Nikolai Sokov

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ELIMINATION: NEXT STEP FOR ARMS CONTROL

by Nikolai Sokov

Dr. Nikolai Sokov began his career as a research fellow at the Institute of USA and Canada Studies in and at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), where he received his candidate of history degree in 1986. In 1987, he joined the Soviet Foreign Ministry and worked on disarmament issues and participated in the START I talks. In 1992, he took a leave of absence and enrolled at the University of Michigan, where he received his Ph.D. in Political Science in 1996. Dr. Sokov is now a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

uclear disarmament is again ons as a desirable first step.2 the Commonwealth of Independent receiving the attention of Tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) States (CIS) at the end of 1991 and Npoliticians and nongovern- are the only part of the nuclear arse- in early 1992 (indirectly codified by mental experts after several years nals of the United States and the Lisbon Protocol to the START I on the back burner. Debates have that is regulated primarily by an in- Treaty) developed this informal re- been stimulated by the December formal regime—one that is not codi- gime further. These agreements pro- 1996 letter from a distinguished group fied in an international treaty. That vided for the withdrawal to Russia of retired U.S. and Russian generals regime was established in 1991 by of TNW from the territories of calling for the complete elimination reciprocal unilateral obligations of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan. 1 of nuclear arms. The uncertain the United States and the Soviet Finally, in December 1996, the START II ratification process and Union. According to these initia- North Atlantic Council ministerial potential U.S.-Russian confrontation tives, all ground- and sea-launched meeting declared that “NATO coun- over NATO enlargement add ur- TNW of the United States and the tries have no intention, no plan, and gency to this task of moving ahead were withdrawn to no reason” to deploy TNW on the with further disarmament. storage facilities (along with long- territories of the future new mem- An obvious question is where to range sea-launched cruise missiles bers of the North Atlantic Treaty start? The Canberra Report, which (SLCMs)), while the number of air- Organization (NATO) and “do not 3 developed a specific plan of moving launched TNW was also reduced. foresee any future need to do so.” toward complete elimination of Meanwhile, a large number were The remaining number of deployed nuclear weapons, singled out mea- slated for elimination. TNW is relatively small. The United sures related to non-strategic weap- The agreements concluded within States has about 500 nuclear bombs

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 17 Nikolai Sokov in Europe.4 Although Russia has not he would like Russian nuclear weap- sumptions are challenged, serious disclosed the number of its deployed ons to be redeployed in his country.13 initiatives in the area of TNW will TNW in Europe officially, The Bul- But there are even more far-reach- always lack the necessary domestic letin of Atomic Scientists estimates ing proposals. Minister of Atomic support. that Russia has 2,200 deployed Energy Viktor Mikhailov has pro- This article is an effort to reassess 5 TNW, with probably about half of posed development and production traditional views of TNW. It seeks them in Europe. The number of of 10,000 new, fourth generation to demonstrate that TNW do not TNW in storage, however, is still nuclear warheads, as well as the ab- enhance security under any condi- fairly large. The United States is es- rogation of the Intermediate-Range tions, that their value for deterrence 6 timated to have 7,000. While offi- Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 is grossly overestimated both by cial Russian figures remain and the redeployment of SS-20 and Russia and by NATO, and that these classified, warheads for non-strate- SS-23 missiles.14 His proposal on weapons need to be eliminated, re- gic delivery vehicles constitute 40 the fourth generation of weapons is gardless of actual or potential imbal- percent of the total nuclear weap- not as far-fetched as it might seem: ances in conventional or strategic 7 ons stockpile, which puts their ac- as early as 1992, Lieutenant General nuclear weapons. Consequently, tual number somewhere between Evgeniy Negin announced that Rus- measures to formalize the current 8 6,000 and 13,000 warheads. Ac- sia already had developed a minia- regime could (and should) be under- cording to scheduled reductions, the turized nuclear weapon.15 taken independently of the issues of total stockpile should fall to 5,000 to NATO enlargement and START II 10,000 warheads by the year 2005.9 The possible consequences of these proposals are bleak. A new ratification. The existing, largely informal re- round of the arms race could follow. This article begins with an over- gime might become inadequate A breakdown of the existing TNW view of the missions assigned to fairly soon, however. A consensus regime also could lead to Russia’s TNW by Russia and NATO and then is emerging in Russia regarding the rejection of the START II Treaty and proceeds with a critical reassessment value of TNW for ensuring the to new deployments of land-based of the utility of TNW. Finally, it country’s security, especially in the strategic missiles with multiple war- elaborates on some initial measures wake of NATO’s upcoming enlarge- heads (MIRVed ICBMs), which to create a formal TNW regime and ment. The decision to reverse the START II bans. The United States move toward deep reductions in and 1991 Soviet obligations is all but is likely to respond in kind, by de- eventual elimination of TNW. official: reportedly, it has already ploying additional TNW in Europe been endorsed by the military and and taking other measures. As a re- MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO the presidential administration as a sult, at least one of the nuclear TNW preferred response in case Russia states—and more in the case of a Increased attention to TNW in perceives the need to adopt military NATO response—would be seen as 10 Russia is part of a larger trend, un- countermeasures. A distinguished reneging on obligations under Article derway since the breakup of the So- military expert, retired general VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty viet Union, toward reliance upon Vladimir Belous wrote that the new (NPT). If these events were to oc- nuclear weapons as the main source deployment should entail the cre- cur, the nonproliferation regime of security. As early as the spring of ation of “groupings” of tactical would be seriously weakened. nuclear weapons,11 which could in- 1992, the military proposed aban- clude delegation of control over The only way out of the conun- doning the Soviet Union’s no-first- TNW to local commanders, at least drum is to formalize the current re- use policy. This innovation became in time of crisis. Reportedly, a new gime, make it legally binding, and official in the fall of 1993.16 The missile (dubbed SS-X-26 by NATO) broaden its scope to include com- policy shift was justified by the radi- with a range of 400 kilometers is al- plete elimination of TNW world- cal weakening of Russian conven- ready being flight-tested.12 wide. However, deeply entrenched tional forces as a result of both the Belarusian President Aleksandr assumptions about the value of disintegration of the Soviet Union and Lukashenko, in a recent statement TNW for security hinder progress the on-going economic crisis. The before the Russian Duma, hinted that toward this solution. Until these as- 1993 doctrine, however, did not

18 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nikolai Sokov specify which classes of nuclear forgotten.”22 In other words, for the conflict to an early termination.24 weapons Russia needed. But the foreseeable future, the imbalance in Under current international condi- first-use plank is likely to figure conventional weapons will continue tions, the role of TNW has remained prominently in the new defense doc- to preoccupy Russian decision- more or less the same, although their trine. Indeed, Yuri Baturin, the Sec- makers; success in the ongoing ne- war-fighting mission is being de- retary of the Defense Council, has gotiations might help to postpone the emphasized somewhat. The complained that the strategic situa- decision until such time as the level “Alliance’s Strategic Concept” of tion has become even worse since of trust becomes sufficient to aban- 1991 states: 1993, suggesting a strengthened com- don plans of TNW deployment com- The fundamental purpose of 17 the nuclear forces of the mitment to the first-use doctrine. pletely, but, in the meantime, the Allies is political: to pre- The upcoming enlargement of possibility of deployment will con- serve peace and prevent co- tinue to exist. ercion and any kind of war. NATO has focused attention on de- They will continue to fulfill veloping means to compensate for In view of the regional imbalance, an essential role by ensur- NATO’s considerable superiority in Russia has adopted the same solu- ing uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the conventional forces, which is ex- tion that NATO developed during the nature of the Allies’ re- pected to increase further after the Cold War in the face of Soviet supe- sponse to military aggres- actual enlargement takes place. In riority in conventional forces. The sion.25 1995, for the first time, deployment differences between the past NATO Officially, they are not targeted of additional TNW by Russia was and current Russian approaches are against Russia: a 1996 NATO docu- proposed as an appropriate means of insignificant and can be accounted ment stated that nuclear weapons response.18 for by the particulars of Russia’s “are no longer targeted against any- 26 NATO’s statements about its ab- geostrategic position. Similarities one.” The remaining question, sence of hostile intentions receive include the two policies’ stress on: therefore, is who is the potential tar- relatively little attention in Russia,19 a desire to contain superior conven- get, since the negative guarantees where few now trust promises from tional forces of the other side, deter adopted in connection with the NPT the West. The points commonly made the other side’s TNW, and deter preclude the United States from even at the official level are that: 1) “third states” (either non-NATO or threatening non-nuclear states with NATO has not yet transformed it- those not in alliance with Russia). nuclear weapons? In addition, within NATO, TNW self sufficiently for Russia to be able Russia’s new approach proceeds played a role in providing a link be- to discount the alliance as a military from the same premise. A recent tween the United States and the Eu- threat20 ; and 2) even if NATO is not book, published by the Russian In- ropean members of NATO; such a a threat today, it might change its stitute of Strategic Studies, stresses role is not yet relevant for Russia. policies in the future and become a the effectiveness of TNW as a de- threat, especially after enlarge- terrent and specifically points out ment.21 Containment of Superior that their deterrent value depends on Conventional Forces Consequently, the decision on a demonstrated willingness to use 27 whether military countermeasures Generally, speaking, the threat of them. As General Belous writes, are needed and whether to deploy “going nuclear” supposedly deters “TNW, which have relatively high TNW will depend, to a large extent, the other side from utilizing its su- indicators under the cost/effective- on NATO’s capabilities. As Defense periority and thus helps to prevent ness criteria, might serve as an equal- Minister Igor Rodionov said in a war. But the effectiveness of deter- izer of sorts, depriving NATO of 28 speech in Brussels on December 18, rence depends on the technical readi- military superiority.” He assesses 1996: “political intentions are an ness and political will to actually NATO’s superiority as threefold to- 23 abstract category, but military poten- employ nuclear weapons. day and even greater after an en- tial is a permanent and tangible fac- In the plans of NATO, TNW were largement that he assumes to include tor. [...]as even the recent experience supposed to stop the advancement Poland, the Czech Republic, and of history shows, political intentions of Soviet troops in case of war and Hungary. The inferiority of Russia change and verbal declarations are possibly defeat them, bringing the in modern precision-guided conven-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 19 Nikolai Sokov tional weapons is even greater (four- hostages, provided for a much stron- For Russia, the contradictions and to-one compared to the United States ger coupling effect in and of itself. uncertainties of the non-strategic alone and six-to-one compared to This issue is not relevant for Rus- nuclear balance are the same, if not 29 NATO as a whole ) and is another sia because there simply is not a co- greater. The presence of U.S. TNW reason often cited in favor of reli- hesive alliance, and, consequently, clearly weakens the equalizing role ance on TNW. Based on these as- there is no need for such a link. of Russia’s TNW. Moreover, U.S. sessments, some experts consider When (and if) an alliance emerges TNW are capable of something that proportionate reductions of TNW as (Belarus is effectively a military ally Soviet TNW could never achieve disadvantageous to Russia, if the and the Tashkent Treaty Organiza- during the Cold War: reaching the conventional imbalances are not tion, established in 1992, is a proto- strategic forces of the other side. 30 taken care of in advance. type of an alliance35 ), Russian According to General Vladimir guarantees still will not be seriously Dvorkin, probably the most authori- TNW as a Link between the doubted, since the territories of its tative source on the issue, up to 50 United States and Its European allies would be contiguous. The need to 60 percent of facilities that com- Allies for such a link might surface, how- prise the strategic arsenal of Russia and its command and control cen- For NATO during the Cold War, ever, if Russia establishes a perma- ters are within reach of NATO TNW; the reliability of U.S. security guar- nent military presence in Serbia.36 after the enlargement, the figure antees represented a serious prob- could reach 70 to 80 percent.39 This lem: the question was whether the TNW as a Deterrent to the TNW figure will continue to haunt Russian United States would come to the of the Main Opponent military planners, since the decision defense of Europe if U.S. territory The deterrent mission of TNW of NATO not to move nuclear weap- were not affected by a supposed So- emerged by default, simply because ons eastward is unilateral and could viet attack.31 It was believed that both the Soviet Union and the United be reversed. It is no wonder, then, early use of TNW would guarantee States had TNW in Europe. The So- that U.S. TNW are often classified U.S. participation in a European viet Union, despite its superiority in as “strategic”40 and that the issue of war.32 conventional forces (which it never NATO enlargement has figured The “coupling” role of TNW was recognized and the significance of prominently during START II rati- (and is) somewhat uncertain, how- which is challenged by some ana- fication hearings in the Duma. ever, since TNW simultaneously lysts37 ), sought to balance against raised the specter of a limited nuclear U.S., British, and French non-stra- Deterrence of “Third” States war in Europe, in which only sub- tegic nuclear weapons. It treated strategic nuclear weapons would be TNW as an integral part of its con- Many Russian experts consider used.33 The possibility of a limited ventional forces, whose mission was TNW important for missions other war gave the United States a theo- straightforward support of combat than deterring NATO. China, with its retical ability to stay out of a Euro- operations. This mission was inher- enormous superiority over Russia in pean conflict. This contradiction was ited from the early stages of the conventional forces, is an obvious never solved and, for all practical nuclear age, when nuclear weapons object of nuclear deterrence, even purposes, should have died out with were thought to be fairly “usable.”38 though it has not been mentioned ex- the Soviet Union and the Warsaw As a result, TNW came to play a dual plicitly in open publications. A Rus- Pact (although officially it is still role for NATO—that of an equalizer sian study that attempted to measure listed as an important mission of and of a counterbalance to the TNW the level of external threat to vari- U.S. TNW34). But, paradoxically, the of the Soviet Union. The second ous regions listed the Russian Far question of whether or not TNW do, mission ostensibly downgraded the East as facing a threat that was three in fact, strengthen the commitment relevance of TNW as a deterrent in times greater than that facing west- 41 of the United States to the defense relation to Soviet conventional su- ern Russia. It should be noted, of Europe, is probably irrelevant: the periority and as a link between the however, that the “danger of the presence of U.S. troops in Europe, United States and its European al- threat,” which denotes the immi- who effectively played the role of lies. nence and the gravity of conse-

20 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nikolai Sokov quences of possible attack, is the side and, indeed, is likely to increase not as reliably controlled.45 To con- same for both regions. This means it. vince the other side of readiness and that Russian military analysts con- ability to use these weapons, the de- sider NATO a more immediate mili- THE MISGUIDED terring side must deploy TNW in the tary threat than China. RATIONALE FOR TNW field in a ready-for-combat mode (or, at least, to have a proven, demon- Non-nuclear states bordering on The “sacred” foundations of strated capability to deploy them the former Soviet Union are an ob- nuclear deterrence theory, as applied with troops in a crisis period). It must ject of nuclear deterrence as well, to TNW, merit renewed examina- also predelegate the authority to use even though this appears to contra- tion. No matter what security chal- TNW to field commanders. No mat- dict Russia’s negative guarantees lenges might beset a country or an ter how limited hostile action is, under the NPT. A study by the Spiri- alliance that possesses TNW, it can TNW have to be used quickly, or tual Heritage foundation, a conser- be shown that these weapons would they might be lost to a first strike by vative Russian think tank, notes that be of little help. Assuming that the other side. Deployment of TNW, Russia faces a new threat from the nuclear weapons can be a security therefore, results in a hair-trigger South: “a belt of unstable, and some- guarantee at all, strategic weapons posture, under which a mistake or times unfriendly, states and coun- can provide security without nega- an over-reaction by a local com- tries, covertly seeking weapons of tive “side effects” of the same mag- mander might start a nuclear war in mass destruction.”42 nitude. This assumption does not a situation where a limited response suggest that nuclear weapons need There is evidence that the U.S. or even diplomatic efforts could have to be retained indefinitely. Rather, military is considering similar mis- saved the day. sions. For example, Assistant Sec- elimination of nuclear weapons retary of Defense Harold Smith should begin with TNW, whose very Even worse, the deployment of identified the B-61 nuclear bomb as existence is fraught with danger for TNW to combat units in a time of “a weapon of choice against the both the deterred and the deterring crisis represents, by itself, a move Libyan chemical weapons pro- side. Several points are worth elabo- that could be easily misread by the gram.”43 In general, there is a grow- rating in detail. other side. Instead of deterring an attack, TNW could provoke it. But ing trend to view TNW as a deterrent 1. TNW promote a hair-trigger even that does not represent the com- against potential weapons of mass posture, making accidental nuclear plete list of dangerous possibilities: destruction (WMD) proliferators— war more likely. ostensibly under the assumption that the vulnerability of TNW might Effective deterrence hinges on an the presence of TNW could render make a preemptive strike an attrac- ability and willingness to use nuclear the WMD of proliferators useless tive option under the “use them or weapons or, at least, upon the per- before they are actually acquired.44 lose them” principle. ception of the other side that nuclear The ability of nuclear weapons to To summarize, both sides have weapons would be used in case of be a “great equalizer” makes them certain missions that, admittedly, can attack. This principle applies differ- suitable for offensive purposes even be filled only by TNW. For Russia, ently to strategic and non-strategic by the side whose conventional the significance of TNW as an in- nuclear weapons. Strategic weapons forces are inferior. Yuri Fedorov, a strument of security is greater than are much less vulnerable and thus are professor at MGIMO (Moscow In- for NATO. But NATO, too, seems suitable for a second strike: the de- stitute of International Relations) is to value TNW, even if they now have terring side has the luxury of wait- one of the very few experts in Rus- only residual value. The question is ing some time after the aggression sia who has pointed out that the pres- whether the need for TNW is real or takes place, determining the goals of ence of TNW and their high combat perceived. The next section explores the attacker and the scale of hostili- this question and seeks to demon- readiness might actually provoke ties, and only then retaliating. 46 strate that the value of TNW may be NATO instead of deterring it. Para- By contrast, because TNW are misperceived. It concludes that the doxically, this was the view of the deployed close to the potential front elimination of these weapons will Soviet military, which feared NATO line, they are highly vulnerable and not diminish the security of either aggression despite Soviet conven-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 21 Nikolai Sokov tional strength; now the Russian mili- within the range of Chinese TNW). influence among the former Soviet tary denies the same logic to the other This means that while Russia can use republics or accepting membership side. TNW to fight Chinese troops, it will of the Baltic states in NATO.48 TNW 2. TNW are better suited for war- not be able to achieve a level of un- are intended to deprive NATO of its fighting than deterrence. acceptable damage without using military leverage and give Russia a strategic weapons. Why, then, are stronger position in bargaining with Contrary to beliefs generated by TNW needed at all, if the goal is the West. Western theoreticians and shared by deterrence and not war-fighting? many Russian experts, the capabil- Underlying this logic is a belief ity to fight a war does not equal An increase in war-fighting capa- that the threat of nuclear war is cred- “pure deterrence”: the latter is en- bility stimulates an equal or greater ible under any circumstances and, sured by the ability to “punish” the increase in the war-fighting capabil- consequently, has considerable po- aggressor. Hence, deterrence is pro- ity of the other side. In a potential litical payoffs. But this belief is vided by weapons that possess a sec- Russian-NATO standoff, the greater based on faulty premises. True, ond-strike capability. reliance of Russia upon TNW is NATO may not be willing to risk likely to prompt NATO to upgrade nuclear war for the sake of political TNW, however, are primarily its own TNW, so the overall level of gains, but neither is Russia likely to counterforce or “war-fighting” security would decrease. The same risk war for the sake of preventing weapons. By definition, they were logic applies to Russian-Chinese re- NATO from achieving political designed for use primarily against lations. The process could lead to an gains. If NATO were to decide to troops and other military targets, exact repetition of the situation in the admit the Baltic states, would a rea- which makes them unsuitable for relations between the Soviet Union sonable Russian response be to re- “pure” deterrence. Strategic weap- and NATO in the late 1970s and sort to an all-out nuclear war? The ons, on the other hand, while pos- early 1980s, except that the roles impermissibility of war is about sessing counterforce capabilities, would now be reversed. It is well- equal for both sides, but NATO is can also be used efficiently against known that the U.S.-Soviet arms race much better positioned in a civilian targets, which makes their was on a very dangerous track and brinkmanship game because the Bal- deterrent value greater. After all, the was reversed only as a result of the tic states want to join the alliance. level of unacceptable damage to the elimination of intermediate-range Russia is automatically on the defen- civilian population is much lower missiles. Unfortunately, the opposi- sive, and it is Russia that would have than that to military personnel: any tion of NATO did not make it pos- to decide whether to start a war. country would be less disposed to sible to expand this approach quickly Russia’s decision has to be against have its civilian population suffer to TNW, and a new Soviet proposal, that option and yielding under threat than its troops. Consequently, only under development in the summer of would only further decrease Russia’s a handful of warheads on strategic 1991, was preempted by the initia- global position and credibility. delivery vehicles might assure un- 47 tives of President George Bush. As In addition, there are other instru- acceptable damage, while many at the end of the 1980s, a combina- more TNW warheads would be ments of pressure the West can em- tion of nuclear and conventional ploy that TNW cannot neutralize. needed for the same effect on the arms control measures is the only battlefield. For example, Russia—or any other way out of the new security stale- state—would not start a nuclear war The disadvantages for Russia of mate. over economic sanctions, nor the maintaining a reliance on non-stra- 3. TNW cannot achieve non-mili- West’s refusal to invest money. tegic weapons can best be seen by tary goals. analyzing bilateral nuclear dynam- Such fears about future pressure ics with China. There are very few A popular line of reasoning by the West may or may not be well- Chinese non-military targets (espe- among more nationalistic experts in founded: but whether such plans cially major cities) within the range Russia is that the West intends to use exist is entirely beside the point. of Russian TNW (by contrast, there its superior economic and military Even if such suspicions are correct, are plenty of Russian civilian targets potential to force Russia into politi- TNW cannot help and, to the con- cal concessions, such as foregoing trary, might even aggravate the situ-

22 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nikolai Sokov ation. Political stability, economic Another problem that might mission), these weapons have seri- prosperity, and multi-faceted inter- emerge if nuclear weapons were ex- ous negative side-effects that can- dependence are much better means plicitly assigned a mission of deter- not be discounted. In fact, the very to avoid inequality and pressure. The ring non-nuclear states is the presence of TNW in the nuclear ar- problem is, they take time and pa- disappearance of the psychological senals of any side promotes a war- tience to develop. TNW, however, barrier between nuclear and conven- fighting, trigger-happy military provide the illusion of a “quick fix,” tional weapons. As Schelling noted posture, weakens central control which is so appealing to populist and in one of his early writings, if nuclear over nuclear weapons, and leads to nationalist politicians but is ulti- weapons were used even once (he a general deterioration of the strate- mately counter-productive. referred, specifically, to the experi- gic situation. Under current condi- 4. TNW are inapplicable for de- ence of the Korean War), this would tions, when U.S. TNW are capable terring potential threats from non- “open the door” for unrestrained use of reaching Russian strategic weap- 49 nuclear states. of such weapons. The logic seems ons, TNW also affect the strategic applicable to deterrence: if nuclear balance between Russia and the It is illegal and contrary to weapons deter non-nuclear states, United States and are capable of se- Russia’s and NATO’s international these states eventually are likely to riously derailing the ongoing efforts obligations to threaten the use of try to obtain such weapons. Obvi- to reduce the strategic arsenals of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear ously the acquisition of nuclear the two sides. states. Russian military doctrine does weapons by the “southern flank” Unless measures to limit, reduce, not provide for that possibility either. states would be detrimental to Nevertheless, as was noted above, and ultimately eliminate TNW are Russia’s security. Strict adherence to taken within the next several years, some authors do suggest that TNW negative guarantees is about the only could be employed in deterring po- a new arms race could ensue. Elimi- means to deny non-nuclear states a nation of TNW will not be an easy tential threats from such countries, solid pretext to go nuclear. so this option has to be explored as task and will require serious efforts well. Similarly, NATO’s plans to rely on by both Russia and the West. The TNW to prevent “rogue states” from first steps should include: 1) the cre- To say that large-scale aggression acquiring nuclear weapons appear ation of more favorable conditions on the part of Iran, Iraq, or Pakistan faulty. First, potential proliferators under which elites of the nuclear is highly improbable would be a are likely to assign their nuclear states can become more amenable to gross overstatement. Realistically, weapons other missions than con- the idea of parting with their TNW; that threat can be ruled out com- tainment of nuclear states (e.g., Iraq and 2) the development of arms con- pletely. For other potential threats, might want them against Iran, Israel, trol approaches that would be politi- TNW are simply inapplicable. But or Saudi Arabia). Second, the mere cally acceptable. how would Russia use TNW if Pa- presence of TNW in nuclear states The first question is, which side kistan were to install a friendly re- makes it more likely that non-nuclear gime in and acquire should take the initiative? We can states might want to acquire the same look to the past to find prescriptions strong influence over Turkmenistan? weapons as a means of deterrence, Or if Turkey were to get an upper of how to deal with the emerging following standard Schelling-esque crisis. At the end of the 1980s, the hand in Azerbaijan? Under any pos- logic. sible scenario not to Russia’s liking, arms race in intermediate-range TNW will prove useless and will re- nuclear weapons was reversed by an CONCLUSION: INITIAL initiative of the side that had superi- main at their storage facilities. A ARMS CONTROL MEASURES threat of use would not be credible ority in conventional forces: the So- enough, so even the deployment to This article has sought to demon- viet Union agreed to eliminate more combat units would be of no effect. strate that regardless of any value weapons than the United States and Thus, the “southern flank” cannot be TNW might have as a security guar- to overlook the existence of British used as a justification for retaining antor (whether against superior con- and French theater nuclear weapons. TNW, much less for their modern- ventional forces or as a balance to The reason is simple: the side that ization. the other side’s TNW, or any other enjoys a greater margin of security

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 23 Nikolai Sokov can afford greater flexibility, especially tion of the TNW that Russia cur- aircraft, but they are not attached to regarding steps that are bound to be rently has are known and verifiable. the aircraft all the time). controversial domestically. Russia would benefit from the lower Existing verification techniques, If this example is followed, then level of nuclear weapons that could particularly those used under the it is up to NATO, in particular the be targeted against its territory and START I and II Treaties, as well as United States, to take the lead. This from the greater predictability that under the INF and the CFE Treaties, conclusion also follows from the fact American TNW would not be de- appropriately amended and strength- that Russia today is highly unlikely ployed covertly in Eastern Europe (or ened, might also be used for a TNW to be responsive to the idea of uni- be moved from U.S. territory to Eu- regime. Warheads could be corralled lateral elimination of TNW.50 The rope with little or no warning). at declared facilities and a system of prevailing mood in Moscow is that An obvious problem with this pro- perimeter monitoring, not requiring “the period of material concessions posal is verification. Indeed, difficul- the presence of inspectors (approxi- for the sake of political gains is ties with developing a reliable mately along the lines of the continu- over.”51 Granted, an initiative on verification regime are one of the ous perimeter and portal monitoring TNW would not be easy, given the reasons why the existing TNW re- procedures at production facilities current domestic political climate in gime is still informal. For the first under the INF and START I Trea- the United States, but an initiative time in the history of arms control, ties), might be created to make sure by Russia is even less likely. verification measures will have to that warheads are not being re- The key background condition for focus on warheads rather than deliv- moved. Other measures might in- successful measures in the area of ery vehicles and might involve ac- clude: exchanges and periodic TNW is a new Conventional Forces cess to sensitive facilities where updates of information; extensive in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Negotia- warheads are stored and dismantled. baseline inspections to verify accu- tions began in early 1997. The elimi- The task of codification of the racy of the initial exchange of data; nation or at least significant reduction 1991-96 regime poses several veri- on-site inspections at declared facili- of conventional imbalances in Europe fication challenges. The first task, ties to verify the declared number of might make Russia more amenable verifying the absence of nuclear warheads; on-site inspections to con- to the idea of parting with its TNW. warheads in the territories of East- firm elimination of warheads; on- Another important step was that ern Europe and Belarus (a de facto site challenge inspections at taken by NATO at the December non-nuclear zone in the center of undeclared facilities to verify the 1996 North Atlantic Council minis- Europe), is probably the easiest. It absence of warheads; and national terial meeting when it all but ruled would be sufficient to monitor the technical means, enhanced by con- out the possibility of any nuclear de- existing and well-known facilities fidence-building measures. ployments to new NATO members. that were intended for nuclear war- Clearly, the easiest task is to verify Only months before, such a state- heads. The second challenge is the absence of nuclear warheads: this ment was commonly considered un- monitoring the central storage facili- could be done without excessively thinkable. ties outside the non-nuclear zone, intrusive inspections simply by us- A measure that might help to where warheads are being stored. ing radiation detection devices. Veri- jump-start a dialogue would be the This measure would probably have fication of the number of warheads codification of the 1991-96 informal to include the whole territory of Rus- presents a greater challenge, espe- TNW regime to make it legally bind- sia and the whole territory of the cially since during some types of ing and verifiable.52 It might also United States, even if verification inspections it would be necessary to include an obligation by Russia not would be limited to declared facili- distinguish between warheads for to deploy its TNW in Belarus. For ties. Finally, the storage facilities at tactical delivery systems and war- NATO, the new regime would en- military bases where “deployed” heads for strategic systems, as well sure that Russia’s TNW are not in- warheads are kept must be moni- as between nuclear warheads and creased or modernized, that they are tored (these weapons are “deployed” other objects that contain fissionable not deployed to the west of its terri- in the sense that they are close at materials. These problems are by no tory, and that the numbers and loca- hand and can be quickly mounted on means insurmountable, but would

24 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nikolai Sokov require the special attention of ex- The article is based on an interview with Sergei Kortunov, whose title is given as a representa- perts. tive of the office of presidential aides (in other 1 Press Release, “Statement on Nuclear Weap- sources he is named advisor to Yuri Baturin, ons by International Generals and Admirals,” After that, the two sides can pro- the secretary of the Defense Council). December 5, 1996; for the full text, see ver- ceed to complete withdrawal of all Kortunov said that the proposal about revers- sion published in Arms Control Today 26 (No- ing the 1991 obligations in case a military TNW from Europe and elimination vember/December 1996), pp. 15, 18. response is needed had been made already by 2 “Statement of the Canberra Commission on the of the withdrawn warheads; this the military and was being considered by the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” section “Im- administration of the president. An article by measure would generally follow the mediate Steps,” Programme for Promoting the Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov cor- guidelines of the Canberra Report. Nuclear Non-Proliferation, No. 35 (3rd quarter roborates that statement: “We might objec- 1996), p. 22. As noted above, the “coupling” role tively face the task of increasing tactical 3 “Final Communiqué,” issued at the Ministerial nuclear weapons at our borders....” (Igor of U.S. TNW in Europe was always Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 10 De- Rodionov, “Neobkhodimo reformirovat’ ne cember 1996, M-NAC-2(96)165, paragraph 5 doubtful; in the absence of an iden- chasti systemy voennoi bezopasnosti (gopher://marvin.nc3A.nato.int:70/11/ tifiable large-scale threat to NATO, gosudarstva, a vsyu ee v tselom” (It is Neces- natodata/PRESS/COMMUNIQUE/1996). sary To Reform the Whole System of the State’s they do not seem to play any justifi- 4 Yaderniy Kontrol’, No. 14 (February 1996), p. Security, Instead of Its Parts), Nezavisimoe 7; this data is taken from the Nuclear Notebook, able role. British and French tacti- Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 22 (November 1996). The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, (November/ 11 Vladimir Belous, “Budet li ratifitsirovan cal nuclear weapons might be placed December 1995). A report of Greenpeace Inter- Dogovor SNV-2?” (Will the START II Treaty Be under an international verification national estimates the total number of NATO Ratified?), Yaderniy Kontrol’, No. 18-19 (June- TNW at 520, of which 480 are U.S. warheads regime within their national territo- July 1996), p. 35. “Groupings” mean administra- and the rest British. See Hans Kristensen and tively independent groups composed of various ries. Incidentally, the withdrawal of Joshua Handler, “The 520 Forgotten Bombs: How units (for example, several divisions under the U.S. and British Nuclear Weapons in Europe Un- U.S. and Russian TNW from Europe military district commander). dermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” would immediately ease the burdens 12 The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (September- Greenpeace International, Nuclear Campaign October 1996), p. 62. This missile is mentioned of the verification regime. The final Report, October 1995 (www.greenpeace.org/~usa/ in a book published by the conservative Spiritual reports/nuclear/520.html). step would be complete worldwide Heritage Foundation, Ratifikatsiia Dogovora 5 “Estimated Russian Nuclear Stockpile, Septem- SNV-2: Resheniia, Problemy, Perspektivy (Rati- elimination of TNW, including those ber 1996,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Sep- fication of START II: Solutions, Problems, Per- of France, Great Britain, and China. tember/October 1996), p. 63. The journal lists spectives), (Moscow: Spiritual Heritage and 1,600 warheads on 426 aircraft (presumably, be- RAU-Corporation, 1996), p. 58. This book spe- The most pressing issue today is longing to the air force) and 600 warheads on 240 cifically states that the new missile will replace aircraft, which belong to the navy. Additionally, to avoid a new nuclear arms race, the Oka (SS-23) missile complex, which the Rus- 1,000 nuclear warheads are assigned to other sea- sian military continues to believe was slated for and the only available means is launched systems, but they should have been with- elimination improperly (the INF Treaty covers the through renewed attention to arms drawn in accordance with the 1991 initiatives and, systems with the range of 500 km and more, while as The Bulletin notes, Russian officials say that control and disarmament. We no the Oka complex had the range of 450 km; the the initiatives are being followed. Indeed, in Sep- U.S. side insisted during the talks that it had been longer have the benefit of preserv- tember 1996, a representative of the Russian For- tested to the 500 km distance and thus had to be eign Ministry officially announced that Russia did ing the current situation, as it is likely eliminated; Gorbachev made that decision with- continue to implement the 1991 obligations and to change in the near future. The only out consulting with the military). intended to complete implementation by the year 13 The text was published in Sovetskaya Rossiya, question is whether the change will 2000. (Interfax, September 26, 1996; in FBIS- November 14, 1996; in FBIS-SOV-96-221 (14 SOV-96-189 (26 September 1996) (on-line). be toward greater numbers and va- November 1996) (on-line). There exists, of course, 6 Yaderniy Kontrol’, No. 14 (February 1996), p. a question of whether such deployment would be riety of TNW or toward lower num- 8; this data is taken from the “Nuclear Notebook,” consistent with the obligations of the two coun- bers. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (November/ tries under the Lisbon Protocol to START II. The December 1995). question is beyond the scope of this article, but a Domestic politics in the United 7 Interview of Commander-in-Chief of Russian cursory look suggests that if the deployment is Strategic Rocket Forces Igor Sergeev, Krasnaya States, Russia, European NATO limited to TNW and if control over weapons re- Zvezda, December 5, 1996. mains in Russian hands (similar to the status of states, and future members of NATO 8 Yaderniy Kontrol’, No. 14 (February 1996), p. U.S. weapons in Germany), the move might be remain a serious obstacle as current 4. Some analysts give a higher figure—up to legal. 20,000: Oleg Bukharin, “Analiz razmerov i domestic conditions are not very 14 Viktor Mikhailov and Aleksandr Chernyshov, kachestva uranovykh zapasov Rossii” (An Analy- “NATO’s Expansion and Russia’s Security,” Vek, conducive for TNW-related arms sis of the Size and Quality of Uranium Stockpile September 20, 1996, p. 5. in Russia), reprinted in Vooruzhenie i Voennaia control measures. But there are two 15 Mary Fitzgerald, “The Russian Image of Fu- Tekhnika, December 4, 1996, p. 4. ways to approach obstacles: as a rea- ture War,” Comparative Strategy 13 (1994), p. 9 Bukharin, “Analiz razmerov i kachestva 173. son for doing nothing or as a reason uranovykh zapasov Rossii,” p. 4. 16 The doctrine was published in Izvestiya, No- 10 “Russia’s Answer to the Expansion of for an increased effort. Under the vember 18, 1993. However, unpublished drafts NATO,” Power in Russia: Russian Executive dating from the spring and summer of 1992 present circumstances, the latter and Legislative Newsletter, Nos. 22-28 (June already contained a similar provision. A new should be tried. 1996)(www.russia.net/rial.reln/rexln.html).

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 25 Nikolai Sokov doctrine, which is being developed under the Dogovor SNV-2?” (Will the START II Treaty 36 On the “theoretical” possibility of such pres- auspices of the Defense Council, is widely as- Be Ratified?), Yaderniy Kontrol’, No. 18-19 ence see an interview of Yuri Baturin to Ekho sumed to retain the plank on the first strike (June-July 1996), p. 35. See also Vladimir Moskvy, November 13, 1996; in FBIS-SOV- (see “The Second Military Doctrine: the De- Belous, “Means of Political and Military De- 96-211 (13 November 1996) (on-line). fense Council Draws it for Approval in the terrence: Evolution of Washington’s Views on 37 Recent reappraisals of the Soviet conventional Near Future,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Novem- Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Nezavisimoye forces posture cast doubt upon the common per- ber 6, 1996, and a press conference of Yuri Voyennoe Obozrenie, October 31, 1996; in ception of the ability of the Soviet Union to win a Baturin “Russia Needs a Provisional Military FBIS-SOV-96-212-S (1 November 1996) (on- war in Europe. See Matthew Evangelista, “Stalin’s Doctrine,” Power in Russia: Russian Execu- line). Postwar Army Reapprised,” International Secu- tive and Legislative Newsletter (RIA-Novosti), 29 Lev Rokhlin, “Opinion: A Third Position on rity 7 (Winter 1982-83) and Richard Ned Lebow, No. 46 (November 1996) (www.russia.net/ria/ START II: We Need to Ratify the Treaty, but Un- “The Soviet Offensive in Europe,” International reln/rexln.html). der the Condition that We Prepare a New One.” Security 9 (Spring 1995). The evidence, recently 17 “Russia Needs a Provisional Military Doctrine,” Nezavisimoye Voennoe Obozrenie, August 22, found in the archives of the former GDR, sug- Power in Russia: Russian Executive and Legis- 1996; in FBIS-SOV-96-184-S (22 August 1996) gests that, despite the offensive posture, the So- lative Newsletter (www.russia.net/ria/reln/ (on-line). viet plans were not necessarily intended for rexln.html). 30 Vladimir Belous, “Budet li ratifitsirovan aggression (See Christoph Bluth, The Collapse 18 Vladimir Belous, “Takticheskoe yadernoe Dogovor SNV-2?” (Will the START II Treaty Be of Soviet Military Power (Brookfield: oruzhie: poluzabytaia realnost” (Tactical Nuclear Ratified?), Yaderniy Kontrol’, Nos. 18-19 (June- Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995). One Weapons: A Half-Forgotten Reality), Segodnya, July 1996), p. 35. is tempted to note that the inadequacies of June 23, 1995. 31 See Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible conventional forces, which the Soviet mili- 19 Yuri Baturin noted in this regard: “We are be- Response: NATO’s Debate over Strategy in the tary knew well and probably even overesti- ing told that NATO is not a threatening bloc, but 1960s (London: Macmillan, 1988); Gregory mated, might have increased the role of TNW. a friendly one. But why they are insisting the Treverton, “Managing NATO’s Nuclear Di- 38 For the old Soviet view of employment of Russian heavy missiles be eliminated [under the lemma,” International Security 7 (Spring 1983); nuclear weapons in conventional warfare see V. START II Treaty]? We can say, too, that under Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Ye. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational the conditions of proclaimed partnership SS-18 Strategy (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1983), Art and Tactics (A Soviet View) (Moscow: Mili- missiles are ‘friendly’ toward the West, which especially pp. 383-86. Freedman, however, has tary Press of the Ministry of Defense, 1972) (trans- should not be afraid of.” (Oborona i Bezopasnost’, pointed out that the link between the United States lated and published under the Auspices of the No. 143, December 2, 1996, p. 3). and Europe remained relatively weak even with United States Air Force) Especially relevant is 20 See, for example, an article by the Minister of the presence of U.S. TNW in Europe. chapter 3, “Summary of the Basic Principles of Defense Igor Rodionov, reprinted in Oborona i 32 Catherine Kelleher noted in this respect that at Operational Art and Tactics (According to Views Bezopasnost’, No. 139, November 22, 1996, p. least some members of NATO, especially Great of 1953-59),” pp. 167-278. 4. Britain and West Germany, tried “to secure the 39 Vladimir Dvorkin, “Narushenie 21 See, for example, an interview of Yuri Baturin, most complete US involvement, whether as con- strategicheskogo balansa” (A Violation of the reprinted in Oborona i Bezopasnost’, No. 143, ventional ‘hostage’ or as tactical nuclear ‘trigger’ Strategic Balance), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May December 2, 1996, p. 2. to strategic retaliation.” ( Catherine Kelleher, Gali 16, 1996. For similar arguments see also Lev 22 Military Bulletin 6 (RIA Novosti)(January Mattox, eds., Evolving European Defense Poli- Rokhlin, “Opinion: A Third Position on START 1997)(www.russia.net/ria/military/ tics (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), p. II ...” and an interview with Viktor Ilyukhin, the military.html). Rodionov was referring to the 5). See also Paul Butteus, The Politics of Nuclear chairman of the Duma Security Committee, pub- late-1980s promise of key NATO states not Consultation in NATO, 1965-1980 (New York: lished in Yaderniy Kontrol’, No. 20-21 (August- to expand NATO eastward. It is a widely held Cambridge University Press, 1988). September, 1996), pp. 2-3. view in Russia that such promise was actually 33 On the contradictions involving limited nuclear 40 See Igor Borisenko, “Rokhlin Says START-2 made. war, see Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Will Cause Rearmament,” ITAR-TASS, Septem- 23 See Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University ber 17, 1996; in FBIS-SOV-96-121 (17 Septem- (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966) Press, 1984), especially pp. 86-96 and 109-11. ber 1996) (on-line). on the problem of credibility of deterrence, which The possibility of a limited nuclear war, waged 41 V. Tsygychko, “Geostrategicheskie aspekty depends, in his view on the perceived willingness only with non-strategic weapons, was clearly kontseptsii natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossii” to use them. spelled out by the Secretary of Defense Elliot (The Geostrategic Aspects of Russia’s National 24 For a concise description of non-strategic Richardson in 1974. He stated that theater nuclear Security), Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 9 (1996), p. 23. nuclear weapons as a deterrence against conven- weapons would be used in a conflict involving 42 Ratifikatsiia Dogovora SNV-2: Resheniia, tional forces see George Lewis, “The Future of “the use of nuclear weapons against or by the US Problemy, Perspektivy (Ratification of START II: US Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces,” in Michelle or allied forces overseas, but not against the United Solutions, Problems, Perspectives), (Moscow: Flournoy, ed., Nuclear Weapons After the Cold States itself.”) (“Statement of Secretary of Defense Spiritual Heritage and RAU-Corporation, 1996), War (New York: Harper Collins, 1993). Elliot Richardson before the House Armed Ser- p. 58. 25 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, November vices Committee on the FY 1974 Defense Bud- 43 Cited in Stephen Lambert and David Miller, 1991, paragraph 57 (gopher://marvin.nc3A. get and the FY 1974-8 Program,” April 10, 1973, “The Future of US Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” nato.int:70/11/natodata/PRESS/COMMUNI- p. 27). unpublished manuscript,The Naval Postgraduate QUE/1991-1994). 34 “Final Communiqué of the Defense Planning School, Monterey, CA, fall 1996, p. 8. 26 “Final Communiqué,” M-DPC/NPG-1 (96)88, Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group of 44 For a comprehensive analysis of that rationale 13 June 1996, paragraph 3 (gopher:// NATO,” December 17, 1996, M-DPC-NPG- behind TNW see Hans Kristensen and Joshua marvin.nc3A.nato.int:70/11/natodata/PRESS/ 2(96)173, paragraph 7 (gopher://marvin.nc3A. Handler, “The 520 Forgotten Bombs...” COMMUNIQUE/1996). nato.int:70/11/natodata/PRESS/COMMUNI- 45 See Bruce Blair, Strategic Command and Con- 27 Yadernyi faktor v sovremennom mire (The QUE/1996). trol: Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washing- Nuclear Factor in the Contemporary World), Vasili 35 Interestingly, Ukraine seems to take the TTO ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985). The Krivokhizha, ed., (Moscow: RISI, 1996), p. quite seriously—as a military-political alliance. problems of control over nuclear weapons, includ- 114. This has been stated by a high-placed Ukrainian ing that of communications under crisis condi- 28 Vladimir Belous, “Budet li ratifitsirovan official, who asked not to disclose his name. tions, was thoroughly explored by Valeri

26 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nikolai Sokov

Yarynych, a retired military expert, who now cation of START II: Solutions, Problems, Per- works in the staff of the Duma Defense Com- spectives), (Moscow: Spiritual Heritage and mittee. See Valery Yarynych, C3: Overcom- RAU-Corporation, 1996), pp. 8-9. ing Nonsense, unpublished book manuscript, 52 For an elaboration of the proposal see Wil- Naval Postgraduate School-Monterey Institute liam Potter, “Next Steps in Nuclear Disarma- of International Studies, 1996. ment: The Challenge of Tactical Nuclear 46 Yuri Fedorov, “Perspectivy i protivorechiia Weapons,” paper prepared for the Seminar on rossiiskogo yadernogo sderzhivaniia” (The Pros- Nuclear Disarmament After the Indefinite pects and Contradictions of the Russian Nuclear Extension of the NPT, Kyoto, Japan, Decem- Deterrence), Yaderniy Kontrol’, No. 14 (Febru- ber 2-5, 1996. ary 1996). This argument was developed by Jervis, Lebow and Stein. See Psychology and Deter- rence, ed. by Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). 47 Prior to the U.S. initiatives in September 1991, the Soviet Foreign Ministry was developing a new proposal to begin negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. This proposal envisaged deep reduction to equal levels, below the lowest level of either side, and eventual elimination of all such weap- ons. The plan included intrusive verification and broad transparency measures. In making that new effort, the Soviet Union sought to capitalize on the apparent concern of the West about the con- trol over TNW in the Soviet Union in the after- math of the 1991 attempted coup. The Western concerns were somewhat misguided, because even before the coup the Soviet military had withdrawn TNW from all republics except those, where stra- tegic weapons were deployed (in at least one case—in Azerbaijan—the withdrawal of TNW involved a serious confrontation and the military had to resort to arms, although, luckily, no one was injured). The new proposal on TNW was al- most ready by the end of September, but had to be abandoned in the aftermath of the Bush initia- tives: the Soviet military, like their American counterparts, grasped the opportunity to achieve the goal without intrusive verification and with- drew its support from a complex verification scheme developed by the Foreign Ministry. 48 This view is actively promulgated in, among other publications, Ratifikatsiia Dogovora SNV- 2: Resheniia, Problemy, Perspektivy (Ratification of START II: Solutions, Problems, Perspectives), (Moscow: Spiritual Heritage and RAU-Corpora- tion, 1996). 49 Thomas Schelling, Nuclear Weapons and Lim- ited War (Santa Monica: RAND, 1959). It is in- teresting that later Schelling adopted a different view: that demonstrated readiness to use weap- ons is the best deterrence. It is the latter approach that came to dominate the Western and recently the Russian policies on TNW. 50 En route to Scandinavia in September 1996, Perry urged Russia to eliminate its entire stock of TNW, but did not specifically mention any pos- sible matching steps on part of the United States. See Disarmament Diplomacy (October 1996), p. 47. More recently a similar proposal was put for- ward by NATO defense ministers (“Final Communiqué,” M-DPC/NPG-1 (96)88, 13 June 1996 (gopher://marvin.nc3A.nato.int:70/11/ natodata/PRESS/COMMUNIQUE/1996)). 51 See, for example, Ratifikatsiia Dogovora SNV- 2: Resheniia, Problemy, Perspektivy (Ratifi-

The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 27