Nepal's Peace Process: the Endgame Years

Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°131 Kathmandu/Brussels, 13 December 2011 Nepal’s Peace Process: The Endgame Nears post-constitution government to oversee the next election, I. OVERVIEW which should take place some months after the new constitution is adopted. The Maoists’ main coalition partner, Nepal’s peace process has moved into a phase of defini- the Samyukta Loktantrik Madhesi Morcha (Morcha), an tive progress. More than five years after the ceasefire, the alliance of five Madhes-based parties, has often been seen parties have reached a deal on the Maoist fighters, who will as fractious and anti-Maoist, but the strength of the front leave the cantonments and enter the army or civilian life. and the new government challenges that perception. Final- An unofficial deal sets out power-sharing arrangements ly, there has been a gradual shift in India’s policy line in until the next election. The parties are focusing on the 2011, reversing an often hostile approach to the Maoists critical task of writing a new constitution, which promises in favour of accommodation and cooperation. a deep restructuring of the state to become more repre- sentative and decentralised. Challenges remain, including After the 1 November agreement, the Maoist combatants from continuously evolving coalition dynamics and divi- were surveyed and chose either integration into the na- sions within parties. There will also have to be further tional army or voluntary retirement with a cash package. discussions on the combatants. As the parties discuss fed- More fighters chose integration into the Nepal Army (NA) eralism, which of all peace process issues goes most to than the 6,500 allowed by the deal. This opens up another the heart of ordinary Nepalis’ expectations and anxieties, negotiation on the final number. Combatants likewise groups within and outside the Constituent Assembly will showed themselves to be unhappy about decisions made see their options narrow, which could strain the process. on individual qualifications for entry into the NA. Ranks Yet, this is still the best chance the parties have had to have not been decided yet either. The special concerns of reach formal closure on the war and to institute some of fighters with disabilities will also have to be addressed. the fundamental changes they promised, provided they Discussions could be protracted, but are not likely to derail have the courage to make far-sighted compromises. the constitution writing process. The breakthrough on 1 November was the result of a se- The term of the Constituent Assembly (CA) was renewed ries of realignments between many political leaders and for six months, from 1 December, and the state restructur- factions of parties, which strengthened the futures of cer- ing commission, controversial but mandated by the interim tain individuals and acknowledged their political lines. The constitution, was formed. The commission should build major players also had few unused tools left in the nego- on proposals already prepared in the CA and also provide tiating process, and gratuitous inflexibility and stalling recommendations to that body. Its composition, however, had run their course as bargaining tactics. Major power suggests that critical decisions will be taken elsewhere, at centres in all three parties, including a dogmatic faction the highest political level. Indeed, senior leaders are on of the Maoists, resent having been left out of the talks. track to negotiate compromises on the proposed federal But while they can obstruct and slow the process, they states and system. They will have to balance acknowledg- cannot derail it. A consensus government will have to be ing historical identities and discrimination and the rights formed sooner or later, though it is unclear whether the of Nepal’s many ethnic, caste and linguistic groups. present government will need to resign or whether the The manner in which negotiations take place matters as opposition will join in. much as the outcome. Historically marginalised communi- Power-sharing remains the most tangible dividend com- ties, their representatives in mainstream parties and other ing out of the peace process to date, though there was ethnic formations have to be engaged, rather than simply no mention of it in the November 2006 Comprehensive be informed of decisions. Centralised, top-down decisions Peace Agreement (CPA). The formation of a Maoist-led on federalism cannot be sold easily outside Kathmandu, government in August 2011 was the first factor that made where identity-based groups and sceptics of federalism progress possible. Without that, the party would have have been mobilising. There is supposed to be public con- been reluctant to give up its army. Following that was the sultation on proposed constitutional provisions. Rather Maoists’ willingness to unofficially accept the main op- than treat this as a formality, the parties should see it as a position party, the Nepali Congress (NC), as leader of the way to increase the buy-in of various groups. Nepal’s Peace Process: The Endgame Nears Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°131, 13 December 2011 Page 2 As the future landscape becomes clearer, resistance could integration of some Maoist fighters into the Nepal Amy well come from traditionally powerful constituencies that (NA) was unavoidable and that continuously stalling was are outside the CA and see the proposed changes as a ze- no longer rewarding.2 The deal is critical for the Maoist ro-sum game, including a mix of anti-federalists, Hindu fighters, whose future has been up in the air for five years. groups that oppose secularism and some royalists. The More broadly, it paved the way for progress on the consti- parties in the CA and their factions will also look to ex- tution, which was stalled as long as there were two armies tract the most from the process, and parliamentary parties in the country. on the right are regrouping. For many, the temptation could be to not negotiate, but instead to sharpen social The Maoist party was clear that it had to be in power be- polarisation along the divisions the peace process seeks to fore it could make a deal that would dismantle the People’s narrow: ethnic, religious, cultural, regional and class. Liberation Army (PLA). The other parties and New Delhi were equally clear that a Maoist-led government could not The peace process has informally come to mean only the be headed by the party chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal question of the Maoist fighters, rather than the whole of “Prachanda”, who they felt had been unreliable and an- the CPA. Politicians do regard the constitution as a matter tagonistic when he was prime minister.3 For them, as well of urgency, but they are also exhausted and want to see as for the faction of the Maoist party led by Senior Vice- the process quickly concluded, so Nepal can go back to Chairman Mohan Baidya “Kiran”, that felt Prachanda ex- business as usual. The commitment to democratise the erted too much control over the party, senior leader Babu- Nepal Army has already been dropped. The commission ram Bhattarai was a broadly acceptable option.4 on land reform is a dead-end. The issue of justice for war- era abuses continues to be defined by the lack of incen- tive for all actors to deal with it. These issues and the complexities of federalism will not lose relevance simply 2 A maximum of 6,500 ex-combatants are to be integrated into because the mainstream parties decide to ignore them. a new Nepal Army (NA) directorate responsible for forest and Whether or not they prove to be drivers of mass mobilisa- industrial security, development support and crisis manage- tion or violence in the coming months, they will be criti- ment. There is to be some relaxation of the NA’s regular re- cal ahead of the next general election. Nepal’s political cruitment standards for age, educational qualifications and mar- class needs to make some difficult decisions rather quick- ital status. Whatever the final number of former Maoist fighters ly, so as to ensure its own relevance. are chosen for integration, they are to comprise 35 per cent of the personnel in the directorate, whose remaining personnel are to be drawn from other parts of the NA. Cash packages for combatants to be rehabilitated have also been negotiated. See II. A NEW DEAL, NEW CHALLENGES also Crisis Group Report, Nepal: From Two Armies to One, op. cit. Other elements of the deal include forming the commis- sions on enforced disappearance and truth and reconciliation, The 1 November deal for the first time laid out concrete addressing “legal cases of the conflict period” in keeping with options for the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist the CPA and the 2007 interim constitution and providing relief fighters and revived some of the major commitments of packages for conflict victims. For more on justice and repara- the CPA.1 For the Maoists, this was a long-overdue demon- tions issues, see Crisis Group Reports N°184, Nepal: Peace stration of their party’s willingness to give up its military. and Justice, 14 January 2010 and Nepal: From Two Armies to For the NC and other parties, this meant accepting that One, op. cit. The parties committed to forming a national consensus government as the peace process and constitution writing proceeded. This left the door open for further disputes on sequencing. Similarly, there is no clarity on how land reform 1 For recent Crisis Group reporting on the evolving political will take place, although the CPA calls for a commission. Fi- dynamic, the connection between peace process issues and nally, the CPA and interim constitution present as parallel the power-sharing, and other contested issues related to the CA and commitments to integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army the Maoist army, see Asia Briefing N°120, Nepal’s Fitful Peace personnel and democratisation of the Nepal Army, but the latter Process, 7 April 2011; and Asia Report N°211, Nepal: From is entirely absent from the new agreement.

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