Written evidence from The Chiltern Society (HSR81)

Q1 What are the main arguments for or against HSR?

1.1 To answer this question meaningfully it is essential to distinguish between the concept of High Speed Rail (HSR), the proposed HS2 project and the issue of whether the latter is an effective response to the Government’s case for the former.

1.2 HSR covers a wide spectrum of different rail track and train design speeds1. If there is a demonstrable case for HSR, one key question is ‘what design speed concept(s) will provide the best strategic fit and value for money for England, Wales and Scotland?’

1.3 The Chiltern Society is not opposed to the concept of HSR. It is though strongly opposed to the currently proposed HS2 project, which has been evolved through a highly flawed, and arguably unlawful, process. Moreover, the HS2 project has been proposed in the absence of a soundly developed national strategic context against which to test its soundness in terms of fitness for purpose. The Society is drawn into this debate because, as a direct result of these process failures, an HSR route through the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) is proposed. This has been done without conclusive demonstration, as required by planning guidance2 and best practice, that no alternative that avoids the AONB is possible to meet the (currently undefined) ‘national interest’ need for an HSR network.

1.4 The Society is prepared to accept that there are prima facie arguments for reducing rail travel times between major cities and, importantly, improving connectivity to and between major centres in the English Midlands and the North. Achieving these objectives is likely to require the use of one or more forms of HSR. By definition, the overlaying of a separate network of new ‘dedicated’ Very High Speed Rail (VHSR) track proposed by HS2 Ltd (HS2L) and DfT severely limits the number of major centres that can access and benefit most from HSR. In contrast, an ‘integrated’ approach to accommodate slower speed HSR trains as part of the development of the existing national strategic rail network would eventually enable many more communities to benefit from HSR. This could still require sections of new HSR track, such as a strategic ‘spine’ route integral with the existing network.

1.5 The HS2L/DfT HS2 proposals were founded on the presumption of future capacity restrictions on the West Coast Main Line tracks. Value of time and ‘wider economic impact’ (WEI) assumptions have been used to justify these proposals. The value of time assumptions used have been discredited3 and there is no apparent robust evidence base to justify the WEI claims. At best, the HS2 economic case remains unproven.

1.6 Interestingly, the HS2 proposals are based on the ‘dedicated’ VHSR network concepts mainly used in non-European countries such as China where the populations served are separated by very long distances. In European countries where the major centres are not as closely located as they are in Britain, the preference has been for the ‘integrated’ network approach, with a consequent wider spread of benefits. By this comparison, the HS2L/DfT proposals do not seem fit for purpose. 1.7 It also seems perverse that the principal cause of the future capacity problems perceived for WCML arises mainly, not from the growth of long distance inter-city travel, but from rail industry responses to an increasing and extending demand for peak hour commuter services that are currently very heavily subsidised. This in turn distorts the sound economic provision of rolling stock assets and acts against the ‘work-closer-to-home’ trends, central to regional planning over recent years, of encouraging a reduction in commuting distances on sustainable development grounds4. Government policy on the sustainability of commuting and subsidised pricing of commuter train services should be part of the strategic context against which major rail development options are tested.

1.8 It is self evident that the ultra high investment required for a ‘dedicated’ VHSR network will be far more sensitive and vulnerable to ‘predict and provide’ traffic forecasts (as underpin the HS2 proposals) than applying the same risk factors to an ‘integrated’ model for strategic development of the national rail network. The latter would have far more scope and flexibility to adjust to failure to achieve estimated traffic levels and operating costs.

Q2 How does HSR fit with the government’s transport policy objectives?

2.1 The short answer is that the Government has yet to produce a coherent set of transport policy objectives that would provide the comprehensive strategic context against which HSR proposals (such as HS2) can be tested and judged.

2.2 The Government recently launched a scoping consultation on its future sustainable aviation strategy5. Its draft proposals for a National Policy Statement on National Networks are still awaited. Other initiatives, including work on delivering a sustainable railway, are understood to be in the pipeline. These will eventually help create the framework of a (currently non-existent) sustainable National Integrated Transportation Strategy. It is foolhardy prematurely to propose what would in effect become the spine of a national VHSR network for the next century (i.e. Phase 1 of HS2 between London and Birmingham) and take a decision on it prior to taking account of the outcomes of this programmed range of new transport policies and consultations.

2.3 Unlike the HS1 route, the ‘dedicated’ southern spine route of HS2 will not be available to slower speed HSR trains. With an ‘integrated’ approach based on slower speeds, there would be far more flexibility to use HSR trains to connect to intermediate stations and to cities linked to the HSR spine via the classic railway network.

2.4 A core political argument of Government for HS2 (in response to its policy decision not to build a third runway at Heathrow) is that it will facilitate the transfer of passengers to HS2 from domestic air services to Heathrow from the North of England and Scotland. Whether the Government currently believes it or not, its recently launched consultation on a sustainable framework for UK aviation will inevitably lead to a review of its decision to oppose additional runways at Stansted and Gatwick airports. In which case, given the many challenges and likely fundamental changes facing the global airline and airport industries, it would be highly unwise to assume that, for example, the case for a HSR link to a twin- runway Stansted post 2030 would be less than that perceived for Heathrow in 2011. If the country needs a new HSR spine track south of the Midlands, would it not be prudent to locate its southern approach to London where it could facilitate easier access from the North to a range of major transport nodes in Southern England, including a London station on the HS1 route? Such long term strategic scenarios should be an integral part of the nation’s HSR network strategy considerations. There was no such consideration in the conception of the HS2 proposals, because HS2L’s remit was so heavily constrained by current thinking influenced by the traditional dominance of a Heathrow hub airport. This repeated a fundamental mistake made in the 2003 Aviation White Paper.6

Q3 Business Case

3.1 There remains considerable doubt as to whether the highly constrained ‘dedicated’ VHSR approach (e.g. current HS2 proposal) with its very high risk profile, is an affordable or safe strategy. Challenges to the HS2 business case by other parties seem to confirm that.

3.2 By any standards, the HS2 passenger forecasts are very bold, particularly the assumptions about new traffic generation and transfer from air. Given the huge timescales involved, over a period of inevitably uncertain change, traffic forecasting is more an act of faith than a science7. Over a 30 to 50 year period we can expect to see further life-changing communications developments that will reduce the need to travel for business purposes; and also cultural changes, such as more working from home as an alternative to 5-day commuting. This emphasises the need to adopt infrastructure strategies that maximise the flexibility to respond to change, rather than those which have built-in inflexibility such as the current HS2 proposals.

3.3 There appears to be no clear Government policy on the regulatory rail pricing regime that will apply once HS2 commences service. Statements by ministers seem to imply that competitive pricing will be permitted between HS2 and operators on the classic network. That seems both sensible and essential for the late 2020s and beyond. The rail industry should by then be using the more advanced inventory control pricing systems that are now commonplace in the airline industry. However, given the wide difference in the load factors between HS2 and WCML quoted for 20438, this highlights an important weakness in HS2 passenger forecasting. Learning from airline competition experience, a 58% HS2 load factor would not be sustainable against promotional pricing by slower competing WCML services, with 69% spare capacity over the same sector. The same would apply with respect to pricing competition on an improved Birmingham-London Chiltern Line.

3.4 Work by other parties on the possibility of upgrading scenarios for the West Coast Main Line (WCML) draws out several points. First, there is more optimism than assumed by HS2L that capacity improvements on WCML and development of the Chiltern Line could postpone any critical capacity point well beyond that assumed by HS2L and DfT. Second, government institutional thinking is heavily biased by the history of poor performance and high cost of previous WCML upgrades and the additional risks to sustaining service standards during construction.

3.5 Management of the Olympic and other recent major projects suggests that the second point reflects undue caution. Certainly the Government is dedicated to improving risk management in major projects.9 Arising from the first point, one must seriously question whether it is essential, as the Government implies, for a decision on the proposed HS2 southern spine to be taken before the end of 2011 and before the Government has considered the outcomes of its major national transportation investigations referred to above. The Government should resist pressure from the rail industry lobby for such an early decision, when there is so much uncertainty on critical strategic issues and the potential environmental harm to special protected areas, such as the Chilterns AONB, would be devastating, as the previous government’s transport minister admitted in Parliament10.

Q4 The strategic route

4.1 The proposed HS2 southern spine route alignment stems from the very narrowly drawn and highly constrained remit given to HS2L. Hence, this, and the Coalition Government’s political commitment to an early decision, has meant that a proper comprehensive strategic review of feasible scenarios and options has not been conducted.

4.2 The original ‘Adonis’ remit for HS2L, which the present Government essentially adopted, was focussed on a London to West Midlands route11. Among the ‘Absolute requirements’ of that remit were: a ‘Heathrow International station’; a ‘Connection to HS1’; ‘no intermediate stations between Heathrow International and West Midlands’. Those requirements determined that any southern HSR spine route must approach London from the West. With those constraints, alternative scenarios that might have approached a London terminal from the north were effectively outside HS2L’s remit. That remit also denied HS2L the opportunity to investigate fundamental changes to the distribution of rail services into London that might have facilitated better passenger service in the post- Crossrail era and achieve a far more direct and speedier HS2 connection to HS1. It also effectively ruled out in-depth consideration of an ‘integrated’ model of HSR network provision that could, in future, have provided for slower HSR services to intermediate stations in the South Midlands Sub-Regional Growth Area (and beyond) and, for example, HSR services between that area and the London Gateway Growth Area in Kent.

4.3 HS2L’s first report made it clear that HSR services between London and Birmingham alone would not be economically viable. That has been stated subsequently on several occasions by HS2L’s former Chairman and its Chief Engineer. Yet HS2L places great weight on achieving a straight line connection between London and the West Midlands (Birmingham). The real benefit of HSR is over greater distances, e.g London to Manchester and Leeds/Sheffield. Had the original remit been prioritised to link those cities to HS1 and London, the ‘straight line’ philosophy would have suggested a more easterly alignment for the southern HSR spine that would have passed through the South/East Midlands.

4.4 This fundamental failure initially to commission a much broader high level strategic rail network review has severely precluded a proper comprehensive evaluation of alternative HSR scenarios and spine route options. Since the current HS2 proposals also pre-empt the outcomes of other major strategic transportation studies and consultations, that project, including the proposed Y configuration, should at least be put on hold until a more comprehensive and coherent assessment is possible. The current HS2 proposals are widely perceived as unsound12.

4.5 In terms of priorities for a HSR spine route over the last three-quarters of this century, there can be little doubt that effective HSR through-service capability to the Continent from the Midlands and beyond will be essential. It is far less certain over that timescale that an HSR connection to Heathrow will still be perceived as important as it is now. Indeed, with all of its inherited shortcomings and constraints, it is inconceivable that Heathrow will still retain such a dominant role over other UK and near European airports, making speedier HS2-HS1 connections far more important. Another priority is clearly the need for interconnectivity improvements between cities in the Midlands and the North of England. The phasing of the development of the national HSR network strategy should take these priorities into account.

Q5 Economic rebalancing and equity

5.1 We have already referred to the lack of a substantive evidence base for WEI. However, it seems self-evident that the more flexibility there is eventually to deliver HSR connections to more cities in the Midlands and North, with their classic rail connections to their sub- regional hinterlands, the greater the prospects for regeneration and greater modal shift to rail. This points strongly towards an ‘integrated’ network strategic approach. In contrast, the ‘dedicated’ VHSR network approach of the current HS2 project is concentrated only on the country’s major city conurbations, where arguably the need for regeneration support is much less. The wider rail network improvement is, the broader will be the benefit to a wider range of socio-economic groups. Concentration on the HS2L dedicated network could detract from sound investment in the development of sub-regional rail networks.

Q6 Impact

6.1 Even HS2L seem to accept that its project proposals will be no more than carbon neutral. This is particularly because of its fixation on a business model based on an exclusive 400kph VHSR, dedicated track network. Slower HSR speeds would reduce carbon emissions substantially. They would also reduce energy consumption. Slower speeds permit greater track curvatures and reduced tunnelling and associated costs, as well as significantly reduced embedded carbon impacts. They also make it, in stark contrast to the HS2 proposals, far more feasible to align any new HSR track within the environmental envelope of existing major transport corridors. The latter seems to be accepted good practice in the most densely developed European countries.

6.2 An HS2 connection to Heathrow is unlikely to have significant impact on reducing carbon emissions from aviation. Any runway slots released would be reutilised by larger long-haul aircraft, unless prohibited by regulation. Domestic flights into Heathrow are becoming less economic. When bmi recently pulled out of its Heathrow-Glasgow services, British Airways responded by increasing its services from London City Airport to Glasgow and easyjet increased its Glasgow-Gatwick services13.

International transfer traffic to/from Manchester and Scottish airports would be far more likely to transfer to connecting flights to/from Continental hubs, enabling them still to check in their baggage at their originating airport, rather than carrying it onto an HSR train and then via additional modal interchanges to reach their departure terminal at Heathrow.

6.3 Note that the Government does not intend to publish its draft policy on a sustainable framework for aviation until March 2012. It will adopt the framework in March 201314. 6.4 The true environmental impact cost of HS2 has yet to be fully assessed. There are huge gaps in the environmental evidence base so far produced by HS2L15, and therefore in the account taken of environmental costs in the HS2 business case.

6.5 The major concern for the Chiltern Society is the Government’s proposal for a VHSR route right across the heart of the Chilterns AONB. The Chilterns is a unique example of ancient English countryside16 and, as a result, one of only two AONBs to have a statutory conservation board. The Chilterns is the most easily accessible large area of designated special countryside close to London and the only AONB between London and Birmingham. AONBs share the distinction with the National Parks of representing the finest quality of English landscape. Driving a VHSR route through the Chiltern Hills is the equivalent for people in the many growth areas surrounding this tranquil ancient countryside to driving such a route through the fantastic National Parks that people in the cities of Yorkshire and the North of England rightly value, enjoy and protect. If there are alternatives to such devastating harmful abuse of these national assets, they must be used.

6.6 The highly restricted nature of HS2L’s original and extended remit made it inevitable that the company would recommend a HSR route straight through the Chilterns. We are confident that a more well founded and comprehensive strategic assessment of the nation’s future rail transportation needs, including HSR, would identify other feasible solutions with much wider benefits, without causing irreparable harm to the Chilterns.

May 2011

1 For example see EU definitions - http://www.uic.org/spip.php?article971 2 See Planning Policy Statement PPS7 para. 22 and related legislation 3 Analyses by HS2 Action Alliance and others. 4 For example –see para.23.7 of South East Plan 5 Developing a sustainable framework for UK aviation: Scoping document –DfT March 2011 6 Future of Air Transport White Paper 2003 7 The NAO report into Channel Tunnel 2005 – Found that passenger volumes and revenue forecasts were too optimistic. The Public Accounts Committee report on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 2005/06 – concluded that ‘Where future income from passengers is expected to provide a major element of the revenue needed to repay the cost of constructing transport infrastructure, it is crucial that realistic forecasts are prepared from the start. Downside risks need to be given due weight, drawing on both UK and international experience, in considering future projects.’ 8 Economic case for HS2 – Figure 4 p. 21 9 See - http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/government-launches-major-projects-authority 10 Mr. Sadiq Kahn – Hansard 11 March 2010 Column 458 11 HS2 Ltd remit. Sir David Rowlands letter to Lord Adonis 13 February 2009 and Lord Adonis’ reply of 9 March 2009 12 See, for example – The Right Lines Charter for High Speed Rail http://www.cpre.org.uk/what-we-do/transport/rail/update/item/1683-a-charter-for-high-speed-rail 13 ABERT Newsletter 25 April 2011 14 Developing a sustainable framework for UK aviation: Scoping document –DfT March 2011 – para.1.17 15 As admitted by HS2L staff/consultants at an HS2L Technical Seminar on 17 March 2011 16 Chiltern Society paper by Alison Doggett - http://www.chilternsociety.org.uk/hs2/paper01.php Written evidence from TravelWatch NorthWest (HSR 82)

TravelWatch NorthWest is an independent organisation representing all public transport users in NW England. We are pleased to give the following views on the questions raised by the Committee on High Speed Rail. A document setting out our Position Statement (Revised) on High Speed Rail is also attached.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR.

The majority of the TWNW Board is in favour of the principle of HSR in Britain. The main argument for HS2 is primarily an increase in capacity to meet growth beyond the capacity of the existing system. It will also bring economic benefits to the north. A high speed rail network provides fast and convenient city to city transport over distances of up to 500 miles. Deutsch Bahn have found HS rail a highly effective competitor to air on rail journeys of up to 4 hours and still competitive up to six hours due to the hassle factor of travel to and from the airport and potential problems at the airport.

The main arguments against are its very high cost and the environmental impacts along the route. A minority view from the TWNW Board is that ultra high speed lines of the type proposed have to be very straight and are therefore very unforgiving to the landscape and the communities they pass through in visual terms and in the noise they emit. They have to be serviced by trains which demand so much energy that their carbon footprint is at best neutral and at worst negative. And, in return for these downsides, the time saved would be marginal in a small county such as the UK, existing rail services would be seriously impaired and the benefits promised are questionable. It could well be the case that the only place which really benefit is London and having a slightly faster journey to it from Birmingham and Manchester merely encourages more people to live in those two cities but work in London

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

Inter-urban connectivity is important but the need to reduce the north-south divide and the need to combat climate change is also important. There is little point in spending large sums on the highway network. Additional road building takes up more space than rail, is more intrusive to nearby residences, raises air quality issues in the surrounding area, generates more unsustainable travel and currently is less environmentally friendly. It is also equally expensive and leaves cities with major problems in dealing with incoming cars. 2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

It is vitally important that concentration on the HS2 project does not deprive the existing route network of investment or continuing development. HS2 expenditure must be in addition to ongoing spending on rail. In addition the spin-off benefits of HS2 on other parts of the rail network must be fully exploited.

Investment in local rail based systems must continue and be expanded, including light rail in cities such as Leeds and Liverpool. HSR will not achieve its full potential if local connections are still slow, unreliable and infrequent.

Recent announcements by the government for further major rail investment in the classic network, including route electrification in the north west, seems to belie concerns about diversion of investment into a high speed project.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation?

Domestic aviation should be reduced or even eliminated because of its adverse environmental impacts and the need to reallocate airport capacity to longer haul flights, without the need to invest in new runways. HSR will assist that change.

3. Business case

3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (e.g. about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network?

Forecasts that the development and increasing use of information technology would reduce the demand for travel have not been borne out by the evidence in passenger numbers throughout the British rail system. Increasing congestion of roads and motorways, coupled with rapidly increasing fuel costs and a growing environmental awareness, have done, and will continue, to drive more passengers – and freight – onto the railways.

Recent figures show that even in the middle of a major economic downturn, passenger usage is up by 6.6% during the 12 months to March 2011. This figure is likely to rise further when the economy returns to normal and fuel costs increase for private cars.

It is noticeable that practically all UK line and station re-openings have exceeded the passenger numbers expected by government estimates. Note should also be taken of the anticipated increase in population in the UK and the attendant increased travel demands that will bring.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

Experience in the on-line upgrading of the West Coast route, the main works of which were extended at vast sum over a period of ten years up to 2007, is not one which users of the line would wish to see repeated with the extensive disruptions to services and unreliability they endured during that time. In any case most of the route is not suitable for further upgrading to HS engineering requirements.

It has cost approximately £10bn to increase the speed of the existing West Coast line to 125 mph. To increase its speed to 140 mph (the potential top speed of current stock) and increase the number of tracks to meet a necessary increase in capacity is likely to end up costing as much as HS2 without the High speed access to other UK and European cities which is the base case.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?

Pricing rail travel off the system to reduce demand (which is already happening on a significant scale) is bad for the economy, bad for global warming, bad for modal split and is likely to lead to more travel demand by road. Alternative modes are already at or near capacity.

There is little evidence that computer working has so far reduced the demand for travel in general. On the other hand, with increased free time, leisure travel is growing. It is noticeable that despite the depression passenger growth on many rural/tourist lines in the North West have shown continued growth. It is in Britain's economic interest to foster tourism from overseas which is also growing as other countries become more prosperous. Tourists tend to visit environmentally sensitive cities and rural areas and are thus best transported by rail. Many tourists prefer to use rail in view of the confusion caused by driving on the left.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

Projects that have been built on time and within budget should be compared with those that have not to define the features that are essential for success. We should learn from those who have done it, particularly the French, instead of trying to re-invent wheels.

4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

It is vitally important that major stations along the HS2 route, e.g. London, Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester, are all built in close proximity to existing stations to avoid the inconvenience and time penalty of changing with the classic network. To build any station on the outskirts of a city and then expect passengers to change onto a transport link will prove to be a disincentive to travel and will negate the attraction of an otherwise high speed journey.

For example, any terminus in Birmingham would need to be co-joined to New Street station. In London to terminate HS2 at a separate station from HS1 would make connections worse and discourage usage. Ideally a terminus with in-station pedestrian connection to HS1 and Euston would be preferable, with allowance for trains from the North to stop and continue their journeys to the continent without changes.

If HS train length is an issue with station location and design consideration could be given to double-deck trains which would obviate the need for very long platforms and hence stations by almost providing a full train capacity in just over half the length. However if HS trains are to travel onwards on the existing classic network (as they should following completion of stage 1) this would mean two fleets, unless major gauge enhancement work was carried out on appropriate parts of that classic network. This is a complex area to which the Committee should give careful examination.

Selective Park and Ride stations should be an integral part of HS2, whilst keeping the number of station stops as low as possible to avoid destroying the benefits of high speed (some 'skip stop' operation may be necessary). The criteria should be to minimise total journey time including access time and ensure maximum connectivity with other main line and local rail services

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice?

The Y configuration is basically the right choice, serving Manchester and Liverpool on the west and Sheffield and Leeds on the east. It is important that HS trains should continue beyond Birmingham and beyond the limits of subsequent stages (as on the Continent) to serve the NW, Yorkshire, the NE and Glasgow/Edinburgh. HS stations should be located in the regional centres with good interchange with existing rail networks rather than at regional airports. This will mean tunnelling in most cases.

To serve the East Midlands and to allow HS travel between provincial cities consideration could be given to extending the Y into a diamond shape with the left hand proceeding Birmingham - Manchester - Leeds and the right Nottingham – Leeds. 4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

We have always advocated that any HSR proposals are seen as logical parts of a much longer term strategy for the provision of a network of new lines to connect the various nations and regions of the UK with London and each other.

However the current proposals do not indicate how a high speed network would be extended to serve the further parts of northern England, Scotland or other regions of the UK. The lack of a longer-term and wider strategy could well lead to costly white elephants as has resulted with the concentration of HS1 services at St Pancras International leaving the expensive development of Waterloo station and its connections now abandoned after a life of little more than a decade. Questions needing to be answered now include that of whether Manchester should be served by a terminus station or a through station which would allow trains to proceed onwards to Scotland.

Admittedly, building the network in stages starting from London is probably the only practicable option but it is crucial that the network is planned and approved as whole system and built as a rolling programme, not separately funded and approved sections

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

The link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 is an important one for through travel to and from the continent. We originally felt that the case for linking the NW and Heathrow was limited but we recognize the need for major improvement in the connectivity between Heathrow and the North of England. The route as planned now is some distance from the Airport. If the Governments argument for HS2+ involves reduction of internal flights thus lessening the need for a third runway it is important that high speed rail transport to the Midlands, North and Scotland is provided at Heathrow at some stage.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide?

The only real evidence in the UK is the economic benefits of HS1 which are considered to be much greater than estimates. Similar evidence can probably be found from France and Spain and of course Japan.

Subsequent extension beyond Birmingham (which should be a through station) and construction of the diamond (above) would enable the introduction of a high speed rail service between these cities e.g. Birmingham - Manchester - Leeds - Newcastle which would do a lot to promote provincial growth 5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration?

Local and regional regeneration should be taken into account but not at the expense of the key criteria.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?

While the higher socio-economic groups may be expected to be the main beneficiaries, spin off benefits onto other rail routes will benefit a wide range of users and locations, some which are not anywhere near the actual HS route.

The HSR provision should not be seen as the ‘rich man’s railway’ by virtue of charging premium fares.

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

It will be extremely difficult to attract financial contributions from Local Authorities or businesses. Added land value taxes may be one avenue worth exploring but difficult to administer. Any possible EU funds including TEN-T should be fully investigated.

6. Impact

6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

The overall direct impact of HSR on carbon emissions may be small but the overall impact including all spin-off benefits should be substantial as it will encourage rail travel in place of car or air. Actual figures can only be determined by relevant studies.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

Environmental costs including noise should be fully accounted for in the business case, either as quantified or unquantified costs. A separate audit of the business case may be needed to ensure this requirement is met. The alternatives of further air and road travel growth are currently more likely to cause environmental and noise damage in excess of HS2. The latter also has options for varying power generation sources. 6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network?

By removing substantial passenger movements from the classic network it should be possible for some paths to be released for additional freight movements, with consequential environmental benefits. However this must be balanced with the provision of more frequent local train services using capacity released from removal of longer distance trains.

HS2 could also provide a suitable route for international freight movements. Tests are currently under way on HS1 with high speed freight trains. New locomotives and stock are not required for this as the existing container trains already run through to the continent via the tunnel and the class 92 locomotives can also work through to France.

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?

It is inevitable that there will be substantial disruption during construction but the fact that most of the route will be on new alignment should reduce the impacts of existing rail services to those locations where the two systems are adjacent, eg Euston and Birmingham International.

The environmental problems which have been highlighted will mainly be short term during the building of the line, and will be offset by the obvious difference between an electrified high speed railway and six lane plus motorway which would be the only alternative.

13th May 2011 WrittenevidencefromCraigTodd(HSR83)

ThankyouforyourSelectCommitteeinquiryintoHS2.Ihavesubmittedmypersonalfeedbackvia theOnlinePublicConsultationsiteandadditionallywishtosupplyyoumyalternativeviewtoHS2as detailedbelow.  WhileIagreewithmostofthereasonsforpeoplerejectingHS2,Ihavenotheardtoomanyradical alternativesuggestions.Iwishtoofferone.  ThemaindriverforHS2seemstobethecaseforbridgingtheeconomicdividebetweenLondonand northerncities(Birmingham,Manchesteretc.).WhileahighͲspeedrailnetworkconnectingthese northerncitiestoLondonappearslikeagoodideainprincipleͲitisunfortunatelyfundamentally flawedinmyopinion.  Ratherthaninvestingbillionsofpublicfunds(andintheprocessblightingthecountrysideand thousandsofhomes)surelyitwouldmakefarbettersensetousethismoneytoencourage Government/PublicOrganisationsandPrivateCompaniestorelocatetheirofficestonortherncities? ThishasalreadybeendemonstratedtobeasuccessinplacesliikeLeeds.Thebenefitstothissimple butseeminglyoverlookedplanarenumerous:  1.LesscommutersimpactingonanalreadyovercrowdedLondon. 2.Nomassiveinfrastructurecosts. 3.Nodamagetothecountrysideandwildlife. 4.Nodetrimentalnoise/visualimpacttothousandsofhouseholds. 5.Noexposuretotheriskofrisingcommodityprices(whichmusthavealreadysignificantlyinflated theprojectedcostofHS2). 6.NohugeenergycostsorCO2emissions. 7.Fullysustainable.  'Localjobsforlocalpeople'issurelymuchmoresensiblethanamultiͲbillionpoundHS2forCityͲto Citycommuters.Additionally,partofthesavingsofnotgoingaheadwithHS2couldbeusedinstead toinvestintheDigitalInfrastructureoftheUK(againencouraginglocalandhomeworking).  Ihopethatyouwillagreewithmyviews,andifyes,thattheycanbeaconstructivepartofanhonest appraisaloftheHS2proposal.

18thMarch2011  Written evidence from David Miles (HSR 84)

The Proposed Building of the HS2 railway

TheBusinessCaseforHS2

HS2 is not a sound investment. Commercially it loses money. It costs £25.5bn, but only generates £15bn of extra fares. So Government turn to cost benefit analysis (CBA) to justify the expenditure. The CBA claims its value for money (NBR of 2.7). But it’s based on heroic assumptions that underpin excessive demand and illusory benefits, with a flawed assessment of the alternatives to HS2. On demand: ƒ A huge increase in rail demand, some 267% - over 3½ times more than now. DfT both ignore the evidence of demand saturation for domestic travel generally and that the engine for rail growth is modal substitution. ƒ DfT’s underlying model assumes a relationship with GDP that no longer exists (and not just in the UK) ƒ DfT use out of date data that inflates forecast demand, ignoring recent analysis that give lower growth factors ƒ Projected demand takes no account of new technology or Government’s own initiative to reduce travel ƒ Domestic air travel is overestimated given the trends, inflating air modal shift numbers (and carbon impacts) ƒ Car occupancy assumptions are too low which overestimates potential gains from cars ƒ Despite obvious uncertainty only a single case for demand is presented, instead of a range of scenarios ƒ The effects of competition (from classic rail) are assumed away despite the devastating consequences of inadequately anticipated competition for HS1, and Channel Tunnel.

On benefits: ƒ Biggest benefit wrongly assumes businessmen don’t work on trains -so 30mins saved adds 30m productive time ƒ Using 10 year old data assumes top draw earnings for rail business travellers (£70k/a in current money) unadjusted for a nearly fivefold increase in journeys by 2033. HS2 represents a regressive subsidy ƒ The £5bn overcrowding benefits depend on implausible levels of crowding if HS2 does not happen

On alternatives: ƒ HS2 is assessed against a ‘do minimum’ scenario that is an unrealistic alternative as it can not accommodate forecast demand (because it takes no account of overcrowding and its effect on choking demand growth) ƒ DfT’s own alternative (Rail Package 2) is ignored despite meeting demand with less crowding than HS2, being cheaper (£2bn), better VfM (NBR 3.63), and delivering benefits incrementally, unreliant on long term forecasts ƒ DfT justify rejecting RP2 on the basis it does not provide the surplus capacity that HS2 provides ƒ 65% more capacity can be created on WCML with more rolling stock and hence without material disruption

On the recently claimed transformational benefits (to redress the north/south divide): ƒ Wider economic impacts are already assessed in the business case, at just £3.6bn - only 11% of HS2 benefits ƒ Any additional economic growth from faster connectivity assessed by Imperial College is small (£8/10m/a) ƒ The redistributive effects will benefit London, UK’s dominant city, not the regions. DfT assume trips to London grow at twice the rate as those from London, and with 70% leisure travellers the result is obvious ƒ HS2 Ltd say biggest regeneration opportunity is Old Oak Common (not outside the M25, or even the N Circular) ƒ Respected experts say there is no evidence base to support such claimed benefits (Overman, Tomaney)

All this ill befits a government overseeing spending cuts of unprecedented severity. To solve rail capacity issues does not require a new £30bn+ railway. Instead of spending £0.75bn this parliament on planning for HS2 it could have a complete but unglamorous solution for £2bn.

1 Government first focused on HS2 as part of the low carbon economy (although even HS2 Ltd says it is ‘broadly carbon neutral’); then the spotlight moved to its business case (but increasingly found it holed below the water line); it appealed to catching up with our EU partners (but little has changed since Eddington, we still have faster connections between our key centres); most recently it is economic transformation and breathing economic life north of the M25. But moving the goalposts is a poor smokescreen to cover an ailing business case, failing to disguise that HS2 is a terminally anaemic white elephant.

These cost figures do not include the cost of blight compensation, compulsory purchase, new rolling stock and the development of a new generation of engines and rolling stock!!!! There has been no cost calculation for the additional electricity generation required or where these capital assets will be located. As one living close to the proposed route I am also concerned that compensation for “loss” will be restricted to property value and not even go near to quality of life or disruption during construction. The Secretary of State for Transport has said that compensation payments will be better than ever before, but has not published what these will be.

How can an economic argument be put forward in favour of HS2 when so many questions remain not only unanswered but also un-costed.

Such a huge financial commitment needs to be based on a certainty that it will provide national benefits and that those funds cannot be used better in other ways. Parliament needs to satisfy itself that HS2 will lead to significant economic activity in excess of its costs and that it will provide environmental benefits including dramatically reduced emissions of greenhouse gases. How it can do this with no stations en route is to say the least baffling.

A new high speed network would bleed the rest of the railway of money and care. What travellers want are boring unglamorous improvements to the services we actually use. This can be better accomplished with greater access to “all” the population by improving the existing corridors. x HS1 network has already been shown to only be worth 60% of its costs. The rolling stock and train length levels have been cut and new trains cancelled as a result of inadequate demand. This on a line that DOES have stations. x No weight is given to the importance of IT, which will result in a dramatic decline in the need to travel for both business and social purposes. x HS2 Ltd has assumed that time on a train is wasted and therefore there is a monetary value assigned to time saved for all travellers. In reality most travellers make good use of time of a train especially for business purposes - it is not wasted. x The value assigned to that time saved is exaggerated by HS2 Ltd and is equivalent to the average business traveller earning £70,000 per annum in today’s prices. This is clearly an overestimate of 150%! Research has shown that passengers want reliability and value for money much more than high speed. x Faster journey times will only lead to people staying in bed longer in the mornings, not getting to work earlier, so no economic benefit there. x Traffic and volume can be increased in existing corridors at seriously less cost, with the advantage of stations en route. These alternatives are of so much more benefit to the whole country but HS2Ltd ignores these economic issues as it has only one remit, therefore it can only be biased x Using existing corridors will also significantly reduce the impact of the incredible noise levels projected for these trains. The HS2 Ltd noise survey has only been modelled using both the time trains are passing and when they are not so that it can demonstrate “acceptable” levels. This is nothing less than a “swindle” and you as a leader of this country cannot be seen as part of this. There is political expedient and there are down right lies!

2 x HS2 Ltd believes that an additional 135,000 passengers per day will use the line (existing usage of the West Coast Main Line is 45,000 per day) just because it exists. This is not sustainable argument and is wholly unproven, especially in an era when energy saving should be an every day habit.

Is High Speed Rail Environmentally Friendly? x According to HS2 Ltd, HS2 will not reduce overall carbon emissions and will be carbon neutral at best. Even assuming there will be an increase in renewable energy production this will not create the low carbon economy claimed. It is much more likely to generate a net increase in carbon dioxide emissions. x The number of passengers switching from planes to HS2, according to HS2 Ltd will only be 3.5 million per annum - less than 7% of all passengers using HS2 and less than 5% of all passengers using Heathrow. There is evidence that domestic flights to London have been in decline for several years. Therefore the “green” argument for masses of travellers switching to train is nonsense. x The modal shift from cars and planes to trains will be small. Fewer than 2% of those driving on the motorways between Birmingham and London will switch to HS2. So what and who is this railway for? x HS2 Ltd. assumes a worst case scenario for aviation emissions, when the CAA expects aviation emissions to show a significant improvement by 2030. If domestic flights are displaced by long haul flights HS2 will have triggered an increase in aviation emissions. This is a blatant attempt to load the dice in favour of a dream and the earning of the major contractors who will be involved. x The carbon emissions generated by the construction of the line are significantly underestimated - the quantities of concrete, steel and stone required by HS2 will be colossal. So when will these emission be offset, 100 years? x The energy used by high speed trains will be at least double that of existing inter city electric trains. If HS2 reaches speeds of up to 400 kph they may use more than 4 times the energy. Where is this coming from? x HS2 Ltd believes the demand for through trains to the continent from north of Birmingham will be very low. This is consistent with the low numbers using the Eurostar services, which have stagnated. It will not significantly reduce the demand for short haul flights to the continent. According to the rail industry itself any journey taking more than three and a half hours is more likely to be taken by plane than train. So where is the economic argument in favour here/ x The countryside will be permanently damaged all along the line including the nationally protected Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. It calls into question why these areas are given a special status if they can be so badly damaged by the government. How will the economic “benefit” be attached here/.

Just in case you need reminding. There will be 14 – 18 trains per hour in each direction (28 – 36 trains in total). Operating hours for line are 5am – midnight. Maintenance overnight. Noise levels will be 95 decibels at 25 metres (Health & Safety requirement to wear ear defenders at 85 db.) Trains will run at up to 360km/h (225 mph) with ultimate speed planned of 400km/h. Trains will be 400m long. Therefore noise will just about be continuous. How to you place an economic value to this?

HS2 is a delusionary dream with no real economic benefits. Politicians are not supposed to be dreamers.

21ST March 2011

3 Written evidence from Ian Waddell (HSR 85)

1. Introduction

1.1 Very ambitious claims are being made by proponents of HS2 in terms of its predicted impact on regional and local economies. These may perhaps best be summarised in the assertion that it will play a key role in ‘bridging the North – South divide’.

1.2 It is clearly extremely important that the TSC examines carefully the nature of the evidence behind these claims in order to assess their validity.

1.3 In order to assist the Committee in this process my paper:

(i) Firstly summarises key evidence based on my analysis of INSEE statistics in relation to the French experience (France being the first European country to invest in high speed rail)

(ii) Secondly critically reviews the evidence being offered in support of the regeneration impact of HS2 in the West Midlands (a region with which I am extremely familiar)

(iii) Thirdly briefly relates these findings to the outcomes of a range of other independent national and international studies on the wider economic impacts of high speed rail.

2. Has the French TGV network had a significant impact on the economic fortunes of those cities and regions which it serves?

2.1 The primary TGV network was completed nearly thirty years ago. Consequently if high speed rail investment is indeed a significant factor in reducing local and regional growth economic disparities, then some evidence of this should be apparent by examining trends in relative economic well being of French regions, departments and cities served by the TGV.

2.2 In this context the proponents of HS2 frequently cite the examples of Lille and Lyon: When examining the case of Lille it is firstly crucial to remember that it is located at the cross roads of the European high speed rail network. It therefore enjoys levels of HSR accessibility and frequency of service, significantly in excess of what might be expected for, say, Birmingham, Manchester of Leeds.

2.3 Leading transport expert Roger Vickerman of Kent University observes: “…. the biggest gains in accessibility accrue to the major access points to the network. These are first, the major metropolitan areas such as London or Paris, and secondly major interchange points, such as Lille or Lyon.”

2.4 Lille has certainly seen a significant growth in jobs particularly as a result of the large EuroLille development. But to what extent are these genuinely new jobs and how far has investment which would have taken place anyway been diverted from other parts of the Lille Conurbation, local Nord Department or the wider Region?

2.5 If these are mostly genuinely new jobs then one would expect to see an impact in terms of a reduction in the persistently high levels of poverty and unemployment in the Lille conurbation, Nord Department and Nord Pas de Calais region.

2.6 Evidence (from the French National Institute of Statistics - INSEE) shows that this has not occurred:

2.7 Between 1999 and 2009 the rate of unemployment in the Lille conurbation1 has actually increased, both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of France

2.8 The same applies to the Nord Department and the Nord Pas de Calais Region within which Lille is located. Unemployment in the Nord Department has increased since the arrival of the TGV in the early 1980s (from an average of 10.7% 1982-6 to 11.9% 2006-10), resulting in a further widening of disparities when compared to the rest of France2.

1 The INSEE website provides localised trend data for ‘Zones d’Emploi’ for the period 1999-2010 (Q2), the metropolitan area of Lille is defined by INSEE as comprising the two Zones d’Emploi of Lille and Roubaix-Tourcoing . Both show an adverse trend in unemployment rates over this period – taking the average rates for the first and last 4 quarters of the period unemployment in Roubaix-T went up from 13.2 to 14.7 % and in Lille from 10.7 to 11.1%. 2 Taking INSEE figures for Q4 of 2009 and the first three quarters of 2010 (the latest currently available) and the equivalent quarters for 1982/83 the unemployment rate in the Nord Departrnent has increased by 3.9%, and the Nord pas de Calais Region by 3.3%. Over the same period the unemployment rate in metropolitan France increased by 2.3%. 2.9 Turning to the case of Lyon, this is an area which has traditionally been amongst more prosperous parts of France. It has not suffered the depredations of the decline of traditional industries on anything like the same scale as the North East of France.

2.10 Nevertheless, if claims for the wider regenerative benefits of the TGV are to be believed, some further decline in absolute and relative levels of unemployment might be expected for the Rhone Department, over 75% of the population of which live within the Lyon area.

2.11 In fact the reverse is true: unemployment in the Rhone department has increased by nearly 1.5% since the arrival of the TGV (from an average of 6.3% 1982-6 to 7.8% 2006-10). It has also increased in relative terms compared to France as a whole by 1.24% over the same period.

2.12 The picture for the region of Rhone Alps within which Lyon is located is similar: its prosperity relative to the rest of France measured in terms of unemployment rates has actually declined since the arrival of the TGV in the early 1980s3.

2.13 In conclusion therefore there appears very little evidence that investment in high speed rail in France has had any significant impact in reducing regional and local economic disparities based on the most obvious yardstick – unemployment. Over a period of nearly thirty years since TGV services started running, there has clearly been no “transformational” effect, in fact the evidence shows that disparities appear to have worsened.

3. A critical review of evidence being offered in support of the regeneration impact of HS2 in the West Midlands

3.1 A number of ambitious claims have been made for the job creation and wider regeneration benefits of HS2 on the economy of the West Midlands. Most notably they are contained in a document:

“High Speed Rail and supporting investments in the West Midlands - consequences for employment and economic growth”

KPMG/CENTRO June 2010

3 INSEE figures based on an average for the 4 quarters of 1982 and 2010 show an increase in the unemployment rate for the Rhone Alps region of 2.8% compared to an increase of 2.4% for metropolitan France. 3.2 The document purports to be an independent analysis, however CENTRO (the West Midlands PTE) have been active proponents of HS2 since well before its publication and KPMG had previously been commissioned by pressure group Greenguage 21 to produce similar material nationally.

3.3 To do the report justice, headline figures such as 22,000 new jobs for the region from HS2 have been widely quoted in an unqualified manner and totally out of the context of the report, which contains many significant caveats.

3.4 A close examination of this report and its methodology reveals that, even if the report’s own conclusions are accepted uncritically, then it implies:

i) the figure of 22,000 jobs is based upon a huge investment in local transport in addition to HS2, without this investment the report admits the jobs created would reduce to 10,000. Any “fare premium” required for HS2 over other rail services would further significantly reduce the jobs created – the report examines the impact of a 30% fare premium, concluding that jobs created would be further reduce to around 5000.

(at an estimated cost of £17bn for phase 1 of HS2 this would give a cost per job created of £340,00 compared to the DfT VFM guideline of £27,000 per job.)

2) In terms of the distributional impacts of HS2, the report admits that employment in Birmingham and Solihull will increase at the expense of employment elsewhere in the region:

“The benefits are concentrated in central Birmingham and around the new Birmingham International HS station.”

(Para 6.1 of the report page 38)

3.5 In terms of connections with Europe, the report admits the benefits to Birmingham are, in the final analysis, marginal, modelling links with just one European city they the report concludes:

“With the introduction of a direct high speed rail service, Paris could become some six times more important as contributor to Birmingham’s effective business to business market. However, it begins from a very low base and remains far enough away to form only a very small part of Birmingham’s effective business to business market, even with a high speed rail link.”

3.6 The methodology itself is based upon a highly academic analysis of projected connectivity improvements which is in turn based upon highly tenuous base data. In summary key weaknesses are:

ƒ no account taken of jobs attracted away from the region as (particularly business and financial sector enterprises) are enabled by HS2 to service their WM region clients from London ƒ no account taken of the fact that time spent on trains can be productive ƒ no account taken of the future impact of IT developments on the need to travel/business efficiency ƒ the report bases its benefit calculations on assessments of productivity increases based upon a (highly dubious) assumption that relative wage levels can be used as a proxy for this. However it fails to identify appropriate local data sources, admitting:

“It has not been possible to source data for productivity that is more disaggregate than district level. This has weakened the analysis of productivity impacts using local data. Model results are therefore not based on relationships derived from local data but on composite assumptions drawing on findings from other studies.”

3.7 In conclusion the report’s findings cannot in any way be relied upon to provide trustworthy evidence of positive regeneration impacts. Where it is in tune with other studies however is that it supports the view that high speed rail will have significant re distributional impacts – resulting in jobs and investment moving to areas in close proximity to projected stations from other (already less prosperous) parts of the region.

4. How the above findings relate to the outcomes of a range of other independent national and international studies on the wider economic impacts of high speed rail.

4.1 The above analyses (of unemployment impacts in France and of the probable redistributional impact of HS2 on jobs and investment in the West Midlands region) fit well with the vast body of independent research on the wider impacts of high speed rail key aspects of which are highlighted below. 4.2 This research shows that there is no evidence of any dramatic transformational effect on regional and local economies as a result of high speed rail. To the extent that there is a provable impact, it is in influencing the distributional patterns of jobs and investment:

ƒ from less prosperous to more prosperous regions ƒ from more peripheral (and often less prosperous ) parts of regions to those areas in close proximity to the few HSR stations (often already the more prosperous areas).

4.3 Professor Henry Overmann of the LSE in giving evidence to the TSC (19 October 2010) stated:

“ …..broadly speaking, the evidence that High Speed 2 will lead to a reduction in disparity is pretty limited”.

4.4 This view was echoed by Professor John Tomaney of Newcastle University

“….. the evidence that HS2 will have a positive impact on rebalancing the national economy, to use the current jargon, is not really there. I think the international evidence suggests that, where you make these big investments in this kind of infrastructure- particularly high speed train networks-as important to the investment in the infrastructure itself is investment in the conditions of the nodes around the lines that stimulate economic benefit and economic development. There is some evidence from European high speed train systems, and from Asian high speed train systems, that this is a critical ingredient, and in the debates around HS2 I haven’t really seen that discussed.”

4.5 In the case of the KMPG/Centro work discussed above, investment in a package of local transport improvements is shown to be equally, if not more effective in creating local jobs than the investment in HS2 and offers far higher VFM ratio in terms of jobs created.

4.6 At a broader level an OECD report4 evaluating the impact of transport infrastructure investment on regional development concluded: “…. there is a lack of information derived from ex-post studies which could provide a firm, quantitative basis for claims about the

4 Impact of Transport Infrastructure Investment on Regional Development OECD 2002 impact of infrastructure investment on regional economies and regeneration.”

4.7 Lastly, as exemplified by the following extracts, there is a strong body of independent European research shows that a connection to high speed rail may actually disadvantage poorer regions:

“….for regions and cities whose economic conditions compare unfavourably with those of their neighbours, a connection to the HST line may even result in economic activities being drained away and an overall negative impact (Givoni, 2006; Van den Berg and Pol 1998;Thompson 1995).

“Medium size cities may well be the ones to suffer most from the economic attraction of the more dynamic, bigger cities “ High-Speed Rail: Lessons for Policy Makers from Experiences Abroad” - Daniel Albalate and Germà Bel GiM-IREA Universitat de Barcelona 2010

“Roads and rail tracks can be used to travel both ways. A better connection between two regions with different development levels not only gives firms in a less developed region better access to the inputs and markets of more developed regions. It also makes it easier for firms in richer regions to supply poorer regions at a distance, and can thus harm the industrialisation prospects of less developed areas.” - The Economic effects of High Speed Rail Investment Ginés de Rus, University of Las Palmas 2008

16 May 2011 Written evidence from Leslie Fawcett (HSR 86)

Summary. 1. Thankyou for the opportunity to comment on HS2. 2. A new railway will almost certainly be needed but the current HS2 plan is fatally flawed. 3. Please press the government to commission an independent review of HS2 by professionals not tied to DfT or HS2 Ltd, as part of a national transport plan. 4. The plan does nothing towards the legally committed 80% reduction in CO2 emissions, while a sensible route at a sensible speed could make a major contribution befitting the largest rail scheme in the UK for over a century.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR. It is most likely that we will need new rail tracks northwards from London to carry the number of people wanting to travel and the government is right to plan for it. The forecast passenger numbers are only forecasts and they may turn out to be wrong. A flexible policy is needed to respond to demand as the picture becomes clearer. This can be achieved by incremental development of the network, not by an all-or-nothing segregated railway that will take 10 years of construction before it is any use at all, and will then be found to be not what the nation actually needs.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? Rail is the correct means of achieving the extra capacity for long-distance passengers and freight that will be needed in the future for an increasing population, consistent with the commitment in the Climate Change Act to reduce our CO2 emissions by 80%. Road will remain the principal mode of UK transport. Rail developments can reverse the long- term increase in road usage, especially for long distance journeys, thus obviating large-scale expenditure on trunk road and motorway works. Since it is widely accepted that we cannot build our way out of road congestion, rail is the answer. A shortcoming of the HS2 plan is that it deals only with one corridor. A national rail plan is needed incorporating HS lines where appropriate. For local journeys, light rail and bus should be developed together with further discouragement of car use. This will reduce congestion and carbon emissions while allowing economic development in a growing population.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? The rate of spend on HS2 will be similar to the current spend on Crossrail and Thameslink, while other rail works continue. Consequently there is no reason why development of the classic network should not progress concurrent with HS2. Demand is likely to increase on all rail corridors so the HS2 plan should be part of a national rail plan considering all needs.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? Demand for long-distance air transport is likely to rise despite rising fuel price. Airport space can be released by replacing internal and near-continent air travel with HS rail travel. This will give slots for more long haul flights by larger aeroplanes, without new runways. International agreement is needed to subject air travel to the same realities as surface travel, e.g. VAT and fuel taxation. Passengers going to Heathrow will be a very small proportion of those using HS2, so access to Heathrow must not be allowed to dominate the HS2 plan.

3. Business case

3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network? The forecasts put forward by HS2 Ltd are symptomatic of someone striving to prove a weak case. Whilst it is true that Treasury approval will not be given unless there is a business case, the case should be made for HS2 to Manchester and Leeds rather than for the expensive first phase out of London. Forecasts can be wrong, therefore we should develop a range of plans in parallel. We have 5 years before construction is due to start and can reassess our plan during that time. This is more realistic than a gung-ho pursuit of a very expensive segregated HS2 that is not what the nation needs. Scheme costs are unreliable. For example, a blanket figure has been allowed for diversion of statutory services, whilst "stats" can form over half the cost of urban schemes. Records of underground services are available from all the "stats". Costs should be calculated from the actual work needed rather than a blanket figure. The unreasonable charges made by stats as monopolies should be challenged, but this is a matter outside this study. It is a reason for UK construction costs being higher than those in similar economies. The transport planning profession have calculated the value of time on a train as lost time, and have only recently acknowledged that time is not all lost time because passengers work on trains. Philip Hammond recently announced that the NATA transport tool will be replaced by a new tool giving more emphasis on carbon emissions. Application of this to HS2 will lead to some of the basic flawed decisions being challenged, e.g. 400km/h and DfT infatuation with Old Oak Common, the source of the disastrous choice of route. The HS2 plan should be specific about its effect on classic services. The theory of HS2 releasing capacity on classic tracks is valid where trains are removed from towns where they currently pass without stopping, but is detrimental to towns where services stop now and would be taken away. The aspirations of bodies such as Centro and Greengauge 21 for a considerable increase in classic services consequent to the opening of HS2, are not backed up by any responsibility to provide those services, and in some cases there are not the available paths for them without additional works that are not proposed within HS2. That is why a national rail plan is needed rather than one for HS2 in isolation.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? Alternatives to HS2 have been developed and costed. Whether they would provide sufficient capacity depends on the passenger numbers. Forecast numbers may prove to be wrong. The government is right to progress the HS2 plan, indeed it would be irresponsible to neglect it in the face of the forecast demand. The answer to the uncertainty is to progress the alternatives in parallel. We have 5 years before construction is due to start. In that time we can reassess our needs and have more confidence in the likely demand before committing to construction. The government should take a neutral stance in the debate rather than spending public funds promoting HS2 to a sceptical public. Most important of all is for the government to commission an independent review of HS2 which would either reassure the public that the right decisions have been made, or more likely to reveal that the plan is fatally flawed and needs to be reconsidered.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? Price is a valid tool in a purely commercial venture but rail is a public service highly dependent on public funds. Fares are already labyrinthine with widespread anomalies and unfairness. Managing demand by price would increase the unfairness, and perhaps more importantly if there is insufficient capacity we will reap the economic consequence. Pricing is valid as a temporary measure, if only to raise the funds for a better railway, but is no substitute in the long term for providing the capacity needed.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? Experience shows that when risk is offloaded by employers onto contractors, prices rise, claims rise and delayed completion is more likely. This often happens where there is insufficient time to complete design work before inviting tenders, and when the employer has insufficient expertise to do the detail design. The remedy is to design the project in detail before asking contractors to price the work. Incremental development allows continuous smooth demand for expertise and construction industry output, and allows the first section completed to be used while construction of later phases continues. This is better than waiting 10 years to see if it all works.

4. The strategic route

4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? The plan for HS2 is defective, perhaps because the brief was wrong. If the design team had been asked what transport provision the nation needed, they may have come up with a different plan from the one making a beeline from London to Birmingham. Euston is the right choice for a London terminus because it is the only place with sufficient space. Old Oak Common is ideal as an interchange for various services including those running off HS2 en route to Heathrow, but there is no justification for diverting HS2 miles off its natural course northward from Euston, very expensively in tunnel, wasting time by stopping at OOC, then having to exit London via the Chilterns AONB in yet more tunnel which is only likely to get longer to placate protestors. (Tunnels form 25% of the construction cost of HS2, stations another 25%). Commentators have agonised over whether HS2 should go through Heathrow. It should not, nor should it go near Heathrow on the vague notion that it would allow easy access to Heathrow. There is no need for a change of train to go to Heathrow if trains run from various cities via HS2 to north London then directly to the various Heathrow stations via N London line and OOC. The proposed station near Birmingham is the worst example of an out-of-town parkway sucking in thousands of cars on roads already congested, then needing another journey to reach NEC/B'ham airport. There is no need for it when there is International station in exactly the right place, with space for more platforms and car parks if needed, and already rail connected to most of the country. Fazeley St is the best compromise for a station in central Birmingham. It is unfortunate that it also called Curzon St because this leads people to believe it would be at the original station some distance from New St and Moor St stations. Terminus stations need travelators to reduce the walk distance. Travelators (or at least a shuttle bus) are also needed to integrate the new station with New St station. Moor St station should be integrated with Fazeley St to form one interchange station. The space above WCML should be bridged over to provide pedestrian, bus and taxi space between the old and new parts of the station.

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? All communities along the route should benefit, not by having a HS line to each of them but by having UK gauge trains running off HS2 to existing city centre stations. This needs HS2 to be integrated with the existing network to link cities rather than being a stand-alone showpiece railway that links just a few of them to London. It will need 4 tracks to do it. HS2 have proposed this then forgotten about it in their detail plans, and they have admitted that a second route north would be needed eventually. We must get it right first time. A Y-plan would be acceptable if it could achieve those principles, but it will not. A spine and spur route east of the Pennines will connect more cities with less route miles on easier terrain at less cost and with less carbon emissions in construction and in use.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? Yes, it is inevitable that the project will develop within the limits of cash flow and construction industry capacity. A basic error in the HS2 plan is that the London-Bham section is proposed to take 10 years and £17bn before it is of any use whatsoever. If passenger numbers increase as forecast, that will be too late. If instead HS2 is linked to WCML near Rugby, it will come into use earlier and cheaper while construction progresses onward. This alignment along M1 allows early connection to MML at Leicester and eventual connection to ECML, thus serving all communities north of London.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? I can't evaluate the relative merits. Both links are needed, but they do not have to be HS rail links. It may be helpful to say that Heathrow needs better rail access from all directions, but HS2 is not the vehicle for it given that only about 2% of HS2 passengers will want to go to Hrow. The proposed single track connection between HS1 and HS2 is likely to be regretted in the future. Double tracks are needed.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? There is no doubt that an HS station will attract development around it (as at Lille in France) but the effect will be local and development may not be desirable there, e.g. at the Bickenhill WM interchange which would be in the green belt. Benefits around the station will be counterbalanced by disbenefits to communities remote from the station. Network Rail's 2009 New Lines Study evaluated the benefits to each city served. Not surprisingly they were proportional to the size of the city. This means that the north-south divide would be exacerbated by HS2 rather than relieved, not only by favouring the largest cities but also blighting the communities bypassed by a poorly-designed HS2. The way to avoid that problem is to design the route of HS2 so it is not London-centric and to make sure all communities are included.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? HS2 should take into account planned developments rather just trying to serve communities as they are. It would be a mistake to skew the network as a means of social engineering, hoping economic generation will follow HS2 in areas with deep economic problems.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? Locations that will benefit are those near the stations. Claims that benefits will spread from cities with stations to cities without them are somewhat optimistic when the clear indication is that communities not served will be blighted. Wolverhampton, Sandwell, Dudley, Walsall, Stoke on Trent, Coventry and Leicester, would all be disadvantaged by the current plan, whilst an alternarive plan integrated into the existing network could be benefit all of them and be of so much more use to the nation as a whole. Users of HS2 are likely to be mainly the higher echelons of society. This is true of the existing railway and is likely to be more prevalent with a premium cost service. Classic services are likely to suffer as those prepared to pay the higher fares are creamed off by HS2. Classic services will have less passengers when HS2 runs parallel, the remaining passengers will be more price-conscious, so services will need more subsidy or will be withdrawn.

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? The gov'ment should seek EU funding and it is surprising they have not already done so in view of the large sums already spent. Making local authorities and businesses contribute to the cost would no doubt dampen their enthusiasm. It has only been worthwhile for local authorities and businesses to lobby for HS2 on the assumption they would get an advantage over others without having to pay for it. There is no perfect formula, but the government could propose one on the French TGV model where the state gives the largest contribution, the region gives some (TfL and Centro or the successor to AWM), businesses pay an enhanced business rate and the local authority gives a smaller amount. It would be interesting to see local reaction to such a proposal. The clamour by various cities to be served by HS2 is perhaps more to do with them terrified of the indignity of being left out than any confidence in HS2 being of real benefit to them.

6. Impact

6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? HS2 Ltd tell us that carbon emissions will barely change due to HS2 (+0.3% to -0.3%). That is not acceptable for the biggest transport scheme for over a century when we are committed by the Climate Change Act to reduce our emissions by 80%. If HS2 cannot contribute, what can? The major source of transport emissions is road. That is because road is the dominant form of transport. It is therefore essential for any rail scheme to enable a reduction in road use. Rail is nominally more green than other forms of transport, but the situation reverses when a full car or coach is compared with an empty or poorly-loaded train. The way to ensure trains are well loaded (especially if they have 1100 seats as proposed) is to run them along a series of cities. A spine and spur arrangement achieves this, whilst a fan of tracks radiating from London does not. The design speed of 400km/h involves more construction cost and environmental damage than is necessary. Energy use increases exponentially with speed. No rail service in the world runs at 400km/h. HS2 Ltd describe this as future-proofing. Their plan cannot be future-proof when they say that a second HS route will be needed northwards from London for the passengers not served by HS2. It is clear that there will not be a case for a second HS2 after the first has creamed off most of the flow. We must get it right first time. The way to do that is to route HS2 directly north from London along the M1 corridor and to link it with WCML, MML and ECML to relieve the congestion on all those routes that will be congested by the time HS2 is open.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? It is not possible to accurately evaluate noise, visual intrusion, division of communities and disruption during construction, in money terms. The relative values can only be a judgement. It is the lack of such judgement that has lead to the insensitive current HS2 plan.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network? Any new rail tracks are bound to yield spare paths for freight. Whether the railfreight industry uses them is subject to commercial judgement. Part of the national rail plan I am asking for is enhanced freight facilities subsequent to the opening of HS2.

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? Rebuilding of Euston is necessary and must involve some disruption. This can be minimised by working through the station gradually, taking 2 platforms out of use at a time, as in the rebuilding of New St. There is no need to expand the footprint of Euston or to demolish 5 blocks of flats. 400m platforms can be built within the current area, 2 new platforms can be added in place of a lorry ramp, some local services can be diverted to Old Oak Common. Pedestrian travelators are needed for 400m platforms as it is unreasonable to expect passengers to walk that far. Combined with escalators and a new pedestrian deck above the platforms, this gives more pedestrian area within the same footprint and the opportunity to separate conflicting pedestrian flows. Stations form 25% of the construction cost of HS2 and rebuilding of Euston is planned to take all of the HS2 construction period. There is scope for large cost savings at Euston and OOC, and earlier completion.

May 2011

Written evidence from English Heritage (HSR 87)

Introduction and summary 1. English Heritage is the UK Government’s statutory adviser and a statutory consultee on all aspects of the historic environment and its heritage assets. This includes archaeology on land and under water, historic buildings sites and areas, designated landscapes and the historic elements of the wider landscape. This memorandum of evidence focuses on question 6.2 in the call for evidence: Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

2. English Heritage is considering closely the details set out in the Government’s consultation on high speed rail and associated Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS). We are investigating which historic places will be affected by the proposed route, and evaluating the nature of that impact. In doing this we will consider both demolitions and effects on the setting of important heritage, such as listed buildings and scheduled monuments. It is not English Heritage’s role to take a position on whether the line should go ahead or not.

3. In summary, English Heritage believes that without additional work to identify those historic assets outside the 350m buffer zone where the setting will be adversely affected and, ideally, on the currently unknown sites of archaeological interest within the corridor, the full extent to which the stated sustainability objective for cultural heritage is met by this route option cannot be properly judged.

Impacts 4. The Appraisal of Sustainability sets out the impacts upon designated assets and evaluates whether they are supportive of the objective to “preserve and protect archaeological assets/historic buildings/historic landscapes”. No grade I or II* listed buildings are directly impacted (i.e. within the anticipated land take for construction). Two scheduled monuments, three grade II* registered parks and gardens and fifteen grade II listed buildings are directly impacted. Two grade II* listed buildings would be close to the construction, which would need to be carefully managed to minimise potential impact.

5. The appraisal also considers a 350m buffer either side of the line. This includes 11 grade I and grade II* listed buildings and 274 grade II listed buildings. No assessment is given of the scale of the impact upon the setting of these assets. The desktop nature of the exercise means that no consideration been given to whether, given the changing landscape features, 350m is a sufficient buffer for all the route. Some important assets well beyond 350m will be impacted in some way (e.g. their setting) by the new line.

Assessment of impacts 6. The AoS appropriately considers that the impacts on the GII* registered parks and gardens are highly unsupportive of the heritage objective. However, the direct impacts on two scheduled monuments (Grim’s Ditch in the Chilterns and a Roman villa site in the vicinity of Edgcote), likely to result in substantial harm, have been appraised as a lower level of impact. The loss of such nationally significant monuments ought to be appraised as a significant impact. The AoS also erroneously categorises Grade II buildings as regionally important: as a national designation, this is inaccurate and must be changed.

7. It should be noted that there may be as yet unrecognised nationally important archaeological assets that would suffer substantial harm. Although these cannot be appraised at this stage, their possibility means that the existing impact assessment is only partial.

8. We are also aware of the significant impact on landscape, including the historic landscape. We are engaged with the lead government agency on landscape issues, Natural England, and we anticipate that they will respond fully on this matter.

Mitigation and offsetting of impacts 9. English Heritage will continue to work with HS2 to minimise impacts where possible. However, the scope to do this will be limited owing to engineering constraints. While working with HS2 to minimise any impacts, we will also seek to mitigate them where unavoidable. This may include the use of good design to minimise landscape impacts, and archaeological and building investigation and recording. Where impacts are substantial and unavoidable, the opportunity to offset the harm through enhancements elsewhere will be identified, as was the case at Cobham Hall in Kent for High Speed One. In line with the Government’s objectives, English Heritage will advise that opportunities are taken to capture evidence from the historic environment and to make it publicly available, particularly where a heritage asset is to be lost. This process should be informed by an innovative and coordinated approach to maximise the benefit to the body of knowledge.

Representation of the heritage sector 10. This memorandum does not aim to reflect the views of other organisations within the heritage sector. We expect that HS2, if appropriate, will liaise with those organisations separately.

May 2011

Written evidence from Greengauge21 (HSR 88)

Introduction

1. Greengauge 21 is an independent not-for-profit company which carries out research and planning on high-speed rail (HSR) in Britain. Greengauge 21 has no vested interest in High Speed Two and is not seeking to be part of any direct beneficiary (construction company, operating company etc.). The company seeks to act in the national and the public interest, by carrying out research and bringing forward evidence so that a full and open debate on high-speed rail can take place.

2. Since 2008, most of Greengauge 21’s research has been supported and funded by an HSR Public Interest Group which includes city councils, regional development agencies, transport authorities and rail organisations.1 The research and policy positions developed by Greengauge 21 have been the subject of extended discussion and debate with the Public Interest Group members.

What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?

3. High-speed rail is needed to provide additional transport capacity for Britain. Evidence, in particular from Network Rail’s Route Utilisation Strategy programme, shows that the rail network continues to get busier and unless action is taken the major rail routes will be overcrowded and congested by the 2020s. By 2024, Network Rail estimates that 12% of long-distance services operating on the West Coast Main Line will be carrying standing passengers to/from London Euston. There will also be serious overcrowding on commuter services on the route. This is despite an assumed programme of continuing investment to increase capacity over the intervening years. Network Rail concludes that “thereafter the WCML, particularly at the south end of the route, is effectively full and any interventions will be disproportionately expensive compared with the benefits gained.”2

4. Other modes of transport – air and road – are also facing worsening congestion but cannot deliver the additional capacity needed without unacceptable environmental costs and increased carbon emissions. Travel by high-speed rail is considerably more carbon efficient than travel by car or by air. Developing a high-speed rail network is the most effective way of delivering the required increase in transport capacity.

5. While the initial driver of the need for new high-speed railway lines is capacity, the economic benefits they bring are wider and include the effects of improved connectivity between towns and cities, with improved reliability and reduced journey times. The Eddington Transport Study3 provides extensive evidence on the need for improved connectivity to build economic growth. By providing sufficient long-term capacity and improving connectivity and journey times, Britain’s international competitiveness will be enhanced, particularly with direct HSR services between Britain’s major cities (including London, of course) and between them and European cities such as Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam and Frankfurt and international gateway airports, including Heathrow.

6. The Coalition Government has spoken of the need to re-balance the national economy. This will not happen without significant policy intervention: market forces favour development in the South

1 The Public Interest Group membership for 2010/11 comprised: Advantage West Midlands, Association of North East Councils, ATOC, Birmingham City Council, City of London Corporation, East of England Development Agency, East Midlands Development Agency, Glasgow–Edinburgh Collaboration Initiative, Great Western Partnership, Newcastle City Council, Northern Way (the partnership led by the three northern RDAs), Nottingham City/ Nottinghamshire County Councils, PTE Group, Railway Industry Association, SEStran, Sheffield City Region, Transport for London

2 Network Rail, West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy Draft for Consultation, December 2010, p. 8. 3 Sir Rod Eddington, Eddington Transport Study, December 2006. East. High-speed rail brings a radical re-profiling of the national accessibility map, increasing the appeal of development outside the South East. Investment in HSR creates the real possibility that private sector investment decisions over the decades ahead will lead to a re-balancing of the economy and to substantial uplifts in productivity across the English regions and Scotland and Wales.

How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

7. The development of HS2 was supported by all of the main political parties in the 2010 General Election, appearing in Party Manifestos.

8. A high-speed rail network has to be seen as part of the national transport system and it fits well with Government’s vision for “a transport system that is an engine for economic growth but one that is also greener and safer and improves quality of life in our communities.”4 The timescale for delivery of a national HSR network we estimate to be 30 – 35 years and this corresponds to the commitment to reduce carbon emissions by 80% by 2050. Alongside this obligation, to which HSR can make a major contribution, is the policy aim of reducing dependence on imported oil, and enhancing energy security as a consequence.

9. The role of the high-speed rail network within the national transport system is to provide for efficient longer distance journeys between urban centres and to liberate capacity for the expansion of other rail services on the existing network. With HSR in service, the existing main lines can play an expanded role in providing for regional, local and freight services. These benefits are just as much a part of the case for HS2 as are the advantages conferred by the new HSR services themselves. They represent a highly cost effective way of securing improvements in commuting conditions, with less reliance on the use of private cars – and achieving reductions in lorry miles.

10. Greengauge 21’s recent report, Capturing the Benefits of HS2 on Existing Lines,5 put forward a possible post-HS2 timetable for the West Coast Main Line (WCML), to highlight the potential wider benefits of HS2. This demonstrated that the capacity relief provided by HS2 brings substantial opportunities, especially to places between London and the West Midlands that have poor rail services today, squeezed out by the non-stopping Pendolino services on the WCML. It allows for a considerable expansion of freight services on the WCML (the busiest rail freight corridor in the country) to three trains per hour throughout the day. Services at Watford, Milton Keynes, Rugby, Nuneaton, Tamworth and Lichfield would be transformed into a pattern of frequent regular interval services, allowing them to act as major transport interchanges. Substantial increases in commuting capacity into both London and Birmingham become possible, relieving what will otherwise be conditions of severe over-crowding. New and improved services would also become possible at Northampton, Stoke-on-Trent, Coventry and the Black Country. The feasibility and value of new connections to the West Coast Main Line will be enhanced, improving the case for the East West Rail link, the Croxley Link and new services over the line between Leamington and Coventry serving Kenilworth. Ambitions for services which cannot be accommodated on the West Coast Main line today because of capacity constraints – such as from Mid/NE Wales and Shropshire and Walsall – all become feasible.

11. High-speed rail stations will need to be planned so that they integrate well with local public transport services – rail, metro, tram, bus – in order to ensure that passengers can access HSR services effectively and on sustainable modes of transport. The relevant local authorities and PTEs affected by the HSR proposals will therefore need to develop long-term strategies that take into account the impact of HSR. It is quite possible that the additional volumes of passengers attracted to high-speed rail stations will improve the case for local public transport schemes that might not otherwise be viable. High-speed rail should be seen as part of the transformation of the nation’s

4 Department for Transport (DfT), Business Plan 2011 – 2015, May 2011. 5 Greengauge 21, Capturing the benefits of HS2 on existing lines, February 2011. public transport networks that is needed to meet the expectations of demand growth, given the disadvantages of attempting to expand the road network to accommodate it.

12. High-speed rail can also help the aviation sector. The global connectivity of Heathrow in particular is important to the whole of the UK and to international business competitiveness. In recent years, however, Heathrow’s domestic air service network has been shrinking. To access long haul destinations, northern business travellers increasingly use the nearest available hub airports such as Amsterdam Schiphol or Paris Charles de Gaulle – and the evidence is that this leads to a further worsening in the carbon impacts from air travel. With a direct link to Heathrow Airport, as is proposed by Government in the second phase of development of HS2, high-speed rail can provide the domestic connections that are currently getting squeezed out. It may be that the experience on Britain will differ from that of other countries where the introduction of HSR led to the demise (or major cut-back) of domestic air travel: in the British case, much of the air demand is already being displaced into short-haul European feeder flights because of the constraints on runway slots at Heathrow. It will be these environmentally damaging short-haul flights that will be replaced by HSR services to Heathrow. HSR will therefore re-connect Heathrow with its wider national catchment, enhancing its role as an international hub, and reducing carbon emissions at the same time.

13. There is an excellent fit between high-speed rail and the Government’s wider objectives for sustainable development. Railways have the effect of encouraging more sustainable patterns of land-use development than highways. High-density – and hence sustainable – commercial and residential development is encouraged around stations in urban centres (the Kings Cross lands and Stratford City examples being two contemporaneous HSR examples in Britain), whereas the construction of new roads (and airport expansion) virtually without exception encourages suburban and edge-city development, leading to pressure for incursions into the green belt and other protected and vulnerable greenfield sites.

14. The last Government’s transport policy was very much influenced by the Eddington Transport Report. Greengauge 21 notes that the Transport Select Committee considered the case for high- speed rail in 2007 in the light of the Eddington Transport Report.6 Contrary to the understanding of most commentators who had presumed, based on an interpretation of his report, that he was opposed to HSR, Sir Rod Eddington made it very clear to the Transport Select Committee that he was in fact in favour. His report, he explained, was sceptical of new technologies such as Maglev, which at that time was the subject of a significant private sector lobbying effort. He had visited the Maglev system in China and rejected it for Britain: he saw it as being far too risky. But Sir Rod’s evidence to the Committee was that high-speed rail would have a strong business case in the London/Birmingham/Manchester corridor, and should be progressed.7

Business case

15. The HSR business case prepared by HS2 Ltd is based on standard methodology and assumptions used across the transport sector and by the Department for Transport for all major transport schemes. As such, Greengauge 21 considers the forecasts and appraisal assumptions to be (appropriately) cautious.

16. The HS2 Ltd projections of passenger demand for HS2 are based on forecasts of background growth in long-distance rail trips of 95% between 2008 and 2043, or 1.9% per annum.8 This is considerably lower than historic growth in long-distance rail trips, which has averaged 5% per annum since 1995 and shows no sign of market saturation, unlike long-distance car travel which

6 Eddington, op.cit. 7 House of Commons, Oral Evidence given by Sir Rod Eddington, Government Specialist Transport Advisor,2 August 2007. 8 HS2 Ltd, Demand for long-distance travel, April 2011. has been relatively static for the last decade or so. On the WCML, the number of long-distance passengers travelling to/from London is forecast to increase by 127%, or 2.3% per annum. This is below the mid-point of the range of forecasts prepared by Network Rail in its draft West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy9 which suggests that that the WCML inter-regional market will grow at between 1.1% and 5.0% per annum up to 2024 (under different scenarios). Growth rates on individual city-to-city flows to/from London are forecast by both Network Rail and HS2 Ltd to be somewhat higher: for example, London-Manchester demand is forecast to increase by 3.0- 3.2% per annum by Network Rail and by 2.6% per annum by HS2 Ltd.

17. With HS2 services in operation, HS2 Ltd forecasts that it will carry 150,000 passenger trips per day in 2043, a net increase of 53,000 passengers/day on the British railway network. We consider these forecasts to be conservative, and Greengauge 21’s own forecasts suggest much higher demand is possible: for example, we forecast approximately 250,000 daily trips on a London- Birmingham-Manchester HSR network10 by 2055 (HS2 Ltd assumes that there will be no growth anywhere after 2043).

18. Greengauge 21 considers the economic case for high-speed rail in Britain to be strong. The Government estimates that the economic benefits of the first phase HS2 scheme will exceed costs by a ratio of 2.0:1 (or 1.6:1 excluding ‘wider impacts’) – a level judged to be ‘good’ under DfT criteria.

19. Greengauge 21’s own work from 2008/09, using assumptions consistent with standard DfT methodology – and carried out by the consultants now responsible for forecasts and appraisals for HS2 Ltd – estimated a benefit:cost ratio for a comprehensive national high-speed rail network of 3.5:1.11 While we did not assess the business case for a scheme identical to HS2, a high-speed railway line from London to Birmingham and Manchester was assessed to have a benefit:cost ratio of 2.9:1 (excluding wider impacts). Overall, we believe the HS2 Ltd demand forecasts and economic appraisal to be consistent with current accepted practice and prudent in approach, but cautious.

20. Greengauge 21 has considered the argument put up by anti-HS2 campaigners that the journey time benefits are overstated because business travellers work on trains and so time savings achieved by HS2 have reduced value. We agree with the point that the treatment of travel times is simplified. But Greengauge 21 countered this argument,12 explaining that the objectors’ thesis ignores the possibility that for those choosing HSR who would not otherwise travel by car or by air, the creation of HSR creates opportunities to work which in general are not otherwise available at all. It has also been demonstrated by HS2 Ltd that the combination of effects of the simplified treatment of travel times and the ability to work while travelling does not weaken the case for HSR – if anything the economic case is strengthened.13 The HS2 Ltd response also points to the issue of crowding levels and its impact on passengers’ productivity while travelling. Without HS2, crowding levels on West Coast Main Line services will worsen, and passengers will find it impossible to work while travelling.

21. While the economic case is very important it does not look specifically at effects on national productivity, or GVA (gross value added - a measure of economic output). Work carried out for

9 Network Rail, op.cit. 10 SYSTRA/MVA (for Greengauge 21), High-Speed Rail Development Programme 2008/09 – Principal Consultant Final Report, October 2009, p. 46. Unfortunately, demand forecasts were not prepared for a network exactly comparable to the proposed HS2 line. 11 Greengauge 21, Fast Forward: A high-speed rail strategy for Britain, September 2009. 12 Greengauge 21, Fresh light on a key issue – why it’s worth saving time for business travellers, 10 March 2011 (published at http://www.greengauge21.net/blog/fresh-light-on-a-key-issue-why-it%E2%80%99s-worth-saving- time-for-business-travellers-2/). 13 Department for Transport/HS2 Ltd, Economic Case for HS2, February 2011, p. 51. Greengauge 21 by KPMG14 drew on the limited data available on GVA performance at a local level to estimate the relationships between accessibility and productivity. The KPMG analysis suggested that a comprehensive national network of high speed services could boost Britain’s annual GVA in 2040 by up to £29bn, including the impacts of re-using the capacity released on existing lines. The service sector and knowledge-based businesses would particularly be expected to gain from HSR. Additional annual economic impacts on this scale could increase annual tax receipts by between £6 and £10 billion in 2040 (in 2010 prices). On this basis, HSR is an investment that delivers a good return to the Treasury and the taxpayer.

22. New high-speed rail stations can stimulate economic development and regeneration. Research carried out by Greengauge 2115 on international high-speed rail experience suggests that effects have been positive, but not uniformly so. Much depends on the relevant local authority’s appetite for redevelopment and regeneration to make the most of the opportunities high-speed rail creates. The European evidence suggests that HSR stations need to be planned as part of city- wide masterplans and well integrated with local transport networks.

23. Alternatives to the national HSR network that rely on upgrades to existing lines and operation at broadly existing speeds fail to provide much of the benefit of high-speed rail and should be rejected. ‘Rail Package 2’, the alternative package of rail upgrades analysed by Atkins and supported by many of those opposed to HS2, only delivers an additional three peak train paths per hour (compared with up to 16 train paths provided by HS2) and does not improve services to the intermediate centres between Birmingham and London such as Northampton and Milton Keynes. Rail Package 2 also worsens services in some cases (Rugby loses its fast trains to Euston, Coventry loses one of its fast trains to London Euston), impacts adversely on the reliability of the WCML, provides no extra capacity for railfreight and would subject passengers and freight consignors to another line-of-route upgrade programme with high levels of disruption.16

The strategic route

24. Greengauge 21 supports the Government’s proposals to develop a high-speed rail network in phases, and for HS2 to be the first stage. According to our research, there is an excellent case for a national high-speed rail network to deliver economic benefits and improve connectivity across Britain. We proposed a full national network in the Fast Forward strategy published in September 2009.17 Ultimately, the national HSR network should link London, each of the eight ‘core cities’ in England (Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield), together with Glasgow, Edinburgh and Cardiff. It should also have direct connections to Heathrow, to HS1 and to the classic network so that many more places can benefit from direct HSR services.

25. In 2007, Greengauge 21 published a report18 setting out the reasons why there is a strong case for the first stage of the HSR network to be a new route between London and the West Midlands, and these include the capacity constraints on the WCML, the route expected to have the most severe capacity problems within the next 15 years.

26. The Government’s proposed configuration of the route for HS2 is welcomed. Our own research highlights the importance of high-speed railway lines serving city centres directly, as achieved by the Government’s proposals for both London and Birmingham. This allows passengers to access

14 Greengauge 21, Consequences for Employment and Economic Growth, February 2010. 15 Greengauge 21, High speed trains and the development and regeneration of cities, June 2006. 16 Atkins, HS2 Strategic Alternatives Study, London – West Midlands Rail alternatives – update of Economic Appraisal, Appendix A, February 2011. 17 Greengauge 21 (Fast Forward), op.cit. 18 Greengauge 21, High Speed Two – a Greengauge 21 proposition, June 2007. HSR easily by public transport and other sustainable modes, and has the potential to deliver economic regeneration benefits in the city centres. The proposed route rightly, in our view, does not incorporate intermediate stations between the London and West Midlands areas; to do otherwise would compromise local planning policy and guidance, and threaten unwanted large scale development across rural areas.

27. The proposed connection between the high-speed rail network and Heathrow Airport is welcomed, although Greengauge 21 considers that a through station at the airport allowing services from the Midlands and the North to connect to the South East and South West would provide a more effective solution than a simple spur. Greengauge 21’s February 2010 report The Heathrow Opportunity19 sets out how a high-speed rail connection to Heathrow could be developed in a way that delivers best value for money and provides wider benefits across the South East, South West and South Wales.

28. Greengauge 21’s Public Interest Group has consistently highlighted the importance of operating direct HSR services between cities in the Midlands and the North of England to continental Europe, and we welcome the proposed direct connection between HS2 and HS1. Such as link should allow better use to be made of the currently under-used Stratford International station: these opportunities have not yet been examined by HS2 Ltd.

29. While there are sound reasons in the first instance for the Government to seek Parliamentary Powers for HS2 rather than for the more extensive Y-shaped network, Greengauge 21 urges that consideration is given to ensuring that along with the powers sought for HS2 there is an appropriate commitment to the development of a ‘truly national HSR network’, as set out in the Coalition Agreement. This may be achieved through, for example, a National Policy Statement for transport infrastructure, through appropriate wording and provisions in the Parliamentary Bill for HS2 and through appropriate arrangements under the rail industry’s forward planning programme.

30. One addition to the currently proposed HS2 scheme that Greengauge 21 considers would be of substantial value is a connection to the existing Birmingham to Derby railway and onwards to the Midland Main Line. This short connection would allow through high-speed services to operate to London from the East Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds and Newcastle, further widening the benefits from the first stage of HS2 and ensuring that cities in the eastern half of the country do not need to wait until the second phase to achieve the benefits of HSR. Sheffield and Derby would have their London services speeded up by half an hour – and this could be achieved when HS2 opens in 2026.

31. There should be a long-term high-speed rail strategy for the delivery and implementation of the national HSR network. There are parallels with the planning and development of the national motorway network from the 1950s to the 1980s. In order to ensure that Britain’s HSR network is developed and implemented effectively, an organisation needs to be tasked with long-term planning of HSR, developing a national long-term strategy that addresses strategic network issues and ensuring it is integrated with local and regional spatial development plans, local transport, infrastructure and communication networks. This needs to take place alongside the detailed route planning and development work currently being undertaken by HS2 Ltd.

Economic rebalancing and equity

32. The development of a high-speed rail network has a valuable role to play in redressing the north- south divide, by better connecting the cities of the Midlands, the North and Scotland with each other as well as with London. A recent study by Chen and Hall on the impact of the Intercity 125/225 trains on Britain’s economic geography20 found that where enhanced rail services

19 Greengauge 21, The Heathrow Opportunity, February 2010. 20 Chen, C.-L., Hall, P. The impacts of high-speed trains on British economic geography: a study of the UK’s InterCity 125/225 and its effects. J. Transp. Geogr. (2010), doi:10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2010.08.010 brought cities within a two-hour journey time from London, cities’ economic competitiveness was improved, unemployment rates were arrested and average incomes increased. The researchers concluded that reducing rail journey times had a positive impact on developing local knowledge- based service economies, as long as this was accompanied by local strategies to capture the development opportunities. This economic re-balancing would contribute to addressing the inequality of opportunity, prosperity and well-being visible in the current north-south comparative statistics. In addition, the economic modelling carried out for Greengauge 21 by KPMG21 forecast that a national high-speed rail network would deliver larger economic impacts in the north of the country with the largest productivity and employment gains in Yorkshire and the Humber, Scotland, the North East and North West and East and West Midlands. HSR has the potential to help to spread prosperity outside beyond the South East and contribute to closing the North-South divide.

33. While the effects of HSR on the tourism sector have not yet been studied in any detail, so far as we are aware, it is clear that HSR could contribute hugely to relieving the concentration on London and spread international visitors to other parts of the country, helping in the process to create new opportunities in this significant employment sector.

34. Greengauge 21 notes that the Government’s commitment of £750m to develop plans for HS2 has not been at the expense of other rail investments that also offer value for money. Electrification and regional schemes such as the Northern Hub are natural complements to high-speed rail, not alternatives to it.

35. Concerns have been expressed over whether passengers will be able to afford to travel by high- speed rail or whether it will be a transport system suitable only for wealthy business travellers. However, Greengauge 21’s business case analysis, in common with HS2 Ltd’s, is based on assumptions that fares paid for HSR travel will be no higher than fares paid for travel on conventional rail services. In today’s prices, this means that the average fare paid for a single journey could be £40-45, which is the average fare paid today for journeys that will be typically on offer in future on high-speed rail.22 As with all competitive transport systems, much lower fares, perhaps £20-25 one-way, would most likely be available on HSR services for those willing to forgo some flexibility on travel times or able to take advantage of discounts such as from railcards.

36. Rail usage is not restricted to people with higher incomes,23 as some have argued. Even those on lowest incomes make a significant number of rail journeys, with little difference between rail usage in the lowest 20% income band and the next two income groups. With fares for high-speed rail expected to be (on average) at the same level as those on the existing rail network, we can expect the same broad level of usage, right across the social spectrum and across all income levels.

37. HSR can also make a positive contribution to social inclusion by offering high standards of accessibility, including to the mobility-impaired, connecting seamlessly with local transport networks and offering a reliable, safe and high-quality passenger experience at an affordable price. As with today’s rail services, HSR should be available to all, including those who for whatever reason are unable to drive or are reluctant to use short-haul air services.

Impact

38. HSR will make a valuable contribution to a low-carbon transport system. An average HSR trip generates one-third of the carbon emissions of a comparable car journey and one-quarter of the

21 Greengauge 21 (Consequences, 2010), op.cit. 22 Greengauge 21, High-Speed Rail: Fair and Affordable, October 2010, p. 10. 23 HS2 Ltd, op.cit., p.4. carbon emissions of a trip by plane. As Britain’s electricity generation supply becomes progressively decarbonised in future years, the environmental advantages of HSR travel will increase, as Figure 1 below illustrates.24 Greengauge 21’s work suggests that a HSR network

could result in a significant reduction in carbon emissions, of up to one million tonnes of CO2 per annum.25

Figure 1: Carbon emissions per passenger-km by mode

119.6

105.3

59.8 51.4

38 29.4

2.1 1.3 4

2008 2040 2055

High-speed rail Car Aviation Source: ATOC

39. HS2 Ltd’s work on this area is relatively cautious, focusing only on the impacts from the first stage of HS2 (which does not deliver the full potential air-rail mode shift) and not incorporating decarbonisation of the electricity supply.

Conclusion

40. Demand for rail travel continues to exhibit a trend apparent since the mid 1990s: it is out-pacing growth on the road sector. But the scope to accommodate ever more passengers through measures such as train lengthening is reaching an inevitable limit. Without the capacity uplift that HS2 provides, there can be expected to be widespread crowding on rail services, unless fares are increased substantially (perhaps doubled)26 to choke off demand.

41. A national high-speed rail network will improve Britain’s economic productivity and international competitiveness. It will particularly strengthen the economies of the Midlands, the North, Wales and Scotland, where there is most need, and provides the potential for inner-city regeneration around the new stations.

42. The costs of the project should be subject to continuing challenge, and Greengauge 21 believes there is scope for some reduction and efficiencies. But the overall costs involved are manageable and represent no more than a continuation of the current levels of capital spend on the rail network which will otherwise subside to much lower levels post 2014.27

43. High-speed rail has been under serious study in Britain for 10 years. The evidence points consistently towards the need for HSR and the considerable wisdom of proceeding with its

24 ATOC, Energy Consumption and CO2 impacts of high-speed rail: ATOC analysis for Greengauge 21, April 2009. 25 Greengauge 21 (Fast Forward), op.cit., p.22. 26 HS2 Ltd, op.cit., p.10. A 2% annual increase in real fares would be required to choke off demand without new capacity. 27 New Civil Engineer, 21st April 2011, p.19 quotes David Higgins, CEO Network Rail: “The next three to four years will be our peak capacity. We’ll be spending £3.5bn a year on major projects. In 10 years we won’t be.” development. Delaying now will jeopardise progressing HS2 through the statutory consultation and parliamentary phases with no good reason.

16 May 2011 Written evidence from Pamela Taylor (HSR89)

Re: High Speed Train

I feel extremely angry that the Government are considering a high speed train to operate between London and Birmingham when all public services are being squeezed, stretched, reduced and shelved. It will be many years before our economy starts to grow and improve, yet Ministers are considering spending billions and billions of taxpayer's money on a project that is not necessary and is being built on a false premise. I am sure all those loyal soldiers, airman, sailors, nurses, policemen and local government employees who are about to be made redundant will be thrilled to learn that their lack of a salary is helping to fund a project that will not benefit them in the slightest. It is a kick in the teeth and the Government should be ashamed.

2.1 The need to travel by train for business or personal use is that of choice taken by the individual. But the need to export and import goods, which have an economic value to GDP, to and from Port is by and large limited to road and rail. Unless HS2 can effectively carry freight then the excessively high cost of this proposed train will be an extravagant vanity project that will benefit the few and not the many. I think one major road in particular needs consideration. The expansion of the A14 has effectively been shelved due to the current economic client, yet Felixstowe Port Authority is building a deep water container bay to accommodate some of the world's largest container ships, which inevitably means more containers to be transported. A minimal amount of those containers will travel by rail, a vast majority will use the A14, yet the government is reluctant to improve this road, relying on a private funding initiative which may never happen. It is vital that consideration is given to what is more important to the economic wellbeing of the UK: a high speed train that reduces travel time by a mere 11 minutes [Birmingham to London] or keeping our imports and exports moving that will benefit our GDP? Should it be decided that HS2 will carry freight it will have absolutely no benefit to the many haulage companies that rely on the A14 for business, and it is both naive and wrong to believe that HS2 will solve all our transport problems. £1.2bn will improve the A14. £17bn rising to £35bn will reduce one journey by 11 minutes! HS2 is not a proven case.

5.1 The north south divide is an interesting question. What exactly is meant by the north south divide? Is it a cultural identity, a social or economic barrier which sounds patronising and meaningless in this multicultural country in which we live? How will HS2 bridge this divide if it really does exist or is it a phrase that currently suits politicians as a justification for this proposed high speed train? To justify this expensive project the cost of tickets must be affordable to everyone and not just to the business traveller. Unless the economy greatly improves over the next few years, small to medium businesses will not be able to afford to pay for expensive train fares when it is more economic to travel by car, and the same will apply to the individual traveller. HS2 will not bridge gaps, real or imaginary. A recent public consultation in the north of England carried out on behalf of Action Alliance were not concerned with the north south divide concept but coined the phase fast train for fat cats.

5.4 It would be unacceptable to ask local authorities to contribute to the cost of HS2 when they are under extreme pressure to reduce their working budgets which has an impact on all local services. The condition of roads in and around my locality of South Northamptonshire is a disgrace which Government should be ashamed. Given the choice of decent roads that are safe to drive on, or a very expensive train that will benefit no one in South Northants, it goes without saying that the repair of roads would win hands down. I feel very strongly that Government should get its priorities in order and think about what is more important to both the voter and taxpayer. Is HS2 a priority? definitely not.

11th April 2011 Written evidence from Thomas Hart (HSR 91)

This submission argues that HSR should be examined not only in relation to conflicts or synergy with other aspects of rail strategy over the next 20 to 30 years but also in the context of the economic importance, and climate change benefits, of more rapid moves to a low carbon and energy efficient economy. It considers whether a high priority for HSR investment might prejudice more beneficial

investment (and other fiscal and regulatory actions) not only in other parts of the rail system but in other parts of the economy.

The conclusion is that there is a justifiable place for phased HSR development in wider programmes for transport and other aspects of moves to a low carbon and energy efficient economy.

Changing Trends in Transport and the Economy

As noted in the attached summary paper on changing trends presented at Glasgow University on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the formation of the Scottish Transport Studies Group, transport trends entered a period of major historical change in the later 1990s characterised by:- - a near stabilisation of passenger movement per head within the UK (even in conditions of economic expansion and increasing car ownership)  a significant shift from car to rail passenger use (not evident in any previous decade since 1910)  a substantial slowing of previous rates of aviation growth from around 2000 (including a near stabilisation of air miles per head within the UK but continuing, though moderated, growth in longer-distance travel by air

Freight was not dealt with in the paper but there is evidence of longer distance freight remaining overwhelmingly dependent on sea and rail with rising road fuel and labour costs and improving rail quality also leading to expansion of general rail freight in addition to bulk traffic parts of which — such has coal and oil — are shifting from growth to decline under low carbon policies)

These changes have been poorly reflected in existing UK methods of movement forecasting. This requires urgent re-examination, especially in relation to longer distance trips and to patterns of movement within city regions. Even in the absence of low carbon issues, changing trends reflect a new situation where rising real incomes and aspirations for a different quality of life seem certain to see an increase in preferences for travel by rail over longer distances and also in, and around, larger cities and tourism centres i.e. a sharp contrast from the car and aviation preferences which were dominant from the 1960s to the 1990s.

Low carbon issues, higher energy costs (notably for oil and gas), changing fiscal and regulatory policies and improved efficiency within the rail sector (both in procurement and in operations) are likely to reinforce an existing trend towards rail over the next 20 to 30 years with increasing probability of some absolute decline in car and lorry vehicle miles (with the possible exception of a few UK regions with above average rates of growth in population). Though it is arguable that an ability of the road motor sector to adapt to low carbon or a superior ability in other sectors to achieve cost-effective carbon reduction may permit a re-expansion of road use relative to rail, this is now highly improbable. It is worth noting that the recent EU draft of a revised transport strategy expects the rail and water share of medium distance movement to rise from around 20% to 50%. This evidence suggests that rail growth over the next 20 tO 30 years will continue at a high level with road traffic stabilising or falling. Recent rail passenger growth on the West Coast Main Line has been as high as 10% a year with the Virgin Rail/Stagecoach partnership confident that growth will continue in the 6% to 8% range over the next 5 years and beyond if key capacity constraints are removed. There are particularly strong prospects for business and discretionary travel shifting from air to rail , not only on shorter trips into continental Europe but also on corridors such as the Scottish Central Belt to London, Birmingham and other English and Welsh cities. Within England and Wales, the greatest prospects are for changes in business and discretionary travel decisions from car to rail use.

Implications for Transport and Energy Strategy

The above scenario, though it may vary in intensity and by corridor, indicates a clear and cumulative shift of mode share from road and air to rail within a stable level of total movement within the UK — demand for substantial increases in road capacity has virtually disappeared with attention shifting to a few localised schemes , better use of the existing inter-urban road network , absolute falls in road traffic levels within cities and some expansion of maintenance and localised schemes yielding clear gains.

In all transport sectors, more attention (and investment — much being private) will require to be given to more efficient use of energy and shifts to low-carbon fuels. But rail offers particular opportunities for increasing the use of low carbon electric traction for both passenger and freight — justifying enlargement of the present electrification programme and the introduction of lower energy usage by both local and longer-distance trains (Present Virgin and Eurostar trains compare poorly with the latest continental HSR trains in terms of energy per seat mile while there are also opportunities to vary pricing to improve seat utilisation).

In terms of track capacity, the present rail network offers much scope to increase usage through provision of more rolling stock, additional and longer platforms and signalling/timetabling changes. However, a key issue is to identify:- a) those corridors on which demand is rising beyond the ability to cope through relatively small improvements b) gaps in the network and interchange/ticketing deficiencies which inhibit rail growth not only on corridors to, and within, London but also between, and within, other cities and tourism/leisure areas. This includes the topic of access to principal airports, using rail access to inter-link with flights increasingly to and from longer-distance overseas origins and destinations,

Under (a), rising demand (and the ability to release capacity on existing routes for freight and additional regional and 'intermediate express' services) justifies planning now for new sections of HSR route (as in the present Y strategy from London to the West Midlands dividing for Lancashire and Leeds) fully completed by 2030 but including complementary work to facilitate shorter trip times north from Leeds and Lancashire and also on other inter-city corridors.

Lengthy sections of new route should be designed for HSR operation (defined as speeds of 200 mph or higher) but with most HSR trains also operating over sections of improved existing route - including extra opportunities for overtaking freight or intermediate passenger services or diversion of some of these to alternative routes. While some HSR trains may be designed to the more commodious continental loading gauge (including double-deck operation) but precluded from operating over existing lines with more limited clearances, the most cost-effective and realistic approach over the next 20 years is likely to lead to most HSR trains in Britain being capable of operating over the inter-city network - though with strictly limited stops and average speeds in the 135-150mph range (higher on longer sections of new build route).

HSR plans should proceed in parallel with:- - city region rail/Metro/tram /bus improvements - strengthened rail freight strategy (including a large rise in electric haulage) - an expanded national and regional rail electrification programme - major improvements in interchange and ticketing - specific programmes for improvements in the inter-urban passenger network (involving shorter sections of new construction, line redoubling, line reopening and measures to raise speeds to 140 or 150 mph on some sections of route — together with timetabling adjustments, this could raise average speeds on inter-city links to the 90-110 mph range if demand so justified. On several routes, the preference may be for improved frequency and lower fares but somewhat lower average speeds — especially for links to, and within, tourist/leisure areas)

Rail Funding

Expanded rail usage could be funded from a variety of sources such as:- 1) Increased usage and income 2) savings arising from shifts in business and discretionary spend from car and air to rail use; reduced HGV levels, energy and fossil fuel savings; cuts in trunk road and airport investment 3) since most savings and benefits under (2) would have no direct reflection in rail income, consideration should be given to allocating a proportion of net proceeds of road fuel taxation and aviation taxation towards rail schemes shown to be offering benefits not fully reflected in income (or reduced if attempts were made to maximise income) 4) earmarking part of the proceeds of carbon trading or fossil energy taxation towards the costs of approved rail projects 5) savings in procurement and more efficient operations (McNulty estimates suggests that, on the basis of continental comparison, rail project procurement costs could be cut in real terms by at least 30% while electrification offers considerable savings in operating costs (especially with a rising trend in usage) plus other opportunities for cuts in operational and signalling costs with gains for transport safety 6)expansion of public/private partnerships subject to assessment of risk transfer e.g private finance could be expanded in some areas of rolling stock provision, track/signalling maintenance and interchange improvement but with public finance (and lower borrowing costs) utilised for the formation of new rail alignments and for payments towards franchise specifications for sub-commercial networks. On some busy corridors, payments from operators to government could help fund borrowing costs but with care taken to ensure that such payments did not contradict the aims of encouraging mode shift from car and air to rail) 7) potential levies on increases in property values or earmarking of other taxes towards contributions to borrowing costs

May 2011 Written evidence from Centro (HSR92)

1. This paper focuses on the West Midlands Metropolitan Area which due regard to national considerations as appropriate. Only questions to which Centro wishes to submit evidence have been addressed.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

2. Centro has assessed the evidence towards High Speed Rail (HSR) and concludes that the two headline arguments for HSR are: A) Rail Capacity & Connectivity: HSR will provide the UK with the rail capacity required to meet existing and future growth on both national and regional rail networks whilst addressing the poor rail connectivity and journey times between the West Midlands and the north. This will provide the generational opportunity to enhance local rail networks to revolutionise the way people travel whether it be everyday commuting, business travel or leisure; B) Economy: by providing enhanced national connectivity; new international connectivity and; reduced journey times, HSR will allow for a step-change in the economic geography of the UK, supporting sustainable economic growth across the regions of UK to the benefit of the entire UK economy reducing the UK’s reliance on London to compete in the global economy;

3. These two arguments are supported by the long term benefits of HSR towards reducing Carbon emissions which with the completion of the Y-Network will allow modal transfer onto rail particularly away from aviation and road based freight movements.

4. To do nothing about the rail capacity & connectivity challenge facing the UK cannot be an option and instead debate must focus on the benefits of HSR against the alternative solutions to the rail capacity and connectivity challenges. The DfT’s Economic Case for High Speed Two (HS2) shows clearly that that investment in a high speed network provides a higher return than that achieved from a new conventional line or upgraded network. Centro believes that this should be the key criterion for investment if the scheme is affordable which as demonstrated below is clearly the case. The supporting evidence for each argument is outlined below:

A) Rail Capacity & Connectivity

5. Capacity to meet existing and future demand is a critical challenge facing the entire UK rail network. Rail is an overwhelming success with 1.25bn passenger journeys per annum whilst rail freight volumes have increased 50% since 1995. To do nothing in meeting the national capacity challenge cannot be an option. The West Coast Main Line (WCML) and West Midlands rail networks are acute examples of the rail capacity challenge but similar challenges are also prevalent on key networks such as the East Coast Main Line and other regional rail networks.

National Rail

6. Long distance rail travel has doubled since 1994/95 whilst the WCML supports 31M journeys today double the 16M made in 1999. London, as heart of UK economy, will continue to drive long distance travel patronage growth with for example Birmingham to London patronage forecasted to increase by 35% by 2024/251. However the problems attached to capacity are not restricted to future growth. Today, the problem of capacity is starkly demonstrated by the common place overcrowding on services and the over

1 Source: Network Rail (Draft) West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy subscription and police stewardship of passengers attempting to access services from London Euston during peak travel times;

7. Current rail industry approach to meeting existing/ future growth is focused on running longer trains and incremental infrastructure enhancements. However there is a finite ability to meet rail growth with this approach whilst delivery is extremely disruptive to existing rail network.

Local Rail

8. The West Midlands Local Rail network has enjoyed sustained long term growth and in 2009/10 supported 40M journeys per annum, double the number carried in 1994. The (draft) West Midlands & Chiltern Route Utilisation Strategy (WM&C RUS) predicts future growth of 32% between 2009/10 and 2019/20. During 2009/10 Rail travel accounted for 27% of all AM peak commuter journeys into central Birmingham.

9. The West Midlands, despite being at the central point of rail network suffers from poor connectivity, frequency and journey speeds to major urban/ economic areas of the UK:

Table 1. Existing Rail Connectivity Between Birmingham and Major UK Cities Birmingham Distance Journey Average Speed Fast Direct to... (straight line; Time (Distance/ Trains Per Hour miles approx) (Hr: Min) Journey Time) (AM Peak) Nottingham 40 1:16 32 mph 2 Sheffield 50 1:13 41 mph 2 Liverpool 60 1:42 35 mph 2 Manchester 60 1:42 35 mph 2 Leeds 100 1:59 50mph 1 London Euston 110 1:24 79 mph 3 Newcastle 160 3:19 48 mph 2 Edinburgh 250 4:01 62 mph 1 Glasgow 250 3:57 63 mph 1

10. High Speed Rail will provide the opportunity to segregate Intercity services away from existing network releasing significant levels of rail capacity to meet demand on the existing network.

Alternative Options

11. The alternative conventional rail enhancement options have been accessed by Centro and do not demonstrate the ability to tackle rail capacity and connectivity challenges faced by the UK on national and local rail networks to meet national travel as well as local commuter and rail freight growth. The HS2 route built as a conventional rail route would cost £15Bn whilst upgrades to the WCML (such as those proposed in Rail Package 2) could cost £5bn but would only provide for growth on the WCML at the expense of West Midlands Local Rail and freight services whilst not addressing capacity challenges on key national rail corridors such as the East Coast Main Line nor addressing the poor connectivity between the West Midlands and the major cities across the UK, especially to the north. No international connectivity is provided by the alternative options.

B. Economy

12. The West Midlands economy suffers from the lowest productivity of the UK major economic centres compounded by road congestion, high unemployment and; unrepresentation of high value business sectors. HSR provides the opportunity to expand rail capacity and connectivity providing businesses with access to new or enhanced local, regional, national and increasingly international destinations whilst providing connectivity between people and employment to the benefit of the economy. Providing the capacity to meet rail freight growth would also provide further economic benefits to the UK with rail freight already contributing £6bn benefits per annum to the UK economy.

13. The subsequent economic benefits of HSR, combined with enhancements to the existing rail network, demonstrated that the West Midlands would benefit from: an additional 22,000 jobs; £1.5bn GVA benefits and; with the attraction of higher value business sectors an increase in average wages of £300 per annum2. HS2 operationally will create 1,500 permanent jobs including 300 jobs at the HSR rolling stock depot at Washwood Heath in Birmingham, one the West Midlands most socially deprived areas.

14. HSR provides rail based national and international connectivity for businesses providing access to new/ expanded markets; HSR reduces journey times between major economic centres such as London, Manchester, Leeds and Newcastle with international connectivity to cities such as Paris, Lyon or Frankfurt. This connectivity will attract national and global companies to invest in the West Midlands ensuring benefits beyond Birmingham including Wolverhampton and Coventry.

C. Carbon

15. The full Y-Network will provide the national and international connectivity and fast journey times that will encourage people to undertake journeys by rail rather than car/ aviation. By maximising the opportunities of the released capacity on the existing network, carbon savings can be made by inducing modal shift onto rail for people making journeys on the West Midlands rail network.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

Q: HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

16. Centro believes that HSR, covering HS2 and the full Y-Network, is consistent with the Governments objectives for transport to support sustainable economic growth and reduce carbon emissions;

Q: Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

17. Centro is of the view that traditionally the funding of major transport infrastructure which provides national economic benefits has been funded outside of national rail budgets and there is no evidence to suggest the delivery of HS2 would be different. The funding of Crossrail requires £2bn per annum up to 2015/16 from which point the funding can simply be allocated to HSR without impact to public services or planned/ future investment in the existing rail network. Indeed, the opportunity to maximise the released capacity on the existing rail network and revolutionise the way people travel will be intrinsically linked to continued and sustained investment in the existing rail network and rolling stock.

Q. What are the implications for domestic aviation?

18. HSR can provide the connectivity and journey times which can reduce demand for domestic aviation and international aviation to destinations such as Paris. However, crucially, HSR can also provide the journey times and connectivity to Birmingham Airport from London which would prove attractive as an alternative for people making flights from major airports such as Heathrow. Major carbon savings are realised from the full Y-Network.

3. Business Case

Q: How robust are the assumptions and methodology– for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network?

19. Centro believes that the business case methodology and assumptions used by HS2 are robust and in alignment with standard Treasury Appraisal. However, Centro’s assessment of the Business Case provides evidence to suggest that the business case understates HSR because:

Future Growth

2 Source: Centro Commissioned Report by KPMG “High Speed Rail and supporting investments in the West Midlands Consequences for employment and economic growth” 20. The future patronage forecasts used by HS2 for growth on the rail network appear to be conservative when compared to historical and actual passenger growth especially on the WCML and West Midlands Rail Network. The demand forecasting work undertaken by HS2 Ltd uses an estimate of underlying growth in rail demand of +3.4% per annum across the entire UK rail network.

21. The key drivers of rail patronage growth include increased economic and population growth. Future growth levels of both are projected to be in broad alignment with historical trends meaning that unless the rail industry introduces policy tools such as pricing to reduce demand, future rail demand is likely to be consistent with historical growth levels.

22. Therefore, the future growth outlined by HS2 needs to be assessed against actual and historical growth in rail travel demand. The (draft) WM&C RUS states that passenger journeys on the West Midlands rail network will grow by 30% by 2019/20 equating to a 2.4% per annum growth whilst journeys to Birmingham are predicted to increase by 32% in the peak by 2019 and broadly the same for off-peak travel. However rail patronage in the West Midlands has increased by 6.4% during 2009/10 to 40M, nearly 3% above the average 2.4% increase predicted by the WM&C RUS. Table 2 outlines historical rail growth in the West Midlands whilst Table 3 outlines growth in long distance rail journeys from London 1999/00-2009/10:

Table 2. Historical West Midlands Rail Network Patronage Growth3 Year 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 Patronage (million) 29.3 30.9 32.8 35.5 37.6 40 % change per annum 6.9 5.5 6.1 8.2 5.9 6.4

Table 3. Historical Growth Long Distance Rail Travel4 London to Total Growth Ave. Annual Growth Rate Manchester 70% 5.4% Birmingham 58% 4.7% Liverpool 41% 3.5% Glasgow 23% 2.1%

23. By 2043 HS2 Ltd have estimated that 136,000 passengers per day will use HS2. This represents an additional 53,000 passengers per day, with the majority of HS2 passengers coming from the existing rail network. Whilst this appears to be significant increase in rail users overall it is in fact a very small increase in additional passengers per annum over a 30 year period (circa 1.5% per annum).

24. HS2 (London to Birmingham) has a BCR of 2:1 (1.6:1 Without Wider Impacts). Centro believes that this could be higher if further work is undertaken on maximising the benefits of capacity freed on the existing rail network. These additional benefits would be spread across the country and generate a significant non- rail user benefit stream as trips from private car users transfer to the improved existing rail network.

Wider Impacts

25. Centro believes that while the Wider Impacts included in the HS2 appraisal are significant they are still an underrepresentation of the impact that HSR could have on the UK economy. If a more dynamic approach to modelling the interaction between changes in accessibility and land use were employed, that reflected changes in the location and mix of businesses in an area as a result of improved transport connections, then this would represent a more realistic estimate of the economic impact of HS2. The Department for Transport have assumed no changes to land use will occur as a result of HSR which is not consistent with international case studies of HSR as outlined in para 36.

Wider Network Benefits

26. The appraisal of the completed ‘Y’ Network estimates a BCR of 2.6:1 (2.2:1 without wider impacts) which Centro believes is understated as the appraisal excludes the benefits of stopping in Carlisle and Edinburgh. Again Centro believes that wider impacts are an under estimate not only because of the methodological

3 Source: Centro Annual Statistics Report 2010 4 Source: Network Rail (draft) West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy approach but also because the current figure is based on work carried out for the London to Birmingham business case.

Q: What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

27. Whilst High Speed rail is marginally more expensive than upgrading the existing infrastructure it offers a number of significant advantages in terms of additional capacity and reduced disruption to passengers. The experience of a previous upgrade to the existing ‘live’ rail infrastructure is relevant. The WCML Route Modernisation project costs were estimated at £2.1bn. The outturn cost was £9bn and it entailed a decade of on-line works, which was hugely disruptive to rail users. There is much greater risk and uncertainty around early line of route cost estimates than those made for new-build. Upgrades also typically take longer than originally programmed.

28. Such an approach to tackling capacity challenges would do very little for the West Midlands in terms of improving connectivity (as demonstrated in Table 1) to key cities served by the East Coast Main Line such as Nottingham, Sheffield, Leeds and Newcastle compared to what would be delivered by the ‘Y’ network. Improvements to the WCML to facilitate additional long distance services would also reduce the ability to improve local services as the railway would remain an inefficient mixture of fast long distance and slow local and regional services.

29. Building a new conventional rail line would save only around 9% of the cost of HS2 but without the international/ national connectivity and journeys times savings delivered by HSR meaning fewer quantifiable benefits, especially economic benefits, and is therefore not considered by Centro to be a credible alternative to HS2.

Q: What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?

30. Centro has previously undertake studies into the impacts of pricing to reduce travel demand which provides evidence that pricing would result in x Lower economic growth and jobs. These stem from faster and expanded travel opportunities and if these do not materialise then the economic benefits do not occur or will be constrained by the extent to which benefits can be achieved on the conventional network. x Social Exclusion. A policy of pricing to manage demand will result in rail only been affordable to selected socio-economic groups which would have major impacts to social inclusion and create barriers for people, especially from lower income groups, to use rail in accessing jobs and educational opportunities. Centro’s Local Transport Plan promotes social inclusion and therefore pricing would counter to this objective; x Increased Carbon Emissions. Those unable to afford to travel by rail would be forced to travel by road or air increasing carbon emissions. Demand in these areas would ultimately increase the case for expanded roads/ airports which have high costs and would be counter to many Government objectives;

4. The Strategic Route

Q: The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

31. Centro believes that the proposed stations on the West Midlands to London route are in the best possible locations. A key issue in determining their success will be ability to interchange with other modes and in particular at Birmingham Interchange it will be necessary to ensure that the HSR Interchange Station, the existing Birmingham International rail station, Birmingham Airport/ NEC are as closely located as possible.

Q: Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice?

32. Centro supports the proposed Y network as it creates significantly improved connectivity between the West Midlands and the North, with both Manchester and Leeds being the key locations needing access. It will be important to consider how improved connectivity to Newcastle and Scotland beyond the proposed Y network can be delivered as part of the HSR strategy, and whether the current network can be sufficiently upgraded to deliver the capacity and journey time benefits needed for High Speed services

Q: Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

33. The scale of the project will inevitably require delivery in stages, although it would clearly be highly desirable for the northern legs of the Y to be constructed as soon as possible after the phase from London to the West Midlands, as the interim situation with HSR services operating on the West Coast Main Line north of Lichfield will create considerable capacity problems for the existing network. Given that a key driver for the project is the relieving of capacity on the WCML at its southern end, it is imperative that the London – West Midlands HS2 route is delivered in time to achieve this.

Q: The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

34. Centro believes that these are the right decisions, as the Old Oak Common Interchange will provide excellent connectivity to Heathrow as part of Phase 1, while the link to HS1 needs to be delivered as part of Phase 1 both for practical construction reasons, but also to deliver the international connectivity benefits of the route as soon as possible. When (or whether) the Heathrow connection is delivered ought to be reviewed as part of how effectively the Old Oak Common Interchange can deal with Heathrow traffic, given that it will have a far better HSR service than could ever be justified for Heathrow alone

5. Economic Rebalancing and Equity

Q: What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide?

35. Centro believes that the dramatic change in accessibility brought about by HSR will support economic regeneration and growth in UK regions by bringing major employment and population centres close together. This change in accessibility will offer greater opportunities to reach new markets, suppliers and employees for businesses and jobs and services for residents. International examples of HSR provide evidence to support this view.

36. For example, Lyon is on France’s HSR network with a population of 3 million people, providing similarities with the West Midlands. As a result of HSR, Lyon is now recognised as France’s 2nd largest economic centre with domestic HSR connectivity to economic centres such as Paris, Lille and Marseilles with international connectivity to Brussels and Frankfurt. The Lyon Part Dieu high speed rail station has underpinned wider regeneration of Lyon city centre and the area hosts 5.3 million square feet of office space and around 20,000 jobs. Lyon is home to 5 high value business sector clusters, driving economic growth and attracting greater inward investment. A similar story is seen in Lille where the opening of HSR in 1993 has led to the creation of 50,000 jobs in the Lille metropolitan area.

Q: To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration?

37. Centro believes that the Y-Network has been fully influenced by the need to support local and regional economies. To remain competitive globally the UK cannot simply rely on the London economy alone. The benefits of HSR will spread prosperity across the regions to the benefit of the UK economy as a whole.

38. HSR stations in Birmingham and Solihull are expected to act as a catalyst for significant private sector development. Development focused on strong regional centres, supported by HSR, will generate benefits that are spread across the wider hinterland of these locations supporting large areas of population and employment outside the South East.

Q: Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?

39. As discussed in para 30, Centro believes all socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR either: - directly through the HSR journey speed and connectivity benefits or by the released capacity on the existing network been used to improve local rail service provisions and connectivity. - Indirectly through a more prosperous economy creating jobs and wealth for all residents to enjoy; 40. Greater capacity in the rail travel market is also likely to have a positive impact on rail fares ensuring all socio-economic groups can access the rail network and particularly ensuring that rail doesn’t becoming a ‘mode of the few’ for long distance trips post 2026.

Q: How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

41. Centro believes that it is fair that those who benefit from HSR should contribute towards its cost but only if the appropriate financial regulations and tools are in place. For example, if Local Authorities are allowed to keep the additional business rates generated by HSR (using mechanisms such as Tax Incremental Financing) then these areas should contribute towards appropriate HSR infrastructure e.g. stations. However, if the Treasury keeps the additional tax raised from HSR then it’s appropriate that the Government and major private sector developers pay for HSR.

May 2011 Written evidence from Messrs Edwards, King, Osborn, Rees and Sullivan (HSR 93)

Introduction

Since HS2 Ltd. published its draft and consultation proposals for a new high speed railway linking London to the West Midlands and, ultimately, the North West and North East, views and attitudes have become increasingly polarised between those against and those for. The authors of this Submission are concerned that reasoned discussion between the two sides has become sidelined. We support the concept of high-speed rail in Britain, accept that some environmental damage will occur whichever route is finally chosen but feel that possible alternatives should be re-examined. We hope that the Alternative Approach to High Speed Rail, outlined below, will lead to a constructive debate of this exciting project.

In our view the present Government’s stated objective, in its Coalition Agreement of May 2010, of creating ‘a truly national high speed rail network for the whole of Britain’ has been thwarted by two factors. First, HS2 Ltd’s enthusiasm to operate at extreme and pioneering speeds and, second, the previous Government’s original 2009 requirement that any new high speed line should be orientated to serve in some way London’s Heathrow Airport

This Paper offers an Alternative Approach, an approach that has emerged from study of the technical background papers to the High Speed Rail Command Paper published in Spring 2010 and other sources. We are persuaded that the flexibility offered by operation at proven speeds of circa 300kph (187mph) outweighs the incremental journey time savings achieved by higher speeds. We are persuaded, too, that the alignment of Britain’s High Speed rail network should be dictated by the needs of the many - not dictated by an impractical vision of improved rail-air interchange for a small minority of travellers. We believe that the foundations of our work are sound and its logic is solid.

Two models for high-speed rail infrastructure have emerged from experience around the world over the past 30 years - overlay and hybrid. In the absence of a clear national rail strategy, HS2 Ltd. has chosen to address a narrow interpretation of its brief using an ‘overlay’ model. We have looked instead at a broader application using high-speed network enhancements of the existing rail network where they are beneficial in addressing broader needs of the travelling public. We call this hybrid the Alternative Approach. As its advantages compared with the HS2 Ltd. proposal are very significant, we believe it merits serious consideration. It would be faster and cheaper to build, would be more flexible to operate and would serve more of the UK population.

Overview of Alternative Approach

1.1 A truly national high-speed, or higher-speed, network can be achieved by: * utilising a mix of (mostly) existing main lines - upgraded to higher speed than 200 kph where technically possible and * building a limited set of new higher-speed lines, integrated with the network and operating as a part of the whole - essentially a hybrid approach. New line speeds could be 320kph (200mph) while speeds on existing, upgraded, lines could be as high as 260kph (160mph) where curvature permits and 200kph – 225kph (125 – 140mph) where alignment constraints prevent it.

1.2 The hybrid approach takes advantage of recently announced commitments to rail investment, especially Crossrail. It circumvents HS2 Ltd’s dependence on a new interchange at Old Oak Common (OOC), resulting in greatly reduced tunnelling in London and through the Chilterns. It proposes interconnection for London Heathrow (LHR) similar to that proposed by HS2 Ltd, and expands it to serve a larger population base. It suggests that greater integration with the existing rail network is complementary to its modernisation.

1.3 Overlay networks, as proposed by HS2 Ltd, provide new high-speed, end-to-end, links between major conurbations. The Japanese were first to implement the idea; followed by China, Spain and others, including the UK’s Channel Tunnel Link – HS1. An overlay approach was necessary in both Japan and Spain, where the gauge of the national network is not standard. Hybrid models have proved more appropriate in closely settled European countries such as France, Germany and Netherlands. New sections of high-speed line have been built between cities while existing, sometimes upgraded lines in urban areas are shared with conventional inter-city and regional services, and use established major stations.

1.4 During the last 30 years, speeds achieved by high-speed trains have risen progressively from 200kph (125 mph), which were the operating speeds both the Japanese Shinkansen at its launch (1964), and the UK’s HS125 (1976). Today, the Shinkansen operates at 300kph, the design speed on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (HS1) through Kent. Although experimental trains have achieved higher speeds, operational speeds have converged across the world in the region of 280 – 320kph. Consideration of energy usage, track design and aerodynamics indicate that, with the relatively short distances between UK cities, still greater reductions in journey times from the higher maximum speeds proposed by would not be justified. Importantly, lower speeds enable more curved alignments, so that new lines can follow more closely natural landform and existing transport alignments. Lower speeds therefore allow routes rejected by HS2 Ltd. to be re-considered.

1.5 HS2 Ltd’s proposal for a ‘Y’ network links just four cities – London, Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds. It would not be a truly national high speed rail network; its lines would not reach Scotland, Wales, the West Country, and East Anglia, much of the East Midlands or central Southern England. An alternative, hybrid approach addresses these omissions to serve an increased population. The likely environmental impact appears favourable, though HS2 Ltd has produced no Environmental Impact Assessment to support their preferred route and, therefore no numerical comparison can be drawn.

1.6 HS2 Ltd’s programme envisages services to Manchester and Leeds – the Phase 2 ‘Y’ route - but at a later date than Phase 1 - London to Birmingham, arguably the two best connected conurbations in the country today. By reducing cost and complexity, the alternative hybrid network creates the opportunity of including Manchester and the East Midlands cities within the timeframe proposed by HS2 Ltd for Phase 1.

1.7 HS2’s proposal includes an entirely new interchange in northwest London – at Old Oak Common – linked with Euston via a long and very costly twin bore tunnel. This is justified by the need to reduce pressure of increased passenger numbers at Euston. We propose instead to greatly reduce London and South East commuter use of Euston, by re-routing outer suburban services directly into Crossrail at Old Oak Common, and transferring the inner suburban (Watford dc) service to the Bakerloo Line. The former is foreseen by Transport for London as a potential additional arm to Crossrail; the latter is a TfL proposal already. HS2 Ltd makes much of the additional population centres served by locating its second London station on Crossrail at Old Oak Common (OOC) – implicitly emphasising the London centric view that underpins its vision. By contrast, the hybrid alignment creates opportunity to serve population centres outside London ignored by HS2 – in particular, the growth triangle of Milton Keynes, Bedford and Northampton, and the manufacturing cities of the West and East Midlands, Coventry and Leicester. An additional served population (1.5m people) is reached without penalising either cost or journey time.

1.8 To satisfy the (unproven) needs of international travellers from the Northwest (Manchester) and North East (Leeds), HS2 Ltd. has proposed a tunnelled spur from HS2 directly into Heathrow (LHR) at a cost of £3 - 4 billion, to be constructed during Phase 2 of the project. We propose that both travellers and airport staff should instead access LHR using existing and/or upgraded rail routes - linked to an electrified GWML - without the need for a new railway and its concomitant tunnels. We believe that overall end to end differences in journey time are marginal and do not justify the enormous costs proposed by HS2 Ltd.

1.9 HS2 Ltd. states, in its Consultation Document, that a dedicated high-speed line will relieve pressure on the existing West Coast Main Line (WCML), allowing more paths for both fast and commuter passenger trains and for freight traffic. However, HS2 appears not to have studied the implications of freight demand on the WCML (nor the other main lines), in order to substantiate its claim. We suggest that new capacity for Fast Passenger and Slow Freight services on the West Coast (WCML) and Midland (MML) Main Lines would be more beneficial if it facilitated dedicated freight transport on two tracks of the WCML and released the (currently under-utilised) MML for passenger use.

1.10 Inevitably new high speed rail infrastructure has both positive and negative impacts on the environment. Its positive impacts result from modal shift – from road and air to rail. However, HS2 Ltd has failed to recognise that operation at unnecessarily high speeds unnecessarily damages the environment through excessive energy usage, inflexible (straight) track alignment and increased noise. The alternative approach impacts all of these by reducing speed and has also considered opportunities for modal shift through improved rail access for local travellers and airport staff. We believe that HS2 has also ignored the opportunity for modal shift of freight from road to rail, available if capacity released on WCML is optimised for freight transport.

1.11 Consideration of both freight and passenger utilisation studies of Network Rail indicates that the extension of High Speed Rail services north of London does not require long, expensive and inherently risky tunnelling. Instead, the Alternative Approach follows the MML Corridor, already shared with the southernmost section of the M1, via a short tunnelled link from Euston Station and thereafter largely follows the M1 corridor to its junction with M6 at Crick (near Rugby). Our mapping confirms that 300kph+ operation is readily achieved virtually everywhere on this alignment.

1.12 If the Centro (West Midlands Passenger Transport Executive) proposal for 4-tracking the congested line between Coventry and Birmingham is accepted, the alternative approach would use the existing track from Crick through Rugby to Birmingham; otherwise new track would be required.

1.13 The alternative approach provides a full capacity connection with HS1, without further tunnelling, replacing the long, costly and inflexible single bore tunnel projected by HS2 Ltd. It also facilitates direct connection between mainland Europe and the Thames Valley, West Country and South Wales using an electrified GWML (now committed). Responses to Topics raised by Transport Select Committee.

Q1 Main Arguments For and Against HSR Principal case for: need for additional capacity to reinforce constraints of the Victorian Network, encourage modal shift from road and air, promote business and regeneration, and extend European HSR north of London. This submission supports the principle of High Speed Rail. However, it strenuously opposes HS2’s proposed overlay solution as technically over-ambitious, outrageously expensive, and unnecessarily risky. Substantially better financial performance (BCR) can be achieved along with improved sustainability and reduced environmental damage. We believe that a hybrid approach would be cheaper and faster to build, meet the key objectives of the remits given HS2, serve more of the population and cause less environmental damage. Q2 How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives? 2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? Increased rail capacity for both long distance and commuting passengers and for freight, targeted at pinch points of the current network, is fundamental to a successful transport policy. 2.1.1 HS2 proposes initially to serve only intercity travel between Birmingham and Lon- don, already the UK’s best connected cities by rail and road. Other major communities, and the devolved capitals of Edinburgh and Cardiff, do not benefit from HS2, as currently proposed. Potential travellers from these communities, who wish to benefit from HSR face additional jour- neys, typically be car, to reach the few rail heads served. 2.1.2 Construction of a new parkway interchange for Birmingham will necessarily increase traffic on already heavily loaded stretches of the motorway network and its feeder roads eg M40, M42, M4, and M6. 2.1.3 Provision of new rail connection to Heathrow only at OOC, does nothing to reduce road congestion of M4, M40, M25 and their feeder roads, (see also 2.2.1) 2.1.4 HS2 repeatedly states that it will relieve capacity (unquantified) for freight on the WCML. However, increased inter-modal freight volumes, the area of greatest growth and great- est environmental benefit, merit not just increased freight movements, but a dedicated freight line on the WCML alignment. 2.1.5 HS2 programme includes heavy costs for environmental mitigation, funds which are therefore not available to Highways Agency to meet commitments under the Noise Regulations (2006). Environmental funding for HS2 could be reduced if its alignment used existing trans- port corridors (which the A413 is not). 2.1.6 With commitment to electrification of GWML, trains from Thames Valley, West Country and S Wales could run directly to HS1. 2.1.7 HS2 has ignored the potential for an interchange at Milton Keynes with the East West Line between Reading, Oxford and Bedford / Cambridge, which would provide access to a large swathe of South Central England, currently ill-served for rail connection beyond London and Birmingham. 2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘clas- sic’ network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.2.1 Four-tracking of the line between Coventry and Birmingham is stated by Centro (West Midlands PTE) to be necessary by 2021 whether or not HS2 is built. The high cost to the public sector of the published HS2 Ltd plan would make very unlikely the funding of 4-tracking Coventry-Birmingham. 2.2.2 HS2 would involve a massive 8-year rebuilding of Euston. The provision of such a large station, providing for London & South East suburban services too, would use up funds that could be better spent on connecting the WCML at Willesden to Crossrail and avoiding the need for such a major rebuild of Euston. 2.2.3 Airtrack (regrettably cancelled) would have permitted commuters from southern Home Counties eg Surrey to travel by train via Heathrow to destinations served by Crossrail, Euston (by extended Heathrow Express) and HS1. Funding is less likely to be made available for this scheme if HS2 is built.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? 2.3.1 HS2 prejudges the outcome of a UK strategy for airports, by focussing on two air- ports whose growth is constrained by proximity to major population centres – London Heathrow and Birmingham. Potential at other airports is ignored by HS2 Ltd’s proposal. 2.3.2 In the absence of flights between Birmingham and London, HS2 has no impact on these routes. 2.3.3 Rail already dominates the market for travel between Manchester, Leeds and London. A fast train service to Heathrow from either of these would presumably be attractive to relatively small numbers of interchange passengers, but the £4.3B cost could never be recovered from an acceptable fare surcharge. 2.3.4 HS2 ignores the potential for an electrified loop on GWML to provide interchange at Heathrow not only for Thames Valley, the West Country and South Wales, but for Southampton and Birmingham (via Oxford). The latter would go some way to achievement of direct termina- tion at Heathrow, using largely existing tracks. 3. Business case 3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology – eg on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network? 3.1.1 HS2’s assumptions and methodology have been challenged by many critics, elsewhere and will not be dealt with here. As no project can make firm predictions for a 60 year life, proponents of any such project must reduce cost and de-risk their proposal to the greatest possible extent. This HS2 has signally failed to do. 3.1.2 Service only for few conurbations, excessive speeds, over dependence on tunnelling increases capital and running costs while restricting revenues. The result is a BCR of 1.6 (2.0 with Wider Economic Impacts (WEIs), and a risk premium of 64%. 3.2 Pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.2.1 The WCML needs additional capacity – a new line – only south of Rugby. North of Rugby its divides into two, and the main Trent Valley line has spare capacity following 4- tracking of the 2-track section in southern Staffordshire in 2004-2008. There is no case for a wholly new line north of Rugby. Where new capacity is built, it can be designed for 300 kph (186 mph) running; a new conventional line would not be a suitable solution. 3.3 Pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 3.3.1 Even in China’s controlled society, government plans to operate its high speed train network at 300kph to achieve competitive prices. 3.3.2 Restriction of travel by rail would increase pressure of travel by road, which is noisier, more dangerous, less environmentally friendly, and slower. 3.3.2 Rationing freedom of travel by price would be politically unacceptable. 3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.4.1 UK can achieve success with major programmes (LHR T5 and Olympic) 3.4.2 Design goals must include minimise of risk. This has not been done by HS2 – eliminate excessive tunnelling, large work packages, gating of the entire project by one critical element, operation at unproven speeds, excessive project duration, big-bang rather than progressive introduction. 3.4.3 Form one team that comprises best experience available, can contribute all necessary skills 3.4.4 Avoid ‘mission creep’. 4. The strategic route 4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.1.1 Euston is the only London station capable of operating as the London terminus. It currently carries two commuting streams, whose diversion (to LU and Crossrail) would facilitate adaption potentially within the existing footprint and with reduced disruption to services. On completion of Crossrail which will serve Heathrow, the Heathrow Express service can be re- routed to Euston instead of Paddington. Removal of commuting traffic from Euston reduces pressure on its limited onward connections. 4.1.2 Hence, OOC appears unnecessary and should be replaced by a station at Milton Keynes (MK), to serve the travelling population of MK, Bedford and Northampton. Journey times would continue to be based on a one stop strategy. 4.1.3 We remain unconvinced of the overall benefit of introduction of constructing additional parkway stations. Upgrade of the city centre stations at Coventry and Leicester should be considered instead, at a frequency justified by travel volumes. 4.1.4 Curzon Street is the best location in Birmingham for a major national interchange. New Street cannot take more trains, or full-length high-speed trains. The HS2 Ltd proposal for a separate Curzon Street station for high-speed trains only would not enable interchange or connections with other services. It should be designed as Birmingham’s main station, with New Street acting primarily for suburban and regional commuter services. 4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.2.1 The Y network appears to be driven by a vision that the overlay high speed network ultimately evolves to be more and more independent of the existing network – imposing ever higher costs for ever reducing returns as it progresses north. HS2 appears to base the Y network on an untested assumption that there should be a hub at Birmingham International Interchange rather than in Birmingham City Centre, where existing lines meet. We question both these fundamental assumptions. 4.2.3 The distance between Birmingham and Manchester is approx. 110 kms – less than London to Birmingham. Even operating at 400kph cannot hope to save more than a few minutes compared with upgrading WCML via Crewe and Wilmslow. Any speed advantage would be negated if the Manchester HS2 station is not one of the existing main stations (Piccadilly and Victoria) so that interchange from other services was not possible. As far as is known, HS2 Ltd does not propose to use either of these stations. 4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.3.1 The immediate focus should be relief of capacity constraints on existing lines, which are most severe on (but not exclusive to) lines emanating from London 4.3.2 Similar priority should be given to capacity relief elsewhere permitting progressive service introduction. 4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.4.1 Government proposes the link to HS1 in phase I only because the necessary very expensive tunnel cannot be constructed later. But a simple linkage can be made with HS1 at low cost by using the North London Line from the Primrose Hill tunnels through the former Chalk Farm station, building one new two-track bridge over Camden High Road to double trackage here from 2 to 4 tracks, and lay double track on the viaduct which connects the NLL with HS1. This viaduct was built for stock movements north of St Pancras as part of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link Phase 2. This means a connection is possible for through trains at relatively low cost. 4.4.2 We do not believe there will ever be a case for construction of a tunnelled link to Heathrow from the proposed HS2 alignment. The economic and effective link would be to operate Heathrow Express from Euston instead of Paddington, once Crossrail is carrying air passengers between Central London and the airport terminals.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity No comments offered

6. Impact

6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

6.1.1 HS2 Ltd has chosen to design the route to support speeds of 400kph (250mph), sub- stantially faster than any other operator, despite its claim that it will not be a pioneering solu- tion. (Even China, acknowledged by HS2 Ltd to be the driving force in HSR has reduced its target speed to 300kph in view of high ticket costs and safety hazards involved in travelling faster, and despite the much greater distances between cities compared with UK). A reduc- tion of max speed from 400 to 320 kph (250 to 200mph) will save approx 1/3 of energy used and an equivalent reduction in greenhouse gases, if power is predominantly generated by non- renewable sources. A railway designed for a maximum speed of 320kph. 6.1.2 A route designed for a maximum speed of 320kph will reduce the energy and cost as- sociated with the direct cost of tunnelling by 75%, since fewer and shorter tunnels are re- quired. Contributions to energy usage and cost for removal of spoil, the volume of which HS2 Ltd appears to have grossly underestimated, are similarly reduced. 6.1.3 HS2 Ltd has ignored the benefit to the environment available from modal shift of freight from road to rail enabled by transfer of passenger capacity from existing to new high speed lines. As it has failed to analyse the capacity released to freight on WCML, it is not possible to comment on this benefit. 6.1.4 HS2 Ltd has examined extension of the line in phase to provide direct access at Lon- don Heathrow, at a cost of some £4bn to serve some 2,800 travellers daily. It has ignored the much more pressing opportunity to improve local rail service at Heathrow for its 48K workers and 200,000 passengers daily whose journeys start or end within 50 miles of the airport. (When LHR was closed by volcanic ash and strikes early this year, the beneficial impact on traffic volumes and therefore flows was remarkable for a radius of at least 20 miles from the airport. 6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2.1 In the absence of an EIA, this question cannot be answered. It is extraordinary and completely unacceptable that HS2 will not release an EIA until the final route has been agreed. 6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network? 6.3.1 HS2 Ltd claims that capacity for freight will be increased by the existence of the high speed line. It provides no evidence to substantiate the claim. We believe the scheme should be allowed to proceed only if, as result, 2 tracks of the WCML between London / Southamp- ton and the West Midlands can be dedicated to freight. 6.3.2 HS2 proposes to route high speed trains on the WCML initially from Lichfield north and in the longer term from the interchange for Manchester / Liverpool. For freight travel- ling on WCML further north (including Scotland), where the WCML is a two track line, the consequences are disastrous. Each additional high speed train will displace 3 – 5 freight trains and therefore force 100 to 150 HGVs back onto the M6 motorway at high energy cost. Many of these will necessarily travel at night to avoid congestion, an increase of perhaps 50% on roads which are already unacceptably noisy at night. 6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during construc- tion, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4.1 HS2 Ltd indicates that reconstruction of Euston will take 8 ½ years, the longest single element of the entire programme. It therefore determines the critical path to completion. Choice of an alternative route could lead to service introduction on the high speed line up to 5 years earlier, bringing benefit rather than disruption to the UK’s over stretched network. 6.4.2 HS2 Ltd’s solution to overcrowding at Euston station is construction of an entirely new interchange at Old Oak Common, for which connections must be provided by tube, cross rail, bus and taxi. Introduction of these additional services in a busy area of North West London will create further disruption during construction and congestion in operation. 6.4.3 Overcrowding at Euston can be resolved by routing commuter traffic unto either London Underground or Crossrail using existing and new links. Disruption during recon- struction at Euston would then be greatly reduced, and it is possible that the reconfiguration could take place within the existing footprint – avoiding destruction of homes and disruption of the lives of hundreds of people. 6.4.4 A similar approach to distribution of traffic between New St and the proposed Curzon St stations in Birmingham would offer similar benefits.

May 2011 

WrittenevidencefromtheBowGroup(HSR94)

Introduction

1. TheBowGroupexiststodeveloppolicy,publishresearchandstimulatedebatewithinthe ConservativeParty.Ithasnocorporateview,butrepresentsallstrandsofConservative opinion.

2. Wehaveaparticularinterestintransport,energyandtheeconomy,allofwhicharerelevant totheHS2proposals.TheBowGroup’sresearchpaper,“TheRightTrack”,1inJanuary2010 contributedtothehighspeedraildebate.Asummaryofourrecommendationsfromthat studyisappended.Linkhere: http://www.bowgroup.org/files/bowgroup/The_Right_Track_PDF.pdf

3. Wearegratefulfortheopportunitytoprovidethisresponsetoanumberofthe Committee’squestions.

Q1ͲWhatarethemainargumentseitherfororagainstHSR?

4. TheargumentforaUKHSRnetworkrequiresanintegratedintermodaltransportandspatial planningpolicycontext,testedthroughthedemocraticprocess.Policyobjectivesmight includeassistingmodalshiftfrombothroadandairtorail,enablingthedecarbonisationof theUK’stransportnetwork,providingnetworkͲwidebenefits,promotingregionaleconomic competitiveness,clarityinfinancialappraisalandminimisingenvironmentalimpacts.We believethatitisalsocriticalthatHeathrowandHS2areconsideredholistically.

5. ThecurrentHS2consultationproposalslacksuchstrategicpolicyobjectivesanddemocratic legitimacy.Thishasresultedinaflawedproposal,whichhasledtowellinformedcriticism onspecificaspectsofHS2and,worryingly,encouragedmoregeneraloppositiontothe principleofHSR.

6. WeagreewiththeCommittee’sconclusionthatclearpolicyobjectivesmustbeagreed beforethecasefororagainstHSRcanbeproperlyconsidered.2

Q2ͲHowdoesHSRfitwiththeGovernment’stransportpolicy objectives?

 1 “TheRightTrack,BowGroup,2010 www.bowgroup.org/files/bowgroup/The_Right_Track_PDF.pdf

2“TheGovernmentmustexplainthenatureoftheeconomicsolutionsthatitisseekingtodeliverthroughtransport spendingandhowtheschemesthatitissupportingwillachievetheseaims.Adetailedsetofobjectivesandarobust analyticalframeworkarerequiredagainstwhichproposalscanbeassessed.Largesumsofmoneyareinvolvedanddifficult choiceshavetobemade.WerecommendthataWhitePaperbepublished,clarifyingtheGovernment’sobjectivesforall transportspendingandthecriteriaitwillusefordecidingbetweendifferentclaimsontheavailableresources”–Transport andtheEconomy,HouseofCommonsTransportCommittee,March2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtran/473/473.pdf 7. Europeantransportpolicyobjectivesmakeitclearthataviationandhighspeedrailshould beplannedusinganintermodalapproach.3Incontrast,theUKcontinuestoadoptasilo approachtopolicy.  8. Forexample,DfT’sNewLineCapacityStudyin20074includedamappurportingtoidentify “thekeytransportcentresofprimaryimportance(ornodes)”.ThisshowedtheUK’smajor cities,aswellasportssuchasDoverandImminghamͲbutomittedHeathrow.

9. ThecurrentDfTconsultationonaviation,5whilstatleastrecognisingthatHS2exists,notes onlythat“inthelongerterm,muchofthedemandfordomesticaviationandfornearͲ EuropeanshortͲhaulaviationcouldbemetbyhighspeedrail”.

10. Government’soriginalremittoHS2Ltd.6continuedthissiloapproach,focusingonreducing journeytimesbetweenLondonandBirminghamtotheexclusionofwiderpolicyobjectives.7

11. Suchsilothinkingisnotnew.LordHeseltinehasnotedthat“asEnvironmentSecretary studyingthevariousproposedroutesforHS1,thencalledtheChannelTunnelRailLink,inthe early1990’s,IwassurprisedbythelackofimaginationshownbyBritishRailandtherail industryintheirplanstoconnectLondonwiththeChannelTunnel.TheroutechosenforHS2 mustnotbelefttotherailindustry,thoughtheirexpertiseandopinionisimportant.”8

12. However,itappearsthattheplanningofHS2hasbeenlefttotherailindustry,sinceHS2 Ltd’sadvisory/challengegroupslackanyrepresentationfromtheUKaviationindustry.9We believethatthisisresponsibleformanyoftheflawsinthecurrentHS2consultation proposal.

Q3ͲBusinesscase

Q4ͲThestrategicroute  3“Bettermodalchoiceswillresultfromgreaterintegrationofthemodalnetworks:airports,ports,railway,metroandbus stations,shouldincreasinglybelinkedandtransformedintomultimodalconnectionplatformsforpassengers”– European CommissionWhitePaper,RoadmaptoaSingleEuropeanTransportArea–Towardsacompetitiveandresourceefficient transportsystem,March2011 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/strategies/doc/2011_white_paper/white_paper_com(2011)_144_en.pdf

4 Figure2.1ͲKeyTransportNodesintheUK,DfTNewLineCapacityStudy,SupplementaryReport,May2007 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/researchtech/research/newline/suppreport.p df  5 DevelopingasustainableframeworkforUKaviation:Scopingdocument,DfTMarch2011 http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/open/2011Ͳ09/consultationdocument.pdf 6 7 “Thecompany’sobjectsarethe‘developmentofproposalsforanewrailwaylinefromLondontotheWestMidlandsand potentiallybeyond’ͲLetterfromSirDavidRowlandstoLordAdonis,13thFebruary2009 http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/55864  8 ForewordbyTheRt.Hon.LordHeseltine,TheRightTrack,BowGroup2010

9 HighSpeedRail:LondontotheWestMidlandsandBeyond.AreporttoGovernmentbyHS2Ltd.–HS2Ltd,2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/hs2r eport/  13. WerespondtoQuestions3and4together,asHS2Ltd’searlydecisionsonthebusinesscase Ͳinparticular,Heathrow’sdemandmodellingandthevalueofjourneytimesavingsͲwere fundamentaltothechoiceofthestrategicroute.

Heathrow’scontext

14. We–andothers1011ͲarguethatacoherenttransportstrategyshouldhaveHeathrowatits heart.Itistheworld’sbusiestinternationalairport,12andUK’sonlyhub,directly contributingaround1%ofGDP.13Anumberofissuescreateanurgentneedtosecurea sustainablefutureforHeathrow.

Heathrow’sgrowth

15. Followingthewithdrawalofsupportforathirdrunway,theCoalitionGovernment’saimisa Heathrowthatis“better,notbigger”.14However,evenwithtworunways,operatingwithin currentplanninglimits,Heathrowisforecasttogrowsignificantly,from65.7mpaa15in2010 to90mppa16or95mppa17by2030.SuchgrowthisoutsideGovernment’scontrol,andisa consequenceofairlinemarketforcesreplacingshorthauldomesticandnearͲEuropeflights withlargeraircraftservinglonghauldestinations.HeathrowisalreadytheUK’ssingle

 10“ThesurfaceaccessibilityofHeathrowistreatedasanancillaryissueinUKairtransportpolicy,withthisimportantissue onlybeingconsideredafterdecisionsonairsideinfrastructureandterminalshavebeenmade.Thisunderminesthepolicy objectiveoftheGovernmentwithrespecttodevelopingHeathrow,especiallywithregardtosecuringitseconomic contributiontothewholeoftheUK”ͲAddingCapacityatHeathrow–TransportStudiesUnit,UniversityofOxford2008 http://www.tsu.ox.ac.uk/pubs/1035ͲgivoniͲbanister.pdf

11“Inparticular,theTCPAhighlightstheneedforanintelligentapproachtointegratedspatialplanninginordertolinkHS2 withexistingrailservicesandcoͲordinatewithplanningforasustainablefuturefortheUK’sairports,especiallyLondon Heathrow”–TheCaseforaSustainableTransportSystem,TCPABriefingPaper26,May2011 http://www.tcpa.org.uk/data/files/resources/1040/TB26ͲHSR.pdf  12 http://www.flightmapping.com/news/CoventryͲAirport/BiggestͲbusiestͲairports.asp

13“Heathrowcontributes0.9%oftheUK’sGDP–significantlymorethananyothersinglesiteintheUK”ͲHeathrow Expansion,LondonAssembly2005http://legacy.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/plansd/heathrow_expansion.pdf

14“AsDavidCameronhasmadeveryclear,webelieveHeathrowshouldbebetternotbigger”–TheresaVilliers,July2009 http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/12/Theresa_Villiers_The_Conservative_position_on_aviation.aspx

15 BAApressrelease12thJanuary2011Ͳ http://www.baa.com/portal/page/BAA%20Airports%5EMedia%20centre%5ENews%20releases%5EResults/8b84191ed806 d210VgnVCM10000036821c0a____/a22889d8759a0010VgnVCM200000357e120a____/  16 UKAirPassengerDemandandCO2Forecasts,DfTJanuary2009Ͳ http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/aviation/atf/co2forecasts09/co2fore casts09.pdf  17 Heathrow InterimMasterplanJune2005,BAAͲ http://www.baa.com/assets/B2CPortal/Static%20Files/LHRInterimMasterPlan.pdf  largesttrafficgenerator18anditspoorsurfaceaccessrequiressignificantimprovementif thisgrowthisnottohaveunacceptablelocalimpacts.19

Heathrow’smarket

16. Heathrow’sexistingmarketisconcentratedonLondonandtheSouthEast.Howeverthis simplyresultsfromitsinaccessibilitybyrailfrommuchoftheUK–indeed,anywhereother thancentralLondon.20Accessis,intheory,possiblefromWales,thewestandsouthwestby changingtrainsatPaddington.Inreality,theinterchangepenalty21actsasdisincentiveto theuseofrail.Hence,Bristolgeneratesca.300,000surfaceaccesstripstoHeathrowpa,of whichonly6%aremadebyrail,andReading,just20minutesfromPaddington,withca. 750,000tripspa,only1.3%byrail.22

17. Heathrowthereforedependslargelyonroadaccess,overthemostcongestedpartsofthe UKnetwork.23RoadcongestionandthelackofrailaccessmeansthatBristol,just90miles fromHeathrowandinwhatshouldbeitsnaturalmarketcatchment,sees10,000passengers bypassHeathroweachweektointerlineinsteadatotherEuropeanhubs.2411.5%of Heathrow’sUKoriginanddestinationpassengerscomefromBerkshireand Buckinghamshire,whereasonly2.8%comefromBirmingham,Manchester,Liverpool,Leeds, Sheffield,Newcastle,Edinburgh,Glasgow,CardiffandBristolcombined.25

 18 “LondonBoroughofHillingdonUDPAdoptedSeptember1998http://www.hillingdon.gov.uk/media/pdf/7/5/udp.pdf

19“Evenwithoutathirdrunway,absolutenumbersrequiringsurfaceaccesstoHeathrowwillincreasedramaticallyoverthe next20years.In2001/2,around27mppausedcarsandtaxistoaccessHeathrow.By2015/20,andassuminga40% sustainablesurfaceaccesstargethasbeenachieved,thisfigurewillbearound40mppa”ͲHeathrowExpansion,The LondonAssembly’sresponsetoBAA’sconsultationontheInterimMasterplanforHeathrow,LondonAssembly2005 http://ww.legacy.london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/plansd/heathrow_expansion.rtf

20“Heathrow’scatchmentareaisverylimitedtoGreaterLondon,thoughitisthemainUKairport,duetoitspoorsurface transportaccessibilityfromareasoutsideGreaterLondon–specificallythefacttheairportisnotanodeontheUKlong distancerailnetwork”ͲAddingCapacityatHeathrowAirport–GivoniandBanister,TransportStudiesUnit,Universityof Oxford2008

21 “Previousstudieshavedemonstratedthataninterchangeinarailaccessjourneytotheairportsuppresseddemandby approximately50%”ͲHighSpeedRailDevelopmentProgramme2008/09,StrategicChoices,MVA/SystraforGreengauge 21http://www.scribd.com/doc/39964950/HighͲSpeedͲRailͲDevelopmentͲProgramme  22 HeathrowHub:TheUK’sGlobalGateway,ArupsubmissiontoHS2Ltd,December2009 www.arup.com/.../091210_Arup_submission_to_HS2_Ltd_Full_Report_c_ARUP.ashx  23 “ThewesternsectionoftheM25istheUK’sbusiestsectionofmotorway.Over18%oftotalUKvehicledelayintheyear endingMarch2010wasexperiencedontheM25”ͲRoadstatistics2009:Traffic,SpeedsandCongestion,DfTJune2010 http://www.dft.gov.uk/adobepdf/162469/221412/221546/226956/261695/roadstats09tsc.pdf

24“MorethantenthousandpassengersaweekareturningtheirbacksondirectflightsfromLondonairportsandinstead travellingbetweenBristolInternationalandhubssuchasAmsterdamͲSchiphol,Frankfurt,ParisCharlesdeGaulle,Brussels andOslo,fromwheretheycanaccessconnectionstohundredsofdestinationsworldwide”ͲBristolAirportpressrelease 13thJune2008,http://www.bristolairport.co.uk/newsͲandͲpress/pressͲreleases/2008/6/tenͲthousandͲjoinͲhubͲclubͲatͲ bristolͲinternational.aspx

25 CAA2007UKO&Dpassengersurveydata  18. Incontrast,Schiphol,(33mpeopleaccessiblebyrailwithin200km)26,Frankfurt,(35mwithin 200km)27,CharlesdeGaulleandBrusselsseeacommercialimperativeinexpandingtheir marketsbydirectconnectiontohighspeedandclassicrailservicesservingacrossͲborder hinterland.28TheSchiphol/CharlesdeGaulleindustrialallianceispredicatedondirecthigh speedraillinksbetweenthetwoairports.29ExtendingHeathrow’scatchment,withnew directrailservices,wouldbenefitHeathrow’shuboperations.30

UKregionalcompetitiveness

19. ThecurrentHS2consultationconfirmsthatHeathrow“isvitaltotheUK’scompetitiveness: easyaccesstoHeathrowisoftenamajorfactorforbusinessindecidingwheretolocate.”31 Domesticflightsaccountedforonly6.6%ofHeathrow’scapacityin2010,32aresultof marketforcesleadingairlinestofocusonlonghaulroutesandthestructureoflanding charges.33Thecontinuingattritionofdomesticflightsandfrequencies,andthelackofarail alternative,reducesHeathrow’saccessibilityfromtheUKregions,increasingtheir dependenceontransfersthroughEuropeanhubstoaccessglobalmarkets.34This exacerbatestheiralreadyperipherallocationwithinEuropeandunderminestheirabilityto

 26“ForSchiphol,landsideaccessibilityisofessentialimportance.TheconstructionoftheHSLSouthlinewillplaceSchiphol ontheEuropeanHSLhighͲspeedrailnetwork.TheHSLwillextendSchiphol’scatchmentareatowardsAntwerpand Brussels”ͲLongtermvisionforSchipholGroup2009

27“Longdistancetrainsdoubled(surfaceaccess)marketsharebetween1998and2000,andsince2004highspeedlong distanceserviceshavecarriedmorepassengersthanlocalservices.19%oforiginatingpassengersusedhighspeedservices in2009,andthisisprojectedtoincreaseto30%by2015”ͲFrankfurtIntraplan2010

28“Inadditiontoderegulationoftheairtransportationmarkets,onereasonforthegrowingcompetitionamongthehubsis thattheircatchmentareasincreasinglyoverlap.TheimpetusherecomesfromthehighͲspeedrailsystems(ICE,TGV) permittingafastjourneytotheairport”ͲFraport2009

29AéroportsdeParisandSchipholGroup,December2008 http://www.schiphol.nl/SchipholGroup1/NieuwsPers/Persbericht/AeroportsDeParisAndSchipholGroupCreateALeadingGlob alAllianceInTheAirportIndustry.htm 30 “AnHSRnetworkservingHeathrowwouldalsoencouragethosewhocurrentlyinterlineatParisCDG,Amsterdamor FrankfurttouseHeathrow,thusstrengtheningHeathrow’scompetitivenesscomparedtootherEuropeanairportsforlong haulflights” - HighSpeedRailDevelopmentProgramme2008/09,StrategicChoices,MVA/SystraforGreengauge21

31 ConnectingtoHeathrow,Factsheet,DfT2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/connectingͲtoͲheathrow_0.pdf  32 CentreforAsiaPacificAviation,April2010http://www.centreforaviation.com/news/2011/04/11/londonsͲheathrowͲ competitiveͲdisadvantagesͲareͲbeginningͲtoͲhurt/page1

33 “Thedomesticpassengerchargewillincreasefrom£13to£20perpassenger,and,from1April2011anannualregulatorͲ approvedincreasewillalsobeimplemented,bringingthetotalchargeto£22perdepartingdomesticpassenger”–BBC News,31stJanuary2011http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/ukͲscotlandͲglasgowͲwestͲ12324693

34 “OrganisationsoutsideLondonwereconcernedabouttheimpactsoninternationalinvestmentintheregionsasaresult ofthelimitedandreducingnumberofservicestoHeathrowfromairportswithintheUK”–TransportandtheEconomy,, TransportSelectCommittee2011http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtran/473/473.pdf  compete.35DirectHSRaccesstoHeathrow,andimprovementstotheclassicrailnetwork, areneeded.

Modalshiftfromroadtorail

20. ImprovingHeathrow’saccessibilitybyrailwouldassistinincreasingrail’smodalshareof passengers(andstaff),essentialifHeathrow’sgrowthisnottoputunacceptablepressureon theHeathrowarea’salreadycongestedroads.Roadvehiclesareamajorcontributortopoor localairquality,36whichevenwithoutfurthergrowthofHeathrowexceedslegallybinding limits,37isamongsttheworstinLondon38andpresentsathreattoHeathrow’sabilityto operatewithinitscurrentlegallimits.39TheenvironmentalchallengeissignificantͲtaking airportoperationsalone,(andignoringairportrelatedsurfaceaccess),Heathrowisclaimed toberesponsibleforalmostonethirdofLondon’scarbonfootprint.40

21. Airpassengerstatisticsalsounderstatethechallenge,sinceeachpassengerusingprivate vehiclestoaccesstheairportcangenerateupto4roadjourneys,(eg:minicabs,kissand ride),estimatedtoberesponsiblefor70%ofairportrelatedCO2emissions.41

Modalshiftfromairtorail

22. IfHeathrowwasseamlesslyintegratedintoHSRservicesservingtheUK’sregionsandEurope (viaHS1),thiswouldreleasevaluableslotsattheairport,currentlyusedforshorthaul  35 “TheUKregionsareatamajordisadvantageintermsofaccessfrommajorworldmarkets.Thishamperstheabilityto attractinwardinvestmentandregionaleconomicgrowth”ͲEconomicImpactsofHubAirports,BritishChambersof Commerce2009 www.britishchambers.org.uk/.../BCC_Economic_Impacts_of_Hub_Airports.pdf

36para.275,LondonBoroughofHillingdonResponsetoConsultationonAddingCapacitytoHeathrowAirport2007 http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/hillingdon.pdf

37“In2001/2,airqualityclosetoaccessroadsatHeathrowfailedtheannualaveragedailyNO2objective.Monitoringhas alsoshownseveralbreachesofthePM10dailyaverageobjective”ͲParliamentaryOfficeofScienceandTechnologyreport 195,AviationandtheEnvironment2003http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/pn195.pdf  38 “TheareaaroundHeathrowcurrentlyhassomeofthepoorestairqualityinLondon.Airqualitymeasurementsshowthat annualaveragenitrogendioxide(NO2)levelsexceedthehealthbasedEUairqualitylimitvalues.”ͲAddingCapacityat Heathrow,MayorofLondon’sresponsetotheconsultation2008 http://www.legacy.london.gov.uk/mayor/.../docs/mayors_response_heathrow_report.rtf  39“AirqualitylimitscouldrequireBAAtoreducethenumberofaircraftusingHeathrow”ͲHeathrowExpansion,London Assembly2005

40“London’sroleasaninternationalaviationhubmeansthat(takingaccountonlyofHeathrow&LondonCityairports) aviationemissionsaccountfor34%ofitstotalcarbonfootprint”(TheMayorsClimateChangeActionPlan2007 http://www.static.london.gov.uk/mayor/.../climateͲchange/.../ccap_summaryreport.rtf–LondonCityAirportresponsible forlessthan1%withHeathrowaccountingfortheremaining33%,basedonfuelloadedintoaircraftonthegroundateach airport,andwithouttakingintoaccountthecarbonimplicationsofairportrelatedsurfaceaccess)

41“Aspartofastrategytoreducethecarbonimpactofsurfaceaccess,itisclearthatthereductionof“KissandFly” journeyswouldhaveasignificantimpactonreducingoverallcarbonemissionssinceitisthemostinefficientformofsurface access,requiringfourtripsperreturnflight.EstimatedlandsideCO2emissions(2005)from“KissandFly”(passengerdropͲ off,includingpassengersusingminicabs)equals70%ofestimatedCO2emissions”ͲBAA2008Ͳ2012TransportVision http://www.heathrowairport.com/assets//B2CPortal/Static%20Files/LHR_SAS.pdf.pdf domesticandnearͲEuropeflights,fornewlonghaulservicesthatcouldbenefittheUK’s globalconnectivity.

23. Thisislikelytohaveanegativeimpactonairqualityandcarbon,asaresultofsmallaircraft beingreplacedbylargerplanes.42However,theprocesshasbeenunderwayforsometime, andmaybeatleastpartiallyoffsetinanationalcontextbyHSRreplacingexistingshorthaul flightsfromUKregionalairportstoEuropeanhubs,(recognisingthedisproportionate environmentalimpactofsuchflights).43

Heathrow’soperationalefficiency

24. Heathrow’sforecastgrowthalsoimpactsontheairport’salreadyconstrainedoperations. Heathrowoccupiesthesmallestsiteofanymajorairport,1227hacomparedtoCharlesde Gaulle’s3309haandSchiphol’s2147ha.44AstrategythatallowedHSRtoprovideacoͲ locatedairportterminalandrailinterchangeoutsidethecurrentconstrainedairportsite couldprovideanumberofbenefits–forexample,improvingthepassengerexperience, providingtheadditionalpassengerprocessing(terminal)facilitiesnecessarytohandle Heathrow’sforecastpassengergrowthandcreatingmorespacewithintheairfieldfor aircraft–theoneactivitythatcan’tbemoved.Thiscouldimproveresilience,reducedelays andassistairqualitythroughmoreefficientairportoperations,(eg;reducingtaxiing distances).45

HeathrowandHS2

25. Earlypolicystatementsbybothmajorpoliticalpartiessupportedtheobjectiveofintegrating HSRandHeathrow.ConservativerailpolicyspecificallyendorsedanHSRrouteserving Heathrowdirectly,alongthelinespromotedbyArup(HeathrowHub),46whileLordAdonis 47andGeoffHoon,thethenSecretaryofState,48expressedsimilarsupport.

 42 “Nosensible,wellͲinformedpersonstillseriouslypretendsHS2isagreenalternativetoathirdrunway.“Thequestion nowisgivennothirdrunway,howwecanmaximisetheeffectivenessofourlimitedcapacityatHeathrow.Thatmeans morelongͲhaulflights.EverytimeBMIorBritishAirwayshavecancelledadomesticrouteinthepast,they’vereplacedit withamoreprofitablemediumorlonghaulroute.That’sexactlywhatwillhappenwhenHS2comesandmoredomestic routesgetcut”–NigelMilton,DirectorofPolicyandPoliticalRelationsBAA,ENDSReport434March2011 http://www.endsreport.com/28048/highͲspeedͲrailͲsetͲtoͲboostͲukͲemissionsͲfromͲaviation

43“Shorthaulpassengerflightsmakeadisproportionatelylargecontributiontotheglobalenvironmentalimpactsofair transport,muchlargerthanthosefromequivalentrailjourneys:C02emissionsperpassengerbyanaverageaircraftin 2001beingoverfourtimesthatofanequivalenttrain”ͲTheEnvironmentalEffectsofCivilAircraftinFlight,Royal CommissiononEnvironmentalPollution2002http://eeac.hscglab.nl/files/UKͲRCEP_CivilAviation_Nov02.pdf

44 Heathrow InterimMasterplan,BAAJune2005

45 “Delayscausedbyairportoperations,(lackofgatesetc),accountedin2006/07foreightpercentagepointsofthe33%of flightswhichweredelayed.EvencontrollingforcongestionwithrespecttoATM’sperrunway,theproportionofdelaysat Heathrowisrelativelyhigh” - ImagineaWorldClassHeathrow,LondonFirst,June2008 http://www.londonͲfirst.co.uk/documents/Imagine_a_world_class_Heathrow_FULL_REPORT.pdf  46“AConservativeGovernmentwillsupportproposalsalongthelinesoftheplanputforwardbyengineeringfirm,Arup,for anewHeathrowrailhub.ThiswouldlinkHeathrowterminalsdirectlyintothemainrailnetworkandthelinestoReading, 26. However,whatappearedtoaveryclearstatementbytheSecretaryofStatewas immediatelyqualifiedinthedebatethatfollowedhisannouncementtotheCommons, insteadconfirmingGovernment’sdecisionthatastationatOldOakCommonshouldprovide theHeathrowinterchange.49Clearly,thisruledoutadirectHS2alignmentviaHeathrow.

27. HS2Ltd’sconclusionscouldthereforebeseenaspreͲdetermined,withHS2Ltd.confirming itsunderstandingfromtheoutsetthatHeathrowwastoberelegatedtoa“convenient,”(not “direct”),interchangewithHS2.50

28. Webelievethisisafundamentalflawanddonotagreethataremoteinterchangesome 12kmfromHeathrow,withitsinherentinterchangepenalty,caneverprovidethepassenger experienceormodalshiftthatHeathrowandtheUKrequires.

29. TheCoalitionGovernment’sSecretaryofStateforTransport,inhisevidencetothe TransportSelectCommitteesoonaftertakingoffice51tookthesameviewandconsequently providedHS2Ltd.witharevisedremit.52

30. Inourview,thissignificantchangetotheentirebasisonwhichHS2Ltd.haddevelopedtheir originalproposalsshouldhaveledtoafundamentalreappraisal.However,HS2Ltd.simply

 Oxford,Bristol,Plymouth,Cardiff,Swansea,CheltenhamandSouthampton,greatlyimprovingpublictransportlinkstothe airport.”ͲConservativePartyRailReview2009 http://www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/2009/02/Getting_the_best_for_rail_passengers.aspx  47 “Ithinkthatit(theHeathrowHub)isanattractiveidea.It’svitalthatwehaveanintegratedapproachtoplanningnew railcapacityandanynewairportcapacitythat’salsorequired.”ͲLordAdonis,SundayTimes4thJanuary2009 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article5439472.ece

48 “AHeathrowInternationalHubstationontheGreatWesternlinetoprovideadirectfourwayinterchangebetweenthe airport,thenewnorthͲsouthline,existingGreatWesternrailservicesandCrossrail,intotheheartofLondon”ͲSecretaryof StateforTransport15thJanuary2009Column356, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090115/debtext/90115Ͳ0006.htm

49 “OurproposalsonthehubareforasitemuchclosertowestLondon,onlandalreadyownedbyNetworkRail,atthe junctionoftheexistingGreatWesternlineandtheproposedCrossrailline.AHeathrowhubwouldnotnecessarilyhaveto beplacedclosetoHeathrow”–SecretaryofStateforTransport,15thJanuary2009, Column368 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090115/debtext/90115Ͳ0007.htm

50“HeathrowInternationalstation:ThismustprovideaninterchangebetweenHS2,theGreatWesternMainLineand CrossrailwithconvenientaccesstoHeathrow”ͲLetterfromSirDavidRowlandstoLordAdonis,13thFebruary2009

51“Whatisclearisthis:therehastobeaformofconnectiontoHeathrowthatmakessensetoairtravellers,thatfeelslike aproperrailtoairconnectionofthetypethatmanymajorEuropeanairportshave.Frankfurt,Paris,toalesserextent Schipol,haveexcellentrailtoairconnections.Itisaboutthepassengerexperience..Therehastobeaconnectionwhich feelsrighttoairlinetravellers,whichwillencourageasitwereinterliningbetweenairandtrain.Thatcannotbelugyour heavybagsdownacoupleofescalators,along600metresofcorridorandthenchangetrainsatawet,suburbanstation somewhereinnorthwestLondon.Thatisnotanoption.Itisalsoclearthattherecouldbeoptionsthatinvolvedatransfer pointthatwasremotefromtheairportitself,providedtheseamlessnessoftheservicewasofatypethatairlinepassengers wouldfindacceptable.”–Q48,PhilipHammond,SecretaryofState,EvidencetoHouseofCommonsTransportSelect CommitteeontheSecretaryofState’sPrioritiesforTransport,26thJuly2010 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmtran/359/10072602.htm

52 LetterfromPhllipHammondtoSirBrianBriscoe,11thJune2010http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/57834 proposedaspur,retrofittedtotherouteoriginallyproposed,withtheintentionof constructingthisaspartofthesecondphaseofHS2,by2033attheearliest,andwiththe abilityforextensiontoformaloopatanevenlaterdate.

31. Itisimportanttorecognisetheinherentinefficienciesinaspur,intermsofservice frequency,operationalcostandflexibilityandlinecapacity.

32. Forexample,fourtrackingofthemainHS2routeeachsideofitsjunctionwiththespurmay berequirediftheprojected18trainsperhourcapacityisnottobereduced.Thetechnical notesconfirmthatthemaximumspeedoverturnoutswouldbe230kphmaximum53whilst theroutemaps54showalinespeedbetween300and360kphoverthesectionfromwhich thespurwoulddiverge.Heathrowservicesjoininganddivergingfromthespurwould thereforeneedtoaccelerateto/deceleratefromlinespeedtoallowthelowerspeed turnoutsandspur,onaca.3200mradiuscurve,55tobenegotiated.Tothewestofthe proposedjunction,fourtrackingwouldnecessitateadditionalboresoveratleastsomeof thelengthoftheproposedM25ͲAmershamtwinboretunnel.

33. Withoutfourtracking,HS2’sbusinesscase,whichisreliantonthe18tphservicepatternand whichisalreadymarginalatbest,islikelytobeunsupportable.Evenwithfourtracking,itis unlikelythatheadwayswouldallowasmanyas18tph.

34. TheconsultationsuggeststhatHeathrowmightbeservedbyhalflengthtrains,whichwould splitandjoinenroutetoHeathrow.56Thiswouldreducecapacityby50%,makingiteasier tofilltrains.Thispresumablyrecognisesthechallengeoffillingdedicatedtrainsat sufficientlyhighfrequencieswhilstrelyingsolelyonairporttraffic.

35. However,joiningandsplittingtrainsaddstocost,asitrequiresadditionaltraincrews, includingtheneedtostaffseparateportionsofthetrain,includingcateringfacilities.There mayalsobeanimpactonthesizeofthetrainfleet.Thereisalsoajourneytimepenalty resultingfromtheneedtosplitandjointrains,andprovidetimetabledresilience.Itisnot clearhowthisrelatestoHS2Ltd’sassumptionof£300Ͳ600mbenefitsforeachminutesaved.

36. AspurmayalsoincuritsowninterchangepenaltyiftheHeathrowinterchangecannot,as seemsinevitableduetolackofspaceandotherconstraints,beimmediatelycoͲlocatedwith anairportprocessor,(terminal).57HS2Ltd’sanalysissuggeststhatasiteintheCentral  53 HighSpeedRail:LondontotheWestMidlandsandBeyond–HS2TechnicalAppendix,HS2Ltd.December2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/tech nicalappendix/pdf/report.pdf  54 HS2Routemap5Ͳhttp://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/HS2ͲARPͲ00ͲDRͲRWͲ04205.pdf  55 “Minimumdesirableradiusofcurvature–200kph1800m,300kph4050m,360kph5900mand400kph7200m”ͲHS2Ltd TechnicalSpecificationhttp://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77048

56 “Aspur…wouldallowHS2servicestostartatHeathrowandsplitonroutetoserveanumberofdestinationsinthe Midlands,theNorthandScotland”–ConnectingtoHeathrow,FactsheetDfT2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/connectingͲtoͲheathrow_0.pdf

57“TheattractivenessofairͲraillinksiscertainlyinhibitedwhenpassengershavetotransfertoasecondmodeoftransport inordertoreachtheirterminalbecausetherailwaystationisnotintegratedintotheterminalbuilding”ͲPotentialand TerminalAreaisunlikelytobefeasible,58whileaT5sitewouldneedtobesomedistance fromtheterminalitself.Incontrast,Arupenvisageaprocessorfullyintegratedwiththeir proposedroadandrailinterchange,(HeathrowHub),withairsidetransitandbaggage connectionstosatellitesontheairfield,avoidinganyinterchange(andservicefrequency) penalties,andallowingafastandseamlesspassengerexperiencefromkerb/traintoaircraft.

37. Governmentproposesthataspurcouldbeextendedatalaterdatetoallowthrough services.However,thesignificantadditionalcostandlimitedadditionalbenefitssuggestthat thisunlikelytobefeasible.Europeanexperienceindicatesthattheinevitablejourneytime penaltywouldrestrictthefrequencyofthroughtrains.59

38. WearenotaloneinseeingtheinherentflawsintheconceptofservingHeathrowbyaspur orloop–sodotheInternationalAirRailOrganisation60MVASystra,61andGreengauge21 62ͲandDfTthemselves.63

39. SNCF64andStarAlliance,65forexample,confirmtheirexperiencethatsuccessfulair/rail interchangesinEuropeareaconsequenceoftheirlocationonthroughlines.

 LimitationsofAirͲrailLinks–AGeneralOverview,AndreasEichingerundAndreasKnorr,IWIMͲInstitutfürWeltwirtschaft undInternationalesManagement,UniversitätBremen2004http://www.iwim.uniͲbremen.de/publikationen/pdf/w034.pdf

58 “Buildingacavernatleast1kmlongandover60mwideunderneathaliveairportwouldbeextremelydifficult” – High SpeedRail:LondontotheWestMidlandsandBeyond.AreporttoGovernmentbyHS2Ltd.–HS2Ltd,2009

59“AloopofhighspeedrailwayhadbeenbuilttoserveCologne/Bonnairportbutthishadadded15minutestotherail journeytimeandasaresulttheloopwaslittleused”ͲHighSpeedRailAccesstoHeathrow,AReporttotheSecretaryof StatebyLordMawhinneyJuly2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhin neyreport/pdf/highspeedrailaccessheathrow.pdf

60 “DedicatedtrainsbetweenHeathrowandtherestofthecountrywouldbenecessary.Thisisamajordisadvantage.With trainsservingLondon,Heathrow,theMidlandsandbeyond,thecombinedloadwouldjustifyareasonablefrequency.Trains justconnectingHeathrow,theMidlandsandbeyondwouldattractfewerpassengersandwouldnotjustifysuchafrequent service–whichwouldbeadeterrenttouse”–HighSpeedRailatHeathrow:aninternationalperspective, InternationalAir RailOrganisation,December2009  61“Tobeattractiveforairlinepassengers,the(rail)servicefrequencyneedstobeatleastoneperhour.Evenonour assumptionthatmorethanonecitycanbeservedwithasingletrain(whichdependsonthestructureoftheHSRnetwork), manyoftheflowsarenotviable.ThesolutionwillrequireservingHeathrowbytrainsthatalsoserveothermarkets,suchas LondontoBirmingham/Manchester,placingHeathrowasanintermediatestation”ͲHighSpeedRailDevelopment Programme2008/9,StrategicChoices,MVASystraforGreengauge21

62“Thekeyreally,asfaraswecouldseefromwhathashappenedinFrance,istomaketheairportstationastationcallen route” - Q147,evidencebyJimSteer,Director,Greengauge21toCommonsTransportSelectCommittee,11thNovember 2009http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmtran/38/38ii.pdf  63“TheinterchangewithHeathrowshouldbeconsideredasthroughserviceswillnotbeabletorunfromallpoints,both becausedemandwouldnotbesufficientandbecauseeveryHeathrowtrainwouldtakeapathonthenewlinewhichcould beusedforLondonboundtrains”ͲNewLineCapacityStudy–CostEstimate,DfT,July2007 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/researchtech/research/newline/costestimate .pdf 40. Aspurisalsolikelytohaveconsiderableenvironmentalimpacts.Aroutebetween,for example,Heathrow’sT5andthemainHS2linewouldbeentirelywithintheGreenBeltand ColneValleyRegionalPark,wherethereisalreadyconcernovertheenvironmentalimpactof themainHS2routecrossingtheParkanditsSSSI.66HS2Ltd.mayinduecoursepropose extensivetunnellingtopartlymitigatetheseimpacts,althoughthegradeseparatedjunction withthemainHS2linewouldnecessarilybeatgrade,(orelevatedsinceHS2crossesthe ColneValleyona3.6kmviaductintheareawherejunctionsareshown).Thecostsofthis lengthoftunnelwouldalsobesubstantial.67

41. Thespur,fromthemostrecentlypublishedmaps68andstatements,69alsoappearstoonly provideanorthernchord.Whilstthiswouldallowhighspeedrailservicesbetween Heathrow,Birminghamandthenorth,thiswouldprecludeservicesfromtheeast–ie;from HS1andEurope.Thiswouldpresumablyhavetoawaitanyfutureextensionofthespurto “loopbacktothemainHS2linesothattrainsfromWestMidlandsandbeyondcouldcallat HeathrowonthewaytoLondon.”70

42. ItisnotclearhowthisverylongtermaspirationrelatestotheGovernment’sobjective,in thecurrentaviationconsultation,“that,inthelongerterm,demandfor….muchofnearͲ EuropeanshortͲhaulaviationcouldbemetbyhighͲspeedrail”.71

43. Heathrowmighteventuallybeservedbyaspurbythe2030’s.However,intheinterim, BAA’sTransportandWorksActOrderapplicationforAirtrackhasbeenwithdrawnand Heathrow,undercurrentproposals,willbesolelyreliantonCrossrailforbetterrailaccess. However,Crossrailisforecasttogenerateverylittlemodalshift,72andsimplyreinforces

 64“ThecommercialsuccessofTGVisduetothefactthatRoissyIsathroughstation”ͲGuillaumePepy,ChairmanSNCF, TransportTimesconferenceMay2009

65 “Heathrowrequiresan“onͲairport”stationonHS2,andlocatedonthedirecthighspeedroute,notonaspurorloop”– StarAlliancesubmissiontoLordMawhinney,June2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhin neyreport/pdf/appendix3_29.pdf  66 ColneValleyNewsRelease,March2011Ͳhttp://www.colnevalleypark.org.uk/High%20speed%202%20Ͳ%20CVP%20Ͳ %20March%202011.pdf

67 “Tunnelscostabout5Ͳ6timesmoreperkmthanbuildingthroughopencountryside” – HighSpeedRail,Londontothe WestMidlandsandBeyond,AReporttoGovernmentbyHighSpeedTwoLtd.December2009

68 Figure1.1,HighSpeedRail:InvestinginBritain’sFuture–DfTFebruary2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hsrͲconsultation.pdf

69 “Aspur…wouldallowHS2servicestostartatHeathrow….toserveanumberofdestinationsintheMidlands,theNorth andScotland”–ConnectingtoHeathrow,FactsheetDfT2011  70 ConnectingtoHeathrow,FactsheetDfT2011

71 DevelopingasustainableframeworkforUKaviation:Scopingdocument,DfTMarch2011 http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/open/2011Ͳ09/consultationdocument.pdf

72 “AnalysisofpassengerandstaffdatasuggeststhatCrossrailwillnotcontributeasmuchtotheairport’spublictransport modesharegrowthasAirtrack,astheareasserveddonothavesuchsignificantnewpassengerandstaffresident populations”–SustainingtheTransportVision2008Ͳ2012,BAA existingaccessfromcentralLondon.ItisthereforedifficulttoseehowHeathrow’sgrowth canbemanagedwithoutunacceptableenvironmentalimpactsonairqualityandroad congestion,andhowitshubstatusandUKregionalcompetivenesscanbeimproved.

44. Inourview,onlyadirectHS2alignmentviaHeathrowprovidestherightsolutionforboth HeathrowandHS2.TheBowGrouphavepreviouslynotedwhatappeartobethebenefitsof Arup’sHeathrowHubproposal.PredatingthepoliticalsupportforHSRandHS2Ltd’swork, thiswouldprovideadirectHS2routeviaHeathrow,achievingseamlessair/railinterchange andaveryhighservicefrequencyinthefirstphaseoftheUK’shighspeedrailnetwork.It alsoincludesadirectconnectionbetweentheGWMLandHS2,andallowsarangeof regionalhighspeedservicesusingnewandexistingrailinfrastructure,transforming connectivityacrosstheUK.

45. Weremainconvincedthattheoriginalpoliticalconsensusforadirectinterchangebetween HeathrowandHS2istherightsolutionfortheUK.However,wehavereviewedHS2Ltd’skey assumptionstoconsiderwhethertheirprioritisationofjourneytimesavingsbetween LondonandBirminghamoverHeathrowcanbejustifiedinwholeorpart.

HS2demandmodelling

46. Heathrowgeneratesmuchgreatertrafficthanrail’sbusiestroutes.Existingrailjourneys betweenLondonandBirminghamtotalled2min2006/7,Manchester2.1mandLeeds1.5m. Thesethreecitiesare,byadecentmargin,thebiggestmarketsforrail.73

47. Heathrowbycontrastgeneratesalmost60millionUKoriginanddestinationpassenger journeysannually,(excludingstaff).74Assumingtheproportionoftransfertrafficremains constant,thiscouldincreasetoca.84mby2030.

48. Heathrow’smarketis,aspreviouslydiscussed,currentlydominatedbyLondonandthe SouthEast,reflectingthedifficultyofaccessingtheairportfromotherregions.  49. However,HS2Ltd’sdemandmodellingassumedthat,regardlessofanyimprovementsin surfaceaccess,Heathrow’sexistingmarketcatchmentwouldremainunchanged.75Hence, theirdecisiontosimplyextrapolatefromcurrentdemand,albeitadjustedtoreflectto reflectprojectedgrowthinpassengernumbers,andtheconclusionthatHS2demandis“not

  73 OptionDevelopmentReport,NewLinesProgramme,NetworkRail,undated http://www.networkrail.co.uk/documents/About%20us/New%20Lines%20Programme/5881_Option%20Development%20 Report.pdf  74“Inadditiontothe43mpassengersurfaceaccessjourneysin2008peopleaccompanyingorcollectingairpassengers (passengers“escorts”)areestimatedbyBAAtohavemade13mjourneys,ofwhich95%werebycar”–HeathrowHub,The UK’sGlobalGateway–SubmissiontoHS2Ltd,December2009 www.arup.com/.../091210_Arup_submission_to_HS2_Ltd_Full_Report_c_ARUP.ashx 75 “TheexpectedcatchmentareasforHS2railtrips…containlessthan10%oftheairpassengersaccessingHeathrow”Ͳ HS2AirportDemandModel,SKM2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/appr aisalmaterial/pdf/airportdemandmodel.pdf sostrongforHeathrowaccessͲwrongmarket(mainmarketisSouthEast),only1Ͳ2,000 passengersperdayforecasttogotoHeathrowonHS2”76  50. HS2Ltd.thereforeforecastjust1,400passengersperdaywoulduseHS2toreachHeathrow, (assumingathirdrunwayandca.95mnonͲtransfer,terminalpassengers)Ͳjust0.5%ofthe total.HS2Ltd’smostrecentreviewofdemand,adjustedtoallowforthecancellationofa thirdrunwayandareduced2030terminalpassengerforecastofca.66mterminal passengers,wouldpresumablyreduceeventhislowforecast.77  51. Webelieve,andEuropeanexperienceconfirms,thatimprovingsurfaceaccesstoHeathrow wouldinfactexpanditsmarketcatchment.Forexample,itislikelythatalargepercentage ofthe0.75millionsurfaceaccesstripsfromReadingand0.65millionfromOxfordͲofwhich 98.7%and98.9%respectivelyarecurrentlymadebyroadͲwouldswitchtorailifHeathrow wasservedbyfrequent,fastanddirectGWMLservicesas,forexample,Arup’sHeathrow Hubproposalprovides.78

52. Thesamelogicappliestolongdistanceservices.TheWestMidlandscurrentlygeneratesless than3%ofHeathrow’ssurfaceaccessjourneys.IfHS2providedafastandfrequentservice toHeathrow,Europeanexperience–andlogicͲsuggeststhatthiswouldsignificantly increasedemand.Forexample,theproportionofFrankfurt’spassengersarrivingbyHSR increasedfrom14%toalmost17%between2006and2007,withtheproportiontravelling morethan100kmtoflyfromFrankfurtalsoincreasingfrom37%to40%inthesameperiod. 79  53. LordAdonisspecificallynotedthisexperience,80whichresultsfromFrankfurtairport’s locationonathroughhighspeedline,notaspurorloop,allowingawiderangeof destinationstobeservedathighfrequencies.  54. Highspeedrailrequiresverylargetrafficvolumesforviability,withHS2Ltd’sbusinesscase dependenton18tphineachdirection,eachwithasmanyas1100seats.Directservicesto HeathrowwouldthereforeassistHS2Ltd’sbusinesscase.  55. HS2Ltd’sassumptionsonHeathrowdemand,ifunchanged,arelikelytohaveasignificant impactonanybusinesscasefortheproposedHeathrowspur.

56. HS2Ltd’sassumptionof18tphineachdirectionbetweenLondonandBirminghamexcludes anyHeathrowservices.81IfHS2Ltd.continuestosuggestlimitedHS2demandfor  76 HS2LtdTechnicalSeminar,Modelling,ForecastingandEconomicAppraisalhttp://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77489  77 SKMUpdateforAtkins,ModellingandAppraisalUpdatesandtheirimpactontheHS2BusinessCase,AReportforHS2 Ltd,AtkinsApril2011http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77824

78 HeathrowHub:TheUK’sGlobalGateway,ArupsubmissiontoHS2Ltd,December2009

79 FraportInvestorDay,Frankfurt,September19,2007

80 “Some16%ofallFrankfurtairportpassengersnowcometoandfromtheairportbyICE(highspeedrail)from destinationsacrossGermany.ThisexperienceneedstobestudiedcarefullyasHS2assessoptionsforservingHeathrow”– LordAdonis,May2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/press/speechesstatements/speeches/spchintertransr ev  Heathrow,itislikelythatreplacingahighlyvaluedLondontrainwithalowervalue HeathrowservicewouldhaveasignificanteffectonHS2’sBCR,(particularlyif,asdiscussed earlier,eachtrainpathoverthespurresultsinthelossofmorethanonepathonthe throughline).TheCatch22isthatanythingotherthanaveryhighfrequencyservicewould incurservicefrequencypenalties,82inevitablysuppressingdemandforHeathrowservices andmakingitdifficulttocreateacrediblebusinesscaseforaveryexpensivespur.

57. Alternatively,ifHS2Ltd.nowconcludethatthereisacaseforfrequentservicesto Heathrow,(necessarytojustifyuseofwhatwouldotherwisebevaluablepathsforLondon services),thenitmaybeaskedwhythisdoesnotjustifyanHS2routeservingHeathrow directlysince,aswediscussbelow,adirectalignmentincursonlymarginaljourneytime penaltiesandcostsapproximatelythesame.

HS2journeytimesavings

58. HS2Ltdclearlyfocusedonaperceivedneedforspeed,asaresultoftheappraisal methodologyestablishedatanearlystage.83Thisledtoachangeinemphasis,from referenceto“sufficientspeed”84totheapparentdecision,bythesummerof2009,that onlyrouteswhichcouldprovideaveryhighspeedof400kphwereunderconsideration.85

 81“TheeconomiccaseforHS2includesthelinktoHS1forthefirstphaseandthespurtoHeathrowforthesecondphase. However,theserviceplanspresentedforHS2donotincludeservicestoeither,butusesallthetrainpathsavailableonHS2 (18/hr)withoutthem.DfTsaythisisbecausethedecisiontoincludeHeathrowandHS1wasannouncedtoolate”–Review oftheFebruary2011consultationbusinesscaseforHS2,HS2ActionAlliance2011 http://www.hs2actionalliance.org/index.php/businessͲcase/consultationͲbusinessͲcaseͲfebͲ11  82“Frequencyisusuallytreatedasbeingveryimportantintransportmodelling–subjecttoaweighting,intervalsbetween trainsoraircraftaretreatedasequivalenttoadditionalinͲvehicleminutes.Typically,animprovementinfrequencyfroma trainorplaneevery2hourstoevery1hourisconsideredashavingthesameimpactonmarketshareasareductionin journeytimeof20Ͳ30minutes.Inordertobeabletocomparetheimportanceoffrequencywiththeimportanceofjourney time,wecalculateafrequencypenaltymeasuredinminutesforeachmodeandroute.Thepointofthefrequencypenaltyis takeintoaccountthatalowservicefrequencymakesamoderelativelyunattractiveevenifthejourneytimeisfaster,and viceversa”–AirandRailCompetitionandComplementarity,SteerDaviesGleaveforEuropeanCommissionDGTREN2006 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/studies/doc/2006_08_study_air_rail_competition_en.pdf

83 “Earlytestssuggestedthatreducingjourneytimesbyoneminutewouldprovidebenefitsofaround£300Ͳ600m(present valuediscountedover60yearsin2009prices)onafullyutilisedhighspeedline”–HS2DemandModelAnalysis,HS2Ltd. February2010 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/dem andandappraisal/pdf/report.pdf

84 “Thenewlineshouldbesufficientlyhighspeedtooptimisejourneytimebenefitsbalancedwithoperationalenergycosts andachievementofmaximumcapacity.ItislikelytobedesignedtoatleastthemaximumspeedofHS1”ͲLetterfromSir DavidRowlandstoLordAdonis,13thFebruary2009

85 “Withsuchahightopspeed,therecouldbenotunnelsandfewcurves.Aerodynamicforceswouldincreasetunnelcosts tendfold”ͲAndrewMcNaughton,ChiefEngineerHS2Ltd,RailNews1stJune2009. http://www.railnews.co.uk/news/business/2009/06/01ͲhsͲtwo.html 59. Hence,evenrelativelymodesttimepenaltieshavesubstantialadverseimpactsonthe businesscase,asrecentlyreͲconfirmedbythecurrentSecretaryofState,86(anddespite doubtbeingcastonsuchmethodologybyareviewofanotherDfTproject).87

60. Othershavepointedoutthevariousflawsinthismethodology.Indeed,HS2Ltd’slatest reviewofthebusinesscasehighlightsthepotentialdifficultyattachedtoprioritisingjourney timesavingsoverothercriteria,byconcludingthatomittingtheOldOakCommon interchange,(seenasessentialbyHS2Ltd.fordispersalofLondonpassengersontoCrossrail, aswellasprovidingaccesstoHeathrow),wouldfurtherreducejourneytimesandhence improvetheprojectsBCR.88

61. Wesuggestthattheprojectedjourneytimesavingof3minutesbetweenLondonand Birmingham89donotjustifythedecisiontoadoptaroutethatbypassesHeathrow.

62. Thedecisiontoadopta400kphdesignspeedhasalsocreatedfertilegroundforopposition, withthecurrentlyproposedroutethroughtheChilternscrossingthewidestpartofthe AONB.ItisdifficulttoreconcilethetranquillityoftheMisbourneValleywiththe Government’ssuggestionthatthisisa“majortransportcorridor”.

63. HS2Ltd.hasclearlyprioritisedspeedoveranyenvironmentalimpactsontheChilterns AONB,despitetheimportanceofitsstatutorydesignation,90andHS2Ltd’sown acknowledgementofitsequivalentstatustoNationalParks.91Itisalsoofconcernthatthe

 86 “Arailwaydesignedforalowerspeedwouldhaveaverysignificantimpactonthebusinesscase”–ResponsebyPhilip Hammond,SecretaryofState,TransportTimesconference4thNovember2010,quotedin GettingBackonTrack,CPRE February2011http://www.cpre.org.uk/campaigns/transport/rail/highspeed2

87“BenefitCostRatio(BCR’s)aresensitivetovariationsinthedata,assumptionsandvaluationsonwhichtheyarebased.It isalsolikelythataproject’sBCRwillchangeovertimeasitscontext,includingitspolicycontext,changes”ͲFosterReview ofIntercityExpressProgramme,SirAndrewFoster,DfT2010http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/iep/fosterreview/  88 “Accountingfortheincreasedcostsassociatedwiththeextrastation,theBCRoftheschemereducesfrom1.75without OldOakCommonto1.63withit” – ModellingandAppraisalUpdatesandtheirimpactontheHS2BusinessCase,AReport forHS2Ltd,AtkinsApril2011http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77824

89 ForarouteviaHeathrow “theadditionalroutelengthwouldentailalongerjourneytimebetweenLondonandtheWest Midlandsof3minutesfornonͲstoppingservices,and8minutesforservicesstoppingattheairport”–HighSpeedRail: InvestinginBritain’sFuture–DfTFebruary2011

90“Shoulditbeimplemented,thecurrenthighspeedrailproposalcouldnegativelyaffectthelocalenvironmentoftwo areas:theChilterns(whichisanAreaofOutstandingNaturalBeautyͲAONB)andtheValeofAylesburyandWarwickshire. Paragraph22ofthePlanningPolicyStatement7(SustainableDevelopmentinRuralAreas)statesthatmajordevelopment withinanAONBcanonlybeconsideredifitsatisfiesthefollowingcriteria:1)Itisclearlyinthenationalinterestand:2)It cannotbebuiltanywhereelse.TheChilternsConservationBoard,anindependentbodyestablishedbyParliamentaryOrder inJuly2004to“fostertheeconomicandsocialwellͲbeingoflocalcommunitieswithintheareaofoutstandingnatural beauty”,doesnotbelievethattheHighSpeedRailproposalmeetseitherofthesecriteria”(EnvironmentalLawFoundation –HighSpeedRailBriefingMay2010http://www.elflaw.org/wpͲcontent/themes/elftemplate/media/ELFͲBriefingͲHighͲ SpeedͲRailͲNetworkͲMayͲ2010.pdf)

91 “AONB’shaveequivalentstatustoNationalParksasfarasconservationisconcerned.ThesinglepurposeofAONB designationistoconserveandenhancethenaturalbeautyofthearea”ͲHS2TechnicalAppraisal http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/tech nicalappendix/pdf/report.pdf SecretaryofStateappearsnottoappreciatetheprotectionthatParliamentintended, dismissingtheMisbourneValleyas“notsomeConstablecountry”.92

64. Analternative,moresoutherlyHS2routeviaHeathrow,couldmorecloselyfollowtheM40 corridor,albeitrequiringsomecompromiseonspeed.However,theM40crossesthe narrowestpart(ca.12km)oftheChilternsAONB.Reducingspeedoverthisdistance,from HS2’sproposed360kph,(albeitonaroutedesignedfor400kph,with7200mradiuscurves), tosay300kph,(4050mradiuscurves),93andallowingthelinetomorecloselyfollowthe motorwayandfittopography,wouldincurajourneytimepenaltyoflessthanoneminute.

65. Clearlyanymajornewtransportinfrastructurewillresultinsomeenvironmentalimpacts. However,thismorebalancedapproach,advocatedinour2010paper,94issimilarthat proposedbyCPRE95andTheRightLinesCharter.96

66. ItalsofollowsEuropeanpractice,(eg:theCologneͲFrankfurt97andTurinͲMilan98highspeed lines),aligningHSRwithmotorwaycorridorstominimisetheirenvironmentalimpacts.This wastheapproachtakenbyHS1,which,byalsominimisingthelengthoflinecrossingthe



92 “Haveyoulookedattheroute?ItrunsalongtheA413.GreatMissendenisbeautiful,butitdoesn'tgothroughGreat Missenden.BetweenGreatMissendenandtheHS2routearetheA413,theChilternRailwayandalineofpylons.Sothisis notsomeConstablecountry”.PhilipHammond,DailyTelegraph11thDecember2010 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/roadͲandͲrailͲtransport/8194406/PhilipͲHammondͲhighͲspeedͲrailͲwillͲbeͲaͲ pleasantͲsurpriseͲforͲmany.html

93 HS2Ltdtechnicalspecification–minimumdesirableradiusofcurvature200kph=1800m,300kph=4050m,400kph= 7200mhttp://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/77048

94 “TheChilternswillbeoneareawherethatseemslikelytobeaffectedbythefirststageofaHSL.Acorridor(isrequired) whichminimisesimpactthroughroutingthehighspeedlineascloseaspossibletoexistingtransportroutesand..keepsto aminimumthedistancethelineruns..throughthedesignatedAONB.This…maymeanthatthereisasmalladverse impactonthemaximumpossibletrainspeedwhencomparedwithastraightroute”–TheRightTrack,BowGroupJanuary 2010

95“Damagetolandscape,heritageandtranquillitymustbeminimal,forexamplebyrunningnewlinesalongexistingroad andraillineswhereverpossible,aswellasextensivetunnelling,landscapingandnoisebarriers”ͲCPRE http://www.cpre.org.uk/campaigns/transport/rail/highspeedrail

96 CPRE,Greenpeace,RSPB,EnvironmentalLawFoundation,CampaignforBetterTransportandothers www.cpre.org.uk/resources/transport/item/download/531  97“Onenvironmentalgrounds,thenewline(betweenCologneandtheRhine/Mainconurbation)wasgenerallyconstructed inparallelwithanexistingmotorway,asclosetoitaspossible.Forthisreason,themaximumgradientwassetat40%, minimumtrackradiusat3350mandmaximumcantat170mm,whichallowsadesignspeedof300km/hraroundcurves.It provedpossibletoreducethenumberoftunnelscomparedwiththealignmentthatwouldhavebeennecessaryformixed traffic.Thismadeconstructingtheline15%cheaperthanitwouldhavebeenotherwise.”ͲDr.Ing.EberhardJaensch, NetworkStrategyUnit,DBNetzAG,RailwayTechnicalReview2/05http://vrt.fd.cvut.cz/data/konference/24ten.pdf

98“Therouteexploitsthenaturallieofthelandandrunsalongsidethemotorwaytominimiseenvironmentalimpact… withinacorridorwithanalreadydenseinfrastructure”–TheNewHighSpeedTurinͲMilan–Line,RFI2005 http://www.rfi.it/cmsͲfile/allegati/rfi/The%20new%20high%20speed%20TURIN%20Ͳ%20MILAN%20line.pdf KentAONB,iswidelyacknowledgedtoachieveasatisfactorybalancebetweenbenefitsand impacts.99

67. Thisapproachappearstohavemerit,evenifHS2Ltd’sfigureof£300Ͳ600mnetbenefitsper minutesavedisaccepted,(althoughtheoverallBCRcalculationappearstoallocatenovalue tothoseimpactsthatcannotbeeasilymonetised,suchaslandscape,heritageandhabitats). Reducingspeedalsoreducesnoise,100energyuse,101maintenancecosts,102and, potentially,cost,103(forexample,aroutethatwaslessconstrainedbytheneedtobe straightmaybeabletoavoidatleastsometunnelling).104

68. ItisthereforesurprisingthatanM40alignmentwasnotincludedinanyofHS2Ltd’s numerousoptionstudies.105

69. WethereforeconcludethatHS2Ltd’smethodologyisfundamentallyflawedandthatamore balancedassessmentofjourneytimesavings,environmentalimpact,costandbenefits, takinganintegratedapproachtoHeathrow,isrequired.

HS2costs

70. TheconsultationclaimsthatadirectHS2routeviaHeathrowisconsiderablymoreexpensive thantheGovernment’spreferredroute.106

71. Athroughrouteissaidtocostanadditional£2.9bnͲ£4.2bn,comparedtotheadditional spurcostof£2.5bnͲ£3.9bn.107However,athroughroutewouldallowomissionofthe(very  99 “HS1hasfittedintothesurroundingcountrysidewell,withfewcomplaints”– GettingBackonTrack,CPREFebruary2011 http://www.cpre.org.uk/campaigns/transport/rail/highspeed2

100“ThebiggestissueinincreasingShinkansen[highspeedtrain]speedisnoisecontrol”ͲEastJapanRailwayCompany TechnicalReviewSummer2008http://www.jreast.co.jp/e/development/tech/contents12.html  101“Journeytimesavingof3.5minutesconsumes23%moreenergy(comparisonof360km/hoperationto300km/h operation)”ͲHS2TractionEnergyModellingDecember2009http://www.hs2.org.uk/assets/x/56774

102 “TellingthePeople’sDailythatspeedrestrictionswouldbeplacedonthetrainstomakethemmostcostͲefficient,Sheng Guangzu,headofChina’srailwaysministry,saidthattrainsrunningat350kphconsumetwiceasmuchenergyasthose travelingat200kph.Slowingthemupwillsavebothonpowercostsandmaintenance.Speedsaretobecutbackfrom upwardsof350kphto200kphͲ250kphwithamaximumof300kph”Ͳ http://chinabystander.wordpress.com/2011/04/14/slow-train-coming/

103“Routesnotconstrainedbyrequirementsforsuchaveryhighspeedcouldfitintothelandscapebetter,suchasbeing abletofollowthelieofthelandratherthancarvingvalleysintoaseriesofcuttingsandembankments”–GettingBackon Track,CPREFebruary2011www.cpre.co.uk/resources/transport/item/download/379.  104ThebaseconstructioncostoftheAmershamtunnelaloneontheconsultationrouteisestimatedbyHS2Ltd.at£0.7bn –HS2CostandRiskModel,December2009 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110131042819/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/hs2ltd/risk model/pdf/report.pdf

105 Routetemplates,drawingno.HS2_ARP_00_G1_RW_00148Issue1,HS2Ltd.  106 “Thisroutewouldbearound£3Ͳ4billionmoreexpensivethantoconstructthantheproposedroute”ͲAlternativeRoutes Considered–Route1.5viaHeathrow,DfTFactsheet2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/alternativeͲroutesͲoneͲandͲaͲhalf_0.pdf expensive)OldOakCommoninterchange.Italsoappearsthattheclaimedcostsfora throughroutemaybeoverstated.Forexample,inassessingArup’sHeathrowHubproposal, HS2Ltd.haveassumedanundergroundstation,whereasArupproposeaHeathrow interchangeatgrade.108Theconsultation’scostestimatesalsoincluderiskandoptimism bias.Aspurservinganinterchangewithintheairportseemslikelytoincuradditionalrisk, andthereforecost,comparedtotheunconstrained,“greenfield”siteoutsidetheairport proposedbyArup.

72. Itthereforeappearsthatthecostsofaspurandthroughroutemaybebroadlysimilar. However,asdiscussedearlier,aspurorloopmayrequirefourtrackingandadditional tunnellinginordertominimiseenvironmentalimpactsandavoidunacceptablereductionsin HS2capacity,thecostofwhichmaynotcurrentlybeincluded.

73. DelayingaspurtoalaterphaseofHS2introducesuncertaintyastowhetherthiscanbe deliveredwithinthetimeframestated,sinceitreliesonphase2ofHS2proceeding immediatelyfollowingphase1.ThisrequiresconsistentGovernmentfundingandpolitical support,perhapsoverfouradministrations.AsCrossrailhasshown,suchconsistencyis challenging,howeverimportanttheproject.TheLabourpartyhaveinanycasealready indicatedapossiblereviewoftheirsupportforHS2.109Incontrast,athroughroutewould allowHeathrowtobeservedfromdayone,andwouldassistHS2’sphaseonebusinesscase, withitslimitedbenefits,fromarouteservingonlyBirmingham,creatingaviabilitychallenge.

74. Theconsultationexplainsthatthoseexpectedtobenefit,(eg;airlineusers,andtherefore passengers),willbeexpectedtocontributetothecostofaspurand/orloop.110

75. Thisisnotunreasonable.However,Heathrow’stotalclosingRABwillbeonly£12bnby2013 underCAA’sMarch2008finaldetermination.Anyeffectivefinancialcontributiontothe veryhigh,(andasyetunknown),costofanHS2spurand/orloopwouldthereforerepresent asignificant,perhapsdisproportionate,shareofHeathrow’stotalassetbase.

76. TheUK’sexpectationthatairportusersbearasignificantshareofthecostofproviding surfaceaccesstoairportscontrastswithothercountriesapproach.111

 107InvestinginBritain’sFuture,Consultation,DfTFebruary2011

108 “Belowisadescriptionoftheengineeringandsustainabilityissuesassociatedwiththelocations:Iver–Cutandcover box”ͲHighSpeedRailͲLondontotheWestMidlandsandBeyond.AReporttoGovernment,HS2Ltd,December2009

109 "AsEdMilibandhassaid,werightlystartwithablanksheetofpaper–thatsheetdoesn'thaveahighͲspeedtrainline alreadyrunningthroughit,"ͲMariaEagleinterview10thDecember2010 http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/dec/10/labourͲhighͲspeedͲrailͲlink

110“Significantnumbersofindividualsandorganisationswouldstandtobenefitfromtheconstructionofnewhighspeed raillines.Thiscouldincludeairportoperators,businessesclosetohighspeedrailstationsandlocalauthorities.The Governmentexpectsthatsuchpartieswouldthereforemakeacontributiontothecostofthoselinks”.ͲHighSpeedRail: InvestinginBritain’sFuture,Consultation,DfTFebruary2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hsrͲconsultation.pdf 77. Heathrowhasrecentlymovedfrombeingtheworld’s20thmostexpensiveairportinthe worldtothe4th,followinguserchargesincreasing46%in2007/08.Whilstthismayrepresent legitimatepricingofscarcedemand,andmightbearguedasnecessarytofundmuchneeded airportimprovements,itisimportantthatthis,andanyfutureprivateandpublicdecisions onchargingandtaxation,areconsideredinthewidercontextoftheUKeconomyand inwardinvestmentdecisions.

78. Heathrowwasoneofonlytwoairportsinthetop30busiestairportsworldwidetoreporta declineintrafficin2010,(theotherbeingLasVegas/McCarrenInternationalin22ndplace). 112Withtheadditionalissuesofconstrainedcapacityandtaxation,Heathrow’scontinued preͲeminenceamongstitsEuropeancompetitorscannotbetakenforgranted.113

79. Theparticularcharacteristicofaspur,servingonlyairportpassengers,makeitdifficultto claimanywidercapacityorcongestionbenefitsthatmightjustifyGovernmentfunding.For Heathrow’susers,aspurrequiresHeathrowtogeneratesufficientdemandtosupportahigh frequencyservicetoawiderangeofdestinationsinordertojustifytheinvestmentrequired. 114AlthoughtheUK’ssinglelargestgenerator,fillingveryhighcapacitytrains,evenifhalf lengthsets,atafrequencythatiscommerciallyviable115wouldpresentHeathrowwitha challenge.

 111“AlreadytheUKGovernmentplacesmorecostsontheairportownerthanisthecaseinternationallyͲe.g.surface accessprojects”–DfTReviewofRegulatoryFrameworkforUKAirports,submissionfromtheCharteredInstituteof Logistics&Transport,2008http://www.ciltuk.org.uk/download/Review_of_Regulatory_Framework_Ͳ_CILT_final.pdf

112 ACIWorldTrafficReport2010http://www.airportsint.com/view_news.asp?ID=3090

113 “Unlikemostothermajorcities,wherethegovernmentandregulatorsunderstandthevalueofairtransport,aviation providersintheUKseemtobeinconstantconflictwithplansbythegovernmenttofurtherrestrict—ortax—theaviation infrastructure.Asaresult,Heathrowisshowingdeclinesinareaswheremostmajorairportsareregisteringpositivegrowth. Inaddition,itsprimarytenant,BA,hasbeensubjecttolabouractionsthathavemademanyseekotherroutingsinorderto avoidunwelcomesurprises.Heathrowwillalwaysbeamajorinternationalhub.Butitscompetitivedisadvantages,coupled withagovernmentdeterminedtofillitscoffersataviation’sexpense,arebeginningtohurt.Ifthepresentdecisionsand policiesstand,wecanexpectLHRtocontinuetodeclineinpositionamongstitspeers,havingdroppedbelowBeijingand ChicagoO'Hareinthelatestworldrankingsfor2010”ͲCentreforAsiaPacificAviation,April2010 http://www.centreforaviation.com/news/2011/04/11/londonsͲheathrowͲcompetitiveͲdisadvantagesͲareͲbeginningͲtoͲ hurt/page1

114 “Tobeattractiveforairlinepassengerswhomightreasonablyneedtocatchaspecificdepartingflight,theservice frequencyneedstobeatleastoneperhour.Evenonourassumptionthatwecanservemorethanonecitywithasingle train,(whichdependsonthestructureoftheHSRnetwork),manyoftheflows,(Scotland,Manchester/Liverpool, Sheffield/Leeds/Newcastle,BirminghamandBristol/Cardiff),donothaveaviableflow”–HighSpeedRailDevelopment Programme2008/09,StrategicChoices,MVA/SystraforGreengauge21

115“Frequencyisusuallytreatedasbeingveryimportantintransportmodelling–subjecttoaweighting,intervalsbetween trainsoraircraftaretreatedasequivalenttoadditionalinͲvehicleminutes.Typically,animprovementinfrequencyfroma trainorplaneevery2hourstoevery1hourisconsideredashavingthesameimpactonmarketshareasareductionin journeytimeof20Ͳ30minutes.Inordertobeabletocomparetheimportanceoffrequencywiththeimportanceofjourney time,wecalculateafrequencypenaltymeasuredinminutesforeachmodeandroute.Thepointofthefrequencypenaltyis takeintoaccountthatalowservicefrequencymakesamoderelativelyunattractiveevenifthejourneytimeisfaster,and viceversa”–AirandRailCompetitionandComplementarity,SteerDaviesGleaveforEuropeanCommissionDGTREN2006 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/studies/doc/2006_08_study_air_rail_competition_en.pdf 80. Evenifaspurcouldbefundedandbuilttothetimescaleenvisaged,Heathrowwouldbe dependentonaremoteinterchangefor20yearsormore,thesameinterchangewhichthe SecretaryofStateforTransportdescribedas“notanoption.“116

81. Inthattime,andbearinginmindcompetitivepressuresandHeathrow’sconstraints,airlines, withtheirmostmobileofassets,mayhavesimplyrelocatedtheirhuboperationselsewhere. NotonlywouldthathavesevereconsequencesfortheUK,itwouldreducetheabilityof HeathrowtomakeanysignificantfinancialcontributiontoanHS2spur.

82. Intheworstcasescenario,ifinvestmentinaspurorloopcannotbesupportedandHS2’s currentrouteistakenforward,thereisasignificantriskthatHeathrowwouldbesolely reliantonabranchlineconnectionwithOldOakCommon.

HS2HeathrowInterchange

83. HS2Ltd’srevisedproposalforaspurtoHeathrownowrequiresstationsatbothOldOak CommonandHeathrow.Thishassignificantcostimplications,particularlyatOldOak CommonwheredeepexcavationisrequiredtoformthesubsurfaceHS2stationbox,with constructiontakingplaceincloseproximitytotheGWML,theproposedCrossrailandIEP (NorthPole)depotsandadjacentGrandUnionCanal.Theproposalsalsorequirerelocation oftheHeathrowExpressdepot,althoughthisisnotmentionednordoesthereappeartobe anycostallowance.

84. HS2Ltd.alsoproposethatOldOakCommonactsasaCrossrailinterchangetorelievewhat wouldotherwisebeunacceptablecongestionontheUndergroundnetworkatEuston appearsweak.However,HS2Ltd’smodellingshows,atbest,amarginalimpactoncrowding. 117

85. Wearesurprisedthatthereappearstohavebeenlittleornoconsiderationofthepotential impactoftheproposedOldOakCommoninterchangeonthesurroundingcommunity,in London’ssinglemostcongestedborough,andremotefromthetrunkroadandmotorway network.118

 116 PhilipHammond,SecretaryofState,EvidencetoHouseofCommonsTransportSelectCommitteeontheSecretaryof State’sPrioritiesforTransport,26thJuly2010 117AverageloadingsonallLULservicestoandfromEustonUndergroundStationinthe7Ͳ10ammorningpeak(expressed asLULloadfactor)– 2008withoutHS2–138% 2033withoutHS2–185% 2033withHS2withoutOOCͲ194% 2033withHS2withOOC–191%

HS2DemandModelAnalysis,HS2Ltd.February2010

118“”ThestrategiclocationoftheboroughanditspositioninrelationtoLondon’stransportnetworkmeansthatH&F suffersfromtheworstroadcongestioninLondon.SomeofthebusiestroadjunctionsinLondonarelocatedwithinthe Boroughanditsuffersdisproportionatelyfromtheeffectsofthroughtraffic.”ͲChapter4,LondonBoroughHammersmith& FulhamLDFCoreStrategyOptions2009http://lbhf.limehouse.co.uk/portal/csojune09?pointId=1236781495778#targetͲ d1756389e1527 86. Withoutlocalroadchargingorotherdemandmanagementmeasures,thecurrentproposals wouldbelikelytoactasamagnetforHS2passengersmakingkissandride,taxiandminicab journeysfrommuchofwestLondon,yetHS2Ltd.makeonlyabriefreferencetotheneed forbetterroadaccess.119Therewouldappeartoarealriskofworseninglocalairquality,120 inaBoroughthatalreadysuffersfromsomeofthepoorestairqualityinLondon,(thewhole ofHammersmith&FulhambeingdesignatedasanAirQualityManagementAreain2000for nitrogendioxide,NO2,andsmallparticles,PM10).121

87. TheeffectofHS2Ltd’sproposedBirminghaminterchangeonthehighwaysnetworkis relevanttoconsideringthepotentialimpactsofanOldOakCommoninterchange.Proposals fortheformerincludea7,000spacemultiͲstoreycarpark,122whichtheGovernments consultationdocumentadmitswouldrequire“significantimprovementstotheroadnetwork (to)accommodateadditionaldemandcreatedbytheinterchange(which)wouldbethe subjectofafuturelocalconsultation.123

88. WesuggestthatadetailedandcostedassessmentofthelocalimpactsofanOldOak Commoninterchangeisrequired,andthatanappropriateallowanceisincludedinHS2Ltd’s businesscase.

89. SignificantconnectivitybenefitsareclaimedforOldOakCommon.However,apartfrom Crossrail,thesedependonprovidinginterchangewiththeNorthLondonandWestLondon lines,somedistanceapart.Thecurrentproposalsappeartomakenoallowanceforthecosts ofsuchconnectivity.TheselineswouldalsorequireverysignificantinvestmentinrouteͲwide capacityenhancements,inordertoprovideclaimedbenefits,aswellasthenecessarywork toprovideasatisfactoryinterchangewithHS2andCrossrail.

90. Incontrast,analternativeHS2routedirectlyviaHeathrowwouldonlyrequireasingle, probablylessexpensiveinterchange,atHeathrow.

91. ThiscouldprovidesimilarlyprovideinterchangewithCrossrailandallowfastjourneysfor HS2passengersintocentralLondonby,forexample,makinguseofGWMLfastlinecapacity releasedonexpiryofHeathrowExpress’strackaccessagreement.Thiswouldallowlimited stopCrossrailservicesbetweenReading,Heathrow,and,(withagradeseparatedjunction betweenmainandrelieflines),Paddington,andthenceallcentralLondonCrossrailstations. SuchaservicewouldalsoprovidemuchneededadditionalcapacityforThamesValley passengers.  119 “Furtherconsiderationshouldalsobegivento…optionsfortheeffectiveprovisionofroadaccess”–HighSpeedRail: LondontotheWestMidlandsandBeyond.AreporttoGovernmentbyHS2Ltd.–HS2Ltd,2009

120“ThereisaclearlinkbetweenpoorairqualityandtrafficinHammersmith&Fulham”ͲPara5.19LondonBorough Hammersmith&FulhamUDP–TransportationandAccessibilityIssues http://www.lbhf.gov.uk/Images/CH_05_Transport_tcm21Ͳ136423.pdf

121 http://environmentͲagency.co.uk/static/documents/Research/HAMFUL_factsheet.pdf

122 HighSpeedRail:LondontotheWestMidlandsandBeyond.AreporttoGovernmentbyHS2Ltd.–HS2Ltd,2009

123 HighSpeedRail:InvestinginBritain’sFuture–DfTFebruary2011 Theclassicrailnetwork

92. HS2Ltd.werespecificallytaskedwithexamininghowaHeathrowinterchangemight improvesurfaceaccessfromHeathrow’sexistingcatchmenttothewest,andassistinmodal shiftfromroadtorail.124However,thiswasnotconsideredatall,asvariously acknowledged,withoutexplanation,byHS2Ltd.125 126 127andnotedbyBritishAirwaysin theirsecondsubmisisontoLordMawhinney’sreview.128  93. Incontrast,Arup’sHeathrowHubproposalintegratesHS2andHeathrowwithCrossrailand existingGWMLservices,asalsoproposedbyNetworkRail.129Wesuggestthatthisapproach hasmerit,particularlyasthereisanopportunityfortheproposedelectrificationand resignallingtobeincorporatedaspartoftheintegrated,intermodalstrategyforwhichwe argue.  94. Aspartofthis,wealsosupportNetworkRail’semergingproposal130 todivertWCML suburbanservicesontoCrossrail,viaanew,(short),connectionatOldOakCommon.This wouldhaveanumberofbenefits,includingimprovingCrossrail’scurrentpoorbusinesscase andutilisationwestofPaddington.131  

 124 “ThekeycarmodalshiftgainislikelytobeinrespectofaccesstoHeathrowfromLondon,thewestandThamesValley, facilitatedbytheHeathrowinterchange(andlocalrailenhancements)”ͲLetterfromSirDavidRowlandstoLordAdonis,13th February2009

125“WehavenottakenaccountofthewiderconnectivitybenefitthatwouldaccrueifIverweretobedevelopedasawider hubinterchange.WehavenotsoughttomodelandanalysethebenefitsofimprovedconnectivitytoHeathrowgenerally through,forinstance,improvedwesternaccess.WefocusedonthecaseforhighspeedandconsideredaHeathrowstation onthebasisofawiderhighspeednetwork”ͲHighSpeedRail–LondontotheWestMidlandsandBeyondͲReportto Government,HS2Ltd,December2009

126 “Ourmodels…donotaddressquestionsrelatingtopotentialdemandforshortdistancetraveltoHeathrowfrom LondonandtheSouthEast(andthereforenotusingHS2)”Ͳ SupplementaryReport,OptionsforServingHeathrow,HS2Ltd. September2010http://assets.dft.gov.uk/hs2Ͳheathrow.pdf

127 “ItisimportanttonotethatthemodeldoesnotanalysethepotentialmarkettoHeathrowfromareastothewest.This meansforinstancethatthemodeldoesnotforecastthedemandtoHeathrowfrom(forexample)ReadingusingaLondon InterchangeStationconnectedtotheGWML”–HS2DemandModelAnalysis,HS2Ltd.February2010

128“Heathrowwasnotfullyassessedforthewiderbenefitsitcouldbringasaninterchangetypestationtothesouthof England”–SecondResponsetotheHeathrowAirportHighSpeedRailAccessReview,BritishAirways,June2010 ttp://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/lordmawhinneyreport/pdf/appendix3_6.pdf)

129 “TheRUSconsidersthattheexistingHeathrowExpressservicewouldneedtobeincorporatedintoCrossrail.Forthisto beoperationallyviable,alltheairportserviceswouldneedtorunontherelieflines,atleastatpeaktimes”ͲLondonand SouthEastRouteUtilisationStudy,DraftforConsultation,NetworkRailDecember2010 http://www.networkrail.co.uk/browse%20documents/rus%20documents/route%20utilisation%20strategies/rus%20gener ation%202/london%20and%20south%20east/london%20and%20south%20east%20route%20utilisation%20strategy.pdf  130“CrossrailextensionontoWCMLslowlines–recommendedforfurtherinvestigation,subjecttobusinesscase,for severalreasons”Ͳ LondonandSouthEastRouteUtilisationStudy,DraftforConsultation,NetworkRailDecember2010

131 “Wehave24trainsanhourinthepeakgoingthroughthetunnelsineachdirectionandtenofthosecontinueonto destinationssuchasHeathrow,SloughandMaidenhead.Wehavetoturn14ofthembackclosetoPaddington”–Anthony Walters,SelectCommitteeonCrossrailBill,Column12738,November2007http://www.parliament.theͲstationeryͲ office.co.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmcross/235/6062727.htm 95. ThisproposalcouldalsoreleasesignificantcapacityatEuston,assistingthephasingofHS2 worksandperhapsobviatingtheneedtoextendthestationsfootprint,andtheconsequent needtodemolishalargenumberofadjacentproperties.Itmayalsoallowreuse,with suitablegaugeenhancement,ofexistingPrimroseHillWCMLtunnelsforHS2,reducingcost anddisruption.  96. RemovingcurrentservicesfromEustonwouldalsoreleasecapacityontheUndergroundfor HS2passengers.

97. Wesuggestthataclearstrategyisrequiredforuseofsparecapacityontheclassicnetwork, whichHS2islikelytomakeavailable.Ifthefranchisesystemistomakeuseofthespare capacity,moderationofcompetitioncanbeexpectedtoensurethatthereisnoabstraction fromHS2’santicipatedmarket.However,itisnotclearwhethersuchservicescouldbe operatedwithoutsubsidy.Alternatively,openaccessoperatorsmaywellbeinterested,with theriskthatfarescouldbesetatlevelsthataremorecompetitivethanHS2,albeitwith journeytimepenalties.Competitiveservicesovertheclassicnetworkwouldcertainlyallow HS2Ltd’sassumptionsonthevalueofjourneytimesavingstobetestedintherealworld.

Publicconsultation

98. Our2010paperhighlightedtheneedforHSRproposalstohavedemocraticlegitimacy.Itis thereforeofconcernthatGovernmenthadmadeupitsmind,evenbeforethestartofwork byHS2Ltd,thatOldOakCommonwouldprovidetheHeathrowinterchange.Asthis proposalhasbeencarriedforward,unchanged,totheschemewhichformsthecurrent consultation,theremustbedoubtastotherigourofthesubsequentoptionanalysiscarried outbyHS2Ltd,andindeedtheentirebasisonwhichHS2Ltd.preparedthebusinesscasefor HS2.

99. RegardingHeathrow,theconsultationlacksanydetailofHS2Ltd’srevisedproposals,apart fromasinglefactsheet132andpassingreferenceinvariousdocuments,Hencequestions suchastheproposedservicepatternoveraspurorloop,businesscase,environmental impactandrelationshipwithaHeathrowmasterplanareleftunanswered.Governmenthas confirmedthatitseesadirectconnectionbetweenHS2andHeathrowasbeingessential. Wesuggestthatthecurrentconsultationisthereforeflawedunlessallissuesrelevanttoa routebetweenLondon,BirminghamandHeathrowcanbeassessed.

100. TheremustalsobedoubtastothewayinwhichalternativeHS2proposalshave beenassessed,forexample,Arup’sHeathrowHubproposal,theprinciplesofwhichwere supportedbytheConservativeParty’sRailReview.HS2Ltd.appeartomisunderstandsignificant featuresoftheproposal,omittingthebenefitsofanairportterminalcoͲlocatedwiththerail interchange,133referringtoalightraillinkratherthananairsidetransitbetweenthe

 132 ConnectingtoHeathrow,Factsheet,DfT2011

133“AstationatIverwouldhaveconnectionstoGWMLandpotentiallytoaparkway.However–whilstalinktotheairport couldbeestablished–itisunlikelytohaveanyconnectivityequivalenttoastationontheairport.Similarlythisisunlikelyto haveconnectionstothePiccadillylineofHeathrowExpress,andonlylimitedCrossrailservices”ͲP.48HS2DMA interchangeandtheairport,134assumingcostsforanundergroundrailstation135and suggestingthatanIversitehasinsuperableenvironmentalconstraints.136

101. Wearealsoconcernedattheconsiderableamountofnewmaterialthathas variouslyappearedonDfTandHS2Ltd’swebsitessincethestartoftheHS2consultationin February2011.

102. Thematerialisobviouslyseenasimportanttotheconsultation,otherwiseit presumablywouldnothavebeenreleased.However,allrelevantinformationshouldhave beenmadeavailable,inacoͲordinatedmanner,atthestartoftheconsultation. Furthermore,noadviceisbeingissuedtoalertconsulteesofnewmaterial,thematerial lacksanyexplanationofitspurposeandrelationshiptoother,previouslypublishedmaterial, thereisnoadviceastowhethernewmaterialsupersedesearlierdocumentsandmuchof thematerialishighlytechnicalinnature,andlacksanyexplanatorytextforanonͲexpert audience.

103. Webelievewehavereasonabletechnicalknowledge,butwefindmanyofthe documentsinexplicableanddifficulttorelatetoearlierpublishedinformation.Muchofitis, webelieve,franklyimpossibleforthegeneralpublictounderstand.

104. Inaddition,someofthismaterialappearscontradictory.Forexample,themap showingtheproposedconnectionstoHeathrowonthe“ConnectingtoHeathrow”factsheet showsadelta(threeway)junctionwiththemainHS2route,whichwouldallowservicesover thespurfromboththeUKandEurope.Incontrast,thediagraminthemainconsultation document137showsonlyanorthfacingconnectionwhichwouldonlyallowservicesfrom BirminghamandthenorthtoreachHeathrow.Thefactsheetalsoshows,without explanation,apurpledottedlinestrikingnorthfromOldOakCommonwhichcouldbeseen asrepresentinganalternativeoradditionalhighspeedalignment.

105. Suchconfusionisnothelpedbypresspublicationofothermaterial,apparently obtainedfromofficialsources.138Whilstthereisnowayofknowingifthisiscurrentor accurate,itcertainlysuggeststhatdetailedstudieshaveinfactbeencompletedonvarious optionsforaspurandloop.Therewouldthereforeappeartobenoreasonwhythescopeof

 134 “aninterchangewithalightraillinktoHeathrow….withoutofferingthebenefitsofanonͲairportstation”Ͳ “HighSpeed Rail:InvestinginBritain’sFuture”–DfTFebruary2011 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/sites/highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/files/hsrͲconsultation.pdf

135 “Belowisadescriptionoftheengineeringandsustainabilityissuesassociatedwiththelocations:Iver–Cutandcover box”ͲHighSpeedRailͲLondontotheWestMidlandsandBeyond.AReporttoGovernment,HS2Ltd,December2009

136 “AnystationatIverwouldhaveamajoradverseenvironmentalimpactwithover50%beingwithintheColnefloodplain withpotentialtodisturbriparianhabitat.Therewouldbeseriousfloodplainimpactswhichwouldbedifficulttomitigate”Ͳ HighSpeedRailͲLondontotheWestMidlandsandBeyond.AReporttoGovernment,HS2Ltd,December2009

137 Figure1.1,HighSpeedRail:InvestinginBritain’sFuture,ConsultationDfTFebruary2011

138http://www.uxbridgegazette.co.uk/westͲlondonͲnews/highͲspeedͲrail/2011/05/11/gazetteͲrevealsͲhs2ͲheathrowͲ optionsͲ113046Ͳ28677661/ thecurrentconsultationcannotbewidenedtoensureacomprehensiveapproachcanbe takentoHeathrowandHS2.

106. Thesereportsalsoappeartoconfirmthatanyoftheproposedspuralignments wouldrequireextensivetunnelling,withthelowestcostoptionquotedasca.£7.3bn. (comparedtocostsforaspurof“between£2.5bnand£3.9bn”inthecurrentconsultation). Itmaybethatthesecostsarenotonthesamebasis,ormayreflectfurtherwork,for example,toavoidthespurhavingunacceptableimpactsonHS2linecapacity.Either explanationwouldappeartoprovidefurtherjustificationforwaitinguntilacomprehensive consultationcanbecarriedout.

107. Otherinformationrecentlyreleasedissimplyunclear–theimagesthathave recentlyappearedonDfT’swebsite,forexample,139lackanycomparisonwithexisting views,showonlydaytimescenes,(whereasthemostsignificantvisualimpactwillbeat night,whentrainswithhighintensityheadlightsandelectricalarcingarelikelytobemore visuallyintrusive),andsomelocationsarepoorlydescribed.

108. Wesuggestthatcontinuingtoreleaseadditionalmaterialatthislatestageinthe consultationprocessisnothelpfulandwouldappeartobecontrarytobestpractice.The growingandcomplexsuiteofdocuments,somereleasedbyDfTandsomebyHS2Ltd, makesitimpossibletoseeanyclearhierarchy,structureorexplanation,placinga considerableandunacceptableburdenonthoseseekingtorespond.Thereisalegitimate questionastowhethertheconsultationprocessiscompliantwiththeAarhusconvention andtheGovernment’sownconsultationcode.140

109. Theprocessasitstandsisfatallyflawed.Aswellasmakingtheconsultationprocess unsafe,thereisalsoariskthatfarreachingandcostlydecisionsaretakeninisolation, perpetuatingtheworstaspectsoftheUK’ssiloapproachtotransportplanningand conflictingwithEuropeanTransportpolicy.

Conclusion

110. Inarareexampleofcrosspartyconsensusonlongtermstrategicinvestment,the twomajorpoliticalpartiesprovidedpoliticalsupportforaUKHSRnetworkaspartofan integrated,intermodalapproachtotheUK’sfuturetransportinfrastructureneeds.

111. ItisunfortunatethatHS2Ltd’sdecisionmakingwasthensoheavilyinfluencedbya railindustryperspectiveandadubiousappraisalmethodologythatprioritisedjourneytime savings.

112. Thatledtothequestionableandfarreachingdecisiontoadoptadesignspeedof 400kph,doomingthehighspeedlinetoslicingthroughanythingthatlayinitspath–inthis case,theChilternsAONB,numerousprotectedwildlifesites,listedbuildings,ancient monuments,NationalTrustpropertiesandlandedestates.Thisissueisoffundamental importance,yettheconsultationadoptsthisasafaitaccompli.

 139 http://highspeedrail.dft.gov.uk/library/images 140 CodeofPracticeonConsultation,HMGovernment,July2008http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file47158.pdf 113. HS2Ltd.alsodetermined,throughfundamentallyflaweddemandassumptionson demand,toignoreHeathrow,theworld’sbusiestinternationalairportandUK’ssingle greatesttrafficgenerator.WithoutanyairlineorairportrepresentationwithinHS2Ltd,no furtherthoughtwasgiventotheillogicalityofthisdecision,ignoringEuropeanexperience,

114. ThesinglespecificareaofHS2Ltd’sremitthatmighthavebroughtacoͲordinated approachtoairandrailwasalsoignored,withtheresultthatHS2,ascurrentlyproposed, failstoconsiderthevitalissuesofHeathrow’ssustainablegrowthandcontributiontotheUK economy.

115. ThecurrentconsultationlacksanydetailonoptionsforconnectingHS2and Heathrow,withoutwhichitisnotpossibletoreachwellinformedconclusionsonthe proposedroutebetweenLondonandBirmingham.Theinformationthathasbeenmade availablesuggeststhat,evenonHS2Ltd’sownassumptions,anddisregardinganywidercase foradirectHS2/Heathrowinterchange,thereappearstobeastrongcaseforanalternative HS2alignmentthatservesHeathrowonathroughalignment.

116. Theconsultationisalso,webelieve,unsoundinthewayinwhichimportantmaterial isbeingmadeavailablewithoutnotice,commentaryorcoͲordination.

117. RetrofittingHeathrowandaEuropeanconnectioncannotmakeabadscheme better,butcallsintoquestionHS2Ltd’sjudgementandabilitytoadviseonabroaderrange ofissuesthanahighspeedrailwayinisolation.

118. AstheBowGroup’s2010papernoted,“thesearenottransportissues,theyreferto (Government)priorities.Theyaretooimportanttobelefttorailindustryexperts,whoserole shouldbetoadviseontheoptionstodeliverthewidernationalpriorities”141

119. Incontrast,HS2Ltd’snarrowapproachtoplanningwhatmaybetheUK’ssingle largestpublicinvestmentinagenerationwouldberecognisabletothe19thcenturyrailway barons–conceivedinisolationfromanyexternalfactors,ignorantofothermodesof transport,ignoringanythinginitswayanddismissiveofitsenvironmentalimpacts.

120. OurfearisthatHS2,ascurrentlyconceived,mayalsohaveparallelswitha20th centurygrandprojet,similarlyconceivedwithoutademonstrablebusinesscase,lacking democraticlegitimacy,ignorantofthechangingenvironmentallandscape,designedwithout regardtoenergyuseandpromotedbyGovernmentasanarticleoftechnologicalfaith– Concorde.142

 141 TheRightTrack,TheBowGroupJanuary2010

142“Aserioustechnicaloversightwasfailuretorecognisesufficientlytheenvironmentalproblems.Probablymore importantwasthecommercialmisconceptionthatspeedwasthekeycriterionforsuccess,overoptimisminpredictingsales andinsufficientregardtocustomerrequirements.Indeed,onecouldarguethattherewasarecklessfailureeventocare whetherornottherewasamarket”ͲTheyMeantWellͲGovernmentProjectDisasters,DRMyddleton,Instituteof EconomicAffairs,2007http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/upldbook419pdf.pdf  121. TheSecretaryofStatehasdismissedopponentsofthecurrentHS2proposalsas having“notmuchmoretotheirargumentthanNimbyism.”143However,webelievethe currentconsultationraisesfundamentalissuesthatcannot,(and,consideringHS2’scostand strategicimportance,shouldnot),besoeasilydismissed.Withouttherigorousanalysisthat theSecretaryofStatesolightlydisregards,thecountry–anditscommitmenttothe expenditureofverylargesumsofpublicmoneyͲiswhollydependentontheconclusions reachedbyDfTandHS2Ltd.

122. WereiteratetheBowGroup’scontinuedsupportfortheprincipleofaUKHSR network.However,wesuggestthatGovernmentmustreturntotheprinciplesunderlying theoriginalpoliticalconsensus,toensurethattherequiredinvestmentdeliversthe necessaryimprovementstothecountry’sinfrastructureinawaythatisintegrated, affordable,environmentallyacceptableandbeneficialtothewholeoftheUK.

123. ThisistheapproachtakenbytheEuropeanhighspeedrailnetwork–plannedonan intermodalbasis,integratedwiththeclassicrailwayandmajorairports,consideredwithina widerspatialandeconomicstrategyandmindfulofenvironmentalconstraints.

124. HS2ascurrentlyproposedisfundamentallyflawedandfacesmassiveopposition. Wehaveofcoursebeenherebefore,144butitisnottoolatetoreturnHS2totherighttrack.

 143Metro,20thMarch2011Ͳhttp://www.metro.co.uk/news/858625ͲtransportͲsecretaryͲphilipͲhammondͲonlyͲnimbysͲ opposeͲ250mphͲtrains#ixzz1MK3yQC2k

144“Whenthehighspeed(ChannelTunnelRail)LinktoLondonwasannouncedtherevoltthatfollowedshooktheTory partytothecore.ArevolutionarymobinwaxedgreenjacketsisenoughtobringanyHomeCountiesMPoutinarash”– TheSundayTimesLondonmagazine,6thMay1990 

AppendixA

ExtractfromExecutiveSummaryofrecommendations

“TheRightTrack”TheBowGroup,January2010

x TheGovernmentriskschoosingthewrongrouteforBritain’ssecondhighspeedrailway (HS2).  x HS2shouldbedirectlylinkedtoHeathrowAirportthroughtheconstructionofaHeathrow hubinterchangestationcombiningHS2,theGreatWesternMainLine,ChilternLineand Crossrailservices.  x HeathrowisoneofthemostdifficultnationalairportsinEuropetoreachbyrail,thusforcing manypotentialtravellerstouseotherEuropeanhubairports.  x WithoutdirectHSRconnectiontoHeathrowtrafficcongestionandpollutionaroundthe airportandtheM25willcontinuetobeamongsttheworstinEurope.  x TheGovernmentmustnotjustlistentotherailindustrywhenmakingitschoiceforthe routeofHS2.BritishRailwaswronginitschoiceforthefirstsectionofhighspeedrail, betweenLondonandtheChannelTunnelinthe1980sandabetterroute,promotedbyLord Heseltine,waschosen.  x AnondirectHSRlinkwithHeathrow,representedbyalooporspur,wouldrepresentfollyin Britain sambitiontodevelopatrulyintegratedtransportpolicy.  x AsuccessfulnationalhighspeedrailnetworkshoulddirectlyconnectallofBritain’smajor airportsandcitiesasissuccessfullyreflectedinFrance,theNetherlands,Belgiumand Germany.  x Britain’straditionalNorth/SouthdividecanbebridgedbyasuccessfulHSRnetworkasitwill betterbindandcoͲordinateeconomicprogress 

May2011 Written evidence from Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce (HSR 95)

Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce (UK Chamber of Commerce of the Year 2009) with 2000 member companies is the leading business representative organisation in Scotland’s capital. We have a wide range of policy groups and have been actively involved in promoting High Speed Rail to Scotland since 2006. Our comments on the Committee’s enquiry follow:

Executive Summary

Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce believes that the extension of HSR beyond London is an overdue and welcome investment.

It believes that we should be planning now for a fully connected line from London to both Glasgow and Edinburgh and that it is the northern end of this line which will offer the greatest cost benefit.

HSR is an imperative investment environmentally, socially, and commercially, and vital to the global competitiveness of the UK.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

1.1 HSR offers speedier transit with environmental and economic benefits. HSR to Scotland has BCR much higher than any transport project seen in recent years. Objections to HSR are less likely in Scotland and Northern England where the main benefit is potentially to be derived and population density is lower. Failure to deliver HSR will leave the Uk as a hwole seriously under-provided with transport infrastructure that is globally competitive, attractive to inward investment and tourism and will accelerate the rate at which our economy is left behind by our major competitors. Given the remote nature of the UK from continental Europe and the remote nature of North Britain (which most needs development) from the South Eastern economic pressure cooker, we must accelerate the rate of HSR take-up and make a UK wide commitment to a truly national network.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

1. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

2.1.1 As the world’s economy progresses towards a common state of City Regions as economic hubs of all successful trading nations HSR offers a crucial option for connecting those major cities to their markets. This does not mean there are nor other important transport objectives, especially in terms of local public transport and an adequate roads network, especially for freight. However it is of paramount importance in terms of giving Britain’s regional cities the access to European markets which SE England already enjoys.

2.1.2 In the world of carbon reduction HSR offers the option of electricity as fuel, which can be derived from renewables. Other forms of vehicular transport are a long way from this option.

2.1.3 For the inland routes of Central Belt Scotland to London airports (the busiest in the UK) a proper end to end HSR system offers transport which is faster, more environmentally friendly, more comfortable, more central and better economically than air. 2. Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

2.2.1 Investment in the existing network should continue. Apart from other considerations the lack of maintenance in the past has been shown to have dire consequences. It will be some years before there is any available expansion of HSR and demands on existing track are growing. Transfer of inter-city journeys to HSR promises to free up capacity on the existing network for both local journeys and freight (which are at capacity in many parts of the existing network).

3. What are the implications for domestic aviation?

2.3.1 For Scotland a proper HSR network from London to Edinburgh & Glasgow would allow major changes to take place. With some seven million journeys Central Belt to London per annum, only one million are currently by road or rail. At this level ECML and WCML have little spare capacity. As many as six million journeys a year could be taken from air to rail with all the benefits mentioned above.

2.3.2 Scotland struggles for landing slots at the London airports (especially Heathrow) and when there are difficulties in the air is the first destination to have its flights out of London grounded (obviously for safety reasons a transatlantic flight being facilitated to land safely has greater priority than sending off a new internal flight which can be replaced by bus or train).

2.3.3. The freeing up of London landing slots would enable access from more northerly airports such as Inverness, Aberdeen and the Northern Isles which struggle to get access now.

2.3.4. The reduction in inland flights frees up more slots for international flights which are more profitable and access markets which cannot be reached by Eurostar.

3. Business case

1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network?

3.1.1 Completely unrealistic in the sense that the best payback and the best environmental benefit, which is from a line connecting Scotland to London is not even on the drawing board in this plan. BCR of (at lowest estimate) 3.5 fold and highest 15 fold is only achieved by including Scotland from the outset.

3.1.2 The models for HSR to Leeds/Manchester and then continuing on conventional track simply doo not stack up. HSR does not tilt and therefore would be slower on the northern end of the track than existing sets (e.g. Virgin’s Pendolinos). Modal shift cannot be achieved as the track simply does not have the capacity to achieve a six fold increase in traffic.

3.1.3 Fare levels need serious consideration. With rail fares above the levels of most of our competitors already, a continuation of the same pattern would result in reduced take-up and continuing lack of global competitivity. We should aim to replace lost revenue on the existing routes with increased local passenger traffic and greater freight traffic, reducing road congestion. 3.1.4 If best possible modal shift is to be achieved then it is vital the Euston-Birmingham (and successive) links are built with adequate capacity to carry the completed network. That should include six million journeys, p.a. from a major modal shift from air on the Scotland/London routes.

2. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

3.2.1 A joke. Having spent £11bn upgrading WCML over many years with gross disruption to existing service a speed benefit of 10mph is a poor outcome. Signalling upgrades might make a small difference but in reality there will be no increase of capacity unless more lines are built in which case the only sensible course of action is to make them HSR.

3. What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?

3.3.1. Whilst there are strong arguments for lower ticket prices at times when demand is low (late at night, overnight, early morning,) any government committed to growing the economy as its first priority should be planning transport systems which aid commerce not hinder it.

4. What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

3.4.1 Simplify contracts to eliminate grounds for dispute. Build in costs for variability. Reward on time delivery. Examine international models which have worked (e.g. South Korea).

4. The strategic route

1. The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

4.1.1 The point of HSR is negated if further stops are introduced.

2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice?

4.2.1 Initial Priorities would be:

London-Birmingham-Manchester-Glasgow/Edinburgh

(It is reasonable that a Glasgow Edinburgh link should be part of a ‘Y’ at Carstairs)

London-Nottingham-York-Newcastle-Edinburgh

Newcastle-York-Leeds-Manchester-Liverpool

London-Bristol- Cardiff

London- Bristol-Exeter (Birmingham-Bristol would be an obvious later addition)

This network would include other options for routes between Cities. Parkway stations might be appropriate in some instances. Airports present one opportunity for location.

3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

4.3.1 It is inevitable that the network will be built in stages. One at a time south-north is not the only answer nor is it the right one. We should start in Scotland and build South at the same time. You don’t build a bridge from one bank to the other- you start at both ends. And often in the middle as well. HSR offers a major opportunity to rejuvenate the economy. That need is now.

4.3.2 Throughout this process we have heard time and again that HSR will be built from London ‘to the North.’ This is a major psychological error- especially for a government committed to defending the Union. Every railway runs in two directions- none run from-to, they all run between. If the government (and HS2’s) statements about the need to strengthen the UK’s regional economy have any validity then surely this point should be self-evident?

4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

4.4.1 Yes

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

1. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide?

5.1.1 We are not repeating information given in previous studies of which the committee will be well aware. Aditionally:

x The models of France and Spain well demonstrate that on a similar distance of air traffic as Edinburgh/Glasgow to London HSR achieves a modal shift of 80% or better. x This modal shift is achieved when the transit time drops below two and a half hours x On such a frequency London is easily accessible from Scotland without an overnight stay (a major cost saving and a major incentive to SME’s) x On such a frequency tourism is much easier and pleasanter by rail x Onward transit to European markets by Eurostar becomes a realistic option from Scotland (which it isn’t currently)

2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration?

5.2.1 100%

3. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.3.1 The City Regions which it accesses, and at the end of the day potentially all socio-economic groups (witness the Lille experience) as businesses will want to be where they can access the network.

4. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

5.4.1 Absolutely yes to TEN-T. The government should definitely seek private sector involvement in financing the network.

6. Impact

1. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

6.1.1 Carbon benefits from modal shift will be greater the greater the extent of the network. Our remarks above apply. 80% from inland air would be a reasonable objective. Road shift is left the further the journey time, and will be minimal for Scotand-London.

2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

6.2.1 If anything we believe they are understated. This is borne out by the continuing growth of rail as transport of choice, beyond historical predictions.

3. What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network?

6.3.1 A proper Scotland –London network would free up major capacity for additional freight on the existing network.

4. How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?

6.4.1 Disruption can be minimised and will happen most when completed sections are joined in to the existing network. This will be necessary for joing sections of complete HSR into areas where there is yet no service, for some City centre access, and to provide ‘escape route’ alternative lines during essential maintenance/incident management.

May 2011 WrittenevidencefromtheRACFoundation(HSR96)



1 Background

1.1 This document addresses numbers 1, 2 and 3 and parts of 5 and 6 of the issues identified in the Transport Select Committee’s Terms of Reference. The government has published a quantity of supporting materials, which contain full accounts of the analysis in support of the particular proposal specified in the HS2 consultation. For the purposes of this document we do not question the proposed physical layout of HS2, the engineering costing, economic assumptions, traffic modeling or economic appraisal.

1.2 High Speed Rail may, or may not be a useful component of the nation’s strategic transport infrastructure. But both the previous government and the present one have committed to the present proposal (HS2) prematurely.

1.3 This is for three reasons: the lack of a National Policy Statement on roads and railways, adopted in Parliament; the incomplete state of Infrastructure UK’s (IUK) development of their National Infrastructure Plan; and a failure to specify how the funding and economic regulation of HS2 would fit with the current arrangement for the “classic” railway.

1.4 The RAC Foundation is a charity which explores the economic, mobility, safety and environmental issues relating to roads and responsible road users. Independent and authoritative research, carried out for the public benefit, is central to the Foundation’s activities.

2 National Policy Statement (NPS) on surface networks

2.1 Government has a statutory duty to write an NPS for surface networks and to secure approval in Parliament. The previous government did not do this and the Coalition Government have said that they will not publish one until December 2011 – long after the current consultation on HS2 has closed.

2.2 There is no doubt that there is a shortage of surface transport infrastructure— both road and rail—as documented by the Eddington Transport Study. These shortages will become worse in the future as: the economy recovers and the level of economic activity increases; population increases and relocates to particular parts of the country; industry relocates as industrial structure changes. The growing demands on the transport infrastructure will not be geographically uniform: the needs will be different in different places.

2.3 It is the role of an NPS to set out government’s view of the magnitudes of these needs and where they will develop. It should set out the government’s policy as to how much resource can be made available and how this resource should be deployed.

2.4 The strategy is likely to include a mixture of road and rail measures. In some English Regions (but not all) population is expected to have increased by one fifth soon after the proposed opening date for HS2. Many of these are not on the HS2 line of route. The needs will be for all kinds of local infrastructure, including local roads and public transport services. Plainly, because HS2 serves long distance trips on one line of route it can only perform a limited set of functions, so if it is to find a place in the strategy it must justify its claim on resources in competition with alternative ways of spending the transport infrastructure budget. Until the NPS has been published, Parliament has not had an opportunity to consider government’s assessment of the extent to which HS2 could play a part in the solution to the problems.

3 National Infrastructure Plan

3.1 The National Infrastructure Plan is a new initiative by Infrastructure UK (IUK) and emanating from HM Treasury. The first document was published just after the Spending Review in October 2010. This is a welcome exercise. It recognizes the vital importance of all infrastructures and starts with the words “For the economy to flourish, people, goods and information must move freely”. The document begins to catalogue the major infrastructure needs in future decades—including roads and railways—and discusses the funding liabilities and how they might be met. The fact that this comes from the perspective of the centre, rather than any one spending department is of some significance.

3.2 The October document is only a beginning and future publications will contain more detail. It is only possible to estimate the future physical and funding needs after one has made an estimate of the size and geographic location of the future demands to be served. The present document refers to the need for the relevant NPS’s to guide IUK’s work.

3.3 The National Infrastructure Plan (paragraph 4.24) does mention a high-speed rail network as one possible component of future transport infrastructure but there is no attempt to relate it to other transport proposals or to demonstrate its place in the portfolio of transport and other infrastructure investments for the future. Presumably, IUK will express a view on this as the Plan is refined.

4 Relationship with the “classic railway”

4.1 There is now a stable strategic planning regime for the existing railway. This comprises two statutory documents issued by government every few years: the High Level Output Specification and the Statement of Funds Available. The consistency of these is adjudicated by the independent Office of Rail Regulation. HS2 would represent a major increase in the capital invested in the railway, it would have many physical interfaces with the classic railway and it would abstract revenue from it. Nothing has been said about how HS2 might fit within the strategic planning regime for the railways. But it must be fitted in somehow. One particular concern is that the public funding necessary for HS2 would be so large that it would inevitably crowd out funding for better projects on the classic railway as well as other modes. 5 HS2 in relation to the Secretary of State’s criteria for decisions

5.1 In the absence of an over-arching strategy it is reasonable to test HS2 as proposed against the five criteria for decisions published in April 2011 as policy by the Secretary of State for Transport 1

“…. This approach ensures decisions are made by taking account of all the relevant information set out in five cases, consistent with the Treasury Green Book, specifically, to show whether schemes:

x are supported by a robust case for change that fits with wider public policy objectives – the ‘strategic case’; x demonstrate value for money – the ‘economic case’; x are commercially viable – the ‘commercial case’; x are financially affordable – the ‘financial case’; and x are achievable – the ‘management case’.”  5.2 For the purposes of this document we take all the calculations presented in the HS2 Consultation Documents at face value. All appraisals considered in the Spending Review (including HS2, railways and roads) were carried out using the new techniques. Before considering the ‘strategic case’ we discuss the other four ‘cases’  5.3 Demonstrate value for money – the ‘economic case’: To make benefits that accrue over a long time comparable with capital investment costs incurred much earlier all money values over a 60 year appraisal period are brought to a value today on a common basis (the net present value). The HS2 Consultation shows that London to Birmingham would offer benefits 1.6 times the costs or 2.0 if Wider Economic Impacts (WEI) are included. For the full “Y” scheme the figures are 2.2 and 2.6 respectively.

5.4 These economic returns show much poorer value for money than a large number of transport schemes. This is documented in Chapter 3 of the Eddington Transport Study2. We note that when the Secretary of State announced to Parliament approval for 14 Highways Agency in the 2010 Spending Review he remarked that “For every pound invested, there will be over six pounds worth of public benefits. On some schemes this will be higher than ten”. These estimates were made in a way that is consistent with the estimates for HS2 and they also suggest that there are a number of schemes that are unfunded but with better returns than HS2.

5.5 Are commercially viable – the ‘commercial case’: For the first phase to Birmingham the value today (that is the discounted present value) of the net capital costs is estimated by HS2 at £17.8 billion and the value today of net operating costs is £6.2 billion. The value today of the net revenues is £13.7

 1“Review of decision making in the Department for Transport”, 27 April, 2011

2SeealsothesurveybyJohnDodgson,RatesofReturnonPublicSpendingonTransport,RACFoundation, June2009,www.racfoundation.org. billion. Therefore, the revenues are more than enough to cover the operating costs but they would not be sufficient to cover operating costs, maintenance and renewals and a return on the capital invested. That is why taxpayer support is required to the value today of £10.3 billion.

5.6 For the full “Y” capital costs are £30.4 billion, operating costs £17.0 billion and revenues £27.2 billion, leaving a contribution required from the taxpayer of about £17 billion (after an adjustment for savings on the classic lines).

5.7 The scheme is not commercially viable. In some sectors, such as aviation, shipping, tolled roads and other utilities, infrastructure investment is fully funded from charges and therefore it is commercially viable.

5.8 Are financially affordable – the ‘financial case’: Affordability is a judgment for ministers. But many people were surprised that they were able to find £750 million in the four years of the Spending Review to fund development work on HS2; money that would have popular alternative uses—for instance in preserving local transport services and roads maintenance.

5.9 The greater part of the taxpayer funding for HS2 would have to be found a number of years into the future. Affordability over that kind of period cannot be considered without the context of an overall transport and other infrastructure strategy which is currently missing. As discussed above it is important to develop and plan for future transport infrastructure, and this needs to be set in the context of an overall transport and infrastructure strategy.

5.10 Are achievable – the ‘management case’: This requirement can be met: in the past HS1 and the M40 across the Chilterns have been delivered and Cross Rail is in hand. HS2 would be a very large and contentious project, but it is achievable. Whether HS2 can be delivered within the projected timescale and budget is another matter. HS1 required a great deal more public financial support and took longer to deliver than had been anticipated when it was first approved.

5.11 Since three of the other four criteria just discussed work against HS2, if it is to be supported the argument must be a particularly “robust” strategic case:   5.12 Are supported by a robust case for change that fits with wider public policy objectives – the ‘strategic case’. This might have a number of components:

5.13 Carbon saving. The consultation document records that the engineering estimates show that overall HS2 would be broadly carbon neutral. In any case carbon savings have been valued at the new official rate and are already included in the economic case.

5.14 Road congestion. The detailed traffic modeling that has been necessary for the engineering, economic and financial appraisals has shown that demand growth will occur on the road network, just as it is forecast for the market for HS2: and that on current plans for the road network significant deterioration in reliability must be expected. But the consultation document also records that in itself HS2 will make a small contribution to traffic congestion and only on the line of route. This is because most road traffic is much shorter distance than the trips that can be served by HS2. The improvements in shorter distance train services will help, but the traffic congestion benefits are still dwarfed by the time saving benefits to rail users from faster travel. They are already included and separately identified in the economic case.

5.15 Aviation. The Consultation shows that when the needs of domestic aviation passengers are considered HS2 offers a limited alternative. The economic case for a direct link to Heathrow is poor (as is the economic case for a link between HS2 and HS1).

5.16 Social inclusion and equity. Railways are predominantly used by those with higher incomes (see p.4 of the HS2 Equality Impact Screening report) and this seems likely to be the case with HS2: many of the estimated benefits come from time savings for business travelers with high value of time. Whilst HS2 would certainly offer benefits differentially to many groups by different geographical locations, HS2 is not directed towards income inequality or relief of poverty.

5.17 Regional economic benefits. Many claims are made and some of them may have validity. However, they are often assertion and, beyond the Wider Economic Impacts already included in the economic assessment, not based on convincing evidence. The Eddington Transport Review, having reviewed the literature, came to the conclusion that it is difficult to adduce firm evidence in support of economic regeneration effectiveness of transport investments.

5.18 When regional claims are made they must always be confronted by the question: could the same benefits have been secured if the same taxpayer monies were spent in some alternative way?

5.19 This is the case with claims for job creation: the Consultation Document makes repeated claims that HS2 would support the creation of jobs. It is certainly true that spending a large quantity of public funds on public projects will create jobs: but HS2 is not the only way to achieve this. An argument for job creation cannot just be made on the direct employment generated by the construction (because any public project would do that); it must be based on the consequences for employment of the operation of the railway. To the extent that long-term job creation is claimed the distinction must be proven between jobs diverted from other places and genuine net new jobs.

5.20 Statements such as “HS2 offers a unique opportunity to bridge the North-South divide” are particularly ill-defined and unsupported by evidence.

5.21 There is a case for a more systematic and complete account of the true economic regeneration benefits delivered by existing high speed rail projects overseas. Since this seems to be the only substantial ‘strategic policy’ argument potentially applying to HS2, the government should make more effort to discover more systematically what regeneration benefits have resulted in other countries. We need a better understanding of the particular circumstances that enabled them to occur and the extent to which those circumstances obtain in this country. 6 London to Birmingham Rail Capacity

6.1 One very simple argument in justification of HS2 is that it solves a problem of shortages of rail capacity in the rail corridor between London and Birmingham.

6.2 If it becomes an absolute case that this must be done whatever the cost then the argument would be “predict and provide” which has long been abandoned as an approach to transport planning.

6.3 A more sensible approach would be to give more serious attention to alternative solutions, or part solutions3. The government has published some analyses of alternative mixed road and rail road schemes in studies published at the same time as the March 2010 HS2 report which deliver capacity benefits on the London to Birmingham corridor but at lower cost. Organizations objecting to HS2 are providing their own suggestions.

6.4 One possibility that tends to be neglected is that the capacity problems are managed by significantly more aggressive use of passenger charges for the existing railway. Pricing solutions were ruled out in the initial terms of reference given to HS2. The RAC Foundation has always advocated considering using charges as a means to manage the demands on a congested road network. The same applies on the West Coast Main Line. This would not be popular with rail users who would, of course, prefer to have better, faster, less crowded services at lower fares, with the implied subsidies paid by the taxpayer. But the HS2 appraisals suggest that this could only be achieved at a cost to the generality of taxpayers that would be disproportionate to the benefits generated.

May 2011

 3Forinstance,seeJ.Preston,Thecaseforhighspeedrail:anupdate,RACFoundation,December2010, www.racfoundation.org Written evidence from Cheryl Gillan MP (HSR 97)

Letter to the Clerk of the Transport Committee

My constituency is on the proposed route for HS2 and should the consultation result in a decision to proceed with the route it would be very seriously affected.

Many of my constituents have directly submitted views to the consultation, but they would like you to consider in your examination of the HS2 proposals the alternative routes which do not appear to have had full scrutiny. In particular, the route proposed by Arup, which follows to a greater degree the M1 transport corridor, and the route that offers better alignment with and connectivity to the West Country. I understand the "Ml Route" gives far better connectivity to a greater number of northern towns and cities. They would also like you to examine the connectivity between the proposed HS2 route and Crossrail, Heathrow and HS1.

I understand that the development and discussion of alternative routes are subject to non-disclosure agreements, but it would be helpful to my constituents if you examined whether this is the case.

In addition, I am attaching two documents concerning Arup and BAA that were brought to my attention by a constituent1. I understand that these documents are now in the government's archives and certain passages and diagrams on some of the pages have been blanked out. The Arup report blanking is easy to find, however the BAA (Heathrow) report is page 24 (or PDF page 36). I understand that the areas blanked out may possibly relate to the cost saving of £400 million and damage limitation to the Chilterns AONB. I should be grateful if the Transport Select Committee would examine this further.

16th May 2011

1 Not printed with this submission Written evidence from the Glasgow Edinburgh Collaboration Initiative (HSR 98)

Glasgow City Council, City of Edinburgh Council and Scottish Enterprise share the following position on high speed rail:

The case for building a UK high speed rail network is well established. We believe it is vital for future economic prosperity. However, the full economic and environmental benefits associated with High Speed Rail will only be realised with the construction of a dedicated HSR line over the entire route between London and Scotland.

We believe that the UK Government should further explore the opportunities to build the network from both ends and give a clear commitment to building a continuous HSL to Scotland. Current proposals to run High Speed services on existing track north of the border do not deliver the sub 3 hour journey time required to ensure maximum shift from air to rail and return on investment.

1. What are the main arguments for or against HSR?

The main arguments for HSR are as follows: 1.1.1 Economic growth; capacity constraints on much of the existing rail network are costly to business and restricting economic growth. HSR is the fastest-growing transport mode in Europe; there is a danger of regional British cities losing out to regional European cities, in the absence of HSR connectivity. 1.1.2 As the DfT’s HS2 consultation documents state, business ‘consistently underlines the importance of reliable transport…95% of companies agree that the UK’s road and rail network is important to their business…Inter-city lines have an unrivalled capacity to enable rapid and direct journeys between central business districts…’ Between 1994 - 2010, ‘passenger miles travelled rose from 18 billion to almost 32 billion. The fastest growth of all has been in demand for long distance travel’ 1.1.3 ‘Many services on…Main Lines are already extremely full. Despite…the WCRM programme, long distance services on this route are regularly overcrowded. Almost half of all long distance Midland Main Line trains arriving into (London) in the peak have passengers standing…demand on the London-Manchester route will grow by around 60% by 2024…(whilst) on the East Coast and Midland Main Lines…overall long-distance growth of more than 70%...from 2007 to 2036. Even higher…on specific routes…’ 1.1.4 Capacity on the existing network can be effectively increased by removing express services. This requires alternative long-distance routes. Having established the need, it is generally more cost effective to build such a route for high speed rather than 125mph/200kph standards. 1.1.5 A new HSR line will release capacity on existing lines, facilitating improved local passenger and freight rail services and encouraging more modal shift from road. 1.1.6 Reduced journey time particularly over longer journeys will help deliver the shift required from plane to train. Current journey times between Glasgow/Edinburgh and London are too long for rail travel to morning business meetings. Same-day return trips by rail leave little time in the destination city. 1.1.7 Reduced emissions; increased capacity and reduced journey times encourage modal shift from air and road to rail. The emission benefits from HSR are highest where trains run with high load factors and use renewable electricity. The greatest reductions will be on longer journeys (e.g. London – Scotland) where city centre – city centre journey times by rail will be faster than air and significantly faster than those by road. 1.1.8 Four major studies confirm the strategic case for HSR as an intercity rail investment: Atkins1 study for the SRA and 2008 Update (Transport Matters); Network Rail’s2 ‘New Lines’ study, 2009 Greengauge 21’s3 Fast Forward, 2009; HS2 Ltd Reports and Consultation Documents 2010,2011

1.2 The main arguments against HSR are: 1.2.1 Affordability; the UK is likely to be emerging from the current economic downturn by the time of major expenditure on HSR. Private sector jobs and growth, which will be unlocked by HSR, will make the UK economy less vulnerable to future economic downturn. Affordability is sometimes linked to doubts about demand forecasts. Recent ATOC figures for number of train journeys confirm the rapid growth in rail travel, which is at it highest level for 90 years. 1.2.2 Disruption; building new lines is likely to cause less disruption than widening an existing transport corridor, which would not only disrupt existing transport services but also necessitate relocation of business and homes. 1.2.3 The costs of adding capacity to the existing network are much more difficult to estimate than those for a new alignment and upgrading existing infrastructure is neither sustainable in the longer term, nor good value for money. 1.2.4 Environmental damage; environmental impact can be mitigated by sensitive design and ancillary works. In ‘quiet’ areas, the introduction of noise where there is presently silence will have an impact, but intermittent noise from passing trains is, arguably, less intrusive than constant road traffic, night and day, from a motorway. 1.2.5 It is sometimes claimed that Britain is too densely populated to warrant or allow HSR, however, the UK’s population density is therefore fairly typical of countries with, or planning, HSR4. 1.2.6 The argument that new communication and information technology will reduce travel is sometimes associated with a view that transport appraisal overstates the value of time savings, especially given the increasing possibilities of using travelling time productively. However, historically improvements in communications technology have not reduced travel demand; if there is any correlation, they have increased it. 1.2.7 If productive travel time was more important than a fast journey, there would already be much greater modal shift from plane to train on UK routes. But it appears that increased air journey times and inconvenience, associated with increased security procedures, have produced such modal shift as has taken place.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and programmes, including the strategic road network?

1Atkins was commissioned to study the feasibility of a north - south HSL. The full network option included Glasgow and Edinburgh 2 Network Rail’s study was designed to identify how to relieve congestion on the WCML and proposed a high speed line to Glasgow and Edinburgh with spurs to Birmingham, Liverpool, and Manchester 3 Proposes the most comprehensive HSR network of the four studies, and a benefit:cost return (BCR) of 3.5:1 . GG21’s H shaped network assumes 200mph operation and a London-Scotland journey time of 2hr 40mins 4 The UK is less densely populated than Taiwan, South Korea, the Netherlands, India, Belgium, Japan and Vietnam but more densely populated than Germany, Italy, China, Indonesia, Russia, Portugal, France, Turkey, Morocco, Iran, US, Sweden and Saudi Arabia. 2.1.1 Britain faces a long term economic challenge to move into recovery and growth, competing on an international stage. It is our cities that will drive this growth and underpin the national economy. The Core Cities and their primary urban areas alone produce 27% of England’s economic output, more than London, with Glasgow and Edinburgh home to just over 20 % of Scotland’s population but generating around 31 % of Scotland’s economic output5. They could do more with the right infrastructure in place. 2.1.2 Enhancing the strategic road network can improve local capacity but ultimately generates more traffic, leading to greater congestion elsewhere. By contrast, investment in HSR creates capacity for an alternative travel mode. Congestion costs business £23.3 billion a year. HS2 is an important first step to avoiding this costly problem. 2.1.3 Road schemes dominated investment between 1945 and circa 2000. From a strategic and long-term perspective, current rail investment (including HSR) merely goes some way to restoring the balance between modes of transport. 2.1.4 Over longer distances, (e.g. Scotland-London), HSR will also abstract air traffic significantly reducing carbon emissions. It will also produce economic benefits as HSR journey-time can be used more productively than air travel.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 2.2.1 Spending on new HSR need not reduce spending on the existing network. The argument that HSR funding should be reallocated across the existing network, or that HSR would distort investment funding, misunderstands the nature of priorities and finance in government. 2.2.2 ‘High-cost’ rail projects are already under construction: London Crossrail (£18 bn over around 7 years) and Thameslink (£5.5 bn over around 8 years). These do not appear to have affected funding for the ‘classic’ network; note for example Great Western Main Line and ECML enhancements, IEP, and further WCML enhancements. The peak annual spend on HSR is likely to be similar to that on Crossrail, which will be largely complete as HS2 construction starts. Crossrail has a BCR of 1.87, which is less than that of HSR. 2.2.3 It is very doubtful that equivalent funding could be invested in the existing railway. There is a limit to the amount of work that it can sustain at one time. The cost of HS2 phase one spread across the existing network is equivalent to implementing the WCML upgrade on the WCML and the ECML simultaneously. 2.2.4 HSR may constitute the most cost effective means of increasing capacity in and around major cities.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? 2.3.1 HSR services between London and Birmingham would have little impact on domestic aviation. Extending HSL to Manchester and Leeds would reduce journey times between London and Scotland sufficiently to encourage some transfer of domestic air travel to rail. It would probably eliminate any remaining air services between London, Manchester and Leeds, except, perhaps, for some interlining. 2.3.2 To achieve a significant modal shift from air to HSR, however, a new HSL over the full distance between London and Scotland is needed, eliminating the current time penalty by rail. In 2009, some 20% of journeys between Edinburgh/Glasgow and London were by rail. If the rail journey time were reduced to less than 3 hours by a new HSL throughout, it is anticipated that around 80% of journeys would be made by rail, saving 4 to 5 million domestic air trips on these routes.

5 Measured as Gross Value Added using NUTS 2 data 2.3.3 Reducing domestic air travel between HSR-served cities could release capacity for additional domestic flights to cities beyond the reach of HSR (e.g. Aberdeen and Inverness) and/or international flights. These could bring economic benefits in excess of those already calculated from the construction of a HSR network.

3. Business Case

3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology e.g. passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fares, costs, economic assumptions (e.g. the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the 'classic' network? 3.1.1 As noted above, Atkins, Network Rail, and Greengauge 21 separately researched the case for HSR. Each considered a slightly different network, but all produced a case for a north-south spine route linking the major cities between London and Edinburgh/Glasgow. 3.1.2 HS2 Ltd’s methodology is based on standard DfT and Treasury models and cannot, therefore, be challenged in isolation. 3.1.3 It has been argued that HS2 Ltd assumed that time on trains is ‘un-productive’ and therefore overestimated the benefits of HSR. In fact HS2 Ltd made no such assumption. Furthermore Greengauge21 reported that counting time on HSR trains as ‘working-time’ marginally increases the overall benefit:cost ratio for HSR (because the productive time gained by passengers transferring from car and air outweighs the working time lost by passengers transferring from classic train services of longer duration). HSR may also create a better working environment than current rail services, affording greater productivity for passengers than other modes.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 3.2.1 The recent West Coast Main Line upgrade added significant capacity but this is rapidly being filled as passenger numbers rise; it is likely to be exhausted by 2020. Even if additional capacity was created, this would soon be exhausted too. Consequently, Network Rail concluded that the only realistic long-term solution for travel between London and West Midlands is to provide an additional line. 3.2.2 The WCML upgrade was initially estimated at £2.1bn; the cost after a decade of disruptive work was £9bn, with less capability than originally planned. Moreover, the new timetable was developed only by a series of compromises that restricted development of commuter services, cross country and freight. 3.2.3 The recent ECML capacity review indicated that stakeholders’ realistic aspirations might be achieved only to the medium term. The new timetable (May 2011) was achieved only after several years work; it is still not optimal. 3.2.4 Proposed improvements on existing routes are not detailed, so cannot be tested, or their feasibility verified. However, an alternative ‘Rail Package 2a’ was set out as the best of a range of alternatives to HS2 examined by the DfT. On completion, RP2a could be followed only by route upgrades with BCRs of 1.11 to 0.85. At which point HS2 would still have to be built. 3.2.5 The ‘High Speed Rail Strategic Alternatives Study’ indicates that the best performing of three scenarios has a BCR of 1.4; considerably less than the HSR network, but still expensive (£13bn). Another option would cost £24bn. These proposals produce a second-rate outcome, whilst requiring significant expenditure, and probably need further subsequent expenditure. 3.2.6 It is more effective to remove long distance express services from these routes so they can be optimised for other rail services. 3.2.7 The railway network was developed in the 1800s primarily to serve local markets, not as a national network. Trying to achieve HS objectives by upgrading existing routes would be like building the motorway network by upgrading A roads. 3.2.8 Increasing capacity on existing routes does not deliver additional terminal capacity. As upgrades or new conventional lines would not deliver the passenger numbers of HSR, the business case for expensive new terminal capacity may not be justified. 3.2.9 A new 125mph line could deliver increased capacity but would not reduce journey-times and would therefore be less attractive for longer journeys. Therefore there would be less modal shift from road and air and consequently reduced environmental benefits. Furthermore, it may not remove sufficient long-distance journeys from the existing network to free capacity on it for local journeys and freight. 3.2.10 Proposals for a new conventional (125mph) line are likely to generate the same opposition on the line of route as proposals for a HSR line. A new conventional line therefore appears to be a non-starter.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 3.3.1 Managing demand by higher fares or by not providing more capacity would encourage passengers to travel by less sustainable modes. Passenger surveys score existing rail services poorly on value for money. The government’s policy is to allow fares to increase by RPI +3% (except in Scotland). Furthermore, the relative and absolute cost of public transport has risen over recent decades, whilst the relative cost of car travel has declined. Any national policy aim of encouraging sustainable travel has to contend with this, before confronting any concept of managing demand through price. Furthermore, it is not clear why public transport demand should be managed by price when car travel is not, other than in London and Durham. 3.3.2 There is a role for price in maximising efficient use of the rail network. Differential pricing according to time of travel and speed of journey could assist in maximising train load factors on both the classic and high speed networks.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.4.1 The construction of new rail lines (as opposed to rail upgrades) has a reasonably good track record in terms of time and budget (e.g. HS1 and the Airdrie-Bathgate project).

4. The Strategic Route

4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? 4.1.1 Atkins identified that city centre stations are critical to a high-speed network. Non-urban stations on the French TGV network are often very lightly used. Without direct access to city centres, HSR risks replicating the access problems of airports. Nevertheless, ‘parkway’ stations can have a role to play; as well as connecting the HSR network to airports (as at Birmingham International), it is unrealistic to expect all passengers to access HSR by sustainable modes to/from city centre stations. 4.1.2 Curzon Street is adjacent to Moor Street station, thus well-connected to the existing network. 4.1.3 There is an overwhelming connectivity case for a London terminal in the Euston/Kings Cross/St Pancras node. 4.1.4 Given the scale of London, the multiple potential origin/destination points within it, and the benefits of dispersing HS passengers across the Underground, there is a case for two stations in London.

4.2 What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations and 4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.2.1 A High Speed network by definition serves a limited number of strategic locations. TGV network managers admit that their system attempts to serve too many small urban centres. Frequency is important, and dispersing services so that everyone gets a train every four hours is not good use of HSR. 4.2.2 Population size, demand and connectivity should be the primary criteria; they generally coincide. The Government’s proposed network is not just about new lines, but services. Within the timescales foreseen in the HS2 proposal, services should include London, Birmingham, Manchester, Nottingham, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle, Glasgow and Edinburgh. Nevertheless, the Y network should be seen as a work in progress, not a final product.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.3.1 It is not feasible to build a national network in a single effort, and therefore phased construction is necessary. However, it should not preclude early completion of route sections further north. We believe that the government should strongly consider building the network from both ends in light of the high BCR on sections of the line North of Manchester.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? 4.4.1 The timing of the HS2-HS1 link arises largely from construction/technical constraints. Later construction would be practically very difficult, particularly expensive and disruptive. 4.4.2 The Heathrow link should be subsequent to the Manchester and Leeds extensions, as a simple Heathrow link may not be the best option. Connecting at Heathrow to a much wider network south and west of London should be examined, so the objectives of the Heathrow link need to be reframed.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north- south economic divide? 5.1.1 A recent study by Oxford Economics6 showed that the newly designated ‘Local Enterprise Partnership’ areas around the eight Core Cities alone could produce an additional 1 million jobs and £44 billion economic output over the next two years, dependant on a number of growth factors, including infrastructure investment. A full HSR network linking the major cities of the UK would cost up to £69bn and would generate over £125bn of economic benefits. These benefits are derived from improvements in journey times, and crowding, reductions in road congestion, environmental improvements and the economic benefits arising in the release of capacity on the conventional rail

6 ‘Our Cities, Our Future’, Core Cities Group 2011 www.corecities.com network. It also includes the beneficial effect on the productivity of businesses through changes to employment patterns and agglomeration effects. 5.1.2 There are examples of European cities that have not benefited economically from HSR but what these cities have in common is that they took little or no other action after gaining an HS service. Cities which co-ordinated their social, economic and planning policies and activities to capitalise on HSR have benefited. 5.1.3 In Scotland, necessary actions were identified by a study by Halcrow for the Glasgow- Edinburgh Collaboration Initiative. Furthermore, we believe that the social, economic and cultural infrastructure of Central Scotland is such that it has the potential, given the right infrastructure, to unlock greater economic growth. 5.1.4 Greengauge 21 identified a reported upsurge in businesses relocating to Ashford after completion of HS1. The South East England Development Agency expects it to be the fastest growing economy in Kent in 2010-11. 5.1.5 HS2 serves city centres and should, given the right conditions, promotes urban regeneration. 5.1.6 Nations across Europe are investing in HSR, and this is both a threat and an opportunity: it makes other countries a better location for investment, but it offers the prospect of getting multiplier benefits from our own investment by linking to European networks.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 5.2.1 HSR is about making areas outside south east England accessible and economic development balanced so it is inherently linked to strategic regeneration.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 5.3.1 In absolute terms, all. However, relatively the Midlands, north of England and Scotland will particularly benefit. A study by KPMG work showed changes in average wages following construction of HSR, comparing a scenario with Greengauge 21’s H network with no HSR at all.7

6. Impact

6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 6.1.1 See above. The Edinburgh and Glasgow - London flows alone account for a quarter of total UK domestic air traffic.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 6.2.1 Overall, HS2 has taken a very cautious (pessimistic) approach.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the 'classic' network? 6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the 'classic' network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston? 6.4.1 See above.

May 2011

7 High Speed Rail: Consequences for employment and economic growth. KPMG for GG21 References Atkins; Because Transport Matters (2008) Atkins; High Speed Line Study Summary Report (2004) City of Edinburgh Council: Local Transport Strategy 2007-2012 (March 2007) Glaeconomics; Reviewing the evidence on carbon emissions from rail and air travel (2010) GECI/Halcrow; High Speed Rail Wider Economic Benefits Study (2009) Greengauge 21; Fast Forward: A High Speed Rail Strategy for Britain (2009) HS2 Ltd/DfT; reports, 2009-2011 Network Rail; New Lines Report (2009) Network Rail; West Coast Main Line Route Utilisation Strategy Draft for Consultation (2010) Network Rail; London and South East Route Utilisation Strategy Draft for Consultation (2010) Network Rail; East Coast Main Line 2016 Capacity Review (2010) Written evidence from Gordon Pettitt (HSR 99)

Summary of Evidence

1. It is based on the HS2 Y project, not just section 1 to Birmingham.

2. I have only responded to those questions “the committee are likely to pursue” where I have appropriate experience or expertise .It is limited to six pages as requested. (excluding this summary)

3. There is one key argument for the HS2 Y network and that is that the existing main lines north from London are already at or near capacity. Between now and 2026 when the first stage is open, a small amount of extra capacity can be added by the lengthening trains, improvement to signalling headways, and construction of more grade separated junctions. Beyond that date new capacity is needed and the best way of providing that is to build a new line that provides a more efficient means of moving longer distance passengers and at the same time releases capacity on the existing routes which can then be used to provide capacity for improved urban, inter-urban, cross country services and freight. This enables the capacity on HS2 and existing lines to be to be increased in total and optimised in a way that reduces operating costs across both networks.

4. It is essential to take into account that the Y network when complete will enable long distance passengers from Euston, St Pancras and Kings Cross to the North to use the new line and benefit from a 40% improvement in journey times (there will be increased benefit at weekends as all maintenance on the new line is undertaken at night ) As a result the new railway will be more attractive to a wider range of passengers who would otherwise choose to drive or travel by air. The very large investment already made and planned in London, the South East and Scotland together with that already planned for Birmingham, Manchester (Hub) and Leeds will increase accessibility to HS2 and provide for the fist time a realistic rail alternative to the M25.

5. The main alternative to HS2 is to endeavour to provide additional capacity on the three existing routes north. I provide detailed evidence of the serious disadvantages of this approach. In particular I point to recent experience with the upgrading of the West Coast main line that took ten years to complete and cost £9 bn. To increase the capacity of this route further, taking into account of the need to increase capacity, for local as well as long distance traffic, will mean additional tracks on the approaches to Birmingham and Manchester and provision of more terminal capacity in those cities. The situation on the East Coast route is worse, as only 50 % of that route has more than two tracks between London and Leeds.. Disruption and delay to passengers will be worse than that experienced over the West coast main line for 10 years.

6..I know of no country in the world with the density and mix of traffic on our three main lines north that has decided that its passengers should suffer the cost and disruption of converting existing infrastructure, (already operating at or near capacity) in preference to building a new line. To pretend that the long term rail capacity problems north from London will be solved by tweaking the existing network would be akin to adjusting the deckchairs on the Titanic. Transport Select Committee inquiry into the Strategic Case for High Seed Rail (the HSR programme)

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?

1.1 My evidence is submitted on the basis that the HSR programme is for implementation of the “HS2 Y Project” as a whole, due for completion in 2032/33 rather than on the first stage to Birmingham due for completion in 2026. It takes into account that there has been a 70% increase in passenger journeys and 46% increase in freight tonne kilometres over the past 15 years and a 14 % increase in population is forecast between 2001 and 2021.

1.2 to cater for this growth there has already been substantial investment in infrastructure, particularly in London, the South-East and Scotland. Further major projects in these areas have been authorised and are due for completion before 2020. Plans are now advanced for major rail enhancement schemes around Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds. These schemes will transform railways in those areas over the next 20 years and will further increase demand for travel between these cities as well as to and from London.

1.3 The main argument for HS2 is that additional infrastructure capacity is needed to meet increased demand for long distance rail travel on a north to south axis between all the major cities in Scotland, North of England / Midlands and London. Existing routes between Euston, St. Pancras, Kings Cross and the north are already at or near capacity. These mixed traffic railways (i.e. used by fast, semi fast and stopping passenger trains as well as freight) have experienced unprecedented increases in business in all these markets, each of which require trains with differing characteristics and stopping patterns. This has already led to increasing conflicts between operators, local authorities and NetworkRail over the use of capacity, not least on the approach to the northern cities which unlike the approaches to London, still have limited access over two tracks for main line and local services and a shortage of terminal capacity following closures in the 1960’s (for background to this see my April Modern railways Article).

1.4 Main line services also suffer. On the East Coast Main line increased business has resulted in the need for more stops at intermediate stations which uses more capacity. This and additional trains on both the main line and suburban networks has resulted in the average journey time of the limited stop long distance trains between London and Newcastle being extended by 10 to 15 minutes compared with the schedules of 1992. This problem which has also affected East Anglia and Great Western lines will get worse on all the routes north, unless there is a substantial increase in capacity..

1.5 The best economic and operational solution to this problem is to divert all the long distance traffic from each of the main lines north from London on to a new railway as proposed for HS2. This will release significant capacity on the existing lines to cater for the growth of the suburban, inter-urban, cross country and freight markets. In this way the capacity of the High Speed and Classic lines can both be optimised whilst allowing growth in all sectors and at the same time minimising the costs of operation on both systems. 1.6 HS2 will be available 16/18 hours a day, 7 days a week with maintenance done at night. The use of modern trains and infrastructure will bring about a step change in reliability compared with today’s standards of main line punctuality. On HS1 delay due to infrastructure problems is 3-4 seconds per train.

1.7 Journey times on the HS2 network will be 40-45% shorter than now and business will of course increase. But what is less known is that investment in rolling stock will, due to the shorter journey times be approx. 50% less than for a similar frequency of service on classic lines. Similarly staff and maintenance costs will also be lower.

1.8 On completion of the Y network, 400 meter trains with a seating capacity 50% greater than an 11 car Pendolino will be used. In the longer term it will be possible to increase capacity further by the use of double deck trains. 3. Business case 3.2 “What would be the pros and cons of resolving the capacity issues in other ways - for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line” 3.2.1 The HS2 Y Project will provide the capacity needed to meet future passenger demand on the East Coast and Midland Main Lines as well as the West Coast Main Line. Experience shows that this is not simply achieved by upgrading existing routes. The key issues are these: Upgrading works on all three routes to the north to meet the capacity demands beyond 2020, will be more extensive, effect more trains and take longer than those recently undertaken on the WCML The work will be taking place on infrastructure already 150 years old where a significant number of bridges, and possibly viaducts and tunnels will be in need of reconstruction during this time. To undertake such work at the same time as undertaking major works to increase extra capacity would be a logistical nightmare with considerable risks and costs attached.

3.2.2 At the end of upgrading work, the capacity added to the classic network will of course be considerably less than if the HS2 network had been built. If it had the capacity of both networks could have been optimised to meet the specific requirements of the individual markets and at the same time reduce the operational costs of those markets.

3.2.3 The areas of land required for grade separated junctions and widening of existing routes will be considerable. All these sites will require individual Transport and Works Act orders (at least 8 on the East Coast route between London and Leeds alone) which means that total route capacity will always be uncertain until the last order is in place. Even if land was available alongside existing tracks on all three routes the work would take longer, and involve very serious disruption to line-side residents and businesses, which are likely to be on a larger scale than now proposed for the HS2 Y which is being routed to minimise the effect on people, businesses and the environment.

3.2.4 At the conclusion of the works the journey times for long distance passengers will be similar to today with little or no change to the already slow and tedious journeys over the last 20/30 miles between the main lines and the terminals of the northern cities.. 3.2.5 Chris Green who was Chief Executive of Virgin Trains at the time of the West Coast upgrade told me recently “This upgrading attempted to keep the WCML open on weekdays, but proved arguably more disruptive as it dragged on for ten years with endless weekend closures and unreliable weekday services. Mainline travel fell as passengers diverted to motorways and airlines. The domestic airlines achieved a 40% share of the London – Manchester (non car) market in this period – and this has only now fallen back to a 20% .It became very clear that it was both more expensive and more complex to upgrade capacity on an existing railway than it was to build HS1 on a brand new site. Working next to an operational WCML brought serious safety constraints. In the meantime the railway was very unreliable: tight engineering schedules often overran to delay morning services; newly installed equipment proved unreliable and the entire route was actually closed at Rugby for two days following a badly planned Christmas close down. But it has barely addressed the core weakness – that parts of the existing nineteenth century route alignment are fundamentally unfit for modern high speed passenger trains. A £9 bn upgrade has effectively raised running speeds by 15mph (from 110mph to 125mph) over the majority of the route but even this required the procurement of a bespoke fleet of tilting trains.

The same £9bn spend on a new railway could have funded and delivered the first 100 miles of a new 215 mph route with negligible impact on existing passengers”.

3.2.6 The problem we now face in the UK with increased traffic levels on mixed traffic lines is similar to those faced by most railways with advanced economies. The HS2 solution was first used in Japan in 1964 with the building of a new line to provide capacity for long distance trains between Tokyo to Osaka. Since then similar solutions, to divert long distance traffic from mixed traffic railways, have been adopted by 14 countries world wide

I know of no country in the world with the density and mix of traffic on our three main lines north that has decided to suffer the cost and disruption of converting existing infrastructure, which is already operating at or near capacity, in preference to building a new line.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand? for rail travel for example by price?

3.3.1 This question is complex when related to mixed traffic routes, that are at or near capacity. In particular which section of the market should have demand reduced by pricing and who will take such decisions and on what basis? Will the decisions change market share to the point where additional road or airport capacity is needed and how are these issues to be linked to the governments objectives linked to road congestion and climate change ?

3.3.2 HS2 will provide a step change in capacity which will avoid the need to manage through pricing or overcrowding, but yield management (which is also used by the airlines to manage capacity) will still be needed to encourage use of off peak services and to take the pressure off peak trains. Pricing elasticity can encourage small changes in travel demand but increasing fares, on its own, cannot deal with the 56% increase in passenger kilometres on Britain’s railways between 1996 and 2010, and the 61% growth in rail demand forecast by HS2 over the next 32 years, with a doubling of trips in the West Midlands to London corridor. Only additional capacity can do that unless, like the road system, we are prepared to see rail travel restricted by chronic overcrowding.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? 3.4.1 The first and most important step is to ensure complete separation of client and contractor roles. The second is to employ project management with international experience and a proven track record of managing major projects – then add incentives to reduce costs and complete on time The project manager must be selected at an early stage and work with the client in ensuring that the project including costs is defined in detail prior to tendering. Finally the client has to ensure that no changes to the plan are permitted. The UK track record with major infrastructure projects has improved in recent years. HS1 and the Olympic project are examples of international best practice which should give confidence that HS2 can be completed on time and to budget.

4. The Strategic Route

4.1 The proposed route to the west Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham New Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? 4.1.1 The stations proposed are the most appropriate for a new railway that is planned to cater exclusively for long distance traffic diverted from the mixed traffic routes between Euston, St Pancras, Kings Cross and the Midlands/ North.

4.1.2 The proposed stations at Euston and Old Oak Common in London give the best possible access to the new railway through the provision of high quality connections to and from the major destinations within London such as the West End, the City, Docklands and Heathrow. The completion of Crossrail in 2017 and of Thameslink in 2018 will have a profound impact on the market for rail travel between the north and south of the country when combined with completion of the HS2 Y project. The network effect of all these new lines with their superb connectivity will provide journey opportunities that are almost impossible to assess today. Rail will provide for the first time a realistic alternative to the M25.

4.1.3 The plans for Euston include an improved underground concourse and a direct link to Euston Square station. Access to HS2 could be further improved with a covered walkway or travelator link between Euston and Kings Cross. The distance between the two stations is no greater than between terminals at Heathrow or Gatwick and a further 82 stations on Thameslink and HS1 Kent routes would be linked to HS2 with a single change of train

4.1.4 The interchange at Old Oak will add 37 stations from Maidenhead, Slough and Heathrow in the west, through the West End and the City, to Stratford, Romford and Shenfield in the east..

4.1.5 The proposed stations at Birmingham International and Curzon Street must like Euston and Old Oak be seen together as maximising access to the new railway. It is impossible to increase the track capacity on the approaches to or increase the number of platforms in New Street. It will therefore be essential to provide pedestrian/travelator links between Curzon Street, Moor Street and New Street. Particularly for longer distance passengers from the South and South West who will (on present plans) have no through trains onto the Y network for long distance journeys north of Birmingham.

4.1.6 There would appear to be no scope for any additional intermediate stations between Old Oak Common and Birmingham International – a distance of circa 100 miles. My recommendation for the criteria would be: That any additional stop generates sufficient income from long distance traffic to justify the loss of capacity on the route as a whole and particularly in peak periods. (one stop can destroy two following paths with a loss of 1,000+ seats)

4.1.7 The top priority for stations on the HS2 Y network north of Birmingham are Sheffield, Manchester and Leeds. The viability of the proposed station for East Midlands should depend on the availability of a suitable site that can deliver effective rail and road connections to Derby and Nottingham. Unless the connections are very good it is possible that existing services may be more competitive, in which case the capacity on the Y network could be better utilised.

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? 4.2.1 I have no doubt that the proposed Y is indeed the right choice. In the longer term extensions to York Newcastle, Edinburgh and Glasgow are likely to become part of the HSR network. Passive provision must be made in plans for the line to be extended to those cities. Journey times from London to Edinburgh and Glasgow will come down to round 2 hours 45 minutes. If the latter are linked to the improved journey times planned in Scotland, through journeys from London, Birmingham and Manchester to Inverness and Aberdeen become viable by rail.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? 4.3.1 The government is right to plan the building of HS2 from the London end but consideration should be given to opening the section from Old Oak Common to Birmingham International first in order that this section can be used for testing as soon as possible and bring forward the opening date for revenue earning traffic. Consideration should also be given to constructing those sections of HS2 around Birmingham and northwards which interface with other major rail or road projects under construction at the same time. In this way it is possible to minimise the construction costs of both. This worked very well on HS1 where the works interfaced with the widening of the A2 in the Southfleet area. .

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2 .Are those the right decisions.

4.4.1 The proposed links to HS1 and Heathrow are both strategic links of national importance but the availability of finance is key to the timescale for the building of both. Building the HS1 link will probably release EEC funds or competitive loans for HS2 but Heathrow does have serious competition from Paris Charles De Gaulle, Frankfurt and Amsterdam Schipol airports, all of which have stations on high speed lines. Rather than delay construction of the Heathrow link to Phase 2 it would surely be better to leave open the possibility of earlier opening if significant funds can be made available from potential partners such as BAA. 5. Economic Rebalancing and Equity

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration?

5.2.1 The cities served by the HS2 Y Project, and particularly Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds and Sheffield all have significant local rail networks. These support the local and regional economy, and growth in levels of rail commuting have generally been higher than the national average over the last 15 years, as the city centres have been regenerated. HS2 provides the additional capacity that enables planners to optimise use of capacity on both the classic and high speed lines and, in effect, to ensure that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. HS2 for example would both add to, and benefit from, the Manchester Hub proposals. Without it, it is hard to see how local services could be improved in the Crewe – Manchester corridor, for example. HS2 could also release the extra capacity to allow a better balance between the needs of long distance and local passengers in the congested Coventry to Birmingham corridor. 6. Impact

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the classic network? 6.3.1 The diversion of many long distance trains will release additional paths for freight, particularly on the main line routes.

6.4 How much disruption wills there be to services on the classic network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?

.6.4.1 A key advantage of building new capacity is that the impact is limited to those locations which interface with the classic network. Disruption is normally limited to weekend closures in order to join the old and new routes together. In the case of HS2 the number of such locations is similar to HS1 which included the rebuilding of the throat area on the approach to St/ Pancras and diversion of the Thameslink route below the station.

6.4.2 The work to be undertaken at Euston is substantial but the plan to have 14 platforms available for use at all times will minimise the effect. The disruption to passengers will be minor compared with the years of disruption and cancellation of trains that passengers throughout the route suffered during the 10 years of WCML modernisation.

15th may 2011 Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in the UK (HSR 100)

Introduction

The Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in the UK (“the Institute”) is a professional institution embracing all transport modes whose members are engaged in the provision of transport services for both passengers and freight, the management of logistics and the supply chain, transport planning, government and administration. We have no political affiliations and do not support any particular vested interests. Our principal concerns are that transport policies and procedures should be effective and efficient and based, as far as possible, on objective analysis of the issues and practical experience and that good practice should be widely disseminated and adopted. The Institute has a specialist Strategic Rail Forum, a nationwide structure of locally based groups and a Public Policies Committee which considers the broad canvass of transport policy. This submission draws on contributions from all these sources.

1 What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?

1.1 The capacity of the rail network needs to expand to meet growing demand for travel. High Speed Rail (HSR) is the most economically efficient means of expanding rail capacity. Major investment in developing the capacity of existing lines is both expensive and disruptive, as experience with the West Coast Route Modernisation showed.

1.2 HSR will enhance accessibility, contributing to the cohesion of Britain and thus reducing the ‘north/south divide’. Many current rail journey times are slow and compare poorly with road. With the proposed ‘Y’ shaped HS2 network, Leeds and Manchester to Birmingham journey times would be virtually halved, greatly improving the connectivity of these cities, both to London and between themselves.

1.3 This would also improve the classic network’s ability to cope with other traffic, which is especially important for the large intermediate towns or cities (near HS2 between London and Birmingham) such as Milton Keynes and Coventry. These may otherwise be faced with increasingly limited access to long distance trains, due to such services being full before these cities are reached.

1.4 HSR helps address the under- appreciated challenges associated with population growth, ageing and distribution, and an increasing propensity to travel.

1.5 The arguments against HSR centre on affordability, the possible reduction of funds to support the classic network, alternative means of expanding capacity by more modest multiple investments, and what might more loosely be called ‘environmental concerns’. 1.6 The last of these can be mitigated by careful routeing of HSR away from sensitive areas and sound protection measures such as noise barriers. Environmental impacts should be seen on a ‘net’ basis, taking account of reductions in effects associated with road and air traffic movements.

2 How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

2.1 HSR represents a major infrastructure enhancement which will contribute to achieving Government’s sustainability and carbon reduction objectives. It will relieve congestion on the strategic road network, reduce pressure on London’s congested airports and by reducing pressure on the classic rail network enable it to meets the challenges of commuter and regional demand more effectively.

2.2 As a means of connecting different regions and urban areas, HSR may be seen as an enabler for economic development, by reducing journey times and providing the necessary capacity. Faster journeys by HSR also mean greater productivity for the transport providers. In broad terms, halving the journey time allows the same number of trains and staff to provide twice as much service.

2.3 A degree of ring fencing between an HSR network and the classic network could be introduced, as it was on London Underground with the construction of the Jubilee Line extension in the 1990s.

2.4 The problems of urban/suburban networks on the classic railway will be affected only marginally by HSR and the continued relevance and need for investment there will remain. Similarly, freight will continue to depend on the classic network, where all the freight terminals are located.

2.5 Contrary perhaps to popular belief, the British internal market for aviation is not strong, due to railway developments in both speed and frequencies in recent years. It does however have niche domestic markets, and these include services where water crossings are involved, such as the Scottish islands, Ireland/Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. What remains of the main trunk routes serves markets close to airports, such as the Thames Valley from Heathrow or Canary Wharf from London City, or passengers interlining at Heathrow for longer distance flights.

2.6 There is thus little scope for further reductions in domestic aviation. It is relevant to note that airport operators and some airlines are fully supportive of HS2, because they feel that it would enhance connectivity to air services

3 Business case

3.1 The approach adopted in the preparation of demand forecasts and in the appraisal of benefits is robust. An appropriate methodology has been adopted and the assumptions and appraisal methodology have been subject to peer review.

3.2 The classic railway system has done very well to accommodate around 40% growth on a more or less fixed network over recent years, but there are practical limits as to what more can be achieved. Gradients and especially track curvature limit future expansion, whilst the four tracking of double track lines (for instance) imposes both land take and the adoption of the standards used by the original railway builders.

3.3 HSR has a strong international precedent demonstrating business benefits. For instance French Railways built their first high speed line as the most economic way of enhancing capacity between Paris and Lyon.

3.4 The building of a new classic railway may be suitable for urban areas, but would be a missed opportunity for an intercity type operation. It might possibly be cheaper, but the benefits would also be much less. There is no reason to conclude that it would avoid environmental problems. It could not provide the same capacity gains as HSR without a fundamentally different approach.

3.5 Any new railway infrastructure designed to link the core cities of Britain and raise the standards of connectivity needs to be built to high speed standards. Such standards also need to be those adopted internationally, if the future holds large scale increases in the demand for such travel.

3.6 Pricing on the existing network is clearly an important issue, and there are precedents for controlling demand by above inflation price increases. But such an approach ignores Government objectives of facilitating travel and social and economic regeneration. Managing strategic demand growth through pricing action will tend to reduce mobility and stifle economic growth to the detriment of the economic and social wellbeing of the nation.

3.7 A related and perennial issue for transport is capturing wider economic benefits, such as increases in time saved by users or in land values, none of which shows in the operators’ accounts.

3.8 Transport projects can and have been delivered to time and budget. Evidence from HS1 and other major transport projects suggest that the key requirements are a clear project plan, a funding plan, strong project management and good stakeholder communications.

4 The strategic route

4.1 CILT agrees with HS2 Ltd’s choice of stations, both the number and locations. Euston requires improvements in access to the Underground and the capacity of the Underground lines serving it, but its superiority to any other reasonably available site is also apparent. 4.2 The Old Oak Common site for a Crossrail interchange, with its own access to Central London, is well conceived and potentially very useful. That extends to connections with services operated on the Great Western main line, which could offer substantial benefits to travellers to South West England and South Wales.

4.3 The proposed route of HS2 is commendably direct. It does not pass near any major towns, and any case for additional stations is correspondingly weak. HS2 Ltd seem to have taken much care in minimising the undesirable effects on the communities through which HS2 is likely to pass and it is not possible to undertake such major transport infrastructure projects without some effects on third parties. Existing trunk rail routes, even when they include major structures such as Welwyn Viaduct, Hertfordshire, and the Royal Border Bridge, Berwick, do not seem to have had a seriously adverse effect on nearby local areas.

4.4 The Y network concept should be supported, albeit as perhaps an intermediate development stage. Success is likely to result in popular pressure to extend the network to Newcastle and Edinburgh, and then to Glasgow, so later extensions to these cities are a distinct possibility. Comprehensive plans for a national High Speed network are desirable and passive provision for later construction should be made, where and when sensible.

4.5 There are two reasons why construction should begin at the London end of the route. Firstly, there are the practical matters of rolling stock and infrastructure maintenance depots, for both of which suitable sites have been identified. Secondly, working north from London would maximise early fares revenues.

4.6 The connection to HS1 is desirable and the option identified is probably the best that can be achieved physically. As matters stand, it will however have to rely solely on revenues from international passengers from Birmingham and those who join at Old Oak Common. (It is assumed that passengers from Stratford, Ebbsfleet and Ashford will have alternative provision). The additional ability to carry wholly domestic passengers on these trains would have a substantial beneficial effect on service viability. This is a matter which needs to be resolved by the Borders Agency as a matter of urgency.

4.7 The proposals to interchange with Heathrow services at Old Oak Common are appropriate for Stage 1. Filling 1,100 seat trains, which have a modest service frequency from the West Midlands, direct to Heathrow, is a substantial challenge. It is not going to happen quickly, and probably needs the stimulus of the services from Manchester and Leeds under Stage 2 to make it a viable proposition.

5 Economic rebalancing and equity

5.1 On its own, HSR cannot provide economic regeneration, but it can make a major contribution. London Docklands provides a useful precedent. The area could not have been revitalised without large rail transport investments, but it did need the input of entrepreneurial bodies. Development had to be underpinned by local authorities providing planning permission, and the judicial investment of public money. 5.2 HSR is however more about regional benefits, particularly those to business. Effective distances are shrunk and the disadvantages of the time taken in having to travel 100-250 miles are much reduced. The cities in the North/North West and the Midlands become that much more accessible, between each other as well as with London and the near continent.

5.3 Care though has to be taken that the High Speed railway does indeed remain as such, so stops are necessarily limited. Benefits for those places which are not served directly may be secured by good quality connectional arrangements, but the freeing up of the classic network will in itself allow substantial improvements to be made.

5.4 Planning for HSR should be in terms of the network which might exist in perhaps 50 years time. It is important that all interested parties; the cities and regions, industrialists, economic and social planners, the transport industry, rail passengers and freight users and the general public, should know what is intended and be able to plan ahead accordingly.

5.5 Funding should be sought from a wide variety of sources including local authorities and potentially businesses. The EU’s TEN-T programme should also be regarded as an appropriate source of funding. In this context, the connection to HS1 and hence the rest of the European High Speed Network will be an important factor.

6 Impact

6.1 Rail is the most environmentally friendly transport system and remains the only proven and demonstrably effective way of using electricity as a source of propulsion in long-distance transport.

6.2 The environmental costs and benefits are properly accounted for in the business case. However, the local environmental impacts, notably noise and visual intrusion, will need to be assessed in detail to ensure that the final design minimises the environmental impact of HSR.

6.3 Freight would remain a classic network customer, and would be able to benefit from the additional train paths being made available. The need for operational flexibility is a characteristic of the freight business, where some traffic flows can change quickly, so the freeing up of capacity would provide opportunities to serve this market better. This additional capacity would be shared by other passenger services, whether long distance, regional or local, its apportionment between these interests subject to regulation.

6.4 The service disruption challenge from Euston reconstruction is significant but preplanning can mitigate the impact considerably, as has been shown with the successful regeneration of St. Pancras station. 7 Conclusion

7.1 CILT(UK) understands the planning, construction and funding challenges of HSR but is fully supportive of this vital project being progressed.

May 2011 WrittenevidencefromProfessorPeterMackie(HSR101)

Declaration—IamamemberoftheHS2AnalyticalChallengePanel.Theevidencesubmittedismy personalopiniononlyandnotnecessarilythatoftheACPorHS2Ltd.Severalpointsareinanycase outsidetheremitofHS2Ltd.

1TheHS2projectisgoingthroughvariousstepsinthefeasibilitystudyphase.Thereisfurther refinementrequiredofthemodellingandappraisal.However,theworktodategivesafair andreasonableindicationofthebenefit/costratiooftheschemeasassessedusingDfT WebTAGprinciples.AnappropriateinterpretationisthattheBCRoftheLondonͲWest Midlandssectionassessedonastandalonebasisisaround2—probablynoworsethan1.5 andprobablynobetterthan2.5.Perhapsforaschemeofthisscale,sucharesultisnottoo surprising—iftheBCRwere10,therewouldbeseriousquestionsaboutwhytheschemehad notbeenassessedyearsago.However,andalsogiventhesheerscaleofthepublicfinance commitment,theschemetakeninisolationisbestcharacterisedasmoderatevaluefor moneyintransportappraisalterms.Thisisbeforeconsiderationofthelocalenvironmental impactssuchasnoise,visualintrusion,severanceetcwhichlieoutsideoftheBCR.

2InthecostͲbenefitanalysis,theschemedependsforitsbenefitsontraveltimesavingsfor currentandtransferred/inducedusersandoncapacityreliefbenefits–reliabilitygainsand reliefofovercrowdingparticularlyontheWestCoastMainLine.Carbonimpactsaresmall andbenefitsduetodiversionfromairaresmallinthecontextofthescheme.

3Thevalueofbusinesstraveltimesavingshasbeenthesubjectofcommentbycriticsofthe appraisal.HS2hasfollowedtheWebTAGguidanceinthisrespect.Iwouldarguethatthere aretwoissueswhichneedtobeexploredbyDfT

x Whetheruptodatebehaviouralevidenceonthevalueoftraveltimesavingsfor briefcasetravellersinthecourseofworksupportsthecurrentvalues,andifnot, howtohandlebenefitstotransferredtrafficfromroadandairaswellasexistingrail travellers;

x WhetherforalljourneypurposestheaveragevaluesoftraveltimeintheWebTAG areappropriateforrelativelylongdistancetrips.Othercountriessuchas NetherlandsandSwedenrecommendhighervaluesfortimesavingsonlong distancetrips.

Takingthesetwopointstogether,IconjecturethattheappraisalisnotseriouslyoverͲegged inthisrespect.

4Theappraisalresultsarecriticallydependentonthefuturetrajectoryofpopulation, employment,GDP/capita,energypricesandrailfaresrelativetoothertransportcosttrends. Also,theincomeandfareelasticitiesassumedandprojectedfarintothefuturearecriticalto thetrafficforecasts.Thereisaneedforafullquantifiedriskassessmentoftheproject.

5 Therearevariousrespectsinwhichfurthermodellingworkisrequired.Someofthesemay betotheadvantageoftheappraisalcase,othersnot x ModellingofstationchoiceespeciallybetweenEustonandOldOakinLondon

x Modellingofchoicebetweenreservationonly(HS2)andwalkupservicesonWCML particularlybetweenLondonandBirmingham

x FurtherworkoninterchangepenaltiesandroutechoicetoBirminghamfortraffic needingtointerchangetoregionalservicesatNewStreet

x FurtherconsiderationofthepotentialforOldOaktobeatrueLondonJunction stationwithmuchbetterconnectionsbetweenLondonandSEregionsouthofthe ThamesandtheMidlandsandNorth

x ConsiderationofsplittingtheLondonͲParis/BrusselsEurostarservicefrequency, runningsomeservicesdirectfromOldOakviaHerneHilltothejunctionwithHS1as analternativetoconstructingthelinktoStPancras

x FurtherassessmentoftheimpactonGreatWesternMainLinepassengersof introducingastopatOldOak

6Morebroadly,theappraisalneedstobeconductedsoasto

x Distinguishclearlytheincrementalvalueofthecomponentsofthestrategy–for exampletheincrementalvalueofthelinktoStPancrasandofdirectserviceto Heathrow.Theseshouldnotbebundledtogetherasapackage,theyarevery substantialprojectsintheirownright.

x Beexplicitregardingthefranchiseterritoryassumptions,competitivebehaviour fromexistingfranchiseesortheirsuccessors,anduseofreleasedcapacityonWCML egbyopenaccessoperators.Theregulatoryenvironmentassumptionsare important.AllfourlongdistancefranchiseswillbeaffectedbyHS2.

x DemonstratecarefulconsiderationofthebestDoͲMinimumalternativescenarioon theWCML.Thereareusuallywaysofcopingwithcapacityandoptionssuchas16 coachtrainswithenhancedenergysupplyshouldatleastbeconsideredagainstthe statusquo.

x EstablishwhatcanbedonetoimproverailaccessibilitytoHeathrowintheinterim. ConstructionofthewestcurvefromtheHeathrowspurlinetowardsReadingwould permit,say,atrainanhourfromHeathrowtoBirminghamwhichwouldbebetter thanwaitingtill2026.

7.Overallitisquitelikelythatadecisiononphaseoneoftheproject(London—WestMidlands) willturnouttobecontingentontheassessedvalueformoneyoftheentireYnetwork.This increasestheimportanceofunderstandingthetechnical,economicandenvironmentalcaseforthe upperarmsoftheYearly.Itcouldbethatthetruepolicychoicemightbeanallornothingone.

8.TheHS2willbeoneofthefirstmajorprojectstogothroughthefivebusinesscaseapproach announcedbytheSecretaryofStateon27April.Theconsistencyoftheeconomic,commercial, financialanddeliverabilitycasesisgoingtobecrucialtotheoverallassessment.Specifically, x Theappraisalcurrentlyassumesnofarepremiumforthehigherspeedsand guaranteedseatofferedbyHS2.Thereisaneedforfurtherconsiderationofthe tradeoffbetweenuserbenefits,farerevenueandtaxpayersupportwithinthe appraisal.Atwhatratecantraveltimeandqualitybenefitsbeconvertedinto revenuethroughyieldmanagement?

x TheappraisalresultsimplythatiftheHS2infrastructureispubliclyfundedand endowedtotherailsystemthentheforwardoperatingcostsoftheinfrastructure andservicescanbefundedfromwithintherailfinancialsupportenvelope.This requirescarefulstudy—itwouldbeamistaketoaccepttheinvestmentappraisal caseonthebasisofanoperatingplanwhichthencannotbefullyfunded.

x ThetacitassumptionisthatthepublicfinancefortheHS2infrastructureisnotgoing todisplacethegeneralityoftransportsectorschemes,ratherthatitisgoingtobea strategicpriorityofGovernmentlikeHS1andCrossrailandthereforeadditionalto thenormaltransportbudget.Ifthisassumptioniswrong,itisnecessarytoquestion theopportunitycostoftheschemeintermsofinvestmentforgoneelsewherein thetransportsector.



9. Turningtothewiderimpactsoftheschemeontheeconomy,itisimportanttorecognise thattheappraisalhasbeenconductedonafixedlandusepatternassumption.Itisquite plausiblethattheschemewillhavelanduseimpactsinCentralBirmingham,inthe vicinityoftheBirminghamParkwaystationandatOldOakandWillesdenandthatthere willbeadditionalbenefitsresulting.Itisalsocrediblethattherearecompetitiveness benefitstotheUKfromconnectingseveralofthetopconurbationstoeachothermore effectively.However,Idonotthinktheseimpactscanpossiblybelargeadditionstothe directtransportbenefitsintheCBA;theyarelargelythesamebenefitsconvertedfrom thetransportsectorintothewidereconomyviathelanduseanddevelopmentpattern.

10. Itisimportant,iftheGovernmentthinksthereisastrategiccaseforbuildingHS2which isaboveandbeyondtheeconomicandenvironmentalcase,thatthereisclarityonwhat thatcaseissoitcanbescrutinised.Forvariousreasons,HS2isratherunlikelytomake muchdifferencetotheNorthͲSouthdivide.Aspatialanalysiswouldprobablyshow Londontobethemainbenefittingregion.ThatisNOTareasonfornotdoingthescheme butclaimsof‘strategicvalue’needtobecapableofinterrogation.

11. Finally,giventhepopulationprojectionsforLondonandtheSouthEast,Ifinditbizarre thatadvantageisnotbeingtakenofthispieceofinfrastructuretoplananewcityeither ontheHS2centredaroundsayBrackleyortotakeadvantageofthereleasedcapacityon theWCML.AtruestrategywouldplaceHS2withinabroaderregionallanduseplan whichcouldaddressseveraldeepproblemssimultaneously.

May2011

 Written evidence from Buckinghamshire County Council (HSR 102)

This paper sets out Buckinghamshire Councils’ response to the Transport Select Committee inquiry into High Speed rail. It is submitted on behalf of Buckinghamshire County, Aylesbury Vale District, Chiltern District, South Bucks District and Wycombe District Councils, in response to question 6.2 of the inquiry’s questions:

Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY x The Government’s proposals for HS2 have not costed or accounted for the total environmental impacts and associated mitigation costs and therefore the business case will potentially be weaker, meaning neither the nation nor the Government can make an informed decision about the HS2 proposals x HS2 is apparently in ‘the national interest’ and yet there is inadequate objective evaluation of all factors, work that other major scheme promoters would be expected to provide to inform the decision making process x The timetable for environmental surveys and assessments is unrealistic and seems to have been driven by ‘political expediency’ to meet Parliamentary timescales , rather than an adequate evaluation timetable; this may be why national designations such as the Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty and the European Habitats Directive have not been sufficiently considered

INTRODUCTION

HS2 proposals will cause major environmental damage both in the short term, during construction, and in the longer term, once operational. The Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS) prepared to support HS2 includes a series of objectives against which the proposals are measured, with scores ranging from highly unsupportive through to highly supportive.

HS2 is unable to score positively against any of the environmental objectives in the AoS, and whilst this is not unusual for any major development project at an early stage, since it indicates where mitigation is most required, HS2 Ltd has offered very few mitigation measures, but rather allocated an amount of funding for future investigations.

Further review of the AoS has highlighted that calculating total environmental costs and impact of the HS2 proposals is not possible, since not all the relevant information, surveys or supporting data has either been published or in many cases undertaken. This is at least consistent with HS2 Ltd’s approach to mitigation.

It is perhaps unfortunate for the Government that expensive solutions will not mitigate all impacts, since in some cases these are not environmentally or economically sensible. It is also likely that many impacts may become highly contentious later in the project, particularly when bound by European legislation.

Since so little has been done to consider mitigation, everyone is being asked to respond to a consultation with insufficient information to make an informed and balanced judgement. Indeed the proposals have been defined by HS2 Ltd as contrary to the Government’s environmental objectives since they fail to protect landscapes, water and the noise environment.

The Department for Transport stated in January 2011 that ‘further site surveys would not at this stage have offered any significant additional information’. We do not agree with this statement and further site surveys at this stage would have enabled the environmental impacts to be more appropriately measured. It is essential information for the business case analysis and without it one must question the validity of the business case.

There is no evidence that the additional surveys, mitigation measures and consequent delays, to comply with legal requirements and the Government’s own commitments have been adequately factored into the business case, and this further exacerbates the extent to which the environmental costs and benefits have failed to be correctly accounted for.

To support this submission, the Councils have tried to identify the environmental impacts of HS2 to let the Transport Select Committee review the strength of the business case.

HS2 PREFERRED ROUTE 3

Key facts about the Preferred Route: x 40% of the route is in deep cutting, 9% on viaduct, about 13% in tunnels x More than 9% of the route passes through the Chilterns AONB x Less than 40% of the route through the Chilterns AONB is in tunnel

Species and Habitats affected by the Preferred Route HS2 runs through Camden, Hillingdon, Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Northamptonshire, Warwickshire and Staffordshire between London and Birmingham. Buckinghamshire is nearly a third of the route and thus an initial environmental assessment was completed to identify species, habitats and significant features impacted.

Headline information is provided below and more detail can be found in the table in Appendix 1. x HS2 travels through more than 25 km of Green Belt in Buckinghamshire x Within 1 km of the HS2 route in Buckinghamshire there are: o Almost 270 ha of Sites of Special Scientific Interest o 245 ha of Biodiversity Action Plan habitats & 474 ha of Ancient Woodland o 60 different Protected Species & 425 Protected Species records o 8 Scheduled Ancient Monuments & 590 Grade I, II*, or II Listed Buildings o 6 Registered Historic Parks & Gardens & 15 Conservation Areas o 141 Archaeological notification sites & 2568 Historic Environment Records x 56 Footpaths or Bridleways will be intersected / crossed by HS2 in Buckinghamshire

Heritage assets, features and landscape also contribute to the character of the Chiltern AONB, protected by Planning Policy Statement 7 (PPS7 - Sustainable Development in Rural Areas). We estimate that up to 7000 historic / heritage assets will be affected by Phase 1 of HS2 between London and Birmingham. However the AoS only identifies impacts on designated heritage assets. As such 90% of all assets may be overlooked. The AoS also underestimates impacts on Rights of Way. It states that ‘there would be at least 27 paths potentially affected’ but Buckinghamshire’s baseline assessment shows that 56 will be affected, requiring 26 diversions and 30 bridges or tunnels. Whilst HS2 Ltd’s Chief Executive, Alison Munroe, clarifies that ‘with respect to footpaths we do not envisage these being closed…’ and ‘we would endeavour to avoid lengthy footpath diversions, and footbridges and underpasses would be provided to enable existing routes to be maintained, wherever practicable’ (in reply to the Ramblers, February 2011),such a large underestimate suggests HS2 Ltd has failed to do its homework.

For biodiversity, no comprehensive ecological surveys have been undertaken to assess impacts on habitats and species. The data given above and in Appendix 1 is taken from the existing record, which particularly in the case of species, is incomplete.

APPRAISAL OF SUSTAINABILITY (AoS)

Buckinghamshire Councils believe that the AoS is an unsatisfactory compromise that tries to meet the needs of SEA, NATA, WebTag and other guidance, but singularly fails. HS2 Ltd and Dft state its proposals linking London and Birmingham are a ‘project’, and subject to EIA. However proposals for Phase 2, linking to Heathrow, Manchester, and Leeds, suggest HS2 is a series of projects, or programme and therefore subject to SEA.

The AoS focuses on Preferred Route 3, without considering other options. It is suggested these were dismissed earlier, but such decisions were made without consultation or explanation. The scope of the AoS may have been determined without reference to Natural England, other stakeholders or consultees.

The AoS, asserts that costs for all options are broadly similar. It is therefore assumed that mitigation costs are also similar but this can only be an assumption without evidence. As such, expensive mitigation measures may be necessary for any option.

ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS

Noise and vibration The assessment of noise in the AoS is limited to train operational noise at dwellings for an 18 hour daytime period (06:00-24:00) with no quantitative assessment of ‘night-time’ noise impacts (23.00-07.00). The AoS does not identify impacts at non-residential receptors, such as schools or community buildings. Other potential adverse noise impacts, such as alterations to existing transport networks, have also not been considered. The noise criteria and assumptions in the AoS represent a significant risk. For example, the adoption of the noise threshold value for High Noise Levels is taken out of context and therefore flawed.

Further mitigation options need to be investigated once the true number and magnitude of noise impact at residential and non-residential receptors have been identified. Current noise mitigation is defined as standard noise barriers no higher than 3m and some reduction in train noise at source. In the absence of any measure to determine the residual impacts, there is major uncertainty about mitigation costs, especially where for example additional cut and cover tunnels or other extensive noise mitigation is needed. Unless more detailed work is completed, and more considered noise mitigation costs developed, future options for additional mitigation could be limited (by cost) to taller and more unsightly noise barriers or controls on train speed.

Land The business case sets out land purchase costs, at £930 million. This does not seem enough to buy all the land needed for offsetting principles. Some impacts from ancillary construction facilities, landscape and ecological mitigation and waste disposal will extend the impact ‘footprint’ way beyond the line, adding to costs.

The Government's 2010 Lawton report proposes biodiversity offsetting which recognises all habitat value and assigns costs to identify the scale of compensation. It also states that if compensation and /or mitigation is undeliverable within the existing footprint, compensatory offsetting should be provided, on a 1:1 ratio at minimum. Land purchase, habitat establishment and land management (in perpetuity) are not factored into costs.

Rights of Way The AoS states it will maintain rights of way ‘in the long term where feasible’. It must be noted that even if access is maintained, the ability to enjoy a tranquil walk through open countryside will be lost. A major underestimate of the number of affected footpaths (based on assessments) means the business case does not reflect the true costs.

Route engineering Assessments show major disruption to a number of existing routes (road, rail, cyclist and pedestrian; man-made and natural) intercepted by HS2. Not all will be suitable for mitigation. Where routes can be diverted around, over, under or moved without permanent closure, the right solution will need to be sensitive to the environment and site appropriate. Such solutions may be costly and are not shown in the business case.

These impacts will be felt along the entire length of the route. Still to be measured are the costs of disruptions or diversions to other transport networks, during a lengthy build programme.

Water The AoS admits that HS2 will affect groundwater, so failing to meet DfT sustainability objectives. Damage to groundwater could affect water supply that cannot be solved with expensive solutions (yet to be determined). Of particular concern is possible damage to the Chilterns AONB aquifer, which could limit water supply for many.

The AoS recognises this risk but fails to prove that it can be managed. Rather the AoS assumes that money set aside for mitigation will cover all eventualities even though the Catchment Abstraction Management Strategies (CAMS, 2007) suggested that the Colne catchment, including the Misbourne, Chess, Gade, and Bulbourne chalk streams was already ‘over-abstracted’. If HS2 impacted public supplies, then any loss would need to be met from long distance imports of water.

OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES Potential delays The consultation documents do not consider possible delays (and associated costs) that may be encountered. DfT say that HS2 is subject to Environmental Impact Assessment, so all ecological surveys must be completed ahead of the Hybrid Bill, set for submission to Parliament in 2013. Given the scale and complexity HS2 Ltd must provide assurance that sufficient time is built into the project plan, should the Secretary of State choose to proceed with HS2. This timetable must not be short circuited for political expediency.

Also, some surveys may need repeating if more than two years elapses between the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and the start of construction. This is good practice that the Government should adopt to ensure data is contemporary, but could further increase costs and impact the cost benefit ratio.

Planning requirements Designated Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) are protected by national legislation, with a presumption to refuse inappropriate development unless proposals identify ‘exceptional circumstances’. It has yet to be proved that HS2 is in the national interest and therefore it does not demonstrate exceptional circumstances.

Planning Policy Statement 9 (PPS9) sets out how ecological impacts should be assessed and establishes the principle that all information presented, and impacts mitigated or compensated. Where this is not possible there is a presumption to refuse development. HS2 Ltd have proposed a single route, not assessed data, and assumed that all ecological issues can be overcome, inconsistent with PPS9.

Visual and landscape impacts HS2 will cut through some of the most iconic, valuable and valued countryside between London and Birmingham. The first section outside London bisects the Mid Colne Valley; a nationally important conservation site, SSSI, and Country Park. The section crossed by high viaduct is an open expanse of water attracting 70 breeding and 80 wintering species of bird, making it of national importance and possibly the most significant wetland breeding bird community in the area.

The site is home to the Hillingdon Outdoor Activity Centre where residents, schools, and voluntary groups enjoy a variety of recreational facilities. These will be lost since the piers of the viaduct will interfere with the activities and the centre’s operation.

When the route emerges from tunnel (close to Old Amersham, a conservation area with listed buildings and not far from a primary school) it cuts through the Chilterns AONB, on a range of tunnels, cuttings, viaducts and embankments. Claims that the A413 is a major transport route overstate the true nature of this single carriageway road through unspoilt countryside.

Once beyond the AONB, it travels across open countryside, impacting on landscape and tranquillity, effects difficult to monetise but valued nonetheless by visitors, residents and businesses. Protection given to Hartwell House does recognise the value of designated assets, but there seems to be scant regard for undesignated but valued landscapes.

Integrating a railway into any landscape can mean looking well beyond the rail corridor depending on visibility, landscape sensitivity and key receptors, to create the right landscape. HS2 Ltd show road and rail crossings but fail to give sufficient details about vertical realignments in critical areas, such as the Princes Risborough crossing, that will have major impacts on the landscape and setting and cost and disruption implications.

It is not just the current proposals that have major landscape and visual impacts, but also Phase 2 linking to Manchester, Leeds and Heathrow. Effects north of Birmingham are unclear, but a number of Heathrow options show routes that cut directly through two Country Parks within the Colne Valley. Black and Langley Parks attract more than half a million visitors each year, and offer filming locations for the adjacent Pinewood Studios.

Historic environment and heritage impacts Historic environment and heritage assets will be impacted by the route with effects being: x Physical destruction or harm during construction x Adverse noise or visual intrusion on the setting of assets x Loss of historic character by severing landscape patterns or linear features x Harm from vibration, or alteration of water table

The AoS does not consider historic landscape patterns, a key feature of the AONB. It makes little mention of impact on undesignated assets or any mitigation. To suggest that: ‘Where practicable, the vertical alignment could be adjusted to avoid any identified deposits of archaeological significance’ fails to account for engineering constraints. We believe most archaeological sites will be destroyed. Information about heritage impacts in Buckinghamshire can be found in Appendix 2.

Biodiversity and habitat impacts The Government’s Lawton Report (2010) stressed the need for wildlife corridors, showing that to rebuild ecological networks, better connections between, or joining sites, through physical corridors, or stepping stones was needed. As a result the Government announced plans to protect wildlife, halving the loss of habitats. It appears, however, that the HS2 proposals contradict such good intentions.. Severing hundreds of wildlife corridors will have serious consequences for many species, not assessed in the AoS.

HS2 will affect important species along the route; many internationally, nationally and locally protected species are already identified. Bechstein’s bats (protected by the EU Habitats Directive) are present in an area bisected by the route, (although further surveys are needed to confirm the population). Such effects must be fully investigated and reported in the EIA. Other species known to be impacted are detailed in Appendix Three.

The AoS provides too little information about biodiversity and habitat impacts, and does not properly consider protected species. It fails to determine how cumulative impacts may be mitigated and key species protected. We believe this is a major omission.

CONCLUSION

It is hard to believe that any infrastructure project, of similar significance, size or effects as HS2, here or abroad, would be subject to such little environmental impact assessment or scrutiny before choosing whether to progress the project and create such major blight.

Technically, the consultation documents show HS2 does not meet DfT’s sustainability objectives and there is grave concern that the Government is applying double standards; requiring less scrutiny for its own scheme compared to those promoted elsewhere. Other infrastructure projects would be expected to look at all impacts at the earliest stage.

HS2 will create major environmental damage that cannot be mitigated. Arguing the project is in the ‘national interest’ cannot justify ignorance or non-quantification of that damage. As presented HS2 is an unsustainable and indefensible infrastructure project that admits huge environmental risks, but fails to show these can be mitigated, even at a strategic level, with no costs included in the business case.

May 2011 APPENDIX ONE Key environmental features in Buckinghamshire - Initial Appraisal Buckinghamshire Buckinghamshire Feature Within 50m buffer Within 1km buffer Length (No.) Area (No.) Green Belt 25.03 km 4569.7 ha

Site of Special Scientific Interest 0.80 km (2) 269.6 ha (8)

Biodiversity Action Plan habitat 0.51 km (10) 245.1 ha (27)

Local Wildlife Site 2.26 km (10) 328.5 ha (36)

Local Nature Reserve 0 (0) 30 ha (3)

Local Geological Site 0 (0) 11 ha (4)

Open Access Land 0 (N/A) 33.5 ha

Village greens 0 (0) 1.2 ha (2)

Protected Species Records (in 1km) N/A (425)

No of different Protected Species (in 1 km) N/A (60) Buckinghamshire Buckinghamshire Designated Heritage Assets1 Within 50m buffer Within 1km buffer Length (No.) Area (No.) Scheduled Ancient Monument 0.03 km (1) 3.5 ha (8)

Listed buildings (Grade I or II*) N/A (0) (37)

Listed buildings (Grade II) (7) (553)

Registered Parks and Gardens 2.31 km (2) 416.1 ha (6)

Conservation area 0.09 km (1) 295 ha (15) Buckinghamshire Buckinghamshire Undesignated Heritage Assets2 Within 50m buffer Within 1km buffer Length (No.) Area (No.) Archaeological notification sites (25) (141)

Ancient woodland 1.54 km (7) 474.0 ha) Other significant historic landscape types: Orchard (3) Historic meadow (12) Not quantified Historic settlement (8) Historic parkland (2) Pre-18th C fields (53)

1 Planning Policy Statement 5 (PPS5) defines designated heritage assets as ‘A building, monument, site, place, area or landscape identified as having a degree of significance meriting consideration in planning decisions’ and may be of archaeological, architectural, artistic or historic interest. 2 The majority of heritage assets are not designated but will still be of archaeological, architectural, artistic or historic interest. 18th / 19th C fields (43)

ALL HISTORIC ENVIRONMENT RECORDS 118 2568 Buckinghamshire Rights of Way Number intersected by HS2 route Footpaths and Bridleways intersected 56 APPENDIX TWO Heritage Impacts in Buckinghamshire - Initial Appraisal

Turweston: HS2 in cutting 200m+ from village conservation area and listed buildings Chetwode: HS2 in cutting 75m from Grade II listed house and 300m from Grade I medieval church. Conservation area, medieval moats and priory affected. Twyford: HS2 on embankment 125m N of Grade I listed St.Mary’s medieval church and 80m from Grade II listed medieval vicarage. Steeple Claydon: 18th century Grade II listed Shepherd’s Furze Farm < 100m S of depot Upper Bernwood: Remote and distinctive landscape south of Claydon House, formerly part of medieval Bernwood Forest. Doddershall House: HS2 on embankment 400m from 16/17th century Grade II* listed house & park Waddesdon: HS2 on embankment 350m from registered park, affecting views from village conservation area, park and Grade I listed country house (National Trust). Fleet Marston: North

Î HS2 cuts through Akeman Street beside largest Roman settlement in county Hartwell: HS2 cuts through Grade II* Hartwell Park, 370m from Hartwell House (Grade I) with South major loss and severance of historic parkland. Grade II listed Glebe House lies within 20m of HS2 in cutting Old Stoke Mandeville: HS2 passes on viaduct 40m from ruined St Marys medieval church with major impact on setting and affecting archaeological remains of deserted village Grims Ditch, The Lea: HS2 destroys 90m of Grims Ditch, a scheduled prehistoric boundary bank East of Great Missenden: HS2 passes in cutting through Chilterns AONB severing field patterns, ancient woodland, lanes and harming setting of monuments and listed buildings Hyde End: HS2 cuts through Grade II listed Hyde Farm and barns - barns destroyed by cutting and farmhouse left within 25m of cutting edge Shardloes Park: HS2 in cutting 1.3 km long and up to 110m wide through part of Grade II* historic landscape park, set around Grade I listed country house Old Amersham: Cutting and tunnel entrance 300m N of town affects setting of conservation area Denham, Savay Farm: HS2 on viaduct 260m from Grade I listed medieval manor house

APPENDIX THREE Protected species along HS2 Preferred Route 3

European protection x All other bats x Great crested newts x White-clawed crayfish x Otters x Dormice

National protection x Amphibians & reptiles x Water voles x Barn owls x Badgers x Stag beetles x Slow worms

Local protection x Brown hares x Hedgehogs x All LBAP butterflies x Black poplars x Veteran trees x Rare plants (some nationally scarce) Written evidene from the Institution of Civil Engineers (HSR 103)

1. What are the main arguments either for or against High Speed Rail?

1.1 The Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) believes that the current proposals of the UK Government for a High Speed Rail (HSR) network offers the potential for significant economic benefits to the North of England, the West Midlands and Scotland as a consequence of the freeing up of capacity on the existing congested classic national railway network and improved connectivity with London and markets with the rest of the European Union.

1.2 The HS2 proposals also offer a sustainable alternative to domestic and short haul flights providing that HS2 can compete with air travel on price, flexibility and connectivity.

1.3 Most importantly, the ICE believes the nation’s interests will be well served by addressing the real need to increase long-term transport capacity within this structured approach to the nation’s transportation planning.

1.4 The performance of a nation’s transport network is a key component of its productivity and competitiveness. Enhanced connectivity is critical to the economic growth of the nation’s major cities. Fast, integrated and reliable transport systems help sustain the productivity of urban areas, supporting deep and productive labour markets, and allowing businesses to reap the benefits of economic agglomeration.

1.5 Transport corridors are vital to both domestic and international trade, boosting the competitiveness of the UK economy. Put simply, better connectivity enhances business value, increases labour market catchments and workforce opportunities. This translates into more jobs, greater productivity, higher incomes and, ultimately, higher tax revenues.

1.6 Inter-urban rail services are expected to face increasingly severe capacity pressures. Demand for transport is concentrated on particular places, modes and times of day. Continued economic success has created increasing demands on the network, which are putting parts of the system under serious strain.

1.7 Network Rail have estimated that before 2020, the existing rail lines from London to the North and West of England will be operating beyond full capacity and the classic next generation tools for increasing capacity will be exhausted. This would constrain the economy, and continued growth in demand.

1.8 Put simply, capacity growth on congested corridors will soon be essential if the UK is to continue to grow and prosper both physically and economically.

1.9 However, there is a counter-argument to suggest that the funding which would be put forward for High Speed Rail would be better spent on upgrading the existing classic network.

1.10 There is an additional argument which questions whether we will actually need to travel as often in the future, in light of improved telecommunications and increased home-working. The responding argument is that cities and business clusters will continue to be as important in the future as they are today, but the question should be addressed.

1.11 We see High Speed Rail as a sustainable, economic and environmentally acceptable solution to achieving the necessary step change in capacity. 2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

2.1.1 The Eddington Transport Study, produced in 2006, stated that there was clear evidence that a comprehensive and high performing transport system is an important enabler of sustained economic prosperity: a 5 per cent reduction in travel time for all business and freight travel on the roads could generate around £2.5 billion of cost savings, which was quoted as being some 0.2 percent of GDP1.

2.1.2 Travel demand in the UK over recent decades has grown rapidly due to its continued economic success. This has created increased pressure on certain parts of the road network at certain times of the day. The rising cost of congestion could potentially waste an extra £22 billion worth of time in England by 2025¹.

2.1.3 The nation already has some of the most crowded roads in the world. In 2007, the Green Light Group, which was facilitated by the ICE, published its report on Road Pricing, which identified the need for measures to be taken to reduce congestion on the UK’s roads. Traffic congestion in the UK is worse than in any other of the 15 members of the EU before enlargement. In Germany, 7% of road users experience congestion, while that figure is only 4% in France. In the UK, 20% of road users experience congestion, making UK roads much less reliable2.

2.1.4 The Green Light Group suggested some clear options of what could be done to mitigate this. These options were:

x Build more roads; x Make better use of our roads – such as driving on the hard shoulders of motorways and ensuring the use of all lanes of motorways and dual carriageways; x Invest in new or improved public transport routes and services; x Encourage working from home, teleconferencing and driving at non-peak hours; x Encourage people to walk or cycle instead of travelling by car; x Concentrate new development in areas well served by public transport and limit the amount of town development; x Manage demand through parking schemes and road pricing.

Since the production of this report, further steps have been taken to encourage sustainable transport options within towns and cities. However, measures to provide an attractive alternative to car travel between urban agglomerations have not yet been taken.

2.1.5 The Green Light Group considered that a restructuring of the way in which transport services are priced and the way we paid for them was essential. A road-pricing scheme, which took into account the costs and environmental externalities, could lead to greater efficiency, as well as greater investment into both roads and public transport. The introduction of road pricing beyond local schemes designed to deal with local problems should be complemented but a restructuring of vehicle and fuel taxation.

2.1.6 However, in May 2010, the Transport Secretary, Philip Hammond, rejected calls to introduce road charging on England’s motorway network and described the existing fuel duty regime as an effective ‘pay as you go’ system. In addition, although the

1 Sir Rod Eddington, (2006), The Eddington Transport Study, The Case for action: Sir Rod Eddington’s advice to Government 2 The Green Light Group, (2007), Road Pricing: What are the facts? Government objective to promote the electric car is a welcome step in terms of reducing carbon emissions, this will not impact upon reducing road congestion.

2.1.7 Therefore, alternative methods of reducing congestion on the road network must be sought, and High Speed Rail would provide a suitable and attractive alternative for inter-city business and leisure travel. The ICE and its membership will be considering these issues in greater detail before responding to the DfT consultation.

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

2.2.1 It is fundamental that the UK continues to improve the ‘classic’ rail network. High Speed Rail will only be able to work to its optimum if part of a complete network. This requires that the existing ‘classic’ network acts as a complementary feeder to the high speed network. High speed trains will be able to access parts of the classic network to reach principal destinations.

2.2.2 The provision of High Speed Rail would release much needed capacity on the ‘classic’ network to be used for more local and interconnecting services. This should provide a far better service in the vicinity of the HSR corridor. Also, if the proposals for High Speed Rail are approved, there would be the need to operate some high speed trains on the existing classic network. Therefore, the infrastructure would need to be improved sooner rather than later to reap the benefits of increased speed on the classic network before any high speed line is implemented.

2.2.3 Connections must be seamless if High Speed Rail is to be effective. Therefore, if High Speed Rail is to be introduced, the ‘classic’ network should not be considered as a separate entity, but part of an holistic rail network, with additional integrated transport solutions applied for inner-suburban and urban travel.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation?

2.3.1 In 2010, the ICE published its report Rethinking Aviation, which aimed to stimulate debate and highlight actions required to improve UK Aviation and Airport Infrastructure. Whilst it recognised the importance of aviation to investment in the UK economy, it documented that runway capacities at the busiest airports in London and the South East of England were severely constrained. This not only caused delays, but impeded the UK’s global connectivity, and ability to attract new long-haul services to and from emerging economies3.

2.3.2 As the UK emerges from recession it is essential to find new commercial opportunities in emerging markets. The ICE has encouraged strategically placed airport capacity to guarantee international connectivity for passengers and freight. More importantly, in relation to this Inquiry, the ICE supports the gradual surface- based substitution of short-haul flights within the UK. To enable this transition, more surface transport infrastructure, such as low carbon rail and road would need to be developed to not only ensure the UK meets its ambitious carbon reduction targets, but also to maintain regional connectivity as domestic air travel is reduced.

2.3.3 In 2009, the ICE produced its Aviation 2040 scenarios report, aimed at challenging industry and government to challenge their beliefs about what the future of air transport and infrastructure holds. The most significant message drawn from this report was that international long-haul aviation, in particular, is highly valuable to the UK economy and vital for maintaining the UK’s global competitiveness. However, unrestrained growth in aviation would lead to damaging long-term effects such as increased carbon emissions, higher noise levels and air pollution. This leads to the

3 Institution of Civil Engineers (2010): Rethinking Aviation need to develop strategies that facilitate the provision of valuable long-haul business without extensive airport expansion.

2.3.4 Air travel and demand for air travel has risen in the UK, with respect to both domestic and international journeys. This is clearly putting pressure on airports and airspace. If a successful modal shift were to be achieved for short-haul domestic aviation, this could have significant implications for domestic aviation and reducing the environmental impact of increased air travel. It would be some time before High Speed Rail would be able to compete competitively with international short-haul flights, but, in the long-term, additional international short haul flights could be migrated onto rail. The success of the Eurostar High Speed Rail link from London to Paris/Brussels clearly illustrates the viability of this.

2.3.5 Therefore, the ICE would encourage the establishment of a network of fully integrated, low-carbon surface transport infrastructure solutions to provide alternatives to domestic short-haul air services in the long-term.

3. Business case

3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (e.g. about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network?

3.1.1 The assumptions and methodology appear fairly robust. Our members have commented that the level of detail they have received is comprehensive and far beyond the level provided in previous consultations. However, with regard to operational costs, these were based on 2009 prices. The costs of oil have risen somewhat since this time, due partly to the 2011 ‘Arab-Spring’ and the instability of Governments within the Middle Eastern region. This should be borne in mind. Of course, the energy mix of the trains being used would dictate the operational costs and it is not possible to predict how far energy costs will have risen by 2026. The key issue is that high speed trains would be powered by electricity and, that it is up to current energy strategists in government and industry must ensure that, in the future, UK grid electricity will be generated with the lowest carbon impact. As far as possible, this should be insulated from political manipulation.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

3.2.1 Upgrading the West Coast Main Line or adding a new conventional line would provide additional capacity, but it would not match High Speed Rail for speed, and would not be as effective in encouraging a modal shift from air/car travel to rail. Congestion on the WCML is only a significant problem southeast of Rugby, so the high-speed route must take account of that section.

3.2.2 However, a further upgrade of the WCML would be extremely disruptive to the existing train services during construction, as occurred during the previous upgrade. Upgrades can also be far more costly, relative to the benefits accrued than new railways. It will always be more expensive to work on an existing railway where trains are still required to operate. This is even without accounting for any compensation which would be liable to rail operators and/or customers, where the cost penalty can be huge.

3.2.3 A new high speed railway would provide a step change in travel times and route possibilities for many potential users, particularly once the line is extended further north. Research indicates that significant modal shift to rail from other modes can be achieved once journey times are reduced to below three hours. New convenient direct services would be possible between our major cities4.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?

3.3.1 This would be a short-term option which would do little to increase the UK’s competitiveness, and would do little or nothing to increase economic growth or resolve the real need for additional transport capacity. Rail travel should be encouraged as a reliable, effective and affordable source of travel, not limited to the wealthy.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

3.4.1 The Government should ensure that a new high speed line is built to standard specifications used previously, such as for High Speed 1 or a French LGV. This reduces risks of use of new technologies, which can delay projects or lead to cost escalations. High Speed 1 (the Channel Tunnel Rail Link) was built to time and to budget on that basis. The ability for the track to cater for double-deck rail carriages should also be considered strongly.

3.4.2 High Speed 1 was successful in terms of its construction planning and execution. There is substantial information available publically on lessons learned and of course this is directly comparable to HS2, being a high speed railway to be constructed in the UK. Infrastructure UK (IUK) has investigated the reasons why construction costs are relatively high in the UK and the ICE is working with IUK on implementation.

4. The strategic route

4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

4.1.1 The ICE West Midlands regional office is currently considering whether these are the best locations for a High Speed Rail route. High Speed Rail will be most effective if it travels quickly from city-centre to city-centre, and allows seamless interchange to allow passengers to arrive at their destination. Curzon Street should allow this assuming that increased public transport connectivity is provided.

4.1.2 A stop at Birmingham International would seem a sensible option. Birmingham Airport is a Strategic National Asset and is running at less than 40% capacity. There is spare capacity at Birmingham - enough capacity to take another 9 million passengers immediately and an anticipated 21 million plus passengers in future years, as capability is enhanced in line with existing Planning Consents. Currently, London Euston is only 70 minutes from Birmingham Airport. With a High Speed Rail link between London and Birmingham in place this could be reduced to just 38 minutes. This would provide a realistic solution to alleviating capacity shortages at airports in the South-East.

4.1.3 The Old Oak Common station would seem a sensible option to provide a link to Heathrow Airport, if a direct link to Heathrow is essential. Appropriate junction engineering works would be included to make it possible for a High Speed spur to Heathrow to be built at a later date.

4.1.4 With regard to the case for more intermediate stations, this should be assessed by considering whether or not these impact greatly upon the journey time between city-

4 Network Rail (2008): High Speed Rail Investment; an overview of the literature centres. The key attractions of High Speed Rail are speed and capacity. Increasing journey times would slow the service and reduce line capacity, therefore making the service less attractive to long distance travellers. It would be far better to add stations to the classic lines where this would increase overall accessibility to the rail network once High Speed 2 is operational, for example on the Chiltern Line or the West Coast Main Line.

4.2 Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice?

4.2.1 This is an issue we are currently discussing with our members. It is vitally important that we consider, at this stage, whether this strategic route is the right option for providing a truly national High Speed Network. HS2 has to be designed to the correct holistic railway engineering principles. The key points on which the new railway has to perform are on the attached document.

4.2.2 Regardless of the cities served, good connectivity from those not served will be essential. There must be frequent, fast and reliable connections between cities and any HSR hubs. The resulting overall journey times for real passengers must be competitive with the alternative transport modes such as road or air. The requirement to provide airport links, particularly to Heathrow, has a huge effect on the ultimate 'high speed' solution. We have to prioritise the key aim, which is to end up with an efficient, high-capacity, inter-conurbation railway.

4.2.3 Connectivity outside London, inter-regionally, is a major shortcoming of current UK rail transport. Improving this situation needs to be a key objective of any new rail development whether high speed or not, if the UK is to achieve worthwhile modal shift to rail.

4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

4.3.1 In our view, yes, because this would lead to staged resource requirements at each stage, e.g. for design, procurement and construction, and reduces the timescale for Stage 1, which leads to earlier benefits for all.

4.4 The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

4.4.1 Yes. A link to HS1 would be difficult and intrusive to construct at a later stage; would bring immediate benefits of reduced journey times for passengers travelling from the north to the continent, and reduce the number of passengers travelling through the London terminal stations. However, we consider that the link, as provided for in the current proposal, is inadequate and should be enhanced to improve capacity from that envisaged in the current proposal.

4.4.2 Given that the London Heathrow to Manchester and Leeds routes have much greater potential to attract modal shift than London Heathrow to Birmingham, it would appear sensible for the construction of the LHR link to be constructed as part of Phase 2. Also, the interchange at Old Oak Common onto Crossrail will allow immediate benefits for passengers travelling to Heathrow from the north. Additional reductions in journey time through a later direct link to Heathrow can be added in stage 2 when demand has increased.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 5.1.1 Lille is an example, as it was in economic decline until the arrival of the LGV to Paris and the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. It is now France’s third most prosperous city. The arrival of the High Speed Line would benefit the regions that it serves i.e. Birmingham, the North West (Liverpool/Manchester), the East Midlands, Yorkshire and the North East, all of which would help bridge the North/South divide.

5.2 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration?

5.2.1 Its route should be influenced by where the demand is greatest, but the exact locations should be agreed with the local authorities to fit in with their local regeneration plans and where there is, or will be, good connectivity with other local areas.

5.3 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?

5.3.1 Potentially all, from businessmen on the high speed trains; those using the route for leisure; through to those able to make more local rail journeys because of the freed up capacity on the classic routes. Another argument is that without HS2, capacity on the rail network may end up being regulated via escalating fares, which could lead to rail travel only for the rich. This is something that Government will need to address.

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

5.4.1 HS2 should be funded centrally as a national strategic project, free from local funding uncertainties. If European Union (EU) funding is available then it would further improve the business case.

6. Impact

6.1 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

6.1.1 The proposals states that the impact on greenhouse gas emissions as a result of the implementation of high speed rail will be broadly neutral and we have no evidence or reason to disagree with this conclusion. We would like to state strongly, that every effort should be made now to ensure that carbon emissions are kept to a minimum during construction and operation.

6.1.2 High Speed Rail lines would be electrified, which provides the possibility of using a carbon free source of energy, whereas inter urban road and air transport are currently dependent on oil. Electrically powered trains are also free from local air pollution, except for a small amount of particulate matter from braking at the point of use, although the visual intrusion and noise from a new high speed line is often the subject of controversy.

6.1.3 In terms of energy consumption, High Speed Rail has a substantial advantage over air, car and conventional rail travel. HS2 trains would have fewer stops, and most of the energy consumption occurs when trains accelerate.

6.1.4 Diverting traffic from roads does not simply affect greenhouse gases, but also reduces road noise, accidents, local air pollution and congestion. The biggest external benefits of HSR are likely to come where road or air is highly congested and expansion of these modes is difficult and expensive in terms of environmental costs. 6.1.5 Ultimately for High Speed Rail to reduce greenhouse gases, it must depend on a non- fossil fuel source of electricity generation5. Electrified high speed rail will be low carbon or carbon free automatically to the extent that the nation's power generation system becomes so.

6.1.6 The embedded carbon, representing the carbon emissions associated with construction operations has been accounted for in the appraisal of sustainability. Although the source is subject to uncertainty, there is scope to reduce emissions by the selection of plant equipment, and every effort should be made to reduce carbon where possible.

6.2 Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

6.2.1 The environmental costs and benefits are sufficiently accounted for, although we would have appreciated further details of the energy mix which would be used for High Speed Rail. We believe also that the impact of noise during operation has been sufficiently accounted and justified.

6.3 What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network?

6.3.1 HS2 would release additional freight paths on the classic network. This again has further environmental advantages. Overall rail produces less than one per cent of the total U.K. emissions of carbon dioxide, the principle green house gas, compared with 21 per cent from road transport6. Tonne for tonne rail freight produces 90 per cent less carbon dioxide than road transport7. With pressure on the classic network reduced owing to the reduction of long distance trains on West Coast Main Line there would be great potential to increase the number of train paths available for freight services, leading to increased capacity and reliability of freight services and further possibilities of modal shift from road to rail for freight.

6.4 How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?

6.4.1 It should be possible to follow a phased construction sequence as at St Pancras International, whereby the new terminal platforms on the west side of Euston are constructed, then the existing services are switched to the new platforms whilst work on the existing platforms is carried out, then the existing trains switched back to the refurbished side. This could be done with a few blockade weekends at bank holidays without too much interference to existing services

May 2011

5 Nash, C. (2010), When to invest in high-speed networks and rail links 6 DfT Ports Policy consultation (2010) – Rail freight’s role 7 DfT Ports Policy consultation (2010)– Rail freight’s role   WrittenevidencefromDerwentLondonplc(HSR104)   ͳǤ•Š‹‡ˆš‡ —–‹˜‡‘ˆ‡”™‡–‘†‘’Ž ǡ ƒ™”‹–‹‰‹”‡•’‘•‡–‘–Š‡ ‘•—Ž–ƒ–‹‘‘Š‹‰Š•’‡‡†”ƒ‹Ž –Šƒ–™‹ŽŽˆ‘”’ƒ”–‘ˆ–Š‡”ƒ•’‘”–‡Ž‡ –‘‹––‡‡̵•‹“—‹”›Ǥ  ʹǤ‡”™‡–‘†‘‹•–Š‡Žƒ”‰‡•–‡–”ƒŽ‘†‘ˆ‘ —••‡† ™‹–Šƒ’‘”–ˆ‘Ž‹‘˜ƒŽ—‡†ƒ–‘˜‡”͉ʹǤͶ„‹ŽŽ‹‘Ǥ  ’ƒ”–‹ —Žƒ”ǡ™‡Šƒ˜‡ƒ•—„•–ƒ–‹ƒŽŽƒ†Š‘Ž†‹‰ƒ†Œƒ ‡––‘—•–‘–ƒ–‹‘ƒ–ͳ͵ʹǦͳͶʹ ƒ’•–‡ƒ†‘ƒ†–Šƒ–™‹ŽŽ „‡†‹”‡ –Ž›ƒˆˆ‡ –‡†„›–Š‡’”‘’‘•‡† ʹ ‡–”ƒŽ‘†‘–‡”‹—•Ǥ  ͵Ǥ‡•—’’‘”–‹˜‡•–‡–‹–Š‡‡ ‘‘›–Š”‘—‰Š‹ˆ”ƒ•–”— –—”‡’”‘Œ‡ –•ƒ†‹†‡‡†•—’’‘”–‡†”‘••”ƒ‹Ž Šƒ˜‹‰‘™‡†–Š‡‘––‡Šƒ‘—”–‘ƒ†–ƒ–‹‘‘˜‡”•‹–‡†‡˜‡Ž‘’‡–ˆ‘”ʹͲ›‡ƒ”•Ǥ  ͶǤ‡ƒ”‡‘ˆ–Š‡‘’‹‹‘–Šƒ–•—„•–ƒ–‹ƒŽ•ƒ˜‹‰• ‘—Ž†„‡ƒ Š‹‡˜‡†„›ƒŽ–‡”‹‰–Š‡”‘—–‡ǡ™Š‹Ž•–ƒ‹–ƒ‹‹‰ –Š‡‡›„‡‡ˆ‹–•–‘–Š‡‡ ‘‘›‘ˆ ʹǤ‡–Š‡”‡ˆ‘”‡—”‰‡–Š‡ ‘‹––‡‡–‘ ‘•‹†‡”ƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡‘’–‹‘•–‘ –‡”‹ƒ–‹‰ ʹƒ–—•–‘Ǥ  ͷǤ‡•—’’‘”– ʹ‹’”‹ ‹’Ž‡ǡŠ‘™‡˜‡”ǡ™‡ƒ”‡ ‘ ‡”‡†ƒ„‘—––Š‡•‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–‹’Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘••—””‘—†‹‰–Š‡ ”‘—–‡–‡”‹ƒ–‹‰ƒ–—•–‘Ǥ  ͸Ǥ—””‡–’Žƒ•ˆ‘”–Š‡’”‘’‘•‡† ʹ”ƒ‹ŽŽ‹•—‰‰‡•––Šƒ––Š‡”‘—–‡™‹ŽŽˆ‘ŽŽ‘™–Š‡‘”–Š‘†‘Ž‹‡ –Š”‘—‰Šƒ†‡ǤŠ‹•™‘—Ž†”‡“—‹”‡‘—”—•–‘•‹–‡–‘„‡–Š‡•—„Œ‡ –‘ˆƒ‘’—Ž•‘”›—” Šƒ•‡”†‡”ȋȌǡ ™Š‹ ŠŠƒ•–Š‡’‘–‡–‹ƒŽ–‘„‡–Š‡Žƒ”‰‡•–‡˜‡”‰”ƒ–‡†‹–Š‡‹–‡†‹‰†‘Ǥ ‹˜‡–Š‡Š‹‰Š’”‘’‡”–› ˜ƒŽ—‡•‹‡–”ƒŽ‘†‘ƒ†‹Ž‹‰Š–‘ˆ–Š‡ ‘˜‡”‡–̵•„—†‰‡–”‡†— –‹‘’”‘‰”ƒ‡ǡ•—„•–ƒ–‹ƒŽ•ƒ˜‹‰• ‘—Ž†„‡ƒ†‡„›‘–„”‹‰‹‰ ʹ‹–‘‡–”ƒŽ‘†‘ƒ†–‡”‹ƒ–‹‰ƒ–ƒƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡•‹–‡•— Šƒ•Ž†ƒ ‘‘Ǥ  ͹Ǥ—•–‘–ƒ–‹‘‹•ƒŽ”‡ƒ†›—†‡”•–”ƒ‹‹–‡”•‘ˆ ƒ’ƒ ‹–›ǤŠ‡‘†‘†‡”‰”‘—†‹•—Ž‹‡Ž›–‘„‡ƒ„Ž‡ –‘ ‘’‡™‹–Š–Š‡ƒ††‹–‹‘ƒŽ’ƒ••‡‰‡”—„‡”•–Šƒ–™‹ŽŽ„‡„”‘—‰Š–‹–‘—•–‘„› ʹ™‹–Š‘—–•—„•–ƒ–‹ƒŽ ƒ††‹–‹‘ƒŽ‹˜‡•–‡–Ǥ‡”‹ƒ–‹‰ ʹƒ–Ž†ƒ‘‘™‘—Ž†ƒ˜‘‹†–Š‹•‹••—‡„›ƒŽŽ‘™‹‰ ʹ’ƒ••‡‰‡”• –‘ ‘‡ –‘–‘”‘••”ƒ‹ŽǤ  ͺǤ‡•—’’‘”––Š‡ƒ••‡”–‹‘–Šƒ–•Š‘—Ž†–Š‡ —””‡–’Žƒ•ˆ‘” ʹ‰‘ƒŠ‡ƒ†ˆ—”–Š‡” ‘•‹†‡”ƒ–‹‘™‹ŽŽ„‡ ”‡“—‹”‡†‹‘”†‡”–‘†‡ƒŽ™‹–Š–Š‡ƒ††‹–‹‘ƒŽŽƒ”‰‡—„‡”•‘ˆ’‡‘’Ž‡ƒ””‹˜‹‰ƒ–‘†‘—•–‘Ǥ‡ƒŽ•‘ƒ‰”‡‡ –Šƒ–ˆ—”–Š‡” ‘•‹†‡”ƒ–‹‘‡‡†•–‘„‡‰‹˜‡–‘–Š‡‹’ƒ – ʹ™‹ŽŽŠƒ˜‡‘’ƒ••‡‰‡”ˆŽ‘™•ƒ ”‘••‘†‘ƒ† ’ƒ”–‹ —Žƒ”Ž›–Š‡ƒ††‹–‹‘ƒŽ†‡ƒ†‹–™‹ŽŽ„”‹‰–‘–Š‡‘†‘†‡”‰”‘—†Ǥ  ͻǤŠ‡‡–™‘”ƒ‹Ž‘—–‡–‹Ž‹•ƒ–‹‘–”ƒ–‡‰›‘•—Ž–ƒ–‹‘ʹͲͳͲ ‘–ƒ‹‡†‘’–‹‘•™Š‹ Š’”‘’‘•‡† ‹ ”‡ƒ•‹‰ ‘‡ –‹˜‹–›–‘Ž†ƒ‘‘ˆ”‘–Š‡‡•–‘ƒ•–ƒ‹Ž‹‡•‡”˜‹ ‡•ǤŠ‡ƒŒ‘”„‡‡ˆ‹–‘ˆ–Š‹• ‘’–‹‘‹•–Š‡”‡†— –‹‘‹†‡ƒ†‘–Š‡†‡”‰”‘—†•›•–‡ƒ–—•–‘Ǥ‹‡™‹•‡ǡ–Š‹•‘’–‹‘ ‘—Ž†„‡—•‡†‹ ”‡•’‡ –‘ˆ ʹ‹‘”†‡”–‘”‡†— ‡–Š‡ ‘•–•‘ˆ ʹƒ† ƒ’ƒ ‹–›‘˜‡”Ž‘ƒ† ‘‹‰‹–‘‘†‘—•–‘Ǥ  ͳͲǤŠ‡’”‘’‘•‡†‡š–‡†‡†–‡”‹—•ˆ‘”—•–‘™‹ŽŽŠƒ˜‡•‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–‹’Ž‹ ƒ–‹‘•–‘–Š‡•—””‘—†‹‰ƒ”‡ƒ‹ –‡”•‘ˆŽ‘‰–‡”„Ž‹‰Š–ƒ†–Š‡†ƒƒ‰‹‰‡ˆˆ‡ ––Š‹•™‹ŽŽŠƒ˜‡‘–Š‡ƒ”‡ƒǤŠ‡Žƒ ‘ˆ ‡”–ƒ‹–›ƒ•–‘–‹‹‰ –Šƒ–ƒ’”‘’‘•ƒŽ•— Šƒ•–Š‹• ƒ„”‹‰ǡŠƒ˜‹‰‡š’‡”‹‡ ‡†–Š‡•–‘’Ȁ•–ƒ”–ƒ–—”‡‘ˆ”‘••”ƒ‹Žǡ‰‹˜‡•—•‰”ƒ˜‡ ‘ ‡”Ǥ  ͳͳǤŠ‘—Ž†–Š‡—•–‘–‡”‹—•‰‘ƒŠ‡ƒ†–Š‡•‹œ‡‘ˆ–Š‡’”‘Œ‡ –™‹ŽŽƒŽ•‘•‡˜‡”‡Ž›‹’ƒ –‘–Š‡ƒ”‡ƒ™‹–Š Š—†”‡†•‘ˆ”‡•‹†‡–‹ƒŽ—‹–•„‡‹‰†‡‘Ž‹•Š‡†ƒ•’ƒ”–‘ˆ–Š‡”‡†‡˜‡Ž‘’‡–Ǥ ƒ‡”•‹–ŠƬ —ŽŠƒ‘— ‹Ž •–”‘‰Ž›•—’’‘”–•–Š‡”‡†‡˜‡Ž‘’‡–‘ˆŽ†ƒ‘‘ƒ†–Š‡‡™Š‘‡•‹–™‹ŽŽ ”‡ƒ–‡Ǥ  ͳʹǤ  ‘ Ž—•‹‘ǡ™‡ƒ”‡‘ˆ–Š‡˜‹‡™–Šƒ––Š‡”‡ƒ”‡‘”‡ƒ––”ƒ –‹˜‡ƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡•–‘–‡”‹ƒ–‹‰ ʹƒ–—•–‘ „‘–Š‹–‡”•‘ˆ–”ƒ•’‘”– ‘‡ –‹˜‹–›ƒ† ‘•–Ǥ  ͳ͵Ǥ‡ƒ”‡ —””‡–Ž›‡‰ƒ‰‹‰™‹–Šƒ†Œ‘‹‹‰‘™‡”•ƒ†–Š‡‘†‘‘”‘—‰Š‘ˆƒ†‡‹”‡•’‡ –‘ˆ–Š‡ ‹’ƒ –‘ˆ ʹƒ†™‘—Ž†„‡Šƒ’’›–‘’”‘˜‹†‡ˆ—”–Š‡”ƒ••‹•–ƒ ‡‘”ƒ› Žƒ”‹ˆ‹ ƒ–‹‘™Š‹ Š™‘—Ž†ƒ••‹•––Š‡ ‘‹––‡‡Ǥ  May2011  

Page 2 of 2 8 June 2011 WrittenevidencefromJaneFarley(HSR105)  IdonotbelievethatthereisanycredibleargumentinfavourofHS2andmanyreasonsagainstit.  RailPackage2wouldprovidemorethantherequiredcapacityontheWestcoastMainlineatone sixthofthecostandinamuchshortertime. Theforecastrequirementsfortravelarebasedoninaccurate,unsubstantiatedinformationanddo nottakeintoconsiderationtheeffectoffasterbroadbandandinternetconnectivity.  HS2canonlyreplacedomesticairjourneysservedbyitsrouteplustheforecastreductionintravel timeofapproximately20minsby2032isnotsufficienttomakeanimpressiononpotentialair travel.  TheschemewillnotbenefitthenorthasresearchhasshownthatHS2willserveonlythetop20% salaryearnerswiththemajorityofjobsbeingcreatedinthesouth,particularlyLondon.Infactit couldbesaidtoexacerbatetheproblemratherthanrelieveit.  Theprojectisincrediblyexpensivewithabusinesscasethatisnotproven.The£30bncouldbesaved andafarsmallersumusedtoinvestinexistingrailnetworksandschemestoimprovetransportas wellasdiscourageunnecessaryjourneys.Atatimeoffinancialrestraintandgovernmentcutbacks toproposespendingsomuchmoneyonanunprovenschememustbewrong.  ThelessonsofHS1havenotbeenheededandrailtravelinBritainalreadycomparesfavourablywith highspeedrailinEurope.  Thisschemeishugelyexpensive,hasanunprovenbusinesscase,isnotgoingtodelivereither sufficientlybettertravellinksorimprovethenorth/southdivideashasbeenargued.Inadditionit willbehugelydestructiveoftheenvironment,cuttingthroughAreasofOutstandingNaturalBeauty, imposingyearsofupheaval,socialandeconomicdisruptiontothoselivingalongtheline.Ifapproved thisprojectcouldaffectthousandsuponthousandsofpeopleslivesinthiscountryastheir environmentisdowngraded,propertyisdestroyedorsignificantlydevaluedandtheirdailylivesare blightedbyconstant,repetitivenoise. NoonewhodoesnotworkforHS2orisnotapoliticianlookingforaglamorousprojecttopintheir nametocouldpossiblythinkthisschemewasaproperorwiseuseofpublicmoney.Itismostlikely thatthosewhopromotethisschemewillnotbeinofficetodealwiththesocial,environmentaland economicproblemsthatwillresultifthisschemegoesahead.Mywholefamilyincludingmanywho arenotlivinganywhereclosetotheproposedlineareagainstthisschemeandwillcontinuetodo everythingwecantostopit.  May2011 WrittenevidencefromtheCivilEngineeringContractorsAssociation(HSR106)

AbouttheCivilEngineeringContractorsAssociation

TheCivilEngineeringContractorsAssociation(CECA)wasformedin1996toprovideasingleindustry voiceforcivilengineeringcontractorsintheUK.Withmorethan300membercompanies,rangingfrom thelargestinternationalconstructioncompaniesintheindustrytospecialistSMEsuppliersoperatingat aregionalorlocallevel,CECArepresentsthosecompaniesthatareinvolvedintheconstructionand maintenanceoftheUK’stransportandutilitynetworks.

Ourmembersareestimatedtodeliverbetween70and80percentofthetotal£20billionofcivil engineeringworkcarriedouttheUKannually.CECAmemberswillbeintimatelyinvolvedinthedelivery offuturenationallyͲsignificantinfrastructuresuchastheHighSpeedRailnetwork,andassuchweare keentoworkcloselywithGovernmenttoensurethedeliveryoffutureprojectbothontimeandto budget.

CECA’sStatedPolicyonHighSpeedRail

CECA’sstatedpolicyonHighSpeedRail,draftedinNovember2010andagreedbytheCECARailForum andTransportCommittees,isasfollows:

“CECArecognisesthesignificantbenefitsthatcanbedeliveredthroughtheintroductionofHighSpeed RailtosomeoftheUK’slargestconurbations.

“Suchanetworkwouldcontributetogrowth.Intheshorttermitwillprovideastimulustothe constructionsector,whichrepresentsasignificantproportionoftheUK’seconomicoutput.Inthelonger term,anoperationalHighSpeedRailsystemwilldeliverimprovedjourneytimesbetweenUKcities, reducecongestionfromexistingtransportnetworksandencouragethetransferoftrafficfromroadto rail.

“HoweverweareconcernedaboutthebusinesscaseforHighSpeedRailwhencomparedwithother formsoftransportinvestment.CurrentestimatesfortheLondontoBirminghamsectionofHS2suggesta fundingrequirementintheorderof£11Ͳ13billion.Werethefullcostofsuchaproposaltobedrawn frompublicfunding,itislikelythatthiswouldleadtoshortfallsinotherareasoftransportfunding.As suchitisessentialthatanypublicallyͲfundedHighSpeedRailsystemfirstdemonstratesthatitpresents bettervalueͲforͲmoneythaniftheysameamountoffundingweretobedirectedtowardstraditional projects.”

CECAReponsestotheSelectCommitteeQuestionsonHighSpeedRail

CECAisunabletocommentoneveryquestiontheSelectCommitteeonTransportplanstoaddresswith regardstoHighSpeedRail.However,pointsinresponsetothequestionssetCECAwishestoraiseareas follows: ForandAgainstHighSpeedRail–CECAbelievesthattheimplementationofaHighSpeedRailNetwork would,likeothernationallyͲsignificantinfrastructureprojects,actasakeydrivertoeconomicgrowth. TheWorldEconomicForum’sGlobalCompetitivenessReportplacestheoverallqualityoftheUK’s railwayinfrastructure19thoutof139competitorcountries,andtheoverallqualityoftheUK’s infrastructureadisappointing33rdoutof139,despiteitsstatusastheworld’s6thlargesteconomy.

Intheshortterm,theimplementationofHighSpeedRailwouldprovideamuchͲneededboosttothe UK’sconstructionsector,whichhassuffereddisproportionatelyduringtheeconomicdownturnofthe lastthreeyears.Furthermore,HighSpeedRailwilldeliverimprovedjourneytimesbetweenUKcities andreducecongestionontheexistingtransportnetwork.

However,CECAisconcernedthatshouldthefundingforHighSpeedRailbedrawnfromtheexisting transportbudget,orfromothersourcesofpublicfunding,thiswillnegativelyimpactonothersectorsof theUK’stransportinfrastructurethatrequirebothcontinuedmaintenanceandfurtherinvestment.To detractfromexistinginvestmentinfrastructureforthepurposeofbuildingHighSpeedRailwouldbe detrimentaltotheUK’sinfrastructureasawholeatatimewhenimprovingthatinfrastructureisboth statedGovernmentpolicyandwidelyacknowledgedtobecrucialtoachievingtheeconomicgrowth necessarytoasecurerecovery.

WhileachievinginterͲurbanconnectivitywillhaveobviouseconomicbenefits,todosoattheexpenseof othersectorsofthetransportnetwork,suchasthestrategicroadnetwork,wouldunderminethe Government’sstrategyofimprovingUKinfrastructureinaholisticmanner.

LessonstoLearnfromOtherMajorTransportProjects–Itisofvitalimportancethatnationally significantinfrastructureprojectsbeimplementedinaconsistentmannerwithinasuitabletimeͲframe. Bytheirverynature,infrastructureprojectsinvolvelargeͲscaleworksoverlargegeographicalareas,and mustbeimplementedoveralongertimeͲframethanotherconstructionprojects.Itisofvital importanceforthesuccessfuldeliveryofmajorinfrastructureprojectsthatthereisnounnecessary delayinthecommissioningandprocurementprocess,andthatcivilengineeringcontractorsareenabled todeliverprojectsfreefromunnecessaryregulationsorbureaucracy.

Ourorganisationslongexperienceinthisareaprovidesuswithagoodunderstandingofthefactorsthat makethedifferencebetweensuccessandfailurewhenitcomestothedeliveryofmajorinfrastructure projects.Keypointstoconsiderinclude:

x Visibility–thesupplychainmusthavegoodvisibilityandconfidenceintheforwardwork programmeassociatedwithdeliveryoftheproject.Byprovidingthis,supplierscaninvestinthe skills,innovationandequipmentthatwillberequiredtodeliverworldclassperformanceonthe project.Suchvisibilitywillincluderegularengagementwiththesupplychainasearlyplansare developed,toallowindustrytochallengeassumptionsandidentifypotentialrisksandconflicts beforetheyhavethechancetoimpactupontheproject. x Earlyinvolvement–Havingworkedonsimilarprojects,UKsupplierscanprovideconsiderable expertiseinthedevelopmentofprojectsastheymovetowardsdeliveryontheground.Early appointmentofsupplychainteamswillhelpsecurethebestvaluesolutiontoeachelementof theproject. x Clientcapability–itisessentialthatforaprojectofthescaleofHighSpeed2,theexpectations ofthequalityofthefinishedproductarematchedbythecapabilityofthosewhowillbe requiredtomanagedeliveryoftheproject.Poororunclearmanagementrepresentsoneofthe greatestriskfactorsformajorinfrastructureprojects.

May2011 Written evidence from Stop HS2 Ltd. (HSR107)

This submission is on behalf of Stop HS2 Ltd. Although we focus on the proposal by HS2 Ltd, some of the material may be relevant to other possible high speed rail proposals.

0. Introduction - What is HS2?

HS2 is a proposed new high speed rail line, designed for running at speeds of up to 400kph. It is proposed to join Euston and Birmingham in Phase 1 at a capital cost of £17 billion (2009 prices): rolling stock will cost another £3 billion, including some specially designed 'classic compatible' trains. It is also proposed to include a link to HS1, although the designs for this have not been made public.

The government anticipate a second phase of the route, beyond Birmingham. This will have two branches, one on to Manchester and another to Leeds, with stations at East Midlands and South Yorkshire. This phase will include a link to Heathrow. HS2 Ltd anticipate the total cost for both phases to be about £33 billion in 2009 prices.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

1.1 Arguments Against HS2:

1.1.1 Unclear policy objectives

Following the consultation on the Coalition's programme for government, the Department for Transport said:1

“Our vision is of a truly national high speed rail network for the whole of Britain. We believe it can play a significant role in promoting a low carbon economy thereby helping to make our country greener and more sustainable. We believe it will be a transformational project that will revolutionise travel between our major cities and will almost eliminate the need for internal domestic flights.”

Since the publication of that statement, the government has suggested a number of other reasons to go ahead with HS2. These range from promoting a low carbon economy (HS2 Ltd's own documentation shows HS2 won’t reduce carbon emissions), to healing the north-south divide, to reshaping the economic geography of Britain and to providing extra capacity for commuters.

1.1.2 Opportunity Costs

Alternative lower risk strategies could deliver benefits earlier.

A FOI request by Speen HS2 action group2 showed that the government is expected to spend about £1.1 billion on HS2 in the period to 2015. The capital cost of Phase 1 is £17 billion.

Clearly, this level of spending would finance a large number of alternative projects. Spending it all on one project which will not provide any benefits until 2026 is a high risk strategy, and means that the money cannot be used on smaller incremental projects which will meet policy objectives. Treasury “green book” guidelines recommend incremental improvements and ad dressing pinch points rather then big transformational projects.   ͳhttp://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/government/pfg/ ʹhttp://www.speenbucks.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/FOI10-047.doc

 1.1.3 Environmental costs

Almost all large scale projects will have environmental consequences. It is therefore important that the projects are designed sensitively, and that the design constraints are chosen so as to balance the needs of the users of the project versus the damage to the environment and the areas through which it will pass.

By choosing a design speed of 400 kph, HS2 Ltd have increased energy consumption and made it harder to avoid environmentally sensitive areas.

1.1.4 Cost in the UK

The cost of building HS2 will be higher per kilometre then the cost of building high speed lines anywhere else in the world. A UIC document3 gives the typical price of constructing a high speed line as €12-30 million per kilometer, far less then the cost of building HS2.

1.2 Arguments in favour of building HSR used elsewhere

1.2.1 Possibility of modal shift from air, due to time savings

Many high speed projects across the world lead to large time savings compared to using classic rail. It is typical for high speed rail journey times to take less than half of the time of the conventional rail journey: often as little as a third of the conventional rail journey they replace.

In contrast, the HS2 Economic case, published in February 2011, lists a number of UK journeys and their time savings after completion of HS2 phase 1 and 2. Not a single journey they list is reduced to half the time.

In minutes, the reductions in UK journey times are very small compared to other countries. For example the HS2 Consultation document (p38) says the Tokyo-Osaka journey reduced from 7 hours to 2 hours 25 minutes, a time saving of 4.5 hours. In contrast the largest time saving in the HS2 Economic case (p10) is one hour, with one example journey (Newcastle to London) being only 15 minutes faster. All of this at a far higher cost per kilometer to the UK then other countries spend.

It is agreed that these large time savings elsewhere prompt the large scale modal switch from air to high speed rail. However, in the UK, domestic air passenger numbers are already falling. For example, air's share of passengers between Manchester and London has been decreasing by approximately 5% a year from 2003, compared with rail.

Because HS2 only links London and a limited number of cities, there is a limit to how much effect it would have on cross country flights.

1.2.2 Filling in missing links in the network

Countries like the Netherlands have built high speed rail lines to fill in gaps in the European network.

Although a direct link to HS1 will extend the network, HS2 trains will not be able to run at full speed in Kent, because the design speed of HS1 is lower. It should be noted that HS1 was originally expected to link to the West Coast Main Line.  ͵High Speed rail: fast track to sustainable mobility, Nov 2010.

 1.2.3 Other countries’ experience

In recent months, other countries are having second thoughts about their high speed ambitions. These include China, Portugal, the US, Brazil and the Netherlands. Rather then being left behind in a high speed rail race, it looks like Britain will be seen to have had a lucky escape from a financial fiasco.

2.0 How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

The HS2 proposal appears at odds with other transport strategies.

2.0.1 Carbon reductions:

High Speed rail was included in the Coalition's Programme for Government as a means of reducing carbon emissions. However the HS2 Ltd main report published in March 2010 says

“Perhaps the most important point to note is that this is equivalent to a range of -0.3% to +0.3% of UK transport emissions. So HS2 would not be a major factor in managing carbon in the transport sector. “ p180

On February 9th 2011, Philip Hammond sent a letter4 to MP's in which he said "our proposed London-West Midlands line is expected to be broadly carbon neutral".

2.0.2 Reducing Demand for Travel - the Government's non-travel remit

In a speech on sustainable travel which Philip Hammond gave last year he said5:

"Promoting alternatives to travel is a key part of the sustainability agenda. And although it has not traditionally been thought of as a transport responsibility, I have decided that we should integrate it into our transport agenda. "

Far from discouraging travel, the HS2 proposal assumes that travel will continue to grow unabated. Further, they say the new rail route will encourage travel to the extent that 22% of travellers on the route are only traveling because the rail link has been built.

Alternative ways of spending money, such as ultra-fast broadband would fit better with this part of the Dft's strategy, and potentially benefit everyone in the country.

2.1. HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

HS2 does nothing to improve inter-urban connectivity. HS2 as proposed links cities which have already got good rail links. Travellers between Birmingham and London can already chose between the WCML and the Chilterns Line. Similarly there are existing rail routes between all the cities which will be connected in phase 2 of the plans.

There is no evidence that HS2 Ltd considered links with other proposed rail projects, such as the East-West line which will join Oxford, Milton Keynes, Bedford and Cambridge.  ͶŠ––’ǣȀȀ•–‘’Š•ʹǤ‘”‰Ȁ™’Ǧ ‘–‡–Ȁ—’Ž‘ƒ†•ȀʹͲͳͳȀͲʹȀˆ̴ ƒ‘†̴Ž‡––‡”̴–‘̴•̴”‡̴–‘’ ʹǤ’†ˆ ͷŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ†ˆ–Ǥ‰‘˜Ǥ—Ȁ’”‡••Ȁ•’‡‡ Š‡••–ƒ–‡‡–•Ȁ•’‡‡ Š‡•ȀŠƒ‘†ʹͲͳͲͲͻͳͲ

 2.2. Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

Many supporters of HS2 refer to an improved rail system which would be possible if HS2 and other improvements are made. This is a commitment over and above the possible spending on HS2. A typical example is6

"HS2 will require a package of supporting measures on the existing rail network to maximise benefits” p3

These other improvements will cost money, which is not included in the HS2 business case. In many cases, these improvements can go ahead, even if HS2 is not built.

The opportunity costs of HS2 matter, because the more money allocated to HS2 and the associated improvements the less money available for other projects. These include the electrification of the rail line between Cardiff and Swansea.

2.3. What are the implications for domestic aviation?

According to a BATA briefing paper7, 85% of domestic routes are over water or involve locations that cannot be served by high speed rail.

3. Business case

3.1. How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network?

3.1.1 Passenger Forecasts:

It is Stop HS2's view that the passenger forecasts for HS2 are unsound.

HS2 Ltd were widely criticised for the passenger growth figures in their original proposal. Their February 2011 proposal has decreased their forecast growth rate. However, they have also extended the cutoff date for the forecasts.

In March 2010, they used a cutoff date of 2033 for passenger forecasts, justified as it took the forecast period beyond the opening date of HS2. However, the Febraury 2011 proposal now uses the cutoff date of 2043 - ten years later then in the March 2010 document.

HS2 Ltd's reason for this is 8  ͸ ‘™ ʹ‹ŽŽ”ƒ•ˆ‘”–Š‡‡•–‹†Žƒ†• Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™ǤŠ‹‰Š•’‡‡†ʹ™‡•–‹†Žƒ†•Ǥ ‘Ǥ—Ȁ ƒ‰‡•Ȁ‡–”‘ΨʹͲ–—†›ΨʹͲ‘ΨʹͲ ‘‘‹ ΨʹͲ„‡ ‡ˆ‹–•ΨʹͲ‘ˆΨʹͲ”‡Ž‡ƒ•‡†ΨʹͲ ƒ’ ‹–›̴– ͵͹Ǧ͵͵Ͳͺ͵Ǥ’†ˆ  ͹Air and High Speed Rail Briefing Paper – The Realities of Rail, March 2010, BATA, ht tp://www.bata.uk.com/Web/Documents/data/policybriefingnotes/BATA%20Air%20and%20High%20Sp eed%20Rail%20Briefing%20Paper%20March%202010.pdf ͺEconomic Case p 15 3.2.9

 "…For our earlier work we capped growth of rail demand in 2033, at a level of demand in the WCML corridor that is slightly more than double current levels. With the lower current GDP forecasts, this cap would now be hit later, in 2043. This level of demand is consistent with households becoming wealthier as GDP per head grows and adopting lifestyles with more frequent long distance travel as demonstrated by those in higher income bands today. We have also capped our forecasts for growth of demand for other transport modes at 2043."

This is the wrong way round. One should choose a suitable cutoff date first, and then see what the demand level is at that date. Instead HS2 have picked the level of demand that suits their business case and then chosen the date that fits.

In addition, demand estimates for high speed rail are frequently wrong: Fitch ratings9 say that 9 out of 10 rail projects are overestimated. This can be seen with HS1: in 2009 the total passengers was 9.2 million whereas the original forecast said there would be 25 million in 2006.

HS1 ignored possible competition from ferries, and the case for HS2 ignores competition from other rail franchises.

Another competitor for HS2 is the increasing use of videoconferencing. If saving half an hour on a train journey is sufficiently important to make a difference, how much better would it be to not have to make a journey at all? Just like HS1 faced unexpected competition from low-cost airlines offering cheap flights to alternative destinations, so HS2 faces competition from videoconferencing.

And there are as yet unknown competitors. Speculatively, as the first generation of teenagers to grow up with easy access to the internet reaches working age, what will that do to working practises…?

3.1.2 Modal Shift

High speed rail is often cited as causing in modal shift from air. However, with HS2 65% of passengers are expected to have transferred from classic rail: only 6% from air and 7% from car. At the moment there are no scheduled flights between London and Birmingham. Rail's share of the London Manchester market is increasing by about 5% a year. There is limited scope for further modal shift: in 2009, 74% of passengers on domestic flights between Heathrow and Manchester were transferring onto a connecting flight.10

3.1.3 Fares

HS2's demand figures are based on HS2 fares being similar to existing fares. Other high speed lines use premium fares.

Rail fares in the UK are currently heavily subsidised. If the demand figures are wrong, then it will be necessary for the government to subsidise HS2 heavily meaning less money available to  ͻ http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/presentations/2010/gig/fitch_high_speed_rail_projects_apr2010. pfd  ͳͲAir and High Speed Rail Briefing Paper – The Realities of Rail. March 2010 http://www.bata.uk.com/Web/Documents/data/policybriefingnotes/BATA%20Air%20and%20High%20Sp eed%20Rail%20Briefing%20Paper%20March%202010.pdf 

 subsidise passengers on the classic lines.

One report about fares on HS2 often cited by people who support HS2 is by Greengauge 2111: However, the analysis in this report is less then robust, consisting of the following circular argument: - Because many travelers currently use discounts at the moment, train fares are affordable by all segments of the population. - The HS2 business case is based on HS fares being similar to 'classic' train fares. - Therefore high speed train fares will be affordable by all segments of the population.

The report has no explanation of why fares will be the same other than that is what the HS2 business case says.

3.1.4 Value of time

Most of the so called “economic benefits” of HS2 come from the notional value of time savings. These are separated into business user savings and commuter and leisure user savings. Over half the monatarised benefits come from business user savings, so it is vital that these are robust.

Recent academic work shows that the amount of time spent working by business travelers on the train has been increasing over the last decade. A 2008 paper says that12

"In the UK a trend over time is discernible by comparison with the activities reported in the Autumn 2004 National Passenger Survey. A like-for-like comparison gave the proportion of business travellers who spend some time working/studying as 52% in Autumn 2004, 79% in Spring 2008. Whilst a like-for-like comparison of the percentage of time they spend working/studying has not yet been undertaken, the two surveys yield estimates of 43% in 2004 (for 1h-3h journeys), and 57% in 2008, again suggestive of a strong upward trend." p8

The paper says the time spent working on trains is nearly as productive as work in the office - respondents reported on train productivity levels of between 96-98% compared to being in the office (p9). The study also looked at the effects of crowding on trains and concluded 13

"Table 5 sets this out split by crowding bands, and indicates that increasing crowding does have an impact on productivity – but that productivity remains high, even in the worst crowding conditions."

These results show that currently used assumptions about the value of time for business travelers on trains are out of date and should be revised. This is especially important for a project which will not start operating for 15 years.

3.1.5 Costs to business affected by construction and running HS2

The economic case makes no mention of the costs to businesses caused by the construction and operation of HS2. Anecdotal evidence show that building the new rail link will directly affect many businesses of a range of sizes.

 ͳͳhttp://www.greengauge21.net/wp-content/uploads/HSR-AffordableToAll.pdf high-speed-rail-fair-and- affordable/ " High-Speed Rail: fair and affordable". ͳʹThe Productive Use of Rail Travel Time and Value of Travel Time Saving for Travellers in the course of Work, 2008 The Mott MacDonald IWT Consortium ͳ͵‹„‹†

 3.2. What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

HS2 will have limited effects on the rail network outside the London to the North corridor. It will do nothing to relieve capacity issues on trains to Wales, the West Country, the South coast or East Anglia.

The cost of HS2 is being treated as if it was a stand alone project. However organisations which support HS2, including Centro, Virgin trains, Greengauge 21 and Birmingham Airport. say that it is also necessary to undertake other improvements to the transport system so as to benefit from HS2. These include improvements to the West Coast Main Line.

The alternative to HS2 in the economic case is a 'do-nothing' scenario. This is clearly untenable, as according to Theresa Viliers, at the Parliamentary Lobby Day organised by Stop HS2 in October 2010, the West Coast Main Line will run out of capacity before HS2 will open.

Rail Package 2 has also been put forward as an alternative to HS2, but has attracted criticism recently. It is important for any business case that it is compared to a well developed and credible alternative. Unless this done, how can HS2 be seen as the best option?

It should be noted that the Department for Transport is arguing against West Coast Main Line improvements: for instance in their FAQ about HS2, written for a general audience, they say14

"Wouldn't it be better just to upgrade the existing lines? I've heard people say that 'Rail Package 2' offers an alternative to high speed rail. The 1998 - 2009 upgrade of the West Coast Main Line demonstrated the difficulties of upgrading a busy 'live' rail line. The upgrade took over a decade, cost £9bn and caused huge disruptions for the passengers that use the line.

Another upgrade, such as Rail Package 2, would provide nowhere near the new capacity of a high speed line or its speed and connectivity benefits while again causing massive disruption for passengers."

In addition, because HS2 ltd say it will offer a more attractive service between London and the North, consideration should be given to the effects on other long distance journeys (eg Leeds to Oxford), which involve cross country routes and changes at places like Birmingham New Street. If using the high speed service makes it more convenient to travel via London, this will have an effect on the demand for other routes from London.

3.3. What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?

A report in November 2010 by the Public Accounts Committee criticised the rail industry for its attitudes to solving problems. It said (our bold) 15 “The unique and complex structure of the rail industry makes it inherently cumbersome and expensive, and provides little external challenge to its vested interest in its own growth. The Department should conduct a fundamental review of the rail industry’s structure, to ensure better accountability and value for money, with the aim of reducing conflicts of interest, aligning efforts on maximising efficiency, and restraining the  ͳͶhttp://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/faq  ͳͷhttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubacc/471/471.pdf

 tendency to seek solutions through growth.”

The report suggested a number of alternatives, such as smart cards and changes to the way season tickets work. Schemes like this can be rolled out across the entire country, benefiting commuters on overcrowded trains everywhere.

3.4. What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

The biggest problem facing HS2 is that not enough detail has been made available before the public consultation. Many questions raised during the consultation period have no clear answer. There are numerous questions about the strategic business case as well as the environmental case. Technical challenge is taking place behind closed doors. Information is being released in an ad hoc way, without publicity.

These would be best dealt with in a public inquiry, as has occurred with transport projects like Heathrow Terminal 5 and the East-West line.

In addition there is no clear plan for the scope of the work. The original proposal had no link to Heathrow and no link to HS1. These have been added in later, although the total cost of the proposal has not changed.

4. The strategic route

The first issue when considering high speed rail is what it would add to the nation's infrastructure. According to international experts conventional railway lines are faster then ultra high speed lines for distances of up to about 150km - 200 km. London to Birmingham and Birmingham to Manchester are only just in this range. The stations on the branch to Leeds are far closer than this.

According to European definitions, the WCML, the ECML and the Great Western Line are all "high speed lines", and their top speeds are similar to other new high speed projects across Europe.

1. The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice?

3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards?

4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

The government seems to have no clear high speed strategy. This piecemeal approach puts up costs and risks choosing less then optimal solutions

For instance, early documents regarding the building of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link refer to the building of a connection to the West Coast Main Line: one document suggested a possible travel

 time between Milton Keynes and Paris of 2 hours 50 minutes16.

This link was not constructed, and according to Frank Dobson, in a Westminster Hall debate on March 31st 2011, the route that was seen as unsuitable for HS1 is now being considered to link HS2 and HS1.

A newspaper report of a meeting held with Theresa Villiers in Newcastle says that delegates at the meeting were told17 “trying to get a bill through Parliament for just the London to Birmingham extension was difficult enough, without adding to that the greater problems of a nationwide line.”

5. Economic rebalancing and equity

5.1. What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide?

HS2 was not proposed as a way of providing economic regeneration or bridging the north-south divide. Therefore it has not been compared to other schemes set up for that purpose.

Evidence from France (Lille) is often quoted, but in reality HSR was only part of a larger package of regeneration measures.

We have no way of knowing what the opportunity cost of going ahead with HS2 is, compared to other schemes targeted on the north, such as the Northern Hub project.

About 70% of the permanent jobs created will be in London.

Further, MPs in Birmingham have criticised18 the choice of Washwood Heath for the HS2 maintenance depot, saying that alternative schemes could provide more, higher-skilled jobs, (3500 v 300) and sooner than HS2 would.

There is another potential problem with the regeneration effects of HS2. Rather then creating new jobs, there is a serious risk that jobs are instead moved from other areas, such as Coventry.

5.2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration?

We believe that a high speed rail network alone is an inefficient mechanism to create regeneration.

5.3. Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? Or lose out.

According to the HS2 documentation, some areas will suffer worse train services after HS2 is  ͳ͸Channel Tunnel Rail Link Project Brief, Union Railways, October 2010  ͳ͹http://www.journallive.co.uk/north-east-news/todays-news/2011/03/25/mp-challenged-over-east-coast- main-line-high-speed-rail-service-61634-28400838/2/  ͳͺhttp://www.birminghampost.net/news/2011/03/04/birmingham-mps-oppose-plans-for-high-speed-rail- depot-at-alstom-site-65233-28276475/ 

 built. This has been analysed by the Taxpayers Alliance.19

The majority of the national benefits come from monatarised time savings to business travellers. However it is the top 20% by income who undertake the most long distance journeys. Therefore most of the benefits of reduced travel times will be going to high earners or their employers.

HS2 Ltd state the other monetarised benefits go to commuters and leisure users. If HS2 encourages an increase in commuting to London from a specific area, this comes at a cost to the 'home' area. The commuter will spend some of their salary on their season ticket, and some of it on goods and services in London. House prices in areas convenient for access to the high speed station will rise, making then less affordable to people working in their home area.

The leisure opportunities created seemed to be based around regional users being able to get to London more easily. Money will be taken from the regions and spent in the shops and venues of London. For example, Philip Hammond told the Yorkshire Press20

"What we expect train operators to do is seek to fill their trains by attracting marginal passengers who currently wouldn’t be travelling by rail with very attractive fares in the off- peak,” said Mr Hammond.

“For the person who’s able to travel in the mid- to late morning or the afternoon or later in the evening when there isn’t so much demand I would expect they will be able to get some fantastically good deals on High Speed Two.”

4. How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme?

It is clear that some cities, such as Birmingham, see themselves as huge beneficiaries. Other areas, such as Buckinghamshire have been warned that they will get no advantages from HS2, in spite of the environmental damage they will suffer. Therefore the government should expect Birmingham City Council and Birmingham businesses to put significant financial resources into the building of HS2, and it is equitable that the government should compensate areas like Buckinghamshire for the environmental damage they endure.

6. Impact

6.1. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon?

The Coalition Program for Government said: “Our vision is of a truly national high speed rail network for the whole of Britain. We believe it can play a significant role in promoting a low carbon economy thereby helping to make our country greener and more sustainable. We believe it will be a transformational project that will revolutionise travel between our major cities and will almost eliminate the  ͳͻResearch Note 86, 30 March 2011 HS2 Capacity Analysis, Chris Stokes http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/hs2capacity.pdf

ʹͲHigh speed rail network ‘could slash prices for train tickets’, Monday 21 March 2011 http://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/at-a-glance/main- section/high_speed_rail_network_could_slash_prices_for_train_tickets_1_320215

 need for internal domestic flights.”

However the HS2 proposal does not promote low carbon transport, but relies on decarbonising the electricity sector.

Because HSR uses more energy then classic rail, this means that more electricity will need to be generated. By increasing the country's total electricity demand, we will need to use more of the ungreen forms of electricity.

The March 2010 Main report published by HS2 Ltd said

“Perhaps the most important point to note is that this is equivalent to a range of -0.3% to +0.3% of UK transport emissions. So HS2 would not be a major factor in managing carbon in the transport sector. ” p180

Moving 65% of passengers from a lower-energy form of train to a higher energy form does not make up for the 6% who have transferred from air.

There is the issue of carbon emissions during construction, which HS2 Ltd has ignored.

Further, the HS2 proposal does not take into account efforts by both the aviation sector and the automotive sector to make vehicles which use less carbon intensive forms of power.

6.2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

The environmental costs of HS2 have not been considered adequately as there is no Environmental Impact Assessment yet.

Any new high speed railway will have environmental costs, whichever route it chooses. However by setting a design speed of 400kph, the design of HS2 is constrained and cannot avoid sensitive sites in the way a slower design speed would be able to. This speed seems unnecessarily fast, because the advantage of this speed compared to a lower speed are negligible for the distances concerned. Further, with three stations on the Leeds branch, the trains are unlikely even to run at full speed: the UIC says that it takes 10-20km for high speed trains to reach their maximum. The design speed seems to have been chosen to make a marginal business case possible.

HS1 was built with 85% of it in tunnels or next to railways, major roads and motorways. Of the remaining 15%, about half of it was through industrial areas.

In contrast HS2 will be going across significant amount of open countryside. Although it will travel alongside existing roads in places, they tend to be minor roads like the A413 ‘transport corridor’ which is a single carriageway country road between market towns.

There are also concerns about damage to the Chilterns aquifer, and aquifers in Warwickshire, which supply water to London and other parts of the south east and Midlands.

Stop HS2 is aware of the Voxopp submission and endorses their report about noise impacts. It is of note that noise is more intrusive where the background level is low.

6.3. What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network?

This question is outwith Stop HS2's remit.

 6.4. How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?

Building work at Euston station will take 7-8 years, according to HS2 Ltd's documents. There will also need to be changes to the underground to allow for increased numbers of on-ward passengers. There will also need to be work on the WCML where the HS2 route joins it.

In summary West Coast Main Line passengers can expect significant disruption.

May 2011

 Written evidence from Pan-Camden HS2 Alliance (HSR108)

1 Camden - who we are

1.1 The London Borough of Camden is an inner London borough with some 236,000 inhabitants in an area of 22km2. It contains significant areas of employment, notably in the academic and medical fields, media and creative industries and professional (legal and accountancy) fields. Camden Lock and Markets are important retail and tourist magnets and there is a large number of hotels in the Borough.

1.2 Two Main Line railway termini (Euston and St Pancras International) are in the Borough and two important main lines and three important freight routes run through the Borough.

1.3 Arguably, the proposals for HS2 Limited weigh more heavily on Camden than any other local authority area.

1.4 The pan-Camden HS2 Alliance

1.4.1 The pan-Camden HS2 Alliance has evolved in response to the acute local concern and seeks to protect the interests of local residents and businesses. A series of well-attended public meetings has been held, a website established and there has been considerable local publicity. Councillors of all political parties of London Borough of Camden have been very supportive of the Alliance.

1.4.2 Because our area is home to many people with interests in public policy and strategy development, and because there are also many residents with relevant professional experience, most of the scrutiny has been concerned with the policy and strategic implications of the proposals and how they assist, or work against, the achievement of other public policy objectives.

1.4.3 This process has caused many people to form the opinion that the HS2 scheme as presently tabled is unlikely to make an adequate contribution to achieving current National objectives.

(We believe that some local disbenefits could be mitigated although they will require major rethinking: local groups would hope to work with HS2 Ltd and its consultants to this end). 2. Scope of the Inquiry and the areas covered by this pan-Camden HS2 Alliance submission

2. 1 The Transport Select Committee plans to examine:

2.1.1 The main arguments for and against high-speed rail.

2.1.2 How the proposals for HS2 relates to the Government’s transport policy objectives particularly in relation to transport connections between urban areas.

2.1.3 The strength of the business case and the robustness of the underlying assumptions and methodology, scheme costs.

2.1.4 Alternatives as regards capacity, other ways of managing capacity (for example by pricing).

2.1.5 The strategic route, proposed Stage 1 stations, the case for intermediate stations on the strategic route, links to HS1, freight, links to Heathrow

2.1.6 The extent to which considerations of local or regional regeneration should shape the route.

2.1.7 Equity issues and whether the project will assist economic rebalancing.

2.1.8 The importance or otherwise of regeneration in the business case.

2.1.9 Environmental and other impacts including noise, and how these are treated in the business case

2.1.10 Disruption especially in connection with the rebuilding of Euston Station.

2. 2. The Pan-Camden HS2 Alliance submission only contains evidence concerning matters of direct relevance to Camden and inner north and west London, or to matters of which we have the relevant experience to provide useful observations. Our evidence generally relates to aspects of the following issues:

2.2.1 The main arguments for and against high speed rail.

2.2.2 The strength of the business case - whether the natural growth rate is not in fact the result of investment, the importance of the assumptions about advances in signalling technology, the feasibility of the service assumed in the business case by reference to the services actually achieved on the French LGV with the greatest similarities, whether HS2’s proposals might be inherently unstable, taking into account other government, regional and local policy objectives, the forecasting risks and choice of discount rate to reflect these risks, redundant trains, capacity on residual classic network.

2.2.3 Alternatives, capacity and economic mechanisms - Euston commuters, a new line does not remove the need to spend on remaining classic routes.

2.2.4 The strategic route - the cross London corridor, Old Oak location, Euston location, regeneration, effect of an additional station on the HS2 Phase One 1 route, freight strategy

2.2.5 Equity issues - some interesting value judgments inherent in HS2 Ltd.’s case.

2.2.6 Disruption at and near Euston - community, station users, road network, and the construction of the HS1 - HS2 link.

3. The main arguments for and against high-speed rail

3.1. There is no single standard definition of high-speed rail. Because the realities of high-speed rail are so complex, the International Union of Railways (UIC) deliberately uses “definitions” in the plural. The concept is evolving all the time, and the technologies are also changing as operators and planners attempt to overcome perceived drawbacks in the concept as pioneered in the 1960‘s and 1970‘s. The UIC’s definitions imply a state of continual advance, since all components of the travel experience, including marketing, should be “state of the art”.

3.2 The definitions of “high-speed rail” offered by the UIC and by European Union Directive, and the permitted variations (usually for environmental or planning reasons) are so broad that they would cover almost any new or upgraded railway line which could accommodate trains which are capable of speeds in excess of 200 kilometres/hour (upgraded) or 250 kph (new build), even though in densely populated urban areas the operating speed could be as low as 110 kph. It is thus perfectly possible to build a high-speed line that would fit in to the topography of the London/West Midlands/North West corridor in a less intrusive manner.

3.3 HS2 attempts to achieve the highest speeds possible regardless of what the transport and regional objectives actually are. To produce a case for its construction, it claims high speed to be necessary in order to solve a range of problems for which in many cases it is not the only solution, or its contribution is not key.

3.4 “Capacity” is a complex idea. There is little doubt that obtaining a reliable, fast, transit system in the corridor requires a considerable upgrade in capacity. This is because railways do not operate reliably when pushed towards their design limits for long periods of the day. Typically, reliable railways operate at about one half of their theoretical capacity except for short bursts when they step up to perhaps two thirds or three quarters of capacity. The HS2 solution would in fact do little more than transfer an existing “capacity” problem to a new railway whose higher operating speeds will increase the likelihood of inherent instability. There is every likelihood that there would still be a need (for reasons of capacity) for quality longer distance services on other routes in the corridor.

3.5 HS2 Ltd.’s brief was ill focussed and reflected a somewhat dated view of high-speed rail. The end result is an engineering project not a transport solution. Imagination and vision has not been central to the process. Aping the rather different high speed rail networks of France, Spain and Germany, without apparently understanding the mechanics of the operations and the reasons why they work as they do, is not a solution that is necessarily going to work in the UK.

3.6 If a solution is needed to the movement of very large numbers of people at speed in fairly densely populated corridors, then this has been achieved in Japan. However the Japanese design philosophy is different from the European approach. The Japanese system is “closed”, that is to say with no operating interaction with classic lines. The Tokkaido Shinkansen has an average station spacing of just 30.3 km. There are faster and slower trains. It moves around 400,000 passengers a day.

3.7 There are worse courses of action than studying how particular concepts work in practice and whether there are lessons that could be applied in the UK. We have considered how HS2 in its present form would deliver against the Government’s core ambitions set out in White Paper CM7176 “Delivering a Sustainable Railway”, July 2007. Overall HS2 does not score well. That is not to say that we think high-speed rail has no part to play in the corridor. We accept there is a need for increased capacity and this is going to require new construction. And as the definitions at the beginning of this section suggest, this will almost certainly fall within the definition of a “high-speed railway”.

3.8 The problem of HS2 stems from its narrow view of what is high-speed rail, the lack of operational understanding of a railway, and the seeming inability to think at a fairly low level about transport as a means to achieve policy ends rather than as an objective in its own right.

4. The strength of the Business Case

4.1 Base line forecasts - natural growth or a largely predictable consequence of investment in a product?

4.1.2. We believe that the growth experienced since 1995 has been misinterpreted. Far from being a “natural” rate of growth, much of it can be explained as a return on investment and marketing.

4.1.3 We have formed this view having looked at figures for the past decade for inter-city railway investment in infrastructure and rolling stock. We have also reviewed the train miles operated. (Earlier figures are not apparently publicly available in a comparable form.)

4.1.4 In a more general way we have also considered what happened to the economy, to railway services, to fares, to investment and car ownership in earlier years. The base line taken by HS2 Ltd for its forecasts is in fact the second lowest point recorded since 1955. Over six decades passenger mileage increased by about 25%.

4.1.5 When modelling for, and forecasting for, a project with a 60-year horizon, we think it appropriate to back-test the forecasting model against longer-run historical data.

4.1.6 We have also reviewed SNCF’s passenger-kilometre figures for main line services, which include TGV services. The French picture seems to be a steady but slow upward progression. If the UK figures are, in fact, a natural growth rate, then we would expect similar figures to show up elsewhere in Europe - but this does not appear to be the case.

4.1.7 We would have expected the DfT to have that information available for example from submissions in support of projects or from “post-audits” carried out the check on value for money. We would also expect DfT to comprehend the impact of these changes on passenger usage. If a model cannot satisfactorily explain the past, then it cannot be used with confidence to predict the future. 4. 2. Treatment of demand when capacity is not available

4.2.1 If the forecasts are indeed correct, and trains are grossly overloaded at some point in the next few years, we would expect trip suppression or diversion to take place, and growth would slow down or come to a halt.

4.2.2 The least flexible journeys may be choked off by congestion: passenger will look for alternatives and some of these (eg different ways of working, videoconferencing) will become permanent.

4.2.3 Individuals will take different decisions about where to live and work. Some of these changes may reverse wholly or in part if conditions become more favourable, but this process will take time, and the benefits will be to new users rather than existing.

4.2.4 The “rule of half” is conventionally applied to such new trips. Benefits to existing users are overstated because numbers will have dropped owing to suppression.

4.2.5 The trips that may eventually take their place when conditions improve will be from new users, some of whom will have been attracted by a very small change in conditions, some of whom will only have been attracted by a very large change. The average improvement experienced by new users is therefore taken as one half of the change experienced.

4.3 The importance to the business case of the assumptions about signalling

4. 3.1 Behind all railway signalling is the idea of maintaining a safe braking distance between trains, even if the first train crashes. The distance required for an emergency stop is significantly shorter than the distance required for bringing a train to a stand without discomfort to passengers. The greater the distance between trains, the lower the number of trains that can be run on a line in any one period. The safe braking distance is expressed as a number of “blocks”.

4.3.2 Railways are still constrained by the lack of a workable technology that would allow a reduction in the difference between the “comfort” and “emergency” braking distances. Put in the simplest terms, if the “comfort” distance could be reduced towards the “emergency” distance by a train “knowing” the distance between it and the train ahead, as well as the speed of the train ahead, then line capacity could be increased. This concept is sometimes referred to as “Moving Block”, and would be at the heart of an innovative signalling system.

4.3.3 Such a Moving Block system would have to be a pan-European standard, and to that extent, the timescale is not at the discretion of HS2 Limited. Innovative signalling systems using Moving Block principles have often resulted in being abandoned or downgraded for cost or technical reasons, the Jubilee Line and the recent WCML upgrade being cases in point.

4.3.4 Moving Block is also key to minimising service disruption in two ways: (1) Any unplanned deceleration or stop has an effect on capacity and reliability as well as on journey time. (2) The greatly reduced amount of lineside equipment means that physical damage is much less likely, and the temptation for copper thieves removed.

4.3.5 Moving Block underpins the business case for HS2 as without it the ultimate anticipated capacity of 18 trains an hour cannot be attempted.

4.4 The practicability of the service assumed in the business case

4.4.1 The business case depends on assumption about reliability, service intensity and journey times. As we are interested in the robustness of these assumptions and in claims about capacity, we have looked in some detail at the broad timetabling and rolling stock requirements.

4.4.2 We have also looked at what actually happens day-to-day on the group of high speed services that use the LGV Sud-Est and the various branches and the line to the Midi. We consider that this line probably has the most in common with the concept of HS2. We then considered the service frequency operated on the Tokkaido Shinkansen. We concluded that HS2 would have more in common with LGV Sud-Est than the Japanese Shinkansen, which being physically a different gauge to the rest of the Japanese railway system, operate in isolation and therefore perturbations cannot be transmitted between their classic and high-speed lines.

4.4.3 These are the key similarities between LGV Sud-Est and HS2:

Double deck train operation using high-speed double decker trains (TGV Duplex). The same trains have been taken as the “reference” train for “captive” train operation on HS2 A significant proportion of trains starting or finishing on classic lines

Average passenger loadings on trains over 70%

Some services call at airport stations (but these are located on connecting lines) eg Paris Charles de Gaulle and Lyon St Extupéry TGV

4.4.4 But there are some important differences:

Distances between centres south of Lyon served by TGV services are shorter

The cities served by TGV services are smaller

TGV service intensity is lower

“La période blanche” a time of light traffic (when the system catches its breath) exists only on the TGV service

The proposed number of passengers for HS2 is almost twice that for LGV Sud-Est

The loading gauge of the classic network allows TGVs (there are no captive trains on LGV Sud-Est) 4.4.5 The number of trains that actually run over all or part of the LGV between Paris and Lyon is usually six to eight an hour in each direction. This compares with an HS2 minimum of 10/hour at stage 1, rising to 14/hour and then to 18/hour.

4.4.6 The present day theoretical operating capacity of the LGV Sud-Est is given as 12 trains an hour, (but if the signalling were upgraded this might rise to 16 trains an hour). The comparative figures for HS2 are 14 and 18.

4.4.7 HS2 proposes an intensive service that runs continuously for seventeen or eighteen hours a day, every day, throughout the year. Most of these trains would be “classic compatible” and would run off HS2 onto ordinary lines which are subject to all the problems of unreliability found on a traditional railway.

4.4.8 Scrutiny of the SNCF timetable confirms that there is an hour or so during the day when this intensity drops sharply, the so-called “période blanche”, which is a time when the system catches its breath, as it were, and recovers. HS2’s service proposals make no provision of this nature.

4.4.9 The “dwell time” allowed at continental stations for high speed trains is usually at least 3 minutes, although times in excess of 6 minutes are shown for some trains at busy locations. On other European high-speed services, dwell times at busy stations are often in the 4-8 minute range.

4.4.10 By comparison HS2 Ltd is assuming a two-minute dwell time. Thus at peak times up to 450-500 passengers would be expected to join or leave trains at Old Oak Common through 16 doors in just two minutes.

4.4.11 Our experience of high speed operation in Europe is as passengers, but it seems to us that the comparison above should serve to alert the Transport Committee to the strong possibility that the operations of HS2 would be inherently unstable as proposed.

4.4.12 It seems to us that there is a high probability that HS2 will be unable to deliver its claimed levels of service and journey times and that therefore the business case should include assessments of the effects of only being able to achieve a part of the improvements claimed. We would expect to see some modelling of the potential for instability on HS2, as we believe that the proposed levels of service are inherently unstable.

4.5 Taking into account other governmental, regional and local policy objectives

4.5.1 Because transport is not an objective in its own right, our experience is that the assessment of transport schemes in isolation can easily lead to “wrong” decisions in the overall picture of policy ambitions. For example, regeneration benefits are treated as all of equal worth, but in practice, the policy objective is to seek a more balanced economy and we propose that a part of the appraisal process should include an assessment of scheme benefits weighted for policy objectives at the different levels of government.

4.5.2 A similar approach was being developed at the Greater London Council in the 1970’s to test the contribution or otherwise of road schemes to GLC policy objectives in the GLC Development Plan. For example, such an approach helps highlight the more questionable value judgments often implicit (although generally unintended) in schemes and assist in the political decision making process.

4.5.3 As another example, is the loss of several hundred homes and communities in West Euston a reasonable trade-off for the modest safety benefit of straight platforms at Euston and the possibility of reducing disruption during station rebuilding, or are there other ways of achieving the desired result?

4.6 Forecasting risk and the choice of discount rate

4.6.1 Away from HS2 Ltd.’s consultation documents, there is recognition that the forecasts might be substantially in error. We note the length of the forecasting period, the inflexibility inherent in the present concept, and the over dependence on a few key benefits, some of which are in fact dependent on external factors if they are to work positively.

4.6.2 It is a basic commercial concept that an interest (or a discount) rate is a proxy for the riskiness of a venture. In discounting future benefits, a higher discount rate is assumed in order to take some account of risk. We note that rail and road projects both involve risks that vary according to the characteristics of the mode, and we believe that for these reasons different discount rates are logical and appropriate. A high-speed rail project is likely to be much more a “double or quits” bet than a road project.

4. 7. Redundant trains - a cost not taken into account

4.7.1 We note that nothing is said about the use of the current Pendolino fleet once HS2 stage 1 was to be operational. These vehicles were built in 2001-2004 and more are under construction. They should not reach the end of their useful lives until around 2035-40 but it is unclear if many of them could be reused economically elsewhere on the UK rail network.

4.7.2 The residual classic services are unlikely to require a large fleet of high capacity trains. Resale elsewhere depends on the availability of compatible signalling and electrical supply systems: a fleet of aging non-standard trainsets is not an attractive commercial prospect. We submit that the difference between Pendolino net book value and net realisable value at that date is a cost to the HS2 project and should therefore be included in the financial appraisal.

4.8 Effects on the classic railway post-HS2

4.8.1 We have looked in some detail at the effects on the classic railway and its capacity following the completion of HS2 Stage 1. We have looked at the possible effects on the distribution systems forward from Euston. We have also looked at the effects of the project on arguably the most strategic station in the country - Birmingham New Street. 4.8.2 None of these issues have been dealt with to our satisfaction in the studies carried out by HS2 Ltd. That is not to say that we consider these matters to be sticking points for the scheme as a whole, (we think, for example, that HS2 could enable desirable infrastructure improvements eg between Camden Road/Euston and Wembley which would just not be feasible now.) But they do need to be incorporated in a proper assessment and this needs to be reflected in the HS2 case.

4.9 The Euston commuter issue

4.9.1 We have considerable past experience of the planning and operation of these services and have the following observations to make. (We have not gone into detail but a more technical assessment is available should it be required.)

4.9.2 The Euston outer-suburban commuter services divide broadly into three sections:

4.9.2.1 The mature metropolitan commuter zone between Euston and Watford Junction. This is well served in terms of service frequency and journey times, stable in terms of demand and little change can be expected short of a more radical proposal like diversion away from Euston onto Crossrail. This section of line produces around 3000 commuters.

4.9.2.2 The belt of restricted development north of Watford Junction and south of Leighton Buzzard. Green belt and similar restrictions have been in place for many years and our assessment is that little change to the service provision at these stations would be possible although additional capacity could be provided by restructuring the calling pattern to attract passengers from the development zone (see below) away from these services. As with the mature metropolitan belt, only a radical proposal like the Crossrail diversion would be expected to materially affect commuter numbers.

4.9.2.3 The development zone consisting of Leighton Buzzard and stations north including Milton Keynes and Northampton. The material passenger growth over the past forty years has come from these stations, as was indeed forecast in the early 1970s. We have reviewed traffic and other data, and we concur that post HS2, this is where any growth will come from. We would not be surprised if, expressed as a percentage increase, this was substantial. However in terms of a requirement for train paths, we would not expect more than two or three extra trains to be required in the peak hour. This is not perhaps as significant in the wider scheme of things as has been made out in some quarters. These extra trains may require subsidy but we do not have access to the figures which would enable us to confirm that this would be so.

4.9.3 Commuter forecasting over a ten-to-twenty year period is a fairly straightforward and robust process compared with other railway forecasting. The key variables (housing stock, office stock, the effects of any changes to the distribution network within Central London) are known with a high level of accuracy. All the commuters twenty years hence have already been born. Simple gravity models have been in use for years and are well understood. The 60 minute upper limit that people apply to their commuter journey has remained fairly constant for well over a century although with greater flexibility in employment practices this seems to have risen slightly in recent years. 4.9.4 Another important reason why explosive commuter growth will not happen is that Euston is not located within walking distance of any key business district. The hinterland has a national importance as an academic and medical district, but the employment densities are lower than in major business districts. Commuters wishing to travel to the higher density business districts have to change onto other modes and for many this places the journey outside their time tolerance limits.

4.10 Additional distribution capacity at Euston

4.10.1 It is possible but by no means inevitable that the operation of a high capacity railway from Euston would require an increase in the capacity of public transport at Euston. This is a strategic matter for London and we urge that in the consideration of this problem, a key aim is to provide wide-ranging benefits for London. Some of the solutions being touted involve very substantial expenditure, and have major implications over a wide area and for large numbers of Londoners and others. If such expenditure is required to make HS2 “work” (that is to say provide a quality and properly integrated transport experience) then the costs and benefits should be properly accounted for in the HS2 case.

4.10.2 We have had significant experience in the design and construction of major stations, and urge that the users’ needs should be accorded a very high level of importance (good design for commuters is not necessarily a question of great engineering or architectural statements - Euston is primarily an interchange station so what is required is quality functional design that places convenience, connectivity and adequate space above commercial needs). Our examination of the proposals for the new Euston suggests that they do not yet address these needs.

4. 11 The Birmingham New Street question

4.11.1 We have looked at the potential for additional cross-country services. We suspect most of these would need to access Birmingham New Street.

4.11.2 Birmingham New Street is in many ways the most important station in England because it is the crossing point between the South - West to North - East lines and the Birmingham loop of the WCML.

4.11.3 To optimise network capacity, one has to work outwards from New Street across most of the rest of the country. New Street is reported as operating at capacity, and it is not clear from HS2 Ltd.’s reports how much capacity might be released by the introduction of HS2.

4.11.4 The line capacity may well be increased, but if the capacity of the key station on the route does not expand then these paths are of little use to passenger traffic.

4.11.5 Until and unless there are practical and costed proposals as to how the additional line capacity can be used, we suggest its “benefits” be excluded from the case for HS2.

4. 12 Differences of opinion 4.12.1 We are concerned that the outcomes of HS2’s work are significantly at odds with the thinking of Transport for London, Network Rail and the local authorities along the route, all of which can be expected to have devoted far greater intellectual effort to the issues.

5. Alternatives as regards capacity, pricing, diversion and suppression

5.1 Diversion of some outer suburban trains to Crossrail

5.1.1 Network Rail is considering the possible use of the ten spare train paths and the diversion of Euston outer suburban services via a short length of new track at Old Oak Common onto Crossrail.

5.1.2 Demand might change if the proposal to route ten Euston commuter trains an hour onto Crossrail were to come about. For some important destinations in key business areas, weighted journey time reductions might be achievable equivalent to those expected for Milton Keynes. However integration with Crossrail is unlikely provide a “win-win”:

x The service that could be operated might preclude running the semi-fast trains enjoyed today and.

x Significant business districts such as Victoria will not be as easily accessed via Crossrail as via Euston.

x There will still be a need for some service into Euston because Crossrail cannot accommodate all the Euston commuter services.

x The number of seats on trains is likely to reduce.

5.1.3 If we are right on these points, our preliminary assessment is that passengers from north of Tring might receive little benefit from a Crossrail service, but that some substantial benefits could accrue to the rather higher numbers who travel from Tring and stations south. Because of the constraints noted earlier, the effects on commuter volumes are unlikely to be transformational.

5.1.4 There are difficulties in introducing a Crossrail service for “LMR” commuters prior to HS2, but it would help ease the problems in building the new Euston and the lines to Camden whilst running today’s level of service.

5.1.5 This could relieve pressure on Euston quite substantially, both in terms of train movements and passenger numbers, and mean that the new Euston would only need a fairly small number of shorter classic platforms.

5.2 Our researches lead us to the conclusion that there is no one “right” solution for the London/Heathrow -West Midlands corridor. A robust and reliable solution to the demands of passenger and freight movement requires a margin of spare capacity to provide operational reliability and also give scope for future growth.

5.3 We accept that that some form of high-speed railway may be necessary, together with some upgrading of the WCML, of the “Evergreen” route, and a GC gauge route for freight. However as we have pointed out in our comments in Section 3 on the case for High Speed rail, there seem to be fundamental misconceptions in government quarters about the way in which high-speed solutions are now being developed in Europe.

6. The strategic route

6. 1. The HS1 to HS2 link - the cross London corridor

6.1.1 The proposed link between HS1 and HS2 runs in a new single-bore tunnel between Old Oak and Primrose Hill tunnels, where it then picks up on the alignment of the North London Line link between the WMCL at Primrose Hill and Camden Road. This section of line will be singled to allow low-cost conversion to GC gauge.

6.1.2 We consider that the HS1 to HS2 link proposals are the wrong response to the wrong question.

6.1.3 Further, the levels of reliability achieved on LGV in France with significantly lower utilisation levels suggest trains will regularly present late, especially at Old Oak Common, so the long single track section will be a major source of instability for the network as a whole.

6.1.4 Key strategic issues are whether:

x HS1 can be linked to the main rail corridors serving the rest of the country, by adapting existing infrastructure and/or new build, to provide GC standard routes across London.

x Existing infrastructure could be adapted to minimise new construction required.

x These links can be designed to reduce, below existing levels, the environmental impact of railway operation on Londoners.

x These links can also embrace other local and strategic transport objectives.

6.1.5 The singling of a strategically important section of cross-London railway between Primrose Hill Tunnels and Camden Road (the Primrose Hill link) would worsen conditions for freight because:

x It would restrict the number of trains that can access the WCML from the south route that is one of only two “high cube” routes across London from the Haven Ports.

x The route is used as a regulating area for trains joining or leaving the WCML: if this function cannot be performed here there is a real risk of delays being transmitted between the WCML and the GE lines out of Liverpool Street to the Haven ports.

x Haven Port trains are already half a kilometre in length. The lower cost options for increasing traffic capacity for these services are centred on train lengthening but the singling of the Primrose Hill link may rule out this option. Train lengthening reduces unit costs which is why users favour it.

6.1.6 Network Rail has an aspiration to provide a GC route between London and the country’s industrial heartlands at some unspecified future date.

6.1.7 We hope that the HS2 Ltd.’s focus on the West Midlands and the North of England would be modified to consider also access to the West of England and Wales via Old Oak Common, for both freight and international passenger services. 6.1.8 A reduction in the number of daytime paths available through Primrose Hill will increase pressure for additional night-time trains leading to a worsening of living conditions for residents close to this and other cross London routes.

6.1.9 A number of proposals have been made in recent years to provide a GC gauge link to the Midlands using sections of the former Great Central railway. We offer no view on the desirability or practicality of this, but we do urge that the Government takes a holistic view of transport needs in the London-West Midlands corridor and considers how any future high speed link contributes - or at least does not impede - realisation of a GC gauge link. Even if currently a GC gauge freight route is considered not justifiable, the story of transport in this country should serve as a warning against closing off options for future generations.

(We are aware of the current upgrades of the Southampton - Nuneaton and the Felixstowe - Nuneaton routes to accommodate “W10” working for “high cube” containers, and that in consequence the capacity problems on the WCML south or Birmingham will be relieved for the foreseeable future.)

6.1.10 TfL which is responsible for Orbirail services running on the cross North London routes, has expressed concern about the effects of HS2 Ltd.’s proposals on TfL services. Although most of the adverse effects could be removed by the widening of approximately 350 metres of viaduct, HS2 Ltd.’s proposals would prevent the operation of TfL’s proposed Queens Park-Stratford service which is essential for relieving overcrowding on Orbirail - and which might possibly be developed as part of a strategic cross-London link to improve access to Old Oak Common.

6. 2. International rail services

6.2.1 HS2 Ltd. proposes that international rail services would use the HS1 to HS2 link. We have already commented, in our assessment of the business case, on the capacity issues that we expect to become evident at an early stage on HS2, and, considering the relatively low passenger usage that can be expected for international services, point out that these services must be prime candidates for exclusion from HS2. Our reasons for this claim are that the achievable timings using HS2 are not so far removed from what could be achieved on the WCML as it stands, or less if the signalling and line speeds were to be upgraded.

6.2.2 However existing rail investment means that a Birmingham to Paris / Brussels service using Eurostar classic-compatible trains is already quite practical.

6.2.3 If it is the Government’s opinion that such services will help bridge the North-South divide by linking to our major international gateways, then such a service should be introduced in advance of the construction of HS2, even if, initially it is a very limited service (perhaps even just a seasonal service). If the Government is confident of its case, it will pick up the challenge and prove its case.

6.2.4 Over a decade ago DfT concluded that there was insufficient demand to justify such a service. However between 1997 and 2010 Eurostar passenger volumes rose by 58% after much investment in track and station facilities. The earlier conclusions may no longer hold. 6.2.5 Recent trends in high-speed travel have included a greater willingness amongst passengers to use rail for journeys that hitherto have been regarded as beyond range in terms of journey time. For example, Deutsche Bahn is considering through services from Frankfurt and Cologne to London.

6.2.6 We estimate that if the international services using the WCML have all intermediate station stops taken out, the journey time differences between a WCML and HS2 solution between Birmingham and, say, Paris, would be 20 minutes, and 30 between Manchester and Paris at best, or 50 minutes at worst. Birmingham to Paris via the WCML would be 3 hours 30 minutes, and Manchester-Paris 4hrs 35 minutes. SNCF’s “wish list” for future LGV construction includes the LGV Picardie, which would reduce these timings by about 20 minutes. This line could be in operation before HS2.

6.2.7 If it is thought there is a case for running international services from the Midlands and North, our challenge is simple. The service should be capable of being introduced within a very few years. The equipment is there, even if not immediately available. The infrastructure is there. Run it, even if only on a seasonal, or once-daily service, prove the case, put the idea into the consciousness of West Midlanders and Mancunians, demonstrate that there is a business case, and start building up traffic.

6.3 The choice of London terminus

6.3.1 If it is thought necessary to have a Central London terminus, we think that the Kings Cross - St Pancras area would make much more sense in transport terms but we have been unable to establish the status of development land. Unfortunately this is a case of lost opportunities: had the idea of HS2 been under serious consideration twenty years ago, it would have been possible to use the Kings Cross lands.

6.3.2 We note that all high-speed lines in Europe make use of upgraded classic alignments in order to traverse urban areas.

6. 4. Old Oak Common: a great opportunity for connectivity and regeneration

6.4.1 We believe that the issues concerning Old Oak Common (OOC) are so interconnected that they should be dealt with in the same section and not split as between discussion on regeneration and the strategic route.

6.4.2 The regeneration of OOC should take place regardless of whether HS2 is built, if only because it is one of the few remaining large areas available for development. What HS2 is likely to do is stimulate more thinking and discussion, and as a result it may be possible to exploit more of the potential of the site as new synergies become possible.

6.4.3 Worldwide, there can be few urban areas with such potential for accessibility and interchange as Old Oak Common (OOC). It is where two of the country’s main trunk railways converge and it potentially enables numerous connections with the rest of the system. The urban surrounds of OOC (including Park Royal) include large tracts of derelict industrial space and there is both need and scope for industrial regeneration and new housing.

Old Oak Common – the area bounded by the tracks is approximately 1km-2

6.4.4 The average distance travelled to work in London is under four miles, and the average journey time under 45 minutes. Much of Camden is therefore in the range of OOC.

6.4.5 Within a few years London Overground will circle the capital - the “Orbirail” scheme. “Orbirail” routes traverse both Camden and OOC. One of the benefits of Orbirail is that it will provide better accessibility in areas of relatively high deprivation.

6.4.6 Development of OOC, together with accessibility improvements to both it and the major industrial area of Park Royal, could assist with more general issues of social deprivation in Camden and other areas of north and west London. Equally, the rail-locked nature of the OOC site means that good local transport will be an important key to success.

6.4.7 TfL is concerned about the number of journeys which involve travel through the congested central area of London but which could advantageously be re-routed orbitally. The ongoing positive development of "Orbirail" services, which started over thirty years ago, demonstrates the worth of this approach. Inner London’s geography makes orbital movement very significant and concentrates it in fairly narrow corridors that are well suited to rail solutions.

6.4.8 Important local passenger lines run adjacent to OOC: the Central and Bakerloo lines of London Underground, the Stratford-Richmond, Willesden Junction-Clapham, and Watford-Euston services of London Overground/Orbirail, and national rail services from Reading to Paddington, and Milton Keynes to Euston and Gatwick. The rail lines through the area are also of considerable strategic importance for freight.

6.4.9 London Underground services could be extended from Kensington Olympia along existing track to run through the site, and it should be possible to adapt the proposed Orbirail Queens Park - Stratford service to provided a link between, say, the Park Royal industrial area, Old Oak and north London.

6.4.10 There is thus enormous opportunity although detailed study might show not all potential schemes would in fact be justifiable. The more radical proposals may only be desirable in the context of a major Crossrail/HS2 interchange.

6.4.11 Network Rail is examining the possibility of diverting some Euston commuter services onto Crossrail via a short length of new track at OOC.

6.4.12 Today OOC is largely rail-locked by presence of so many rail links, with their associated sidings and other facilities,. A canal also bisects it. Regeneration pre-supposes resolution of site accessibility restrictions. Such resolution could improve the rail infrastructure and connectivity generally, provide better road, pedestrian and cycle access to the site, and also release land for development so it can be aggregated into more suitably sized and shaped areas.

6.4.13 HS2 Ltd. claims that the OOC regeneration area is capable of supporting 20,000 jobs. By contrast London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham (LBHF) envisages 5,000 jobs. This discrepancy may be due to a more conservative estimate by LBHF of the area that could be made available for development, particularly given the need for land for housing.

6.4.14 It may that HS2 Ltd. envisages higher densities of development in order to improve their case rather than promote the most appropriate and beneficial uses for the site in relation to the economy of London and the nation. We note that HS2 Ltd. does not provide details of the types of jobs would be created at OOC or how they might fit into the wider scheme of things.

6.4.15 We think it illogical to rank equally all jobs created by regeneration and suggest there should be some weighting to favour jobs that align with government and local objectives in line with the thinking set out in the October 2010 White Paper “Local Growth”.

6.4.16 LBHF proposes to capitalise on the area’s potential as a media and high technology centre, citing Imperial College and Wood Lane as cluster foci.

(Wood Lane is one of the three areas of London with the highest density of creative jobs: creative jobs, broadly defined, account for around 15% of London‘s jobs.) The numbers have grown sharply in number over the past twenty years and there is no reason to think that they will not continue to do so. Continued growth in the type of jobs that LBHF think suitable will help diversify London’s economic base and employment opportunities. The area has a number of advantages that support LBHF’s aims, but none of them are critically dependent on HS2. )

6.4.17 As we have pointed out OOC provides a great opportunity to integrate HS2 and the local rail network. Sadly, we do not see signs that this has percolated into the thinking behind the proposed interchange station. For example, the station engineering does not provide currently for good interchange because of inconsistencies with the infrastructure demands of the services actually proposed.

6.4.18 In essence HS2 Limited underestimates the potential of OOC. As the London terminal for HS2 a developed OOC could enable London-bound passengers to switch to several tube lines, Orbirail / Overground in addition to Crossrail and current commuter lines. The availability of many alternatives would avoid the swamping of Crossrail and be consistent with TfL’s thinking.

6.4.19 However for OOC to become the London terminal a change in the railway “mindset” is essential: it should be regarded as a place to be developed for the benefit of the country rather than simply serving the narrow interests of rail people.

6.4.20 It has been suggested that Arup and Partners had proposed OOC as the London HS2 terminal but that this was opposed by Crossrail which intends to use the valuable real estate for a large train shed.

6.4.21 It is an indictment of generations of railway companies that industrial archaeology is possibly the only attraction of today’s OOC, a big parcel of land close to the centre of London. Even the vast former Eurostar depot lies empty, not yet 20 years old.

6.4.22 With OOC as the HS2 terminal then redevelopment of Euston within today’s footprint could proceed on its own merit and without the destruction of the local community.

6.4.23 We suggested earlier (6.2.7) that a trial link and service from Birmingham to Paris could be established over today’s infrastructure. If that trial proved to be encouraging and the traffic volumes were sufficient then consideration could be given to a link from OOC to HS1 at GC gauge at an acceptable speed. In the event that traffic volumes did not justify a dedicated link then continental services could continue over existing lines. 6. 5 Additional stations on the route

6.5.1 To help us understand the HS2 proposals, we carried out some work on rolling stock requirements and service capacity. The results may be of interest to the Committee, since they illustrate the effects on the costs of operating the service if one station is added to the Stage 1 route. The results are not, scalable, so the effect of adding more than one station cannot be estimated by multiplying our estimated costs by the number of extra stations.

6. 5.2 The Transport Select Committee’s remit includes consideration of additional stations. Our detailed work on timetabling and rolling stock usage provides information on the effects of adding stations tot the Stage 1 route.

6.5.3 The intensity of service proposed on HS2 means that if additional stations were to be included in the scheme then all trains must stop at them. (A pattern in which only some trains stop reduces line capacity very significantly.)

6.5.4 If a high speed train is travelling at its maximum operational speed, a significant time - around 5 to 6 minutes depending on assumptions - is needed to bring it to a halt in a station without causing discomfort to passengers, for dwell time at the station and then to bring it back up to speed on departure.

6.5.5 Time is also extended by the station dwell time necessary for passengers to alight and join: a double-deck train may require a longer dwell time.

6.5.6 The trainset utilisation proposed for HS2 is intensive: for routine operation a train turnround time of 20 minutes is required at termini, and the trainsets would be required to operate over a fairly complex route using fleets of vehicles with limited interchangeability.

6.5.7 Our calculations suggest that the additional capital costs of rolling stock required to maintain seating capacity with one extra stop on the Phase 1 route would be of the order of £200 million: the exact number of additional sets required could only be established after a detailed exercise.

6.5.8 In turn, this affects the number of platforms required at termini, depot and stabling facilities, and train crewing requirements. (Power consumption will also be increased significantly.)

6.6 Freight and operating flexibility

6.6.1 HS2 will be built to GC gauge that could permit full size continental freight trains to run over it provided the engineering took account of freight’s needs for heavier axle loads, easier gradients and other freight-specific constraints.

6.6.2 However we understand HS2 Limited proposes that the route would not be designed to convey freight traffic at any point along its route. For instance it would be physically impossible to access HS2 from the southern end as the proposed gradient of the section of line onto the HS2-HS1 link tunnel at Primrose Hill is too steep to permit freight working. After construction it would only be possible to modify the line to accommodate freight at enormous cost.

6.6.3 Not all high-speed lines are built to the exclusion of freight. Some sections of the French Lignes à Grande Vitesse (LGV) can accept mixed freight and high-speed passenger working. HS1 was also built to permit freight operations.

6.6.4 We have discussed the importance of GC routes across London and how they should be designed to take account of freight’s strategic needs.

6.6.5 Proposals for HS2, and indeed, any other high-speed lines, should as a matter of course be subject to scrutiny so that it can be established whether there are any sections that should be designed so as to enable mixed operation.

6.6.6 We note that the proposed HS2 passenger network does not provide for operating flexibility (for instance diversions for renewals or in the event of disruption). The strategic importance of these lines is so great and so concentrated that these risks should be properly evaluated and appropriate provision made to permit greater operating flexibility.

6.7 Disruption especially at Euston and on classic services

6.7.1 If we are correct in our comments about the practical capacity of HS2, then HS2 will be inadequate for all the services that are mooted. Issues of future-proofing then arise and there should be some clear strategy as to how demand will be catered for once HS2 becomes full. Potentially, the question of future-proofing could blight Camden for three or four decades unless proper provision is made when the Euston and Euston approaches are remodelled.

6.7.2 We note that in order to build the “up” tunnel portal the important tracks on the west side of the approaches will have to be taken out of use. These tracks perform two crucial functions:

6.7.2.1 they provide a facility that allows main line trains to depart from the eastern side of the station without crossing over the all the suburban lines on the flat.

6.7.2.2 they access the Camden sidings used in the main for daytime stabling of commuter trains.

6.7.3 Should these facilities not be available, there may be considerable additional train mileage to an alternative stabling point and pressure on line and platform capacity generally. This will represent significant cost and delay that should be incorporated in the project evaluation.

6.7.4 The construction of a GC gauge link from Primrose Hill through Camden Town to HS1 will need to be carefully managed. For most of its length, the line is on viaduct as it crossed the valley of the Fleet River. A number of important traffic arteries, both radial and orbital pass under this viaduct, in the main on elderly iron bridges which will require rebuilding. We estimate that up to 20 single-track spans will need to be replaced.

6.7.5 Fortunately there is at present a certain amount of space on the viaduct which is not at present used for running lines, and it may be possible to adapt the techniques used on the construction of the new Borough Market viaduct, with final fabrication of most of the replacement spans on site and then rolling them along the trackbed into position. This may need to be phased over several years if road closures are to be kept, as at Borough Market, to holiday weekends. If an innovative approach to the logistics is not possible, then there will be very considerable disruption to road traffic in North London and the costs associated with this should be reflected in the HS2 Limited economic case.

6.7.6 We offer no comment on the disruption that might occur during the reconstruction of Euston and its approaches for HS2, save that we pray that the apocalyptic scenes described by estwhile local resident Charles Dickens in Dombey and Son, are not repeated.

7 How does HS2 fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

7.1 The flavour of every government and DfT statement on their transport objectives is that sustainability and CO2 reduction are key policy drivers. Fairness and quality of life in our communities are added to the mix.

7.2 Andrew Adonis announced HS2 on 11thMarch 2010 as, “the most sustainable way to provide more capacity between conurbations”.

7.3 Philip Hammond commended HS2 on 26thJuly 2010 as part of the new Government’s commitment to a programme of measures to, “create a low carbon economy”.

7.4 Under the Coalition’s programme for Government, “Freedom Fairness and Responsibility” the new Government committed to “reform the way decisions are made, and which transport projects to prioritise, so that the benefits of low carbon proposals are fully recognised.”

7.5 In September 2010 at the IBM Start Conference Mr. Hammond stated:

“And make no mistake - the Coalition Government is committed to the sustainability agenda in everything it does, including transport. And of course, addressing the urgent and unavoidable challenges of climate change are a key part of ensuring sustainability.

Sustainable solutions have, of course, first and foremost to be environmentally sustainable. But they must also be fiscally and economically sustainable - affordable to the taxpayer in the long-term and compatible with an economic growth agenda.

And the Department for Transport can and must be at the heart of this programme. Tackling climate change through policies which deliver technology and behaviour that will decarbonise mobility as we progress through the 21st century.

Those challenges call for a genuinely sustainable policy response: A response that recognises the need for carbon reduction, fiscal discipline, economic growth, social justice and genuine localism.

Not one, or some of them, But all of them. Together. In every policy initiative.”

7.6 The DfT business plan has as its vision, “a transport system that is an engine for economic growth but one that is also greener and safer and improves quality of life in our communities. By improving the links that help to move goods and people around, and by targeting investment in new projects that promote green growth, we can help to build the balanced, dynamic and low-carbon economy that is essential for our future prosperity.”

7.7 The importance of a low CO2 agenda is repeatedly emphasised throughout DfT publications as is the importance of fairness and quality of life for communities. Creating Growth Cutting Carbon, January 2011 the government’s vision for a sustainable local transport system, encourages local authorities to prioritise quality of life, safety and the environment alongside economic development in their transport planning.

7.8 Surely this integrated thinking should be implicit in national transport strategies? Transport is not purely an issue for travellers. It is also an issue for those travelled over. From a fairness perspective, investments in transport must put the quality of life of people they affect at the heart of the design process and actively seek to redress the wrongs of the past. The Euston community has re-assembled itself after the initial re-development of the station and displacement in the 1960s. The HS2 Appraisal of Sustainability recognises the people due to be displaced at Euston are amongst the poorest in the borough and the fact that almost all new jobs created will be filled by those who will be travelling in from elsewhere, which is neither fair nor sustainable.

7.9 Developing a sustainable framework for aviation (March 2011) plainly states “the fact that climate change has become one of the gravest threats we face”. It is our view that there is a flaw and a contradiction at the most basic level in the Government’s policy aspiration and its practical implementation. Ultra high-speed travel is not sustainable, ultra high-speed travel, within the context of the world as we know it today, can never contribute to CO2 reduction. The development of HS2, as it is proposed, will contribute nothing to the quality of life for communities and in many cases will damage them.

7.10 Energy used increases with the square of velocity: a train travelling at 400kph will consume four times the energy of one travelling at 200kph. Currently 93% of the UK’s electrical energy comes from burning fossil fuel. The difficulties of implementing alternative sustainable sources of power in the face of increasing national demand and international events are daunting and cannot be safely predicted.

7.11 We will leave it to others to analyse the cost benefits of travel time saved but the fact remains that HS2 would require a massive increase in power per unit distance. Even assuming that sustainable power generation was widely available HS2 would require more generating capacity. This is inconsistent with a sustainable model.

7.12 Any unforeseen technological developments that might make HS2 more viable could by the same token make alternative transport solutions such as electric coaches and cars more sustainable.

7.13 As for fairness and sustainable communities, ultra high-speed is inflexible in its infrastructure requirements compared to existing high-speed railway: the land take is greater and the platforms are more intrusive as is the case in Euston.

7.14 Equally flawed in terms of sustainability and practical effect is the assumption that domestic air passengers tempted off domestic flights (although there are none between London and Birmingham) would contribute to overall CO2 reduction. BAA Limited has stated that any released short-haul slots would be replaced by long-haul flights typically increasing emissions tenfold.

7.15 In their 12th July 2007 report for the DfT, Estimated Carbon Impact of a New North-South Line Booze Allen Hamilton Limited concluded that building and running a new high-speed line from London to Manchester would have such a large carbon footprint that the assumed shift from road or air would take 60 years to offset the damage.

May 2011

Definitions

Camden - the geographical area comprising the London Borough of Camden

GLA - Greater London Authority - regional authority

LBB - London Borough of Brent - local authority LBC - London Borough of Camden - local authority

LBHF - London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham - local authority

TfL - Transport for London

UIC - the International Union of Railways, the worldwide international organisation of the railway sector.

Orbirail - the various services marketed as London Overground together with TfL’s “wish list” of enhancements.

LNWR - the London & North Western Railway, merged with the Midland Railway and others to form the London Midland and Scottish Railway.

OOC – Old Oak Common – The large area of railway-owned land 4km west of Paddington and immediately north of Wormwood Scrubs.

HS1 - High Speed One – the GC gauge 109 kilometre long high-speed railway from St Pancras to Folkestone (formerly known as the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL))

GC gauge - a loading gauge used on mainland Europe that will apply to HS2 (and applies to HS1). It is wider and higher than other loading gauges used in UK.

Classic-compatible train. A train built to fit on Classic lines that can also operate on HS2 or HS1 with identical performance characteristics to a Captive train. It may also have a tilting capability to maximize its speed potential on a Classic line.

Captive train - a train that can only operate on GC gauge lines such as HS1 or HS2. It is thus “captive”.

WCML – West Coast Mainline - the fast line running out of Euston to Glasgow. This is a Classic line.

ECML – East Cost Mainline - the fast line running out of Kings Cross to Edinburgh. This is a Classic line.

LGV - Ligne à Grande Vitesse – a French high-speed train line specially built for the famous TGV. Written evidence from 51m (HSR 109)

51m represents the following 13 Local Authorities who are aligned in their response to the HS2 consultation:

x Buckinghamshire County Council x Aylesbury Vale District Council x Chiltern District Council x South Bucks District Council x Wycombe District Council x London Borough of Hillingdon x Cherwell District Council x Lichfield District Council x South Northants District Council x Warwick District Council x North Warwickshire Borough Council x Warwickshire County Council x Stratford-on-Avon District Council

The 51m name represents the equivalent of how much HS2 will cost each and every Parliamentary Constituency...£51million. The group wants to emphasise the impact this proposed scheme will have on every taxpayer in the country for years to come.

51m are opposed to the current High Speed rail proposals as they are presently outlined and do not believe that they are in the best interests of the UK as a whole in terms of the benefits claimed in the business case.

51m are not opposed to higher speed rail per se and fully acknowledge the need for strategic improvement to the national rail infrastructure. However, we do not believe that all the other alternatives to achieve the transport capacity, regeneration and environmental benefits have been fully explored by the Government and with in excess of E3Obillion proposed to be invested, we owe it to the nation to ensure these are fully explored. Due to the reasons outlined above and in the enclosed report, we cannot support the current proposals suggested by Government and are actively working on a plan to strongly object to them.

This submission has been formatted as a single strategic response to Question 1 (What are the benefits and drawbacks of HSR) together with amplification of the issues raised in the subsequent chapters. MAIN ARGUMENTS AGAINST HS2 - QUESTION 1.

Introduction

1. 51m is a consortium of Local Authorities between London and Birmingham on the HS2 route. The Group is called 51m because E51m is the cost to each Parliamentary constituency in the UK of the HS2 project.

2. This document is 51m's response to Question One, and will set out the overall arguments against HS2. It will cross refer to the supporting evidence, which form the chapters of this report and which in turn cross-refer to the TSC's questions, although not in the same order, so that the Committee can see where we have dealt with the relevant issues.

3. HS2 is an enormously expensive (E30bn Net Present Value) and

environmentally damaging piece of infrastructure, which requires £17bn

(NPV) of public subsidy. Even on the DfT's own case, the Y has a benefit cost

ratio ("BCR") of only 2.2 (excluding Wider Economic Impacts — WEI) and 2.6

(including WEI) and this reduces to 1.6 and 2.0 respectively for Phase 1 , and

these are based on some over optimistic assumptions. HS2 should only be

given the go ahead if there is a clear case in the national interest, which has

been robustly and independently scrutinised. The DfT case is fundamentally

flawed in a large number of respects and has not been

adequately scrutinised and tested.

4. 51m is not against high speed rail per se, but it must be the right project and

properly justified. The Government should not spend f billions, simply

because HSR is a modern and glamorous form of infrastructure, particularly

where smaller and less expensive transport schemes would give far greater

benefits in environmental, social and transport terms. As Sir Rod Eddington

said in his 2007 Transport Study;

"because the UK is already well connected, the key economic challenge is therefore to improve the performance of the existing network... There are very high returns from making best use of existing networks [with....11arge projects with speculative benefits and relying on untested technology, are unlikely to generate attractive returns."

5. The evidence shows that HS2 would largely be used by those in the highest income brackets (and many of those for leisure purposes). In essence HS2 is

a massive public subsidy to the well off, with at best some doubtful economic benefits.

6. There is a long history of over optimistic forecasting by the rail industry,

both in terms of passenger forecasts and costs. The Committee should bear in mind that schemes such as this are developed by those who have a strong interest in them, as is recognised by international studies.

7. The issues which arise on the DfT's case are:

a) There are much cheaper incremental alternatives, which can meet the forecast demand, but in a quicker and more responsive manner.

b) Demand forecasts are optimistic.

c) The rail industry has a poor record on passenger forecasting.

d) HS2 service provision of 18tph is undeliverable.

e) It wont reduce overall air travel and will have no climate change benefits

f) The benefits assumed are too high, particularly as assumptions about time spent on trains being wasted are out of date.

g) The scheme will have little impact in rebalancing the regional economy, in contrast to local and regional schemes that offer practical benefits.

h) It creates large disbenefits to many existing rail users.

i) Major construction impacts at Euston.

j) No justification for Heathrow and HS1 links.

k) HS2 is critically different from the European examples DfT rely upon.

Unrealistic Comparators/Better Alternatives — Chapters 1 &10

8. Probably the most fundamental problem with the DfT's economic analysis is that they have not used the best alternative as their comparator with which to test the business case, instead using a wholly unrealistic "do-minimum" comparator with almost no changes over 30 years. The DfT's principal alternative, Rail Package 2 "RP2", fails to optimise the opportunity for

extending and reconfiguring trains; includes unnecessary and costly

infrastructure; and fails to apply a consistent approach to the infrastructure

which is needed between it and HS2. This is contrary to basic principles on

carrying out a business case such as this, and has led to a wholly distorted

picture as to the need for, and benefits of, HS2.

9. DfT have used different do minimum cases for their evaluation of HS2 and their alternative RP2 which results in the overestimation of the benefits of HS2.

10. Issues about the level of passenger growth, how time is spent and the value

of time saved are inevitably open to subjective judgement, and ultimately

guesswork. But it is a simple fact that huge increases in capacity can be

produced on the relevant parts of the rail network, with relatively simple

and far cheaper steps than HS2, and which address crowding issues earlier.

11. There are a series of incremental improvements to the existing network

which can deliver more than sufficient to meet the forecast demand. These

steps have 4 major advantages over HS2. Firstly, they can be introduced

incrementally so that if the massive demand increases forecast by HS2 do

not materialise there is no wasted investment. Secondly, they are far

cheaper than HS2. Thirdly, they can be introduced much more quickly than

HS2, so can deal with existing overcrowding issues, rather than having to

wait until 2026 (at the earliest). Fourthly, they are very low risk.

12. In summary the incremental ways to increase capacity over the DfT base case are:

a) Take account of Evergreen 3 (line speed increase from London Marylebone- Birmingham), which will be completed this year and provides journey speeds to Birmingham only a few minutes longer than those on Virgin trains, thereby reducing demand from Euston and increasing capacity including at peak times. This scheme was deliberately ignored in the DfT business case.

b) Change the train configuration on Pendolinos to change at least one carriage from first to standard. The overcrowding issues only arise in standard class;

c) Lengthen existing Pendolinos, all to 11 car and then most to 12 car. The combination of (b) and (c) produces 9 standard cars per train, in contrast with 5 at the moment;

d) Introduce "smart" ticketing and demand management, to reduce peak demand, for example eliminating the artificial peak on Friday after 7pm at Euston;

e) Carry out a series of relatively "minor" infrastructure capacity improvements at pinchpoints, including a grade separated junction south of Milton Keynes, to allow improved separation between fast and slow lines.

13. The cumulative capacity increases of these measures over the 2008 base

case demand would be in the order of trebling (211%), see table below, at a

total capital cost in the region of £2bn. Of course these steps would not

provide the journey time improvements of HS2. But once it is understood

that the majority of the benefits from the journey time reductions are

dependent on the assumption that business people do not work on trains, it

can be seen that spending £30bn (NPV) for this gain is a very poor use of

public money. Interventions Daily Daily standard % increase above Comments trains class seats 2008 base

Train investment with no/little infrastructure investment

HS2 2008 Base 59,298 Base used by DfT for evaluation of HS2. Predates full WCML upgrade timetable

Current timetable 286 81,924 38% Includes Voyager services (30 daily)

Evergreen 3 [68] [28,900]' [55%] Committed scheme — complete in 2011 Committed lengthening project 286 105,924 79% Committed scheme — implemented from 2012 December 2013 additional 306 113,769 92% Additional hourly off-peak train services each way First class reconfiguration 306 134,379 127% One car converted from first to standard

12 car sets (except Liverpool) 306 166,908 181% Major physical constraints at Liverpool Infrastructure Investment

Additional services 336 184,326 211% 30 additional daily trains following investment to relieve pinchpoints

14. These improvements would cause no disruption at Euston, as opposed to

HS2's disruption which will be massive for 7-8 years. It is also important to

stress that the alternative would cause minimal disruption to the WCML and

is in no way comparable with the WCML upgrade which took place a few

years ago.

Demand Growth2- Chapter 2

15. DfT forecast is for 102% "background" demand growth to 2043, and 209%

including the additional growth generated by HS2. The DfT describe this as

"conservative", but that is misleading. They justify this by reference to high

Illustrative Evergreen 3 figures assume Chiltern trains currently 4 car class 168 units (275 seats), lengthened to 6 car class 168 (425 seats) and this capacity increase is not included in 211% levels of growth on long distance rail travel in the last 15 years and a very

strong relationship between increased wealth and increased long distance

rail trips. But this must be seen in the context of overall long distance trips

on all modes per person remaining constant since 1995; no rail growth in

the period 1952-1995; and rail travel being strongly influenced by

investment (including public subsidy) post privatisation. It is wholly unsound

to assume that the factors which led to rapid growth post 1995 will continue to 2043.

16. The DfT have used assumptions on growth derived from the rail forecasting

manual (PDFH) for the period up to 2043, even though this is contrary to

their own normal forecasting practice; to Sir Rod Eddington's

recommendations and to Network Rail's position. To take a period of

exceptionally high growth, based on very particular factors, extrapolate it

forward for 35 years, and then to suggest that this is a conservative

approach is not justified.

17. Forecasting is inherently uncertain, and in recognition of this DfT's own

Guidance imposes a cap of demand growth in 2026. DfT in its original

evaluation extended this to 2033, because of the long lead in time for HS2.

However, they have now extended the forecast period to 2043 and then

capped the forecast at double the current levels. The DfT has therefore

applied its high growth figures for 35 (2008-2043) years. This leads to a

highly uncertain forecast. The failure to carry out any proper sensitivity

testing exacerbates the inadequacies of the forecast.

18. Even if one were to take a half way point between the growth forecast by the DfT and the work carried out on behalf of 51m, the Benefit Cost Ratio would fall to below 1.5 (excl. WEI), and therefore fails any normal test for Government supported projects.

Rail Industry history of poor forecasting — Chapter 3

19. 51m's concern that the passenger forecasts are seriously over optimistic, is strongly supported by the rail industry's very poor record on forecasting demand for major rail projects. CTRL (now HS1) predicted demand in 2006

of 25 million passengers, whereas the actual traffic is around 9 million. The

Public Accounts Committee in 2006 reported that the DfT had told them

that they had learnt from their mistakes and next time would factor in more

severe downside assumptions, but they have notably failed to do so, on

HS2.

20. Comparisons with HSR internationally are often cited, implying that we are

a long way behind other countries, however there are fundamental

differences between virtually all HSR networks and the UK: elsewhere their

rail journey times were much slower pre-HSR than in the UK, where WCML

is a modern 125mph railway; post-HSR their journey times are all more than

halved; and with the exception of Frankfurt - Cologne the distances are

much longer. The table below sets out the impact of HSR routes on journey

times for a number of international networks.

Distance Pre — HSR Post — HSR

Tokyo — Osaka 515km 6hrs 30mins 3hrs 10mins (now 2hrs 30mins)

Madrid — Seville 472km 6hrs 30mins 2hrs 45 mins (now 2hrs 30 mins)

Paris — Lyon 431km 4hrs lhrs 55 mins

Frankfurt — Cologne 180km 2hrs 20 mins 1hr 2 mins

London — Manchester 296km 2hr 08mins 1hr 13 mins proposed (from 2032)

London — Birmingham 182km 1hr 24 mins 49 mins proposed

21. On the face of it, the Cologne — Frankfurt route appears to be equivalent to

London — Birmingham, at essentially the same distance. However, Cologne —

Frankfurt is part of a much wider network, with almost all trains going to or

coming from somewhere else, as part of longer distance routes such as

Amsterdam — Basel and Dortmund — Munich. The HSR route also gives

proportionately much greater time savings than HS2 to Birmingham, with

Cologne — Frankfurt times of 62 minutes, compared with timings on the

tortuous classic route of 140 minutes. But London — Birmingham is only 84 minutes today, and Virgin Trains say that they could deliver 70 minutes on the existing track.

22. The DfT has placed great reliance on international examples to support its

case, however the evidence does not support this conclusion. The Dutch

HSR has financial problems, the President of SNCF has stated that the

network is decaying as investment is focused on TGV lines, distances

between stations on TGV lines are much greater than in the UK, and in

Germany the classic network is slow and not comparable with the UK

mainlines.

HS2 Service Provision — Chapter 4

23. The DfT passenger forecasts are reliant upon their assumptions about the

number of trains that can be provided, their speed and reliability. However,

their entire case rests on assuming 18tph for the full network, which is a

figure that has never been achieved anywhere in the world for high speed

infrastructure. High speed rail worldwide only has 12 -15 tph maximum.

Industry experts place no reliance on being able to achieve 18tph in the

foreseeable future.

24. In terms of reliability, the DfT assume a very high level of reliability,

although even on the full "Y" scheme many of the high speed trains will be

coming from the classic network and will be using train paths shared with

other users. This raises major doubts over the robustness of the

assumptions about reliability.

25. The entire forecasting exercise is therefore based on untried (indeed un- invented) technology and unjustified assumptions about other train operators.

Modal Shift from Air — Chapter 11

26. The DfT forecast only 6% of HS2 passengers are switching from air. Domestic demand to all London airports has fallen by 26% since 2004 and it is therefore very difficult to reconcile this with DfT predictions of 128% growth to 2043. Journey times from Glasgow/Edinburgh to Paris/Brussels will remain over 6 hours and therefore no modal shift can be assumed.

27. It is interesting to note that even on Madrid-Barcelona, where the high speed rail link reduced journey times from around 6 hours to 2 hrs 40mins hours, there remain 25 flights per day, each way, on the route.

Benefits - Chapter 2

28. The key benefit of HS2 in its economic case is the value of shorter journey

times, which accounts for £18bn of the £44bn benefits. £14bn of this

depends on the assumption that time savings translate into greater

productivity for business travellers. This is because in the economic case the

DfT have assumed that time spent on trains is wasted, and have taken no

account of modern technology which allows business travellers to use train

time productively. This is considered in detail in "51m Economic Case".

29. The DfT seek to rebut this by saying that if one does assume that time on

trains is used productively then that is simply recovered by the benefits of

reducing overcrowding. But this is flawed. The much cheaper alternative

proposals reduce overcrowding more than HS2 (HS2 predicts load factor of

58% in 2043, whereas the Optimised Alternative has about 52% and even

the DfT alternative RP2 has 51%) , and can provide additional capacity

sooner.

30. Given the above concerns, if you undertake a 50% downside sensitivity test on the benefits in the business case (between DfT's and work done for 51m) the BCR falls to less than 1.0 (excl. WEI) for Phase 1 and about 1.2 (excl. WEI) for the Y.

31. Importantly the DfT in the business case has ignored price competition from

the classic network which post HS2 will have much spare capacity. It is

difficult to see why those who are getting the benefit from high speed rail

should not be paying premium fares for those benefits, or to believe that

this will not happen in practice. But the DfT business case rests on there

being no premium fares, and the shortfall being made up by public subsidy. Without this assumption the business case would fall much further because the passenger forecasts would reduce significantly.

Economic Rebalancing and Regeneration — Chapters 3 & 5

32. The DfT now places great emphasis on the desirability of "rebalancing the

economy", and "reshaping the economic geography" of the UK. It is well

established in the academic literature that the benefits of high speed rail

between regional centres and a dominant capital city are likely to accrue

significantly more to the capital than to the regions. Essentially the

argument is that if you provide very good transport links from the hub to

spokes, there is some benefit to spokes but most benefit to the hub. So

regional centres will gain something but most of the gain will fall to London

and SE, as by far and away the strongest areas of the national economy.

Even on the DfT's case 7 out of 10 jobs are created in the South East and

twice as many new trips are generated to, compared with from London.

33. If Government wishes to prioritise rebalancing the economy, and

regenerating the Northern cities, then the way to achieve this is through

significant investment in transport between the northern cities, and within

their travel to work areas. This has been the clear aspiration of those

regions as set out in the Northern Way strategy and transport priorities.

Impacts Carbon — Chapter 6

34. In terms of carbon emissions the DfT's own case is that HS2 will only be

carbon neutral. Given the massive public investment in the scheme, and the

overall contribution of transport to carbon emissions it seems odd that the

Government should support a scheme with so little carbon benefit. HS2 also

generates a very large number of new trips, i.e. people who are not

currently choosing to travel, and only achieves 7% of HS2 passenger shifting

from car use. Emerging Government policy is to encourage people to travel

less, and to prioritise schemes which achieve a reduction in carbon

emissions. HS2 does neither. 35. But in any event the forecast of HS2 being carbon neutral is itself extremely

optimistic. This forecast rests entirely on high assumptions about modal

shift from air see above, and most critically on making the assumption that

airport slots which are freed up by the reduction in domestic flights would

not be re-used. In reality it is quite clear that those slots, particularly at

Heathrow will be filled with long haul flights, which are both more

profitable for the airlines and much more carbon emitting. Aviation growth

is constrained by the number of runways in the SE of England. If HS2 frees

up slots at those airports then the inevitable consequence will be a growth

in carbon emissions.

Impact on Freight — Chapter 7

36. The current Network Rail freight strategy does envisage freight tonnage

growing in the next 30 years with the highest growth in containerised traffic

from the ports of Felixstowe, Southampton and Thames Gateway. The

current Felixstowe — Nuneaton freight upgrade project will take some 20

trains per day off the southern part of the WCML releasing capacity for

freight growth. Other investments are being made in the freight network

including Southampton — West Midlands gauge enhancement.

37. Freight almost exclusively uses the slow lines on WCML, so has little impact

on fast lines services and capacity except when it has to cross the fast lines

on a flat junction or there are short 2 or 3 track sections. This happens at

certain pinch points: south of Nuneaton, Colwich and Stafford Infrastructure

works currently being delivered or proposed in alternatives would in any

event address the pinchpoints for freight.

Impacts on the Classic Network — Chapters 8, 9 8110

38. The HS2 case is based on no investment beyond those already committed

by 2015 on the WCML, MML or ECML, until the completion of HS2, even

though they are predicting major growth on these routes in the intervening

years. This will lead to major overcrowding issues and is an unsustainable

position. Overcrowding currently exists on the commuter route between Northampton/Milton Keynes and London and will not be addressed until 2026 at the earliest when Phase 1 of HS2 is proposed to open.

a) HS2 results in the WCML only having an average load factor of 31%. £9bn has recently been invested in this route to make it the most modern in the UK.

b) There will be capacity and/or frequency reduction to some cities, for

example Coventry, Wolverhampton, Stoke-on-Trent, Leicester,

Chesterfield, Peterborough and Doncaster. These reductions are

included in the business case, because there is an assumed saving of

around £5bn (NPV) in operating costs. Any promises to maintain existing

service levels to these cities would have serious impact on the business

case.

c) As Heathrow Express(HEX) trains to stop at Old Oak Common, all GWML services will also have to stop otherwise capacity on the route will be reduced. This would add approximately 5mins to all journey times to/from the West and Wales.

39. There will be massive disruption throughout the construction period at Euston station, for about 8 years. The scheme involves the reconstruction and lowering of all the existing platforms and major changes to the approach tracks. It is inconceivable that this can be achieved without extensive track closures.

40. The creation of a station at Old Oak Common will have significant impacts

on the operation of the GWML, HEX and Crossrail services. The paucity of

detail on the Old Oak Common proposals make it impossible to predict what

will happen there, but both the Crossrail services and its depot are likely to

suffer major disruption.

Links to Heathrow and HS1 — Chapters 11 & 12

41. The DfT proposal involves linking HS2 to Heathrow and HS1. It is beyond any possible doubt there is no economic case for providing such links, a view held by the rail industry as well — the passenger forecasts are far too low. Further, there are no train paths available for these services in any event.

42. This merely provides an example of how poorly thought out HS2 is, and how proposals for expenditure of fbillions of public funds have not been properly appraised.

Environmental Impacts — Chapter 13

43. HS2 have provided little detail on the environmental costs, benefits and

mitigation (apart from saying there will be some and allocating funding) for

London to Birmingham (Phase 1). No details have been provided for the Y

(Phase 2) and the route has not even been identified, although HS2 have

indicated that this will be divulged at the end of this year after the

consultation has been completed. This is the only opportunity for the

benefits and drawbacks to be understood and considered, before the

principle is fixed. The lack of information makes any valid consultation or

assessment impossible.

44. Any project of this magnitude will inevitably have significant environmental

impacts and HS2 will be no different, indeed its Appraisal of Sustainability

scores all aspects negatively. Due to the lack of information and the fact

that HS2 has not offered any mitigation measure, two authorities south of

Birmingham have undertaken their own initial investigations to reach an

initial understanding of the impacts. Buckinghamshire have major concerns

about impacts upon the AONB, local hydrology, habitats, heritage assets

and the wider landscape. Similarly Hillingdon and South Bucks have

significant concerns with regard to the Colne Valley Park, a vital local

resource.

45. Given that the route goes through four other rural counties, as well as densely populated urban areas, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the number of adverse impacts on environmental assets would be very substantial. 46. It is also important to remember the impact on people's lives, both in terms of noise and disruption, but also the 100s of dwellings to be demolished.

47. HSR has specific noise characteristics compared with classic rail and

although HS2 have focused a lot on noise in their road shows with the noise

booth, it is clear that this does not provide a true reflection of the impacts.

They have provided little detail on the real impacts in the areas either side

of the route. Fundamental to understanding the impact of noise on

dwellings, business, schools, AONB etc is the production of noise contours.

48. For these reasons it is not possible to understand the real environmental costs and benefits of HS2 as little or no information has been provided.

Government Transport and Environmental Policy — Chapter 14 & 15

49. In the most fundamental aspects this proposal appears to be contrary to key parts of Government policy

a) It involves a major subsidy into rail transport at a point in time when the Government is seeking to reduce subsidy to the rail industry.

b) It encourages people to travel more, indeed relies upon them doing so, when Government policy is moving towards encouraging less trips and more use of alternative technology.

c) It involves a relatively small modal shift, when Government transport policy is supposed to be focused on sustainable development.

d) It has neutral or negative carbon impact.

e) It produces highly speculative regeneration benefits and will be far less effective in achieving the policy objective of rebalancing the economy, than would far less expensive regional investments. This is contrary to the policy priorities of the Northern Regions Development Agencies.

f) Although the capital costs of HS2 will fall outside this spending review, £750m is to be spent in this parliament simply on achieving the Hybrid Bill. Conclusions

50. For all these reasons 51m is of the view that the case for the HS2 scheme does not

begin to be made. Not only are there serious doubts over the validity of the HS2

case but there is a real practical and low risk alternative, which can meet the need as

it arises and relatively cheaply. This is not as exciting or high profile as HS2 but far

better value for money. The Committee is asked to request the DfT to undertake

a fundamental reappraisal.

51. "the risk is that transport policy can become the pursuit of icons. Almost invariably such projects — 'grand projects' — develop real momentum, driven by strong lobbying. The momentum can make such projects difficult — and unpopular — to stop, even when the benefit:cost equation does not stack up, or the environmental and landscape

impacts are unacceptable". Sir Rod Eddington — The Transport Study.

May 2011

The documentation to support this submission can be found in the attached chapters at: www.51m.co.uk/select-committee

Further written evidence from 51M (HSR 109A)

McNulty Report

Further to our recent submission to the Committee, the publication on 19 May of “Realising the Potential of GB Rail”1, Sir Roy McNulty’s report into value for money in the rail industry, raises a number of new and important issues in relation to the case for High Speed Rail which we believe the Committee should consider in forming its view.

The study was set up to investigate why the costs of the rail industry in Britain are significantly higher than for comparable European networks. The report confirms that the efficiency gap could be as high as 40%. One of the key conclusions was that an important factor is the lower level of train utilisation in this country, with on average fewer passengers using each train.2 The report therefore recommends that there should be much better use of existing capacity:

“There should be a move away from ‘predict and provide’ to ‘predict, manage and provide’, with a much greater focus on making better use of existing system capacity”3

The study also identified a bias in the planning system towards capital expenditure.4 This is illustrated by the Network Rail “Route Utilisation Strategy” process which captures the plans and aspirations for using key parts of the rail network from existing and potential users. However, rather than prioritising these on the basis of economic value, the process tends to look for physical solutions which enable all the aspirations to be met, in effect, “predict and provide”, an approach which was dropped for the road network some years ago, and has now also been implicitly dropped for airport capacity in the South East.

These issues are brought together in recommendation 6.3.7:

“The Study considers that industry, together with the ORR and the DfT, should review incentives and responsibilities for the efficient management of capacity. There needs to be at least as much focus on train utilisation (the number of passenger km per train km) as there is on track utilisation (the number of train km per main track km). Existing approaches appear to focus much more on track utilisation and the provision of train paths, but whilst that is important, the unit costs of carrying passengers are influenced heavily by

1 http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/strategyfinance/valueformoney/realising-the-potential-of-gb- rail/pdf/realising-the-potential-of-gb-rail-summary.pdf 2 Executive Summary, paragraph 4; also section 2.3.4, figure 2.12 3 Executive Summary, paragraph 23 4 Section 4.4 train utilisation, which does not appear to be a primary focus for any organisation within the present system.”

We believe the approach we advocate through the development of our “Optimised Alternative” is entirely consistent with Sir Roy McNulty’s recommendations. We have identified low risk, low cost approaches which increase capacity on the existing network on an incremental basis as and when it is clear that additional capacity is needed. This is principally achieved through increasing standard class capacity on each train, directly improving train utilisation; our proposals give a potential increase in standard class capacity on the West Coast Main Line of 211% over the 2008 base used by DfT in its evaluation of HS2 – over three times the base capacity. Our approach would also significantly improve the industry’s financial performance.

In contrast, the proposed HS2 project is a clear and dramatic example of the failures that he has identified. Even on DfT’s own optimistic evaluation, the project would have a net cost to the taxpayer of £17bn over 60 years.

June 2011 WrittenevidencefromMikeVernon(HSR110)  ThestrategyforHSRappearstobecoͲdependentuponUKenergypolicyandthisraisesaspecific concernredevelopmentofHS2assetoutintheconsultationpaper/economiccase.  Havingreviewedthetechnicalpapersthereareconcernsthat

ThepublishedcostingsfortheconstructionandrunningofHS2donotfullytakeintoaccountthe impactofthegovernment’spoliciesdesignedtomeettheUK’scarbonemissionsreductiontargets. Inparticular,theydonotincludeanyallowancefortheimpactoftheintroductionoftherecently announcedCarbonPriceFloormeasuresfrom1stApril2013.  Furthermore,itisfeltthatthecomplexityoftherangeofUKandEUmeasuresdesignedto encouragetheintroductionoflowͲcarbongenerationtechnologiesmaymaskamoreserious underlyingproblem.Thisproblemistheuncertaintyaboutthesupplyofelectricityinthemedium termbroughtaboutbythenecessitytoachieveemissionreductiontargets.Achievementofthese targetsislikelytoresultinwidespreadclosuresoffossilfuelledpowerplantsbeforetheendof2015. Thepotentialreductioninsupplyandconsequentincreaseinthepriceofelectricitywouldaffectall aspectsoftheconstructionandrunningofHS2.Itisfeltthatthisuncertaintyaboutelectricitysupply andpriceshouldbetakenintoaccountinthecostingoftheproject.  ThegovernmentiscommittedtofullcompliancewithEUDirective2001/80/ECLimitationof PollutantsDirective.ThisineffectstatesthatunlesstheUK’smajorfossilfuelledpowerplants conformtoEUemissionstandardstheywillhavetoceaseoperating,whichcouldmeanthatby 31/12/201525%ofourlargestfossilfuelledpowerplantswillhavetoshutdown.Thegovernment hasalsostatedthatallbutoneoftheUK’snuclearpowerplants(SizewellB)willbeshutdownby 2025.Thelikelyconsequenceoftheseclosureswouldbeanupwardpressureonelectricityprices, anduntiltheintroductionofsignificantlevelsoflowͲcarbongenerationcapacity,fossilfuelswill continuebeprovidethebulkofUKelectricitygeneration.Thecarbonpricesupportmechanismwill thereforecontinuetoinflateelectricitypricesthroughouttheconstructionperiodforHS2,andthis shouldbefactoredintotheestimatedcostsoftheproject.  Assurances

x Canitbeconfirmedthattherearespecificplansinplaceforgovernmenttoincreasethe supplyofenergyandthereforesupporttheincreaseddemandforpowerarisingfrom investmentinHSR?

x Willrevisedcostestimatesbepublishedinthenearfuturetotakeintoaccounttheeffectsof energypriceincreasesresultingfrom(a)carbontaxincreasesand(b)possiblesupply constraints?

x WhentherisingcostsofenergyarefullyreflectedinthebusinessmodelforHS2,what impactdoesthishaveonticketprices–ortherequirementforadditionalgovernment subsidyͲandthereforetheachievementinthegrowthofpassengernumbersforecastinthe businesscase[whichinturnunderpinsthecaseforHS2]   Keypoints Evidence  By2015,25%ofthelargestfossilfuelplantsareplannedtoclose, EUDirective2001/80/EC aspartoftheUKGovernment’scommitmenttowardsreducing LimitationofPollutants carbonemissions. Directive[replacesDIR  88/609/EEC]   Alsogovernmenthasalsostatedthatallbutoneofournuclear Seeattachment1 powerplants[SizewellBwillbeshutdownby2025][seeattached  listofplantclosures]:andasyettherearenoplansinplaceto replacetheseplants.  TheUKgovernmenthascommittedtoreducingcarbonfootprint HMTreasuryHMRC andhasannouncedtheintroductionofacarbonfloorpricing Document/CarbonFloorPrice policyw.e.f.April2013,whichwillhavetheimpactofincreasing ConsultationͲTheGovernment thepriceofpowerproductionfromfossilfuels Response:March2011pdf]  TransportationwithintheUKingeneralcontributed24%ofall BlueSpaceThinkingLtdApril CO2emissionsin2007. 2010–ReviewofHighspeed  Rail–HS2Proposals ThebusinesscaseforHS2isbasedonthepremiseofincentivising ConsultationDocumentonHS2 asubstantialincreaseingrowthoflongdistancetravelwithin  England–specifically,fromseveralmajorcitiesintoLondonͲ  throughsubsidisedtravelonthenewHSRnetwork.

ThenewsystemwillusesmorepowerthanaconventionalinterͲ HS2TractionEnergyModelling citytrainandsomustincreaseourCO2emissionssignificantly. Report31/12/2009 Thetechnicalreportidentifiesthata3.5minutetimesaving  betweenBirminghamandLondonachievedthroughhigherspeed  addsanadditional23%totheenergycostforthejourney.Soas withotherformsoftransport,theveryhighspeedsproposedin HS2requiredisproportionatelymoreenergyuse.  Theoperatingcostspresentedinthebusinesscaseare“highlevel” Page4s.1.1.5CostandRisk andthetechnicalreportstatesthatmoreworkisrequiredoninͲ ModelTechAnnex0.4 depthcostinganalysis.Nocostescalationshavebeenfactoredin onoriginal12.3billionpoundcostsforLondontoBirmingham route.Allcostsarebasedon2009figures.  

May2011 Written evidence from Henry Law (HSR 111) 1 What are the main arguments either for or against HSR 2 Journey times between cities will be reduced. 3 Additional capacity will be created, including capacity released by transfer of services from existing routes. 4 The case made by the proponents of the route rests primarily on the second argument. However, additional capacity could equally well be created by construction of a new route or routes, including one on a similar alignment to that selected for HS2. This could be substantially achieved by the reinstatement (as 125 mph railway) of routes and tracks removed in the 1960s rationalisations, including the Great Central main line, the Midland direct route to Manchester, and the Midland and other routes where quadruple track was reduced to double track. 5 The costs of constructing, equipping and operating a high speed railway must be very substantially higher than those for a 125 mph railway. Energy consumption doubles for every 40% increase in speed. Higher speeds give rise to higher costs for other reasons. This will include the provision of a fleet of bespoke high speed trains for running on Britain’s classic routes, 6 To reinforce the above point: 250 mph is not optimal for rail transport in the UK. Costs are proportional to speed to the power of x, where x is greater than 2. Thus, the costs of travel at 140 mph are more than double those at 100 mph. These extra costs comprise amongst other elements, energy costs, initial costs of equipment specified for the higher speed of operation, wear and tear, and maintenance. 7 Time savings, on the other hand, are less for each increment of speed increase. Thus a journey of 120 miles takes 2 hours at 60 mph, 90 minutes at 80 mph, 72 minutes at 100 mph and 60 minutes at 120 mph, giving successive time savings of 30 minutes, 18 minutes and 12 minutes respectively. For typical UK distances, speeds much higher than 100 mph achieve diminishing returns 8 The high costs of the service will mean that demand has to be finely tuned, using yield management techniques, resulting in complex fares structure which force people to make their travel plans far in advance and tie their journeys to particular times. This in turn adds to journey time since passengers must allow the best part of an hour for delays on the way to their point of departure. That completely negates most of the time savings achieved by high speed running. From this point of view, a conventional speed walk-on service will give shorter journey times than a high speed railway with an airline-style booking system! 9 How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives 10 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network? 11 All journey start and finish with local journeys. The number of local journeys made is at least an order of magnitude greater than the number of inter-urban journeys. Investment must be balanced between the different needs. HS2 could be harmful to this balance by consuming too much of the available resources. 12 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? 13 Unless additional funding is set aside, the classic network could be starved of funds. Moreover, there is a risk that building of the line and rolling stock could consume an excessive share of the physical engineering resources and personnel available for rail construction in the UK. 14 What are the implications for domestic aviation? 15 In that most inter-urban journeys are not city-centre to city-centre, for trips starting and finishing within the catchment areas of airports, especially local ones, HS2 may not be as attractive as expected. 16 Business case 17 How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network? 18 The best measure of the external economic value of infrastructure is aggregate change in land value attributable to the project. There is a need to refine the methodology so that this can be more accurately forecast. 19 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? 20 This was comprehensively explored in the report by W S Atkins. However, that report over-estimated the difficulties of running longer trains on the WCML, referring to the need for platform lengthening. This problem could be significantly alleviated by the development of an improved system of selective door opening. (SDO) to facilitate the stopping of long trains at stations with short platforms. 21 As regards a new conventional line, the option that needs to be explored is the reinstatement of the Old Oak Common to Northolt route, the Great Central main line and cross-connections including Ashendon-Grendon Underwood, the Calvert spurs and the east-west route between at least Oxford and Bedford, reinstatement of four tracking of the Midland route from London to Trent Junction, and reinstatement of the Midland Peak Forest direct route to Manchester via Matlock and Buxton, all as 100 mph – 125 mph railway. 22 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? 23 Complex yield management schemes are unpopular. High fares drive people onto alternative modes of transport. 24 Economic rebalancing and equity 25 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? 26 HS2 is as likely to promote long distance commuting and further centralisation to London as it is to promote regional economic regeneration. A strategy more certain to bridge the north-south economic divide would be to adjust the tax system so that it was related to ability to pay, where this is determined by geographical advantage and disadvantage – in effect creating “tax havens” where they are most needed and raising a greater share of public revenue from those areas most able to bear the burden. This would apply the same principle as the Domesday survey. 27 To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? 28 This question lies at the crux of the matter. There is a need for connectivity both at local and national scales. 29 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR? 30 The benefits of fixed infrastructure are ultimately capitalised into land values. The benefits go to whoever owns the land. This was demonstrated with the construction of the Jubilee Line Extension in London, which resulted in a land value uplift of three times the cost of building the line. 31 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? 32 By a substantial replacement of existing taxes by a charge on the site rental value of land. This is the policy known as land value taxation (LVT). In the absence of this tax, the benefits will be creamed-off through higher rents and higher land prices, including prices of domestic property. Any other means of recovering the benefits will be arbitrary and unfair. 33 Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? 34 No. Conditions are likely to be imposed resulting in additional costs. 35 Impact 36 What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? 37 It is worth noting again that energy consumption doubles for every 40% increase in speed. In addition, the embodied energy of the structure and rolling stock must be taken into account. 38 CONCLUSION 39 The fundamental question that must be asked is whether, given a pot of money sufficient to pay for HS2, and a decision to spend it on public transport infrastructure, whether HS2 is the best way to spend that pot, as against other options such as a 125 mph railway, urban light rail, or improvements to urban bus travel, and beyond this, on improvements in facilities for cyclists and pedestrians in cities. 16 May 2011 Written evidence from ASLEF (HSR 112)

1. The Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) is

the UK’s largest train driver’s union representing approximately 18,000

members in train operating companies and freight companies as well as

London Underground and light rail systems. The union has 130 years

knowledge and experience of the railways.

2. ASLEF welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this Transport Select

Committee Inquiry into High Speed Rail. As the union representing the UK’s

only high speed train drivers’ on Eurostar and HS1 we believe we are well

placed to comment on this proposed infrastructure development.

3. Investment in the UK’s infrastructure, particularly rail, is crucial to reducing

the deficit and boosting economic growth. A key objective of that investment

in the railways must be to cultivate a modal shift from air to rail and from car

to train along in tandem with the development of a high speed rail network in

line with Coalition’s Programme for Government commitment to make the

transport sector greener, more sustainable and reduce carbon dioxide

emissions. An increase in rail capacity is strongly linked to a decrease in car

journeys undertaken with the result that there is less carbon emissions.

Decisions must therefore be determined by what will best deliver these

outcomes. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR?

4. ASLEF believes that the development of a high speed rail network is vital to

the long term prosperity of the UK and notes that British rail network is

already running at capacity. Over the past few years rail use has been at

record highs with more distance being travelled by rail than any other era in

peacetime. We are travelling 10 billion miles a year more than we did just a

decade a go. Projections quoted by the McNulty review team suggest that

the rail industry has the potential to double its traffic by 2030. In addition the

UK is highly unlikely to build any more motorways in the near future so the

construction of a high speed rail network is therefore the only viable solution

to the capacity challenge.

5. The growth on the main two north to south rail routes in the UK has also

witnessed an extraordinarily upward trajectory. Between 2008-2009 and

2009-2010 the West Coast Mainline increased the number of passenger

journey’s carried by 15.8% and passenger kilometres by 18%.

6. The East Coast Main line is one of the busiest routes on the rail network yet

there is currently insufficient capacity on parts of the line to deal with the

existing requirements of passenger and freight services notwithstanding

future growth requirements. 7. The Committee will know Network Rail’s West Coast Route Utilisation

Strategy published in December 2010 explained that “the Line is nearly full

to capacity. The market for travel between London and Manchester is

expected to grow at the fastest rate, with passenger demand expected to

increase by as much as 61 per cent.” It also states that “this RUS therefore

supports the development and implementation of a high speed network

initially between London and the West Midlands, but also to Manchester and

beyond. We believe that this is the best way to free up capacity on the West

Coast Main Line and are delighted the Government is committed to the

project.”

How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

8. This Government has sought to become the greenest Britain has seen.

Therefore not only must this been seen in the context of improving inter-

urban connectivity, but within the scope of carbon reduction through

reduced car journeys and flights. The Government has a legal commitment

to reduce CO2 emissions by 34% by 2020 and 80% by 2050.Transport is

the fastest growing polluter in the UK. However rail emits just 2% of these

emissions whilst road is responsible for 19% of all emissions and 55% of

transport emissions. Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities?

9. It is essential that any funds spent on a high speed network are ring fenced

and should not detract from the ongoing funding of the remaining network. It

is thus essential that the High Speed rail builds capacity along with other

areas of the network rather than simply moving it.

What are the implications for domestic aviation?

10. By linking to Heathrow airport, domestic connecting flights which use

Heathrow as a main hub for international journeys will be substantially

reduced. It is important to remember that travel by HSR produces one-

quarter the emissions of an equivalent trip by air, taking into account the

average loadings typically achieved on each mode.

Business case

What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line?

11. High speed lines tend to promote more growth than conventional lines.

Currently rail only enjoys a 15% market share in journeys between London

and Scotland. The Eurostar demonstrates the popularity of high speed rail

as an alternative to air travel with around an 80% share of London to Paris

travellers. What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price?

12. ASLEF believes that for environmental reasons and likely road congestion

projections we must look at increasing demand and capacity on rail.

Reducing demand in lieu of investment in capacity is simply not an option.

HSR can deliver modal shift from carbon-intensive car and air travel by

dramatically speeding up journey times for medium and long-distance

journeys. In the future, the carbon savings of HSR will be as great if not

better, given that it operates on electric traction and will therefore benefit

from future de-carbonisation of the electricity supply. This is likely to be the

case even if a switch is made to electric cars and if aviation becomes

considerably more efficient.

The strategic route

The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations? Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions?

13. ASLEF believes that it makes no sense to have a high speed network in the

United Kingdom that does not go to Edinburgh or Glasgow. These are two

major cities in the UK and the benefit of high speed travel and the shortening of journey times would be enormous. This is especially true

when you consider that rail only enjoys a 15% market share in journeys

between London and Scotland whereas the Eurostar now has four fifths of

London to Paris travelers. Paris-Lille, Osaka-Tokyo and Cologne-Frankfurt

routes are all about 120 km long, which is quite similar to the first part of

high-speed rail that is planned (i.e. the line to Birmingham).

14. Research already carried out by ARUP and Volterra had shown that a ‘Y-

shaped’ network travelling from London to Birmingham, where it would split

with one arm of the ‘Y’ heading to Yorkshire, could provide between £1.5bn

and £3bn of productivity benefits to the economy, in addition to transport

benefits of around £29bn.

ARUP’s new research estimates that linking the Sheffield City Region the

Leeds City Region, and the “Three Cities” of Derby, Nottingham and

Leicester as part of a national high speed rail network would connect an

area of 6.7 million people and 3 million jobs. Existing connections to the

Tees Valley and Tyne and Wear City Regions would provide access to a

further 2.2 million people and 0.9 million jobs.

This route to the East of the Pennines would provide an estimated £60

billion in standard transport benefits and a further £2.3 billion of productivity benefits. Its Benefit to Cost Ratio would be 5.61, compared with 2.58 for the

route to Manchester.

A direct route to the Leeds City Region, via the East Midlands and Sheffield,

would have greater economic benefits than the a less direct route to Leeds

via Manchester. It would have a higher Benefit to Cost Ratio of 2.46

compared to only 1.88 for the less direct route, deliver far greater

productivity benefits - £2.3 billion compared to £0.4 billion - and result in far

faster journey times to Leeds, York and the North East.

The scheme will create in the region of 40,000 jobs and generate economic

benefits of around £43 billion.

Impact

What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network? How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?

15. Examples of the benefits of High Speed rail are clear when

considering the Eurostar and the high speed line between Madrid and

Barcelona. Eurostar now has about an 80% share of London to Paris travellers. In

Spain, since the opening of the new high speed service in 2008, 50% of

passengers now use the train between Madrid and Barcelona.

The EU is currently exploring proposals to reduce carbon dioxide

emissions from transport by 60% over the next 40 years by replacing short

haul flights with high speed rail.

According to the EU, Heathrow's congestion problems could be eased by

cutting domestic and European flights, while demand for new runways

could be suppressed by building new rail networks. The EU transport

commissioner, Siim Kallas, has announced a series of green transport

goals. He explains "If we are successful in creating new railways they can

take over short-haul airline connections. It makes it easier for the runway

issue."

A new high speed line could have a significantly positive effect for Rail

Freight by relieving capacity on the East Coast and West Coast Mainlines

for the use of freight services.

Conclusion

16. ASLEF would again point out that the development of a high speed rail

network is crucial to the economic and social future of Britain. It is vital we invest in our rail infrastructure to encourage more of a modal shift from

unsustainable domestic aviation and our congested roads.

17. High speed rail is the only viable solution to the capacity challenges we face

on a rail network whose traffic is projected to double by 2030.

16th May 2011 Evidence from the Leeds and North Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce (HSR 113)

Introduction This is the Leeds and North Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce response to the Transport Select Committee’s call for evidence on high speed rail. Leeds, York & North Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce welcomes the opportunity to submit comments about High Speed Rail to the Parliamentary committee. The Chamber is one of the largest in the country and represents around 2,500 businesses of all sizes and from all sectors. The Chamber firmly believes that an efficient and effective transport system is essential for a successful and sustainable economy. The Chamber sees high speed rail as a vital component in an integrated transport strategy that will help this region and the north compete even more successfully with areas both within and outside the United Kingdom. The Leeds and North Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce have contributed to the work of the High Speed Rail Eastern Network Partnership. The Partnership has commissioned Arup (the leading global transport and development consultancy) and Volterra (a leading economic consultancy) to analyse the economic benefits of the eastern route of the national Y-shaped high speed rail network. This evidence draws on the Arup-Volterra reasearch.

1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? The Leeds and North Yorkshire Chamber Commerce believe the main arguments for high speed rail are the economic benefits that will result from faster rail journey times and the additional rail capacity that will be created. However to secure these economic benefits the network needs to be planned and constructed in the right way. In particular the eastern route should be built at the earliest opportunity. This route will provide access to the East Midlands, the Sheffield City Region, Leeds and to the East Coast Main Line near York to allow high speed trains to access York and the North East. We believe that high-speed rail is essential if the Government is to rebalance the economy by accelerating the growth of towns and cities in the north of England. High speed rail will connect Yorkshire's businesses with the Midlands, London, and Europe and further afield, via the link to Heathrow, improving the competitiveness and productivity of the region. Investment in infrastructure is vital for us to remain a competitive economy. According to the Arup-Volterra research, the total wider economic impacts of the eastern route of the proposed national high speed rail network are estimated to be £4.2bn over a 60-year appraisal period. These comprise productivity benefits (of bringing businesses closer together) of £2.6bn, imperfect competition benefits of £0.8bn and economic benefits of releasing capacity on existing rail routes of £0.8bn. These benefits are additional to the benefits from reduced journey times of rail passengers (conventional transport benefits), which have been estimated by HS2 to be £23.1bn for the entire Y-shaped network north of the West Midlands. We need to build the eastern route as soon as possible, in advance of, or at least at the same time as the western route. The economic benefits compared to the costs of the eastern route are significantly higher than the western route. In terms of benefits to rail users, the Benefit to Cost ratio of the eastern section of the high speed network north of the West Midlands is 5.6, compared with 2.6 of the western section. The Arup-Volterra research shows that the productivity benefits of bringing businesses closer together of the eastern part of the network (£2.6bn) are around 20% higher than those for the western part (£2.1bn). Once the national high speed rail network is completed it will be important to ensure that there will be at least six high speed trains to / from London on the eastern part of the network. According to the Arup-Volterra research, most (70%) of the productivity benefits of the eastern route are created by the faster journeys to London. It is vital that there are at least six trains per an hour to / from London on the eastern route of the Y shaped network. We need to ensure the eastern part of the high speed network is planned in the right way to maximise the potential for bringing city regions outside London close together. A significant proportion (30%) of productivity benefits from the eastern route will also result from high speed rail bringing city regions outside London closer together. The national high speed rail network has the potential, if it is planned in the right way, to transform the connectivity between main cities outside London. Some of the existing rail links between these cities are poor. For example it now takes almost two hours to travel by rail between Leeds and Nottingham, two of the largest cities in England, which are only 70 miles apart. In addition to the high speed rail services to / from London, there will also be high speed services between Birmingham, the East Midlands, Yorkshire and the North East. The economic benefits of high speed rail will be maximised if it is planned and delivered in the right way and integrated with a strategy for improving rail services on existing lines. High speed rail is essential, but it is not a panacea. It is vital that upgrades be made to existing rail links. Electrification and new rolling stock with expanded capacity must be introduced on regional connections. Upgrades to the East Coast Main Line are a priority. Improvements are needed to existing rail routes in the short to medium term to deliver benefits in advance of completion of the full national high speed rail network (which could take over 20 years). Capacity released on existing rail routes by high speed rail should be used to retain existing long distance inter-urban rail services to the Eastern Network Partnership area, not for additional London commuter services. There should be more regular services to London from places in the Eastern Network Partnership area that do not have them currently. There must also be improvements to local and regional transport networks including rail and light rail services that connect with the high speed rail stations. This will spread the benefits of high speed rail as well as delivering substantial economic benefits in its own right. To maximise its economic benefits and integration with the wider rail network, high speed rail should serve city centre stations where feasible. The economic benefits will be increased if high speed rail is planned in conjunction with regeneration and development projects in the areas next to the high speed rail stations. 2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network?

2.2 Focusing on rail, what would be the implications of expenditure on HSR on funding for the ‘classic’ network, for example in relation to investment to increase track and rolling stock capacity in and around major cities? We believe that high speed rail is not an alternative to investment in local and regional transport networks, and the strategic road networks. In the context of current public spending constraints it is important to remember that major capital spending on High Speed Rail is not planned to start for several years, and will be phased over time. It is possible to deliver investment in transformational national transport projects, as well as a series of other economically important transport schemes. For example, as well as investing in a range of local transport projects and road schemes, the Government is also currently (at a time of spending constraints) investing in Crossrail. Once Crossrail is complete, the next major national transport project should be high speed rail. Evidence from city region studies shows that typically 70-80% of all journeys are within city regions. Therefore, more effective integrated city region transport networks and systems will support agglomeration and economic growth, and contribute towards the Government’s low carbon agenda. Better city region transport networks can help maximise and spread the benefits of high speed rail, by improving access to the high speed rail stations. Improvements to existing lines (including electrification, capacity improvements, and new rolling stock) would deliver benefits in the short-to-medium term. This will be important for places such as Yorkshire which may have to wait for 20-30 years for the full high speed rail network to be completed. These improvements would also help increase the benefits of capacity release on existing rail lines once the high speed network is completed.

2.3 What are the implications for domestic aviation? We believe that the Leeds City Region is at an economic disadvantage in terms of its international connectivity. Leeds Bradford Airport is an under exploited asset, with scope to develop its route network. However, improvements are needed to its connections to the city region transport network in order to strengthen is catchment. Our businesses also require good access to London airports, particularly to Heathrow which is a global hub. Leeds Bradford Airport no longer has flights to Heathrow, and is losing its flights to Gatwick. The proposed high speed rail network will transform our access to Heathrow via the proposed Crossrail interchange in West London. 3. Business case

3.1 How robust are the assumptions and methodology – for example, on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions (eg about the value of time) and the impact of lost revenue on the ‘classic’ network? We believe that the Government’s proposals for high speed rail are underpinned by robust economic analysis. Indeed in some respects the analysis of the economic benefits is conservative. For instance, the existing “Wider Economic Impacts” methodology is best suited to assessing the benefits of commuter rail schemes to successful business centres (it was designed to help make the case for Crossrail) and does not capture all the transformational benefits of high speed rail.

3.2 What would be the pros and cons of resolving capacity issues in other ways, for example by upgrading the West Coast Main Line or building a new conventional line? It is important there are capacity and speed improvements to existing long distance rail routes, particularly the East Coast Main Line, and also to the Midland Main Line. These schemes have a strong business case, would deliver substantial benefits over the short-to-medium term. However improvements to existing lines would not provide the step change in north-south rail capacity that will be needed over the medium to longer term. The experience of the West Coast Main Line upgrade demonstrates the potential pitfalls – disruption and cost over-runs – of seeking to deliver overly ambitious upgrades of existing routes.

3.3 What would be the pros and cons of alternative means of managing demand for rail travel, for example by price? We believe that managing demand by price will suppress overall demand, which will constrain our economy. The cost of a Leeds to London Standard Class Anytime ticket is already £239.

3.4 What lessons should the Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget? High Speed One (the Channel Tunnel Rail Link) was built on time and on budget, despite it being a very challenging scheme in engineering terms.

4. The strategic route

4.1 The proposed route to the West Midlands has stations at Euston, Old Oak Common, Birmingham International and Birmingham Curzon Street. Are these the best possible locations? What criteria should be used to assess the case for more (or fewer) intermediate stations?

No response to this question.

4.2. Which cities should be served by an eventual high speed network? Is the proposed Y configuration the right choice? The proposed Y shaped network is the right option. Previous work undertaken by Arup and Volterra on behalf of the Leeds and Sheffield City Regions demonstrated that the Y shaped network would deliver greater economic benefits than the alternatives. As well as providing fast access to London the high speed network should also be configured to support links between cities outside London. In particular there is an opportunity to transform rail journey times between the Leeds City Region, the Sheffield City Region and the main cities of the East Midlands. This corridor has a population of over 6 million and over 3 million jobs. Its main cities are close together geographically, but currently function as separate economies as a result of poor transport links. For example it takes almost 2 hours to travel by rail the 70 miles between Leeds, Sheffield and Nottingham, generating an average journey time of 36 mph on a service which links three of the largest cities in England.

4.3. Is the Government correct to build the network in stages, moving from London northwards? The Government is right to build the network in stages, but the eastern route between the West Midlands and Yorkshire should be built as soon as possible and in advance, or at the very least, at the same time as the western route to Manchester. It should also be noted that the North West will benefit from the first stage of the HS2 networks because it will include a link to enable high speed trains to run north of the West Midlands on the West Coast Main Line.

4.4. The Government proposes a link to HS1 as part of Phase 1 but a direct link to Heathrow only as part of Phase 2. Are those the right decisions? Yes. The proposed Crossrail interchange in West London will provide easy and fast connections from HS2 to Heathrow. A direct link to Heathrow could lead to capacity constraints on the core London to West Midlands section of HS2. We would not support a direct HS2 link to Heathrow if it resulted in a service pattern of less than six central London high speed services and hour to / from the eastern route of the Y shaped network.

5. Economic rebalancing and equity 5.1 What evidence is there that HSR will promote economic regeneration and help bridge the north-south economic divide? The work of HS2, and the work undertaken by Arup and Volterra, shows that high speed rail will deliver substantial economic benefits to the places it serves. A national high speed rail network, if planned and delivered in the right way, can help narrow the north-south divide in economic performance.

5.2. To what extent should the shape of the network be influenced by the desirability of supporting local and regional regeneration? There is a need to plan the high speed network in the right way, and in conjunction with wider land-use and regeneration plans and investments, in order to maximise the economic benefits. High Speed 1 is a case in point. It has unlocked development areas around the new stations at Kings Cross-St Pancras, Stratford City (location for the London Olympics), Ebbsfleet, and Ashford. In these four locations alone around 50,000 new homes and over 100,000 jobs will be created.

5.2 Which locations and socio-economic groups will benefit from HSR?

5.4 How should the Government ensure that all major beneficiaries of HSR (including local authorities and business interests) make an appropriate financial contribution and bear risks appropriately? Should the Government seek support from the EU’s TEN-T programme? No response to these questions.

6. Impact

1. What will be the overall impact of HSR on UK carbon emissions? How much modal shift from aviation and roads would be needed for HSR to reduce carbon? 2. Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case? 3. What would be the impact on freight services on the ‘classic’ network? 4. How much disruption will be there to services on the ‘classic’ network during construction, particularly during the rebuilding of Euston?

No response to these questions.

That concludes the submission from the Leeds, York & North Yorkshire Chamber of Commerce. As mentioned the Chamber is supportive of high speed rail and will look to continue its support over the coming years. May 2011 WrittenevidencefromGreaterManchesterCombinedAuthority(HSR114)    INTRODUCTION  GreaterManchesterwelcomestheopportunitytocontributetotheCommitteeinquiryinto thestrategiccaseforaproposedhighspeedrailnetwork.Transportisrecognisedasa prioritybytheGMCAandLEPwhichhaveidentifiedtheneedto“significantlyimprove connectivityintoandwithinthecityregion”asastrategicobjective.Itwasinrecognitionof thisthattheGreaterManchesterTransportFund(GMTF)wasdeveloped,aninnovative £1.5bnpackageofschemesdevelopedandprioritisedonthebasisoftheircontributionto regionalproductivitythroughameasureofincreaseinGVAper£ofwholelifecostwhilst alsodemonstratingpositivebenefitsintermsofenvironmentalandsocialoutcomes. Fundedbyacombinationoflocal,regionalandnationalfundingstreams,theprioritisedlist ofschemesaloneisforecasttoincreaseemploymentinthecityregionby20,000andlead toaGVAincreaseof£1.3bnperannumby2021.Weexpressourstrongsupportinfavourof theprinciplesofdevelopingahighspeednetwork,whichwillincreasebothcapacityand interͲurbanconnectivitybetweenManchesterandtheothercitiesonthelineaswellas releasingcapacityontheexistingGreaterManchesterrailnetwork.  1. WHATARETHEMAINARGUMENTSEITHERFORORAGAINSTHSR?  Fromourperspective,theprimaryargumentsinfavouroftheHSRprogrammecentreon theincreasesininterͲurbanconnectivityandtheknockͲoncapacityimprovementstothe ‘classic’network.  Capacity  Despite£9bnofupgrades,theWestCoastMainlineissettoagainexceedcapacitybymidͲ 2020.TheWestCoastistheonlydirectlinkbetweenManchesterandLondon,andissetto seepassengerdemandgrowbyasmuchas61%by2025accordingtotheWestCoastRUS. Furtherincrementalupgradestothelinewouldbeshortsightedwhensetagainstthe opportunitytodevelopanewdedicatedhighͲspeedinterͲurbannetwork.  Increasingcapacitywillnotjustbenefitlongdistancepassengers,itwillfreeupcapacityon theexistingnetwork.Atpresent13%oftrainsarrivinginManchesterduringthe3hour morningpeakareovercrowded.Thisfigureissettorisetoover25%by2025.Theextra capacityHSRwillcreatewouldallowincreasedfrequenciestolocaldestinationsandnew servicestomorelocationsbenefitinglocalcommuters,leisuretravellersandfreight services.  InterͲurbanconnectivity

  CitieslikeManchesterarethedriversofournation’seconomy,withaneconomicbase centredonnewknowledgeͲintensiveandhighͲtechindustrieswhichservelocal,regional andinternationalmarkets.Thecontinuedsuccessfulexpansionoftheseindustriesis dependentonhighqualityintercitylinks,allowingfirmstogainagglomerationbenefitsby accessingnewandmorediversifiedmarketsthroughouttheUKandEurope.Withjourney timesatovertwohourstoLondonandoveroneandahalfhourstoBirmingham(whichare unimpressivewhencomparedtoourEuropeancompetitors)currentinterͲurban connectivityisconstrainingManchester’seconomicgrowth.TheManchesterIndependent EconomicReviewsuggeststhatGreaterManchester,givenitsscaleandrangeofassets,is thebestplacedcityintheUKtoincreaseitsproductivityandlongtermgrowthandtoactas acomplementarygrowthpoletoLondonandtheSouthEast,supportingtheobjectiveof theCoalitionAgreementtorebalancetheeconomygeographically.  2. HOWDOESHSRFITWITHTHEGOVERNMENT’STRANSPORTPOLICYOBJECTIVES?  2.1HSRisdesignedtoimproveinterͲurbanconnectivity.Howdoesthatobjectivecomparein importancetoothertransportpolicyobjectivesandspendingprogrammes,including thoseforthestrategicroadnetwork?  TheHSRprogrammematchestheGovernment’svisionforsustainable,balancedgrowth acrossthewholeoftheUnitedKingdom,byaddressingtheeconomicNorthͲSouth imbalancewhichcoststheUKeconomy£38bnp.ainGDP.HSRwillimproveinterͲcity connectivity,which,whencombinedwithproposalsfortheNorthernHub,willgenerate economicbenefitsacrossthe10millionNorthernconurbation.  HSRalsomeetstheGovernment’stransportpolicyobjectivesforanintegratedtransport networkbyencouragingamodalshifttomorecarbonefficient,environmentallysustainable modes.Existingroadcapacitycannotmeettheforecastincreasesindemand,andbuilding newroadspaceisexpensive,environmentallyunsustainableandpoliticallycontentious. PreviousGovernmentplanstoincreasecapacityontheM6bydevelopinganewparallel runningmotorwaybetweenjunctions11Ͳ19wereabandonedlessthan2yearsaftertheir proposal.HSR,coupledwithinvestmentintheexistingrailnetworkinGreaterManchester viatheNorthernHub,progressiveelectrificationandpotentialTramͲTrainschemeswill complementthedevelopmentofalowcarbonsustainabletransportsysteminManchester.  TheHSRprogrammematchesGovernmentspendingpolicyinachievingvalueformoneyin transportinvestment.ThealternativestoHS2generatemuchlowercostbenefitsand cruciallydon’tprovidethelongtermcapacityincreasesneeded.RailPackage2a(RP2a), whichisbyfarthebestperformingofthealternativeschemestoHS2hasacomparableBCR butonlyincreasescapacityby54%ascomparedtothe200%riseincapacityHS2would create.(HighSpeedRailCommandPaper,DfT,March2010) 

  2.2 Focusingonrail,whatwouldbetheimplicationsofexpenditureonHSRonfundingforthe ‘classic’network,forexampleinrelationtoinvestmenttoincreasetrackandrollingstock capacityinandaroundmajorcities?  TheHSRprogrammeshouldnotbeviewedasanalternateapproachtoinvestmentonthe existingnetwork,butasanaddition.TheeffectivenessoftheHSRprogrammeisreliant upontheefficientrunningoftheconventionalnetworktoaidonwardconnectivity.Itis criticalthatHSRstationsandinfrastructurearewellintegratedintoexistinglocalrailand tramnetworks,astheimmediateareasurroundingtheHSRstationisunlikelytobethe ultimateoriginordestinationofanyjourney.Investmentmustbemadewherenecessaryto existingfacilitiesornewconnectionscreatedtoallowpassengerstoquicklytransfertoand fromtheirultimateoriginanddestination.  ThesuccessofHSRinManchesterandthewiderNorthernregionwillbereliantupon investmentintheNorthernHubscheme,whichwillenhanceinterͲurbanconnectivityinthe North,complimentingtheHSRproposal.MoneymustbemadeavailableforNetworkRailto committothisprogramme(whichgeneratesaBCRof4:1)incontrolperiod5inorderfor thefullsocialandeconomicbenefitsofHS2toberealisedintheNorthWest.  Currentinvestmentcommitmentsallocateinexcessof£1bnp.atoCrossrail,ascheme whichwillbecompleteby2017;thesametimethatinvestmentinhighspeedrailwillneed tocommence.ThisfundingshouldbeallocatedtotheHSRprojecttoreduceadditional fundingrequirementsandprotectfundingfortheconventionalrailnetwork,andother generaltransportspending.  2.3 Whataretheimplicationsfordomesticaviation?  Acombinationofreducedjourneytimes,improvedqualityandincreasedservicefrequency hasbeenproventoinducemodalshiftfromcompetitormodestorail.The2008 introductionoftheVirginPendolinoservicebetweenManchesterandLondon,which reducedjourneytimesfrom2hours30to2hours8minutes,resultedinrail’smarketshare ontheManchesterͲLondoncorridorincreasingfrom38%in2003to80%in2010.  FigurespublishedbyTheAssociationofTrainOperatingCompanies(ATOC)showthatrail’s marketshareonthe10mostpopulardomesticairroutesin2010grewto44%Ͳupfrom 29%in2006.Whilstthisgrowthisimpressive,itshowsthatthemajorityoftripsonthese routesisstillundertakenbyairanddemonstratesthepotentialforfuturemodalshifttorail iffurtherreductionsinjourneytimearebroughtaboutbyHSR.InEurope,theintroduction ofaHSRlinebetweenMadridandBarcelonasawthemarketshareforairtravelfallfrom 84%Ͳ52%,andisexpectedtodroptojust30%inthefuture.Wewouldexpectsimilarmodel shiftfromdomesticaviationtooccurintheUKwiththeintroductionofafullHSRnetwork. 

  WewelcometheGovernment’sinterestinlinkingAirportstotheHSRnetworkandHS2 Ltd’sexaminationofManchesterAirportasapotentialparkwaystationservingGreater ManchesterandtheNorthWest.Wearekeenthatthisoptionisdevelopedfurtherinorder thatthemaximumnumberofpeoplepossibleisabletoaccessthenetworkwithoutthe needtoenterthecentreofManchester.  3. BUSINESSCASE  3.1 Howrobustaretheassumptionsandmethodology–forexample,onpassengerforecasts, modalshifts,farelevels,schemecosts,economicassumptions(egaboutthevalueof time)andtheimpactoflostrevenueonthe‘classic’network?  TheGovernmenthasbeencomprehensiveinitsmethodologyofthecostsandbenefitsofa HSRnetwork,whichhasbeendevelopedonanunderstandablycautiousbasis.The GovernmenthasgonetogreatlengthstorevisetheirBCRassumptionsinlinewithupdated passengerdemandfigures,basedonlowergrowthlevelsasaresultoftheprojectedlower rateofgrowthofGDP.  CostestimatesarebasedontheprojectbeingsolelyGovernmentfunded,yettheSecretary ofStatehasexpressedhisexpectationthatmajorbeneficiariesofHSRintheprivatesector willmakefinancialcontribution.Privatesectorinvestment,whichisn’ttakenintoaccountin thebusinesscasewouldbothmaketheschememoreattractiveandreducecoststo Government.PrecedentforpublicprivatepartnershipfundingisevidentfromtheCrossrail Billwhichincludedtheuseofasupplementarybusinessratetolevyfundsfromtheprivate sectortotalling£150million.  3.2 Whatwouldbetheprosandconsofresolvingcapacityissuesinotherways,forexample byupgradingtheWestCoastMainLineorbuildinganewconventionalline?  Britaincannotcontinuetorelyonincrementalimprovementstoourexistingrail infrastructure.TheWestCoastMainlineisaVictorianrailwaythathasserveduswellinthe 19thand20thcenturies,butisnotabletocopewiththedemandsofthecurrentcentury. ThemainalternativetoHSR;RailPackage2a;isanupgradeofexistinglinesandthe experienceoftheearlierversionofthisapproach(theWestCoastRouteModernisation project)isrelevant.Itscostswereestimatedat£2.1bn.Thefinalcostwas£9bnandit entailedadecadeofonͲlineworks,whichwashugelydisruptivetorailusers.Thereismuch greaterriskanduncertaintyaroundcostestimatestoupgradesofexistinglinesthanthose madefornewͲbuild.Upgradestypicallytakelongerthanoriginallyprogrammedtoo(note HS1wasconstructedontime,andtobudget,unliketheWestCoastRouteModernisation).  Proponentsofthealternativesmustalsotakeintoaccountasbesttheycanwhatwillhave beenachieveduponcompletion.InthecaseofRP2a,asituationwillhavebeencreatedin whichanyfurthersimilardevelopmentsdesignedessentiallytocreateadditionalcapacity

  willhaveincreasinglypoorbenefitcostperformanceandtheGovernmentofthedaywill findthemselvesbelatedlyneededtoconstructahighspeedlineafterall.  3.3Whatwouldbetheprosandconsofalternativemeansofmanagingdemandforrail travel,forexamplebyprice?  Managingdemandbywayofpricingrailoutofpassengers’economicmeanscontradicts Governmentpolicyoncreatingasustainableandintegratedtransportnetwork.Long distancedomestictravellerswillbeforcedintousingairtravel,whichisunsustainableon carbongroundsandgiventhatHSRistheGovernment’salternativetobuildinganew runwayatHeathrow.Similarlyforcingmediumdistancetravellersontothealready saturatedmotorwaynetworkwillstifleeconomicgrowth,whilstalsogeneratingsignificant negativeenvironmentalimpacts.  3.4 WhatlessonsshouldtheGovernmentlearnfromothermajortransportprojectstoensure thatanynewhighspeedlinesarebuiltontimeandtobudget?  FromManchester’sperspective,weurgetheGovernmenttoensurethatthereisnorepeat ofthelackoflongtermstrategicplanningthatresultedinthe‘WhiteElephant’£135m WaterlooInternationalStationonlybeingoperationalfor13years.Itisforthisreasonthat webelieveitisnecessarytodevelopproposalsforthewholeofthe“Y”networknow, ratherthantobreakitdownintotwophases.ItisnotedthatwhilstHS2Ltd’sworkonthe Birmingham–ManchesterlinebeganonlysevenmonthsaftertheirworkontheLondon– Birminghamlineconcluded,itispredictedtoopensevenyearsafterthefirstphase.Itis GreaterManchester’sstrongbeliefthatthemaximumeconomicbenefitswillonlybe capturedifthefullnetworkispromotedasasinglewholeandthatParliamentshould scrutinisetheproposalforthefull“Y”networkratherthanastwoparts.  4.THESTRATEGICROUTE  4.1 TheproposedroutetotheWestMidlandshasstationsatEuston,OldOakCommon, BirminghamInternationalandBirminghamCurzonStreet.Arethesethebestpossible locations?Whatcriteriashouldbeusedtoassessthecaseformore(orfewer)intermediate stations?  WehavenoviewontheproposedlineofroutefromLondontotheWestMidlandsbut supporttheproposedstationsatEuston,andOldOakCommonwhichwillprovideaccessto agreaterproportionofLondonandtheSouthEastthanisaccessiblefromEustonalone,as wellasprovidingaccesstoHeathrow.  IntermediatetownsandcitiesbetweenLondonandManchesterwillbenefitsignificantly fromtheextracapacityreleasedbyHSRonthe‘classicnetwork’.Ifintermediatestations

  weretobebuilt,theyshouldbebuiltinsuchawaythattheprinciplejourneytimesand capacityavailableforservicestoGreaterManchesterisnotdiminished.  4.2 Whichcitiesshouldbeservedbyaneventualhighspeednetwork?IstheproposedY configurationtherightchoice?  GMCAsupportstheGovernment’sproposalforaninitial‘Y’shapedhighspeednetwork servingBirmingham,Manchester(andManchesterAirport)andLeedsasthesecitieswill providethegreatesteconomicbenefitsintermsofagglomeration;thoughwebelievethat moreanalysisneedstobecarriedoutonthehowhighspeedtrainswillbeintegratedonto thecurrentnetworktorunNorthofLichfieldandaccommodatedatstationsincluding PiccadillyandinLiverpool.  GMCAfirmlybelievethattheproposed‘Y’networkshouldbeseenasthefirststepofa longertermstrategyindevelopingacomprehensivenationalHSRnetwork,increasinginterͲ urbanconnectionsbetweencurrentlypoorlyconnectedcitiesinordertoaddressthe nation’seconomicdivide,Manchesterneedsbettermorefrequentandquickerservicesto theNortherncitiesofLiverpool,Leeds,Newcastle,Edinburgh,GlasgowandSheffield.It wouldalsobebeneficialtoimprovelinkstothecitiesofNottingham,BristolandCardiff.  4.3 IstheGovernmentcorrecttobuildthenetworkinstages,movingfromLondon northwards?  WeagreewiththeGovernment’sviewthattheHSRprogrammeshouldbeconstructedin stagesfromLondonupwards.However,aswemakeclearinouranswertoquestion3.4we believetheschemeshouldbeplannedasasingleprojectandconsideredthrough Parliamentonthebasisofasinglehybridbill.Althoughitwouldaddtimeandcomplexity,it wouldstilltakesignificantlylessparliamentarytimethantwohybridbillsindifferent parliamentarysessions.IntheinterveningperiodbeforethehighͲspeedlineopensin ManchesteritisclearthatsomeworkmayberequiredbetweenLichfieldandManchester toaccommodatethenewHighSpeedRailservicesfromdayone.  4.4 TheGovernmentproposesalinktoHS1aspartofPhase1butadirectlinktoHeathrow onlyaspartofPhase2.Arethosetherightdecisions?  WestronglysupporttheproposalsforalinktoHS1aspartofphase1oftheconstructionof theHS2network.DirectaccesstotheChannelTunnelandEuropewillallowfirmsin ManchesterandtheNorthWesttoaccessnewandmorediversifiedmarkets,increasing economicproductivity.  WeagreethatafutureHSRlinktoHeathrowmayberequired,butthismustnot disadvantagepassengerswishingtoaccesscentralLondon. 

  5.ECONOMICREBALANCINGANDEQUITY  5.1WhatevidenceistherethatHSRwillpromoteeconomicregenerationandhelpbridgethe NorthͲSoutheconomicdivide?  Europeanevidencefromcasestudieshighlightingtheagglomerationbenefitscreatedby bringingmajorurbanareasclosertogetherisclear.ItwasfearedtheintroductionofaHSR linebetweenLyonandPariswoulddamageLyon’sregionaleconomy,andwidenthe economicdividebetweenParisandtheFrenchregions.Insteadsincetheintroductionof HSR,Lyonhasseenunprecedentedeconomicgrowthandregeneration,withasecond centralbusinessdistrictformingaroundthenewHSRstation,creating20,000newjobs. TherearestrongparallelsthereforebetweenManchesterandLyon.  Earlylocalstudiesconductedbyuspredictalmost10,000jobswouldbegeneratedacross theregioncoveredbytheNorthernWaypartnership,boostingproductivityandgrowingthe economicoutputacrosstheareaby£967millionperyear.  5.2 Towhatextentshouldtheshapeofthenetworkbeinfluencedbythedesirabilityof supportinglocalandregionalregeneration?  ItisparamountthattheshapeoftheHSRnetworkisledbythedesiretosupportregional economicdevelopmentandwherepossiblelocalregeneration.Urbanregionalcentreswill benefitthemostfromHSRthroughjobcreationandincreasedeconomicoutput,andwe feeltheproposed‘Y’shapenetworklinkingLondon,Birmingham,ManchesterandLeeds; andpotentiallyonwardstoLiverpool,Newcastle,EdinburghandGlasgowwillbecriticalin achievingtheobjective.However,highspeedrailisnotapanaceaforregionalregeneration butisoneofanumberofinterventions,includingcapacityimprovementsontheexisting railnetwork,whichwillbetterlinkawiderangeoftownsandcitiesinordertomaximisethe abilityofpeopletoreachemployment,trainingandeducationopportunities.  5.3 WhichlocationsandsocioͲeconomicgroupswillbenefitfromHSR?  HSRwillprimarilybenefitmajorurbanareasthroughagglomerationopeningupnew markets.HSRwillincreasethenumberofworkplacejobsaccessiblefromManchester within90minutesbyrailby90%.Acitycentrestationsiteisessentialasallpreviousstudies haveconcluded.Onlyrailcanprovideunrivalledcitycentretocitycentretransport capacity.  AsecondHSRstationlocatedatManchesterAirportwouldalsogeneratelargebenefits. GrowthimpactsconcentratedonManchesterAirportandsurroundingareawillseean estimatedproductivityriseof£290perjobperannum.BenefitsofHSRhoweverarenot limitedtotheimmediateurbanareassurroundingHSRstations.IntheNorthWestHS2will

  createeconomicbenefitsthatspreadfarbeyondtheimmediateGreaterManchesterarea, withproductivityperjobestimatedtoriseby£201perjobp.aasfarawayasPreston.  AlthoughHSR’sprimarymarketswillbebusinessandleisuretravel,thecapacityreleasedon theconventionalnetworkwillsupportaccesstojobsandotheropportunitiesatalllevels andtoallsocioͲeconomicgroups.  5.4 HowshouldtheGovernmentensurethatallmajorbeneficiariesofHSR(includinglocal authoritiesandbusinessinterests)makeanappropriatefinancialcontributionandbear risksappropriately?ShouldtheGovernmentseeksupportfromtheEU’sTENͲT programme?  Governmentneedstoexploreallappropriateareasoffunding,especiallythosethatreduce thecosttothetaxpayer.GreaterManchesterthroughitsTransportFundismaking substantialinvestmentsintolocaltransportinfrastructure.InthemainweseeHSRas infrastructureofstrategicnationalimportance–andwouldexpectthereforethatmuchof thenecessaryfundswouldthereforecomefromcentralgovernment.  6. IMPACT  6.1 WhatwillbetheoverallimpactofHSRonUKcarbonemissions?Howmuchmodalshift fromaviationandroadswouldbeneededforHSRtoreducecarbon?  TheintroductionofaHSRnetworkhasthepotentialtosignificantlyreducecarbonemission levelsintheUKasitwillinduceamodalshiftfromthecarbonͲintensivemodesofcarand airtravel.AccordingtotheDepartmentforTransport,in2008domestictransport accountedfor21%oftheUK’sdomesticemissionsofcarbondioxide.ATOCresearch demonstratesthatHSRtravelproducesonlyoneͲthirdofthecarbonemissionsofcartravel andoneͲquartertheemissionsofanequivalenttripbyair,takingintoaccounttheaverage loadingstypicallyachievedoneachmode.AnationalHSRnetworkincorporatingScotlandis forecasttoreduceCO2emissionsbyonemilliontonneseachyearby2055.  HSR’scarbonoutputwillfallfurtherinthefutureduetotheprogressivedeͲcarbonisationof theUK’selectricitygenerationfacilities.  6.2 Areenvironmentalcostsandbenefits(includinginrelationtonoise)correctlyaccounted forinthebusinesscase?  GMCAfeelthattheGovernmenthasgonetogreatlengthstoaccountforenvironmental costsandbenefitswithinthebusinesscase.Assessmentsofenvironmentalcostsand benefitsattributedtoboththelinesconstructionandeventualusagehavebeenderived fromdetailedassessmentsandfuturelevelsofdemandandcarbonemissionsarebasedon

  conservativeestimates.Comparisonshavealsomadewiththeenvironmentalimpactsof HS1andotherrailschemes.  6.3 Whatwouldbetheimpactonfreightservicesonthe‘classic’network?  IntroductionofaHSRnetworkwouldhavepositiveimpactsonfreightservices,astheywill benefitfromthereduceddemandforinterͲurbanservicesontheexistingrailnetwork freeingcapacityonthe‘classic’network.ThefreedcapacityHS2wouldcreateforfreight servicesonthe‘classic’networkisextremelyimportant,asaccordingtoNetworkRail’s‘The NetworkRouteUtilisationFreightStrategy’,volumesaresettoincreasebyasmuchas140% between2006/07and2030/31.  6.4 Howmuchdisruptionwillbetheretoservicesonthe‘classic’networkduring construction,particularlyduringtherebuildingofEuston?  WhilstweaccepttheirwillbedisruptiontoservicesduringtherebuildingofEustonstation, thedisturbancescausedwillbefarlessthanthosewhichwouldbecreatedbyincremental improvementstotheWestCoastMainline.Lessonsneedtobelearntfromthe1998Ͳ2008 WestCoastMainlinemodernisation.Disruptioncausedbyliveincrementalimprovements increasedjourneytimesbetweenManchesterandLondontoalmost3hoursandhada significantnegativeimpactonpunctualityandreliability.Theresultantimpactsaw passengersmoveawayfromrailtraveltomoreenvironmentallyunsustainablemodes,and ittookalongtimefortherailindustrytorecoverpatronage.  Noworkhasbeenpublishedtodatearoundplansthatmayneedtobedevelopedat ManchesterPiccadillytoaccommodateHSRtrainsfromtheoutset.Itisessential(i)that suchplansaredevelopedexpeditiouslyand(ii)thatwhenimplementedtheseplansdonot leadtosignificantdisruptionsduringconstruction.  16May2011 

  Written evidence from the AGAHST Federation, Action Groups Against High Speed Two, comprising 79 local and national organisations opposing HS2 (HSR 115)

We would like to affirm the detailed work being submitted by HS2 Action Alliance Ltd. HS2AA is the ‘evidence based’ arm of the Federation campaign. We invite and encourage the Committee to receive oral evidence from them and myself on behalf of the Federation. The following are key points drawing on HS2AA’s work.

What are the main arguments either for or against HSR? We have no argument against HSR as such but we believe HS2 represents very poor use of resources. There are better, greener and less risky HSR options that provide the needed capacity and can be implemented much more quickly. Key points are as follows. 1. Benefits overstated: the £44bn claimed benefits are overstated by £26bn because of the erroneous assumption that time is unproductive on trains, the use of inflated business income figures and the comparison with unrealistic alternatives creating artificial crowding benefits. 2. Demand forecast overstated: the overall long distance domestic travel market is saturated and the drivers for rail growth since 1995 have largely run their course. The PVFH is not intended to provide a long term forecast and the use of v4.1 rather than 5.0 inflates the demand forecast. HS1 is running at one third of forecast demand. 3. Environmental damage underestimated: 87% of journeys (according to HS2 Ltd) will be new journeys or transfers from lower carbon classic rail; BAA expect to use freed up domestic slots for international use; and the line cuts through an AONB, SSSI, ancient woodlands and some of the most tranquil countryside in Britain. The Green Party and many environmental organisations oppose HS2. 4. Disruption underestimated: the complete rebuild of Euston will cause chaos for 7-8 years and work will impact the Chiltern Line and Great Western at Old Oak Common. 5. Technical problems are ignored: the expectation of 18 train paths / hour is not feasible according to the UIC; Greengauge 21 puts the figure at 15 paths / hour. This obviously reduces anticipated benefits. 6. Better alternatives have been ignored or buried: According to work by former SRA Director Chris Stokes, it is possible to increase standard class capacity on the WCML by 112%, MML by 100% and ECML by 87% before starting on infrastructure projects. This meets the DfT demand forecast until 2043 at a much lower cost and capacity increases can be rolled out in line with demand. The only urgent infrastructure project is grade separation at Ledburn junction, which for £243m would relieve congestion for Milton Keynes and Northampton commuters far more quickly than HS2. The introduction of in-cab signaling will enable trains to run at 140mph not 125mph, a speed similar to many European lines. Significant further capacity can be achieved through work at the six other pinch points identified in RP2, the Government’s own alternative, which was buried in the HS2 papers. 7. Many would be worse off: Many towns will have a less frequent or slower service (e.g. Coventry, Shewsbury, Wrexham, Stoke-on-Trent) and some would experience a long delay in improvement (Midland Main Line stations). Some on the HS2 route would have less capacity (Manchester) or would not see improved journey times (Newcastle). Promises of improved classic services were not forthcoming following HS1 and would depend of a willingness by the Government to increase subsidies. 8. Very high cost: compared with lines in Europe and compared to lower speed alternatives. 9. No evidence of ‘rebalancing the economy’: Most trips will be to London and 73% of the regeneration jobs will be in London.

May 2011 Written evidence from the National Farmers Union (HSR 116)

1. The NFU represents 55,000 farm businesses in England and Wales involving an estimated 155,000 farmers, managers and partners in the business. In addition we have 55,000 countryside members with an interest in farming and the country.

2. Introduction 2.1. The NFU welcomes the opportunity to respond the Transport Committee.

2.2. The NFU is a representative of many of the farming landowners and agricultural tenants on the proposed route who feel strongly about both the economic case put forward by High Speed 2 and also the steps that can be taken to mitigate impact and complexity of the compulsory purchase process. In preparing for this submission, and also our response to DfT’s High Speed 2 consultation, the NFU has held six meetings in the affected regions, as well as gathering information on farm holdings affected.

3. Question 2.1 HSR is designed to improve inter-urban connectivity. How does that objective compare in importance to other transport policy objectives and spending programmes, including those for the strategic road network

3.1. A well-functioning strategic transport network is central to any productive economy, but specifically for those involved in the agriculture and food industries. As UK farmers’ productivity increases, improved transport networks are required to aid competition with other countries products, and also to reduce transport emissions. These dual purposes are highlighted in the Government’s recent Foresight Report1, as food security and emissions awareness both move up the political agenda.

3.2. With this in mind, it would make sense for any transport strategy to lead to better cross country transport links which would make the journey times from processer to distributor and to the port facilities faster and less carbon intensive. With little produce being moved between London and Birmingham, it is difficult to see how High Speed 2 would aid this.

3.3. According to the Economic Case, High Speed 2 should support all transport users through both an increase in rail capacity, but also a modal shift which will reduce congestion on the roads, particularly on the M1. Whilst this will help road users who are forced to use the M1, there are little benefits for road users elsewhere.

3.4. Other road and rail users are concerned that such a large project will leave less funding available for improvements elsewhere, often in places where there could be increasing amount of transport required in the future. For example plans to upgrade the A14, an important cross country road which provides a useful link between the UK’s agricultural heartlands to the ports in the east, have been shelved as part of the spending review. A proper assessment concerning the impact of funding availability for transport projects elsewhere should be considered alongside the proposal for High Speed 2.

4. Question 3.1 How robust are the assumptions in the methodology – for example on passenger forecasts, modal shifts, fare levels, scheme costs, economic assumptions and the impact of lost revenue on the classic line?

1 Foresight Report, Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Synthesis C5 4.1. Whilst the economic case goes into some depth analysing the potential benefits of a high-speed rail line between London and Birmingham, very little attention is paid to the cost, beyond the consideration of risk and optimism bias.

4.2. In particular interest to our organisation is the costs which have been considered in relation to taking land out of production. The appraisal shows that £960million has been allocated to cover the land purchase and compensation costs, but no thought has been given to other costs that farm businesses will face as a result of their land being purchased. Over time the average size of farms in England has increased as the importance of economies of scale has risen, with many farmers renting extra land in order to maximise profitability. The acquisition of small parcels of land from farmers will not only mean that that the farmer loses the area of land taken, but will also affect his bottom line as fixed costs will have to be spread over a smaller farmable area. Whilst there will be a possibility for some farmers to rent other land near by this will not be possible in many cases and farmers will be left out of pocket, and in some cases the farm business will become an unviable asset.

4.3. Access to land via bridges and tunnels is another area where the costs have not been fully considered. There is no indication on where access might be placed on the current set of maps, and there is no estimate of how many of these bridges and tunnels High Speed 2 expects to incorporate. Without access to land separated by the track, farmers will, in some cases, be unable to farm these parcels of land. In other cases farmers may face a lengthy round journey on rural roads, which will increase costs for them as well as increasing congestion, and risk of accidents for other road users as more, large, farm vehicles, such as combine harvesters, take to the roads. We are also aware of cases where the High Speed 2 route effectively isolates farm businesses from access to the main road network, such as removing links that HGV delivery vehicles can use.

5. Question 3.4 What lessons should to Government learn from other major transport projects to ensure that any new high speed lines are built on time and to budget?

5.1. Costs and build time can be minimised if a good relationship is built up with land holders along the proposed route. Having the individual farmer’s support will allow for easy access to the land for the numerous surveys that have to be carried out.

5.2. In the early stages of construction of High Speed 1, goodwill was gained by agreeing a payment upfront, to be given to the landholder on first, second and subsequent visits to the land. A code of conduct should be followed whilst on the land.

5.3. Goodwill was also gained during the construction of HS1, as contractors used by HS1 to do the work had to abide to a construction Code of Practice and a quick dispute resolution procedure. Not only did this improve relationships between occupiers and constructors it also improved the speed of construction as disputes were avoided where possible, or resolved quickly. Construction of HS2 could be improved further by applying a Duty of Care as this will help with the smooth running of the operation of HS2 and for the project to reach its targets and the budget allowed.

5.4. Accommodation works in particular bridges and tunnels need to be considered at the earliest stage in detail and factored into the costs. We know from our experience with HS1 that this element was considered far too late in the process and HS1 did not take on board the access that is required by farmers on a daily basis to reach blocks of land and buildings which are severed by the rail line. Without proper assessment of these costs early on, both budget targets and deadlines will be difficult to meet.

5.5. A further lesson learnt from HS1 was that the initial Bill allowed far too much land to be acquired that was not necessary for the rail link. The total acquisition was 858 hectares whereas 350 hectares was actually required for the rail line and the landscaping. This highlights that it is very important to consider the area of land to be acquired as this will affect the budget.

6. Question 4.3 Is the Government correct to build the network in stages moving from London northwards?

6.1. It does make business sense to have a part of the line open at the earliest available opportunity, so that those who will benefit from the construction of the line can enjoy it as early as possible, and construction costs can begin to be paid off. However, the decision to consult separately on the two phases, particularly when the Government appears committed to both phases does not allow for those affected in the second phase to respond to the initial consultation with full knowledge of how it affects themselves and their business interests.

6.2. The Economic Case shows that the London to Birmingham line on its own, with a benefit cost ratio (BCR) of 1.6, does not meet the Department for Transport’s threshold for high value for money projects of 2. However when considering the whole Y network the BCR is much higher at 2.2. This suggests that, should the funds be available, the project is more likely to go ahead as a whole Y network than simply a line from London to Birmingham.

6.3. Many members of the public have no strong views on this project and north of Birmingham there is a low level of understanding of the Y network. This is especially true for those who live a long way from the urban centres where the stations will be based. Amongst some of the general public, and NFU members, there is an assumption that no new lines would have to be built north of Litchfield, with the trains simply transferring onto the newly upgraded West Coast Main Line (even in phase 2). This lack of understanding reflects the absence of communication with potential stakeholders north of Birmingham, during a consultation which effectively is many people’s last opportunity to comment on the worthiness of high speed across the whole country.

May 2011 Written evidence from London First (HSR 117)

1. London First is a business membership organisation with a mission to make London the best city in the world in which to do business. We do this by mobilising the experience, expertise and enthusiasm of the private sector to develop practical solutions to the challenges facing London. London First delivers its activities with the support of the capital’s major businesses in key sectors such as finance, professional services, property, ICT, creative industries, hospitality and retail. Membership also includes further education colleges and all of London’s universities.

2. We welcome the chance to give our initial views on the Government's proposals for a national High Speed Rail (HSR) network. We will continue to gather our members' views this year.

3. In addition, London First has established a Commission to examine - in the round - the capacity and quality of London's transport infrastructure links with the rest of the UK and the wider world. It will make recommendations for the short, medium and longer term to Government, and others as appropriate. Further background to this Commission can be found in the Annex to this response, and at www.londonfirst.co.uk/connectivity-commission

Conditions for success

4. We welcome the fact that there is a considerable degree of cross-party consensus on long term transport infrastructure planning (with the exception of policy for the UK's international air transport links). The last Government established Infrastructure UK; the present Government has continued it, and presided over the publication of the first National Infrastructure Plan. The Coalition has made a strong case for investment in economically vital long term transport infrastructure. In London, consensus has emerged over the importance of building Crossrail, Thameslink and maintaining the Tube upgrade programme. While we welcome a visionary approach in place of the all-too-familiar sweating of assets to beyond breaking point, proposals for HSR will require sustaining this political consensus.

5. The Department for Transport / HS2 study states wider benefits worth around £44bn are generated by HSR. The Northern Way, which brought together the Regional Development Agencies (RDA's) from the north of England, estimates that the agglomeration benefits in particular could be much greater; indeed that the total GVA benefits could be up to three times the size of welfare benefits assessed in a conventional cost benefit appraisal, and up to £120bn in present value terms. 6. While this might include optimism bias, and the calculation of such wider benefits is fraught with methodological difficulties and forecasting uncertainties, we concur with the Northern RDAs' assessment that “High speed rail is a once in a generation opportunity to transform the economic prospects of the North”1. We believe, however, there are some conditions which must be met if this potential is to be realised to the full.

7. First, if we are to start we must finish. The real transformative benefits come from linking a network of cities to London and to each other: first Birmingham; then Leeds/Manchester; and ultimately on to Scotland. A network that goes no farther than Birmingham will not deliver the value for money of the full network; and it manifestly will not transform the economy of Northern England. Completion requires long term commitment from Government.

8. Second, HSR must be an “and”, not an “or”. This visionary, potentially transformative, grand project must be in addition to other vital work needed to upgrade parts of the existing transport network, to address both historic underinvestment and to meet future demand. This includes as yet unfunded Tube lines in London, road improvements in England and the vital upgrades of our current rail network needed to relieve the overcrowding experienced by commuters every day. It is worth noting, for example, the benefit cost ratio of HS2 is 2.6, while that of the still to be funded Piccadilly line upgrade is 4.2.

9. Third, the delivery of HSR cannot be a substitute for an aviation policy that underpins south east England’s economic growth. Around 80% of all journeys to and from London to Manchester are already taken by rail. The demand for flights in the UK is forecast to nearly double by 20502. Demand for flights in London is forecast to rise to 250 million passengers a year, up from 140 million now. Heathrow, the UK's principal hub airport, is full; Gatwick is full at peak times. They suffer, as a result, the greatest flight delays of all major European rivals. HSR may well transform the economy of northern England but it can’t give London the international links it needs to maintain our world city status, to grow in the future and to share the benefits of this growth - through greater connectivity - with the rest of the country.

10. Fourth and finally, continued investment in London’s transport infrastructure must be integral to any HSR strategy if London is to cope with the increased numbers of passengers expected to arrive on HSR. At Euston, demand is forecast to rise from 21,000 in AM peak in 2008 to 29,000 in 2033 without HSR and 38,000 with HSR stopping at Old Oak Common. Any policy for HSR must be tied to long term plans to upgrade London's Tube and rail infrastructure - including the second phase of the Northern line upgrade (splitting the line at Camden for extra capacity with more frequent services); and Crossrail 2, linking Finsbury Park and Victoria, via Euston. While HSR has enormous potential, it must be tightly bound to coherent transport policy if this potential is to be realised.

May 2011

 1 High speed rail: A once in a generation opportunity to transform the North's economy, The Northern Way, 31 March 2011. 2 UK Air Passenger Demand and CO2 Forecasts, Department for Transport, 2009. Written evidence from Chilterns Conservation Board (HSR 118)

1. The Chilterns is an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, designated in 1965. Such a national designation confers on it the highest level of protection. Any development which would cause damage has to be shown to be in the national interest and demonstrate why it cannot be located elsewhere. The HS2 proposal will cause serous and irreversible damage to the Chilterns AONB. The Chilterns Conservation Board is not persuaded that HS2 will provide national benefits to the economy or environment.

2. The business case is poor and its dependence upon the notional valuation for time saving is not credible. The forecast for passenger numbers also lacks credibility and ignores previous experience of over-estimating demand for Eurostar and HS1 services. The result is to over state benefits to such an extent it materially affects the Benefit Cost Ratio.

3. HS2 will result in increased emissions of greenhouse gases. In combination with the damage to the natural environment the Board does not accept that any net environmental benefits will be forthcoming. The reliance on offsetting against aviation the increased emissions caused by HS2 is wholly unrealistic as it relies on vacated flight slots remaining vacant. The industry has already confirmed that these slots will be used primarily for long haul flights. The net effect of HS2 will be to significantly increase carbon emissions - the national priority must be to make significant reductions.

4. The Board is concerned that the DfT has not fully explained to the public the accepted definitions of high speed rail. Under EU Directive 96/48/EC Appendix 1 high speed railways do not require design speeds of up to 400 kph. The UK can upgrade much of its existing intercity network to high speed lines (200 kph/140 mph) with relatively modest investment compared to HS2, providing the entire country with improved services. The DfT design criteria for HS2 meant that route choice was seriously constrained and the scope to avoid the Chilterns AONB extinguished.

6. A national transport plan is an essential pre-requisite for investment in the rail network and specifically for high speed rail. The most recent analysis of national transport needs, The Eddington Report 2006 and Transport White Paper 2007, remain relevant - neither recommended high speed rail. Such a plan would also give due weight to options for increasing capacity on existing railways. It makes little sense to ignore the potential to increase existing capacity in the short term at much lower cost.

7. The demand forecasts are not credible. The very long period used for forecasting and reliance on historic trend data mean those forecasts are unlikely to be accurate. The active promotion of long distance travel is not a sustainable approach when the conservation of energy will be an increasing national priority. The demand forecasts have given insufficient weight to: the need to reduce travel; alternatives to long distance travel; and the growing effectiveness and availability of communications IT. The priority should be to manage demand and bring it into balance with capacity, and not to provide new capacity at high cost. The predict and provide model has been widely abandoned as unsustainable.

8. The business case fails to include the environmental costs. Whilst it includes several qualitative attributes to which it assigns large monetary values, e.g. time saving and crowding, the impact on the environment is not included at all. The consequences are to undervalue the environmental impacts, nearly all of which are negative. Neither does the business case include any negative impacts on the economy notably the cumulative effects on local economies. 1. What are the main arguments either for or against HSR

There are several accepted international definitions of HSR, which do not require speeds of up to 400 kph. The existing routes which can support speeds of up to 200 kph (125 mph) are considered to be high speed. This has not been explained to the public.

1. HSR as per the HS2 specification is not affordable – more affordable alternatives exist.

2. Experience in comparable countries is that high levels of investment in high speed rail directly leads to diversion of investment from the rest of the network.

3. There is no need for high speed rail of up to 400 kph. The UK is geographically compact, with shorter journey times now compared to comparable countries with HSR.

4. A better alternative would be to enhance capacity on the west coast main line and invest in a truly national programme of upgrading intercity routes in line with EU definition of high speed rail - up to 200kph.

5. There will be considerable environmental damage through construction of the line and the associated significant increase in carbon emissions.

6. There will be irreversible damage to the nationally protected Chilterns AONB.

7 Encouraging more people to travel further, more frequently is not economically or environmentally sustainable. The long term strategy has to be to reduce the need to travel and to save energy.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives

1. There is a need for a national strategy to identify the role of transport in meeting anticipated future social, economic and environment needs. That strategy should go on to provide a context for investment in the rail network. Other priorities must be a road network fit for purpose, enhanced bus services, safe and attractive cycleways and well maintained footpaths of all types. This should all be in the context of reducing the need to travel and conserving energy. Particular emphasis must be given to advances in IT.

2. Such a strategy would provide the context for consideration of investment in HSR. The Transport White Paper 2007 provided some of this - notably it did not support HSR. This needs to be updated before committing the scale of funds required for HS2. Without it the country will be locked into a long term investment programme which, based on precedent and international experience, may lead to misplaced priorities and significant opportunity costs. Major cost overruns and delays can be anticipated.

3. The UK is geographically compact with short distances between major cities. Communications between them are already amongst the best in the world including a dense railway network with frequent fast services. The scope to make major savings in door to door journey times is limited. The time savings provided by HS2 are modest (e.g. only 7 minutes on London- Newcastle) - equivalent to approx. £700m per minute saved.

4. Greater social, environmental and economic benefits are likely to be derived from investment in the existing network. Most intercity rail lines can be upgraded to meet EU definitions of HSR- providing better value for money compared to HS2. Trains already in service are capable of travelling at sufficiently high speed (225 kph- 140 mph) to qualify under EU definitions. Experience of the TGV in France is that existing services suffer as investment and other resources are diverted to creating a new network.

2.3 Impact on domestic aviation

1. The impact on domestic aviation is likely to be restricted to London to Glasgow and Edinburgh. Rail already has significant share of the Manchester - London market (80%) and passenger numbers between other cities affected by HS2 are small.

2. Saving on journey time to Scotland will not be significant (43 minutes saving on current best to Edinburgh and only 38 minutes to Glasgow). This is unlikely to prompt a major modal shift. HS2 assumes that it can convert directly numbers of travellers who switch to HS2 into numbers of withdrawn flights. This is unrealistic as airlines may accept lower load factors or use smaller aircraft. It is possible that international airlines will use this as an opportunity to use vacated domestic flight slots for long haul - the net effect would be a dramatic increase in carbon emissions.

3. HS2 forecasts assume that the domestic aviation market will increase by 178% by 2033. It also assumed new runways would be built at Stansted and Heathrow - they did not change these assumptions despite cancellation of new runways. The reality is that the domestic aviation market between London, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Manchester has been in decline for several years according to CAA statistics.

4. In practice HS2 will have to capture 50% of the current market (3.5m flights per annum out of a total of 6m) from Glasgow/Edinburgh to all London airports to meet modal shift forecasts (7% of passengers using HS2 will have switched from planes). Most flights are to Stansted, Gatwick and Heathrow which have been denied permission to build new runways - there is high demand for vacated slots. A switch from domestic to long haul flights will result in a quantum increase in emissions. The HS2 has not incorporated anticipated reductions in aviation emissions in the next 60 years which further reduces the scope for offsetting its own emissions

5. If airlines are to be forced to keep freed up slots vacant, possibly by legislation there will be a considerable loss of income to airlines amounting to several billion pounds over the 60 year term used for HS2 calculations. If 3.5m of HS2’s passengers previously flew the lost fare income to airlines will be approx. £175m per annum (based on an estimate of £100 per return flight). Over a 60 year period this equates to £10.5 billion in today’s prices. Other losses will be suffered by the airport, e.g. loss of car parking income, retail sales etc. This impact on the aviation industry and national economy has not been included in the business case for HS2.

3. Business case

1. The demand forecasts are far too optimistic with an over reliance on historic trend data. The lessons of the Eurostar and HS2 domestic services, where forecasts were not met, have not been learned despite the warning from other parliamentary committees.

2. HS2 fails to take into account the impact of IT on demand for travel, more flexible work patterns and the relatively high cost of all forms of transport. Neither does HS2 recognise that the individual propensity to travel in the UK has been static for 15 years. Most trips will be for leisure – but no explanation as to why many more people will want to travel long distance for leisure is given. Shopping and entertainment facilities are good in all city centres connected to HS2 - the relative attraction of London is declining. 3.2 Capacity

1. The problem of capacity may not be as great as some have suggested. Over crowding, whilst attracting headlines, is actually a limited problem affecting a small number of intercity journeys - the problem is exacerbated by pricing practices.

2. As identified in the Eddington Report 2006 significant and affordable increases in capacity can be achieved by extending trains, converting first class carriages to standard class and improving a small number of pinch points. Upgrading of the signalling systems has to be installed in any event. These improvements would increase capacity and enable trains to operate at their design speed of 140 mph (225 kph)

3. Adjustments to pricing and the need to reserve seats on peak hour trains would help to avoid any problems of over crowding. It is likely that all HS2 trains will require seat reservation (as per TGV). Passengers cannot be allowed to stand on a high speed train which means numbers have to be controlled.

4. It is imperative that attempts are made to manage demand and keep it in balance with capacity. In line with successive Government policies, reducing the need to travel should be a priority. The ever increasing effectiveness and availability of IT will help with this challenge. It also reduces vastly the HS2 business case as all time on a train can be used productively thus reducing the value of journey time saving. The widespread practice of flexible working will help to remove traditional peaks. The use of the market to bring supply and demand into balance has not been applied fully.

4. The strategic route

1. The selection of the London - Birmingham route was significantly influenced by the DfT decision to specify that trains operate up to speeds of 400 kph. This meant there was very limited scope to alter the alignment. Contrary to government legislation and national planning policy (notably PPS7) it made it impossible to avoid building through the nationally protected Chilterns AONB with no serious option for avoiding the area.

2. This speed was chosen partly because the claimed economic benefits rested so heavily on the value of time saved. That valuation based on the assumption that all time on a train was wasted and any time saved could be converted to productive work with a value equivalent to an annual cost of £70,000 per annum per employee lacks credibility – it fails any common sense test. Anybody who wishes to work productively on a train can do so - the percentage that can’t because they have to stand is so small as to be negligible.

3. The weight given to valuing time saved and the high speed specified constrained route choice to an unacceptable degree. Acceptance of alternative international definitions of HSR would have allowed consideration of alternatives and less damaging routes. It would also have added weight to the Government option of Rail Package 2.

4. The proposed network will only directly link 4 major cities with partial benefits to several others. This will take at least £34 billion and 22 years (2033) to achieve. Most parts of the country will not be directly connected. It is not, therefore, a national network. If HS2 claims are accepted for economic generation the majority will be left out, even positively disadvantaged. It is also an acceptance that other efforts to promote economic regeneration outside London will not be successful unless and until several years after high speed rail is operating.

5. As Heathrow has little scope to expand, creation of a high speed link to the airport is unlikely to bring significant economic benefits - the return on this investment will be poor. The desire to create a direct link has further restricted route choice. n.b. HS2 has not included the cost of a link to Heathrow in its cost estimates nor business plan. 5. Economic rebalancing and equity

1. The Board is not satisfied that there is convincing evidence from comparable countries that HS2 will lead to regional economic regeneration. The HS2 Ltd forecast that over 70% on the employment creation will be in London is more credible. There is international evidence that the modest economic effects of high speed rail are restricted to a geographically small area close to the railway station. The city centres of Leeds, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Birmingham and Manchester have already undergone highly successful regeneration. The economic problems lie in parts of those cities and surrounding regions beyond the reach of HS2.

2. The damage to the economy of those areas affected by the HS2 route have not been taken into account in preparing the HS2 business case. There is emerging evidence that some cities and towns not served by HS2 (e.g. Coventry and Stoke) will suffer a decline in services with an associated impact on the local economy. It is essential that a proposal of this scale takes into account fully all impacts and doesn’t overlook those which are unhelpful to the case for building the line.

6. Impact

1. HS2 Ltd now state that HS2 is likely to be carbon neutral. Earlier claims that high speed rail would be a central part of a low carbon economy are no longer made.

2. It has to be assumed that for the foreseeable future a significant part of electricity generation will be from fossil fuels. This means HS2 services will result directly in carbon emissions. High speed trains use more energy than slower trains - at least double. If trains travel at 400 kph it will be nearer 4 times. As HS2 also propose to run longer and more frequent trains emissions will increase significantly several fold again. HS2 hopes this can be offset by promoting modal shift from cars (very small) and planes. The outcome is that in total HS2 services will generate significantly increased emissions possibly more than 8 times that of services operating today, and indirectly stimulate a considerable increase in carbon emissions if long haul flights replace domestic flights. According to Birmingham airport, a new Birmingham parkway station will enable it to double its passenger throughput to 9 million passengers per annum.

3. HS2 make no allowance for the energy needs for operating the new and enlarged stations.

4. HS2 Ltd calculations for the emissions associated with the construction of the line are too low. The total embedded carbon for constructing the line and associated stations is estimated to be only 1.2 million MtCo2e. This is not a credible figure in view of the quantities of steel and concrete needed, and the associated emissions of transport for movement of material including the quarrying and disposal of millions of cubic metres of spoil. An example of the underestimate is that HS2 state that the volume of spoil to be excavated and disposed of for the section from West Ruislip to Aylesbury is 680,000 cubic metres. The actual volume is nearer 12 million.

Are environmental costs and benefits (including in relation to noise) correctly accounted for in the business case?

1. No. The business case does not include the value of any environmental impacts. Whilst other attributes such as crowding are given monetised values and included no such attempt was made for any environmental characteristic. As significant weight is attached to the Benefit Cost Ratio (especially by Treasury) the environmental impacts have not been correctly accounted for. 2. HS2/DfT has refused to provide a figure for the total land take but it is believed to be approx 2,500 hectares, representing a considerable loss of productive farmland and woodland. No value is attached to the value of production foregone. In the Chilterns AONB alone 24 woods will be lost or damaged (17 hectares) of which 12 hectares are ancient. The Board estimates that in the Chilterns13,700 metres of hedgerow will be lost of which several thousand metres are ancient.

3. The Chilterns is a major aquifer providing drinking water to over one million people. The railway will be tunnelled through the aquifer but HS2 has not been able to provide any reassurance that these drinking water supplies will not be affected. It is known that abstraction sources at Chalfont St.Giles, Amersham and Little Missenden, cannot be used for the duration of the construction. Such matters have not been incorporated in the HS2 report or business plan. There will be a cost as the local water companies will have to seek alternative supplies.

3. The River Misbourne is one of England’s most endangered rivers according to the Environment Agency. It has suffered from low flows for many years due to a combination of over abstraction and variable climate. The railway follows the river valley and the Misbourne is likely to be badly affected during construction with the possibility of permanent changes to its hydrology.

4. The Chilterns is one of the most popular areas for walking in Europe (55 million visits per annum - Southern Tourist Board 2007). Many visitors arrive from London by train in the Misbourne valley. The local pubs and shops benefit from these visitors, but it is a trade which will diminish significantly for many years. The blight has begun as businesses consider whether it is worth investing. The reputation of the whole of the Chilterns will suffer when the work begins, further reducing the number of visitors over a wider area than that affected directly. The loss of business has not been taken into account. In general the impact of the construction itself on the local economy and communities will be significant but no weight has been given to these effects.

6. It will have a major and permanently damaging impact on the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. The reputation of the Chilterns as place for quiet recreation will be affected. The Ridgeway National Trail will be cut and regionally important routes such The Chiltern Way and Chiltern Cycleway will also be severed or diverted. Restoration of these routes may not take place for a decade.

7. Along the line 10 SSSIs and another 100 sites important for wildlife will be damaged. It is known from HS1 that a 2 metre high security fence will be erected for the entire length of route. This would be an ugly intrusion into the landscape and a substantial barrier to the movement of mammals.

8. The quality of the Chilterns landscape (and across the UK in general), is in large measure due to farming. The high speed rail line takes no account of farm holdings, many of which will be dissected. The impact will be that many will be rendered permanently uneconomic due to severance. Others may not survive the disruption caused by the construction itself. The impact on farming is not considered at all in the HS2 business case.

9. The business case has not given any weight to the generation of noise. Published data related only to Laeq figures. This has the effect of averaging thus reducing the actual noise levels experienced. Lmax figures should also have been published. There is international evidence (ANASE Report for DfT 2007) to show that noise disturbance is also related to frequency, timing and suddenness. None of these factors have been take into account. HS2 also acknowledge that above 200 mph aerodynamic noise becomes more of an issue, but no information has been published by HS2 to show what the effect would be if speeds of up to 250 mph were to be achieved.

May 2011 Written evidence from Sue Taylor and Christopher Boyce (HSR 119)

1. Main arguments either for or against HSR

We oppose the plan for a second high speed rail network. In our view (set out in greater detail below), a) there is no convincing case for HS2 on economic, business, environmental or national interest grounds b) other transport policy objectives claim higher priority, especially at a time of severe financial constraint c) although Government promotes HSR as an innovative policy, enabling the UK to match the transport infrastructure of our European partners, it is insufficiently forward looking, taking too little account of advances in communication technology, and missing the opportunity to design a new model of transport suitable for a small and densely populated nation.

2. How does HSR fit with the Government’s transport policy objectives?

We do not believe that HSR is consistent with other key transport policy objectives, in particular: a) Much improvement is needed in our existing infrastructure to give us a properly ‘joined up’ transport network (air, rail and bus), representing value for money for the bulk of the population, as well as cost effective and ‘green’ ways to move goods around. HS2 is set to be an immense drain on resources without achieving the necessary result for our communities and our economy b) The environmental damage will be great – both in construction and operation. This is not consistent with the Government’s stated objective of encouraging low-carbon travel c) As part of a more considered response to our transport infrastructure deficiencies, we would urge the Department to look seriously at Rail Package 2

  to upgrade the West Coast Mainline, as the alternative to HS2 Phase 1. RP2 is capable of delivering much greater capacity than HS2, with less disruption and at much lower cost.

See also 4 below.

3. Business case

We do not find the assumptions and methodology adopted in the business case for HS2 to be robust and compelling. For example: a) Critics (including businessmen, senior politicians and economists) calculate the cost of HS2 to every family at over £1000. At the same time, we learn that the date for benefit to be realised has been extended by a further 10 years to 2043, alongside a small and questionable benefit ratio and an inflated demand target based on outdated assumptions.

4. Economic rebalancing and equity

In our view, HS2 will not promote economic regeneration by tackling the north- south divide, nor is its impact likely to be socially equitable. We would argue that: a) To have an impact on the economy, transport systems must keep the country working at a time of severe financial constraint – enabling ordinary people to get to and from their places of work and other regular travel destinations such as education, healthcare and leisure services – easily and at affordable prices. b) HS2, by contrast, is costly and focused on a long-distance travel market, ie a relatively small and wealthy socio-economic group which is less locally/regionally focused than most workers and their families. We note the Government statement (in the document mentioned below) that in contrast to this market, two thirds of all journeys are under five miles. c) In Creating Growth, Cutting Carbon (Cm 7996, January 2011) the Government appears to recognise the huge importance of local transport systems as an engine of our economy. This document sets out the goal of a transport system   which is “greener and safer and improves quality of life in our communities ... improving the links that help move people and goods around”. Importantly, it states that:

“Local transport faces a sustainability challenge – excess delay is costing our urban economies £11 billion per annum, and carbon emissions impose a cost to society equivalent to up to £4 billion per annum. The costs to the health of our communities are even greater – up to £25 billion per year on the costs of physical inactivity, air quality and noise...” d) Against this background, it is reasonable to question how Government can justify net expenditure of almost £12bn (comparable to the cost of delays in local transport, see above) on HS2, especially when on the Government’s own estimation, benefits will not begin to be seen for decades to come e) The more privileged business travel market that would be the principal beneficiary of HSR should shrink over the proposed development period as a result of continuing advances in communication technology, reducing the need for long-distance, high-speed business travel and replacing it with a ‘low carbon’ solution f) According to DfT, the large majority of regeneration jobs will be in London. This seriously undermines the argument that HS2 can rebalance the UK’s north/south divide. It is also important to bear in mind that the current plan, budget and timetable concentrate on the London to West Midlands route. Impacts beyond that point must remain extremely speculative and long-term until detailed proposals have been put forward and properly scrutinised.

5. Impact – environmental costs and benefits

The absence of a published environmental impact assessment to underpin the HS2 business case is a matter of serious concern to us, as we live in the heart of an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (the Chilterns). Our concerns are both for the Chilterns and for the broader environmental impact of the scheme. We would wish to highlight that:

  a) There is no convincing evidence that HS2 will move traffic from air or road to rail, since most passengers will be making new journeys or transferring from conventional rail. Lorries on roads are ignored. b) HS2 is not a ‘low carbon’ solution – high speed trains have much higher energy consumption than conventional rail. c) The destruction of the AONB in the Chilterns, with no compelling business or environmental case, sets a very dangerous precedent and a pattern for what may be undertaken further north, if and when the line is extended. Many wildlife sites, ancient woodlands and SSIs are threatened, as well as agricultural land and water supplies.

May 2011

  Witten evidence from Nottingham City Council (HSR 120)

This response focuses on the questions that are most relevant to Nottingham as a Local Authority, which is well placed to benefit from the huge potential of a High Speed Rail network, provided the right choices are made in determining route and station locations.

This response has been provided by Nottingham City Council Officers.

1. What are the Main Arguments For or Against High Speed Rail (HSR)

1.1. Nottingham considers that there is a compelling case in favour of HSR and that this case will be seriously undermined if the full Y network is not constructed. The construction of a network will allow the full benefits to be dispersed and shared nationally. A partial network could hold back economic growth and regeneration of those cities not included on the network. This is particularly true of cities like Nottingham where national rail connectivity is already comparatively poor due to short sighted decisions made in the 1960’s with regard to the closure of the Great Central Railway.

1.2. Nottingham as a Core City will support national economic growth but needs appropriate infrastructure and connectivity to do so. There must be investment in new rail technology, in terms of both the Midland Mainline (MML) and HSR, to ensure that sustainable conditions for growth will be secured. This is coupled with the fact that there is an urgent need to invest in the economy, with infrastructure being a top priority. Our cities need better strategic transport connections and simply widening roads will not secure the economic and environmental future of the country. Together with an enhanced classic rail network, HSR should therefore be seen as the answer to meeting our increasing demand for inter-regional, national and international travel demands for the coming decades.

1.3. HSR makes financial sense. According to The British Chamber of Commerce, congestion costs business £23.3bn a year and just within Nottingham it is estimated to cost local businesses £160 million a year. A full HSR network linking the major cities of the UK would cost up to £69bn and would generate over £125bn of economic benefits. These benefits are derived from improvements in journey times, less crowding, reductions in road congestion, environmental improvements and the economic benefits arising in the release of capacity on the conventional rail network. It also includes the beneficial effect on the productivity of businesses through changes to employment patterns and agglomeration effects.

1.4. Forecasts suggest that by 2055 a full HSR network could be carrying 30 million journeys which would otherwise be made by air, and 13 million from car journeys1. This would indicate that high speed rail could deliver carbon savings

1 Fast Forward – A High Speed Rail Strategy for Britain. Greengauge 21. of around one million tonnes per year, but a full national network is needed to create this modal shift.

1.5. HSR would also: x strengthen existing and generate new economic and business flows and interactions, worth £125billion to the economy; x increase rail and decrease air and car journeys by 30 million journeys a year; x provide a catalyst to improve local public transport networks; x enable new business and economic flows between cities; x reduce carbon emissions by 1 million tonnes a year, improve air quality and achieve targets; and x bring UK infrastructure up to competitive international standards.

2. How Does HSR fit with the Government’s Transport Policy Objectives? 2.1. Nottingham supports the move to follow the world leaders in HSR, China, Spain, Japan and France to implement a comprehensive high speed network serving the whole of the country.

2.2. The changing context of the country’s commitments to combat climate change, rising oil prices and peak oil supply threats, means that pursuing UK national transport policies which seek to accommodate travel demand through extending the capacity of the trunk and motorway network will be the wrong path in economic and environmental terms. The costs and environmental impacts associated with sub national domestic air travel are also considered to present strong incentives to pursue a more sustainable national transport policy.

2.3. A new high-speed line would not only significantly boost the national infrastructure itself, but also release capacity on the existing network when long distance services transfer to the new line. This radically opens up the opportunity to provide new services where previously there were none and to improve the quality of existing services, expanding business and employment potential through improved commuter networks and spreading the agglomeration benefits on a much wider basis than just looking at the line itself.

2.4. All this is needed because the country’s existing rail infrastructure is currently reaching capacity. To date we have responded by upgrading what is already there. In order to provide for the level of growth and capacity needed, this is no longer sustainable, nor is it good value for money.

2.5. Modernisation of the West Coast Mainline (WCML) was due to cost £2bn, take 6 years, and deliver maximum speeds of 140mph. The final scheme cost £8.8bn, took 9 years, and provided for maximum speeds of 125mph. Despite this work, the line is expected to reach full capacity by the early 2020’s, and some sections much earlier than this. In addition to the WCML there are capacity problems on the East Coast, Midland and Great Western Mainlines. It is clear that given the strategic importance of these lines to the economy, we cannot suffer years of disruption and delay for upgrades which will not deliver the long term benefits that are needed and will cost nearly as much as building the new HSR lines themselves. Instead we must plan for a new HSR line which runs in addition to the existing classic network.

2.6. However, our existing rail lines do and will continue to play a pivotal role in support of HSR and the national infrastructure. Whilst the classic network alone cannot provide the capacity and speeds that are required, which will be provided by a new HSR network - they are vital for connections and capacity and must where necessary, such as on the Midland Main Line receive the required investment to support them. £69 million has recently been allocated for journey time improvements; but partners are having difficulties in securing just £27 million which is required to raise the standard and reduce the journey time of the MML. This modest investment is in stark comparison to the £8.8 billion that was spent on the WCML.

2.7. It is also important to remember that HSR is not projected to come to the East Midlands for at least 20 years. Investment in the classic rail network such as electrification and allocation of new Intercity Express Rolling stock on the MML which is needed now, cannot and must not be blighted by the plans and must be pursued and funded in addition to HSR.

2.8. The provision of HSR and the classic network is essential for improved inter urban connectivity. Nottingham currently has relatively poor connections to other core cities, the north and London. By improving these connections it will allow Nottingham to fulfil its growth potential, expanding on the growing key economic, science and business sectors which the City needs support to develop and expand.

2.9. For example, the service between Nottingham, Sheffield and Leeds operates at an average speed of 36mph and the Nottingham - Birmingham service at just 44mph. These are short distances but entail relatively significant journey times limiting the agglomeration between the cities. There is therefore a strong case for strengthening the links between these cities on the eastern leg of the Y network and beyond.

2.10. For a city like Nottingham in the centre of the country, as well as improved connectivity to London and Heathrow, HSR offers a very substantial opportunity to connect with the other Core Cities and build economic capacity and agglomeration which will help close the widening economic productivity gap between the midlands and the north and the south-east, with significant associated social inclusion benefits.

3. The Business Case 3.1. The HSR consultation document makes a compelling case, it clearly highlights that the business case for HSR stacks up. This is through the provision of direct economic benefits, much needed additional capacity, but it is also enhanced once the environmental and social benefits are also factored in. 3.2. We are also aware that the business case for the eastern leg of the Y is a very significant element which improves the overall business case for HSR. Previous work undertaken by HS2 Ltd has estimated that the BCR for the eastern leg at 5.6 compared to 2.6 to Manchester. Therefore it is critical important that the process moves forward as fast as possible and ensures that the second Hybrid Bill is not delayed.

3.3. Whilst we see the logic in building the route in phases we would want the construction of the eastern leg to be viewed as the next priority following the Birmingham leg. We believe that it is makes sound financial and business sense to build the eastern route as early as the process allows, ahead of the expansion of the western leg and the Heathrow extension. This is particularly important as the midlands and eastern inter city rail networks have not benefitted from the scale of investments enjoyed by the WCML in recent years. Classic compatible trains could run over the WCML to Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow from the outset, but not to Leeds and the ECML, so it is logical that this is progressed at the earliest opportunity. An absolute imperative will be to ensure that allocation of HSR train paths between the eastern and western legs of the ‘Y’ fully reflects the demand potential and contribution to the business case demonstrated by the eastern leg, which has the potential to join up Nottingham, Sheffield, Leeds, Newcastle and Edinburgh.

4. The Strategic Route 4.1. HSR must be seen as more than just a route, the network approach is essential to its success.

4.2. It is essential that this opportunity to redress the poor national rail connectivity suffered by Nottingham is fully grasped by HSR.

4.3. We are supportive of the Y network but are concerned about the pathing and capacity constraints associated with the ‘trunk’ section of the network. It will be essential (and equitable) to prioritise pathing to the eastern leg, but we believe that in the longer term a wider network which includes a new eastern north south route which would directly serve London could be required to meet growing national demands. We would therefore support further work to expand the network above the remit currently being worked on by HS2 Ltd.

4.4. HSR has huge potential to act as a catalyst for regeneration; therefore the planned network must serve city centres. Where a dedicated City Centre Station on the line is not feasible a spur must be provided with appropriate pathing to ensure that the growth potential and economic benefits of the investment into HSR is maximised by all our core cities. Economic growth needs to be centred on City Centres to support sustainable development patterns, local economies and provide regeneration growth and jobs in a way which meets projected future environmental commitments and social inclusion objectives. There are substantial regeneration opportunities in and around Nottingham City centre which provide capacity for growth in an area where labour supply, housing market conditions and skills availability are very favourable and competitive. 4.5. Firms which would benefit from HSR cluster in City Centres and are willing to pay a premium to be there. This provides the high density labour market which they need and are ideally suited to benefit from the rail market, which can transport large volumes of commuter, business and leisure travellers.

4.6. It is right that a link to HS1 is provided in the first phase. It is logical that a link to existing infrastructure is provided from the outset. It also enhances the national connectivity to the Continent helping to support more sustainable travel options over air travel. Nottingham City would however not support any proposal which would compromise or result in the loss of the existing direct MML connection to HS1 at St Pancras International.

4.7. There are benefits of linking to Heathrow, especially in light of the very poor existing connections from Nottingham, but it is not essential that this is delivered in the first phase, especially in the light of forthcoming improved connectivity to Heathrow via classic rail. We would argue that the eastern leg of the Y should be prioritised ahead of this link when planning the second phase.

5. Economic Rebalancing and Equity 5.1 By significantly reducing journey times between the countries largest cities it should be possible to rebalance the national economy, as a result of the improved connectivity between areas of opportunity with the capacity for growth such as Nottingham.

5.2. Britain needs the South East’s economic contribution, but we can also unlock greater growth elsewhere by investing in HSR, in a way which avoids decreasing environmental conditions associated with exacerbating an unbalanced, overheated, congested and inefficient economy based on London and the south east. However, the Core Cities and their primary urban areas alone produce 27% of England’s economic output. Therefore the rest of the country in particular the Core Cities must be better linked to the South East to allow them to support and grow off each other. This is in addition to improved regional connections to support this.

5.3. For example the Eastern Partnership area (covering the area potentially served by the Eastern leg of the Y) contains more than 8.7 million people and 3.6 million jobs. The delivery of HSR could make this area function as a more balanced single economic zone, reducing dependence on public sector funding and increasing private sector jobs and investment.

5.4. As with the Motorway network HSR is a nationally important investment. Not only will the Cities directly served benefit but the regional economies and areas supported by these cities will grow as a result of the investment.

Conclusion HSR is strongly supported by Nottingham’s local business community as well as the Council. However the opportunities offered by HSR will only be captured with effective connectivity into the heart of the UK’s Core Cities including Nottingham.

However it is crucial that the long planning and procurement processes for High Speed Rail do not frustrate or blight the necessary investments in our classic rail network which will be required over the intervening Control Periods, in particular electrification and the upgrading of the Midland Main line and its rolling stock.

Notwithstanding this, HSR offers an outstanding opportunity to make a step change in the improvement of the country’s national infrastructure which will ensure we are better placed to meet both our growth aspirations and our environmental commitments; for Nottingham in particular it is a once in a generation opportunity to retrieve the damage done by the closure of the Great Central Railway which took the city off the country’s core inter city rail network.

Not to take this opportunity would be a massive economic blow to the City’s medium and long term aspirations to capture our true potential.

16th May 2011