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Blue Stream Gas-In Procedure

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Blue Stream Gas-In Procedure BLUE STREAM GAS-IN PROCEDURE THE INJECTION OF NATURAL GAS THROUGH THE VACUUM SYSTEM MINNETTI Giuseppe, Manager of Process (Snamprogetti S.p.A.) CARUSO Salvatore, Technical Director (Blue Stream Pipeline Company) BOROVIK Vladimir, Technical Director (Blue Stream Pipeline Company) MANSUETO Massimiliano, Process Engineer (Snamprogetti S.p.A.) TERENZI Alessandro, Process Engineer (Snamprogetti S.p.A.) FERRINI Francesco, Manager (SICURGAS) 1. INTRODUCTION The Blue Stream Project represents a challenging work from a technological perspective, since it is the first sealine installed at more than 2000 m of water depth, in a sea environment having peculiar characteristics and presenting safety problems (high water pressure, landslides). The pipeline installation has been completed on 2002. The whole pipeline profile is shown in Figure 1. This paper describes the gas-in operation relevant to one of the twin pipelines crossing the Black Sea, called W2. The procedure developed to carry out the gas-in operation was conceived in order to satisfy the following requirements: { minimise the duration of the operations; { use of conventional or standard equipment; { minimise temporary pipeworks; { maximise the safety of the operations; { take care of risk of possible abort and operation restart; { minimise environment impact; { minimise consumable materials; { avoid any possible hydrate formation during gas-in. The main problem related to the execution of such an operation is represented by the risk of flammable mixture. In fact, air and natural gas in the proper stechiometric proportions will ignite liberating heat. The temperature rise of the gases causes an increase of pressure and, under confinement, might result in an explosion. There are two composition limits of flammability for air and gaseous fuel under specified conditions. The lower limit corresponds to the minimum concentration of combustible gas that will support combustion, the higher limit to the maximum concentration of combustible gas which will be ignited by the corresponding amount of oxygen present in the air. The influence of pressure on the flammability limits is showed in Figure 2 [1]. At low pressures, i.e. 6.7*103 Pa(abs) (67 mbar) (vacuum conditions), natural gas-air mixtures are not combustible. This peculiarity has been taken into consideration as safe operating condition for the gas-in of gas pipelines. Three methodologies were considered for the gas-in: { natural gas injection under pipelines vacuum conditions without use of pigs; { natural gas injection as propellant of a pig train (2) confining a nitrogen batch; { natural gas injection under pipelines pressure conditions without use of pigs The vacuum injection method The vacuum injection method is based on the principle that natural gas does not produce a flammable mixture with air at pressures below 6.7*103 Pa (abs) (67 mbar). Starting from pipeline stand-by filled by dry air at atmospheric pressure, the operation consists of a forced depressurisation by vacuum pump systems located both at Samsun terminal on the Turkish coast and at the opposite pipeline terminal at Beregovaya Compressor Station (BCS) on the Russian coast. Forced depressurisation is ended when the max pressure all along the pipeline, i.e. at the deepest sea bed locations, reaches the value around 6.0*103 Pa (abs) (60 mbar). According to the flammability limits under vacuum conditions, it could be possible to inject natural gas into the pipeline without any risk of ignition, provided that, during the gas injection, vacuum conditions are maintained at the interface front all along the pipeline. However, due to the very small amount of air content, it is wise to displace in part or totally this residual air by nitrogen, in order to avoid any possible formation of gas-air mixture. Therefore, a preliminary nitrogen injection is foreseen at Beregovaya terminal at a controlled flow rate which would permit to maintain all over the ultimate pressure profile reached at the end of air depressurisation. Vacuum pump systems remain in operation during nitrogen injection. The total nitrogen injected volume should be estimated to fill-up not less than 50% of the total pipeline volume. Then, gas injection may follow immediately at the same flow rate as nitrogen and with vacuum pump systems in operation as well, up to the complete evacuation of dry air from the pipeline. This condition is assured by monitoring the oxygen content of the pipeline exhaust at the vacuum pump systems, by using an oxygen analyser probe. Once assured that air has been completely displaced and pipeline is only filled by nitrogen and natural gas, the vacuum pump systems may be shut-down and the pipeline may start to be first pressurised up to something more than atmospheric pressure. The pig assisted injection method The pig assisted gas injection method is based on simultaneous displacement of dry air by natural gas injection assisted by an interface train of at least 2 pigs which includes a batch of nitrogen to prevent any possible formation of gas and air mixture. Due to the remarkably long track and to dry inner pipe conditions, the pig train is recommended to travel at a speed of approx. 0.5 m/s. Due to the remarkable pipeline elevation changes, the control of the pig travel speed should be assured by a back pressure at Samsun terminal of at least 5.0*105 Pa (abs) (5 bara). This value, remarkably higher than the common practice of 2 bar adopted for shorter on-shore pipeline tracks, is here recommended also for facing any possible pig stop, especially on the most sloping sections. The pipeline should firstly be pressurised by dry air up to 5.0*105 Pa (abs) (5 bara), by utilising the same equipment used for drying operation. Then, the first pig has to be launched by compressed nitrogen. The volume of nitrogen separation interface is evaluated on the basis of a predictive model of possible gas leak throughout the pig sealing cups. The second pig has to be launched directly by natural gas available on the Beregovaya CS by-pass line. The method might be performed with the use of more than two pigs. Although the separation efficiency is augmented, resulting in a lower nitrogen consumption, the operation reliability in this case decreases. The method without pig assistance under pressure conditions This operation is based on the physical attitude to displace products from inside pipeline by accepting a confined interface volume expected under turbulent flow regime. Purging of air is carried out by using a nitrogen batch sized to avoid mixing between air and natural gas. The pipeline is assumed to be initially filled with dry air at least at 6.0*105 Pa (abs) (6 bara) due to the need to face an abort of gas-in. Then compressed nitrogen is pumped into the pipeline at a high flow rate to assure a minimum length of the air-nitrogen interface zone. The final selection of the vacuum injection method was mainly dictated by safety considerations. In fact, this methodology does not involve any particular risk, even in case of an abort of the operations, when it would be sufficient to close both the inlet and the outlet points of the pipeline to maintain the achieved vacuum degree. On the other hand, the pig assisted gas injection method has several drawbacks due to the operation sensitivity to the flow control. In fact the pig must be controlled and monitored all over its travel along the pipeline. Moreover, in the event that the operations during the gas-in phase must be stopped, it will be required to abort the entire operation by venting the gas at Beregovaya and allowing the Samsun terminal to dislodge back the pig train in order to restore the basic safety requirements. As for the method without the use of pigs under pressure conditions, the major disadvantages are related to the substantial amount of nitrogen which needs to be stored at site, regassified and compressed at high rates (approx. 30,000 Sm3/h) and at relatively high pressure (6 to 9*105 Pa (abs)). It is worth pointing out that the latter method is not referenced and tested by current practice. The following table sums up the key aspects of the three considered methods: Vacuum injection Pig assisted Injection with no pigs Injection under pressure - duration days 30 35 15 - dependence on external equipment -- high high high - move up time months 2.5 1 1 - upset risk level -- none high high - operation cost estimate -- comparable not evaluated - cost estimate or insurance for upset conditions -- none very high negligible The whole operation was organised on the basis of an international cooperation between different partners, whose tasks are indicated herebelow: { BSPC (Blue Stream Pipeline Company) (Russia/Italy) General management of the system { Snamprogetti (Italy) Supervisor of operation { Kubangazprom (Russia) Responsible of operation in Russia { Sicurgas (Italy) Responsible of vacuum operation in Turkey { Botas (Turkey) Management of Turkish onshore section system The time schedule of the whole operation is reported in Figure 3. 2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The temporary equipment installed at both pipeline terminals and used to carry out the whole operation is described in outline in Figures 4 and 5. Russian coast 3 { No.1 vacuum unit contracted on service base sized for 8,000 m /h (actual); 3 { No.1 nitrogen/natural gas depressurisation skid designed for max 3,000 Sm /h, during gas pressurisation up to 1.5*105 Pa(abs) (1.5 bara), and assembled at site using materials and devices suitable to withstand the maximum available pressure (8.0*106 Pa(abs) (80 bara)). The skid (see Figure 4) included mainly: • Gas heater in order to guarantee a gas temperature after reduction higher than +5°C; • Throttling valves for pressure reduction; • Piping instrumented with pressure gauges and flow meters.
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