Training for Public Service, Indiana University, 1962., 291

Subamonkala, Kontsri. La Thailande et ses Relations Avec la France. Paris: A. Pedone, 1940.

Thompson, Virginia. Thailand, the New Siam. New York: Praeger Reprint Corporation, 1967.

Van Dyke, Vernon. International Politics. New York: Appleton Century-Crofts, 1966.

Varophas, Kusol. "Traditional Institutions and Political Change in Thailand." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, John Hopkins University, 1972.

Vella, Walter F. Impact of the West on Government of Thailand. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955.

Wales, H.G.Q. Ancient Siamese Government and Administration. New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1965.

Wales, H.G.Q. Siamese State Ceremonies. London: Bernard Quaritch Ltd., 1931.

Weber, Max. Charisma and Institutional Building ed. by S.W. Eisenstadt. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.

Welch, Claude E. Jr. Political Modernization, 2nd ed. Belmont: Duxbury Press, 1971.

Wichit Wadhakan, Luang. Thailand's Case. Bangkok: Department of Publicity, 1941.

Wilson, David A. Politics in Thailand. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966.

Wyatt, David K. The Politics of Reform in Thailand. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969.

Zimmerman, Carle. Siam: Rural Economic Survey 1930-1931. Bangkok: 1931.

E. Articles in Thai

Banomyong, Pridi. "Chong Pitak Chetanarom Prachathipatai somboon kong wirachon sip si Tulakom (Uphold the Perfect Democratic Objective of the Hero of October 14, 1973)," Prachathipatai (November 23-30, 1973) 292

Bunnag, Tej. "Kan Pokkrong bap Tesaphiban pen rabop Patiwat ru wiwatanakan (Tesaphiban Administrative System. Is It a Revolutionary System or an Evolutionary System?)." Sangkhomsat Paritat, (Dec.-Feb. 1956-1957), pp. 58-65.

Pamornmontri, Prayoon. "Yuwachon nai tang Pratet (Youth Corps Abroad)." Kao Kosanakan, (September, 1941).

Pongpanich, Kiatchai. "Khana Rat: Khwam kat yang lae rup bap pua kan krong Amnat (People's Party: The Conflicts and Methods to Control Power)." Sangkhomsat Paritat, No. 6 (June, 1972), pp. 76-85.

Prombun, Subsang. "Song soei nak patiwat: Khwam katyang tang udomkan (Two Revolutionary Tigers: The Conflict in Ideology)." Sangkhomsat Paritat (June, 1972), pp. 68-75.

Samucchichai. (pseud. Pibul Songgram, Field Marshal). "Thai yu ku fa prau qarai (Why Does Thailand Survive Forever?)." Kao Kosanakan, No. 5-8 (September, 1942), pp. 1357-1360.

______. "Mala num Thai pen maha amnat (Hats Will Lead Thailand to a Major Power)." Kao Kosanakan. (September, 1942), pp. 1361-62.

______. "Dokmai kong chart (Flower of the Nation)." Kao Kosanakan, (November, 1942), pp. 1551-1555.

______. "Rao tai di kwa chart tai (It is Better for Us to Die Than the Nation)." Kao Kosanakan, (November, 1942), pp. 1590-1595.

_ . "Rak chart, rak winai dui di (Love the Nation, Love the Regulations)." Kao Kosanakan, (January, 1943) pp. 77-80.

______. "Krai cha chana songgram krau ni (Who Will Win This War?)." Kao Kosanakan, (July, 1943), pp. 652.

_ _. "Wicharn kan songgram (War Discussion)." Kao Kosanakan, (July, 1943), pp. 655-661.

Samudavanija, Chaianan. "Kan Patiwat ti rai Kabuankan (Revolution Without a System)." Sanghomsat Paritat, (June, 1972), pp. 44-54.

______. "Punha sumkan kong kao krongkan setakit kong nai Pridi Panomyong (Important Problems Stemming from Pridi's Economic Plan)." Sangkhomsat Paritat. (September-November, 1970), pp. 78-99. 293

Setabut, Noranit. "Ngan Patiwat song si chet ha (1932 Coup)." Sangkhomsat Paritat. (June, 1972), pp. 86-94.

Sivalak, Sulak. "Udomkati tang kan suksa king Thai (Thai Educational Philosophy)." Chumnum hot khwam tang wichakan, published on the anniversary of Prince Wan Waithayakon, Bangkok: Sangkhomsat Press, 1971.

Somvichian,Kamol. "Kan Patiwat kong Samunchon (The Common Man Revolution)." Sangkhomsat Paritat, (June, 1972), pp. 28-40.

______. "Tahan Thai nai rop yisip ha pi (Thai Military in the Past Twenty Five Years)." The Social Science Review, IX (December, 1971), pp. 12-19.

______. "Tahan kap kan muang (Soldiers and Politics)." The Social Science Review, VII (December, 1969, February, 1970), pp. 16-24.

Thongtamachart, Kamol. "Sapa Phutan Rasadon nai rabop kan pokkhrong kong Thai (Parliament in the Thai Administrative System)." Warasan Sangkhomsat, No. I (January, 1971).

F. Articles in English

Batson, Ben A. "The Fall of the Phibun Government, 1944." Journal of Siam Society, Vol. 62, part 2, pp. 89-121.

Christian, John L. and Ike Nobutake. "Thailand in Japan Foreign Relations," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XV, No. 2 (June, 1942), pp. 195-221.

Crosby, Sir Josiah. "The Failure of Constitutional Government in Siam." The Asiatic Review, Vol. XXXIX, No. 140 (October, 1943), pp. 5-26.

. "Siam Imperialism and Pan Thai Movement." The Forthnightly. No. 159 (May, 1943), pp. 300-307.

Dhani Nivat, Prince. "The Old Siamese Conception of the Monarchy." Siam Society Fifteenth Anniversary Commemorative Publication, Bangkok: Siam Society, 1954, pp. 160-175.

Hinley, Donald. "Thailand, the Politics of Passivity." Pacific Affairs, XLI (Fall, 1968), pp. 355-371.

Kasetsiri, Charnvit. "The First Pibun Government and Its Involvement in World War II." Journal of Siam Society, Vol. 62, part 2, pp. 89-120. 294

Landon, Kenneth P. "Thailand's Quarrel with France in Perspective." Far Eastern Quarterly, (November, 1944), pp. 25-42.

______"Thailand's Struggle for National Security." Far Eastern Quarterly. (November, 1944), pp. 5-26.

Landon, Kenneth P. "Thailand's Foreign Policy." U.S. National Archives, no date.

Landon, Margaret, "Thailand Under the Japanese," Asia and the Americas, Vol. 44, No. 9 (September, 1944), pp. 389-393.

Pamornmontri, Prayoon. "Recollection of a Coup d'etat." Bangkok Post, February 27, 1971, p. 5.

Srivisarn Vacha, Praya. "Kingship in Thailand." Selected Articles from the Journal of Siam Society. 1959, pp. 237-246.

Wilson, David A. "Thailand" George M. Kahin, ed. Government and Politics of Southeast Asia. New York: Cornell University Press, 1959.

Wyatt, David K. "Family Politics in Nineteenth Century Thailand." Journal of Southeast Asian History. Vol. 9 (September, 1968), pp. 208-224.

G. Newspapers (Thai) Prachachart

Prachatipatai

Praiamitra

Sayam Review

Siam Daily

Thai Mail

H. Newspapers (English) Bangkok Times Weekly Mail

Bangkok Chronicle

New York Times