Master´S Thesis
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CEVRO Institute MASTER´S THESIS Jennifer Werthwein Prague, 2019 1 CEVRO Institute The development of the German-Israeli relations An analysis of the German-Israeli armament cooperation 1957 - 1965 Jennifer Werthwein PPE - Philosophy, Politics, Economics Thesis Advisor: Tomáš Pojar Master´s Thesis Prague, 2019 2 Abstract On the evening of DeCember 27, 1957, Shimon Peres, DireCtor General of the Ministry of Defense of Israel and Close associate of the Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion visited the German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauß at his home in Rott am Inn. The meeting marks the beginning of a thrilling, in many respeCts Controversial diplomatiC and military operation, known under the Codeword Frank (reich) / Kol (onien) [engl. French Colony]. The Close armament Cooperation ocCurred in the time between the Conclusion of the restitution agreement in Luxembourg in 1952 and the establishment of diplomatiC relations in 1965. However, very little is known about what happened during the thirteen years in between. ReCently, files of the Foreign Ministry for the years 1963, 1964 and 1965 were made publiC. They approve the Close armament Cooperation between the two Countries at a time when diplomatiC relations between them had not existed. Moreover, the files show the extent of the Cooperation. They reaCh from a training and education aid and the first delivery of submarines from Germany to Israel, to the delivery of military equipment to rearm the German Bundeswehr from Israel to Germany. The question arises how such Close armament Cooperation Could evolve, although no formal relations existed. In the shadow of the Shoah, Israel Could not agree to formalize the relationship in Luxembourg in 1952. However, when Israel offered Germany the formalization three years later despite the strongest reservations of the publiC, the German government did not want to do so. This was due the pursue of the Hallstein Doctrine for the sole Claim of West Germany to represent whole Germany. Moreover, the Arab Countries threatened West Germany to reCognize East Germany in Case of any Cooperation with Israel, obliging the Cooperation to be seCret (Cf. WEINGARDT 2002, pp. 106). 3 Nevertheless, the German-Israeli relations Continuously strengthened. The paper will show that this emerged from the faCt that it was more benefiCial for both Countries to ally regarding domestiC and international politiCs and regarding eConomiC faCtors. Moral questions were barely part of the disCussions but rather embedded into the desired outCome. The research shows that the four leading theories of international relations realism, institutionalism, liberalism, and Constructivism, support the analysis and thus, the understanding of the motivations and deCisions made regarding the seCret armament cooperation from 1957 to 1965 and its importance for the proceeding of the German-Israeli relations. However, only by applying the four leading theories of international relations, the underlying motives and poliCy deCisions of the armament Cooperation from 1957 to 1965 between Germany and Israel Can be piCtured and explained Comprehensively. 4 Table of Content 1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................. 8 2. THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ..................................................................................... 13 2.1. REALISM ....................................................................................................................................................... 13 2.1.1. Classical Realism after E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau ................................................................... 14 2.1.2. Security dilemma after John H. Herz ................................................................................................. 15 2.1.3. Neorealism after Kenneth Waltz ....................................................................................................... 16 2.1.4. Advantages and problems of Realism ............................................................................................... 17 2.2. INSTITUTIONALISM .......................................................................................................................................... 18 2.2.1. English School of international relations ........................................................................................... 18 2.2.2. Utilitarian Institutionalism ................................................................................................................ 19 2.2.3. Advantages and Problems of Institutionalism ................................................................................... 20 2.3. LIBERALISM ................................................................................................................................................... 21 2.3.1. Three forms of Liberalism after Andrew Moravcsik ........................................................................... 21 2.3.2. Demarcation of Realism and Institutionalism ................................................................................... 22 2.3.3. Theory of Democratic Peace .............................................................................................................. 23 2.3.4. Limits of Liberalism ............................................................................................................................ 23 2.4. CONSTRUCTIVISM ........................................................................................................................................... 24 2.4.1. Central aspects and boundaries ........................................................................................................ 24 2.4.2. Perspectives and problems of Constructivism ................................................................................... 26 2.5. OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................................................... 27 3. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARMAMENT COOPERATION .................................................................................................................................................. 29 3.1. THE BEGINNING OF THE GERMAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN LUXEMBOURG ..................................................................... 29 3.2. FIRST INTERACTIONS AFTER THE LUXEMBOURG AGREEMENT ................................................................................... 30 3.3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COOPERATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE PAST ...................................................................... 32 3.4. DEBATES ABOUT STRONGER COOPERATION WITH GERMANY WITHIN THE ISRAELI KNESSET ............................................ 33 3.5. ISRAELI ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE GERMAN BUNDESWEHR ACCRUE ........................................................................... 34 5 3.6. THE BEGINNING OF EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING AID FROM GERMANY TO ISRAEL .......................................................... 36 3.7. THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE AGREEMENT ........................................................................................................ 39 3.8. INCREASING CRITICISM TOWARDS THE ARMAMENT COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL WITHIN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT ......... 42 3.9. SECRECY PROBLEMS ........................................................................................................................................ 44 3.10. THE COOPERATION BECAME PUBLIC .................................................................................................................. 46 3.11. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN GERMANY AND ISRAEL ..................................................................................... 47 3.12. INCREASING THREATS FROM ARAB COUNTRIES TO RECOGNIZE THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ............................ 49 3.13. THE FAILURE OF MISSION NERVAS ................................................................................................................... 50 3.14. THE CLIMAX OF THE CRISIS .............................................................................................................................. 51 3.15. GERMANY DEMONSTRATED THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT ........................................................................................... 53 3.16. GRADUAL ALIENATION BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES .................................................................. 54 3.17. SOLUTION BY DETACHMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND ISRAEL ........ 55 4. APPLICATION OF THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT TO THE THEORIES .......................................... 57 4.1. REALISM ....................................................................................................................................................... 57 4.1.1. Anarchy and Hierarchy ...................................................................................................................... 57 4.1.2. Security as the primary objective of government action ................................................................... 58 4.1.3. Uncertainty as of the underlying condition ....................................................................................... 59 4.1.4. International Security Dilemma ......................................................................................................... 60 4.2. INSTITUTIONALISM