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Putin's Private Army

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Putin's Private Army Saturday, February 17, 2018 7 Putin’s private army shadowy mercenary group known as “ChVK Wagner” has come to play a crucial role in Russian operations in Syria. The actions of Wagner Acoincided with the Kremlin’s intervention in Syria in September 2015. Family grieves While Russia was expanding its military presence in Syria, security con- tractor Wagner was recruiting hundreds of ex-soldiers online, posting advertisements in military-themed chat rooms, according to Fontanka.ru, a St Petersburg-based independent news site. Training and selection took place at Molkino in southern Russia, home to the Spetsnaz GRU — the special forces of the foreign military intelligence maid found agency. The first units flew to Russia’s newly completed Khmeimim Air Base in Syria in October 2015. Wagner personnel were paid 240,000 rubles/month (€3,300, $4,100) and figured heavily in operations against so-called Islamic State (IS) around Palmyra in 2016. They served as “shock troops” alongside the Syrian army, says Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russian security at the Institute of International Relations in Prague. dead in Kuwait Although the Russian constitution bans private security contractors Wagner’s commanding officer, Dmitry Utkin, a former Spetsnaz lieuten- ant colonel and his deputy, Andrei Troshev, attended a Kremlin reception hosted by President Vladimir Putin in December 2016. In 2017 Wagner’s role was expanded to include seizing IS-held gas and oil facilities for Evro Polis -- a Russian company linked to St. Petersburg entrepreneur Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close friend of Putin. Wagner’s Syrian operations suffered their worst blow on February 7 dur- ing an attack to seize an oil refinery at Khusham from U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). U.S. warplanes, including F-22 Raptors and an AC-130 Spectre ground-attack gunship, responded with air strikes. Russian MBH Media, quoting former Defence Minister Igor Strelkov, reported the destruction of Wagner’s 5th assault detachment -- an armoured group and an artil- lery unit. Maria Zakharova, a foreign ministry spokeswoman, said five men, “apparently Russian citizens”, died in the attack on February 7 and an unspecified number of Russians were injured. She declined to The sister of a Filipina worker whose body was found inside a provide further details. freezer in Kuwait, throws herself at her sibling’s coffin (AFP) While the official number of Russian military personnel killedVladimir in Syria stands Putin’s at 46, more secret than army 200 Russians,A shadowy including mercenary hundreds group calledof Wagnerians, “ChVK Wagner” has come to Manila Duterte said last week he did not areplay believed a crucial to rolehave in lost Russian their livesoperations since 2015. in Syria. The actions of Wagner he body of a Philippine maid Joanna Demafelis, want a quarrel with Kuwait, but he coincided with the Kremlin’s intervention in Syria in September 2015 Tfound stuffed in a freezer in warned he may resort to drastic ChVK WAGNER Dec 2016: Utkin and deputy Kuwait arrived home to a tearful 29, was found steps, such as a complete ban on the Founded by former Andrei Troshev are guests of welcome yesterday, just days after earlier this deployment of Filipino workers, if special forces officer President Vladimir Putin at Kremlin Philippines President Rodrigo Kuwait and other governments fail Dmitry Utkin for Heroes Day ceremony Duterte barred his nationals from month after her to safeguard Filipinos. 1 Oct 2015: Wagner 2017: Wagner’s role is expanded working in the Gulf state. employers, a Duterte said 82 Filipino workers personnel fly from to include seizing IS-held gas and oil Joanna Demafelis, 29, was died in Kuwait in 2016 and that GRU* training facility facilities for Russian company found earlier this month after her Lebanese man and number rose to 103 last year, in southern Russia, Evro Polis, linked to friend of Putin employers, a Lebanese man and his his Syrian wife, though he didn’t specify the cause to Khmeimim Air Base 3 Jul: Wagner personnel fight Syrian wife, disappeared in 2016. disappeared in of death. 2 Mar 2016: Wagnerians, supported alongside Syrian army to recapture Her death triggered a diplomatic “What are you doing to my by Russian airstrikes, serve as Shaer gas field from IS row between Kuwait and Manila, countrymen? And if I were to do 2016 “shock troops” – attacking so-called 4 Sep-Nov: Wagner takes part which announced a “total ban” it to your citizens here, would Islamic State fighters – paving way in liberation of Deir al-Zour from on new employment for Filipinos you be happy?” asked the volatile for Syrian Army to liberate IS control in the oil-rich country and flew the country, according to local Philippine leader. Palmyra *GRU: Russia’s main intelligence directorate home hundreds of others, a move media reports citing police for the Cayetano said while the death Euphrates River de-confliction line: condemned in the Middle East. information. Authorities found was tragic it would be a “rallying Russia’s area of operations to west, TURKEY The victim’s wailing sister threw her body when they raided the point” for governments to work U.S.-led coalition to east herself at her sibling’s coffin after it apartment over an eviction notice. harder to protect Filipinos overseas, was unloaded at Manila airport on Domestic workers in the country while conceding that Philippine- Hasakah Friday, while her stunned brother are not covered by ordinary Kuwaiti relations were going IRAQ Joejet Demafelis tried to comfort labour legislation, and accounts of through a “very rocky period”. Raqqa 100km Khmeimim Khusham her. Filipinos being subjected to abuse He said only about three to five Air Base Aleppo 60 miles “This is a huge loss for us. Her and exploitation in the Middle East percent of Filipino labourers in Idlib Shaer Latakia 4 5 dream, she told my mother, is that have long circulated. Kuwait were having problems but gas field 5 Feb 7, 2018: 1 Deir she was leaving only because she A fiery Duterte lashed out at acknowledged the government Hama 5th assault al-Zour detachment – wanted to help our parents and our Kuwait after Demafelis’ death, needed to do more. Tartus SYRIA 3 Wagner armoured youngest sibling,” the brother told alleging that Arab employers His department said Monday Russian Homs group and artillery reporters at the cargo terminal. routinely rape their Filipina authorities were repatriating 10,000 naval 2 Palmyra unit – destroyed “My parents can’t accept this. workers, force them to work 21 Filipinos who had overstayed base by U.S. airstrikes Every so often, they start weeping,” hours each day and feed them their visas in Kuwait, with more he added. scraps. than 700 flown home already REAS OF ONTROL (Feb 2018) “I hope they can find those who Philippine Foreign Secretary under an amnesty programme LEBANON Damascus A C killed my sister”. Alan Peter Cayetano said Friday announced recently by the Kuwaiti Syrian army and allies Authorities say 252,000 Filipinos the Kuwaiti ambassador had government. Mediterranean Sea Syrian rebel forces work in Kuwait, many as maids. assured him his government Some 10 million Filipinos work ISRAEL Turkish-backed rebel forces Kuwaiti police believe Demafelis was “outraged” over the killing abroad and the money they remit JORDAN So-called Islamic State had been hired by a Lebanese man and determined to find those back is a lifeline of the Philippine Deraa U.S.-backed Kurdish groups and his Syrian wife who later left responsible. economy.(Agencies) Sources: Fontanka, MBH Media, Syria Live Map Picture: Channel One Russia © GRAPHIC NEWS.
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