<p><strong>October 2016 | Progress Report </strong></p><p><strong>Joint Commiꢀee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research </strong></p><p><strong>Publishing informaꢁon </strong></p><p><strong>Published by </strong></p><p>Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina e. V. President: Prof. Jörg Hacker </p><p>– German Naꢀonal Academy of Sciences – Jägerberg 1, 06108 Halle (Saale), Germany </p><p><strong>Editor </strong></p><p>Dr Johannes Fritsch, Yvonne Borchert </p><p>German Naꢀonal Academy of Sciences Leopoldina </p><p><strong>Contact </strong></p><p>Office of the Joint Commiꢁee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research German Naꢀonal Academy of Sciences Leopoldina </p><p>Head: Dr Johannes Fritsch </p><p>Reinhardtstraße 14, 10117 Berlin, Germany Tel.: +49 (0)30 2038 997-420 <a href="mailto:gemeinsamer-ausschuss%40leopoldina.org?subject=" target="_blank">[email protected] </a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leopoldina.org/de/ausschuss-dual-use" target="_blank">www.leopoldina.org/de/ausschuss-dual-use </a></p><p><strong>Contact at the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaſt (DFG, German Research Foundaꢁon) </strong></p><p>Dr Ingrid Ohlert </p><p>German Research Foundaꢀon Kennedyallee 40, 53175 Bonn, Germany Tel.: +49 (0)228 885-2258 <a href="mailto:Ingrid.Ohlert%40dfg.de?subject=" target="_blank">[email protected] </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.dfg.de" target="_blank">www.dfg.de </a></p><p><strong>Design and seꢂng </strong></p><p>unicom Werbeagentur GmbH, Berlin </p><p><strong>Recommended form of citaꢁon </strong></p><p>German Naꢀonal Academy of Sciences Leopoldina and Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaſt (DFG, German Research Foundaꢀon) (2016): “Joint Commiꢁee on the Handling of SecurityRelevant Research”, progress report of 1 October 2016, Halle (Saale), 22 pages </p><p><strong>Joint Commiꢀee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research </strong></p><p>Preface </p><p>3</p><p>Preface </p><p>This progress report begins with a summary in Chapter A of the developments leading up to the establishment of the Joint Committee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) and the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina in November 2014. Chapter B reports on the tasks of the Joint Committee and its activities up to 1 October 2016, with particular focus on the progress of implementing the DFG and the Leopoldina’s “Recommendations for Handling Security-Relevant Research” of June 2014. Chapter C provides an overview of the political debate on security-relevant research </p><p>in Germany, which was prompted by experiments with highly pathogenic influenza </p><p>viruses. Finally, Chapter D gives an outlook of the planned future development of the Joint Committee. </p><p>4</p><p>Contents </p><p>Contents </p><p>A. Background&nbsp;............................................................................. 5 </p><p>1. Freedom&nbsp;and responsibility of research – the dual-use dilemma ............................. 5 2. Statement&nbsp;by the German Ethics Council on biosecurity and freedom of research..... 6 3. The&nbsp;DFG’s and the Leopoldina’s “Recommendaꢀons for Handling </p><p>Security-Relevant Research”...................................................................................... 7 </p><p>B. Status&nbsp;of implementaꢀon of the Recommendaꢀons for </p><p>Handling Security-Relevant Research...................................... 9 </p><p>1. Mandate&nbsp;of the Joint Commiꢁee on the Handling of Security-Relevant Research.....9 </p><p>2. Composiꢀon&nbsp;and office of the Joint Commiꢁee...................................................... 11 </p><p>3. Establishment&nbsp;of the Commiꢁees for Ethics in Security-Relevant Research (KEFs).... 11 4. Model&nbsp;statutes for the KEFs and a workshop on implemenꢀng the </p><p>recommendaꢀons of the DFG and the Leopoldina ................................................. 13 </p><p>C. Poliꢀcal&nbsp;debate on security-relevant research in Germany.... 15 D. Further&nbsp;development of the Joint Commiꢁee ...................... 18 </p><p>E. Appendix&nbsp;............................................................................... 19 </p><p>Model statutes for Commiꢁees for Ethics in Security-Relevant Research ....................19 </p><p>A. Background </p><p>5</p><p>A. Background </p><p>1. Freedom&nbsp;and responsibility of research – the dual-use </p><p>dilemma </p><p>poultry. The infection was fatal in around half of the cases, prompting widespread concern not only among breeders of livestock. At this time, research groups from <br>Freedom of research as protected by Ar-&nbsp;the Netherlands and Japan/US were pubticle 5(3) of the German Basic Law gives&nbsp;lishing findings that showed the genetic researchers the right to raise their own&nbsp;mutations the virus would have to un- </p><p>scientific questions and to address these&nbsp;dergo for airborne transmission between </p><p>questions independently within the con- mammals&nbsp;to occur.<sup style="top: -0.2755em;">2 </sup>This caused great ditions laid out in the Basic Law. Freedom&nbsp;concern worldwide about the usefulness of research plays a fundamental role in ex-&nbsp;and risks associated with such research. panding human knowledge and in ensur- </p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">ing social progress and prosperity. How- </li><li style="flex:1">The two research groups led by </li></ul><p></p><p>ever, useful research findings and research&nbsp;Yoshihiro Kawaoka and Ron Fouchier de- </p><p>methods can also be misused for harmful&nbsp;fended the importance of their work on purposes by third parties. One example of&nbsp;the transmission of flu viruses, arguing this “dual-use dilemma” in research is the&nbsp;that their findings had made it possible </p><p>discovery of nuclear fission in the 1930s,&nbsp;to understand how the virus could de- </p><p>which also led to the development and&nbsp;velop into a potential threat for humans use of nuclear weapons of mass destruc-&nbsp;through spontaneous, naturally occurring tion. This triggered an intense debate on&nbsp;mutations. Surprisingly, only five simple the responsibility of researchers<sup style="top: -0.2733em;">1 </sup>that still&nbsp;point mutations were required for the vi- </p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">continues to this day. </li><li style="flex:1">rus to become airborne transmissible be- </li></ul><p>tween the ferrets used in the experiment. <br>The dual-use dilemma sparks con-&nbsp;The two scientists believe that this knowltinuous debate over the benefits and po- edge&nbsp;makes it far easier to classify the new </p><p>tential risks of specific research projects.&nbsp;viruses continually emerging in nature in </p><p>In 2012, for example, research into the&nbsp;terms of their potential to spark a pantransmission of highly pathogenic influ- demic,&nbsp;and to take more targeted protec- </p><p>enza viruses – the so-called avian influ- tive&nbsp;measures. enza or “bird flu” viruses of the subtype H5N1 – came to the forefront of interna- </p><p>Critics of this type of research fear tional public debate. No human-to-hu-&nbsp;that the pathogens produced for research man transmission of the virus had ever&nbsp;purposes could escape from the high-sebeen documented and around one hun-&nbsp;curity laboratories into the environment dred people in Asia were infected – pre- through&nbsp;negligent conduct. These risks sumably through very close contact with&nbsp;are addressed in numerous regulations in- </p><p></p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">2</li><li style="flex:1">See also Herfst S. et al (2012), “Airborne transmission </li></ul><p></p><p>of influenza A/H5N1 virus between ferrets”, <em>Science </em></p><p>336.6088: 1534-1541 and Imai M. et al. (2012), “Ex- </p><p>perimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA confers </p><p>respiratory droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets”, <em>Nature </em>486.7403: 420-428. </p><p></p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">1</li><li style="flex:1">See, for example, the Russell-Einstein Manifesto (1995), </li></ul><p></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.pugwash.de/rem.pdf" target="_blank">available at: www.pugwash.de/rem.pdf, and the Göttin</a>- </p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/54320.html" target="_blank">gen Manifesto (1957), available at www.uni-goettingen. </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/54320.html" target="_blank">de/de/54320.html (both last accessed: 21 September </a>2016). </p><p>6</p><p>A. Background </p><p>tended to achieve optimal biological safe-&nbsp;materials research and nanotechnoloty, or biosafety.<sup style="top: -0.2773em;">3 </sup>Another potential hazard&nbsp;gy could contribute to the development </p><p>is that publication of such research find- of offensive weapons; research findings </p><p>ings makes knowledge available that may&nbsp;on industrial robots could be used in the be misused for the purposes of bioterror-&nbsp;construction of combat drones; research ism attacks or biological warfare. A num-&nbsp;methods and results gained in the field of ber of regulations on this issue, known&nbsp;protection from computer viruses could as biosecurity, are in place to prevent the&nbsp;also be used to develop strategies for their distribution of chemical and biological&nbsp;dissemination; research that includes the weapons. These include regular criminal&nbsp;extensive collection and analysis of perlaw, the United Nations’ Biological Weap-&nbsp;sonal data could lead to a violation of perons Convention and the regulations of the&nbsp;sonal rights; findings and methods from </p><p>German Federal Office of Economics and&nbsp;the behavioural and social sciences could </p><p>Export Control (BAFA). Alongside pre-&nbsp;be used to manipulate public opinion in ventative measures on the part of security&nbsp;a certain way. The list is almost endless. agencies<sup style="top: -0.274em;">4 </sup>and the work of law enforcement&nbsp;However, failure to carry out certain reauthorities, self-governance by the scien-&nbsp;search can also be problematic from an </p><p>tific community is also of great importance&nbsp;ethical point of view if, for example, this </p><p>here (see Chapter A.2 and Chapter A.3).&nbsp;hinders the development of treatments, The international debate on the so-called&nbsp;vaccines and other protective measures “gain-of-function” experiments outlined&nbsp;and prevents important innovations in </p><p>above<sup style="top: -0.276em;">5 </sup>– that is, experiments in which&nbsp;other fields. viruses and other pathogens acquire new gene functions – is still ongoing.<sup style="top: -0.277em;">6 </sup></p><p>2. Statement&nbsp;by the German </p><p>The dual-use dilemma extends far beyond the sphere of the life sciences, af- </p><p>fecting all scientific fields. Results from </p><p>Ethics Council on biosecurity </p><p>and freedom of research </p><p>In the summer of 2012, as a response to the gain-of-function debate that had triggered international concern on how to manage biosecurity risks, the German Federal Government commissioned the German Ethics Council to prepare a statement on biosecurity and freedom of re- </p><p>search. The central question under scruti- </p><p>ny was whether the relevant German legal regulations as well as the codes of conduct<sup style="top: -0.275em;">7 </sup>of science and industry are suitable </p><p></p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">3</li><li style="flex:1">In particular, in Germany, the Biological Agents Ordi- </li></ul><p>nance (<em>Biostoffverordnung</em>), the Genetic Engineering Act (<em>Gentechnikgesetz</em>) and the Protection Against Infection Act (<em>Infektionsschutzgesetz</em>); for more information on laws and regulations relevant in the handling <a href="/goto?url=http://www.vbio.de/informationen/wissenschaft__gesellschaft/thema_biosicherheit/normen_und_gesetze" target="_blank">of biological agents, visit: www.vbio.de/informationen/ </a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.vbio.de/informationen/wissenschaft__gesellschaft/thema_biosicherheit/normen_und_gesetze" target="_blank">wissenschaft__gesellschaft/thema_biosicherheit/nor- </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.vbio.de/informationen/wissenschaft__gesellschaft/thema_biosicherheit/normen_und_gesetze" target="_blank">men_und_gesetze (last accessed: 21 September 2016). </a></p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">4</li><li style="flex:1">See comments made by the German Federal Office of </li></ul><p></p><p>Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, Unit III.2 on <a href="/goto?url=http://www.bbk.bund.de/DE/AufgabenundAusstattung/CBRNSchutz/Biologie/biologie_node.html" target="_blank">CBRN protection, available at: www.bbk.bund.de/DE/ </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.bbk.bund.de/DE/AufgabenundAusstattung/CBRNSchutz/Biologie/biologie_node.html" target="_blank">AufgabenundAusstattung/CBRNSchutz/Biologie/biolo</a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.bbk.bund.de/DE/AufgabenundAusstattung/CBRNSchutz/Biologie/biologie_node.html" target="_blank">- </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.bbk.bund.de/DE/AufgabenundAusstattung/CBRNSchutz/Biologie/biologie_node.html" target="_blank">gie_node.html (last accessed: 21. September 2016). </a></p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">5</li><li style="flex:1">On the importance of gain-of-function experiments, see </li></ul><p>also the policy report from the European Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC) “Gain of function: experimental applications relating to potentially pan<a href="/goto?url=http://www.easac.eu/fileadmin/PDF_s/reports_statements/Gain_of_Function/EASAC_GOF_Web_complete_centred.pdf" target="_blank">demic pathogens” (2015), available at: www.easac.eu/ </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.easac.eu/fileadmin/PDF_s/reports_statements/Gain_of_Function/EASAC_GOF_Web_complete_centred.pdf" target="_blank">fileadmin/PDF_s/reports_statements/Gain_of_Func</a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.easac.eu/fileadmin/PDF_s/reports_statements/Gain_of_Function/EASAC_GOF_Web_complete_centred.pdf" target="_blank">- </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.easac.eu/fileadmin/PDF_s/reports_statements/Gain_of_Function/EASAC_GOF_Web_complete_centred.pdf" target="_blank">tion/EASAC_GOF_Web_complete_centred.pdf (last </a>accessed: 21 September 2016). </p><p></p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">7</li><li style="flex:1">See, for example, “Guidelines and Rules of the Max </li></ul><p></p><p>Planck Society on a Responsible Approach to Freedom of Research and Research Risks” (2010), available at: </p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.mpg.de/232129/researchFreedomRisks.pdf" target="_blank">www.mpg.de/232129/researchFreedomRisks.pdf, the </a></p><p>Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) (2013) “Arbeit mit hochpathogenen Mikroorganismen und Toxinen”, available at: </p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.dfg.de/download/pdf/dfg_im_profil/reden_stellungnahmen/2013/130313_verhaltenscodex_dual_use.pdf" target="_blank">www.dfg.de/download/pdf/dfg_im_profil/reden_stel</a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.dfg.de/download/pdf/dfg_im_profil/reden_stellungnahmen/2013/130313_verhaltenscodex_dual_use.pdf" target="_blank">- </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.dfg.de/download/pdf/dfg_im_profil/reden_stellungnahmen/2013/130313_verhaltenscodex_dual_use.pdf" target="_blank">lungnahmen/2013/130313_verhaltenscodex_dual_use. </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.dfg.de/download/pdf/dfg_im_profil/reden_stellungnahmen/2013/130313_verhaltenscodex_dual_use.pdf" target="_blank">pdf, the Leibniz Association (2012) “Verhaltenskodex </a></p><p>für Biosicherheit für Einrichtungen im Umgang mit </p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leibniz-gemeinschaft.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/Presse/Dokumente/Verhaltenskodex_fuer_Biosicherheit_deutsch.pdf" target="_blank">biologischen Ressourcen”, available at www.leibniz-ge</a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leibniz-gemeinschaft.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/Presse/Dokumente/Verhaltenskodex_fuer_Biosicherheit_deutsch.pdf" target="_blank">- </a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leibniz-gemeinschaft.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/Presse/Dokumente/Verhaltenskodex_fuer_Biosicherheit_deutsch.pdf" target="_blank">meinschaft.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/ </a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leibniz-gemeinschaft.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/Presse/Dokumente/Verhaltenskodex_fuer_Biosicherheit_deutsch.pdf" target="_blank">Presse/Dokumente/Verhaltenskodex_fuer_Biosicher</a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leibniz-gemeinschaft.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/Presse/Dokumente/Verhaltenskodex_fuer_Biosicherheit_deutsch.pdf" target="_blank">- </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leibniz-gemeinschaft.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/Presse/Dokumente/Verhaltenskodex_fuer_Biosicherheit_deutsch.pdf" target="_blank">heit_deutsch.pdf (all last accessed: 21 September 2016). </a></p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">6</li><li style="flex:1">For the current discussion on and progress of implemen- </li></ul><p>tation of biosafety and biosecurity measures in the US, see the Federal Select Agent Program (available at: <a href="/goto?url=http://www.selectagents.gov" target="_blank">www. </a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.selectagents.gov" target="_blank">selectagents.gov), </a>the White House memorandum (2015; </p><p>available at: <a href="/goto?url=http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/10-2015_biosafety_and_biosecurity_memo.pdf" target="_blank">www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/10-2015_biosafety_and_biosecurity_memo.pdf" target="_blank">docs/10-2015_biosafety_and_biosecurity_memo.pdf) </a>and the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) report “Recommendations for the Evaluation and Oversight of Proposed Gain-of-Function Research” (2016), available at: <a href="/goto?url=http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/NSABB_Final_Report_Recommendations_Evaluation_Oversight_Proposed_Gain_of_Function_Research.pdf" target="_blank">http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/ </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/NSABB_Final_Report_Recommendations_Evaluation_Oversight_Proposed_Gain_of_Function_Research.pdf" target="_blank">files/NSABB_Final_Report_Recommendations_Evalua</a><a href="/goto?url=http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/NSABB_Final_Report_Recommendations_Evaluation_Oversight_Proposed_Gain_of_Function_Research.pdf" target="_blank">- </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/NSABB_Final_Report_Recommendations_Evaluation_Oversight_Proposed_Gain_of_Function_Research.pdf" target="_blank">tion_Oversight_Proposed_Gain_of_Function_Research. </a><a href="/goto?url=http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/NSABB_Final_Report_Recommendations_Evaluation_Oversight_Proposed_Gain_of_Function_Research.pdf" target="_blank">pdf (all last accessed: </a>21 September 2016). </p><p>A. Background </p><p>7</p><p>and sufficient as normative instruments&nbsp;3. The&nbsp;DFG’s and the Leopoland whether they represent an adequate </p><p>basis for promoting research. The German Ethics Council took this assignment as an opportunity to carry out a system- </p><p>dina’s “Recommendations for Handling Security-Relevant Research” </p><p>atic analysis on the topic of biosecuri-&nbsp;In the opinion of the DFG and the Leopty-relevant research and to put forward&nbsp;oldina, legal provisions offer only a very recommendations for the future handling&nbsp;limited means of controlling the oppor- </p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">of such research and its funding. </li><li style="flex:1">tunities and risks associated with free re- </li></ul><p>search. Research methods and content are </p><p>The statement “Biosecurity – free- constantly changing and research find- </p><p>dom and responsibility of research”<sup style="top: -0.2756em;">8 </sup>was ings,&nbsp;as well as their future application, </p><p>published on 7 May 2014. The paper’s key&nbsp;tend to be almost impossible to predict. </p><p>recommendations included measures to&nbsp;The DFG and Leopoldina continuously increase awareness of biosecurity issues&nbsp;work to ensure that ethical principles and </p><p>within the scientific community as well as&nbsp;mechanisms for the responsible handling </p><p>tighter legal regulation of so-called dual&nbsp;of freedom of research and research risks use research of concern (DURC) in Ger-&nbsp;are developed in science. As part of the many. The German Ethics Council de-&nbsp;gain-of-function debate, the two organi- </p><p>fined such research as “work that can be&nbsp;sations appointed a joint interdisciplinary </p><p>reasonably anticipated to provide knowl-&nbsp;and cross-institutional working group in edge, products, or technologies that could&nbsp;the summer of 2013 that was tasked with be directly misapplied by others to cause&nbsp;analysing and discussing the complex redamage to public health and safety, the&nbsp;lationship between freedom of research environment or to other important legal&nbsp;and research risks.<sup style="top: -0.2727em;">9 </sup>interests.” <br>In discussion with various research <br>The Ethics Council recommended&nbsp;organisations and members of the Leop- </p><p>drafting a legal definition of DURC and&nbsp;oldina and DFG, the working group devel- </p><p>appointing a legally legitimate central&nbsp;oped a set of general guidelines on han- </p><p>DURC Commission. A prerequisite for&nbsp;dling security-relevant scientific research </p><p>private and/or public funding of poten-&nbsp;based on the “Guidelines and Rules on a tial DURC should be that scientists are&nbsp;Responsible Approach to Freedom of Reobliged to seek the advice of the central&nbsp;search and Research Risks”,<sup style="top: -0.2757em;">10 </sup>which the </p><p>DURC Commission. The final funding&nbsp;Max Planck Society approved in 2010. </p><p>decision should also depend on a DURC&nbsp;These guidelines were presented to the Commission vote. Another possible in-&nbsp;public on 26 June 2014 in Berlin under strument for monitoring and controlling&nbsp;the title “Scientific Freedom and ScientifDURC put forward by the German Ethics&nbsp;ic Responsibility – Recommendations for Council is the transferral of decision-mak-&nbsp;Handling Security-Relevant Research”.<sup style="top: -0.276em;">11 </sup>ing powers to a federal agency as part of&nbsp;This document places great importance </p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">an approval procedure. </li><li style="flex:1">on instruments of self-governance within </li></ul><p></p><p>the scientific community. The advantage </p><p></p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">9</li><li style="flex:1"><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leopoldina.org/en/policy-advice/working-groups/completed-working-groups/dual-use" target="_blank">For more information, see: www.leopoldina.org/en/pol</a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leopoldina.org/en/policy-advice/working-groups/completed-working-groups/dual-use" target="_blank">- </a></li></ul><p></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leopoldina.org/en/policy-advice/working-groups/completed-working-groups/dual-use" target="_blank">icy-advice/working-groups/completed-working-groups/ </a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leopoldina.org/en/policy-advice/working-groups/completed-working-groups/dual-use" target="_blank">dual-use (last accessed: 21 </a>September 2016). </p><p>10 Av<a href="/goto?url=http://www.mpg.de/232129/researchFreedomRisks.pdf" target="_blank">ailable at: www.mpg.de/232129/researchFreedom</a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.mpg.de/232129/researchFreedomRisks.pdf" target="_blank">- </a></p><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.mpg.de/232129/researchFreedomRisks.pdf" target="_blank">Risks.pdf (last accessed: 21 September 2016). </a><br>11 Available&nbsp;<a href="/goto?url=http://www.leopoldina.org/uploads/tx_leopublication/2014_06_DFG-Leopoldina_Scientific_Freedom_Responsibility_EN.pdf" target="_blank">at: www.leopoldina.org/uploads/tx_leo- </a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leopoldina.org/uploads/tx_leopublication/2014_06_DFG-Leopoldina_Scientific_Freedom_Responsibility_EN.pdf" target="_blank">publication/2014_06_DFG-Leopoldina_Scientif- </a><a href="/goto?url=http://www.leopoldina.org/uploads/tx_leopublication/2014_06_DFG-Leopoldina_Scientific_Freedom_Responsibility_EN.pdf" target="_blank">ic_Freedom_Responsibility_EN.pdf (last accessed: 21 </a>September 2016). </p><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">8</li><li style="flex:1">Av<a href="/goto?url=http://www.ethikrat.org/publikationen/stellungnahmen/biosicherheit" target="_blank">ailable at: www.ethikrat.org/publikationen/stellung- </a></li></ul><p><a href="/goto?url=http://www.ethikrat.org/publikationen/stellungnahmen/biosicherheit" target="_blank">nahmen/biosicherheit (last accessed: 21 September </a>2016). </p>