5 The ‘War of the Roses’ The Islamic state and the Pancasila Republic (1949-1962) [The government] should not consider [the Darul Islam] an enemy, rather like a father his son. Regardless of how naughty the son, if taught a lesson he should not be beaten to death, rather given a lecture, or dealt just one blow, drenched in affection. It is similar with a domestic rebellious movement.1 Disillusioned by the Republic’s acquiescence to Dutch demands, under pressure by the TNI’s operations in West Java and let down by Masyumi’s inability to make political Islam relevant in parlia- mentary politics, on 7 August 1949 Kartosuwiryo and the dewan imamah had officially proclaimed the establishment of the Negara Islam Indonesia. As shown in the previous chapter, Masyumi’s political leadership and some elements of the TNI reached out to Kartosuwiryo’s NII in the following months to find a political solution to what had become known as the ‘Darul Islam problem’ (soal Darul Islam). This chapter follows the relationship between the Islamic state and the Indone- sian Republic in the aftermath of the surrender of Dutch sovereignty, focusing in particular on how the transformation from the federal RIS to a unitary state affected NII’s attitude and activities. Diplomacy had dictated the rhythm of Indonesian politics for years, with treaties followed by ceasefires followed by their infringe- ment. Some provinces in the archipelago were slowly warming up to the idea of a federal Republic under the patronage of the House of Orange, but the population of West Java – regardless of its alle- giance to the Islamic state – remained unimpressed by the Roem- Van Royen agreement, which, far from confirming the country’s independence, had established the Negara Pasoendan as an instru- ment of The Hague. 1 Kasman Singodimedjo, chairman of Masyumi, ‘DI anaknja, Masjumi ajahnja’, Harian Ra’jat, 20 September 1955. Chiara Formichi - 9789004260467 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 01:16:39PM via free access | Islam and the making of the nation The Dutch were buying the allegiance of civil servants and pol- iticians, and Republican leaders were settling the details for the transfer of sovereignty. Yet, despite its opposition to the Dutch- sponsored state, its frustration at the Republican leadership’s dip- lomatic approach and its anger at the Siliwangi Division’s re-entry in 1948, the Darul Islam was not yet univocally antagonizing the Republican government and army. If one were to believe the image of Darul Islam that has been dominant since the 1960s (a topic I explore in the next chapter), it would be easy to think that as early as 1948-49 the Siliwangi Divi- sion and Republican leaders, concerned with restoring law and order, openly condemned the Darul Islam as a destabilizing force, an agent of the Netherlands and a terrorist movement exploiting and oppressing the people of West Java. On the contrary, archival sources clearly show that the scattered occurrences of cooperation that had dotted 1948 continued through 1949, and that, until the mid 1950s, military commanders and political leaders (mostly, but not exclusively, from Masyumi) suggested that the Republic should put its efforts into finding a political solution to the Darul Islam problem. shifting approaches: between negotiation and condemnation (1949-1954) The ‘Commission for the solution to the Darul Islam problem’ At the end of 1949, two years after the conception of the Majelis Oemmat Islam and the organization of the Islamic Army, the NII was well established in West Java and in Republican areas. Following the second Dutch attack on the Indonesian Republic, in Decem- ber 1948, Kartosuwiryo appointed a TII consul for the Republican territory,2 the Central Java branch of Masyumi was transformed into an MOI, and, in early March 1949, an imam was appointed to the Majelis Islam in Solo.3 In mid 1948 the Darul Islam had expanded well into Central Java under the command of Amir Fatah, and groups had been established in the Banten area, including Malingping, in west- 2 ‘Pemerintah NII – Petikan daripada Piagam2 Imam no. 200/PNII/I/48, 12 December 1948, JogjaDoc no. 218b, ANRI. 3 Letter from Madjlis Islam daerah Surakarta to Imam Negara Islam Indonesia, 9 April 1949, KabPerd no. 150, ANRI. 146 Chiara Formichi - 9789004260467 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 01:16:39PM via free access 5 The ‘War of the Roses’ | ern Java.4 But its influence had gone further than this, with the dispatching of an NII consul to Sumatra. Although the CMI had identified some Darul Islam groups outside Java as early as October 1949, it would take a few more years before the DI-TII established other structured branches and battalions, with their own distinctive characteristics there. The Aceh rebels, for example, only openly declared their participation in the NII in 1955. By the time that colonial rule in West Java was coming to an end, in early September 1949, the press had already exposed the inability of the Dutch to respond to Darul Islam’s attacks.5 As the Islamic militias, which were now defined by the media as ‘bandits’, were disseminat- ing terror6 and clashing with other soldiers,7 the vice-president of the Pasoendan state was counting on TNI’s support to solve the problem.8 According to a military source, the intensification of Darul Islam’s activities was aimed at ‘improv[ing] their [Darul Islam’s] situation before the transfer of sovereignty to the RIS, meaning before the region’s control [was] to be transferred to the TNI’.9 The ramping up of activities should be read in both political and military terms. On the one hand, it represented the Islamic state’s attempt to conquer as much territory as possible from the Dutch, so as to appear stronger against the Republic of Yogyakarta. On the other hand, the Islamic Army felt more comfortable attacking colonial soldiers, rather than fellow Indonesians. Months passed, marked by contrasting opinions and the absence of a coherent approach towards the Darul Islam, as illustrated in the previous chapter. Then, at its West Java congress – in which only the Banten, Jakarta, Bogor and Cirebon branches participated – Masyumi made it clear that it disagreed with Kartosuwiryo, even if the party was far from condemning his entire movement. K.H. Wahid Hasjim stated that every Muslim has to strive for the establishment of an Islamic state, and Masyumi, as an Islamic political party, agrees with the institu- tion of an Islamic state. It doesn’t just agree with it, but it also has to apply itself towards its achievement. What Masyumi doesn’t agree with, in regards to the ‘Preparation for an Islamic State of Pasoen- 4 ‘Rapport’, Politie Bantam, 8 October 1949, APG no. 998, NA. 5 Antara News, 2 September 1949 and 20 October 1949. 6 ‘Soal TNI dan DI – Petjajaan anggota Parl. Pasoendan’, Berita Indonesia, 29 November 1949; ‘DI menjerbu – 100 rakjat mendjadi korban’, Berita Indonesia, 17 November 1949. 7 Antara News, 3 November 1949, 9 November 1949, 15 November 1949 and 18 November 1949 (in Cirebon, Indramayu and Garut). 8 Antara News, 2 September 1949. 9 ‘Tentara Belanda menggempur DI’, Berita Indonesia, 7 December 1949. 147 Chiara Formichi - 9789004260467 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 01:16:39PM via free access | Islam and the making of the nation dan’, is not its Islamic foundation, but rather the fact that a sepa- ratist movement in West Java uses the banner of Islam when the general population wants instead West Java to be a region within the [federal] state.10 On this same occasion, the party renewed its commitment to the ‘parliamentary way’ of establishing Indonesia as an Islamic state,11 and a week later the national congress in Yogyakarta issued a resolu- tion requesting that the RIS form a ‘solution commission’ (Komisi/ Panitya Penyelesaian Darul Islam) that would ‘look for the best way to settle the Darul Islam issue and all that is linked to it’.12 At the transfer of sovereignty, Soekarno named Mohammad Hatta, Ide Agung Gde Agung of Bali, Sultan Hamengkoeboewono IX of Yogyakarta and Sultan Hamid II of Kalimantan as formateurs of the first federal cabinet. This body was not to represent party poli- tics, but rather was meant as a ‘work cabinet’, representing Masyumi, PNI, the Christian party and several others.13 More important than the cabinet’s wide-spread ideological representation, though, was the fact that the Indonesian Republic of Yogyakarta retained the majority of seats, whilst the remaining sixteen states and territories only accounted for a minority.14 This imbalance was to play a crucial role in the following months, as the Republic of Indonesia (Yogya- karta) pressed the case for the dismantling of the federal structure in favour of a unitary one.15 As Masyumi’s prediction that the Darul Islam would dissolve had not come true with the final transfer of sovereignty and the subsequent withdrawal of the Dutch – nor had the movement relented in its violence – the Darul Islam became a problem for the new Indonesian state. Throughout 1950, politicians across the spectrum issued comments on what the government and parties should do about it. 10 ‘Separatisme – mendjalankan move baru dng. nama Islam’, Berita Indonesia, 12 December 1949. The outlook of the federal state and the dynamics surrounding its establishment have been expounded in great detail by Kahin, Nationalism and revolution, pp. 391-445. 11 ‘Masjumi menghendaki Negara Islam dengan djalan parlamenter’, Warta Indonesia, 10 December 1949. 12 ‘Resolusi Kongres Masjumi tentang DI’, Warta Indonesia, 22 December 1949. 13 The cabinet featured four Masyumi ministers (Finance, Education, Religious Affairs and one without portfolio), three PNI ministers (Labour, Communications and Information), one minister from the Christian Party and seven more without affiliation.