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OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Election Observation Mission Russian Federation Presidential Election, 18 March 2018

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OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Election Observation Mission Russian Federation Presidential Election, 18 March 2018 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Election Observation Mission Russian Federation Presidential Election, 18 March 2018 INTERIM REPORT 5 February – 1 March 2018 2 March 2018 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • The Russian Federation will hold a presidential election on 18 March 2018. The Central Election Commission (CEC) registered eight candidates, seven fielded by political parties and one, the incumbent president, as a self-nominated candidate standing for a second consecutive and a fourth overall term. One candidate is a woman. • Several amendments to the election legislation were adopted since the last presidential election, most recently in December 2017, responding to some previous ODIHR recommendations. A number of other recommendations, including those pertaining to guarantees for freedom of assembly, association and expression, remain to be addressed. • The campaign is generally low-key but has become more visible following the 23 February Defenders of Fatherland Day celebrations. Meanwhile, outdoor campaign events are limited in visibility. By contrast, concurrent get-out-the-vote initiatives, with a view to ensuring a high voter turnout, launched by a multitude of actors including local authorities, private and state enterprises, feature prominently across the country. • The presidential election is administered a by four-tiered election administration that serves a five- year term. Preparations for the elections are underway and legal deadlines have so far been respected. The CEC has held regular, public, at times live-streamed, sessions with extensive discussions on various issues including alleged interference by local authorities into the electoral process. A comprehensive voter information campaign, launched by the CEC, is ongoing. • The number of registered voters in the Russian Federation as of 1 January is 108,968,869, including 1,875,408 voters abroad. Some 1,306,800 voters have used the recent amendments to request to vote in a place other than their place of residence. Concerted efforts by the CEC to identify and remove duplicate entries in the voter register are ongoing. • Prospective candidates must open a bank account dedicated to all campaign related transactions. Candidates are required to submit a financial report to the CEC upon registration and again within one month of the announcement of the election results. To date, the CEC requested five candidates to return donated funds mostly due to non-compliance with permitted sources of funding or to incomplete information of the source. • The Constitution provides for freedom of expression and the right to information. Libel and insult of state officials remain criminal offenses. The legislation regulating media coverage of nominating parties and candidates during the official campaign period provides for free airtime on public broadcasters as well as free space in print media. Informational materials published by the media must be unbiased and respect the equality of candidates. The CEC oversees media’s compliance with campaign regulations. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Page: 2 Russian Federation, Presidential Election, 18 March 2018 Interim Report (5 February – 1 March 2018) • Parties, candidates, media representatives, international observers and, following amendments in December 2017, observers appointed by civic chambers can follow the electoral process. The law does not provide for observation by citizen observers and organizations independently of the civic chambers. • Election commissions and the courts adjudicate election disputes. As of 26 February, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation received 60 complaints against CEC decisions, and dismissed 47 of them as inadmissible. Notably, the courts adjudicated two cases related to the constitutionality of legal provisions pertaining to the right to stand, upholding both CEC decisions. II. INTRODUCTION Following an invitation from the Central Election Commission (CEC) of the Russian Federation, and based on the recommendation of a Needs Assessment Mission conducted from 6 to 9 December 2017, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) established an Election Observation Mission (EOM) on 5 February to observe the 18 March presidential election.1 The EOM, headed by Ambassador Jan Petersen, consists of a 13-member core team based in Moscow and 60 long-term observers deployed in 31 subjects of the Russian Federation throughout the country on 14 February. Mission members are drawn from 25 OSCE participating States. Participating States have been requested to second 420 short-term observers to observe election day procedures. III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT The Russian Federation is a presidential republic. According to the 1993 Constitution, it is “a democratic federal law-bound State with a republican form of government” and the president is the head of state who enjoys a wide range of powers.2 President Vladimir Putin was first elected in 2000 and reelected in 2004. Having become prime minister in 2008, he entered his third non-consecutive term in 2012 and is now standing for reelection to a fourth term in office. Legislative power is vested in the bicameral Federal Assembly comprising the Council of the Federation (upper house) and the State Duma (lower house). Six political parties are represented in the State Duma since the last parliamentary elections in September 2016.3 Four of them have publicly endorsed the candidacy of the incumbent president, including United Russia (ER), which holds a constitutional majority.4 There are 67 registered political parties: the number increased tenfold after the process was simplified in 2012. However, several opposition initiatives remain unregistered.5 1 See previous OSCE/ODIHR reports on the Russian Federation. 2 The president may under specific conditions dismiss regional governors, the government and dissolve parliament, issue decrees in areas not covered by existing laws, outline government policy and preside at government meetings, propose judges to the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, the Chairperson of the Bank of Russia and the Prosecutor General and appoint the director of the state television and radio broadcaster. Out of 72 government bodies 19 answer directly to the president, including most ministries (see Decree of the President of Russian Federation No. 636 from May 2012, last amended in April 2017). 3 Parties represented in the State Duma are: United Russia (ER; 343 seats), Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF; 42 seats), Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR; 39 seats), Fair Russia (SR; 23 seats), Civic Platform (1) and Rodina (1). 4 Of the six parties in parliament, KPRF and LDPR nominated their own candidates. 5 For example, Party of Fifth December, and the Party of Progress that was registered in 2014 and deregistered in 2015. According to the ODIHR EOM interlocutors, the group had planned to file for re-registration in March 2018. On 22 February 2018, one of the former deputy chiefs of the Moscow Branch of Party of Progress announced his intention to register an entity under the name of Party of Progress and applied for registration with the Ministry of Justice. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Page: 3 Russian Federation, Presidential Election, 18 March 2018 Interim Report (5 February – 1 March 2018) The 18 March election was called by the decision of the Federation Council that entered into force on 18 December 2017.6 IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM The presidential election is primarily regulated by the Constitution, the 2002 Law on Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in a Referendum (the Law on Basic Guarantees), the 2002 Law on the Election of President of the Russian Federation (the Law on Presidential Election), and the Central Election Commission (CEC) resolutions.7 The legal framework was amended on several occasions since the last presidential election, most recently in December 2017, and some of the changes addressed previous ODIHR recommendations. The most significant amendments relate to voter and candidate registration, observers’ rights, transparency measures as well as introducing administrative and criminal liability for unlawful issue and receipt of ballots papers, both for the election officials implicated and the voters. The Constitution protects the freedoms of expression, association and assembly and stipulates that laws abolishing or diminishing human and civil rights and freedoms must not be adopted. Restrictions may be justified by a federal law on certain grounds – mainly for the protection of the constitutional order, morality, health and lawful interests of other people, as well as to ensure the security of the State. A number of legal amendments introduced since the 2012 presidential election result in restrictions of some constitutionally guaranteed political rights and fundamental freedoms. The 2016 so-called “Anti- terrorist Law” grants authorities broad powers to limit civil rights, withdraw citizenship, and access private telephone and email communications.8 Amendments to several laws passed in 2012 and 2015 require domestic non-profit organizations, including those involved in election observation, that receive funding from abroad to register as foreign agents and permit the authorities to declare foreign or international organizations as undesirable without a judicial procedure.9 Amendments introduced in December 2015 to the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,
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