Evolution and Animal Welfare Author(S): Marian Stamp Dawkins Source: the Quarterly Review of Biology, Vol
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Evolution and Animal Welfare Author(s): Marian Stamp Dawkins Source: The Quarterly Review of Biology, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Sep., 1998), pp. 305-328 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3036918 . Accessed: 19/07/2013 06:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Quarterly Review of Biology. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.67.117.205 on Fri, 19 Jul 2013 06:03:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VOLUME 73, No. 3 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY SEPTEMBER 1998 EVOLUTION AND ANIMAL WELFARE MARIAN STAMP DAWKINS Departmentof Zoology, Universityof Oxford Oxford,OX] 3PS United Kingdom E-MAIL: [email protected] ABSTRACT Animalwelfare is a tbpicoften thought to reside outside mainstream biology. The complexity of themethods used to assess welfare (such as health,physiology, immunological state, and behavior) requirean understandingof a widerange of biological phenomena. Furthermore, the "welfare" of an animal providesa frameworkin whicha diversityof its responsescan be understoodas fitness-enhancingmechanisms.Different methodsfor assessing animal welfare are discussed, with particularemphasis on therole of an animal's own choicesand reinforcementmechanisms. No part of biologyis as yetable to explain consciousness,but byconfronting the possibility that nonhumananimals have conscious experiences ofsuffering, animal welfare studiesfarce a consid- erationof even thishardest problem of all biologicalphenomena in a particularlydirect and evolutionaryway. INTRODUCTION change forbetter or forworse in the future.I shall argue thatmany of the so-called "indica- HOW CANTHERE be a scientificstudy of tors"of welfare that have been put forwardare animal welfare?If "welfare"just means best seen as evolutionaryadaptations, either "health,"then isn't animal welfaresimply vet- enabling the animal to counteract a threatto erinaryscience or animal health studiesunder itshealth and fitnessor, in the unnatural envi- anothet name? And ifanimal welfaregoes be- ronments in which humans often keep ani- yond thisand triesto take on mental as well as mals, showingthat the animal has failed in its physicalsuffering, how can it be more than an attemptsto do so. An action or physiological unscientific collection of assumptions-im- response that is effectivein the wild may possible to test-about what animals mightor become pathological and counterproductive mightnot be feeling? withinthe confines of a cage. One of the rea- The intentof thisarticle is to show thatani- sons why so many problems have been en- mal welfare,far from being a fringe activity countered in the studyof "welfare,""stress,;, outside mainstreambiology, could potentially "suffering"and related concepts is because an- be at the heart of biological thinkingabout imal welfarestudies have generallylacked the fitness-enhancingmechanisms in a varietyof evolutionaryframework that characterizesso disciplines. Assuming that "welfare"includes much else in biology.Animal welfare,in other not onlycurrent health statusbut also a variety words, needs a dose of Darwinian medicine of behavioral,physiological and immunologi- (Nesse and Williams 1995). cal indications that health status is likely to Before thistreatment can be administered, The QuarterlyReview of Biology, September 1998, Vol. 73, No. 3 Copyright? 1998 by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved. 0033-5770/98/7303-0002$2.00 305 This content downloaded from 129.67.117.205 on Fri, 19 Jul 2013 06:03:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 306 THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY VOLUME 73 however, it is necessary to distinguishthree their plants in the way that dog owners care typesof questions that are oftenraised about about thatof theirpets, but it is the belief that animal welfare,but are almost equally often animals have something extra-a mental ca- confused. The firstone is,what objective mea- pacityfor experiencing pain, thirst,boredom surements-biochemical, physiological, be- and other mental states-that gives animal havioral-should we use to evaluate whether welfare its moral edge (Duncan 1993). This the welfareof an animal is poor or good. As argument is also reflectedin the scientificlit- discussed below,biochemistry, physiology and erature, where it has been held that "suffer- behavior are all respectable scientificdisci- ing" includes mental suffering(Dawkins 1990; plines, and there is no real problem about us- Webster 1994), and even that sufferingdoes ing them in animal welfarestudies. Their use not occur unless there is a conscious experi- might be controversialand their interpreta- ence (Duncan 1993, 1996; Duncan and Peth- tion may be subject to doubt in some circum- erick 1991). stances,but theirscientific credentials are not. Animal welfare is thus left with a serious The second type of question is, however, problem. If it sticksto what is scientificallyob- more difficult.Are animals thatcan be shown servable, it leaves out what distinguishesfor to have these objectivelymeasured symptoms many people the studyof "welfare"from the consciouslyexperiencing what humans would studyof physical health, namely, conscious ex- call suffering,if we were experiencing these periences of sufferingand well-being.On the same symptoms?For example, ifa nonhuman other hand, ifit accepts thatconscious experi- animal showsclinical signs of exhaustion, and ences (such as those humans call fear, pain these are comparable to those thatgive rise to and frustration)are also sensed by other spe- veryunpleasant experiences in humans, are cies, it runs headlong into the problem of we justified in concluding that the animal is studyingconscious experiences that no field also suffering?This kind of question poses of science, despite many attempts, has yet more problems than the firstone because it come to gripswith. touches on the greatestremaining mysteryin The thirdtype of question thatcan be asked biology-that of conscious experience. Deter- about animal welfare arises out of a concern miningif an organismis conscious or not raises for animal suffering,but is logically distinct difficultiesof a differentorder of magnitude from the issue of whether animals suffer from finding out whether a particular treat- (Stafleu et al. 1996; Fraser et al. 1997). Is it ment resultsin a raised hormone level, forin- ethicallyright or wrongto treatanimals in cer- stance. Despite the avalanche of books that tain ways? Tannenbaum (1991) argued that has recentlyappeared on the subject of con- scientificstudies of animal welfarecan never sciousness (e.g., Dennett 1991; Edelman 1992; be undertakenseparately from an ethicalframe- Crick 1994; Penrose 1994; Weiskrantz1997), work. Rollin (1995) even argues that it is a we have not achieved the same level of un- waste of time to ask whetheran animal is suf- derstanding about consciousness as we have fering,and the onlyjustifiableapproach is al- (throughobjective measurements) about hor- waysto worktoward reducing suffering."Ani- mones and behavior. Insofaras it concerns it- mal welfare" is thereforeput into the same selfwith conscious experiences of sufferingin category as "public health": it is assumed to animals, the studyof animal welfarecould be be a goal toward which everyone should be accused of strayingoff the straightand narrow working.The viewI shall take here is thatmix- path of what is strictlyscientific. ing ethical questions about how animals ought Yet, when people express a concern about to be treatedwith factual questions about wel- animal welfare,it is preciselythe conscious ex- fare is likely to lead to confusion, since hu- perience of sufferingthat worries them most. mans do not automaticallyknow what condi- Animal welfare has a higher moral profile tions are best for the welfareof animals. Facts than, say,plant welfare,because more people alone, without preconceived moral views, believe that animals consciously sufferthan could lead humans to take a differentview of believe thatplants do. Orchid growersmay be how animals ought to be treated (Dawkins concerned about the health and growth of 1980). In any case, the general viewthat scien- This content downloaded from 129.67.117.205 on Fri, 19 Jul 2013 06:03:00 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SEPTEMBER 1998 EVOLUTION AND ANIMAL WELFARE 307 tificand ethical questions (what "is" and what persistent tendency to believe that a good "ought to be") are differentand should not be measure of welfare(with multiple attributes if confused, has much to be said for it (Broom necessary) is attainable ifwe onlyknew how to andJohnson 1993). constructit. In thissection, I shall firstreview I propose, therefore,to keep these three the main component measures of animal wel- typesof questions-the symptomsof good and fare thatare currentlyin use. I will emphasize poor welfare,the conscious experience of suf- the strengthsand weaknesses of each, as well fering,and our ethical attitudes toward ani- as the importance