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Npr 4.2: Tactical Nuclear Weapons Elimination Nikolai Sokov TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ELIMINATION: NEXT STEP FOR ARMS CONTROL by Nikolai Sokov Dr. Nikolai Sokov began his career as a research fellow at the Institute of USA and Canada Studies in Moscow and at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), where he received his candidate of history degree in 1986. In 1987, he joined the Soviet Foreign Ministry and worked on disarmament issues and participated in the START I talks. In 1992, he took a leave of absence and enrolled at the University of Michigan, where he received his Ph.D. in Political Science in 1996. Dr. Sokov is now a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. uclear disarmament is again ons as a desirable first step.2 the Commonwealth of Independent receiving the attention of Tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) States (CIS) at the end of 1991 and Npoliticians and nongovern- are the only part of the nuclear arse- in early 1992 (indirectly codified by mental experts after several years nals of the United States and Russia the Lisbon Protocol to the START I on the back burner. Debates have that is regulated primarily by an in- Treaty) developed this informal re- been stimulated by the December formal regime—one that is not codi- gime further. These agreements pro- 1996 letter from a distinguished group fied in an international treaty. That vided for the withdrawal to Russia of retired U.S. and Russian generals regime was established in 1991 by of TNW from the territories of calling for the complete elimination reciprocal unilateral obligations of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan. 1 of nuclear arms. The uncertain the United States and the Soviet Finally, in December 1996, the START II ratification process and Union. According to these initia- North Atlantic Council ministerial potential U.S.-Russian confrontation tives, all ground- and sea-launched meeting declared that “NATO coun- over NATO enlargement add ur- TNW of the United States and the tries have no intention, no plan, and gency to this task of moving ahead Soviet Union were withdrawn to no reason” to deploy TNW on the with further disarmament. storage facilities (along with long- territories of the future new mem- An obvious question is where to range sea-launched cruise missiles bers of the North Atlantic Treaty start? The Canberra Report, which (SLCMs)), while the number of air- Organization (NATO) and “do not 3 developed a specific plan of moving launched TNW was also reduced. foresee any future need to do so.” toward complete elimination of Meanwhile, a large number were The remaining number of deployed nuclear weapons, singled out mea- slated for elimination. TNW is relatively small. The United sures related to non-strategic weap- The agreements concluded within States has about 500 nuclear bombs The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 17 Nikolai Sokov in Europe.4 Although Russia has not he would like Russian nuclear weap- sumptions are challenged, serious disclosed the number of its deployed ons to be redeployed in his country.13 initiatives in the area of TNW will TNW in Europe officially, The Bul- But there are even more far-reach- always lack the necessary domestic letin of Atomic Scientists estimates ing proposals. Minister of Atomic support. that Russia has 2,200 deployed Energy Viktor Mikhailov has pro- This article is an effort to reassess 5 TNW, with probably about half of posed development and production traditional views of TNW. It seeks them in Europe. The number of of 10,000 new, fourth generation to demonstrate that TNW do not TNW in storage, however, is still nuclear warheads, as well as the ab- enhance security under any condi- fairly large. The United States is es- rogation of the Intermediate-Range tions, that their value for deterrence 6 timated to have 7,000. While offi- Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 is grossly overestimated both by cial Russian figures remain and the redeployment of SS-20 and Russia and by NATO, and that these classified, warheads for non-strate- SS-23 missiles.14 His proposal on weapons need to be eliminated, re- gic delivery vehicles constitute 40 the fourth generation of weapons is gardless of actual or potential imbal- percent of the total nuclear weap- not as far-fetched as it might seem: ances in conventional or strategic 7 ons stockpile, which puts their ac- as early as 1992, Lieutenant General nuclear weapons. Consequently, tual number somewhere between Evgeniy Negin announced that Rus- measures to formalize the current 8 6,000 and 13,000 warheads. Ac- sia already had developed a minia- regime could (and should) be under- cording to scheduled reductions, the turized nuclear weapon.15 taken independently of the issues of total stockpile should fall to 5,000 to NATO enlargement and START II 10,000 warheads by the year 2005.9 The possible consequences of these proposals are bleak. A new ratification. The existing, largely informal re- round of the arms race could follow. This article begins with an over- gime might become inadequate A breakdown of the existing TNW view of the missions assigned to fairly soon, however. A consensus regime also could lead to Russia’s TNW by Russia and NATO and then is emerging in Russia regarding the rejection of the START II Treaty and proceeds with a critical reassessment value of TNW for ensuring the to new deployments of land-based of the utility of TNW. Finally, it country’s security, especially in the strategic missiles with multiple war- elaborates on some initial measures wake of NATO’s upcoming enlarge- heads (MIRVed ICBMs), which to create a formal TNW regime and ment. The decision to reverse the START II bans. The United States move toward deep reductions in and 1991 Soviet obligations is all but is likely to respond in kind, by de- eventual elimination of TNW. official: reportedly, it has already ploying additional TNW in Europe been endorsed by the military and and taking other measures. As a re- MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO the presidential administration as a sult, at least one of the nuclear TNW preferred response in case Russia states—and more in the case of a Increased attention to TNW in perceives the need to adopt military NATO response—would be seen as 10 Russia is part of a larger trend, un- countermeasures. A distinguished reneging on obligations under Article derway since the breakup of the So- military expert, retired general VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty viet Union, toward reliance upon Vladimir Belous wrote that the new (NPT). If these events were to oc- nuclear weapons as the main source deployment should entail the cre- cur, the nonproliferation regime of security. As early as the spring of ation of “groupings” of tactical would be seriously weakened. nuclear weapons,11 which could in- 1992, the military proposed aban- clude delegation of control over The only way out of the conun- doning the Soviet Union’s no-first- TNW to local commanders, at least drum is to formalize the current re- use policy. This innovation became in time of crisis. Reportedly, a new gime, make it legally binding, and official in the fall of 1993.16 The missile (dubbed SS-X-26 by NATO) broaden its scope to include com- policy shift was justified by the radi- with a range of 400 kilometers is al- plete elimination of TNW world- cal weakening of Russian conven- ready being flight-tested.12 wide. However, deeply entrenched tional forces as a result of both the Belarusian President Aleksandr assumptions about the value of disintegration of the Soviet Union and Lukashenko, in a recent statement TNW for security hinder progress the on-going economic crisis. The before the Russian Duma, hinted that toward this solution. Until these as- 1993 doctrine, however, did not 18 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Nikolai Sokov specify which classes of nuclear forgotten.”22 In other words, for the conflict to an early termination.24 weapons Russia needed. But the foreseeable future, the imbalance in Under current international condi- first-use plank is likely to figure conventional weapons will continue tions, the role of TNW has remained prominently in the new defense doc- to preoccupy Russian decision- more or less the same, although their trine. Indeed, Yuri Baturin, the Sec- makers; success in the ongoing ne- war-fighting mission is being de- retary of the Defense Council, has gotiations might help to postpone the emphasized somewhat. The complained that the strategic situa- decision until such time as the level “Alliance’s Strategic Concept” of tion has become even worse since of trust becomes sufficient to aban- 1991 states: 1993, suggesting a strengthened com- don plans of TNW deployment com- The fundamental purpose of 17 the nuclear forces of the mitment to the first-use doctrine. pletely, but, in the meantime, the Allies is political: to pre- The upcoming enlargement of possibility of deployment will con- serve peace and prevent co- tinue to exist. ercion and any kind of war. NATO has focused attention on de- They will continue to fulfill veloping means to compensate for In view of the regional imbalance, an essential role by ensur- NATO’s considerable superiority in Russia has adopted the same solu- ing uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the conventional forces, which is ex- tion that NATO developed during the nature of the Allies’ re- pected to increase further after the Cold War in the face of Soviet supe- sponse to military aggres- actual enlargement takes place. In riority in conventional forces. The sion.25 1995, for the first time, deployment differences between the past NATO Officially, they are not targeted of additional TNW by Russia was and current Russian approaches are against Russia: a 1996 NATO docu- proposed as an appropriate means of insignificant and can be accounted ment stated that nuclear weapons response.18 for by the particulars of Russia’s “are no longer targeted against any- 26 NATO’s statements about its ab- geostrategic position.
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