RussiAn Military AlmanAc Organization of the Russian Armed Forces In January 1997, President Boris Yeltsin signed an order making official a new he- raldic emblem for the armed forces. The double-headed eagle has wings spread to indicate readiness to take flight, attack, and defend. At the heart of the emblem lay a shield depicting St. George and the Dragon, the symbol of the city of Moscow. everal military structures, each the Federal Communications Agency, junior officers. Women helped compensate S subordinate to Russia’s President, the Federal Railroad Troops Service, the for the shortage of qualified male con- composed the nation’s armed forces in Construction Troops, and the Federal scripts. 1996 and through the first half of 1997. Special Construction Directorate. Neither President Boris Yeltsin and other politi- At the top level, direction was provided the Russian Minister of Defense nor the cal leaders emphasized the importance of by two organizations, each chaired by the Chief of the General Staff had any control Russia’s nuclear forces. Deputy Security President and directed by politically power- over these other power structures, whose Council Secretary Boris Berezovskiy assert ful civilian secretaries. The first was the numbers were estimated to be between -ed that Russia’s new National Security Security Council, responsible for formulat- 800,000 and two million. All of these troops, Con-cept provided for first use of such ing the National Security Concept. This however, were subject to the Military Regu- weapons in a crisis. Priority was given to document defines Russia’s priority national lations of the Armed Forces of the Russian maintaining these weapons and to R&D for interests and reportedly was completed in Federation. future weapons systems, with emphasis May 1997 but not published. Second was The Ministry of Defense (MoD) adminis- on space. Work appeared to continue on a the Defense Council, created in July 1996 tered eight regular military districts inside massive, deep underground battle station and charged with producing a new military Russia. In addition, there were seven in the Ural Mountains. doctrine and guiding military reform. This districts of Internal Troops, six districts of was scheduled to have been ready in June Border Guards, and seven regional centers Armed Forces under the Defense Minis- 1997 but was delayed indefinitely. Threats of Civil Defense Troops. Each agency try. These forces had the primary responsi- to Russia’s security, as well as the role, supported large local staffs with general bility for defending Russia against external structure, and composition of its armed officers in abundance. There was much threats. They are divided into five services, forces, are to be determined by the provi- overlapping and duplication in their work as in Soviet days. Moreover, there were two sions of these two documents. but little coordination. smaller forces: Military Space Forces and Heads of the five most influential Rus- Non–MoD organizations, in particular Airborne Forces, referred to as “reserves of sian uniformed organizations sat on both Border Guards and Internal Troops, were the Supreme Command.” the Security and Defense councils. These not paramilitary forces in any sense. Leading political and military leaders were the Minister of Defense, the Direc- With the treaty-driven downsizing of MoD em -phasized that MoD forces will be re- tor of the Federal Security Service, the troops in the early 1990s, many units organized. Newly appointed Minister of De- Minister of Internal Affairs, the Director of were simply transferred to one of the fense, Gen. of the Army Igor D. Ser geyev, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the other “power ministries.” As the fighting in de-clared that Russia would establish four Director of the Federal Border Guards. The Chechnya showed, non–MoD troops often rapid-response mobile forces, each with its Minister for Civil Defense and Emergency were better armed and trained than MoD own air and naval support, if needed. They Situations, the Head of the Federal Security forces. would be located in the Far East, North Guard Service, and the Minister for Nuclear Russia’s conventional military capability Caucasus area, and Moscow Military Dis- Energy (who heads troops) were members continued to decline. Troop training was at trict (with two). The size of these planned of only the Security Council. a minimum. “Untouchable” reserves of both forces, which were primarily in tended to Less prominent power centers, com- food and equipment, intended for wartime deal with regional conflicts, was not given. manded by generals and filled with troops, emergency, were utilized. Soldiers often also reported to the President. These were undernourished; medical support was Defense Ministry. This once highly profes- included the Presidential Security Service, primitive. There was a serious shortage of sional body became politicized and rife with 56 AIR FORCE Magazine / October 1997 RussiAn Military AlmanAc By Tamar A. Mehuron, Associate Editor, with Harriet Fast Scott, William F. Scott, and David Markov dissent and corruption. Minister of Defense missile-space defense troops, surface- submarines have met the same fate. Rus- Gen. of the Army Pavel Grachev, who to-air missile troops, air defense aviation sia’s newer submarines were a different came to President Yeltsin’s aid in the coup troops, and radiotechnical (radar) troops. story. A new fourth-generation ballistic attempts of 1991 and 1993, was dismissed President Yeltsin continued to press for a missile submarine, referred to as the Borey in June 1996. His successor, Gen. of the “Unified Air Defense System” for the com- project, has been approved by presiden- Army Igor Rodionov, on reaching com- monwealth and directed the Ministries of tial decree and work started on the lead pulsory retirement age of 60 the following Defense and Foreign Affairs to develop and unit in November 1996. The first Borey is December, retired and became Russia’s implement it. The “Agreement on the Cre- scheduled to be launched in 2002, with first civilian Defense Minister. However, ation of a CIS Unified Air Defense System,” an additional unit each year thereafter. Rodionov was never accepted in the Presi- signed in 1995, had not been implemented. The Borey is expected to carry 12 new dent’s inner circle and disagreed with the Only air defense troops of Kazakhstan, ballistic missiles. If the START II agreement reform policies of Yuriy Baturin, Defense Russia, and Belarus performed alert duty. is ratified, 55 percent of Russia’s remain- Council Secretary. Azerbaijan had not subscribed to the ing nuclear warheads would be based on In May 1997, during a televised meeting of Agreement; Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, SSBNs by 2003. the Defense Council, both Minister of De- and Ukraine cooperated with Russia fense Rodionov and the Chief of the Gener- only on a bilateral basis. Moscow’s ABM Ground Forces (SV) appeared as the most al Staff, Gen. of the Army Viktor Samsonov, system, intended “to combat unauthorized, neglected of the five Ministry of Defense were dismissed. Gen. of the Army Igor provocative, or terrorist strikes by various services. Approximately 90,000 of the Sergeyev, CINC of the Strategic Rocket categories of combat missiles,” continued Ground Forces’ personnel were contract Forces, was designated the new Defense to receive attention. volunteers. These troops, as well as the Minister. Gen. Col. Anatoliy Kvashnin, initial regular conscripts, were of poor quality with Commander of the Joint Group of Federal Air Forces (VVS) remained divided into little education. Training was minimal. Within Troops fighting in Chechnya, moved from long-range (strategic), frontal (tactical), the republics of the former Soviet Union, the Commander of the North Caucasus Military and transport aviation. Gen. Col. Peter S. Trans caucasus Group of Forces had troops District to Chief of the General Staff. Dr. Deynekin, CINC Air Forces, admitted that, deployed in both Georgia and Armenia. In Andrey A. Kokoshin retained his position of the Air Forces’ tactical aircraft—intercep- May 1996, a special military contingent was as First Deputy Minister of Defense guiding tors, ground attack, and medium-range formed to direct and support the 17 motor- military-technical and economic policy. theater bomber types—only 30 percent ized and four airborne battal-ions involved consisted of fourth generation MiG-29s and in peacekeeping. A motorized rifle peace- Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) contin- Su-27s. He said that the Air Forces “did not keeping division was in Moldova and an- ued to have first priority in personnel and purchase a single new military aircraft in other similar division in Tajikistan. A military equipment. This service consisted of four 1996.” Deynekin described the shortage of unit remains in Southern Ossetia (Georgia). missile armies, which contained 19 divi- parts, engines, accumulators, and rubber Some units were part of CIS Col-lective sions. The Topol-M missile, an advanced as disastrous and said that only some 50 Peacemaking Forces based in Abkhazia version of the silo-based and mobile Topol percent of the airplanes were operational. and Tajikistan. Russian units also serve ICBM, was introduced into service. RVSN Lack of flying time for pilots remained a as part of UN peacekeeping operations. conducted five practice missile launches in major problem. Military air transport pilots A special branch of service, the Airborne 1996. The last was a RS-22 rocket launch were able to maintain a level of proficiency Forces, were under the direct control of the from a combat railway car launching pad. by flying paid air cargoes and by support- President but administered by the Ground The primary central command point of ing Russian peacekeeping operations. In Forces. There was much confusion about RVSN was located underground next to tactical units fuel shortages limited pilots to their subordination and size. In September the headquarters building in Vlasikha 30–50 hours a year of flight time, compared 1996 the MoD ruled that they would be re- near Moscow.