Outlook for Oil and Gas in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries Manfred Hafner, Simone Tagliapietra and El Habib El Elandaloussi MEDPRO Technical Report No

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Outlook for Oil and Gas in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries Manfred Hafner, Simone Tagliapietra and El Habib El Elandaloussi MEDPRO Technical Report No 1 | HAFNER, TAGLIAPIETRA & EL ELANDALOUSSI Outlook for Oil and Gas in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries Manfred Hafner, Simone Tagliapietra and El Habib El Elandaloussi MEDPRO Technical Report No. 18/October 2012 Abstract The aim of this report is to elaborate the MEDPRO Energy Reference Scenario for oil and gas supply and demand up to 2030 for southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. The report gives an assessment of • oil and gas reserves by country; • oil and gas production, domestic demand and export scenarios by country; and • the existing and planned infrastructure for oil and gas exports. Finally, the report presents some insights on the future role of the Mediterranean as an oil and gas transit region. This paper was produced in the context of the MEDPRO (Mediterranean Prospects) project, a three-year project funded under the Socio-economic Sciences & Humanities Programme of DG Research of the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Research Programme. MEDPRO Technical Reports give an indication of work being conducted within MEDPRO thematic Work Packages (WPs) and aim at stimulating reactions from other experts and academics in the field. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which they are associated. ISBN 978-94-6138-239-9 Available for free downloading from the MEDPRO (www.medpro-foresight.eu) and CEPS (www.ceps.eu) websites © Copyright 2012, Manfred Hafner, Simone Tagliapietra and El Habib El Elandaloussi Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................... i Part A. Natural Gas............................................................................................................................... 1 1. Assessment of natural gas reserves .................................................................................................. 1 1.1 MED-11 in the wider regional context ................................................................................... 1 1.1.1 Europe ......................................................................................................................... 2 1.1.2 Africa .......................................................................................................................... 3 1.1.3 Middle East ................................................................................................................. 4 1.2 Gas reserves in the MED-11 .................................................................................................. 6 1.2.1 Algeria ......................................................................................................................... 7 1.2.2 Egypt ........................................................................................................................... 8 1.2.3 Libya ........................................................................................................................... 9 1.2.4 Syria .......................................................................................................................... 10 1.2.5 The Levantine Basin ................................................................................................. 10 2. Assessment of natural gas production, demand and exports .......................................................... 11 2.1 Major trends in world natural gas production ...................................................................... 11 2.2 MED-11: Natural gas production, demand and exports ....................................................... 12 2.2.1 MED-11 overview ..................................................................................................... 12 2.2.2 Algeria ....................................................................................................................... 14 2.2.3 Egypt ......................................................................................................................... 19 2.2.4 Libya ......................................................................................................................... 22 2.2.5 Tunisia ....................................................................................................................... 25 2.2.6 Turkey ....................................................................................................................... 26 2.2.7 Other south-eastern Mediterranean countries ........................................................... 27 2.3 MED-11: Natural gas infrastructure ..................................................................................... 28 2.3.1 MED-11 overview ..................................................................................................... 28 2.3.2 Gas pipeline infrastructure ........................................................................................ 29 2.3.3 LNG infrastructure .................................................................................................... 29 Part B. Oil ............................................................................................................................................ 32 3. Oil in the MED-11 ......................................................................................................................... 32 3.1 Overview .............................................................................................................................. 32 3.2 MED-11 oil production ........................................................................................................ 32 3.3 MED-11 oil trade ................................................................................................................. 34 3.4 MED-11 oil demand ............................................................................................................. 35 3.5 MED-11 oil transport infrastructure ..................................................................................... 36 4. Algeria............................................................................................................................................ 38 4.1 Oil reserves ........................................................................................................................... 38 4.2 Oil production and demand .................................................................................................. 38 4.3 Oil infrastructure and exports ............................................................................................... 39 5. Egypt .............................................................................................................................................. 41 5.1 Oil reserves ........................................................................................................................... 41 5.2 Oil production and demand .................................................................................................. 42 5.3 Oil infrastructure and exports ............................................................................................... 43 6. Libya .............................................................................................................................................. 44 6.1 Oil reserves ........................................................................................................................... 44 6.2 Oil production and demand .................................................................................................. 46 6.3 Oil infrastructure and exports ............................................................................................... 46 Part C. The Mediterranean as a Region for Oil and Gas Transit ................................................... 48 7. Turkey ............................................................................................................................................ 48 8. Egypt .............................................................................................................................................. 54 9. Algeria............................................................................................................................................ 55 References ............................................................................................................................................ 57 Appendix. MEDPRO Energy Reference Scenario – Tables ............................................................ 60 List of Figures Figure 1. Mediterranean Basin ........................................................................................................... ii Figure 2. MED-11 oil and gas reserves .............................................................................................. ii Figure 3. MED-11 primary energy consumption (Mtoe) .................................................................. iii Figure 4. MED-11 primary energy consumption by country (Mtoe) ................................................ iv Figure 5. Energy dependence of Mediterranean countries .............................................................. viii Figure 6. Energy dependence of MED-11 countries ....................................................................... viii Figure 7. Overall energy dependency in the Mediterranean ............................................................. ix Figure 8. Gas reserves around the
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