The Australian Coastal Patrol
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CHAPTER XI THE AUSTRALIAN COASTAL PATROL: RAIDERS AND MI NE-FI ELDS TOWARDSthe end of 1916 Australia’s part in the naval war seemed to have become almost automatic and mechanical, The Azisfralia in the North Sea, the light cruisers in the North Atlantic, the destroyers and small cruisers in East Indian waters, were engaged under various admirals in a routine of necessary though tedious duties. All that the Naval Board could do for them was to keep up a regular supply of reliefs and mails. During the year, as we have seen, the Board had considered the possibility of enemy raids into Australian seas, and made or suggested counter-prepara- tions ; but nothing had happened, and there was apparently nothing to be done outside the routine. Early in December one of the principal officers at Australian headquarters was contemplating longer week-ends merely because he was tired of sitting in his office with no intelligent occupation. But he did not contemplate them for long; nor had he ever the chance again. With the beginning of 1917, the strain of the German “ unrestricted ’’ submarine campaign was upon Australia, soon to be followed by rumours of raiders (some of them more than rumours), the discovery of mine-fields on the main coastal highway, countless reports of enemy aeroplanes (all untrue but all disturbing), and a whole series of irksome but indispensable counter-measures, ranging from patrols and mine-sweeping to wharf-guards and a drastic censorship of baggage and cargo as well as of news and private messages. During no months since the First Convov sailed was so heavy a strain put upon the brains and the mechanism of the Navy Office as during the long anxious year Of 1917. About~~ Christmas-time of 1916 news came from the Admiralty (a) that a Chilean vessel, manned by Germans probably armed with rifles, had left the coast of Chile on the 336 Dec., 1g16-Mar., 19171 AUSTRALIAN COASTAL PATROL 337 10th of December, (b) that a German raider had been sighted in the North Atlantic on the 4th. At the same time the censorship on shipping news was by direction of the British Chief Censor made considerably more severe. As the Brisbaite was already under orders for Europe-was, indeed, just leaving Thursday Island-all that the Board could do by way of coastal protection was to send the Encouioter to Western Australia, bring the Parramatta and Yarra thence to the east coast, and strengthen the existing motor-boat patrol in ’Torres Straits by adding to it the armed yrtcht Sleuth, which had in peace-time been the private yacht Eiia (she was commissioned on the 13th of January, 1917, and began her patrol on the 5th of March). During January and February further reports were received concerning the raider in the Atlantic, and riimours of a mine-field laid off Cape Agullias ; on the 8th of March it was definitely known that the raider had entered the Indian Ocean. But already the Board was awake to the extreme gravity of the situation. During February it drew up a report for the ,4dmiralty (which was despatched on the 7th of March), setting forth the inadequacy of Australian clef ences against raider attacks now that the vessels of the Australian Squadron had been absorbed in more urgent tasks elsewhere :- “Of the vessels of the Royal Australian Navy, Aw- trulia, Melbourne, Sydney, and Grisbarie are serving in European waters ; Psyclre, Fantonre, and three destroyers are continuously employed, chiefly in the Dutch East Tndies, under the Commander-in-Chief, China Station. Eiicounter is at present stationed in S.W. Aus- tralia for the protection of shipping in the neighbourhood of Cape Leeuwin. Three destroyers are avail- able now for the protection 0.f shipping between Sydney and Bass Strait. To-day they are actually patrolling, one with Jervis Bay as a base, one from Twofold Bay, and one at the eastern end of Bass Strait. The ahovc disposition of Encounter and destroyers has been adopted at the present moment partly as an exercise and partly liecause the raider reported last in the ,4tlaiitic on January 12th might possibly appear in these waters in the next week or two. 338 THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY [Mar.-Apr., 1917 " At present all our vessels are available ; but whe!i the division of destroyers in China waters is being relieved by the division in these waters, and when any of the vessels are refitting, there is a considerable ctir- tailment of force. It is sometimes necessary to leave south-western Australia quite unprotected, and at times there have been no vessels available for the protectioa of southern and eastern .4ustralian waters. No attack has been made on our trade in Australian waters, hut it appears possible that the absence of precautions might tempt an attack. There are, on the coast of Australia and in the near islands, anchorages and harbours where there are no inhabitants, and which are seldom or never visited. When European waters are found to be too unhealthy for submarines, it seems possible that they may be tempted farther afield. " . About 36 guns (6-pr. to 4.7-inch), chiefly old army guns, are available for the defensive armament of coastal shipping against submarines. If their Lordships are of opinion that there is likely to be a danger of submarine attack either here or in Chinese waters, it is suggested that our destroyers should be supplied with depth-charges and rapid sweeps. Some motor-boats, Src., are available, and some use might he made of indicator-nets and patrol-vessels. A small mine- sweeping flotilla is being trained at Sydney and at Melbourne. " The Naval Board think it desirable to bring the above considerations to their Lordships' notice at the present time, not in a spirit of alarm, but in order that they may be sure that the condition of preparedness of Australia is of a degree that has the approval of their Lordships. If their Lordships advise no change, the Naval Board will be in a position to inform the Government that the present state of affairs is such as to justify confidence." The appearance of the enemy raider in the Indian Ocean made it necessary to resume the convoy system of despatching troopships to Europe, and on the 3rd of April the Encounter was (by orders from Whitehall) sent to New Zealand to pick up a convoy, escort it to Frematitle, and then take a joint Apr.-June, 19171 AUSTRALIAN COASTAL PATROL 339 convoy of Australian and New Zealand troopships to a rendezvous on the way to Colombo; thence the East Indies Squadron would take over the responsibility. Deprived of its one cruiser, and impatient of the long delay which is unavoid- able for mails in wartime, the Board on the 13th renewed by cable its request for help :- ‘I Some redistribution of ships may follow joining of America in war. Some relief would be welcome to cope with increased responsibilities due to possible attack by raider and necessity for guarding departure of troop transports, wheat and meat vessels, and coastal shipping.” The suggestion about American help was, as all the world knows, decidedly premature, but the Admiralty did what it could. On the 18th it informed the Board that arrangements had been made with the Japanese Government to send ships to the coast of Queensland and to the Fremantle-Colombo track; further, if the situation demanded it, ships of the East Indies Squadron would be despatched to Australian waters. A letter of the 12th of May, confirming the earlier promise and discussing the Board’s letter of March, mentioned that the Brisharze had been attached to the East Indies Squadron and would probably be used for service in Australian waters if the need arose. Danger from enemy submarines was discounted, but ‘I the supply and organisation of various technical anti-submarine devices ” were indefinitely fore- shadowed. The Board’s reference to the local supply of guns for defensive armament was met with a suggestion that those guns would be of much more use “in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and North Sea.” The remedial measures above mentioned had not, of course, been delayed so long. When the Encounter was sent to New Zealand, H.M.S. Doris of the East Indies Squadron was detachrd to escort transports from Fremantle to the Mauritius. On the 16th of April it was decided to send the Japanese ships Cltikiciira and Hirudo to Australia, and on the 27th the Gliikzcnra was allotted to the Fremantle-Colombo track. In June, when Australia’s whole destroyer flotilla was suddenly called to the Mediterranean, the Brisbane was ordered to Fremantle ; in the same month another British cruiser escorted 340 THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY iI914-17 more Australian troopships from Fremantle to the Mauritius. It cannot be denied that in the months of which the story is now to be told Australia was much exposed to the attacks of any daring enemy, and the responsibility of the Naval Board was heavy ; but it is equally undeniable that, con- sidering the extreme gravity of the German submarine campaign of 1917. and the urgent need for concentrating in European waters every vessel that might efficiently thwart it, the Admiralty gave Australia all the help it could spare. I1 Naval assistance was on the other occasions most readily accorded by the Japanese Government, which showed itself anxious to establish and maintain close relations with the Commonwealth. As ezrly as 1914 the Japanese Admiralty proposed to place a naval officer at Sydney. In Septeniber- 1Yoreml)er of that year the battle-cruiser Ibukzl assisted the Mznotciur, hielbozime, and Sydncy to escort the First Convoy to Aden.