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Black Sea CRC Coloured Format EUROPE’S BLACK SEA DIMENSION EUROPE’S BLACK SEA DIMENSION TERRY D. ADAMS, MICHAEL EMERSON, LAURENCE DAVID MEE AND MARIUS VAHL PREFACE BY YANNIS PAPANIKOLAOU CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES BRUSSELS AND INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR BLACK SEA STUDIES ATHENS The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy research institute in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe. As a research institute, CEPS takes no position on matters of policy. The views expressed are entirely those of the authors. CEPS Paperbacks present analysis and views by leading experts on important questions in the arena of European public policy. They are written in a style geared to an informed but generalist readership of policy-makers, government officials and corporate executives. The cover contains a reproduction of a copper engraved map of the Black Sea, ‘The Palus Maeotic and Pontus Euxinus for the Travels of Anacharsis by J.D. Barbie du Bocage’, published in The Travels of Anacharsis (mid-4th century BC), London, 1825. ISBN 92-9079-383-X © Copyright 2002, Centre for European Policy Studies. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise – without the prior permission of the Centre for European Policy Studies. Centre for European Policy Studies Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels Tel: 32 (0) 2 229.39.11 Fax: 32 (0) 2 219.41.51 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.ceps.be CONTENTS* PREFACE i Yannis Papanikolaou EUROPE’S BLACK SEA DIMENSION – MODEL EUROPEAN REGIONALISM, PRÊT-À-PORTER Michael Emerson and Marius Vahl 1. Introduction 1 2. Organisation of Black Sea Cooperation 2 3. EU Participation in Black Sea Cooperation 19 4. Conclusions 30 Sources 33 CASPIAN OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT AND THE BLACK SEA REGION: AN OVERVIEW Terry D. Adams 1. Introduction 39 2. Caspian Oil 41 3. Caspian Oil Transportation, Black Sea Oil 46 4. The Turkish Bosphorus Straits and Black Sea Bypass Options 49 5. Caspian Central Asian Gas 57 6. The Caspian Legal Regime and Offshore Territorial Boundaries 61 7. Conclusions 67 References 70 Atlas of Maps 71 PROTECTING THE BLACK SEA ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENGE FOR COOPERATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE Laurence David Mee 1. Introduction 81 2. Examining the Symptoms of Environmental Degradation 81 3. International Action for Protecting the Black Sea 88 4. Emerging Challenges and Opportunities for Protecting the Black Sea Environment 107 5. European Integration and the Black Sea Environment 120 6. Conclusion: Towards a Common Purpose 130 References 133 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 136 ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 140 * Separate contents pages appear in more detail at the start of each paper. PREFACE or many years, the countries of the Black Sea belonged to two totally opposing political and military blocs. With the end of the F Cold War, the countries of the region jointly decided to revive the cooperative spirit by setting up the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), despite the fact that the Black Sea area is one of the most diverse regions in the world. The eleven member states of the BSEC (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine) have concluded that their common interests should prevail and that they can better promote them through cooperation. BSEC’s diversity makes it also very convenient to play the role of a bridge between Europe, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The BSEC member states together constitute a vast Euro-Asian space of almost 20 million square kilometres, populated by 340 million people. It possesses huge deposits of natural, particularly energy, resources. It is also very important for the transportation of the energy resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to the rest of the world. Its geo-strategic importance is substantial since it includes Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the countries of the Caucasus among its members. Especially after the 11th of September 2001, BSEC could become an excellent example of how countries so different from each other cannot only co-exist but also cooperate closely in many fields. The success of a formation like BSEC may be also instrumental not only in promoting economic growth and stability in the region but in facilitating its integration with the wider European structures too. The accession of the candidate countries from South East Europe into the European Union (EU) will create a de facto new relationship between the latter and the Black Sea region. The enlarged EU would greatly benefit from enhanced cooperation with the non-EU countries in the Black Sea region and will not be able to fully exploit its growth potential if the BSEC area continues to stagnate and lag behind its new members. The BSEC has developed a rather sophisticated organisational structure which, in addition to its intergovernmental bodies, includes also the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, the BSEC Parliamentary Assembly, the BSEC Business Council and the International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), its think tank. i PREFACE In charting the future road of BSEC, its member states miss no opportunity to reiterate their readiness to establish a close collaboration with the European Union and jointly forge the Black Sea dimension with it. To this end the ICBSS and other members of the BSEC family are trying to contribute to a better understanding between the EU and the BSEC and to a recognition by all parties of the mutual benefits to be derived from an institutionalised BSEC-EU relationship. This is especially so as the parallel processes of globalisation and its counterpart regionalisation affect the relationship between the EU and its new neighbouring regions and make necessary the search for new bonds of collaboration in various fields. In order to facilitate a better exchange of ideas and understanding about the future of the wider Europe and to promote the dialogue between the BSEC and the EU, the International Center for Black Sea Studies identified the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels as an ideal partner. With its tremendous experience and credibility, CEPS is very well suited for the task of developing together with the ICBSS common projects of mutual interest on the interface between the EU and the BSEC in such important fields as energy, the environment and the overall relationship between the two. The present publication is the result of this cooperation and we hope that it will bring the EU and BSEC closer. Such a development would lead not only to a stronger Europe, but more prosperity, security and stability to the wider region stretching from northwest Russia to the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Caspian, Central Asia and the easte rn Mediterranean. We are grateful to CEPS and its staff for the quality of our cooperation so far and look forward to a long-lasting, mutually satisfactory and rewarding relationship. Yannis Papanikolaou Director-General, ICBSS Athens ii EUROPE AND THE BLACK SEA - MODEL REGIONALISM, PRÊT-À-PORTER MICHAEL EMERSON AND MARIUS VAHL CONTENTS 1. Introduction 1 2. Multilateral Organisation in the Black Sea Region 2 2.1 BSEC institutions 3 2.2 Other Black Sea regional arrangements 5 2.3 What kind of organisation is BSEC to be? 7 2.4 What is the core business of Black Sea regionalism? 10 2.5 Issues of deepening, widening and variable geometry 16 3. EU Participation in Black Sea Cooperation 19 3.1 EU interests in the Black Sea 19 3.2 Models of regional cooperation sponsored by the EU 22 3.3 Forms of EU participation in international organisations 25 3.4 Elements for possible EU or EC participation in BSEC 27 4. Conclusions 30 Sources 33 List of Tables 1. Participation by BSEC member states in selected European organisations 8 2. EU bilateral agreements with BSEC member states 20 3. The European Community in international organisations 27 List of Boxes 1. BSEC institutions 4 2. BSEC working groups 9 3. The BSEC Economic Agenda for the Future 12 4. Main EU regional initiatives in the wider Europe 23 EUROPE AND THE BLACK SEA - MODEL REGIONALISM, PRÊT-À-PORTER MICHAEL EMERSON AND MARIUS VAHL 1. Introduction1 The house of the Organisation for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is now a fine piece of regional architecture, symbolised by its elegant mansion on the shore of the Bosphorus, but reflected more significantly of course in its comprehensive institutional structure (ministerial councils, working groups, permanent secretariat, parlia mentary assembly, business council, development bank, think tank, etc.). There is a general concern that the operational performance of BSEC is still thin, however, and that the considerable political and institutional investments are under-exploited. What is BSEC really meant to do? Or, more broadly, how should Black Sea cooperation best be organised to fit into the new European architecture? How should BSEC relate to the important cooperative activities in the Black Sea region that essentially take place outside the BSEC framework (for example in the fields of the environment, transport and energy)? How should BSEC and the EU relate to each other, given that half the Black Sea coastline is now accounted for by member states that are also candidates for accession to the EU, and that BSEC has invited the EU to become an observer and later possibly a full member? This paper argues that BSEC should focus more strongly right now on a set of core functions that have an intrinsically important regional aspect, rather than aspire to be a general purpose international organisation covering almost all desirable policy objectives of the member states.
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