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Pushing Al-Qaeda out of Yemen Impossible Due to Its Ties with Government

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Pushing Al-Qaeda out of Yemen Impossible Due to Its Ties with Government Received by NSD/F A.RA Regi~tration Unjt 08/03/2018 11 :42:04 AM 81312018 Pushing AJ"Qaeda out of Yemen Impossible Due to Its Ties with Govemmen. t . .. ' . Homepage ~ Opinion Published by Ahmed Muthana in Opinion Pushing Al-Qaeda out of Yemen Impossible Due to Its Ties with Government f,',, Yemeni government fighters closing in on an al-Qaeda location in the Hadramawt province. Photo: Saleh Al Obeidi, AFP Five days after President Donald J. Trump took office, he directed his first military action against the al-Qaeda group in the Ar.J.}?ian Peninsula (AQAP), consid~red to be one of al-Qaeda's most dangerous branches. Despite the attempts to push al-Qaeda out of Yemen and the American drone operations aimed at degrading AQAP, all efforts have I . https://theglobepost.com/2018/08!02/al~qaeda-yemen-al--islah/ampn_twitter _impressfon=true 1/5 Received by NSD/F ARA Registration ,Unit 08/03/2018 11 :42:04 AM Received by NSD/FARA ~egistration Unit _08/03/2018 l l:42:04·AM 8/3/2018 Pushing Al=a_~e_da o_u~ of Y~m~n ln:ip9~_sibl_e D.ue ta _l_t~ "J'.i~s .wi!h Go~emn:ient Separatists fronithe Southern Resistance Forces, backed by the_u:s. arid the Uriited Atab Emirates, managed to defeat the te"rrorist group in most of south Yemen. However, the al~Qaeda branch is stronger than evet fo the north of the country. For the legitimate_government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, cutting ties with AQAP is an almost impossible mission. The government takes advantage of the shared · Sunni background with al-Qaeda to push them for the fight against the Iran-backed Shiite Houthis. ' This mean.s that al-Qaeda is engaged in every step of the process ofliberating Yemen froin the Houthis. It makes talking about a future Yemen. without terror groups impossible. AQAP is burrowingdeepe_r int.a the country every day. · Ties Between Government and AQAP The reason why it's impossible to defeat al-Qaeda in Yemen today is the deep coordination on the ground between AQAP and Al-Isiah, the Mt1_sHm ~rotberhood's party in tlle country. Al a Isiah is a crucial part of the Yem.eni government. the links between Al-Isiah and Al-Qaeda go fat back, and senior Al"Islah Je,1der Abdu_l Majeed a.J~Zinda_ni played a vital role in_the bridge between the two parties. In 2004, the U.S. government labeled him as "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" forhis ties· •with al-Qaeda fqunderOsama bin Laden., When the Yemeni army was about to start an offensive against al-Qaeda in Abyan in southern Yemen in 20(2, Al-Zindani called for a _halt. The Al-Isiah leader is a close ally of President Harli. According to Mareb Press, a news outlet loyal to the government, Harli met with Al­ Zindani in 2018 and described him as "the heir of the Prophet.'' Durin.g the meetin.g, Harli iflsisted for Al~Zindani to play a tnore prominent preaching tole in Yemen, which would generate more violent thinking in the region. Ties Between Army arid AQAP httl)s://theglobel)Ost.cOm/2018/08/02/i31-q·aeda-yenien-al-islahlamp/?:. .... Jwitter_ini"pre'ssion=true 2/5 . Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 08/03/2018 11 :42:04 AM Received by NSD/F ARA. Regist,r?tioi;i Unit 08/0}/2018 11 :42:04 AM 8/3/2018 Pushing Ai"-Oaeda out of Yemen Impossible Due to Its Ties with Government •· . ., .. - . --- . .., ,. - . - ~. - - - A!!other'reason why his unlikely AQAP will be defeated ate the ties between Yemeni General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmat and the organization. Al-Ahmat is the most senior general of the Yemeni army iri charge of all decisions ori the ground in North Yemen:­ Since 2016,. he isI also. the country's. vice president.. In 2005, the U.S. embassy in Yemen raised a red flag about Al-Ahmar's trips to Afghanistan and meetings with Bin Laden iri the 1980s. Irt the U.S., Al-Ahmar is believ~d to have pli:!yed a ~ey role in the relocation ofJarl$e groups of aJ~Qaeda fighters from Afghanista_n to Yemen. Al 0 Ahmar resettled many terrorists thatwere banned from going back to their countries in Yemen. That an inclivid~al with? long history of friendship with AQAP is leading the country's army, makes itis no surprise that terrorist group is not defeated in the north yet. Is Al-Isiah a Terrorist Group? Weeks ago, the U.S. Congress held a heari?g to exami_ne the po.ssibilicy of designating. the Muslim Brotherhood party as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization." The hearing resulted in the compromise that the Congress will go through case by case and only designate .the radical Muslim BTcitherhoo~' branches. I Al-Isiah, the group's party in Yemen, is one of the most q1dical Muslim Brotherhood parties and the U.S. should, therefore, designate them as a tetrorist organization. Al~ Isiah is deeply affiliated with AQAP. Many Yemeni youths who carried out suicide bombings had political affiliations with the Al-Isiah party, and leaders like General AI-Ahmar. trained part of them.. ' . Letting Ahislah take over territory in Yemen generates wealth and resources for their· ally AQAP to carry out more terror attacks. Daily incidents indicate that bombings and terrorist attacks ate executed with professional planning arid coordination betweenAl­ Islah and AQAP. https :1/theQ/obep_oSt. com/201810_8/02/al-qaeida-yeme_n-a!-islah/aTTljj/? _twitter_il'TIJ)reSSiOri=true 3/5 . Received by NSDiF ARA Registration Unit 08/03/2018 11 :42:04 AM Received by NSD/FARA ~egistration Unit 08/0_3/2018 11:4_2:04 AM 8/312018 . Pushing AT-a~ed~· a.~- of Yemen _lrr:,pOs~ibl~ pµe _t_o Its Ties with Gov:e.i:nr:s:ient U!!til this moment, a riumber of places under the control of the Al-Isiah party embrace the leadership ofterrorist groups, especially AQAi>, particularly in Marib, al-Baida, and · Taiz .. It does not look like AQAP will be defeated in north Yemen anytime soon. While IS was defeated in Syria and Iraq, anew chapter of the caliphate is breaking out in north Yemen, where the Al-Isiah party lives in hafrilony with al-Qaeda. This scary scene in the north makes people in the south even more focused on having the right to determine their destiny. The south fought against AQAP, even in north Yemen, bi.it today it is believed fighting AQAP makes no sense since the group has the backing 9fa g9vernrnent with internati,011al political recognition. _In south Yemen, a high price was paid to build a democratic, egalitarian society with a free m_arket 11rn:l a significant role for women. We believe that we havl! our own culture and lifestyle that contradicts the presence of extremism or Islamic political groups. We in the south accept diversity, and we will never consider AQAP as a friend just because of our mutual Sunni background: Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi Abdul Majeed al-Zindani Al Qaeda Al-Isiah Ali Mohse·n al-Ahmar . I _Do_nald Trump Muslim BrOthe~hood Osama bm_ Lad~n LB Ahmed Muthana :Fornier Yemeni Diplomat based in Washington o.c . •< C:o]Jlrnents are closed. httl)s://theglobepOst.COmi2018/08/02/al-q·ae_oa-yemen-al-islah/ampl?_twitter_impression=true 4/5 Received by N.SD/F ARA Registration Unit 08/03/2018 11 :42:04 AM Received by NSD/F ARA Registration Unit 08/03/2018 11 :42:04 AM 813/2018 . Pushing AT.:"Qaecla out of Yemen lmp(!SSible Due to Its Ties with Gciv~rrlmerit Related Post Pakistan's New Prime Minister to Taste Constraints of Power fyi:)Jch ha·s bee·n written as t_o ~hy we ?hould eX:p_ect major cha_nges f_roin Pa_kistan's new... Afghanistan's Humanitarian Crisis and "Memory Loss" of Western Conscience While UN reports and humanitarian groups are tryin·g their best to remiild the World of... Why is MEK Group So Unpopular Among Iranians? Despite all ihe efforts, the exiled Iranian political-militant organization Mojahedin-e Khalqm's (MEK) remains unpopular among... · · · \J\forld . National Democracy at Risk Media Freedom Refugees Opinion Submit Op-ed f All Rights Re_served I View No_n-AMP Version Po'.-"'ered by AMPforWP ~ttps_:/lthegl.ob~poS:t. CBml20-18/Q8/02/a,I-qaE!da-y~men-~l-islah/an_,P./?-~t:t_er _i,:ryl)ressio.ri=tru~ ' • . 5/5 Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit- 08/03/2018 11 :42:04 AM I -.
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