Russia's Place in Europe

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Russia's Place in Europe Contents Preface 9 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 11 PART I THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION Introduction 19 Chapter 1 Russian National Interests: The State of Discussion By Andrey Kortunov 21 Two Approaches to National Interests 21 Domestic Interaction with Foreign Policy 25 “Westernizing” vs. “Slavophile” Understanding of National Interests 38 Foreign Policy Today — Two Agendas 44 Chapter 2 Impacts of Domestic and Regional Factors on Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy By Tatyana Parkhalina 47 Three Schools of Thought 48 Rising Nationalism 50 The Political Paradigm 51 Economic Groups and Foreign Policy 52 The Regional Agenda 54 Chapter 3 The Myth of the “West” in Russian Political Culture and its Impact on Foreign and Security Policy By Tatyana Yevgeneva 59 Historical Background 60 Identity Crisis in the Late Soviet Period 63 “Communists” vs. “Democrats” 65 Political Myths in Modern Russia 67 Concluding Remarks 71 A Country in Transition 71 Between Continuity and Change 73 Towards a Consensus on Russia’s National Interests 80 Foreign Policy at the Crossroads? 84 PART II THE CIS DIMENSION Introduction 87 Chapter 4 Reluctant Adaptation: Russia’s Security Policy towards New Eastern Europe and the Baltic States By Dmitriy Trenin 89 Discontinuities of the New Strategic Environment 90 Accepting the Finality of Independence 92 Security Alignments 95 A Different Kind of Russia? 96 Whither Russia? 97 Chapter 5 Ukrainian-Russian Relations and the Debate on NATO Enlargement By Leonid Bilousov 101 Inherited Political Systems 102 The Legacy of Soviet Relations 103 A “Triangle” Relationship 105 The NATO Debate in Kiev’s Political Elite 107 Regional Stability and NATO Enlargement 110 Chapter 6 Belarus, Russia, and a New European Security Architecture By Anatoliy Rozanov 113 The OSCE and a Common Security Space 114 NATO Enlargement: A View from Belarus 116 Belarus-Russia: The Military Aspect of Cooperation 123 Concluding Remarks 129 CIS Priority of Russian Foreign Policy 130 Bilateral Relations 132 Relations with the Republic of Belarus 134 Russian-Ukrainian Relations 137 Post-Soviet Integration? 141 PART III THE EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL DIMENSION Introduction 145 Chapter 7 Soviet Security Concepts in Historical Retrospective By Aleksey Filitov 147 Choosing the Confrontation Paradigm 148 Provoking Militarization 152 The Myth of Khrushchev’s “New Thinking” 155 External Security at Any Cost 160 Chapter 8 Russian Foreign and Security Policy in its Global Dimension By Yevgeniy Bazhanov 163 The Original Strategy and its Failure 163 The Emergence of a Modified Strategy 164 Objectives 167 Strategy 170 Conclusion 174 Chapter 9 Security Relations between Russia and the Western World By Sergey Rogov 177 The Danger of Isolation 178 A Weak Performance in the Early 1990s 180 New Security Relations with the West 183 Economic Interaction 186 Conclusion 188 Chapter 10 Russia’s Concept of a New European Security Architecture By Igor Maximychev 192 A Continental Security System 192 NATO-Russia Relations 196 Cooperation in Europe 201 Chapter 11 East-West Cooperation and International Ecological Security By Vassiliy Sokolov and Andrey Korneev 205 The Environment as a Security Issue 205 Relationship between Environmental and Military Security 210 Military Interests and Global Environment: 213 The Soviet/Russian Case 213 East-West Cooperation in Environmental Security 216 Concluding Remarks 219 Cold War Legacy 219 Russia in a Multi-Polar World 223 Russia within European Security Structures 225 Russia and NATO Enlargement 226 Traditional and Modern Security Agendas 229 CONCLUSIONS 233 Definition of National Interests 235 Russia’s Relationship with CIS Neighbors 236 Russia in Europe and in the Global Setting 237 How Can Russia Meet the Challenge? 238 What Can the West Do? 239 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Published Sources 243 Books and Articles 243 About the Authors 251 Preface This book addresses the role of the Russian Federation within the post-Cold War European security architecture. It provides a forum for relevant Russian foreign and security policy analysts, as well as ex- perts from Ukraine and Belarus, to share their views and to contem- plate official positions on various aspects of this topic. The contribu- tions were presented at an international conference on Russia’s Role within a New European Security Architecture, organized by the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, held in Zurich on 12-13 December 1997. Contributors and participants from Moscow included Prof. Dr. Ye. P. Bazhanov, Diplomatic Academy at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Prof. Dr. A. M. Filitov, Institute of General History at the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dr. A. V. Korneev, Institute of USA and Canada Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dr. A. V. Kortunov, Moscow Public Science Foundation; Dr. I. F. Maximychev, Institute of European Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dr. T. G. Parkhalina, Institute of Scientific Information at the Russian Academy of Sciences; Prof. Dr. S. M. Rogov, Institute of USA and Canada Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dr. V. I. Sokolov, Institute of USA and Canada Studies at the Russian Acad- emy of Sciences; Mrs. Ye. Stepanova, Carnegie Moscow Center; Dr. D. V. Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center; Prof. Dr. T. V. Yevgeneva, Russian State University for the Humanities; Dr. N. V. Yudina, Dip- lomatic Academy at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Participants from Kiev and Minsk included Dr. L. V. Bilousov, Ukrainian Center for International Security Studies; Mr. A. I. Veselovskiy, Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Prof. Dr. A. A. Rozanov, Belorussian State University; and Dr. L. F. Zayko, Center for Strategic Initiatives “East-West.” Chairpersons and participants from Zurich, Cologne, and Paris included Dr. O. Alexandrowa, German Federal Institute for Eastern European and International Studies, Cologne; Prof. Dr. C. Goehrke, University of Zurich; Dr. D. Müller and Mr. J. Perović, Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, ETH Zurich; Prof. Dr. J. Scherrer, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris; Prof. Dr. K. R. Spillmann and Dr. A. Wenger, Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, ETH Zurich; Dr. G. Wettig, German Federal Institute for Eastern European and International Studies, Cologne. The conference was organized under the auspices of the International Relations and Security Network (ISN),1 an Internet-based initiative to promote dialogue and cooperation in security matters at the interna- tional level. As part of Switzerland’s participation in NATO’s Part- nership for Peace, ISN is supported by the Swiss government, whose financial assistance in organizing the conference is appreciated. The editors thank all the conference participants for their contribu- tions. They particularly appreciate the efforts of the speakers in re- vising their papers to include the results of discussions. They ac- knowledge the interest professed by the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belo- russian Embassies in the event. For the organization of the conference, their many thanks go to their staff, particularly to Derek Müller, Jeronim Perović, Daniel Möckli, and Erika Girod. With regard to the organization and scope of this book, Derek Müller and Jeronim Perović merit special mention and gratitude. The editors would also like to thank Lyn Shepard for his help with the manuscript. The views expressed in these conference papers and analytical sections are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the institutions and individuals that so generously assisted them. 1 ISN can be found at the web-address http://www.isn.ethz.ch. General Introduction 11 Wherever Russians gather — may this be in their homes in Moscow or in Zurich with the purpose of analyzing European security problems — their discussion will inevitably reach the philosophical question of Russia’s nature. With this remark, Sergey Rogov provoked thoughtful amusement among the participants of a December 1997 conference on Russia’s Role within a New European Security Architecture, most of whom seemed to share that experience and to regard the question of Russia’s nature as a relevant, important consideration. Yet Russia’s nature is ambiguous. In many respects, the country seems to be a “normal” European democracy with constitutional protection of basic freedoms, institutions of balanced powers, free elections, more or less independ- ent news media, and other formal characteristics of Western societies. Important social indicators, such as demographic structure, levels of urbanization and education, social and professional mobility, seem to suggest that Russian society resembles Western democracies. However, Russian authorities are not in a position to promote large- scale political mobilization. A majority of Russians takes more inter- est in questions regarding daily life, such as the increase in prices, collapse of the economy, or growing unemployment, than in politics. Only a few Russians would describe their country in terms of a “democracy” or “welfare state,” “capitalism” or “liberalism.” A large part of the population would call Russian society “oligarchic,” ruled by a few, highly influential individuals, politicians, and masters of financial empires and oil or gas monopolies. The legacy of paternalis- tic, even authoritarian features is an important aspect of Russia’s po- litical system, as the officially promoted search for a new “Russian idea” suggests. The identification of Russia’s national
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