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Electoral Performance and Policy Choices in the Front National
Electoral Performance and Policy Choices in the Front National James Shields* School of Languages and Social Sciences, Aston University, Birmingham B4 7ET, UK *Correspondence: [email protected] This article proposes a two-level analysis of the Front National (FN) in the 2017 French presidential and parliamentary elections. The first level focuses on the electoral performances of Marine Le Pen and the FN and analyses both elections in terms of gains and losses at the polls. The second level considers FN policy and argues that the party went into these elections with a programme targeting both left-leaning and right-leaning voters, attempting a policy synthesis that partly fitted and partly subverted Kirchheimer’s paradigm of the ‘catch-all’ party. Both levels of analysis link to a number of strategic considerations prompting debate within the party over the direction to take in order to improve its future electoral prospects. 1. Far-right populism, the Front National and the electoral context of 2017 The literature on radical right-wing populism has tended to treat the French Front National (FN) as a test case in the making (Camus and Lebourg 2017; Mudde 2017; Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn 2016; Benveniste 2016; Judis 2016; Beauzamy 2013; Reynié 2011). As Europe’s premier far-right populist party, the FN has plotted a gradual upward course in both elections and opinion polls since its initial breakthrough in the mid-1980s. While other far-right parties have either perished or been drawn into collusion with mainstream parties (de Lange 2012), the FN has sustained its solitary advance, making a virtue of its outsider status (Perrineau 2014). -
MEDIA POLARIZATION “À LA FRANÇAISE”? Comparing the French and American Ecosystems
institut montaigne MEDIA POLARIZATION “À LA FRANÇAISE”? Comparing the French and American Ecosystems REPORT MAY 2019 MEDIA POLARIZATION “À LA FRANÇAISE” MEDIA POLARIZATION There is no desire more natural than the desire for knowledge MEDIA POLARIZATION “À LA FRANÇAISE”? Comparing the French and American Ecosystems MAY 2019 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In France, representative democracy is experiencing a growing mistrust that also affects the media. The latter are facing major simultaneous challenges: • a disruption of their business model in the digital age; • a dependence on social networks and search engines to gain visibility; • increased competition due to the convergence of content on digital media (competition between text, video and audio on the Internet); • increased competition due to the emergence of actors exercising their influence independently from the media (politicians, bloggers, comedians, etc.). In the United States, these developments have contributed to the polarization of the public square, characterized by the radicalization of the conservative press, with significant impact on electoral processes. Institut Montaigne investigated whether a similar phenomenon was at work in France. To this end, it led an in-depth study in partnership with the Sciences Po Médialab, the Sciences Po School of Journalism as well as the MIT Center for Civic Media. It also benefited from data collected and analyzed by the Pew Research Center*, in their report “News Media Attitudes in France”. Going beyond “fake news” 1 The changes affecting the media space are often reduced to the study of their most visible symp- toms. For instance, the concept of “fake news”, which has been amply commented on, falls short of encompassing the complexity of the transformations at work. -
Codebook Indiveu – Party Preferences
Codebook InDivEU – party preferences European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies December 2020 Introduction The “InDivEU – party preferences” dataset provides data on the positions of more than 400 parties from 28 countries1 on questions of (differentiated) European integration. The dataset comprises a selection of party positions taken from two existing datasets: (1) The EU Profiler/euandi Trend File The EU Profiler/euandi Trend File contains party positions for three rounds of European Parliament elections (2009, 2014, and 2019). Party positions were determined in an iterative process of party self-placement and expert judgement. For more information: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/65944 (2) The Chapel Hill Expert Survey The Chapel Hill Expert Survey contains party positions for the national elections most closely corresponding the European Parliament elections of 2009, 2014, 2019. Party positions were determined by expert judgement. For more information: https://www.chesdata.eu/ Three additional party positions, related to DI-specific questions, are included in the dataset. These positions were determined by experts involved in the 2019 edition of euandi after the elections took place. The inclusion of party positions in the “InDivEU – party preferences” is limited to the following issues: - General questions about the EU - Questions about EU policy - Questions about differentiated integration - Questions about party ideology 1 This includes all 27 member states of the European Union in 2020, plus the United Kingdom. How to Cite When using the ‘InDivEU – Party Preferences’ dataset, please cite all of the following three articles: 1. Reiljan, Andres, Frederico Ferreira da Silva, Lorenzo Cicchi, Diego Garzia, Alexander H. -
ESS9 Appendix A3 Political Parties Ed
APPENDIX A3 POLITICAL PARTIES, ESS9 - 2018 ed. 3.0 Austria 2 Belgium 4 Bulgaria 7 Croatia 8 Cyprus 10 Czechia 12 Denmark 14 Estonia 15 Finland 17 France 19 Germany 20 Hungary 21 Iceland 23 Ireland 25 Italy 26 Latvia 28 Lithuania 31 Montenegro 34 Netherlands 36 Norway 38 Poland 40 Portugal 44 Serbia 47 Slovakia 52 Slovenia 53 Spain 54 Sweden 57 Switzerland 58 United Kingdom 61 Version Notes, ESS9 Appendix A3 POLITICAL PARTIES ESS9 edition 3.0 (published 10.12.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Denmark, Iceland. ESS9 edition 2.0 (published 15.06.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. Austria 1. Political parties Language used in data file: German Year of last election: 2017 Official party names, English 1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) - Social Democratic Party of Austria - 26.9 % names/translation, and size in last 2. Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) - Austrian People's Party - 31.5 % election: 3. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) - Freedom Party of Austria - 26.0 % 4. Liste Peter Pilz (PILZ) - PILZ - 4.4 % 5. Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (Grüne) - The Greens – The Green Alternative - 3.8 % 6. Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ) - Communist Party of Austria - 0.8 % 7. NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS) - NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum - 5.3 % 8. G!LT - Verein zur Förderung der Offenen Demokratie (GILT) - My Vote Counts! - 1.0 % Description of political parties listed 1. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) is a social above democratic/center-left political party that was founded in 1888 as the Social Democratic Worker's Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, or SDAP), when Victor Adler managed to unite the various opposing factions. -
GAUCHE & DROITE Quelles Différences
Classe de 3ème EMC DROITE/GAUCHE Quelles différences ? 4 GAUCHE & DROITE Quelles différences ? SOMMAIRE C’est quoi la droite et la gauche ? Présidentielle 2017 : qui sont les 11 candidats ? / t e n ie. h p ra g o t is h / / : ps tt h Classe de 3ème EMC DROITE/GAUCHE Quelles différences ? 1 GAUCHE & DROITE Quelles différences ? Il faut rappeler, d'abord et avant tout, que tous les politiques, quelque soit leur parti, ont pour ambition de rendre les gens heureux. Les programmes prétendent tous améliorer la vie des gens. Il n'y a pas la méchante droite d'un côté, et la gentille gauche de l'autre, ou inversement. Les extrêmes n'y échappent pas, qui proposent toutefois des méthodes un peu plus radicales pour y parvenir. « Reste, qu’on soit de droite ou de gauche, à l’être intelligemment. C’est le plus difficile. C’est le plus important. L’intelligence n’est d’aucun camp. C’est pourquoi nous avons besoin des deux, et de l’alternance entre les deux ». André Comte Sponville, philosophe. Naissance de la droite et de la gauche sous la Révolution française La division droite et gauche est née pendant la Révolution française. Quand les tout nouveaux députés de l'Assemblée de 1791 ont dû se décider sur le rôle du roi, ils n'étaient pas d'accord. Certains voulaient que le roi conserve des droits (les conservateurs), d'autres souhaitaient que ses droits soient limités (les partisans du changement). Pour se distinguer, les conservateurs se sont assis à la / droite du président de l'Assemblée et les partisans du changement, à t e n sa gauche. -
Put at the Test in the Terrorist Threat Era
Eötvös Loránd University A.Y. 2017/2018 THE “HOMELAND OF HUMAN RIGHTS” PUT AT THE TEST IN THE TERRORIST THREAT ERA France, collective memory and counterterrorism Author: Mathilde Bénard Director: Orsolya Salát 1 I would like to thank Orsolya Salát, my research director, for her advice and confidence throughout the semester, The EMA programme, which has truly been a unique, rich and pushing experience, intellectually and humanly ; The EMA staff, who made it possible by always staying supportive and demanding with the 90 of us, All those with whom I shared this year, Laura and Kristina, my Foscarini fellows and the best partners I could have thought of to begin this new experience with ; Victoria and Eva, for the discussions, exchanges, doubts, but most of all the laughs we shared in this now city of ours, Finally, my family, Agnès and Cécile, of course, And my parents, who supported and trusted in me, as they always do... merci. 2 ABTRACT The impact and instrumentalization of collective memory has been broadly addressed in nationalist/ authoritarian contexts, albeit very much less in democratic ones. France's national identity has been very much constructed on its rich History, and still upholds today –to the world but most of all for its citizens– an image of “Homeland of Human rights” rooted on the 1789 French Revolution. The thesis questions this image as to its origins, validity and perpetration through the years. In the light of this idealized national image, it then addresses the current counterterrorism measures adopted by the French State since 2015 Charlie Hebdo dreadful attacks. -
Debout La France !
DEBOUT LA FRANCE ! Le projet de Nicolas Dupont-Aignan pour l’élection présidentielle 2017 1 LE PROJET PRESIDENTIEL DE NICOLAS DUPONT-AIGNAN La France mérite qu’on se batte pour elle. Je veux la sauver avec un projet présidentiel à la fois ambitieux, concret et solide, fruit de milliers de rencontres avec les Français et de centaines d’heures de travail avec des acteurs de terrain et des experts reconnus. Pour le porter, je suis entouré d’une équipe d’hommes et de femmes honnêtes, compétents, gaullistes et patriotes. Je suis candidat à la présidence de la République car je sais qu’une autre politique est possible. Je suis le candidat qui veut rendre le pouvoir aux Français. Je suis le candidat de l’ordre, indispensable pour vivre ensemble. Je suis le candidat du travail, du mérite et de la relance économique. Je suis le candidat de la justice sociale pour rassembler les Français. Oui, je veux une France à nouveau debout, capable de défendre ses intérêts, d’affirmer ses valeurs, de retrouver sa cohésion et sa place dans le monde. Nicolas DUPONT-AIGNAN Député-Maire d’Yerres (91) Président de Debout la France Candidat à la présidence de la République 2 MORALISER ET REFONDER LE SYSTEME POLITIQUE ........................................................................ 14 LE CONSTAT ...................................................................................................................................... 14 NOS MESURES ................................................................................................................................... 14 A. MORALISER LA VIE PUBLIQUE ................................................................................................................ 14 B. REDUIRE LE TRAIN DE VIE DE LA CLASSE POLITIQUE AVEC UN PARLEMENT PLUS RAMASSE ET PLUS EFFICACE ......... 15 C. REMETTRE LE CITOYEN AU CENTRE DU JEU DEMOCRATIQUE ET REVENIR A L’ESSENCE DE LA VE REPUBLIQUE ........ 15 EUROPE : REMPLACER L’UNION EUROPEENNE PAR UNE COMMUNAUTE DES ETATS EUROPEENS . -
Culture LE FN DANS LE FAISCEAU DES ARTS
CHEZ NOUS, DE LUCAS BELVAUX, est la réponse d’un artiste citoyen qui veut comprendre les mécanismes de la montée du Front national. qualifie de « citoyenne » et non de « mili- tante ». La montée du FN, son enracine- ment, en particulier dans les milieux populaires, inquiètent, questionnent nombre d’artistes et intellectuels, écri- vains, metteurs en scène de théâtre, pho- tographes… qui cherchent la forme adé- quate pour rendre compte du vote FN et, qui sait, le décourager. D’aucuns auscultent la mécanique qui permet à des formations extrémistes d’accéder au pouvoir. Anne- Cécile Vandalem a ainsi écrit et présenté l’été dernier au Festival d’Avignon, Tris- tesses, une pièce conçue comme un thril- ler, qui raconte comment la dirigeante du cinémaC’était en 2013. Lucas Belvaux tournait Parti du réveil populaire, de retour dans alors Pas son genre, une histoire d’amour son île natale, exploite le désarroi de la malheureuse entre une coiffeuse, population pour avancer ses pions électo- Jennifer, et un écrivain parisien affecté ralistes. Le spectacle n’avait pas manqué dans un lycée d’Arras. « Les élections muni- de jeter un froid glacial au cœur de la cani- cipales approchaient, les sondages don- cule provençale, laissant le public avignon- naient le Front national à 30-40 % dans la nais sidéré par un dispositif vidéo qui le région et je me suis interrogé : “Cette fille, transformait en véritable voyeur. Jennifer, pour qui j’éprouve de l’estime, de C’est un même effroi qu’avait provoqué, l’affection, pour qui vote-t-elle ? Et pour en 2011, Chute d’une nation. -
French Presidential Election Prepared for CEVIPOF, Jean Jaurès Foundation and Le Monde
3 April 2017 French Presidential Election Prepared for CEVIPOF, Jean Jaurès Foundation and Le Monde CONTACTS Brice Teinturier [email protected] Jean-François Doridot [email protected] Federico Vacas [email protected] 1 ©Ipsos CEVIPOF FJJ LE MONDE – EEF 2017 - Avril 2017 Technical note SAMPLE DATES OF FIELDWORK METHODOLOGY 14 300 persons registered on the FROM 31 MARCH TO 2 APRIL 2017. ONLINE INTERVIEWS electoral rolls, constituting a QUOTA METHOD: GENDER, AGE, representative national sample of the INDIVIDUAL'S OCCUPATION, French population aged 18 years and REGION, URBAN/RURAL. over. en partenariat avec As with any quantitative survey, this study presents results subject to the margins of error inherent in statistics. This report has been drawn up in compliance with the international standard ISO 20252 "Market research, social studies and opinion". 2 ©Ipsos CEVIPOF FJJ LE MONDE – EEF 2017 - Avril 2017 FRENCH ELECTION Question: On a scale from 0 to ten, where 0 means no interest at all and 10 a lot of interest, what is your level of interst regarding the Interest for the presidential election coming presidential election? (Note from 0 to 10) No interest at all Little interest Average interest Sufficient interest Lot of interest (0 à 1) (2 à 3) (4 à 6) (7 à 8) (9 à 10) 3% 3% 15% 26% 53% Average score 8,0 Not interested Quiet interested Interested 6% 15% 79% 3 ©Ipsos CEVIPOF FJJ LE MONDE – EEF 2017 - Avril 2017 FRENCH ELECTION Question: On a scale from 0 to ten, where 0 means no interest at all and 10 a lot of interest, what is your level of interst regarding the Interest for the presidential election coming presidential election? (Note from 0 to 10) 81 80 81 79 80 75 79 Interested 74 71 71 74 20 20 21 21 19 Quite 14 15 14 15 14 15 interested 5 6 8 8 7 5 5 5 6 6 6 Not Jan. -
ISS Forum 20
H-Diplo | ISSF Forum, No. 20 (2019) issforum.org Forum Editors: Michael C. Behrent and Diane Labrosse Web and Production Editor: George Fujii Introduction by Michael C. Behrent H-Diplo/ISSF Policy Forum on the 2019 European Elections Published on 7 June 2019 Permalink: http://issforum.org/forums/europe-2019 Shortlink: http://tiny.cc/ISSF-Forum-20 PDF URL: http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Forum-20.pdf Contents Introduction by Michael C. Behrent, Appalachian State University ....................................... 2 Essay by Eszter Babarczy, Moholy-Nagy University of Art (Budapest) ................................... 6 Essay by Olivier Costa, CNRS, Sciences Po (Bordeaux), Collège d’Europe (Bruges) ............... 8 Essay by Olivier Costa, CNRS, Sciences Po (Bordeaux), Collège d’Europe (Bruges) Translated for H-Diplo by Michael C. Behrent ....................................................................... 12 Essay by Laura Fasanaro, Roma Tre University (Rome) ......................................................... 16 Essay by Till van Rahden, Université de Montréal ................................................................. 21 © Copyright 2019 The Authors | H-Diplo/ISSF Forum 20 (2019) Introduction by Michael C. Behrent, Appalachian State University lections to the European Parliament are in many respects the ugly duckling of the European election cycle. They lack the obvious importance and immediate repercussions of presidential and parliamentary elections, yet they undeniably embody the core of the European ideal, even in its Ecurrent battered and beleaguered state. The European Parliament’s 751 members are, after all, directly elected by the European Union’s 500 million citizens. In recent decades, the Parliament’s role in the EU’s institutional architecture has deepened, giving members a prominent role in drafting legislation and approving the EU’s budget. Yet the Parliament’s rising stature has not been matched by equal levels of public awareness of its role. -
Voter Autrement 2017 for French Presidential Election — the Online Experiment
Voter Autrement 2017 for French Presidential Election — The Online Experiment Sylvain Bouvereta,∗, Renaud Blancha, Antoinette Baujardb, Franc¸ois Durande, Herrade Igersheimc,d, Jer´ omeˆ Lange,d, Annick Laruellef, Jean-Franc¸ois Laslierg,d, Isabelle Lebonh, Vincent Merlinh,d aLIG, Univ. Grenoble-Alpes bGATE Lyon Saint-Etienne,´ Universite´ Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne´ cBETA, Universite´ de Strasbourg dCNRS eLAMSADE, Universite´ Paris-Dauphine fUPV-EHU, Universidad del Pa´ıs Vasco gParis School of Economics hCREM, Universites´ Caen-Normandie et Rennes 1 Abstract In March and April 2017, we have run a voting experiment during the French presidential election. During this experiment, participants were asked to test several alternative voting methods to elect the French pres- ident, like scoring methods, instant-runoff voting, Borda with partial rankings. The experiment was both carried out in situ in polling stations during the first round of the presidential election (using paper ballots), and online during the month preceding the first round, and until the second round of the election (using a web application). A total of 6358 participants took part to the in situ experiment and 37739 participants took part to the online experiment. This paper provides an extensive description of the online experiment. The aim is not to provide any result about this experiment, but to describe the protocol and the format of the dataset resulting from this experiment. Keywords: Voting Theory, Experiments, Elections, Online Voting 1. Introduction In April 2017, the fourth edition of the series of experiments about alternative voting methods at the French presidential election was carried out. During this experiment, called “Voter Autrement”, voters from 5 French cities were asked, right after having voted in their respective polling stations for the first round of the official election, to test alternative voting methods for the election of the French president. -
Macron Leaks” Operation: a Post-Mortem
Atlantic Council The “Macron Leaks” Operation: A Post-Mortem Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer The “Macron Leaks” Operation: A Post-Mortem Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-588-6 This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Indepen- dence. The author is solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. June 2019 Contents Acknowledgments iv Abstract v Introduction 1 I- WHAT HAPPENED 4 1. The Disinformation Campaign 4 a) By the Kremlin media 4 b) By the American alt-right 6 2. The Aperitif: #MacronGate 9 3. The Hack 10 4. The Leak 11 5. In Summary, a Classic “Hack and Leak” Information Operation 14 6. Epilogue: One and Two Years Later 15 II- WHO DID IT? 17 1. The Disinformation Campaign 17 2. The Hack 18 3. The Leak 21 4. Conclusion: a combination of Russian intelligence and American alt-right 23 III- WHY DID IT FAIL AND WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED? 26 1. Structural Reasons 26 2. Luck 28 3. Anticipation 29 Lesson 1: Learn from others 29 Lesson 2: Use the right administrative tools 31 Lesson 3: Raise awareness 32 Lesson 4: Show resolve and determination 32 Lesson 5: Take (technical) precautions 33 Lesson 6: Put pressure on digital platforms 33 4. Reaction 34 Lesson 7: Make all hacking attempts public 34 Lesson 8: Gain control over the leaked information 34 Lesson 9: Stay focused and strike back 35 Lesson 10: Use humor 35 Lesson 11: Alert law enforcement 36 Lesson 12: Undermine propaganda outlets 36 Lesson 13: Trivialize the leaked content 37 Lesson 14: Compartmentalize communication 37 Lesson 15: Call on the media to behave responsibly 37 5.