Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research Publishing Information
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October 2016 | Progress Report Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research Publishing information Published by Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina e. V. President: Prof. Jörg Hacker – German National Academy of Sciences – Jägerberg 1, 06108 Halle (Saale), Germany Editor Dr Johannes Fritsch, Yvonne Borchert German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina Contact Office of the Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina Head: Dr Johannes Fritsch Reinhardtstraße 14, 10117 Berlin, Germany Tel.: +49 (0)30 2038 997-420 [email protected] www.leopoldina.org/de/ausschuss-dual-use Contact at the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) Dr Ingrid Ohlert German Research Foundation Kennedyallee 40, 53175 Bonn, Germany Tel.: +49 (0)228 885-2258 [email protected] www.dfg.de Design and setting unicom Werbeagentur GmbH, Berlin Recommended form of citation German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina and Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) (2016): “Joint Committee on the Handling of Security- Relevant Research”, progress report of 1 October 2016, Halle (Saale), 22 pages Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research Preface 3 Preface This progress report begins with a summary in Chapter A of the developments leading up to the establishment of the Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Founda- tion) and the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina in November 2014. Chapter B reports on the tasks of the Joint Committee and its activities up to 1 Octo- ber 2016, with particular focus on the progress of implementing the DFG and the Leo- poldina’s “Recommendations for Handling Security-Relevant Research” of June 2014. Chapter C provides an overview of the political debate on security-relevant research in Germany, which was prompted by experiments with highly pathogenic influenza viruses. Finally, Chapter D gives an outlook of the planned future development of the Joint Committee. 4 Contents Contents A. Background ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 5 1. Freedom and responsibility of research – the dual-use dilemma .............................5 2. Statement by the German Ethics Council on biosecurity and freedom of research ..... 6 3. The DFG’s and the Leopoldina’s “Recommendations for Handling Security-Relevant Research” ...................................................................................... 7 B. Status of implementation of the Recommendations for Handling Security-Relevant Research �������������������������������������� 9 1. Mandate of the Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research .....9 2. Composition and office of the Joint Committee ...................................................... 11 3. Establishment of the Committees for Ethics in Security-Relevant Research (KEFs) .... 11 4. Model statutes for the KEFs and a workshop on implementing the recommendations of the DFG and the Leopoldina ................................................. 13 C. Political debate on security-relevant research in Germany .... 15 D. Further development of the Joint Committee ......................18 E. Appendix ������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19 Model statutes for Committees for Ethics in Security-Relevant Research ....................19 A. Background 5 A. Background 1. Freedom and responsibility poultry. The infection was fatal in around of research – the dual-use half of the cases, prompting widespread dilemma concern not only among breeders of live- stock. At this time, research groups from Freedom of research as protected by Ar- the Netherlands and Japan/US were pub- ticle 5(3) of the German Basic Law gives lishing findings that showed the genetic researchers the right to raise their own mutations the virus would have to un- scientific questions and to address these dergo for airborne transmission between questions independently within the con- mammals to occur.2 This caused great ditions laid out in the Basic Law. Freedom concern worldwide about the usefulness of research plays a fundamental role in ex- and risks associated with such research. panding human knowledge and in ensur- ing social progress and prosperity. How- The two research groups led by ever, useful research findings and research Yoshihiro Kawaoka and Ron Fouchier de- methods can also be misused for harmful fended the importance of their work on purposes by third parties. One example of the transmission of flu viruses, arguing this “dual-use dilemma” in research is the that their findings had made it possible discovery of nuclear fission in the 1930s, to understand how the virus could de- which also led to the development and velop into a potential threat for humans use of nuclear weapons of mass destruc- through spontaneous, naturally occurring tion. This triggered an intense debate on mutations. Surprisingly, only five simple the responsibility of researchers1 that still point mutations were required for the vi- continues to this day. rus to become airborne transmissible be- tween the ferrets used in the experiment. The dual-use dilemma sparks con- The two scientists believe that this knowl- tinuous debate over the benefits and po- edge makes it far easier to classify the new tential risks of specific research projects. viruses continually emerging in nature in In 2012, for example, research into the terms of their potential to spark a pan- transmission of highly pathogenic influ- demic, and to take more targeted protec- enza viruses – the so-called avian influ- tive measures. enza or “bird flu” viruses of the subtype H5N1 – came to the forefront of interna- Critics of this type of research fear tional public debate. No human-to-hu- that the pathogens produced for research man transmission of the virus had ever purposes could escape from the high-se- been documented and around one hun- curity laboratories into the environment dred people in Asia were infected – pre- through negligent conduct. These risks sumably through very close contact with are addressed in numerous regulations in- 2 See also Herfst S. et al (2012), “Airborne transmission 1 See, for example, the Russell-Einstein Manifesto (1995), of influenza A/H5N1 virus between ferrets”, Science available at: www.pugwash.de/rem.pdf, and the Göttin- 336.6088: 1534-1541 and Imai M. et al. (2012), “Ex- gen Manifesto (1957), available at www.uni-goettingen. perimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA confers de/de/54320.html (both last accessed: 21 September respiratory droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 2016). HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets”, Nature 486.7403: 420-428. 6 A. Background tended to achieve optimal biological safe- materials research and nanotechnolo- ty, or biosafety.3 Another potential hazard gy could contribute to the development is that publication of such research find- of offensive weapons; research findings ings makes knowledge available that may on industrial robots could be used in the be misused for the purposes of bioterror- construction of combat drones; research ism attacks or biological warfare. A num- methods and results gained in the field of ber of regulations on this issue, known protection from computer viruses could as biosecurity, are in place to prevent the also be used to develop strategies for their distribution of chemical and biological dissemination; research that includes the weapons. These include regular criminal extensive collection and analysis of per- law, the United Nations’ Biological Weap- sonal data could lead to a violation of per- ons Convention and the regulations of the sonal rights; findings and methods from German Federal Office of Economics and the behavioural and social sciences could Export Control (BAFA). Alongside pre- be used to manipulate public opinion in ventative measures on the part of security a certain way. The list is almost endless. agencies4 and the work of law enforcement However, failure to carry out certain re- authorities, self-governance by the scien- search can also be problematic from an tific community is also of great importance ethical point of view if, for example, this here (see Chapter A.2 and Chapter A.3). hinders the development of treatments, The international debate on the so-called vaccines and other protective measures “gain-of-function” experiments outlined and prevents important innovations in above5 – that is, experiments in which other fields. viruses and other pathogens acquire new gene functions – is still ongoing.6 2. Statement by the German The dual-use dilemma extends far Ethics Council on biosecurity beyond the sphere of the life sciences, af- and freedom of research fecting all scientific fields. Results from In the summer of 2012, as a response 3 In particular, in Germany, the Biological Agents Ordi- to the gain-of-function debate that had nance (Biostoffverordnung), the Genetic Engineering Act (Gentechnikgesetz) and the Protection Against triggered international concern on how Infection Act (Infektionsschutzgesetz); for more infor- mation on laws and regulations relevant in the handling to manage biosecurity risks, the German of biological agents, visit: www.vbio.de/informationen/ Federal Government commissioned the wissenschaft__gesellschaft/thema_biosicherheit/nor- men_und_gesetze (last accessed: 21 September 2016). German Ethics Council