Master´S Thesis

CEVRO Institute

MASTER´S THESIS

Jennifer Werthwein

Prague, 2019

CEVRO Institute

The development of the German-Israeli relations

An analysis of the German-Israeli armament cooperation 1957 - 1965

Jennifer Werthwein

PPE - Philosophy, Politics, Economics Thesis Advisor: Tomáš Pojar Master´s Thesis Prague, 2019

Abstract

On the evening of December 27, 1957, Shimon Peres, Director General of the Ministry of

Defense of Israel and close associate of the Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion visited the

German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauß at his home in Rott am Inn. The meeting marks the beginning of a thrilling, in many respects controversial diplomatic and military operation, known under the codeword Frank (reich) / Kol (onien) [engl. French Colony]. The close armament cooperation occurred in the time between the conclusion of the restitution agreement in Luxembourg in 1952 and the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1965.

However, very little is known about what happened during the thirteen years in between.

Recently, files of the Foreign Ministry for the years 1963, 1964 and 1965 were made public.

They approve the close armament cooperation between the two countries at a time when diplomatic relations between them had not existed. Moreover, the files show the extent of the cooperation. They reach from a training and education aid and the first delivery of submarines from Germany to Israel, to the delivery of military equipment to rearm the German Bundeswehr from Israel to Germany.

The question arises how such close armament cooperation could evolve, although no formal relations existed. In the shadow of the Shoah, Israel could not agree to formalize the relationship in Luxembourg in 1952. However, when Israel offered Germany the formalization three years later despite the strongest reservations of the public, the German government did not want to do so. This was due the pursue of the Hallstein Doctrine for the sole claim of West Germany to represent whole Germany. Moreover, the Arab countries threatened West Germany to recognize East Germany in case of any cooperation with Israel, obliging the cooperation to be secret (cf. WEINGARDT 2002, pp. 106).

Nevertheless, the German-Israeli relations continuously strengthened. The paper will show that this emerged from the fact that it was more beneficial for both countries to ally regarding domestic and international politics and regarding economic factors. Moral questions were barely part of the discussions but rather embedded into the desired outcome.

The research shows that the four leading theories of international relations realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism, support the analysis and thus, the understanding of the motivations and decisions made regarding the secret armament cooperation from 1957 to 1965 and its importance for the proceeding of the German-Israeli relations. However, only by applying the four leading theories of international relations, the underlying motives and policy decisions of the armament cooperation from 1957 to 1965 between Germany and Israel can be pictured and explained comprehensively.

Table of Content

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 8

2. THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ...... 13

2.1. REALISM ...... 13

2.1.1. Classical Realism after E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau ...... 14

2.1.2. Security dilemma after John H. Herz ...... 15

2.1.3. Neorealism after Kenneth Waltz ...... 16

2.1.4. Advantages and problems of Realism ...... 17

2.2. INSTITUTIONALISM ...... 18

2.2.1. English School of international relations ...... 18

2.2.2. Utilitarian Institutionalism ...... 19

2.2.3. Advantages and Problems of Institutionalism ...... 20

2.3. LIBERALISM ...... 21

2.3.1. Three forms of Liberalism after Andrew Moravcsik ...... 21

2.3.2. Demarcation of Realism and Institutionalism ...... 22

2.3.3. Theory of Democratic Peace ...... 23

2.3.4. Limits of Liberalism ...... 23

2.4. CONSTRUCTIVISM ...... 24

2.4.1. Central aspects and boundaries ...... 24

2.4.2. Perspectives and problems of Constructivism ...... 26

2.5. OVERVIEW ...... 27

3. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARMAMENT COOPERATION ...... 29

3.1. THE BEGINNING OF THE GERMAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN LUXEMBOURG ...... 29

3.2. FIRST INTERACTIONS AFTER THE LUXEMBOURG AGREEMENT ...... 30

3.3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COOPERATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE PAST ...... 32

3.4. DEBATES ABOUT STRONGER COOPERATION WITH GERMANY WITHIN THE ISRAELI KNESSET ...... 33

3.5. ISRAELI ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE GERMAN BUNDESWEHR ACCRUE ...... 34

3.6. THE BEGINNING OF EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING AID FROM GERMANY TO ISRAEL ...... 36

3.7. THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE AGREEMENT ...... 39

3.8. INCREASING CRITICISM TOWARDS THE ARMAMENT COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL WITHIN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT ...... 42

3.9. SECRECY PROBLEMS ...... 44

3.10. THE COOPERATION BECAME PUBLIC ...... 46

3.11. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN GERMANY AND ISRAEL ...... 47

3.12. INCREASING THREATS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES TO RECOGNIZE THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ...... 49

3.13. THE FAILURE OF MISSION NERVAS ...... 50

3.14. THE CLIMAX OF THE CRISIS ...... 51

3.15. GERMANY DEMONSTRATED THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT ...... 53

3.16. GRADUAL ALIENATION BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES ...... 54

3.17. SOLUTION BY DETACHMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND ISRAEL ...... 55

4. APPLICATION OF THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT TO THE THEORIES ...... 57

4.1. REALISM ...... 57

4.1.1. Anarchy and Hierarchy ...... 57

4.1.2. Security as the primary objective of government action ...... 58

4.1.3. Uncertainty as of the underlying condition ...... 59

4.1.4. International Security Dilemma ...... 60

4.2. INSTITUTIONALISM ...... 61

4.2.1. Uncertainty leads to common rules and institutions ...... 62

4.2.2. Institutions matter ...... 63

4.2.3. Stronger institutions lead to higher control ...... 64

4.3. LIBERALISM ...... 65

4.3.1. Individuals determine the interaction on the international level ...... 65

4.3.2. International cooperation ...... 67

4.3.3. International politics as a result of a two-level game ...... 68

4.3.4. Theorem of Democratic Peace ...... 68

4.4. CONSTRUCTIVISM ...... 68

4.4.1. Culture and institutions construct an international system ...... 69

4.4.2. Four principles of all states ...... 70

4.4.3. The social construction of reality ...... 71

5. CONCLUSION ...... 73

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 77

APPENDIX ...... 82

TIMETABLE ON THE GERMAN-ISRAELI-RELATIONS BETWEEN 1945 AND 1967 ...... 82

1. Introduction

At the end of September 2014, the arrival of INS Tanin was celebrated in the port of Haifa, meaning that the fourth in Germany1 produced submarine of the Dolphin class took service in the Israeli Navy. In the following years, two other submarines came into force. In return, the

German Bundeswehr has leased Israeli drones for use in Afghanistan and has German soldiers trained by the Israel Defense Forces in urban warfare. These are current examples of armament cooperation between Germany and Israel (cf. BT-Drs. 18/2787 2014). However, the cooperation of the two states in this sensitive political subject has a long history, beginning about ten years after the end of the Second World War and ten years before the formal establishment of diplomatic relations in 1965.

The German-Israeli armament cooperation dates back to the 1950s. The young Jewish state faced a hostile Arab neighborhood and was desperately looking for war equipment for the IDF which was still under development. The Federal Republic seemed to be a reliable partner in this matter. A moral obligation to Israel characterized the policy of the first Federal Chancellor

Konrad Adenauer. After the conclusion of the Luxembourg Agreement in 1952, therefore, there were cautious overtures between the two states in the field of armament. Already in the early

1950s, Israel acquired dual-use goods, goods that can be used in both the civilian and military sectors, from Germany through the Luxembourg Agreement (cf. NEUBERGER 2005).

The starting point of the secret armament cooperation and first major weapon deal marks a conversation in December 1957 when Shimon Peres, Director General of the Tel Aviv Ministry of Defense and close associate of Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, visited the German

1 In the course of the research, Germany stands only for West Germany, namely the Bundesrepublik Deutschland and literally translated as the Federal Republic of Germany, in short BRD. East Germany, namely the Deutsche Demokratische Republik and literally translated as the German Democratic Republic, is named fully or in short as GDR.

Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauß at his home in Rott am Inn. They agreed on armament cooperation between the two countries, which should later become known as Frank/Kol2. The beginning of the diplomatic and military operation between Germany and Israel is unparalleled as it was secretly negotiated at a time when diplomatic relations between the two countries had not existed.

Even in the initial phase, it was by no means a one-way street. Cooperating with Israel was relevant for the security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany: Bonn urgently needed intelligence on the weapons systems of the Soviet Union. Israel was the perfect source of information because its Arab neighbors were supplied primarily from Moscow's arsenals.

Already after the Suez crisis of 1956, Israel's military provided the Germans with captured

Soviet weapons technology. Besides, Israel delivered ammunition, uniforms and above all the famous Israeli Uzi submachine gun to the German Bundeswehr.

In Israel, such deals with Germany were initially viewed critically. When munitions exports to

Germany became publicly known in the summer of 1959, a storm of indignation broke out in the Knesset. However, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion made clear, that it would harm

Israel's position in the world, its future, and its existence, if the German economic and political weight would be left the Arabs as allies.

From 1962 the arms cooperation was extended. While primarily surplus and decommissioned

German military equipment shipped to Israel, the subsequent armament shipments focused on sizeable military equipment. In August 1962, Adenauer gave his permission for deliveries that were supposed to take under the strictest secrecy. In order to not upset the Arab states, the number of initiates kept as low as possible, and the delivery of weapons had to be hushed up.

The delivery of weapon systems was covered up, too. Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauß reported about adventurous methods, like the secret fetching of equipment and weapons that

2 Frank/Kol, written out Frankreich/Kolonien and literally translated as France/Colonies

were promised to Israel from depots of the German Bundeswehr, later reported as stolen by the

German police. Both sides were satisfied with the armament shipments (cf. DEUTSCHKRON

1983, pp. 254).

However, in autumn 1964, the German-Israeli armament cooperation was reported in the

Egyptian press. The rhetoric of the Arab states increased sharply threatening to recognize the

German Democratic Republic, short GDR3 if the Federal Republic continued to provide military support to the Jewish state. In response to the arms deliveries, Egypt's head of state

Gamal Abdel Nasser announced in January 1965 the visit of the GDR State Council Chairman

Walter Ulbricht. In Bonn this was not welcomed, as the prevention of the recognition of the

GDR was one of their leading principles. According to the Hallstein Doctrine4, this would automatically lead to the demolition of diplomatic relations with Cairo. The government under

Ludwig Erhard became nervous and announced that henceforth armament deliveries into areas of tension would be stopped, also applying for Israel. Bonn tried to convince the Israelis of the transformation of armament deliveries into other goods, but Jerusalem responded rigidly and insisted on the delivery of the agreed weapons systems. Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol said in the Knesset that Germany has an unprecedented heavy responsibility. He has to assist Israel with the equipment necessary for its safety. Moreover, compensation cannot replace the fulfillment of this obligation.

At the same time, Bonn tried to persuade Nasser to give up or postpone Ulbricht's visit.

Regardless, Ulbricht visited Egypt at the end of February 1964. The GDR entered into bilateral

3 GDR, or German Democratic Republic, translated from the German term Deutsche Demokratische Republik, was a state in Central Europe that existed from 1949 to 1990. Originating from the division of Germany after 1945, the GDR until the peaceful revolution in the fall of 1989 was a communist or real-socialist dictatorship under the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, which professed Marxism-Leninism. The republic understood itself as a socialist state of the workers. 4 The Hallstein doctrine was a foreign policy doctrine of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1955 to 1969. It said that the inclusion of diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic by third countries must be regarded as an unfriendly act against the Federal Republic. Any countermeasures of the Federal Republic were not specified. Thus, a wide range of economic sanctions was possible until diplomatic relations with the state concerned were broken off. The aim was to isolate the GDR from a foreign policy perspective.

agreements on cooperation in various areas. In return, Cairo announced the opening of a consulate in East Berlin. In response, the Federal Republic ceased economic aid and withdrew the ambassador.

The relationship between Bonn and Jerusalem was distant. In order to overcome the discrepancies, the CDU deputy Kurt Birrenbach was sent to Israel in March 1965 offering the establishment of diplomatic relations as a compensation for the lack of armament deliveries (cf.

DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 288). For years the Federal Republic had shied away from this step trying to prevent the recognition of the GDR by the Arab states. After tough negotiations,

Germany and Israel agreed to convert the outstanding deliveries into a transfer fee of DM 140 million, enabling Israel to buy the weapons elsewhere. When resolved, the way to negotiate full diplomatic relations was set.

After the establishment of diplomatic relations and the affirmation of German politicians to stop supplying armament to the Middle East, armament cooperation continued in an adapted form.

Unobtrusive armament and individual parts for the production of weapons moved into the center of German exports to Israel5. Israel's ammunition shipments to Germany remained unchanged. Between 1977 and 1991, they amounted to about DM 1.3 billion6.

The paper aims to explain the context for the occurrence of the secret armament cooperation from 1957 to 1965 between Israel and Germany resulting in the establishment of diplomatic relations between both countries. The question asked, is what the underlying motives and policy decisions of the armament cooperation between Germany and Israel were. Hence, what led to the conclusion of the agreement. Therefore, the four leading theories of international relations realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism are utilized.

5 Especially diesel engines and gearboxes played a major role for the assembly of the Israeli main battle tank. 6 The currency rate between 1977 and 1991 was in average USD 1 = DM 2,13 (cf. MARCUSE 2018). Therefore, DM 1.3 billion was worth USD 610 million.

In the first place, the four leading theories of international relations are introduced in the second chapter. A historical outline, the development of the theories and the main characters behind each theory are given. However, special attention lays on the basic ideas and concepts of each theory and their limitations. The chapter aims illustrating the main differences between the four theories and highlighting their explanatory power for the reality of international politics is.

The third chapter will outline the historical development of the armament cooperation from the current state of research. Each chapter will present some section of the overall development starting with a brief introduction of the context of the Luxembourg Agreement as the foundation of the German-Israeli Relations, followed by the first significant interactions after the

Luxembourg Agreement, when Peres met Strauß in Rott in December 1957. The historical development will be explained in detail until Germany offered Israel the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1965.

After presenting the theories and the historical context independently, the theories will be applied to the historical context in the fourth chapter. In order to answer the research question, how the armament cooperation came about and what its underlying reasons were, the four leading theories of international relations are applied to the historical information accordingly.

However, the overall political, economic and geopolitical situation is added to the explanation necessary for gaining a complete picture of the circumstances.

In conclusion, the paper shows that the armament cooperation was determined by various and consolidating motivations from both sides. The dichotomy between the theories of international relations, which is often made up, can be refuted. Instead, an interlock of the different theories is needed to picture the historical case appropriately. Realism seems to predominate with the explanatory power in the present case. However, if taken alone, it cannot explain all decisions comprehensively.

2. Theories of international relations

In the following, the four leading theories of international relations are presented, and their fundamental differences sought. The challenge is to provide a very compact but meaningful overview of the four theories of international relations that can provide an initial picture of the scientific approaches to explaining international relations. The decisive question of this chapter is to find out what the essential differences in theories of international relations are and what explanatory power they have for the reality of international politics. However, their explanatory power occurs in a historical context, wherefore a historical development is outlined. The assumption is that the different theories of international relations complement each other very well in sub-aspects, that even in more modern theoretical assumptions and considerations approaches are contained. This can be linked quite well with perspectives of traditional theories.

Methodically, a descriptive approach is chosen, that is, the core ideas of the particular theories are first described and then analyzed in their differentiation. First, the four theories realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism are presented chronologically in their respective forms by the leading representatives. Each chapter presents an assessment of the benefits, contradictions, and unsolved problems of the individual theories. In this context also, their differences are worked out. This chapter concludes with a summary giving a brief overview of the presented theories in order to obtain an overall picture for the following course of the paper.

2.1. Realism

Realism sees itself as one of the dominant theoretical schools of international relations. It became known at the end of the 1930s and 1940s within the US. The outbreak of the Second

World War refuted many theorists of international relations of that time as they had assumed that they could prevent or at least severely contain war through intergovernmental institutions

emerging at that time, like the idea of the League of Nations. However, the Second World War nullified these lofty expectations. Realism offered an alternative view that could explain the outbreak of the war despite the institutions that existed before.

2.1.1. Classical Realism after E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau

The first representative of political realism refers to Edward Hallett Carr. With the publication of his book The Twenty Years Crisis in 1939, Carr gave political realism a boost in international relations. In his book, Carr dealt critically with the preceding idealism and rejected its objective of international peace (cf. CARR 1966). Firstly, he states that history can be understood as a consequence of cause and effect which can be examined by intellectual means. Secondly, a theory does not create practice as the Utopians agree, but on the contrary, theory arises from practice. Therefore, science must distinguish between what should be and what is, namely, reality. He demands a balance between utopia and reality and puts the power interests of the powerful in the foreground of his reflections. Thirdly, politics is not a function of ethics, but on the contrary, ethics is a function of politics. Thus, morality is a product of power. However, he calls for the interaction of power and morality in political action at the same time.

Carr's colleague and best-known classical realist Hans Morgenthau gave realism the last and decisive boost when publishing his book Politics Among Nations in 1948. As a Jew living in

Germany, he had exposed to constant discrimination since his schooldays in the 1920s. The political interests of the lawyer and political scientist begin with the terrible experiences of the

First World War. In his main work, he formulates the principles of realism and thus lays the foundation for the first three decades of realistic analysis of international relations (cf.

MORGENTHAU 1967). He, too, sets himself apart from idealism and wants to regard the essence and history of man as they are, as the basis of his theory. In doing so classical realism refers to thinkers such as Niccolò Machiavelli or Thomas Hobbes and their assumptions about human nature, which they regard as unchanging and politics determining. According to them,

politics is determined by objective laws whose origin lies in the nature of man. The good cannot be realized, because according to Morgenthau's central assumption man is determined primarily by the drive for power. Hence, power is the central category of international politics, distinguishing it from economics, law, and ethics. Human only remains to recognize this lawfulness of power and to combine it with the goal of moderation. Morgenthau defines power as the domination of people over people but distinguishes between the power of democratic and limitless barbarism in non-democratic states. Although he strongly warns against moralism, he demands that balancing the consequences of political actions must be the highest virtue of politics. He makes a clear distinction between unlimited power and moral power. In doing so, he demands from the foreign policy actors the careful consideration of alternative options for action in the interest of the national interest. Decisive instruments in this matter are

Morgenthau's diplomacy and the Balance of Power.

In classical realism, states and political leaders are the political actors. The principal category is the power interest. Since there is no decision-making and sanctioning authority in international politics, states at the international level are in a state of anarchy in which they seek to maintain or increase their power (cf. JAKOBS 2003).

2.1.2. Security dilemma after John H. Herz

The theory of John Herz presented in his book Staatenwelt und Weltpolitik sets in at this point

(cf. HERZ 1974). Against the background of the armaments race in the 1970s, the theory states that there is an international security dilemma in that there is no superordinate regulatory and security authority for the individual states at the structural level of the international system.

From the desire for security and the protection against attacks of others, a state is forced to accumulate more and more power. In turn, other states unsettle and ultimately leads to a race for power. However, it is not the mere, natural interest in power, such as Morgenthau, but the need for security that is the central category. The international power competition is not

biological, but a social problem. The fear of each other, not the pure imperiousness for power is the core of power politics according to Herz.

2.1.3. Neorealism after Kenneth Waltz

This idea is taken on by the leading representative of neorealism, also known as structural realism, Kenneth Waltz. In 1979, the American political scientist formulated his system- theoretical considerations in his work Theory of International Politics. From the point of structural realism, only two organizing principles in international relations exist, namely anarchy and hierarchy. Hierarchy is the common structural feature within a state. However, in theory, a black box remains. The international system as inter-state relations, on the other hand, is decentralized and anarchic. Accordingly, anarchy prevails in the modern world of states, which does not mean violence or chaos, but merely the absence of a superior power. Therefore, a risk of violence and the need for a defense for the individual state maintains, resulting in defense preparedness and deterrence to one's survival.

The international interaction of the actors can also be expressed in the form of alliances.

However, there is a varying degree of power relations between the individual states, which leads to different configurations of the overall system. According to Walz, states compete for security and power, but above all for security. The best means of survival is power. States arm themselves militarily to ensure their security because ultimately, they depend on self-help for survival. There is no world police to help in the event of a raid. However, an upgrading state releases its neighbors the fear of being attacked by it in the future. Accordingly, the neighbors also upgrade, which in turn increases the uncertainty for their neighbors. There is an armament race in which all participants want to outdo each other. This security dilemma does not arise from the desire for conquest, but only from the desire for security. The urge for the security of all states, therefore, leads to rearmament and consequently increases the uncertainty between them, a classic rationality trap.

This is the clear demarcation of neorealism from its classical variant. The international system is a self-help system, and the different power potentials available to states for self-help form the relevant difference between the state units. According to Walz, interstate interaction characterized by the preservation of one's autonomy and, in the case of cooperation in the distribution of profits, no less than the partner state. According to neorealism, three power distributions of international politics are conceivable: uni-, bi- and multipolar. The safest is the bipolar, as it is less conflict-prone than the other two. Security arises with the most significant possible balance of power (cf. SCHÖRNIG 2003, pp. 83).

2.1.4. Advantages and problems of Realism

In brief, realism recalls the power and potential for violence in politics. Classic realism in the first half of the twentieth century assumes that peoples’ desire for power leads to a desire for state power. The ensuing neorealism, on the other hand, argues that ensuring security for states becomes the engine of power interests. One of the strengths of neorealism is its sensitivity to competition between states, the constraints of the international system, and the ideological aspects, which demand a critical reflection on power and political interests. However, foreign policy today cannot be reduced to nineteenth-century diplomacy as assumed by Morgenthau, and in democratic systems, the particular society and its interests also included. The individual states cannot remain a black box. The security dilemma may make an essential contribution to explaining international conflicts, but that alone is not enough. Today, values and norms are valid not only in the individual states but also on an international level: human rights, for example, represent such an extremely central value of the international community. Another criticism of realism is that it limits the options for political action. Besides, the proponents of this theory adopt objectivism that they ultimately do not adhere. Thus, even the realists’ interpretation of the world, overlooking in part the fact that man is not just a power-driven being but also a social one (cf. KRELL 2003, pp. 158).

2.2. Institutionalism

In this theory, mutual interdependence on the basis of common goals creates institutions through which relationships are regulated. At this point, two basic directions are presented, the

English School and the utilitarian approach.

2.2.1. English School of international relations

While realists like Waltz assume an international system, institutionalism speaks of international society and at the same time seeks to establish a connection between the anarchic international politics and the hierarchical state politics. An outstanding representative of this theory is Hedley Bull, one of the co-founders of the English School of international relations.

It is assigned to the normative direction of institutionalism. In his work The Anarchical Society:

A Study of Order in World Politics published in 1977, Bull states that regulated relationships between social groups are a fundamental requirement of society even without a central authority

(cf. BULL 1995).

According to Bull, socially organized life always has three objectives: security against violence, reliability of agreements and stability of the possessions. Political scientist applies these goals to international relations. He asserts that states organize their ordinary existence according to these guidelines, even though this organization has its limits and is always in danger. Common fundamental interests led to commonly accepted rules and these to common institutions. While in realism uncertainty and states' fear of each other lead to a willingness to conflict, in institutionalism this leads to common interests. Economic and social exchanges characterize international state relations more than warlike intentions. A standard set of rules and network of institutions bind the states together, not only out of selfish motivation but also because morality and law gain their weight. A balance of powering institutionalism sets himself mechanically, automatically in comparison to realism.

In institutionalism, this balance is the result of an internationally developed understanding of common interests, reflected in the heads of those responsible and communicated among them in negotiations. The term institution does not necessarily mean an organizational form with buildings, articles of association, own household or administration. There may well be habits and practices that work towards the above goals. So, regimes that represent international agreements, without necessarily being fixed in writing. In this sense, international law and diplomacy are also considered as institutions.

2.2.2. Utilitarian Institutionalism

Economic and social relations between states create interdependencies. While realism also takes this into account, it is crucial for institutionalism to avoid these interdependencies in favor of the sovereignty and autonomy of the state. The utilitarian approach of institutionalism assumes that interdependence is a relational pattern at the international level characterized by a high degree of interaction, the loss of which entails high costs for the respective states. Conflicts may well be associated with this interaction. For example, states less exposed to interdependence may seek to manipulate the international system in their favor. While in realism the individual state acts as an actor, this theory also interacts with international organizations, social and economic interest groups resulting in a dense network of international relations, which increases the willingness to control the exchange processes among each other.

Thus, power is no longer the only means of international politics, but norms and institutions can contribute to the settlement of conflicts of interest. This defuses the security dilemma and reduces the fear of being attacked.

Nevertheless, even with identical interests of states, cooperation does not automatically occur, because the rationality of the individual state is not necessarily identical to the collective rationality, as there may be uncertainty whether all actors actually subordinate to the common goal, or not a state leaves the universal obligations in favor of an individual interest. Besides,

the cost-benefit distribution of international cooperation remains initially open. Institutionalism assumes that regimes, that is, norm-led and rule-based cooperation between states, represent an opportunity to achieve greater security in international action. These include contractual agreements, which, however, need not be fixed in writing, but may well be based on agreements or traditional practices. Regimes institutionalize cooperation through four related mechanisms: the principles set the common goals. Common standards are the standards of behavior on the way to achieving these goals. These norms are concretized and operationalized in rules, resulting in the procedures, accordingly practices that are analogous to the rules.

In realism, cooperation stands in the shadow of the power and security competition between states. However, utilitarian institutionalism assumes that even those states that pursue only self- interests or useful calculations are endeavoring to establish order on the international level, beyond hegemony and hierarchy, reduce the obstacles to cooperation, such as the security dilemma or the violation of regimes. The normative approach of this theory emphasizes the socialization of states by macro institutions (cf. KRELL 2003, pp. 173).

2.2.3. Advantages and Problems of Institutionalism

Overall, institutionalism seems to consider of increasing global interconnectedness through issues of international relevance, such as environmental protection, but also at the level of interaction, for example, on the world market, intertwining through the Internet for instance, national power interests arising from the need for security have long since given way to cooperation and international institutionalization. If, on the one hand, bridges can be built from this theory to realism, then institutionalism nevertheless appears to be a more modified theory of international relations.

2.3. Liberalism

Liberalism as a school of thought in international relations is applying the essential anthropological assumptions from the eponymous theory of liberalism aiming for international cooperation and peace. Three connected principles are essential, namely the rejection of power politics, international cooperation and the primary role of non-governmental organizations for influencing policy choices (cf. RIPSMAN 2016, pp. 4). However, the areas of study within liberalism are broad, and thus only the most important aspects will be outlined. Idealistic liberalism assumes that forms of domination and economy, as well as geographical location, specific forms of identity. In economic liberalism, market factors determine cooperation and confrontation. In contrast, Republican liberalism assumes that the form of government of a state also determines its external behavior. In this case, there is a demarcation to realism and institutionalism.

2.3.1. Three forms of Liberalism after Andrew Moravcsik

Since the 1970s the new liberalism of international relations in the form of its leading representative, Andrew Moravcsik, has been developing at a time when the relaxation in the

East-West Conflict with systemic approaches was explained inadequately (cf. MORAVCSIK

1997, pp. 513). It experienced a renaissance in the 1990s. The central assumption is that preference formation in foreign policy takes place over the material and immaterial interests of individuals and groups of a state. Therefore, the perspective changes, because the black box state overcomes and organizes in social groups. In this lay the decisive difference between realism and institutionalism. It is not the world of states but the world of state-organized societies that is of primary interest. If the preferences of social groups cover up, co-operation and coexistence take place on an international level. In the opposite case of diverging preferences, negotiations are taking place at the intergovernmental level in feedback with the respective society. If this fails, clashes may result.

Moravcsik distinguishes three variants of liberalism (cf. ebd.). The Republican liberalism focuses on domestic representation. The structure and decision-making processes within social and political organizations and institutions determine the foreign policy action of a state.

Foreign policy is all the more cooperative, the broader the influence is evenly distributed among many groups: the fewer groups involved in preference formation, the higher the tendency to confront other states. In idealistic liberalism, identities and values in a society are formed, for example, by geographical location, economic or political form. These demonstrate themselves in the social demands. If domestic preferences converge on ideological foreign policy, then cooperation takes place at the international level. Divergence is the consequence of a policy of tension and conflict. The focus of economic liberalism is on the incentives of the market, where economic preferences determine foreign policy. The security policy consequence is a renunciation of aggressive external behavior in order to keep the economic exchange stable.

However, social actors also regulate the opening of markets to optimize their market position.

2.3.2. Demarcation of Realism and Institutionalism

It is not the international system that determines the preferences and actions of states, but it is the individuals and groups that pursue their material and ideal interests. These interests determine international interaction, initially independent of the preferences and strategies of other states. However, the theory of liberalism is not concerned with domestic politics, but with the interests of the society that effect on foreign policy. As described above, even in liberalism, states can be concerned about their safety. In contrast to realism and institutionalism, however, this does not occur due to a specific power constellation, but only in the case of different state- mediating preferences of societies. Representatives of the new liberalism, such as Andrew

Moravcsik, believe that there is a connection between democracy and peace, even though in principle they believe that aggression is possible even in democratically composed international systems (cf. KRELL 2003, pp. 201).

2.3.3. Theory of Democratic Peace

The perspective of social analysis, and in particular the empirical and theoretical thesis of democratic peace. In essence, Ernst-Otto Czempiel, one of the first modern peace researchers, states that democracies tend towards a non-violent foreign policy among themselves as non- democratic states (cf. CZEMPIEL 1998). However, it is unclear as to whether democracies are comparably peaceful even for non-democratic states. The hypothesis of democratic peace is explained both domestically and internationally, among other things, with the institutional argument. The institutional connection of social interest groups thereby leads to stability at all levels. Normative-cultural, it is also stated that the democratic values in the respective states are similar, while distrust of non-democratic states tends to lead to a security dilemma.

Furthermore, democratic peace is understood as a piece of deterrence between risk-averse states. However, the degree of democratization of societies is also different. Thus, the risk diminishes with a substantial democratic expression of the state (cf. HASENCLEVER 2003, pp. 199). A system of domination based on consensus and therefore not in need of a force instrument will also avoid violence in relations with the international environment7.

2.3.4. Limits of Liberalism

Three counter-arguments against the hypothesis of democratic peace can be pointed out: on the one hand, liberal norms and institutions do not always lead to peaceful foreign policy.

Furthermore, factors other than the rule system must be used to explain war and peace between democracies and non-democracies. Moreover, the social composition of authoritarian regimes does not automatically lead to a more aggressive foreign policy. The finding of peace between democracies can be secured only since the end of World War II. The democracies of the 19th century were relatively unstable. Therefore, a distinction between stable and unstable

7 The thesis of democratic peace can still be differentiated into different lines of argument. The elaboration is beyond the scope of this Thesis. Thus, the limits of the liberal peace theory are shown below.

democratic systems is necessary. For instance, the process of democratization is often associated with nationalism, which turns into aggression. Unstable democratic states that are still in the process of democratization thus have a comparatively high potential for armed conflict.

Criticizing the legitimacy of the security argument is also critical. The US tends to war against non-democracies. Here, not only in the war against Mexico but also more currently in the Iraq war, the defense argument at the international level is not undisputed. Indirect forms of participation in the war also limit the explanatory power of democratic peace: weapons supplies, military support and other forms of interference that promote violence should be mentioned here. If then, the central assumption of the liberal peace theory is that violence in the organization of the system of rule and its external relations declines as the level of participation in a society increases, this can only be partially agreed empirically (cf. KRELL 2003, pp. 2017).

By downplaying the relative distribution of power and by downplaying the central role if foreign policy executive’s liberalism limits its theory for expelling various aspects of international relations (cf. RIPSMAN 2016, p. 6).

2.4. Constructivism

Constructivism bases on a reciprocal construction of ideas and reality. In this thinking, the world is accessible to actors only through interpretation and perception, and ideas and interpretations shape it.

2.4.1. Central aspects and boundaries

Constructivism is more a purely scientific research perspective than a ready-made theory, often associated with a social movement. Its upswing, which is strongly influenced by sociological and cultural studies approaches, is also related to the end of the East-West conflict. Central is

the assumption that ideas and intuitions construct our reality and vice versa. Interactions form these ideas and identities. They allow and justify actions and strategies and are thus more than just the expression of interests, as is the case in utilitarian institutionalism. Reality is therefore not experienced as natural, but it is socially constructed and is changeable. Ideas are an image, a knowledge of reality whose reality is more important than material reality. Norms and ideas, namely values characterize the identities of the political actors and their relationship to one another. State interests and structures must be considered here in a historical and cultural context constituted by norms. His principal representative, Alexander Wendt, demarcates constructivism from rationalist theories: social actors and the surrounding structures invariably determine and change each other. The interests are also social, hence constructed interests. On the international level, norms are either imposed, taken over for interest or taken over by insight, depending on the cooperation of states in international institutions (cf. ULBERT 2003, pp. 391).

Constructivism, which regards the reality of international relations to be a social construct, has three programmatic tendencies: on the one hand, one could speak of a socialization of nature, which implies, that much of what was considered natural in the previously presented theories, get here a social and thus constructed by human component. Flood catastrophes, for example, can no longer be described as a purely natural phenomenon, but as a part of the problems that people have caused.

Constructivists, therefore, address the boundaries between nature and the social, noting that this demarcation is already a social process. The new aspect of constructivism is that interests are not determined naturally and definitely, but that they are negotiable. Interests are always the result of a communication process. Second, the world is re-idealized. This means that the respective interests of a state have no objective existence, but made and resulted from interpretations of our world. An Iranian rocket, for example, causes more significant concern for the US than 200 identical British models. It is not the structure of the international system

that creates friendliness or enmity between the states, but the interpretations associated with it.

The third programmatic aspect is the revaluation of culture and norms in international relations: in utilitarian institutionalism, norms are comparable to traffic rules. They regulate a process that would exist without them for the benefit of all involved. Constructivist norms are closer to the rules of chess, which would not work without them. Norms are not regulative here, but constitutive. Constructivism tries to describe the world as it is, and as such collective ideas can thus, as in realism and Marxism, represent an objective reality. However, this is just socially constructed.

2.4.2. Perspectives and problems of Constructivism

In his article, Anarchy Is What States Make of It published in 1992, Alexander Wendt sets himself apart from neorealism, emphasizing that even within anarchy different security systems can be useful (cf. WENDT 1992, pp. 129). Only disputes about the load distribution will come up, but violence will no longer occur. Self-help and organizations can guarantee security in these systems of states if states with the same interests advocate it. Regardless of this, Wendt states that the real state's anarchic state of nature in realism is not really a natural state, but that there is already an international interaction and interpretation between the states that does not automatically end in the security dilemma. Even traditionally grown states and realities between states, such as the East-West conflict, can be deprived by their reflection and interpretation of their apparent naturalness and thus changed.

For Wendt, the national interest is also socially constructed. Nevertheless, four principles are valid for the virtually of all states and of collective interest: firstly, the physical survival of a state, secondly, autonomy, thirdly, economic well-being and fourthly collective self-esteem.

Furthermore, there are national individual interests which are social facts and thus objective facts which require intersubjective communication.

In summary, three themes of constructivism can be stated: there is a correlation between social actors and the social structures they have created. Secondly, the ideas and interpretations by which the material world receives its meaning and meaning are a central aspect. Thirdly, are the collective norms. Consequently, constructivism at its core in all the theories presented in this work, or at least touched on them. The problem is that constructivism does not provide an answer to the question of why and when which ideas play a unique role. If the idea lays the foundation for all actions, then ultimately the idea lacks its idea, or in other words, the constructivist approach remains an approach without a political theory. In the materialistic theories of international relations, that is, for instance, realism and Marxism, one crucial finding is that ideas often rationalize particular interests. This insight is not sufficiently integrated into constructivism until today. Besides, constructivism tends to devote itself to the so-called good ideas and norms in international relations and neglects the aspect that even pathological ideas and interests in the universal interaction of states can matter. The relationship between ideas and power has so far been insufficiently addressed.

2.5. Overview

Even today, the importance of realism lies in its two core assumptions, namely, power as motivation and real instrument of politics, which always has a power component at all levels.

In addition, the assumption that states always seek security at the international level has not lost its validity. The chronologically subsequent institutionalism emphasizes common interests and goals in international relations. Its idea of the resulting state-owned society offers an excellent opportunity to analytically tackle global problems such as in ecology or the so-called world market and to develop solutions that go beyond national potential. The merit of liberalism lies in the fact that for the first time the black box state becomes the object of investigation. The individual interests of the states of the international system determine the relations. This is the value of liberal thinking because we understand global politics only if we also consider national

interests and motivations for action in the analysis. The formation of preferences of groups of international actors can only be understood from within.

Moreover, liberalism with the idea of democratic peace makes a valuable contribution to research. As with neo-liberalism, the significance of historical-political development for the development of the own theory of international relations is also evident in constructivism with the end of the East-West conflict. The significance of constructivism lies in its tendency to philosophical interpretation. This research perspective emphasizes the ambivalence of idea and reality and thus directs the view towards a meta-level of consideration of international relations.

Other theoretical approaches, such as Neo-Marxism, feminism and political psychology, each bring their aspects into the discussion of international relations theories that can refreshingly and constructively expand traditional theoretical thinking.

This chapter took a closer look at the differences between the four leading theories of international relations and their explanatory power for the reality of international politics in general. One important conclusion is that they partly complement each other, which will be applied in the further course of this paper.

3. The historical context of the establishment of the armament cooperation

3.1. The beginning of the German-Israeli relations in Luxembourg

On 10 September 1952 Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Konrad Adenauer8, head of the CDU9 and the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Sharett10, member of

Mapai11, signed an agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel in

Luxembourg. Later known as the Luxembourg Agreement, it was considered as a symbol of reparation and as material compensation for the European Jews persecuted by the Nazi regime.

The Federal Republic undertook a contribution of a total of DM 3.45 billion12 to be delivered within 14 years to Israel. A share of DM 450 million was to be forwarded to the Conference on

Material Claims against Germany, which represented the Diaspora-Jews (cf. WOLFFSOHN

1988). This agreement created a precedent, because the legal successor of the German Reich, that the Government in Bonn recognized itself, provided material compensation to the citizens of another state that had not existed at the time of the injury, and reserved itself the right to put forward a claim on behalf of the Jews persecuted under Hitler. However, this agreement was the first step towards reconciliation between Jews and Germans (cf. SHINNAR 1967, pp. 53).

The Luxembourg Agreement as the starting point of the relationship between Germany and

Israel was seen as the most important cornerstone of the newly formed German Federal

8 Konrad Hermann Joseph Adenauer was a German statesman who served as the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, West Germany, between 1949 and 1963. He was member of the CDU party. 9 CDU, literally translated as Christian Democratic Union of Germany, is a Christian democratic and liberal- conservative political party in Germany. 10 Moshe Sharett was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Ben Gurion’s government. In 1954 he became second Prime Minister of Israel. He was member of Mapai party. 11 Mapai, literally translated as Workers’ Party of the Land of Israel, was a center-left political party in Israel founded in 1930 and dissolved in 1968 merging into the modern-day Israeli Labor Party. 12 The currency rate in 1952 was USD 1 = DM 4,20 (cf. MARCUSE 2018). Therefore, DM 3.45 billion was worth USD 822 million.

Republic as well as a crucial element in the future relationship between Germany and the Jewish people. The agreement was incomparable in history, without any legal precedent in international law, and its motivation behind a start of collaboration is most diverse (cf. HEILIG

2002, p. 180).

3.2. First interactions after the Luxembourg Agreement

As controversial as the Luxembourg Agreement seemed to be at that time, there has been even more significant cooperation between Germany and Israel established only a view years after the end of the second world war: The secret plan Frank/Kol on the German-Israeli armament cooperation between 1957 and 1965.

The first trip to Rott in December 1957, at which Shimon Peres13, Director General of the Israeli

Ministry of Defense, was accompanied by Asher Ben-Natan14 who followed Peres as Director

General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense in 1959. It was preceded by a Cabinet meeting in

Israel, at which the left-socialist coalition partner of the Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion's party Mapai resolutely rejected any contacts with Germany (cf. HANSEN 2014, pp. 480).

Nevertheless, they were overruled by the authority of the head of government, who believed from early on in another Germany and wanted to use its increasingly important role in the pursuit of its pro-western policy. The debate in the Knesset followed after an Israeli newspaper published a report about the plans and called Franz Joseph Strauß15, member of CSU16, who was Defense Minister of Germany, as the head of a Nazi army of murderers (cf. SHINNAR

13 Shimon Peres was Minister of Defense under Ben Gurion’s government. Moreover, he was twice Prime Minister of Israel, Interim Prime Minister and he became the ninth President of Israel in 2007. He was member of Mapai until 1965. 14 Asher Ben-Natan was the Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense between 1959 and 1965. Moreover, he became the first Israeli ambassador to Germany in 1965. 15 Franz Joseph Strauß became Defense Minister of Germany in 1956 in the second cabinet of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Moreover, he became chairman of the CSU in 1961. 16 CSU, literally translated as Christian Social Union in Bavaria, is a Christian democratic and conservative political party in Germany, only operating in Bavaria and forming on the federal level a common fraction with the CDU at the Bundestag.

1967, pp.140). In this course, Ben Gurion announced the departure of a delegation to Bonn with the objective to purchase military material, which could only be obtained from Germany (cf.

DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 248). Moreover, he menaced to resign if his plan to establish a cooperation with Germany in the security sector would be denied. In order to discipline two members of government who had voted against him in Parliament, he resigned in December

1957, forming the same government only one week later. On the German side, stronger military cooperation was prepared by representatives of the German government since the Suez War in

1956. This was supported by the German journalist Rolf Vogel17, whose work was mainly devoted to the German-Israeli relationship. The first stages of the military cooperation between both countries were relatively modest. They exchanged samples of captured Soviet weapons and submachine guns for instance. Furthermore, since 1955 parts of the funds of the

Luxembourg Agreement were used for security purposes, even though the agreement stated that funds should not be used to supply weapons, ammunition or other military equipment (cf.

HANSEN 2004, p. 486).

However, when those first arrangements over arms and equipment purchases between Germany and Israel became public, the Egyptian ambassador, on behalf of his Arab colleagues, requested clarification in December 1957. Germany denied any form of security supply claiming that the agreed lists of goods preclude the supply of weapons and military goods. Moreover, the German government stated to comply with the framework of Article 2618 of the Basic Law, saying that any supply of weapons in areas that are at the center of an acute conflict is prevented in order to avoid aggravating existing tensions.

17 Rolf Vogel was a German journalist devoting his work in particular to the German-Israeli relationship. In 1971 the Central Council of Jews honored Vogel with the Leo Baeck Prize. Moreover, he was awarded the Saarland Order of Merit in 1976 for his lifetime achievements for the German-Israeli relationship. 18 Article 26 of the Basic Law in the Original version of May 1949 says that actions that are appropriate and intended to interfere with the peaceful coexistence of peoples, in particular to prepare the conduct of a war of aggression, are unconstitutional and to be punished. Moreover, it stated that weapons that are intended for warfare may only be manufactured, transported and placed on the market with the approval of the Federal Government.

3.3. The Establishment of the cooperation in the light of the past

The meeting in Rott presented the establishment of cooperation between two countries in the light of a painful past. Both, Peres and Strauß described the armament cooperation within their memories. Peres described the relations with Germany as one of the most unusual moral and political challenges international diplomacy he had ever faced. Moreover, he stated that the past could not be forgotten or changed, but the future shaped (cf. PERES 1979, pp. 67). Strauß was impressed by his interlocutor's arguments regarding Israel's security deficits, given that

Egypt had been armed since 1955 with the most modern weapons of the Eastern bloc, like MIG fighters. Peres emphasized that German support would not only benefit peace and counter the advance of Eastern Europeans in the region but that it would be a moral dimension to the past, in addition to financial support. An essential request he made for this time was the provision of two submarines because the Soviet Union had delivered three submarines to Egypt in the summer of 1957 (cf. HANSEN 2004, p. 489; SHINNAR 1967, pp. 142).

The German Minister of Defense reacted in favor as he perceived close cooperation between

Israel and Germany as an essential contribution to overcome the past (cf. DEUTSCHKRON

1983, pp. 252). Moreover, strengthening Israel created an essential counterweight to the Soviet

Union in the region, which was seen as defending Western Europe at the back door, and thereby contributing to peacekeeping, existentially important for the divided Germany at the interface between East and West conflict by Strauß (cf. VOGEL 1967, pp. 137). This was in line with

Adenauer's credo, to maintain peace as the highest political commitment and therefore to avoid letting the Arabs unite with the Soviet Union (cf. SHINNAR 1967, p. 143).

From the German side, Strauß became the decisive promoter of defense cooperation between

Israel and Germany. It is remarkable, as he had filed objections to the ratification of the

Luxembourg Agreement barely five years earlier regarding the foreign trade with the Arabs and abstaining in the Bundestag. In the fall of 1953 the head of the Cologne Israel Mission, Felix

Shinnar19, counted him as the most violent and most dangerous opponents of the agreement (cf.

JELINEK 1997; SHINNAR 1967, pp. 69). On the Israeli side, Haim Laskov20, Chief of General

Staff and member of the group Nakamm, which believed that an act of revenge against the

Germans was necessary. It is difficult to imagine that under these conditions a solitary initiative led by Peres developed, which provided the crucial basis for the progress of German-Israeli relations. Peres, who lost his beloved grandfather in the Shoah by being burned alive in a synagogue, has repeatedly championed close and trusting relations between the two countries

(cf. VOGEL 1967, pp. 141). In March 1958, at the second meeting of the two politicians, Strauß was able to report that upon consultation with Chancellor Adenauer and Germany Secretary of

State Walter Hallstein21 (CDU), representing the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Heinrich von Brentano22 (CDU), despite concerns from the Foreign Ministry, they agreed in principle, meaning that the cooperation started (cf. HANSEN 2004, p. 491).

3.4. Debates about stronger cooperation with Germany within the Israeli Knesset

Ben Gurion persistently defended the cooperation against all the odds in the Knesset (cf.

NEUBERGER 2005). When the chairman of Ahdut HaAvoda23, Yitzhak Tabenkin24, reproached him for having kept secret the meeting in Rott, calling the German side as leaders of the Nazi killers, the Prime Minister made him aware that he was informed by reliable and

19 Felix Elieser Shinnar was a German-born Israeli bank lawyer and diplomat. From 1952 until March 31, 1966, Felix Shinnar was the ambassador, but without diplomatic status, leading the Israel Mission, a trade mission to settle Germany's reparations to Israel on the basis of the Luxembourg Agreement built in 1952. 20 Haim Laskov was the fifth Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces. 21 Walter Peter Hallstein was a German lawyer, university professor, politician and member of the CDU. The former Secretary of State at the Foreign Ministry became the first chairman of the Commission of the European Economic Community in 1958. Moreover, he became known for the so-called Hallstein Doctrine. 22 Heinrich von Brentano di Tremezzo was a German politician and member of the Christian Democratic Union. He served as Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs between 1955 and 1961. 23 Ahdut HaAvoda, literally translated as Labour Union, was a series of political parties and one of the forerunners of the modern Israeli Labour Party. 24 Yitzhak Tabenkin was famous for being a Zionist activist and founder of the Kibbutz Movement in Israel. Moreover, he was one of the founders of Mapai and Ahdut Ha Avoda.

trustworthy informant, that persons known as Nazis did not staff important positions in the

Federal Republic. Moreover, a commission was set up in order to examine the past, and in every case where there is even the slightest suspicion of a Nazi past, orders the person concerned to be expelled. Israel, and especially the Israeli army, is much admired (cf. JELINEK 1997, p.

159). In a speech to the Executive Board of the Mapai in September 1958, he pointed out that on a political level America has not shown solidarity with Israel and moreover, no weapon was sent by the US to Israel since the founding of the state. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations,

Germany helped Israel on a political level, which was very important for Israel as it was the only European state at that time that was from high weight in America (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp.

491).

3.5. Israeli arms deliveries to the German Bundeswehr accrue

The first stage of the armament cooperation was the equipment of the Bundeswehr with Israeli military goods. It started with Grenade launcher ammunition. This was followed by uniforms and other equipment from the textile sector, leading to refusals of work in Israel. It was countered using internal exchanges (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp. 492). Of particular importance was the acquisition of the submachine gun Uzi. Already in 1956, the journalist Vogel told Peres and

Ben-Natan in Tel-Aviv that an Uzi in the hands of German soldiers is indeed better than all the brochures against antisemitism (cf. VOGEL 1987, p. 135). The deliveries from Israel worth around DM 250 million until 196525, benefited the Israeli economy. The equipment of the

Bundeswehr with goods from Israel also made it easier to argue against criticism of the German rearmament, due to the particular connection. Taken together, the relevant Israeli sales to

Germany grew up until almost DM 3.5 billion until 1996 (cf. HANSEN 2004, p. 493).

25 The currency rate between 1956 and 1965 was in average USD 1 = DM 4,1 (cf. MARCUSE 2018). Therefore, DM 250 million was worth about USD 61 million.

When the armament delivery became publicly known by the article Granaten aus Haifa in the weekly newspaper DER SPIEGEL26 in June 1959 (cf. DER SPIEGEL 1959), protests broke out in Israel due to its symbolic significance. In 1951, the Knesset unanimously expressed against any form of rearmament of Germany. Despite the fact, Ben Gurion had decided for military cooperation not informing the cabinet. In June 1959, he explained himself in front of the Central

Committee of the Mapai, stating that Germany did not maintain its position of power in Europe because Israel had agreed with it. Therefore, it would harm Israel's position in the world and its existence, if Germany with its political and economic weight would be led the Arabs as allies.

Thus, the cooperation with Germany was necessary in order to survive as a state. Ben Gurion emphasized that he does not see any moral, emotional, or other obstacles, emphasizing that

Adenauer is not Hitler (cf. SEGEV 1995, p. 417). Ben Gurion stood behind this pragmatic approach, despite further heated debates in the Knesset. He underlined the involvement of

Germany in Europe and the Franco-German Entente27. The head of government also warned to not misuse the Holocaust as a propaganda tool. The majority of the Knesset ultimately approved the sales of military goods to Germany at the beginning of July 1959 (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp.

495).

When the coalition partners Mapam28 and Ahdut HaAvoda voted against, even though the representatives of these two parties were involved in the negotiations with Bonn, the prime minister again demanded the four dissenters to make their cabinet mandate available. When they refused, he resigned a second time with the whole government on July 6, 1959. This time, however, he failed to form a new one, and thus remained in office with the old one until the elections in November 1959. Also, in the coalition negotiations, the armament cooperation with

26 DER SPIEGEL, literally translated The Mirror, is a German weekly news magazine and one of the largest such publication in Europe. 27 The Franco-German entente has a large scope, on various levels such as cultural, economic, and military level. It was initiated in order to reconciliate between France and Germany aiming for a symbolic victory of the present era over history. 28 Mapam, literally translated as United Workers’ Party, was a left-wing political party in Israel founded in 1948 and dissolved in 1997 merging into the modern-day Israeli Meretz Party.

Germany played an important role. Yitzhak Tabenkin repeatedly asserted that arming Germany meant arming the Arabs, corrected by Ben Gurion that the Soviets armed the Arabs (cf.

HANSEN 2004, pp. 498).

3.6. The beginning of equipment and training aid from Germany to Israel

It was the first time in the history of Germany to implement an equipment and training aid for a foreign country. Peres noted that valuable material had been made available only a few months after the first encounter. Fundamental understandings were not fixed in writing but based on mutual trust that should dominate the cooperation from the beginning until the end (cf. VOGEL

1987, pp. 140). When Karl Carstens29, Secretary of State at the Foreign Ministry, asked his colleague Karl Gumbel30, Deputy Secretary of State at the Defense Ministry, about the 150 agreed tanks and how the business had been achieved he replied that there were no documents available (cf. AAPD 1965/92.). The meetings between Shimon Peres and Franz Joseph Strauß occurred frequently shaping the cooperation in the course of their talks. Peres argued later on that the US helped Israel financially, but not with weapons, whereas France helped with weapons, but not financially. Germany, however, was able to deliver weapons without asking for money or anything else (cf. VOGEL 1967, p. 142).

The first verbal agreements prepared the floor for a joint decision of the two heads of government. It took place at their famous New York meeting at the Hotel Waldorf Astoria on

March 14, 1960 (cf. SHINNAR 1967, pp. 94). The part about defense assistance was introduced by Ben Gurion referring to the meetings between his envoy and Strauß. He first referred to the

29 Karl Walter Claus Carstens was a German politician and member of the CDU. He was from 1976 to 1979 President of the German Bundestag and from 1979 to 1984, the fifth President of the Federal Republic of Germany. 30 Karl Gumbel was a German administrative lawyer and state sectarian. In 1955, the ministerial director became head of the personnel department in the Federal Ministry of Defense. In 1959, he became Deputy Secretary of State in the Federal Chancellery and 1964 State Secretary.

submarines, pointing out that ten modern submarines of Soviet design stationed in Egypt representing a constant danger for Israel. Furthermore, he mentioned radioactive missiles, praising Franco-German cooperation and the traditional support of Israel through Paris. Then he pointed out that Strauß had taken a positive attitude towards the Israeli request, asking

Chancellor Adenauer whether he complies him or not. Adenauer only expresses his agreement.

At the New York summit of the two heads of states, the formalization of relations has not been discussed. Israel was in favor, but Germany did not want to decide on an exchange of ambassadors because of the Arab threats to recognize the GDR. Moreover, some parts of the

Israeli political establishment made a virtue out of necessity by practicing this more or less consistently for years a double strategy: On the one hand, to urge Bonn repeatedly to establish diplomatic relations, on the other, however the refusal to pay. In a note from Head of Unit

Western Europe in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it states that the current state is currently appropriate because Germany feels obligated to compensate Israel, as long as there are no regular diplomatic relations (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp. 539).

Strauß met Ben Gurion and Peres in Paris for a three-hour conversation in early June 1961. The note mentioned that grenade launcher ammunition was purchased from Israel and that it is planned to set up production sites on the licensing route in Spain or Portugal. The short phrase followed that they do not deliver arms to Israel. However, it said that Germany provides Israel with know-how in the field of air defense, which meant in particular that Israeli officers and soldiers were trained in the Flak-Schule Rendsburg. The training aid also practiced at the

Munsterlager military training center and in the Fliegerhorst Schongau parachute school, presents a separate assistance category in addition to the equipment assistance service (cf.

DEUTSCHKRON 1983, p. 257). Furthermore, Carstens stated that within the framework of the

American lend-lease program some aircraft were delivered to Israel for training purposes.

These, however, carry the emblems of other NATO countries.

In December 1961 Shinnar and Rolf Lahr31, State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry substantiated the necessary arrangements for the “Aktion Geschäftsfreund” that started thereby

(cf. WEINGARDT 2002, pp. 126). Recent findings show that this agreement of financial aid from Germany to Israel, kept as a top secret until today, significantly financed the nuclear armament of Israel and thus gave the state a guarantee of the survival of a particular kind (cf.

RÜHLE 2015).

In February 1962, the two initiators of the cooperation discussed again. The Minister of Defense informed the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry in February 1962, who noted that German stocks were to be made available through France for DM 15.5 million per year. In June 1962

Peres met for a two-hour conversation with Adenauer, whom he met in sent a personal message to Ben Gurion. As in New York, the Chancellor, who at first expressed his sincere gratitude at the important leadership of the Eichmann trial affirmed that Germany has helped Israel in the past and will continue to do so in the future. Peres noticed that Adenauer's aim to enter into close relations with Israel, had something almost religious about it (cf. PERES 1979, p. 75).

A ceiling of DM 250 million was envisaged, in which individual arrangements had to be made

(cf. OSTERHELD 1992, pp. 150). This second phase of cooperation went beyond the surplus material, mainly to large equipment like anti-aircraft warfare, submarine, speedboats, and tanks.

In July 1962, Peres conferred with Strauß and Carstens at the Defense Ministry in Bonn (cf.

AAPD 1965/2). Also, Herbert Becker32, the sub-division chief for defense planning at the

Ministry of Defense, and Colonel Asher Arbel33 representing the Israel Mission were present.

The detailed list of interest included: 6 Jaguar class speedboats, 3 submarines of 350 tons, 36

American howitzers, 24 US helicopters, 12 French Aforar, 15 tanks built in Germany, 54

31 Rolf Otto Lahr was a German diplomat. Between 1961 and 1969 he was also Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry. 32 Herbert Becker was member of the CDU and the sub-division chief for defense planning at the Ministry of Defense. 33 Colonel Asher Arbel was at the IDF and responsible for the Israel Mission.

Swedish anti-aircraft warfare guns and Cobra anti-tank missiles. The total value estimated about

DM 240 million. To date, only paramilitary equipment has been made available to the German side. Everything should be kept top secret. Until then Peres visited Bonn six to nine times, nobody knowing anything (cf. HANSEN 2004, p. 623).

3.7. The accomplishment of the agreement

Adenauer finally agreed in August 1962, and the assistance was fully received (cf. AAPD

1964/289). Secretary of State Volkmar Hopf and German officers flew several times to Israel.

Peres noted that the quality was excellent, and the scale was considerable compared to what they were used to, although it was far not as much as the Egyptians received from the Soviet

Union. Furthermore, he commented that the poorly equipped Israeli army, which had been forced to skimp on its meager holdings, was almost spoiled for the first time. The general involvement of the Social Democrats34 had become indispensable, and the financial dimensions now in question also required the referral of Parliament. The leaders of CDU/CSU, SPD, and

FDP35, Brentano, Ollenhauer36 and Mende37, were informed by Adenauer on the agreed specification of the Frank/Kol project worth DM 240 million (cf. AAPD 1964/289). For the first time on 13th December 1962 the information on the equipment assistance regularly provided by two, then three individual representatives of the political groups (cf. HANSEN

2004, pp. 624).

34 SPD, literally translated as Social Democratic Party of Germany, is a social-democratic political party in Germany. 35 FDP, literally translated as Free Democratic Party of Germany, is a liberal and classical liberal political party in Germany. 36 Erich Ollenhauer was between 1952 and 1963 chairman and parliamentary leader of the SPD in the German Bundestag. 37 Erich Mende was a German officer, lawyer and politician. Between 1960 and 1968 he was chairman of the FDP and between 1957 and 1963 chairman of the parliamentary group of the FDP. Moreover, he served as federal minister for all-German questions and was at the same time vice-chancellor between 1963 and 1966. He was a member of the FDP and then the CDU.

The number of initiated persons was kept as low as possible in both countries, and even the

Federal President and the President of the Bundestag were left out. In Germany, it was not the

Cabinet that decided at the governmental level, but the small Security Council, also meeting under the chairmanship of the Chancellor. The Israeli side acted similarly. In the Knesset, the seven members of the Subcommittee on Defense were involved (cf. SHINNAR 1967, pp. 144).

Peres made the cooperation strictly confidential to prevent indiscretions from the press in

December 1962. Even the Bonn Allies were initially not trusted, and Peres at the request of

Erler38 in April 1963 casually informed President John F. Kennedy, who agreed (cf. PERES

1979, p. 76; DEUTSCHKRON 1983, p. 255). Nevertheless, the American Embassy was on

June 13, 1963, in the Foreign Ministry with a request for clarification. The Embassy in

Washington reported that the State Department's had inquired about the form and scope of equipment aid to Israel and had formulated seven specific questions (cf. AAPD 1963/390).

Initially, loans or leases agreed for camouflage. The shipment of the material to Israel had to be disguised. The weapons produced outside of Germany, such as Swedish anti-aircraft guns, were brought directly from the manufacturer country for shipping and paid the bill through Bonn.

Most adventurous methods occurred, such as secretly fetching the equipment and weapons promised to Israel from the depots of the Bundeswehr and, in some cases, issued a theft deterrent to the police afterward (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp. 625). The Noratlas built in Germany under French license was first sent to the French Air Force by the Germans delivered and passed from this to the Israeli. In mid-May 1960, the French took delivery of the first three aircraft at their airfield and handed it over to the Israeli pilot. They brushed the Iron Cross with the Star of David and landed in Israel via Marseille 24 hours later (cf. HANSEN 2004, p. 626). All references to German origin were removed for all weapons (cf. AAPD 1964/289).

38 Fritz Erler was a German politician and member of the SPD. Between 1953 and 1957, he was Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Bundestag.

The delivery of US Sikorsky helicopters, whose forwarding was not approved by the

Washington Ministry of Munitions Control, occurred in 1963, with the helicopters already on their way from the United States in the port of a third country from German to parallel at night anchored Israeli transport ship changed. The affair became public when the manufacturing company found the absence of two machines at the unloading at the German destination, at which point worldwide searches were made, even with the involvement of the FBI, which eventually led to Israel. Kennedy's security adviser McGeorge Bundy39 complained emphatically to Knieper40, but it remained a formal protest. In August 1963, the US Embassy in the Foreign Ministry raised concerns about the emergence of 15 to 20 American-style helicopters in Israel, which said that reinforcing the Israeli air force is likely to postpone military potential in the Middle East and thus alarm the US government. The case was also raised in the conversation between Schröder41 and Deputy Secretary of State George W. Ball42 to speech, which turned out to be worried (cf. DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 252). Another affair occurred when a transporter in Genoa docked at the wrong quay for loading onto an Israeli ship, the customs opened the shipment, and the press brought photos with weapons, the unknown to the

Italian General Staff. - M48 tanks were stuck in a tunnel during rail transport to Italy, which the newspapers also reported (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp. 627).

Following the resignation of Strauß at the end of November 1962, his successor Kai-Uwe von

Hassel43, whom Peres met for the first time in June 1963, not only honored the promises he had

39 McGeorge Bundy was serving as United States National Security Advisor to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson between 1961 and 1966. 40 Werner Knieper he was Senior Head of Department for Armament Affairs in the Ministry of Defense until 1966 and between 1966 and 1967 State Secretary at the Chancellery. 41 Gerhard Schröder was a German lawyer, politician and member of the CDU. From 1953 to 1961 he was Federal Minister of Interior, from 1961 to 1966 Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs and from 1966 to 1969 Federal Minister of Defense. 42 George Wildman Ball was an American lawyer and diplomat. In 1961 he was initially Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs at the State under President John F. Kennedy. From 1961 to 1966 he became Deputy Secretary of State under Foreign Minister Dean Rusk. 43 Kai-Uwe von Hassel was a German politician and member of the CDU. Between 1954 and 1963 he was Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, from 1963 to 1966 Federal Minister of Defense, from 1966 to 1969 Federal Minister for displaced persons, refugees and war victims and from 1969 to 1972 President of the German Bundestag.

received but also made certain deliveries. Additional orders for the Bundeswehr were agreed.

The new minister was even willing to provide a dozen Leopard tanks (cf. PERES 1979, p. 82).

Israel urgently needed them to compensate for the equipment of Egypt with modern T34/85 and

T54 by the Soviet Union (cf. SHINNAR 1967, p.145). In the interview of January 30, 1964,

Hassel agreed to further requests but insisted on distinguishing between offensive and defense weapons. Therefore, German submarines would have to be renounced, but Bonn will pay for two now to be built by the UK. Regarding the delivery of American tanks M48, the Minister remained vague and referred to the necessary involvement of the Foreign Ministry. The control panel of the Bundestag had already asked Hopf44 in February 1963, to deliver no submarines and tanks, and they had not been approved by Adenauer then. In February 1964, the parliamentarians examined a supplemented Israeli wish list with the expansion of the financial volume to about DM 300 million.

3.8. Increasing criticism towards the armament cooperation with Israel within the German government

If Strauß and Hassel, as well as Adenauer, were supportive, then this does not apply to Schröder, on the contrary. After the replacement of Brentano in November 1961, the Foreign Ministry increasingly criticized armament cooperation with Israel, and the new Foreign Minister, who always avoided a meeting desired by Peres, became its most emphatic adversary (cf. HANSEN

2004, pp. 628). The Ministry of Defense did not inform the Foreign Ministry about some things, or inaccurate, although it had to decide on questions of equipment and training assistance. In the quarterly country statistics of arms purchases abroad the figures for Israel were either not included at all or were obscured (cf. STRAUSS 1989, pp. 346). At the departmental level, no information was provided about arms deliveries to Israel (cf. AAPD 1964/289) As news of the

44 Volkmar Hopf was a National Socialist lawyer and became member of the CSU after the war. In 1959 he was appointed as Secretary of State in the Federal Ministry of Defense and in 1964 as President of the Federal Court of Audit and the Federal Commissioner for Economic Efficiency in Administration.

leakage of aid accumulated, Schröder wrote on June 5, 1964, Ludwig Erhard45, who had replaced Adenauer in October 1963, that the Foreign Ministry had no overview about it.

Moreover, he considered this as intolerable and therefore suggested inviting Hassel for a meeting in order to discuss the further cooperation.

The meeting took place in July 1963, where Schröder in the presence of Carstens, Hopf, and

Knieper emphasized towards Hassel that he does not want to take any form of responsibility for it. In his point of view, Germany should not have any military relations with neither the

Egyptians nor the Israelis (cf. AAPD 1965/2). Schroder’s main concern was that the Israelis wanted to force a break between Germany and the Arabs. This controversy shows how much uncoordinated the German policy towards Israel was, and how much Foreign Minister mistrusted the Israelis. However, Schröder was unable to assert himself, and in July 1964 he was overruled in the Cabinet of the Security Council (cf. AAPD 1964/289, 21. October 1964).

Even before that, the United States urged Bonn to provide Israel with 150 tanks of M48 to offset its arms exports to Jordan. Their delivery followed after critiquing from Cairo, when the US had equipment Israel with anti-aircraft missiles, in order to not further endanger their relations with the Arab countries. The American ambassador George McGhee46 was therefore active in

Bonn from the beginning of 1964, but Erhard and Schröder were extremely reserved. On May

26, 1964, Peres, after meeting with McGhee earlier, submitted to Ludger Westrick47 the concept of giving the tanks to smudge the tracks, initially without guns and engines, to convert them there and ship them directly to Israel, including he had obtained the consent of Rome. In his reminiscences, he grips enthusiastically with the atmosphere in the Chancellor's Ministry,

45 Ludwig Wilhelm Erhard was an economist, German politician and member of the CDU. Between 1949 and 1963 he was Federal Minister of Economics. Between 1957 and 1963 he was also Vice Chancellor and became the second Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1963 until 1966. 46 George Crews McGhee was a diplomat in the United States foreign service. 47 Ludger Westrick was a Wehrwirtschaftsführer appointed by Hitler in the Nazi era, dealing with armament goods. In the postwar period he became a German politician and member of the CDU. Between 1963 and 1966 he was Chief of the Federal Chancellery and became Federal Minister for special tasks in 1964.

which was tense because of an assassination attempt on de Gaulle in Germany, and Westrick's consent given under time pressure (cf. DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 248). However, the

Germans argued that after all, it was American, not German tanks. The Germans argued that if the Americans had good reason not to deliver directly, the Germans had more substantial ones given the Arab reactions. Schröder spoke to Erhard his most serious reservations. Although the

Chancellor preferred direct export from the United States to Israel, financed by Bonn, he agreed to do the delivery during his visit with President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara48 in June 1964 in Washington. The 150 patrons represented the last and most momentous stage of defense assistance to Israel before the establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and Israel (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp. 635).

3.9. Secrecy problems

Israeli support for weapons, which had figured in the budget since 1962 as equipment and training aid in general terms, was based on the personal relationships of the initiated politicians and was a matter of trust. Of course, there was no guarantee that such a comprehensive operation would be concealed. In that sense, it bore the core of the crisis from the outset.

Already from the article of DER SPIEGEL on Israeli exports to the Bundeswehr, speculation in the summer of 1959 about the supply of Israel with German armament had been made its round in the Arab press. The press in Baghdad spoke of the Washington-Bonn-Tel Aviv axis against the Arabs, claiming that the Federal Republic delivered weapons and submarines in exchange for Israel. Even the protagonists made more or less clear allusions. For instance, in

December 1962, Ben Gurion said in the Dawar that he appeased the anger that Nazis are in

Egypt, by saying that Israel is dependent on Germany regarding political friendship and concerning weapons that help Israel to protect their independence (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp. 638).

48 Robert Strange McNamara was an American manager and politician. He became Secretary of Defense in 1961 until 1968 and President of the World Bank in 1968 until 1981.

In May 1963, the Herald Tribune49 reported that a high-ranking official had stated that West

Germany was making a significant contribution to Israel's defense needs. Peres said that

Germany's importance for Israel's vital interests was no less than that of France. Moreover, the close ties to Bonn represented Israel's most crucial security success since the Sinai War50. Peres remarks were the most open reference yet to the German-Israeli security connections, although there have been hints about this in the past. Peres said that Strauß, as Secretary of Defense, has contributed very substantially to Israel's security (cf. VOGEL 1967, pp. 143).

The Knesset variously raised veiled references to the armament cooperation. Strauß repeatedly hinted at persistent questions during his visit to Israel from May 28 to June 7, 1963. After Ben

Gurion and Peres had often pointed to his services to the safety of Israel during the visit to protect the guest from protests, a Mapai politician in parliament asked the rhetorical question as to why the German deliveries could not be explained. In addition, when Strauß denied the training aid at a press conference, Hans Merten51, who belonged to the control committee of the

Bundestag, corrected in a newspaper article, as he was convinced that the cooperation would become public sooner or later (cf. BAR-ZOHAR 1995, pp. 435; DEUTSCHKRON 1983, p.

256).

It is astonishing that despite the various indiscretions Frank/Kol was not earlier than October

1964 in the pointing line of the Arabs. The Foreign Ministry was always eager to play down the cooperation, for instance, in a directive to ambassador Walter Weber52 in Cairo for training

49 The New York Herald Tribune was a newspaper published between 1924 and 1966. 50 The Suez Crisis, or Sinai War, was an international conflict in October 1956 between Egypt on the one hand and Britain, France and Israel on the other. The trigger was the nationalization of the majority British-French Suez society by the President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser. His aim was to liberate the formally sovereign Egypt from the British sphere of influence. For Great Britain, however, the Suez Canal had great importance for oil supplies wherefore they planned an attack together with France and Israel aims to regain Western control of the Suez Canal and to remove Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. 51 Hans Merten was a German politician of the SPD. After founding the Federal Republic, he was a speaker at the Federal Ministry for displaced persons, refugees and war victims. Moreover, he belonged to the control committee of the Bundestag, 52 Walter Maria Weber was a German diplomat at the time of National Socialism and the Federal Republic and from 1964 ambassador to Egypt.

aid stating that it was of no fundamental importance and that it should be considered as an isolated case (cf. AAPD 1963/302). The head of the Middle East department, Hans Schirmer53, suspected that the reason for the restraint was the fact that the German technicians and German scientists were active in Egypt (cf. AAPD 1964/54, SHINNAR 1967, pp. 134). On 24 February

1965, the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser told to DER SPIEGEL that he had initially believed that it was all about light weapons, and only when he learned a few months ago that tanks would be delivered free of charge, he had addressed the President of the Bundestag Eugen

Gerstenmaier54 in Cairo on the matter. In a note on deliveries of armament to the Middle East the head of the Political Department, noted that it still seems correct, in principle, that there is no supply of arms to the Middle East. In order to keep good relations with all countries one- sided military cooperation with Israel would be politically detrimental (cf. AAPD 1964/151).

3.10. The cooperation became public

In spring 1964, the secret cooperation became an increasingly worrying manner, denied by the

Foreign Ministry many times. However, in fall 1964, Cairo went public. The official newspaper

Al-Gumhuria55 chose to detour the report of alleged German-Israeli nuclear projects on October

22, 1964, which four days later led to the Frankfurter Rundschau's56 statement about German nuclear physicists in Israel, that the Arab states are not aware of the details of the armament aid previously given to Israel remained hidden. More leaves follow, especially the New York Times with details on October 31, 1964, though still without mentioning tanks. It became notorious

53 Hans Schirmer was a German diplomat. Between 1962 and 1966 he worked in the Foreign Service of Bonn as Head of the Middle East department. In 1965, Schirmer became member of the NSDAP 54 Eugen Karl Albrecht Gerstenmaier was a German protestant theologian, politician and member of the CDU. In 1949 he became member of the Bundestag and in 1954 until 1969 president of the German Bundestag. 55 Al Gomhuria, literally translated The Republic is an influential state-owned Egyptian Arabic language daily newspaper. 56 The Frankfurter Rundschau, literally translated Frankfurt Review, is a supra-regional subscription newspaper.

that Israel was delivered with arms worth more than DM 200 million, agreed between Adenauer and Ben Gurion by an agreement reached in 1960 by Strauß (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp. 692).

The question of who made it public on the first stage was repeatedly asked (cf.

DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 258). The triggering message from Cairo speaks for the Arabs.

However, there were parties in Germany, who disagreed with the cooperation and were interested in its rumbling. Alternatively, the Israelis, who could foresee their expiry and, as

Schröder had suspected in 1963, wanted to disturb the German-Arab relationship. Government spokesman Karl-Günther von Hase57 pointed out to Shinnar's representative Leo Savir that in several places in Bonn it is alleged that the information came from the Israeli side in order to force the federal government, relations and the whole relationship with Israel to a more specific basis - the establishment of diplomatic relations. However, Savir stated with the determination that this was not the case. No one in Israel could have an interest in announcing these deliveries, not even in order to achieve broader political effects (cf. AAPD 1964/306). The answer to such assumptions and speculations, however, does not seem very significant, because the fact of the arms deliveries as such Arabs had long been known (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp. 694).

3.11. Conflicts of interest between Germany and Israel

The public opinion in Germany was overwhelmingly critical, and many supporters of Israel regretted that the postponement of establishing diplomatic relations was compensated with armament deliveries (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp. 709). It became the prevailing view of the politicians of the coalition and opposition - except Adenauer and Strauß, both of which no longer belonged to the federal government. Karl Mommer58, one of the two Social Democrat

57 Karl-Günther Paul Otto von Hase is a German officer, diplomat, artistic director and member of the CDU. He was from 1962 to 1967 under the Chancellors Adenauer, Erhard and Kiesinger Chief of the Press and Information Ministry of the Federal Government. Afterwards he served as a State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Defense. 58 Karl Mommer was a German politician and member of the SPD. Between 1957 and 1966 he was parliamentary director of the SPD faction and then until 1969 vice president of the Bundestag.

confidants of the Bundestag, argued that they aimed to help Israel because they wanted to ensure its defense and not change the status quo in the Middle East. If there had been consultations beforehand, other solutions would have been suggested, like a financial rather than a military help (ebd., pp. 719).

Jerusalem responded quickly making an urgent appeal on November 2, 1964, insisting on the demarche. The Israeli government wanted to prevent any form of official confirmation of

German arms deliveries to Israel. However, the head of the Federal Press Ministry replied that it was impossible to make a false official statement. Moreover, it was necessary to clarify the facts in their proportion correctly. Two days later, Shinnar, who just came back from Israel, insisted to Erhard that despite the expected explanation of the Federal Government, Jerusalem wants to avoid the impression of strong Arab pressure.

Moreover, Shinnar urged not to add that Bonn does not want to enter into new agreements in this respect. The Chancellor's, therefore, asked if it might be possible to exchange money for future military aid, with which Israel could then buy weapons. Shinnar agreed in generally (cf.

DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 262). A public statement did not appear, although Federer warned that it would have to lead to serious unrest in the Arab states. Schröder argued in a letter to

Erhard for a strict cessation of all military cooperation with Israel in the future. It was urgent because the Arab world perceived the Bonn policy as insincere.

On the other hand, the financial and economic benefits should be continued, even if this required equal help from Germany for the Arab state. In this sense, the Foreign Ministry sought different package solutions. Gerstenmaier, a committed friend of Israel, suggested in a two- hour conversation with Nasser on November 22, 1964, that the Federal Republic should refrain from providing armament assistance and that the Arabs should accept diplomatic relations with

Israel without upgrading the GDR (cf. HANSEN, pp. 715; DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 260).

3.12. Increasing threats from Arab countries to recognize the German Democratic Republic

The whole complex became increasingly caught in the turmoil of increasing Arab threats with the recognition of GDR. It remained a taboo to Bonn politics, although at that time the Foreign

Ministry had already begun to consider ways of gently liberating itself from the constraints of the Hallstein Doctrine (cf. AAPD 1965/42). On December 24, 1964, the Egyptian politician attacked Germany and the United States in a speech, claiming that the United States had compensated Bonn for weapons supplied to him in vain. The vicious circle quickly became solidified with an additional, extremely alarming foot. On January 24, 1965, Al Ahram59 announced the visit of the GDR State Council Chairman Walter Ulbricht60 to Egypt. In the

Cabinet Meeting of January 27, 1965, Schröder requested to stop further weapon deliveries to

Israel (cf. DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 262). However, after much discussion, the overwhelming opinion in the Cabinet was that the already agreed arms deliveries to Israel should continue. It was also the position of the Federal Chancellor. However, he also stated that there was no intention to conclude new arms-supply agreements with Israel. At the end of

January, Carstens had the order to carry out an open conversation with Nasser aiming to prevent his visit to Ulbricht under all circumstances. He seeks to have clear and workable arrangements for arms deliveries and, in particular, to prevent weapons from Germany being delivered to areas of tension. Moreover, no new obligations to enter any forms of deliveries to Israel were to be avoided (cf. DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 277).

59 Al-Ahram, literally translated Pyramids, is the name of a state-owned Egyptian newspaper that was founded in December 1875. It is the second oldest newspaper in the Arab world and is currently being published in Cairo, majority owned by the Egyptian government. 60 Walter Ernst Paul Ulbricht was a German Communist politician. From 1949 until his disempowerment in 1971 he was the most important politician of the German Democratic Republic. Ulbricht played a leading role in the creation Communist Party of Germany in the Weimar Republic and in the early development and establishment of the German Democratic Republic. As the First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party from 1950 to 1971, he was the chief decision maker in East Germany.

On the outside, Bonn remained quiet, even after the ambassador announced that a person close to Nasser had informed him that there was a chance to prevent the Ulbricht visit, namely the immediate cessation of all arms deliveries to Israel. However, Nasser left no doubt that Bonn was connected closely to Israel. Nasser declared that Germany not only supplied weapons to

Israel but also supported their economy and gave Israel political influence. This alliance led

Nasser to follow Ulbricht’s yearlong invitation. After consultations with the German ambassador to Egypt together with the three parliamentary group leaders in the Bundestag,

Rainer Barzel61, Wolfgang Mischnik62, and Herbert Wehner63, the politicians agreed in

February 1965, to let the arms deliveries to Israel run out and to not entirely new ones.

3.13. The failure of Mission Nervas

Despite this clear position the German Chancellor assessed the situation for rather hopeless.

Moreover, he emphasized that it is necessary for Germany to get out of the situation of blackmail (cf. OSTERHELD 1992, pp. 154). Erhard affirmed that weapons should not be delivered to areas of tension, stipulating that the Middle East should be regarded as such. In this regard, he instructed the Foreign Ministry resume negotiations with the Israeli government for deliveries to Israel that were already agreed but not yet made (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp. 721).

The German government was in the greatest embarrassment. They believed that it was necessary to act quickly and therefore they decided to turn to Spain with a request for mediation with Nasser, which included the head of the department at the Foreign Ministry, Francisco

Marques de Nerva, from February 6 to 10, 1965, in four talks with Prime Minister Ali Sabri64

61 Rainer Candidus Barzel was a German politician and member of the CDU. Between 1962 and 1963 he was Federal Minister for All-German questions. From 1964 he was the head of the parliamentary group of CDU/CSU. 62 Friedrich Adolf Wolfgang Mischnick was a German politician and member of the FDP. From 1961 to 1963 he was federal minister for displaced persons, refugees and war victims and from 1968 to 1991 chairman of the FDP parliamentary group. 63 Herbert Richard Wehner was a German politician and member of the SPD from 1946. Between 1966 and 1969 he was Federal Minister for All-German issues and afterwards until 1983 chairman of the parliamentary group of the SPD. 64 Ali Sabri was an Egyptian politician of Turkish origin. He was the head of Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate between 1956 and 1957. Between 1962 and 1965 Ali Sabir was Prime Minister of Egypt.

(cf. DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 272). As Carsten's ambassador Helmut Allardt65 pointed out in Madrid, the main thing is to get Nasser to cancel or at least postpone Ulbricht's visit. It turned out to be a mistake as not only the plan failed. Moreover, Nervas gave the impression that he had made promises to the Egyptian side, which went beyond his instructions from Bonn, and above all that the arms deliveries Israel immediately wholly set and no diplomatic relations with

Jerusalem would be taken in the foreseeable future (cf. SHINNAR 1967, pp. 153). The press reports from Cairo hit the German government on 10th February 1965 unexpected. Schröder heard about it during a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, in which legislative measures were discussed to no longer arm non-NATO countries. He had nothing to correct but that the

Arab capitals had merely been informed that they would no longer be able to supply arms to the Middle East in the future. The amateurish and under enormous pressure agreed Mission

Nervas remained an episode on the edge and stained piece of German and Spanish foreign policy (cf. HANSEN 2004, p. 728).

3.14. The climax of the crisis

The situation escalated, even more, when Shinnar informed Carstens that the Israeli government had rejected the German offer. He emphasized that Israel urgently needed the things agreed that have not yet been delivered. Otherwise, there will be a gap in the planning that could not be closed (cf. AAPD 1965/65). The State Secretary emphasized that the Germany policy in the

Middle East and beyond in other parts of the world is in grave danger and that this situation is not acceptable. Shinnar met first Westrick and then the Chancellor. The Minister repeated by invoking the vital interests of Germany to expire the weapon delivery. However, the ambassador, repeatedly emphasized that the agreed arms deliveries must adhere in order to safeguard the existence of Israel. The head of the Federal Chancellery now brought up an

65 Helmuth Allardt was German diplomat and ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Jakarta, Madrid and Moscow.

argument which had already been asserted by Carstens, and which occupied an important place in the German documents in the following weeks, namely the need that the cooperation had to remain secret. It was agreed that if they were not kept secret, the deliveries would be stopped

(cf. SHINNAR 1967, pp. 155). The main issue in the following weeks was the tanks, which played a crucial role in the last phase of arms deliveries. In the following conversation with the

Chancellor, an apparent way out was discussed. Erhard, with a copy of instructions to Mission

Nervas, proved that he had exceeded his mandate. He repeated the offer from the beginning of

February and urged him to seek his approval again at home. Shinnar was optimistic about the severance negotiations if he could say that firstly the communications were wrong. Secondly, the business basis of the previous agreements had changed, thirdly the Chancellor was sympathetic to Israel's vital interests, and fourthly the redemption did not appear as the success of Nasser. Erhard repeated that he was seeking for an amicable solution and that the transformation should not be in harm for Israel (cf. AAPD 1965/70).

After consulting with Adenauer and Gerstenmaier, Shinnar left for Jerusalem. Hase declared on February 12, 1965, that the Federal Government had decided not to deliver weapons to areas of tension. In the same sense, the chancellor expresses himself to the foreign press. The optimism, however, proved premature. In Jerusalem, they remained relentless and even decided that the head of the Israel mission should not return. On February 15, 1965, Levi Eshkol66 stated in the Knesset that Germany has an unprecedented heavy responsibility. It must assist Israel with the equipment necessary for his safety. Compensation and indemnification cannot replace the fulfillment of this obligation. They stated that Israel would not accept monetary compensation as a substitute for hiring the promised security aid. Moreover, Eshkol criticized

66 Levi Eschkol was was an Israeli statesman who served as the third Prime Minister of Israel from 1963 until his death in 1969. Moreover, he founded the Israeli Labor Party and served in numerous senior roles like Minister of Finance between 1952 and 1963 and as Minister of Defense between 1963 and 1967.

the term area of tension. In his point of view, it would not distinguish between assailant and defender (cf. DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 277; SHINNAR 1967, pp. 158).

Besides, Peres explained to DER SPIEGEL on February 24, 1965, that it is not just a tension between Arabs and Israel that could be compared to any other tension in the world, as they do not disagree on mutual demands. Moreover, the Arab countries do not demand anything from

Israel except its total annihilation. He concluded that the conflict is asymmetrical, not symmetrical, and therefore it is the obligation of Germany to support Israel in its struggle for survival (cf. VOGEL 1967, pp. 143).

The Israeli press reacted in the strongest terms. The Jewish associations in the US were indignant with opportunism and moral bankruptcy (cf. DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 257). Their president reported the great concern to ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein67 in Washington

(cf. AAPD 1965/58). He reported on demonstrations in front of the official representations as well as boycott and protests by interested parties against Lufthansa and other German companies. Only Ben Gurion, who was no longer in office, found mediating words: Although he considered the Bonn decision to be a mistake, the damage it caused to German-Israeli relations was repairable (cf. AAPD 1965/77).

3.15. Germany demonstrated their disappointment

Erhard was disappointed by the response of the Israeli government, and on February 17, 1965, in an emotional statement to the Middle East policy in the Bundestag he pointed out, that

Germany has always seen their accomplishments to Israel as their duty. However, after more than a decade of faithful fulfillment, he was hoping to receive understanding regarding the situation. Moreover, he emphasized that the commitment was not resolved, but a true

67 Karl Heinrich Knappstein was a German journalist and diplomat. Between 1962 and 1968 he was the German ambassador to the United States.

replacement of a continuing obligation without material discrimination was proposed. Erhard further referred to the Israeli statement of changing their conviction and their thesis of moral failure, outlining that Germany only appealed for Israel’s understanding in a severe conflict situation for Germany. Erhard concluded that one deprives the German people of the hope that it would even be possible to make a good future overcoming the past injustice. Furthermore,

Erhard said that Eshkol is right to believe that Germany commits the Israeli people who cannot be done by a single arms shipment. However, Germany does not have an eternal obligation to deliver arms to Israel (cf. WOLFFSOHN 1993, p. 36). Bonn was deeply disappointed, but the intransigence of the Israelis is understandable because they did not want to accept an Arab veto in the international relations of the as yet vulnerable state. As with the affair for the missile specialists in Egypt, the again fully present mistrust of all Germans with deep-seated security fears. Although only the smaller part of the promised material had not yet been delivered, it was anticipated that it would be difficult to obtain other important weapons, especially the 90 of 150 tanks and the six speedboats. It is not astonishing that Germany, which, despite the lost war had full employment and achieved a considerably high standard of living, was willing to poker with Israel that was plagued by many pressing problems. Indeed, the obligations of the

Luxembourg Agreement had been scrupulously respected and moreover had a positive effect.

However, Israel had no interest in Bonn's claim for sole representation, and it even had strong emotional reservations against unity (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp. 740).

3.16. Gradual alienation between Germany and the Arab countries

At the same time, the relationship between Bonn and Cairo also became more reserved. In

February 1965, Nasser had threatened to break off relations with the Federal Republic if the arms deliveries continued, which the Arabs emphasized even more before the Ulbricht visit to the Nile. Germany was in a desperate situation. Therefore, efforts to pressure the Americans to persuade the delivery of the desired Patton at German expenses to Israel. According to Erhard

the United States caused the matter and therefore was responsible for helping Germany (cf.

DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 257 and pp. 279). However, it turned out to be difficult even though also the Americans noticed that possibly the most severe foreign policy crisis of the

Federal Republic since its founding was about to happen, they called for moral obligations. For political reasons, the United States wanted to avoid publicly acting as a supplier (cf. AAPD

1965/74). However, after various discussions between the American ambassador McGhee and

Erhard and Schröder on the German side, Washington finally agreed to go into tank exports for

Bonn (cf. HANSEN 2004, pp. 729; DEUTSCHKRON 1983, p. 293).

3.17. Solution by detachment and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and Israel

Since the departure of Shinnar, there had not been any talks between Bonn and Jerusalem (cf.

SHINNAR 1967, p.149). After Ulbricht's visit to Cairo, which made a particularly rude note against Israel, Barzel determined against the resistance of Schröder's Erhard to break through the situation of Bonn's Middle East policy and offer diplomatic relations to Israel (cf.

DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 281 and pp. 285). In the statement of the Federal Government in

March 1965 it is said that they will no longer deliver weapons in areas of tension and convert a remaining supply in agreement with Israel (cf. SHINNAR 1967, pp. 108). The replacement of the equipment aids together with economic support played in the negotiations of the CDU deputy Kurt Birrenbach68 the crucial role, and it resulted in bitter controversy. Peres proved to be a particularly tough negotiator, but when the Americans finally agreed to deliver their remaining 110 tanks in March 1961, he cleared the way for the conversion of all remaining pledges. The 20 tanks waiting to be retrofitted in the Breda factory went back to the Federal

Republic, and Israel, after some hesitation from Washington, received 110 of the most modern

68 Kurt Birrenbach was a German politician and member of the CDU. From 1957 to 1965 Birrenbach was Vice President of the European Union and 1967 board member of the lobby organization Atlantik-Brücke.

types from the US. The six speedboats caused the greatest difficulties. More than fifty hours were negotiated, and Birrenbach and Peres clashed massively. After the US had made the provision of the most advanced tank version on German request dependent on the agreement on the shipping issue, the Israeli side agreed to have the boats built in France (cf. HANSEN

2004, pp. 749). As a replacement, they eventually agreed on DM 140 million. It was left to the government of Israel to buy as many tanks, helicopters, and engines as they thought fit from their point of view. Germany attached great importance to a joint German-Israeli declaration on the cancellation of arms deliveries since otherwise, the danger of new controversial discussions in public could arise. Furthermore, in Erhard's letter to Eshkol on the establishment of diplomatic relations on May 1965, it was agreed to note that both countries have succeeded in reconciling the remaining deliveries left over from earlier agreements with Israel on the supply of arms (cf. WD 2015).

Conversely, the Israelis wanted an express German assurance of future military cooperation, which meant, not least, the deliveries to the Bundeswehr. Carstens rejected that, but there was no interruption in the sales (cf. SHINNAR 1967, pp.159). New was the cooperation in research and development, which Helmut Schmidt69 initiated as Minister of Defense and in which the two countries play a significant role in the future (cf. HANSEN 2004, p. 750).

69 Helmut Heinrich Waldemar Schmidt was a German politician and member of the SPD. From 1967 to 1969 he was chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, between 1969 and 1972 Federal Minister of Defense and between 1972 and 1974 Federal Minister of Finance. Moreover, he was head of government of a social-liberal coalition and became after the resignation of Willy Brandt the fifth chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, serving between 1974 and 1982.

4. Application of the historical context to the theories

Having taken a separate look at the theories of international relations and the historical background of the armament cooperation, this chapter combines both, by asking, in how far the four leading theories of international relations can contribute to understand and explain the decisions and motivations that lead to the German-Israeli cooperation, in particular, the

German-Israeli armament cooperation between 1957 and 1965. In this regard, the overall political, economic and geopolitical situation of Germany and Israel will be taken into consideration as determinants of their motivations and decisions.

4.1. Realism

4.1.1. Anarchy and Hierarchy

In the postwar period, the different aims and interests between the Western powers under the leadership of the United States of America and the so-called Eastern bloc under the leadership of the Soviet Union emerged in the reorganization of the world. Moreover, it led to the division of Europe into two hostile power blocs with associated military alliances: NATO and the

Warsaw Pact countries. The proclamation of the Truman doctrine by US President Harry S.

Truman in 1947 is perceived as the starting point of the Cold War.

At the same time, the establishment of the State of Israel took place. Since the British Mandate for Palestine ended, David Ben Gurion proclaimed on behalf of the Jewish National Assembly the establishment of the State of Israel in the Declaration of Independence on May 14, 1948.

Israel was recognized among others by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia

(cf. DAYAN 2006). However, following the declaration, army units of an alliance formed by the Arab states of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq moved into the former British

Mandate and attacked Israel. The Arab alliance did not accept the UN partition plan for

Palestine and denied Israel's right to exist. Therefore, they wanted to eliminate the emerging state. Despite the apparent superiority, the war ended with a clear military victory for Israel concluding ceasefire agreements with its Arab war opponents in 1949 through the UN mediation. Thus, the Jewish national movement successfully established its state. However, it should not have been the last war for survival Israel was facing.

Germany was right from the beginning one of the key venues of the struggle for power between the two superpowers in the Cold War, which Israel would only later on become. With the unity of the three western zones forming the Federal Republic of Germany and the founding of the western military alliance NATO in April 1949, the USSR equaled founding the German

Democratic Republic. This sealed the division of Germany and Europe and cemented the bipolar world order.

Both, Israel and Germany, aimed for their establishment as an independent state in the long term. Although they were facing most of the time different challenges, there were also common goals such as the maintenance of a new founded democratic state, their recognition at the international level and the survival in the face of hostile neighboring countries.

4.1.2. Security as the primary objective of government action

In contrast to the founding of the two German states, Israel not only had to build up itself from hardly anything after its founding but primarily to defend its state integrity militarily against the attacks of the neighboring Arab states. Although it had won the war against the outnumbered

Arab countries in 1948, it was subsequently refused recognition. Any neighboring Arab state did not recognize the state integrity and sovereignty of Israel during the period of the investigation. Besides, it faced an economic boycott and aggressive propaganda from all surrounding countries. Israel remained isolated from foreign policy in the Middle East and was

reliant on allies to protect themselves. The first years of the country remained marked by pressing challenges: ensuring Israeli security from Arab attacks, high spending on defense, building a functioning economy, ensuring water and medical care, and integrating tens of thousands of refugees. Against the background of almost complete foreign policy isolation in the Middle East, Israel’s foreign policy was focusing on the interest in international recognition in order to preserve, secure and consolidate its newly won statehood within the framework of the world community (cf. WOLFFSOHN 2016, pp. 311).

As Herz argued, the need for security is the primary objective of any government action. Israel was driven by the fear of a military offensive emanating from the surrounding Arab states, that wanted Israel’s total annihilation, and which were equipped with Soviet armament. As the best means of survival is power, the only way to win in the realist struggle of power is by arming themselves. Ben Gurion emphasized multiple times that the principal objective is the survival of the state and therefore, cooperation with Germany with its political and economic weight was necessary in order to survive as a state.

4.1.3. Uncertainty as of the underlying condition

One crucial aspect of Herz’s theory is that states take any means to achieve security under the condition of uncertainty over the actions of other states. For instance, Israel concluded against domestic resistance the Luxembourg Agreement with West Germany in 1952, which promised

Israel significant support by the Federal Republic of Germany as a reparation for the crimes of

National Socialism. This agreement primarily benefited Israel on an economic level. However, it served also as a symbol for recognition of both states, showing their ability for independent negotiations. The conclusion of the agreement can be interpreted as the first stage and by receiving trust between each other and at the international level in order to receive proper means for security at the next stage. Therefore, the Luxembourg Agreement is a puzzle within the competition for security and power, as the best means of survival is power. According to Waltz,

states arm themselves militarily to ensure their security, because ultimately, they depend on self-help for survival. For instance, Ben Gurion emphasizes that the military material which

Israel needed for their defense could only be obtained from Germany.

The next stage eventually took place at the meeting in Rott between Peres and Strauß. From the

Israeli side, it was primarily motivated by the increasing insecurity in the region, as the Soviet

Union was continually arming the surrounding Arab countries and had delivered three submarines to Egypt in 1957. Moreover, Israel was looking for cooperation that was in contrast to the US that helped financially, and France that helped with weapons, able to deliver weapons without asking for money (cf. DEUTSCHKRON 1983, pp. 249).

The positive reaction from the German side, as previously mentioned in chapter two, can be interpreted as an overall strategy to strengthen the Western collective. Thereby, the establishment of a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the Middle East region, as a defense of

Western Europe at the back door and therefore willing to pay for Israel’s armament is aimed

(cf. DEUTSCHKRON 1983, p. 251). At the same time, Germany was interested in this cooperation as the first stage of the cooperation was the equipment of the Bundeswehr with

Israeli military goods. Israel as the supplier of weapons for Germany was a shrewd move as it made it easier to argue against criticism of the German rearmament.

However, it is partly contradicted by the German attempt to keep good relations to the Arab countries, becoming visible by the fact that German technicians and scientist were active in

Egypt. However, a dual strategy in the region was also implemented by other countries, like the

United States until the breakage was unavoidable anymore.

4.1.4. International Security Dilemma

Herz described the vicious circle of security and power accumulation. Its most important examples from the recent past are the military alliance structures during the Cold War, between

the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The political security of the respective alliances and their members secured through military strength as part of the armament race. Although the armament was primarily intended for defense, it was perceived by the political opponent as a threat, which in turn equal, thus arming. The original goal of increasing security has led to a heightened sense of insecurity as a higher number of weapons has compounded the subjective threat. The observation of an armament race can not only be observed at the international level but can also be noticed at the regional level. Israel armed in reaction to the armament of the

Arab countries by the Soviet Union, Germany armed in order to demonstrate power against the

Eastern Bloc. In 1953, for instance, Israel spent up to 25% of gross domestic product for maintaining their national security. However, in order to win the struggle of power, the Israelis aimed to arm themselves with nuclear weapons, for which Germany contributed to a decisive way since 1961 when “Aktion Geschäftsfreund” started (cf. WEINGARDT 2002, pp. 126).

The importance of the cooperation for Israel as a way to secure their existence became most apparent when Germany under the pressure of the Arab countries denied a transformation of the agreed armament to financial compensation. Israel insisted and argued that their security was in danger if the promised material would not be delivered. However, Israel and Germany eventually agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations. Likewise, many other aspects that occurred can be interpreted through the lenses of the three other theories of international relations.

4.2. Institutionalism

Institutionalists agree that security is the leading principle of any state. In contrast to realists, they argue that uncertainty leads to standard rules and institutions, such as international law and diplomacy, and not to arm. In the following institutions that occurred within and between

Germany and Israel will be outlined.

4.2.1. Uncertainty leads to common rules and institutions

The western part of Germany was reorganized, and in 1949 a new constitution came into force.

Political control was given back to Germany gradually. Under the agreements, the Occupation

Statute on Disarmament, Demilitarization, Foreign Policy, Foreign Trade, Foreign Exchange and the Application of the Basic Law published in September 1949. In the Petersberg

Agreement from November 1949, the Allies retained consular relations, dismantling and decisions on the accession of Germany to international organizations. Moreover, German participation was discussed at the founding of NATO in April 1949 in Washington. In October

1950, France proposed a European Defense Community to prevent the establishment of a

German army but could not prevail. Thus, in October of the same year, the empty office in the

Federal Chancellery was set up to prepare for rearmament. Moreover, in April 1951, the ECSC became the basis for the raw material industries. As a consequence, international control of the

Ruhr area was lifted. In addition, the Federal Border Police was created and from 1956 on half of the officials entered the Bundeswehr.

From the foundation of the state of Israel until now the fundamental goal of Israeli foreign policy is to secure its existence by acquiring strong allies ensuring military support and therefore security. The Arab states not only questioned Israel's right to exist, but they also tried to prevent its incorporation into the international community. To this day, Israel is, for instance, the only country in the United Nations that does not belong to a regional group. Therefore,

Israeli governments have always sought to receive the support of a significant power to increase the country's security against the Arab threat. In the Revolutionary War of 1948,

Czechoslovakia delivered the necessary weapons (cf. DAYAN 2006). At the outbreak of the

Korean War in 1950, Israeli policy turned to Western allies. In 1955, when the Eastern bloc overshadowed a pro-Arab position, Israel entered into a strategic alliance with France between

1955 and 1967. After the Suez war of 1956, which was ended by intervention by the American

government, Israeli policy sought closer ties with the United States, which was not easy at the beginning, as the US under Eisenhower was still extremely critical of Israel. However, from

1962, US-Israeli relations deepened under the reign of John F. Kennedy. Among other things, this recognized the potential of Israel as a military counterweight to the activities of the Soviet

Union in the Middle East. A strategic partnership between the US and Israel solidified only during the 1970s, especially among the Nixon and Reagan governments in the form of treaties and agreements regarding financial support and the exchange of military technology.

4.2.2. Institutions matter

At its foundation Israel had only hazarded institutionalized alliances, looking for reliable cooperation partners. The conclusion of the Luxembourg Agreement in 1952, in which the

Federal Republic undertook to provide Israel about three and a half billion DM in compensation for the victims of the Shoah, can also be interpreted within the aim to establish institutions. Not having any form of contact, nor cooperation between both countries, this was the first step in building up a respective institution. From 1955, Israel was able to call up this money for twelve years in the form of goods, services, and fiscal transfers. The aid made up a large part of Israel's income and reduced the substantial foreign trade deficit. In this regard, the Israel Mission was established 1953 in Cologne in order to process the payments (cf. JELINEK 1997, pp. 251).

With the inception of the London Agreement on German External Debts in 1953, the conditions for German creditworthiness and thus for international business and foreign trade was created.

Two years later in 1955, Germany was able to give up its status as an occupied country with the accession to NATO. It was from the Allied High Commissioners Ambassadors of the

Confederate States and the following year 1956, the Bundeswehr as an army within NATO founded.

4.2.3. Stronger institutions lead to higher control

For Germany, the Luxembourg Agreement was in line with gaining back trust among the other

European countries. In these years Germany signed many international agreements, like the

Treaty of Rome together with France, Italy and the Benelux countries, which established the

European Economic Community, which would later become the European Union. However, relations with the East were very low, primarily aiming to negotiate the release and repatriation of two of approximately 3.3 million German prisoners of war. Therefore, Adenauer was in early

September 1955 to visit in Moscow (cf. BÖLSCHE 2006).

However, the way to establish diplomatic relations with the other Eastern Bloc countries was obstructed by the dogma of the Hallstein Doctrine, the sole representation claim of the Federal

Republic as the only legitimate representative of the German people. The Hallstein Doctrine, stating to not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the GDR, was taking very rigorous as an institution. When the Arabs increased their threat to recognize the GDR, Germany was eager to avoid this, asking for negotiations with the Israelis about renegotiating the armament agreement and moreover, trying to use another institution, Article

26 of the Basic Law, to solve the situation. Article 26 states that any supply of weapons in conflict areas should be prevented. Relying on that Germany tried to convince the Israelis to renegotiate. The Israelis, on the other hand, did not accept the institution brought forward by the Germans and insisted on the fulfillment of the verbally agreed deal. Eshkol criticized the institution as inappropriate, emphasizing that the tension between the Israelis and the Arabs cannot be just compared to other tensions, as the Arab countries demand Israel’s total annihilation.

The tensions between Israel and Germany were only resolved, when Bonn decided to detach from the Arabs, offering Israel the establishment of diplomatic relations. By leveraging stronger relations, stronger institutions and a higher interaction developed. However, Institutionalism

alone cannot explain the whole development, as it leaves out the key actors that were taking decisive decisions and not the institutions that advanced by themselves.

4.3. Liberalism

4.3.1. Individuals determine the interaction on the international level

Israel's economic development between 1948 and 1967 was marked by the founding, consolidation and rapid growth of the economy. With the founding of the state, the leaders of the Zionist parties saw the opportunity to establish a viable Jewish state with the knowledge and ideas of the Jewish immigrants from the Diaspora. It was not only Theodor Herzl's ideas which characterized the economy of the newly founded state but rather the ideas of the most influential political currents at that time David Ben Gurion, member of the socialist party

Mapai. He represented the concept of Mamlachtijut70. In consensus with the other political currents, they pursued the goal of establishing a modern economic system with regulative state interventionism and cooperative structures, but also with protected private property and entrepreneurship (cf. HOFMANN 2008).

After the declaration of independence, Israel was in challenging economic conditions. The country had no significant mineral deposits and was an agricultural state without significant or interrupted infrastructure. The two main tasks until 1952 were the supply of the population with basic goods and the institutionalization of their economic system. The government ran an emergency program until they implemented a new economic policy in 1952, reducing the rationing and price control, but further determined the direction of development of the economy. Their focus laid on the expansion of agriculture and construction in order to supply

70 Mamlachtijut literally translated as statehood

the growing population. Moreover, sharp devaluation of the Israeli pound, which lost half of its value against the dollar, boosted the foreign trade of Israel (cf. WOLFFSOHN 2016, pp. 311).

When the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany was promulgated in 1949, elections followed, and the first federal government was formed in September 1949, by Konrad

Adenauer. Adenauer's government was a coalition of CDU, CSU, and FDP. The next day, the occupation statute came into force, granting powers of self-government with certain exceptions.

Despite the difficult situation after the unconditional surrender in 1945, in the territory of the later Federal Republic, unlike in the case of the urban living, about 80 to 85 percent of the production capacity remained intact. The total capacity after the war even surpassed that of the last peace year 1938. The road and rail network were only partly destroyed at certain points.

Many interruptions were resolved relatively quickly. Moreover, the reconstruction work in the cities made rapid progress (cf. BENZ 2005).

The occupation policy of the Western powers after the war initially did not aim for a rapid economic recovery in Germany. However, after many discussions, the Western Allies decided to rebuild, mainly because of widening differences between the Western Allies and the Soviet

Union, which led into the Cold War. As a consequence, the Reichsmark, which was largely devalued after the war, was replaced by the new German Mark in 1948. This currency reform created the conditions for economic consolidation and simplified the organizational help already provided by the Marshall Plan. The currency reform of 1948 ended the hitherto widespread barter and the black-market economy virtually overnight. Just as quickly the shelves filled with goods, first and foremost goods for the cover of basic needs. For a broad investment activity, companies initially lacked sufficient capital. This changed in the following years, initially hesitant, then sweeping. The basis in this matter was the good profit development, the subsequent willingness to invest was in no small extent self-financed. This also improved the

extremely precarious financial situation of many companies until the early 1950s (cf. KIMMEL

2005).

Ben Gurion and Konrad Adenauer became the most significant characters for the early years of the two new countries, believing in the benefit of cooperation between Israel and Germany. In particular, Ben Gurion had to defend any form of interaction with Germany from early on. He stood behind his goal to avoid a war, arguing that it is from fundamental importance for Israel, that they establish relations with Germany, perceiving them as an essential power.

4.3.2. International cooperation

Besides the two leaders of Israel and Germany, there were also other important figures shaping the coalescing relations. Taking a closer look at the Israel Mission as an administrative office, it becomes clear that Shinnar, as the head of the mission acted as an ambassador, even though he was not the representative of a state, but only the head of a non-diplomatic government agency. He used his position to function as a mediator in order to build and strengthen relations between Germany and Israel. In this context, Rolf Vogel and Avigdor Tal are to be mentioned, in particular as they were helping to prepare an advance of stronger military cooperation after the conclusion of the Luxembourg Agreement.

In their role as Ministers of Defense, Peres and Strauß were the actors most involved within the negotiations and elaboration of the cooperation. Particularly emphasized should be the fact that the agreement was only agreed orally, based on mutual trust, even though Strauß had been opposing the Luxembourg Agreement years before. The basis of the cooperation was the personal relationships of the initiated politicians and a matter of trust which is surprisingly taking the extent of the cooperation into account.

4.3.3. International politics as a result of a two-level game

In the context of the German-Israeli relations, the domestic policy played a decisive role. In the background of the Second World War and the face of the Shoah, the Israeli society was divided into people opposing any form of contact and cooperation with Germany and the people prefixing the benefits of such cooperation for security purposes. In the context of the

Luxembourg Agreement riots in the streets of Israel occurred among the mass demonstrations organized against the reparation payments. However, the government prevailed.

In the context of the military cooperation, the pressure from Israeli people came from a different angle. The tool was again moral values, but at this time the direction of impact was against the

Germans accusing them of moral bankruptcy, not supporting the Israelis in their struggle for survival. The Jewish associations in the US, for instance, demonstrated in front of the official representations of Germany in Washington, and German companies were boycotted.

4.3.4. Theorem of Democratic Peace

Liberalism emphasizes that the more participatory a democratic system of rule is, the lower the likelihood that it will be expected to use force in international politics and to attack another democratic country. Following this theory, it could be concluded that Germany’s interest to maintain a democracy in the region and Israel’s interest to strengthen the democracy in

Germany was stronger than the other alternatives due to the same values shared as democratic countries.

4.4. Constructivism

Although constructivism was only developed recently, primarily since the 1990s, its ideas of a historically and socially constructed international system can be used to explain the occurrence of the German-Israeli armament agreement.

4.4.1. Culture and institutions construct an international system

As Germany claimed to be the legal successor of the Nazi regime and therefore took responsibility for the atrocities committed by the Nazis, Israel claimed to be the rightful representatives of those victims. That a state is providing material compensation to the citizens of another state, that had not existed at the time of the injury and reserved itself the right to put forward a claim on behalf of the Jews persecuted under Hitler, is precedent in itself and shows the possibility of the construction of the international system.

In line with perceiving themselves as the newly emerging Jewish state, the Knesset passed a law in 1950, which gives all Jews in the world the right to immigrate to Israel, until today. Even before the passage of this law, immigrants flocked to Israel, causing significant financial and logistical problems. The Israeli state supported some of them. Between 1947 and 1950 about

250,000 Holocaust survivors came into the country. Moreover, between 1949 and 1950 about

49,000 Yemeni Jews came to Israel. By 1958, the population of Israel had risen in particular due to immigration from 800,000 to 2 million inhabitants. This influx was an economic burden on the young state, necessitating rationing of most consumer goods until 1959 (cf.

WOLFFSOHN 2016, pp. 206).

In order to master those challenges, Israel received economic aid from the Soviet Union and

Poland in the early years. However, the initially preferred socialist tendencies became less vigorously persecuted. As a consequence, Israel was looking for allies and financial assistance.

Israel's neutrality policy in the Cold War, however, had to be abandoned only after the Suez

Crisis when they formed a strategic alliance of Great Britain, France, and Israel on the other since Nasser and other Arab states tied themselves more politically to the Soviet Union.

4.4.2. Four principles of all states

Although Wendt argues that any national interest is socially constructed, he admits that there are four valid principles shared among all nations. This can be found within the motivation of the actions of Germany and Israel.

Firstly, the primary objective of both countries was their physical survival as a state, described various times within the course of the paper.

Secondly, both states are trying to achieve as much autonomy as possible. The armament cooperation can be seen as the achievement of military autonomy, even though cooperation and alliances were entered to ensure survival as the leading principle and therefore dispense from their autonomy. In particular, Germany was determined by the loss of sovereignty and statehood in the first years after the end of the Second World War, from which cooperation with the Allies was the only way out. To combat the need, the Americans provided in the framework of the

Marshall Plan71 from 1947, construction aid for the coal and steel industry. Following the currency reform in 1948 prepared by the Americans the reconstruction could begin. In 1948, the London Six-Power Conference urged the founding of a West German state. The Federal

Republic of Germany was founded in 1949 after the Western Allies agreed to the German draft of a new constitution. However, also Israel was in a permanent struggle for achieving autonomy and defending it as a newly founded country, not approved by its surrounding neighbors.

Thirdly, both countries focused besides their security aspect on the achievement of advancing their economy. The German share of world exports rose rapidly as the German industry retained a cost and price advantage over foreign countries and used the advantages of the European

Payments Union. Thus, shortly after the war, German industry was again able to supply new

71 The Marshall Plan, officially called the European Recovery Program, was a major economic stimulus program for the United States of America that benefited post-war Western Europe and the US. It consisted partly of loans, but mainly of raw materials, food and commodities.

capital goods and consumer goods. From 1953, capacity expansion was at the forefront of investment. Previously, war damage had to be remedied and then investment arrears from the war years had to be made up. The conversion to civilian productions initially tied up considerable parts of the scarce investment funds. In the second half of the 1950s, the German

Bundesbank accumulated high foreign exchange reserves due to continuing export surpluses and built up gold holdings. Ahead of schedule foreign liabilities were repaid and as a consequence, Germany could finance the rearmament.

Moreover, the armament industry is traditionally a strength of the Germany economy.

Therefore, Germany was interested in keeping and making use out of the know-how was present. On the other hand, Israel was keen on importing knowledge and advancing their economy from an agricultural to an industrialized country. Good relationships with western countries were therefore beneficial. Moreover, the armament cooperation benefited their economy, as Germany paid for it.

Fourthly, collective self-esteem was achieved by paying off the moral debt and ensuring Israel’s security on the Germany side, and on the Israeli side it was a form of retaliation, that was not expressed in a struggle but in the form of making the Germans paying.

4.4.3. The social construction of reality

Based on the example of Wendt, illustrating the social construction of reality by explaining that

British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than North Korean nuclear weapons, the German support to Israel for arming the country and moreover financing their nuclear armament falls into this category. Germany did not perceive Israel as a threat given to the material structure. The social relationship between Germany and Israel and Germany and the Arab countries was perceived differently based on their interactions. However, nuclear weapons become only then meaning when they are seen and understood within the social

context. Therefore, the effects of ideas and beliefs on world politics need to be taken into account. Moreover, the reality is continuously under construction which would explain why

Germany was active in Egypt and Israel at the same time. In line with constructivism, the decision to detach with the Arab states and to establish diplomatic relations with Israel was, therefore, a change over time as a result of the change of ideas and beliefs that the involved actors were holding.

5. Conclusion

The aim of this research is to explore the underlying motives and policy decisions of the armament cooperation from 1957 to 1965 between Germany and Israel, utilizing the four leading theories of international relations realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism.

The second chapter introduced the four leading theories of international relations. The basic ideas of each theory were presented, but also its limitations appointed. While looking at the differences in the four leading theories of international relations and their explanatory power for the reality of international relations in general, it must be concluded that the theories can complement each other, in particular when considering complex constellations on the international level. Within the context of the German-Israeli relations, this could also be determined when applying the historical observations on the theories.

To gain a general picture of the historical background of the development of the armament cooperation, the third chapter presents the different stages, starting with the Luxembourg

Agreement in 1952 until the establishment of the diplomatic relations in 1965. When outlaying the historical developments of the establishment of the armament cooperation, the various dimensions and interconnections were implied.

In the fourth chapter, the theories were applied to the historical context. However, only when adding the overall political, economic and geopolitical situation of Germany and Israel at that time and considering all determinants, the interconnectivity and the compliment became significant as a comprehensive picture of the circumstances was gained, necessary to understand some political decisions that were made at that time shaping the German-Israeli relations. The interconnectivity was demonstrated by applying the historical context to the

essential statements of each theory, showing that the decisions made in this context have connections to each approach.

Regarding realism, that means, that the international area at the beginning of the military cooperation between Germany and Israel was anarchic, characterized by new emerging countries and military alliances. Both countries were aiming for their independence, thus their maintenance as a democratic state, their recognition at the international level, and their survival in the face of hostile neighboring countries. Therefore, security was the primary objective of both government actions. Right from its foundation, Israel had to defend its state integrity militarily against the attacks of the neighboring Arab states. In this regard, Ben Gurion emphasized several times that the principal objective is the survival of the state. The cooperation with Germany with its political and economic weight was necessary to survive as a state. However, also Germany was facing the threat of the Soviet Union within the Cold War.

The condition of uncertainty was a constant fact. Thus, any means to achieve security were taken. Against domestic resistance the Luxembourg Agreement was concluded between

Germany and Israel in 1952. The agreement benefited Israel primarily on an economic level.

However, it also served Germany as a symbol for recognition of both states, and moreover, showing the ability of both countries for independent negotiations. The international security dilemma as the last key point of realism reaches its peak with the “Aktion Geschäftsfreund” starting in 1961, where Germany contributed to the Israelis armament with nuclear weapons in a decisive way.

Despite the fact, that realism has a significant explanatory power analyzing the overall picture of the development of the German-Israeli relations; it fails to explain the whole context.

Institutionalism must be considered to explain the new emerging institutions that occurred within and between Germany and Israel. In contrast to the realist arms race as the answer to surviving in the struggle of power, institutionalism argues that uncertainty leads to standard

rules and institutions. In the context of the historical case, Germany and Israel aimed for allies ensuring military support and therefore security. Thus, the conclusion of the Luxembourg

Agreement in 1952 can be interpreted within the aim to establish institutions, as it was the first step in building up a respective institution between the two countries, only seven years after the end of the Second World War. For Germany, the Luxembourg Agreement was a way of gaining back trust on the international level through building up institutions. In this regard, Germany was signing several agreements on the international level. In addition, Germany established the dogma of the Hallstein Doctrine, an institution that stating to not develop or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the GDR. Moreover, Article 26 of the Basic Law of

Germany was used to argue for renegotiating the armament agreement with Israel, resulting in tensions between Israel and Germany, as the Israeli side did not accept the institution brought forward by the Germans. The strains were only resolved, when Bonn decided to detach from the Arabs, offering Israel the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Furthermore, liberalism explains the role of individuals for the course of history. In the context of the German-Israeli relations, it was the ideas and visions of influential figures, like Konrad

Adenauer, David Ben Gurion, Shimon Peres, and Franz Joseph Strauß, that shaped the structure and the outcome of the cooperation. Ben Gurion and Adenauer became the most significant characters for the early years of the two new countries, believing in the benefit of collaboration between Israel and Germany. In particular, Ben Gurion had to defend any form of interaction with Germany from early on. He stood behind his goal to avoid a war, arguing that it is from fundamental importance for Israel, that they establish relations with Germany, perceiving them as an essential power. Taking a closer look at the Israel Mission founded to execute the

Luxembourg agreement, its head Felix Shinnar acted as an ambassador, even though he was not the representative of a state, but only the head of a non-diplomatic government agency.

Moreover, individuals like Rolf Vogel and Avigdor Tal were helping to prepare an advance of stronger military cooperation after the conclusion of the Luxembourg Agreement, showing that

personal relationships were one crucial element of the collaboration. Following the theorem of democratic peace, Germany’s interest to maintain a democracy in the region and Israel’s interest to strengthen the democracy in Germany was stronger than the other alternatives due to the same values shared as democratic countries.

By considering constructivism, the resulting strategic alliance can be explained and hence one element of the occurrence of the German-Israeli armament agreement and the establishment of diplomatic relations between both countries. Culture and institutions construct an international system, which means Germany took responsibility for the atrocities committed by the Nazis, and Israel claimed to be the rightful representatives of those victims, making them become the two negotiating parties in this context. When looking at the four principles shared among all nations, it can be observed, that the leading principle taken over by Germany and Israel was the physical survival as a state. Besides, both countries tried to achieve as much autonomy as possible, focused on the aspect of advancing their economy, and aimed for the achievement of self-esteem by paying off the moral debt and ensuring Israel’s security on the Germany side, and on the Israeli side through retaliation, that was not expressed in a struggle but in the form of making the Germans paying. The alliance between Germany and Israel was since Israel seemed to be less threatening to Germany and Germany appeared to be a reliable partner on the international level to Israel. The decision to establish diplomatic relations was, therefore, a result of similar ideas and beliefs that the involved actors were holding and socially constructed over time.

In conclusion, only by applying the four leading theories of international relations, the underlying motives and policy decisions of the armament cooperation from 1957 to 1965 between Germany and Israel can be pictured and explained comprehensively.

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Appendix

Timetable on the German-Israeli-Relations between 1945 and 1967

20.09.1945 Weizmann calls for collective compensation as president of the Jewish Agency.

14.05.1948 Declaration of Independence of Israel.

23.05.1949 Announcement of the Constitution of Germany.

12.03.1951 Israeli Note to the Allies with their claims towards Germany.

27.09.1951 Adenauer's declaration in the Bundestag on the crimes against the Jews.

07.01.1952 The Knesset approves negotiations.

21.03.1952 Beginning of the negotiations in Wassenaar.

10.09.1952 Signing of the reparation Agreement and the two protocols in Luxembourg.

04.11.1952 The delegation of the Arab League is asked to leave the Federal Republic.

03.-07.04.1956 Ambassadors Conference in Istanbul.

04.04.1956 Nasser threatens diplomatic relations with the GDR.

01.11.1956 Ben Gurion sends a letter to Adenauer during the Suez War.

27.06.1957 Ben Gurion publicly demands “normal diplomatic relations” between Germany and Israel.

27.12.1957 Peres visits Strauss in Rott am Inn.

31.12.1957 First resignation of Ben Gurions.

01.07.1959 The Knesset approves arms deliveries to the Bundeswehr.

06.07.1959 Second resignation of Ben Gurions.

23.02.1960 Meeting of Strauss with Peres in Bonn.

14.03.1960 Meeting og Ben Gurion and Adenauer in New York.

11.04.1961 Opening of the Eichmann Process.

21.12.1961 The beginning of “Aktion Geschäftsfreund”.

09.01.1962 Confirmation of Knesset Culture Exchange Policy.

08.06.1962 Adenauer holds a conversation with Peres on the armament cooperation.

15.06.1963 Uncovering of training aid.

16./25.06.1963 Change of Government Ben Gurion - Eshkol.

16.09.1963 Adenauer's last attempt to establish diplomatic relations fails.

15./16.10.1963 Change of Government Adenauer - Erhard.

26.05.1964 Peres talks with Westrick about the provision of American tanks.

26.10.1964 The equipment aid reaches the public in a targeted manner.

6.-10.02.1965 “Mission Nervas” takes place in Egypt.

14.02.1965 Israel rejects a financial replacement of the weapon commitments.

Shinnar is not allowed to return to Bonn.

17.02.1965 The Federal Government stops the arms deliveries.

24.02.- Ulbricht visits Egypt.

01.03.1965

07.03.1965 Statement by the Federal Government on the establishment of diplomatic relations.

10.03.1965 Washington enters tank shipments.

16.03.1965 The Knesset accepts the exchange of messengers.

12.05.1965 Correspondence to establish diplomatic relations.

12.-16.05.1965 Ten Arab states break their relations with Germany.

29.06.1965 Approval of the Compensation Act.

22.02.1966 Start of economic negotiations.

12.05.1966 Agreement on economic aid between Germany and Israel.

(cf. HAGALIL 2004)

Declaration of Authorship

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Jennifer Werthwein Haifa, December 30, 2018

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