i - MASTER'S THESIS M-1185 I AMSTUTZ, Mark Robert I CHILE'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD HEMISPHERIC ISSUES, 1961-1965. The American University, Mj^., 1967 Political Science, intemation^ law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan CHILE'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD
HEMISPHERIC ISSUES, I96I-I965
by
Mark R. Amstutz
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS
MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Signatures, of Committee:
Chairman: , , -
Date : I SA 7.
Dean of Schoo. Date: iTé'y 'flMERIMN UNI\?ERS1TY LIMkAKV
MAY 2 Ü wo/
bSiL TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
INTRODUCTION.
I. CHILE AND THE CUBAN INVASION...... 7 The Crisis. Chile's Policy Toward the Crisis. Reaction.; by Political Parties and Groups.
II. CHILE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS...... l8 The Crisis. Chile's Policy Toward the Crisis. Reaction by Political Parties and Groups.
III. CHILE AND THE CRISIS AT THE EIGHTH MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS...... 29 The Crisis. Chile's Policy Toward the Crisis. Reaction by Political Parties and Groups.
IV. CHILE AND THE CRISIS AT THE NINTH MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS...... 39 The Crisis. Chile's Policy Toward the Crisis. Reaction by Political Parties and Groups.
V. CHILE AND THE PANAMA-UNITED STATES CRISIS...... 50 The Crisis. Chile's “Policy Toward the Crisis. Reaction by Political Parties and Groups.
VI. CHILE AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS...... 65 The Crisis. Chile's Policy Toward the Crisis. Reaction by Political Parties and Groups.
CONCLUSION...... 80
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 85 INTRODUCTION
To the student of international politics, Chile has little economic or political significance in the world community. Too weak, small and underdeveloped to carry a position of leadership, Chile has most often been a passive follower in the world arena. Even in Latin America, Chile's
importance and significance has been all but visible at
first glance at the continent. Its small size is over
shadowed by Mexico; its military power is insignificant to
Brazil's; economically it lags behind Argentina. Upon
closer investigation, however, Chile becomes a country of
remarkable qualities and characteristics that calls for
one's admiration and respect.
Perhaps most outstanding is Chile's long record of
political stability which has produced one of the most mature democratic systems in Latin America. The past one-
hundred and forty years have been relatively free from any
turmoil or intervention by the military, so often charac
teristic of Latin American nations. Large scale.revolutions
and dictatorships, caudillo regimes and military governments
have all bypassed this nation. The result is that the
chilenos are, in spite of strong social class divisions,
a sophisticated people who respect law and order and the
processes of representative democracy. In addition, Chile
is a land rich in natural resources, which if used -2- effectively would make it more than self-sufficient, a country with a people of strong national pride and purpose,
; and one of the most scenic and panoramic countries in the continent, often referred to as the "Switzerland of Latin
America."
Chile's foreign policy, like the country, does not call attention to itself. This is due to several reasons:
First, Chile has maintained close ties with the United
States through the letter's economic aid and through Chile's willingness to follow a democratic system of government, as opposed to a communist system. Between 19^7 and 1958 the Communist Party was illegal, and since then it has made
important progress, yet not enough to play a determining
role in Chile-United States relations. The recent rise
of the Christian Democratic Party to power in 1964 has produced many changes, one of which is a new emphasis on
ties with the Communist block, but these minor changes are not likely to draw attention as did Guatemala in 1954 or
Cuba from I96I to 1964. Secondly, Chile has followed a mature
and consistent path based on law in foreign policy, and as
a result its actions have not been dramatic or sensational.
Because of the country's record of consistent adherence to
law and principles, Chile's policies during conflicts and
crises in the hemisphere have come as a surprise to few
students of Chilean diplomacy. Thirdly, Chile's weak power
and small size, in comparison to Mexico and Brazil, have
contributed to the insignificance of its foreign policy. For -3- exaraple, Chile has followed a path in foreign policy just as independent and juridical as Mexico, yet few realize this fact. Indeed, two small countries that have followed a most interesting and independent course in their foreign policies have been Uruguay and Chile, not Brazil and Argentina,
The purpose of this study and the reason for presuming on the reader's time is to make Chile's foreign policy more significant in the context of the international relations of Latin America. The writer has done this by analyzing
Chile's policies during the 196I-I965 period toward issues of hemispheric concern. The writer has limited the area and time of study for two reasons: first, Chile has not had significant contact with the other continents, hence the information available is limited in areas other that
Latin America; second, the author has chosen the period between I961 and I965 because, while it is one of the most
interesting ones in the history of Chilean foreign policy,
it provides an example of Chile's consistency to law and principles which have long guided its foreign policy.
It would be absurd to describe Chile's foreign policy as immutable, for changes must occur if a nation is to
adapt itself to new situations. But Chile's foreign pOlicy
is characterized by the fact that while it" has changed its policies to new circumstances, it has remained faithful--
at least in its own eyes--to principles established long ago.
Four of these principles were outlined at the Punta del Este Meeting of Foreign Ministers in I962 by Mr. Carlos Martinez -4-
Sotomayor, Foreign Minister of Chile. These four principles were: democracy, human rights, non-intervention, and self- determination.^ Democracy to Chile does not necessarily mean adherence to a form of government such as that which the United States practices, but a form of government which provides dignity to the individual by giving him both political and economic liberty. Similarly, human rights deals not only with individual freedom but with economic aspects of I life, such as misery and ignorance. Non-intervention is without doubt the basic norm of Chile's foreign policy.
During the crisis studied here the government of Chile
reminded other nations on several occasions of its re
sponsibilities to this principle. A recent example not discussed here of the sanctity of this principles is the
vehement criticisms that emanated from Chileans in protest I to the United States for having "intervened" through Op
eration Camelot, a study group designed to analyze the possibilities of subversion in Chile. The House of Deputies made a study of the incident, and subsequently issued a
report which was approved unanimously charging the United
States with intervention and asking the Chilean government
to denounce the United States in the GAS and the United 2 Nations. The principle of auto-determinâtion, a corollary
1 El Mercurio, January 25^ 1962, p. 40.
^The Washington Post, November 22, I965, p. 2, -5- of non-intervention, has also been a basic guideline for
Chile. Chile believes that it is indispensible that each
nation have the right to choose its own political, economic
and cultural way of life. Chile's one reservation to complete
liberty in choosing a political system is that it must
respect the rights of individuals. According to Mr. Soto- mayor, "There can be no auto-determination when human rights 3 are suffocated."
In addition, the principle of non-militarism has
been an important guideline of Chile's foreign policy,
particularly during the period concerned here. Chile's
opposition to settlement of controversies and disputes
through armed forces is the result of her own tradition of
an apolitical military force. The belief in pacific rather
than forceful settlement of disputes has recently led Chile
to take a position of leadership against the introduction of
nuclear armaments in the Southern Hemisphere. Another
guideline of Chile's foreign policy is the strict juridical
interpretation of treaties. Chile believes that the basis of
its foreign policy must be law, and the best method to enforce
this is by interpreting treaties and agreements "strictly,"
even at times when inaction would be more suitable to its
own national interests. The principle of sanctity of treaties
has led Chile's policy to be charaterized as legalistic,
narrow and uncompromising.
^E1 Mercurio, January 25, 1962. -6-
Changes in Chile's emphasis in foreign policy have taken place during the last decade. The most significant of these is that Chile's concern is no longer centered on ideology. Rutland's assertion that it was "Chilean leader ship in the continent in an offensive against international
Communism which is best known," is an anachronism today.^
Throughout this study ideology is not a primary consideration for policy formation; rather, concern is centered on econ omic measures that might indirectly forestall Communist expansion. Chile's answer to Communism in Latin America is not the imposition of sanctions but the provision of econ omic measures that will raise the standard of living and thus eliminate discontent on which Communism thrives.
ii Gilbert Rutland, Chile; an Outline of its Geography, Economics, and Politics (London, 1956), p. 113. ' CHAPTER I
CHILE AND THE CUBAN INVASION
The idea of the Cuban invasion had its beginning in the early summer of i960, soon after it became evident that
Castro had betrayed his intentions of a peaceful return to democracy. the United States received many Cuban refugees, tolerated the functioning of an organization to direct anti-Castro activities in New York and the training of anti-
Castro activities in United States territory, and expressed through public statements of the President sympathy for the anti-Castro movement. When the Eisenhower Administration first conceived of an attempt to overthrow the Castro regime, it was not concerned with ap invasion as such, rather its original plan was to feed recruits back to Cuba in order to reinforce several thousand anti-Castro guerillas already established in the mountains. About December i960, the character of the plans seems to have changed from dispersed guerilla landings to the establishment of a beach-head. This change was made by the Central Intelligence Agency, which was apparently in charge of organizing and training the rebel
Cuban troops.
The extent to which the United States through the activities of the CIA collaborated with the military inter vention into Cuba on April 17, I96I is not entirely certain. -8-
Szulc and Meyer believe that the United States, under agree ment with the rebel forces located in the United States, provided most of the equipment and instruction in a specially built military camp in the mountains of Retalhuleu in Gua
temala.^ Less certain is the actual role the United States had in the expedition to the Bay of Pigs. But regardless how one interprets the invasion, it is clear that Cuba-- a member of the OAS--was subjected to an armed attack across
its borders, and this was facilitated by the willingness of
the United States to give its support to the enemies of the
government in power.
The participation of the United States in the invasion,
even if limited, seems to be one of confusion and perplexity.
On April 12, President Kennedy made his position very clear:
There will not under any conditions be... an inter vention in Cuba by the United States armed forces. This government will do everything it possibly can-- and I think it can meet its responsibilities--to make sure that there are no Americans involved in any actions against Cuba.^
Three days after Kennedy had spoken these words, preliminary
air strikes were made by a few B-26's, piloted by Cuban
refugee fliers, against Cuban air fields. These planes, which
were based in Central America and landed in Florida after
their missions, were relatively unsuccessful in their purpose.
The United States immediately asserted that these planes had
defected from the Cuban Air Force. As a result, a storm arose
^Tad Szulc and Carl Meyer, The Cuban Invasion: A Chronicle of Disaster (New York, 1984), p. 8Ï1 ^"Mr. Krushchev to President Kennedy," State Depart- ment Bulletin, May 8, I96I, p. 664. _9~
In the United Nations, and Adlai Stevenson, United States
Ambassador to the United Nations, declared publicly that these planes had come from Cuba. Ambassador Stevenson was later informed of his mistake.
On the early morning of April 27 rebel military forces began the invasion on the Bay of Pigs. The rebel troops immediately encountered heavy losses because B-26 flights due to protect the invading forces had been canceled by President Kennedy--a decision that came as a result of
the confusion that had emerged two days earlier in the
United Nations over the previous air strikes. ' Once the rebel forces had landed, pilots were permitted to fly
support missions but at this time it was already too late
to save disaster. The Cuban invasion had not succeeded.
CHILE'S POLICY TOWARD THE INVASION
Chile's policy toward the Cuban invasion, unlike
any other crisis between I96I and 1965^ was uncertain, nebulous and confused. This perplixity was perhaps due to
a large extent--if not entirely— to the uncertainty of the
part that the United States had in supporting the rebel
force during the invasion. While in retrospect there is
much information about the crisis, at the time of the invasion
an objective analysis of the situation was almost impossible.
As a result, Chile's policy was vague and indecisive, and
protests against the United States--as was the case in the
Santo Domingo crisis in I965— were nonexistent here. — 10 —
Despite the lack of information concerning the invasion,
Chile maintained a policy toward the crisis that was consistent with its principles. Chile’s consistency was not so much due, however, to an overt explanation as to the fact that
Chile refused to give a specific policy or attitude when it did not have adequate information for such a judgement.
Since Chile believed that in this crisis there was insufficient information to accuse any nation of committing aggression,
Chile chose a simple yet consistent path: suspension of judgment. According to Daniel Schweitzer, United Nations
Ambassador of Chile, it was Chile's obligation to withhold any judgment or qualification until there was enough evidence to warrant a conclusion.^ Specifically, the Ambassador reminded the United Nations General Assembly that had heard both sides of the conflict--the accusation of Cuba and the replies to these criticisms by United States-- and that it would continue to watch the crisis closely.'"
Chile's refusal to charge the United States with aggression is evident by the following words by Mr. Schweitzer:
We believe in the sincerity of the words of Ambassador Stevenson, likewise, the declaration reiterated by President Kennedy and his Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, related to the absence of participation by United States forces in the present Cuban situation. Above all, we believe her manifestation that she does not intend any military intervention...
While Chile refused to follow an overt policy, Mr.
Schweitzer reminded the United Nations General Assembly that
^E1 Mercurio, April 12, I96I, p. 20. 4. 'Ibid. -11-
Chile would continue to mold its foreign policy during this crisis according to principles that have historically guided it. Three of these which Chile considered central to the conflict were nonintervention, pacific settlement of disputes, and regional ism--all of which were important in both public and governmental debate following the invasion.
The principle of nonintervention was perhaps the central issue of debate during the crisis. This was so because Chile has regarded this principle as the fundamental norm of its foreign policy; any slight violation of non intervention has always brought strong protests from Chile ans. Moreover, it was not surprising that Chile reminded the
United Nations members that it would stand behind this principle and support any measure to defend it. In addition, the Government of Chile, through its representative,
reiterated its respect for the sovereignty of Cuba.
While it is true that there was much uncertainty
concerning the actual support the United States had given
the rebel forces during the invasion, it nevertheless seems
surprising that Chile was not more opposed to the United
States for at least having been associated with an act that
violated the basic norm of Chile's foreign policy. One of
Chile's guidelines in the application of the principles of
nonintervention has been strict juridical interpretation of
treaties and principles. On this occasion, in the writer's
view, Chile's policy was all but "strict" in interpretation. -12-
It has been suggested that Chile did not accuse the United
States of intervention because there were no facts that
legally conformed to its strict interpretation of the
principle of nonintervention. In Chile's view the necessary
"visible, clear, and undisputed acts" violating this principle were not committed by the United States.^
In addition to nonintervention, the principle of
pacific settlement of disputes was also emphasized here.
Chile believes that solution of a dispute must be the result
of law and political compromise, not force or military power.
Moreover, during this conflict Chile offered to render
assistance to solve the crisis; it stated publicly that it
would be ready to "collaborate in the search for pacific
settlement so that the problems that might surge among
American States will be solved...
The third principle that the Government of Chile
emphasized during this crisis was regionalism--which to
Chile means that all disputes or conflicts, with the exception
of those concerned with extra-continental nations, should be
solved through the GAS or through another regional procedure.
Since the Cuban invasion was concerned only with continental
countries, Chile--with six other nations--presented a res
olution on April 21 in the United Nations which urged that the
5qAS Coun d-l, Acta de la Sesion Extraordinaria, Febrero 4, 1964 (Washington:PAU), p. 24.
^E1 Mercurio, April 21, I96I, p. 1. -13-
Cuban dispute with the United States be solved through the
regional organization of Latin America, the OAS. In addition,
the resolution urged countries "to lend their assistance in
order to achieve a pacific solution.The resolution was
passed with a majority of votes in the General Assembly, in
spite of the opposition from the Soviet-bloc, spearheaded by
Cuba. At the same time that this resolution was being
considered in the world forum, Mexico presented a resolution
in the General Assembly calling for the suspension of all
military help to Cuba outside of the country. Specifically,
the Mexican resolution called on "all nations to be preoccupied
that their territories shall not be used to aid the civil Q war in Cuba." While Chile agreed with the strict inter
pretation of nonintervention as presented in this resolution,
it opposed the measure because the resolution did not mention
the OAS, the body to which Chile believes all regional disputes
should be taken.
Reaction by Political Parties and Groups
Significant to the evaluation of Chile's policy
toward the Cuban invasion is the consideration of reactions
of political parties and groups. The most important result of
the 1961 invasion was not the direct opposition to Chile's
7Ibid., p. 20.
^Ibid., April 22, p. 1. -14- policy but the debate it caused in the Chilean Government-- particularly in the Senate--and in a large segment of the populace. Although the debate was not of significant influence on Chile's foreign policy, it nevertheless created a modest internal opposition to the United States, most of which was verbal. The opposition generated against the
United States by leftist senators was not concerned, however, with the dubious role that the United States had had, rather it dealt exclusively with ideology, hoping to enhance the
Cuban model of government which Socialists and Communists in
Chile admired so much. Salvador Allende, leader of the
Popular Action Front (FRAP) and presidential candidate both in 1958 and 1964, for example, likened the invasion to the days of Roosevelt and his "Big-Stick Diplomacy. He also gave a lengthy tirade criticizing President Kennedy's speech delivered after the invasion--a speech in which Kennedy had set forth the idea that the United States would not tolerate subversive intervention in this hemisphere under the protec tion of the doctrine of nonintervention. Similarly, many other
FRAP senators joined Allende in denouncing the United States, yet none of them openly criticized Chile's policy of suspen sion of judgment.
In contrast to the extreme position taken by FRAP, some senators sought to defend not only Chile's policy but
^Ibld., April 20, p. 20 -15- the United States as well. One of these was Conservative
Francisco Bulnes Sanfuentes, who defended the United States as well as the rebel effort to overthrow Castro. Speaking for his party, Mr. Bulnes said:
In the Cuban regime there are no free elections, no legislative powers, no autonomous judicial power... As a result--the Conservative Party supports the reestablishment of liberty and democracy, to which the heroic and suffering Cuban nation has a legitimate right
A similar declaration was presented by the Liberal Party which defended Chile's foreign policy toward the cpisis as well as condemned the dictatorship of Castro for his failure H "to provide Cuba with freedom of government through elections."
Some leftists groups tried to pressure the government of Chile to oppose the United States by public protests, but these efforts had little success. The most significant attempted protest was the effort made by the Central Labor
Union (CUT), the large leftist labor union organization, which passed a resolution to bring a-halt to all labor activities.
The resolution, however, was never implemented. TheJ.ess radical labor organization of Chile, the National Confederation of Laborers (CNT), in opposition to the CUT resolution, issued a declaration supporting the policy of the Government of Chile, a portion of which stated: "The CNT does not pretend to under stand the complicated situation in Cuba, which is a problem
10Œbid.,; p. 23.
11 - 'Ibid., April 19, p. 21. -l6-
12 for the Cubans."
The only group to accomplish any major action was the Union of University Federations of Chile (UFUCh), a union that controls over 20,000 university students through out Chile. The UFUCh in protest to the policy of Chile brought a large portion of university activities to a close for two days. This move, however, was not surprising since it is not uncommon for class suspensions and strikes to occurr in universities in Chile.
In short, one wonders why Chile did not oppose the United States rather than follow a position of sus pension of judgment, particularly since the basic norm of
Chile's foreign policy is nonintervention. To the writer,
Chile's policy toward the invasion was not an evasion of
its responsibilities toward nonintervention but a ful fillment of them by interpreting the principle "strictly,"
in consonance with its traditional policies. Former Ambas
sador Manuel Trucco believes that Chile's policy was clearly
in consonance with its principles, although he readily admits
that the crisis was difficult to understand and evaluate, especially at the time of the actual invasion. In defending
Chile's policy, Mr. Trucco singles out three reasons for
Chile's policy of abstention of judgment: first, the invasion was a great surprise to Chile; secondly, facts concerning
the extent to which the United States aided the rebel forces
l^ibid., April 20, p. 6l. -17- were few; finally, there was some hope among a few Latin
Americans that Castro would fall.^3 Like other crises,
I during the Cuban invasion the Government of Chile pursued its foreign policy only on the basis of law and principles and disregarded all political opposition, forait was concerned with ideology, not principles. *
13 Interview with Mr. Manuel Trucco. QHAPTER II
CHILE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
The Cuban missile crisis began in the early part of
October I962 , when rumors began circulating that the Soviet
Union was equipping its Caribbean satellite with missiles
that could carry nuclear arms. On October 10 the United
States had its first evidence that something was wrong: planes had photographed roads being built through forests and had spotted Russian-made tents in various locations. Pour
days later. Navy fighter pilots collected more evidence with thousands of pictures that showed that Cuba, almost
overnight, had been transformed into a probable missile base. On October 15 more aerial photographs were taken that
established beyond any doubt that Soviet-built Migs with a capability of carrying nuclear warheads and missiles, also with a capability of carrying nuclear payloads, were being
installed in Cuban territory. Upon further analysis it was found that two types of missiles were being introduced :
one, a 1000-mile medium-range ballistic missile; the other,
a 2,000 mile intermedia te-range missile, which had to be
fired from a fixed position. Evidence proved that there were at least 40 medium-range missiles and a half-dozen
intermediate-range missiles already in Cuba.
While there was no conclusive evidence that nuclear
warheads had been provided to Cuba, United States military -19- analysts agreed that it made no military sense for the
Russians to put ballistic missiles into Cuba without also providing nuclear warheads. Both the missiles and the planes were classified by military specialists as "first strike weapons," useful in a surprise attack.
The United States waited one week before taking
action. On Monday, October 22, Congressional leaders who were scattered throughout the nation were brought back
to Washington and presented with facts of the crisis and
the blockade plan that the United States intended to use.
On this same day foreign diplomats were summoned to the
State Department where they were briefed about the action
that the United States was jus t about to take in response
to the missile build-up in Cuba. At the same time that
diplomats were informed, the United States Representative ! to the Council of the OAS addressed a note to the Council
Chairman reporting that the United States had received
conclusive evidence of the fact that offensive weapons had
been established in Cuba. He therefore requested that,
pursuant to Article Six of the Rio Treaty, the Organ of I Consultation be invoked immediately to consider the action
that should be taken for the common maintenance of peace and
security.^ In addition, the United States requested that the
^OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary General, I961 (Washington:PAU), p. 3- —20—
Council establish itself as soon as possible as the Provi
sional Organ of Consultation. Had the United States gone
ahead with its plans without invoking the Rio Treaty or presenting her plans to the OAS member states--as it did in
the Dominican Republic crisis--it is doubtful that the United
States would have received much support.
On the evening of October 22 President Kennedy,
speaking to the nation through radio and television, des
cribed the crisis in the following manner;
. . .within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that impris oned island... this secret, swift and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles., in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and Hemispheric policy...is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which can not be accepted by this country, if our courage _ and our commitments are ever to be trusted again.
In response to the problem created by the Soviet Union,
President Kennedy outlined several key steps to blockade
Cuba, the most important of which was the "quarantine."
Accordi^ng to this sanction, "all ships of any kind for Cuba
from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain
cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back..."3 a day and
a half after the proclamation of the blockade, the Navy inter
cepted an oil tanker but allowed it to pass uninspected
because the United States felt that oil was an item of
2qas, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance; Applications, l96C-l9b4 (Washington: PAU), p . l4g.
^Elie Abel, The Missiles of October: The Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Macgibbon & Kee, Ltd.], p. Il2. -21- necessity of life for Cuba. A few hours later two destroyers intercepted a Lebanese freighter which upon inspection was allowed to continue its journey to Cuba. At this same time a far more significant event occurred, however: the remain ing Soviet arms-carrying merchantment were heading back to the Soviet Union. Krushchev had decided not to collide with the United States Navy.
Chile's Policy Toward the Missile Crisis
In contrast to the uncertain and non-committal policy toward the Cuban invasion, Chile's policy in the missile crisis was clear, straightforward, in support of the United States. The first evidence of Chile's support toward the United States came a day after the United States presented a resolution to the Council of the OAS, invoking the Organ of Consultation, in accordance with the Rio
Treaty. Chile, with eighteen other countries, voted in support of the resolution--a unanimous vote that even surprised Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The vote in sup port of the resolution--while unanimous--was nonetheless significant to Chile.
Chile's position on the United States resolution was important for two reasons: first, because it was in consonance with Chile's interpretation of the Rio Treaty, and secondly, because it was consistent with Chile's tra dition of strict juridical interpretation of treaties. Chile believes that the Rio Treaty is the "penal code" of Latin -22-
America, the instrument to be used as last resort in a
regional conflict. In the words of one Chilean diplomat:
"the purpose of the Rio Treaty is to deal only with 'Pearl
Harbor' type of conflicts where there is no doubt as to what
aggression is."^ Situations where facts are ambigious, where
there is uncertainty, where an investigation is necessary,
in Chile's view, do not warrant the application of the Rio
Treaty. Therefore, when Chile voted in support of the United
States resolution, it did so because it believed that evidence
of aggression was clear and certain.
In addition, Chile voted for the application of the Rio
Treaty because it conformed to one of the cornerstones of
Chilean foreign policy, namely, the strict Juridical inter
pretation of treaties. Law, according to Chilean dip'lomats,
is the basis of the inter-American system and of representative
democracy, and peace in the Hemisphere will come only be
strict juridical compliance with treaties and agreements
that bind the American community. Mr. Trucco made this clear
before the OAS Council, in reference to this crisis :
Chile, like the other Republics of the Hemisphere, has signed these pacts (the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty) and has adhered to them in its international conduct. Our country's permanent attitude has been a logical result, not only of our democratic tradition of adherence to legal rules and of respect for the principles inter national law, but also it has grown out of the conviction that it is only by means of faithful compliance with these treaties and principles that a harmonious develop ment of the American community can be achieved, with resulting security, solidarity, social and cultural
^Interview with Mr. Manuel Trucco, former Ambassador from Chile to the OAS. -23-
progressj and improvement of the political standards that lead to an effective representative democracy.^
Consequently, Chile believes that treaties are to be kept
(pacta sunt servanda) and that juridical interpretation must be rigid and strict, in consonance with the tradition of civil law.^ Application of treaties and charters must conform to the exact specific conditions in order for application to be lawful. This narrow juridical interpretation of treaties has often led Chile to appose the use of the Rio
Treaty, particularly when the -situation of "aggression" was doubtful, such as during the crisis at the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers. On this occasion, however, Chile-- not surprisingly--voted for application of the Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance.
The second evidence of Chile's support for the United
States was its vote supporting the DAS Council resolution of
October 24, which called for immediate action by member states to deal with the crisis and for withdrawal of missiles from
Cuba. Specifically, the Council, acting provisionally as
Organ of Consultation, resolved;
1)to call for the immediate dismanteling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability; /
2)to recommend that the member States, in accordance with articles 6 and 7 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Govern-
^Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Precencia Inter- nacional de Chile (Santiago: Ministerio de R. E. ), p . 30. ^Contrary to the practice of common law in the United States, Latin America follows the practice of civil law; the principle of stare decisis has no place in their system. -24-
ment of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino- Soviet powers military materiel and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent.'
It would be inaccurate to suggest that this vote was part of an effort to remove the ideology of Communism from
Latin America, particularly Cuba. Ideological considerations have had, if any, only a minimal amount of influence in policy formation in Chile since 196I. During the Bay of
Pigs invasion, for example, the Chilean Chancery completely
ignored internal ideological criticisms of the United States
and was concerned only with the possibility of intervention
by the United States. Similarly, at the Eighth Meeting of
Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este in 19^2, Chile refused to
give support to any resolution that opposed Cuba strictly
on the basis of ideology. In 1964 during the Panama-
United States crisis it was again evident that law rather
ideology was the guideline in Chilean policy formation.
The issue at stake in the Missile crisis was not the
Cuban revolution or the infiltration of an opposing ideology
but the simple fact that a foreign extra-continental
country had intervened in Cuba, and by establishing nuclear
armaments (or by the possibility of their establishment)
now posed a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere
Chile's singular concern with armaments is evident by the
following statement made before the Security Council;
Cuba has been intervened by an extra-continental power.
^Annual Report, op. cit., p. 4 -25-
Chile'S quarrel with this extra-continental Power is that it was not concerned with fundamental structural changes that impede social justice hut with introducting weapons for its own sake. If a country was concerned only with social and economic transformations, indus trialization and a higher standard of living, this extra-continental power would have sent only experts in the various development fields and not used Cuba as a springboard for dominion."^
Moreover, Chile opposed the Soviet Union bitterly throughout
the crisis.
Chile's opposition to the Soviet Union was twofold : first, Chile believed that the principle of nonintervetion.
and its corollary, auto-determination, had been violated by
the extra-continental power. Secondly, Chile believed that
the introduction of missiles and planes capable of carrying
nuclear warheads seriously endangered the peace of Latin
America. In addition, Chile opposed the Soviet Union for
specifically violating Chile's plans of disarmament. Only
a few days before the Cuban crisis, Chile had expressed its
position about nuclear arms in the First Committee on Nuclear
Arms of the General Assembly. Chile expressed its view this
way:
If these efforts (opposition to nuclear tests) do not bring results, Chile believes that, as a transitory and partial measure, it would be necessary to establish de-nuclearized zones in the world, and it believes that Latin America ought to be one of those zones. Our countries would obligate themselves, not only to refuse to acquire nuclear arms, but also to refuse them even if they were offered.°
O Precencia Internacional, op. cit., p . 33,
9lbid., p. 35. -26-
Not surprisingly, sometime after these words were spoken, Chile presented a joint resolution with Brazil in the General
Assembly that urged that Latin America be made a denuclearized zone. The proposal, while not aimed at Cuba, was timely and had significant influence in determining the future of the military bases in Cuba.
In addition to the factors above, Chilean opposition to the Soviet bloc may have also been influenced indirectly by the dispute between Cuba and Chile that occurred two weeks before the missile crisis. The dispute began on October 9 when the Cuban Embassy in Chile received a large shipment of goods from Cuba to be used only in the embassy. Upon inves tigation it was found that much of the materials received on the above date were Communist propaganda material to be used to influence people outside of the diplomatic circle. The
Chilean Government considered that such a move by Cuba was illegal, deceptive, and endangered its national security; as a result, many Government officials were anxious to break relations with Cuba. After further consultation Chile decided to present an "energetic" protest against the Cuban move, so that diplomatic channels could still remain open. While the incident is insignificant and while it bears no direct relevance to the missile crisis, Chilean opposition to the Soviet bloc was undoubtedly affected by this dipsute.
Reaction by Political Parties and Groups
Opposition to Chile's policy from politi cal parties and -27- groups during this crisis was insignificant. Admittedly, leftist parties opposed the United States and Chile verbally, but active opposition, as in the Dominican crisis, was non existent here. In general, it may be said that the majority of political organizations supported Chile's policy toward the missile crisis.
This crisis, like the Cuban invasion and the Panama-
United States dispute, provided an opportunity for leftist politicians to criticize the United States Senator Salvador
Allende, for example, in a speech before the Senate on October
23 criticized the history of the United States interventions in Central America, yet failed to deal with the clandestine establishment of missiles in Cuban, the cause of the crisis
(and for his speechi). A more pertinent and cogent criticism of the United States came from FRAP senator Salomon Corvalan, who accused the United States of an illegal naval blockade.
In Corvalan's opinion the blockade was not a means to settle a dispute as outline in the United Nations or the OAS.^^ One of the most realistic appraisals by a Chilean political party was the position taken by the Chrisitan Democratic Party (PDC).
The PDC denounced the quarantine and the naval blockade on the basis that it inspired military power and thus created a precarious balance in international relations. It also
denounced the blockade on the basis that it exceeded the
legal norms established by the Inter-American system and the
United Nations. The PDC, however, admitted that the installation
l^El Mercurio, October 26, 1962. -28- of military bases clearly violated the security defined by the Rio Treaty, and therefore collective action by Latin American nations to prevent its establishment was legitimate.
In conclusion, while leftist parties used this crisis to criticize Chile's policy as well as that of the United States,
Chile's policy remained immune from these criticisms and pursued a policy based on law. As in other crises, Chile's policy was the direct result of rigid adherence to principles, not pragmatic adaptation to internal pressures. CHAPTER III
CHILE AND THE CRISIS AT THE EIGHTH MEETING OP FOREIGN MINISTERS
Since the birth of the Organization of American States there has been no conflict in the hemisphere like that pro duced by the clandestine intervention of Communism through the efforts of Fidel Castro. Soon after the ascent of Castro in 1959, Cuba became the headquarters for the preparation and launching of subversive expeditionary movements through out Latin America. While a few countries opposed Castro's ideals and ideological efforts, some hailed his moves as part of an indigenous social revolution throughout the continent. What impressed many young political leaders was not so much Castro's ideology, however, but the rapidity with which he had taken control and begun programs of social reform in his country and the forecefulness with which he challenged the United States.
As early as March 1959, the United States began to doubt Castro's promises for a democratic government. Inevit ably, its patience wore thin, not only because of ideological differences but because of Castro's undermining of the Inter-
American system by disavowing obligations to the Rio Treaty.
Castro's unfriendly and dangerous policies finally led the- ■
United States to cancel its import sugar quota, the basis of
Cuba's economy. In January 196I, when Cuba informed the -30-
United States that It would be necessary for it to reduce its embassy staff, the United States retaliated by breaking relations. (By this time several Central American nations had already ruptured relations.)
Despite threats from the United States and several
Latin American countries, Cuba continued to export subversive movements designed to overthrow legitimate governments. In
order to deal with these threats the OAS Council decided that
time had come to deal with the Cuban problem. The Council
voted to convene a meeting a foreign ministers in August, 196I
at San Jose, Costa Rica to deal with the threat of Communist penetration in Cuba. This meeting was not called under the
Rio Treaty but under Articles 39 and 40 of the OAS Charter.
Here at the meeting Latin American nations were prepared to
condemn Castro's ideology--Communism--but not his country.
In November, i960, the continent witnessed new eruptions
of violence in Central America, with accusations directed
against Castro's Cuba as the trouble maker. The three nations
that were victims of Castro's subversive efforts were Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Still there was no agree
ment that Castro was violating the non-intervention principle
of the inter-American system. Even after Castro confessed
in a public address that he had all along bee a Marxist-
Leninist, there was little unanimity in condemning Castro's
regime. But the time had come for more action— for another
meeting of foreign ministers.
In October, 1961, Peru requested a meeting of the Organ
of Consultation because of violations of human rights by the -31-
Cub an Government. The Council of the OAS did not accept the Peruvian request but instead resolved to use the Inter-
American Peace Committee to deal with the facts denounced by Peru. On November l4, the Council took cognizance of a more cautious request by Colombia. Colombia's note asked that the foreign ministers meet, in accordance with Article
Six of the Rio Treaty, to
consider threats to peace and to the political indepen dence of the American states that might arise from the intervention of extra-continental powers directed toward making American solidarity and particularly to; a) point out the various types of threats to the peace or certain acts that, if they occur, justify the applica tion of measures for the maintenance of the peace and security...b) determine measures that are advisable to take for the i^aintenance of the peace and security of the hemisphere.
On December 4, the Council approved this resolution by a bare majority and the meeting was convoked at Punta del
Este, Uruguay in January of the following year.
At Punta del Este, as in the Seventh Meeting of Foreign
Ministers in San Jose, Latin Americans were unified in repudiat ing Communism and extra-continental intervention but were split in their condemnation of Cuba. By a bare majority of two- thirds which the Rio Treaty requires, the Foreign Ministers voted to exclude the Cuban Government from participation of the Inter-American system. The failure of six countries--
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico--to accompany the United States demands for tougher action against the Cuban regime may be attributed to doubts concerning the
OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary General, I962 (Washington: PAU),' p. 2. -32- legality of Cuba's exclusion and to an alarm over possible internal political repercussions which could increase domestic problems. In spite of the opposition by these six countries representing nearly two-thirds of the population in Latin
America, on February l4, 1962, Cuba was officially ousted from the Council and the other organs of the OAS.
Chile's Policy Toward the Crisis
The impact of the Cuban revolution and subsequent subversive efforts in Latin America seems to have had little,
if at all any, effect on Chile's foreign policy during the
196I-I965 period. About the only significant impact in Chile was the effect of the Cuban revolution on leftist political parties and groups, united under the leadership of the
Popular Action Front (FRAP). Here the Cuban revolution left
a strong imprint on political leadership as well as on
university students. It was not, however, the doctrine
of revolution by a combination of guerilla warfare and urban
terrorism that appealed to the Chilean leftist groups. What
fascinated them were the developments after Castro's advent
to power : "the rapid socialization of the Cuban economy,
Cuban defiance of the United States, and the political, military
and economic support of the revolutionary regime by the Soviet
Union.Despite the strong admiration for Cuba by the left,
the Chilean Government during the crisis that led to the Eighth
Ernest Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile (Boston: MIT Press), p. 231. -33-
Meeting of Foreign Ministers maintained a policy of consistency with principles already estalbished. Never for a moment did Chile consider to sacrifice any of its fixed guidelines in order to deal with the Cuban Communist threat.
Chile's policy toward the Cuban threat was outlined in
August, i960, at the Sixth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in
San Jose, Costa Rica. At this meeting, which had been called to deal with the threats of the Dominican Republic to the territorial integrity of several Caribbean nations, Chile's
Foreign Minister, Enrique Ortuzar, outlined two methods by which the inter-American system could be perfected in order to cope with extra-continental intervention. These two methods were: first, perfection of the inter-American legal system and, secondly, development of the standard of living.
A week later, at the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers,
Chile in an effort to strengthen the legal system recommended
that all American states accept as binding obligation ipso facto the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
in juridical disputes that dealt with the following four
areas: 1 ) interpretation of treaties; 2 ) questions on inter national law; 3 ) matters of fact relating to international
obligations, and 4) cnanges or reparations for breaking
international agreements. 3 Emphasis on economic development
was also given at this meeting and is evident by the words
of the Foreign Minister of Chile: "We are convinced that the
immense restlessness in the Latin American nations is rooted
^Septima Reunion de Consulta, Actas y Documentos (Washington: PAU), p. 24. -34- in the desequilibrium between its legitimate aspirations and the scarce economic resources to satisfy these desires."^
A year later at Punta del Este, the Chilean Government gave concrete support to economic development by supporting the
Alliance for Progress. These two methods outlined above-- the legal and the economic--provided the basis for Chile’s policy during this crisis because of Chile's belief that had the inter-American system been perfected legally and economically the present Cuban crisis would not have occurred.
The first evidence of Chile's legalism at the Eighth
Meeting of Foreign Ministers was its failure to support the
Colombian resolution calling for a meeting of foreign ministers in accordance with Article Six of the Rio Treaty. As has been noted already, Chile's principle of strict juridical interpretation of treaties has led Chile to oppose the use of the Rio Treaty whenever there was uncertainty about "ag gression." On this occasion Chile, believing that the facts of the crisis did not conform legally to the Rio Treaty, abstained from voting on the Colombian resolution. Chile was joined by Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador, while
Cuba and Mexico voted in the negative.
A further evidence of Chile's legalism during the Eighth
Meeting of Foreign Ministers was Chile's pattern in voting at the meeting. Perhaps the most important resolution of this
^Ibid., p. 126. -35- meetlng was Resolution VIII, which declared;
1)that the adherence by any member of the OAS to Marxism-Leninsim was incompatible with the inter- American system and the alignment of such a govern ment with the Communist block would break the unity solidarity of the hemisphere;
2)that the Government of Cuba, which officially identi fied itself with a Marxist-Leninist Government was in compatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system.
3)that this incompatibility excluded the present Govern ment of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system.5
Chile, with eighteen countries, voted in support of the first part of the resolution which declared the Communist regime in Cuba as "incompatible." Chile and five other countries--
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador--however, parted company with the United States and thirteen other coun tries on the third part of this resolution by voting against it. Chile believed that since there were no legal provisions in the OAS Charter for expulsion of member states, to support
Cuba's expulsion would be contrary to her strict legal tradi tion.^ Moreover, Chile, in consonance with its principle of strict juridical interpretation of treaties, opposed Cuba's expulsion. In spite of opposition from six nations, the measure was supported by fourteen nations, enough to enforce the resolution.
Since Chile refused to deal with Communism through
5OAS, op. cit., p. 2.
^It can be argued that since there are no legal provisions for admission or expulsion of members in the OAS Charter that Chile's vote had little juridical basis. -36- juridical procedures, what then was its answer to the problem that had brought the foreign ministers together? Chile's answer, according to Mr. Carlos Martinez Sotomayor, Foreign
Minister from Chile, was economic, not legal or ideological.
According to the Foreign Minister, the reason for Communism
in Latin America was that nations had not dealt with the root of the problem, which was misery and inequality. Communism had exploited the weaknesses and social desequilibriums and had caused hemispheric tensions serious enough to warrant a meeting of foreign ministers. The real threat to democracy,
in Chile's view, was not Communism but poverty and low standards
of living. Speaking before the Punta del Este Conference
Mr. Sotomayor declared:
Nothing would do more to further the anti-democratic cause than limiting ourselves to the application of sanctions against one nation or another merely because it resolved to live on the margin of our scale of values, if we have not been capable of demonstrating before hand that the solidarity that binds us together can be transformed by free nations into a truly revolutionary effort in the economic and social field.'
Moreover, Chile's answer to the crisis was not to adopt
coercive measures such as sanctions but to improve the low
economic condition, which in its view was the cause of the
crisis. The solution to the conflict is best described in
Mr. Sotomayor's words:
We believe that if the other Latin American nations, which make up nearly the whole of the area and population of this part of the Hemisphere, mobilize both their natural resources and their economic and financial re sources to work exclusively for an immediate improvement
7e 1 Mercurio, July 26, 1964, p. 43. -37-
in the standard of living of their peoples, they will be able to meet successfully any threat that may arise from the fact that a government forming part of the regional system has declared itself Marxist-Leninist... We should not allow our attention to be occupied unduly by the spectacle of a revolutionary process which does not coincide with the principles and norms of our system. On the contrary, we should convince ourselves that the only possible defense against any ideological threat from within or without the Hemisphere consists in showing the people of Latin America that prosperity can be achieved within a free society— now, and not in an indefined future.°
Consequently, Chile opposed any efforts to apply economic sanctions.to Cuba. Its leadership at the Punta del Este
Meeting in opposing sanctions resulted in limited action for the foreign ministers: only a resolution suspending the trade of arms and war materials and a watered-down measure calling on the OAS Council to study the feasibility and desirability of extending suspension of trade to other items other than war materials were passed.
Reactions by Political Parties and Groups
In contrast to other crises, Chile's policy during the
Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers caused little opposition from political parties and groups. Leftist groups, such as the university federation (UPUCh) or the labor organizations
(CUT and CNT) were all but active during this crisis; only the Communist Party considered the crisis important enough to issue a declaration criticizing Chile's policy and the United
States. For the most part, political parties supported the
Sibid., p . 1, -38-
Government ' s position of strict legalism. The Christian
Democratic Party, for example, supported Chile's expulsion from the inter-American system. The PDC, however, made it clear that it did not support Cuba in any way but rather desired to defend the basis of the inter-American system which had been undermined by the application of illegal measures on other occasions. On this occasion the PDC praised government leaders for Chile's position of "legalism."
In summation, during the Eighth Meeting of Foreign
Ministers Chile followed a policy that was consistent with its policy of strict juridical interpretation of treaties.
At this meeting Chile introduced a new emphasis in its foreign policy by dealing with economic development. Chile's policy received wide support because it followed a juridical, albeit independent, path. CHAPTER IV
CHILE AND THE CRISIS AT THE NINTH MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
During the period following the Eighth Meeting of
Foreign Ministers, Cuba's relations with the United States and Latin America deteriorated. Relations between Latin
American nations and Cuba were such that by January 1964 all members of the OAS had broken relations with it with the exception of Bolivia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Chile. Cuban relations with the United States had deteriorated so far that the United States had placed a near absolute embargo on Cuba, except for essential medical and food supplies.
This move remained almost a unilateral act, since no measures had been taken at the Eighth Meeting ordering a general trade embargo. Nevertheless, trading with Cuba declined considerably in the period following January 1962.
One of the important results of the Punta del Este
Meeting was the setting up of the Inter-American Security
Committee, designed to study Communist subversion in the hemisphere. In its first report on February 12, I963, the Committee declared that many types of destructive weapons were being smuggled from Cuba to communist groups in various
Latin American nations, and that through the use of these weapons such elements were carrying on terrorist activities designed to overthrow legitimate governments. One country -4o- where subversive elements had worked effectively, according to the report, was in Venezuela. On November,-1962, govern ment authorities discovered on the coast of Venezuela was materiel, which upon investigation was identified as coming from Cuba. The report further pointed out that throughout the month of January, 1963, the Havana Radio had sent calls for revolution in Venezuela and broadcast instructions to communist guerillas and urban terrorists in that country on how to use the weapons and funds sent from Havana to
Venezuela. The report also suggested that unless Brazil,
Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay broke relations with
Cuba the job of curbing subversive activities would be
impossible.^
As a result of the above-mentioned and other efforts of terrorism that followed, Venezuela on November, 1963,
sent a request that the Rio Treaty be invoked "to consider
the measures that should be taken to deal with acts of
intervention and aggressions affecting the integrity and p sovereignty of Venezuela." On December 3 , 1963, the Council
of the OAS adopted a resolution to convoke a meeting of foreign ministers, and at the same time established an
investigating committee to study the acts denounced by
Venezuela. The committee presented a report two months later
^Ann Van Thomas and Wynen Thomas. The Organization' 1 of American States (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press), p. 370.
^OAS, Report of the Secretary General, I963 (Washington; PAU), p. 1. -4l- and on the basis of this study the foreign ministers met in Washington from July 21 to July 26, 1964.
Chile's Policy Toward the Crisis
Chile's policy toward the Ninth Meeting of Foreign
Ministers was similar in many ways to its position at the
Punta del Este Meeting two years earlier: Chile refused to deal directly with the intervention of Communism into Cuba.
In consistency with its principles of foreign policy, Chile followed a narrow individualistic policy based on the princi ples of strict juridical interpretation of treaties and agreements, as it had done at the Eighth Meeting. Chile's policy during this conflict,, however, was the least consistent during the I96I-I965 period.
In the period between January, I962, when the foreign ministers met at Punta del Este, and July, 1964, when the foreign ministers met in Washington, Chile continued its policy of legalism toward the Communist threat from Cuba.
One incident that best describes Chile's consistency is its refusal to support a ban on travel to Cuba. In July, 1963,
the Inter-American Security Committee, which was created at Punta del Este, sent a report to the Council of the OAS urging hemisphere governments to curb pro-Communist sub version and propaganda by international pro-Communist meet
ings, barring the movement of funds and people to Cuba and
the establishment of closer links among hemisphere security
organs.
3n c w York Times, July l4, 1963* -42-
Thls report was adopted by fourteen nations, while
Chile, the only country to do so, voted against it. Chile's vote was not due to any support for Castro but to juridical and technical differences. According to Ambassador Trueco, the Committee did not have any authority to issue recommenda tions to the Council In establishing the group in January,
1962, the foreign ministers had specified that it could make recommendations only to governments that requested them.
Therefore, Chile believed that to support any recommendations of the Committee which it had not requested was both illegal and injurious to the inter-American system. Furthermore,
Chile opposed the report on the grounds that it might violate two principles of Chile's foreign policy, namely human rights and non-intervention.
Chile's record of consistency in the strict juridical application of the Rio Treaty was clouded in
December, 1963, by its dubious vote in support of the Vene zuelan resolution calling for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers, in accordance with Article Six of the Rio Treaty.^ When the resolution was presented to the OAS Council on December
3, Chile voted for the measure. To the writer, as well as to others, Chile's vote on this occasion was dubious because the facts representing Cuban "aggression" against Venezuela
^In an interview, Mr. Trucco, who voted for the resolution, admitted candidly that personally he would have opposed the resolution. According to him, his vote was the result of a compromise in an effort to solve the present conflict. -43- were not "visible, clear, and undisputed" as Chile had demanded that they be on past o c c a s i o n s . ^ Chile defended its vote on three grounds: 1 )in the light of the circumstan ces, the Rio Treaty was correctly invoked; 2) Venezuela did not demand a pronouncement of the crisis in depth, rather it designated a Committee of the Council to analyze and study the incident; 3) the resolution establishing the Committee gave the right to investigate onlyMost importantly,
Chile voted for the resolution because, in its judgment, an investigation could not be verified by the Council with out undertaking responsibilities it did not possess."^
Even if it be admitted that Chile's vote was incon
sistent, its dubious policy did not last long. On June 10,
1964, the OAS Ambassador from Chile refused to support a
resolution requesting that a definite date and place be
set for the Meeting of Consultation, already convoked on
December 3 , 1963. Chile's refusal to vote for the resolution was due to its belief that the measures under Article E'ight
of the Rio Treaty were inadequate to deal with the crisis at
hand. In spite of Chile's negative vote, the Meeting of
Foreign Ministers was convoked in Washington, D. C. in July, 1964. The foreign ministers met on July 21 and after several
days of deliberation and discussion, the Council of the OAS,
acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, presented the
5 q A S , Acta de la Sesion Extraordinaria, February 4 , 1964, p . 27 .
^Ibid., December 3 , 1 9 6 3 , P* 2 4 .
7 l b i d . -44- following resolution;
1) to declare that the acts verified by the investi gating committee constitute an aggression and an inter vention on the part of the Government of Cuba in the internal affairs of Venezuela, which affects all-the other member states;
2) to condemn energetically the present Government of Cuba for its acts of aggression and of intervention against the territorial inviolability, the sovereignty and the political independence of Venezuela;
3) to apply, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance the following measures: a) the governments of the American states shall not maintain diplomatic relations with the Government of Cuba; b) the governments of the American states shall suspend all trade, whether direct or indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, medical equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons. c) the governments of the American states shall suspend all sea transportation between their countries and Cuba, except for such transportation as may be neces sary for reasons of a humanitarian nature.°
The delegation of Chile in the OAS abstained from voting on the first two paragraphs of this resolution because of its doubts regarding the use of the term "aggression" in describing the acts of Cuba. Secondly, it voted against the third paragraph because it was convinced that the measures agreed to were not appropriate to the particular case that had brought about the application of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.^ According to
Foreign Minister Julio Philippi, the reason for the Ninth
®New York Times, July 26, 1964, pp. 241-242.
^Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Ap plications, I96O-I964 (Washington: PAU), p. I88. -45-
Meeting was not to deal with "urgent matters and common concern" (Art. 39 of the OAS Charter) nor to deal, as it happened at Punta del Este, with the "threats to peace and political independence of the American states that could come as a result of intervention of extra-continental powers."
The Meeting was called strictly to deal with Cuba's sub versive acts against Venezuela, not with Communist action in the continent.
The writer, however, does not believe--as Mr. Philippi did--that the Meeting of Foreign Ministers had over-stepped its legal boundaries by calling for a rupture of relations.
The major conflict was this; Had Cuba committed "aggression?"
In the view of all but four nations (Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Bolivia) Cuba committed aggression against Venezuela, therefore a resolution calling for a break in relations under Article Eight of the Rio Treaty was legal. Chile's opposition to the application of Article Eight stemmed from
the fact that it did not believe actual aggression had been committed; moreover, any collective action under the Rio
Treaty was illegal. Another factor, besides legal technical
ities, that led Chile to oppose sanctions was its belief
that the rupture of relations would alienate not only the people but make Castro's return to the democratic camp more
difficult, if not impossible.
Despite the fact that Chile opposed the resolution to
^^El Mercurio, July 26, 1964, p. 43. -46-
break relations with Cuba and that it considered the sanctions as "inconvenient and inadequate," the President of Chile,
Mr. Jorge Alessandri, three weeks after the OAS decision had been approved, terminated relations with Cuba. The President's decision was made in the light of threats from the left that might bring violence throughout the country, and more significantly, only a few weeks away from the Presidential elections.
There is no doubt that it would have been easier for
President Alessandri to wait and let the newly elected
President decide Chile's policy toward Cuba. For President
Alessandri, however, Chile's basic principles of "faithful and exact compliance of treaties and respect for agreements adopted democratically by the necessary majorities" were at stake.The failure of Chile, in the President's eyes^ to abide by the recent resolution would imply an important precedent and would mean sooner or later, the withdrawal of
Chile from the inter-American juridical system. Moreover,
Chile--however painfully--broke relations on August 11, 1964.
Chile's compliance with the OAS resolution was in direct accordance with the principle of the Rio Treaty which makes resolutions by necessary quorums obligatory, even for nations who voted in opposition to them. Thus here again Chile acted
in accordance with its principle of strict legalism.
11 Ibid., August 12, 1964, p. 1. -47-
Reactlons by Political Parties and Groups
Chile's rupture of relations with Cuba was most
significant in the light of the fact that both leading presidential candidates for the elections that were held
in September were in favor of continuing realtions with
Cuba. Both Eduardo Frei, candidate of the Christian
Democratic Party, and Salvador Allende, candidate of the
Popular Action Front (FRAP), contended that despite ideologi
cal differences with Cuba, Chile should maintain relations.
According to Allende, FRAP had always supported diplomatic,
commercial, and cultural relations with all countries in the
past^ and it was logical for it to continue a similar policy
in this crisis by opposing the rupture of relations. In
addition to public statements, the FRAP issued a declaration
in which it expressed several reasons for the invalidity of
the sanctions. Two principal reasons for its opposition 12 were : the disregard for Article 16 of the OAS Charter
and the adoption pf a measure in violation of Article 52
of the United Nations Charter because of its disregard given
to the Security C o u n c i l .^3 Speaking for the Christian
Democratic Party and for candidate Frei, Senator Rodomiro
Tomic said that the diplomatic and economic measures
approved in Washington were a "juridical crime and a political
stupidity. Like the FRAP, Mr. Tomic opposed the sanctions
1 p Article 16--N0 State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind. ^3jbid., August 1 3 , 1964, p. 21. -48- because they violated Article l6. Whilë Mr. Tomic was quick to urge that relations be continued with Cuba, he did not deal with the complex problem of the legality of not adopt ing the OAS resolution--a problem which had led Alessandri
to break realtions.
Perhaps the most indicative sign of Chile's opposition
to the sanctions was a public poll taken by Professor Eduardo
Hamuy Berr of the University of Chile shortly after the
Ninth Meeting of Foreign Ministers. In answer to the question
"what do you believe ought to be the attitude of Chile
toward Cuba?" Dr. Hamuy found that five percent of those inter viewed favored broadening relations, 57 percent favored
continuing diplomatic relations, and only 10 percent favored
a rupture of relations. It might seem from'these results
that the Chilean public was favorable to Cuba. This idea
did not follow, however. When Professor Hamuy asked the
public what opinion they had of the Cuban revolution only
15 percent replied with a favorable opinion, while 63 percent
with an unfavorable one. Twenty-two percent of the inter
viewees held undefined positions.
While there was a plethora of opposition to the sanctions
adopted at the Washington Conference by leftist political
parties and groups in Chile, few dealt with the complex
problem of Chile's legal responsibility to adopt the measure
calling for santions after it had been accepted by the
l^New York Times, July 27, 1964, p. 7-
^^EI Mercurio, August 12, 1964, p. 27. -49-
necessary two-thirds majority. To oppose President
Alessandri's policy would have been to oppose the basis of
Chile's foreign policy. As a result, in the Senate-- as in the Chamber of Deputies--there was wide agreement that Chile should adopt the Washington sanctions. The
President of the Senate, for example, noted that Chile's acceptance of sanctions was the national derivation of the fundamental philosophy of Chile--the sanctity of treaties.
Another important statesman, Mr. Isauro Torres, President of the Senate Commission on Foreign Relations, stated that he believed it was Chile's obligation to follow the Washington 17 resolution because of Chile's ratification of the Rio Treaty.
In conclusion, Chile during this conflict maintained a consistent legal position. While the Government of Chile refused to support sanctions at the Washington meeting, it adopted them later because of Chile's established principle of the sanctity of treaties. Whether or not the Christian
Democratic Party will establish relations in the future with
Cuba--perhaps against an aspect of its legal tradition-- is not certain. Thus far, Chile has maintained a narrow juridical approach toward the issue of relations with Cuba.
l^Ibid., p. 31.
l?Ibid. CHAPTER V
CHILE AND THE PANAMA-UNITED STATES CRISIS
The hemispheric crisis between Panama and the United
States had its beginning in an insignificant issue concerning flags. The flag issue was not new at the time of the crisis but had been a bitter dispute for some time. So high had feelings been that the United States Governor, Major
General Robert Fleming, Sr., had decided to fly both the
Panama and United States flags at selected locations in the zone.
Conflict began when the United States high school students raised their flag in a United States school in
Balboa on January 8, 1964. While this act was insigni ficant, the issue raised the emotions and passions of Pana manians. As a result, a large group of students from Panama arrived at Balboa with their flag in protest of the unilateral dct by the United States. In order to avoid conflict, the students were dispersed and sent back to their own ter ritory. They returned peacefully but the issue became more serious when this small group of students was Joined by older men prepared with rifles and Molotov cocktails. A cry went out that the Panamanian flag had been trampled by Americans while they were in the Zone--and this plunged the incident
into an hemispheric crisis. -51-
Sniper fighting broke out immediately along the border causing the death of thirty-six and wounding at least eighty- five others. President Robert Chiari in a radio message claimed that there had been at least three-hundred casualties, and blamed the United States for all of them. In addition,
Chiari charged the United States with "unprovoked armed attack," announced to the OAS that he was breaking relations with the United States and demanded an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, where Panama's re presentative later accused the United States of "bloody aggression."^ The Government of Panama, furthermore, requested that the OAS Council meet immediately and that it send a group to study the critical situation. The following day the inter-American Peace Committee arrived in Panama, at the request of both the United States and Panama. The Com mittee consisted of five members, one of whom was Mr.
Manuel Trucco, Chairman of the Committee and Vice-President of the OAS Council. Mr. Trucco had been appointed by the
Council of the OAS to replace the representative from the
United States because it was a party to the conflict.
On January 15j the Peace Committee reached an agreement between Panama and the United States. In accordance with this agreement, the two countries agreed to resume relations and--thirty days after diplomatic relations had been established-
; to undertake formal "discussions" through representatives without limitations on all questions of any nature existing
^"Crisis Over the Canal," Time, January 17, 1964, p. 36 . -52-
p or affecting relations between Panama and the United States.
A day later, under internal political pressure. President
Chiari of Panama sent a demand that the United States give public assurances that it would revise the I903 Treaty, which gives perpetual right to the United States to own the Canal
Zone. This demand came as a result of the agreement signed the day before through the efforts of the Peace Committee, by which the United States had agreed to "discuss" differences with Panama.
At this point the nature of the crisis changed. Up until
January I6 the Panama-United States crisis was concerned chiefly with the flag incident. But now the conflict dealt with a new, unrelated issue--the revision of the 1903 Treaty.
The new conflict was the result of a problem of semantics
in the Committee agreement. The problem concerned the inter pretation of a single verb in reference to the 1903 Treaty. In
the English version of the agreement the verb read "discuss;"
the Spanish-language version read "negociar," a verb with 3 a wider meaning. According to Chiari's interpretation, the
United State^ had agreed to a revision of the 1903 Treaty by
this agreement. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, however, insisted
that the United States had made no pledge to revise the treaty,
only to discuss matters of conflict. When the United States
refused to accept Panama's public demands, Panama broke
^New York Times, January 16, 1964, p. l4.
^Time, January 24, 1964, p. 30. -53-
diplomatic relations completely, and all efforts of the Inter-
American Peace Committee came to a halt.
On January 29^ Panama's representative of the Council
of the OAS requested that the Organ of Consulation be
invoked, in accordance with Articles 6 and 9 of the Rio
Treaty in order to take cognizance of the "acts of aggression
against Panama. On February 4, at a special Meeting of the
Council member states accepted to convoke the Organ. At this
same meeting, both the United States and Panama expressed a
desire that the tragic events occurred on January 9 and 10
be fully investigated. Moreover, the Council, acting pro
visionally as Organ of Consultation, resolved:
a) to urge both governments to abstain from committing any acts that might result in violating the peace in Panama. b) to establish a general committee composed of all the members of the Council...with the exception of the Representatives of the parties in conflict.^
In addition, the general committee had the power to investigate
the acts that occurred in Panama on January 9 and 10 and there
after and submit a report to the Organ of Consultation on.
the efforts exerted by the governments of the United States
and Panama during subsequent days to find a solution to the
dispute. The general committee began investigation in
Panama the following day after its creation, but it was several
weeks before it was able to reestablish mutual understanding
between Panama and the United States.
^OAS, Annual Report of the Secretary General(Washington: PAU), p. 6W. 5o a S Council, Decisions taken at the Meetings, January December, ig64 (Washington: PAU), p . -54-
Chlle's Position Toward the Crisis
Chile's position toward the Panama-United States crisis is important because Chile maintained a solitary.. independent policy throughout the conflict. Chile refused to follow regional pressure created in the Council of the OAS and instead, by refusing to compromise its principles, continued a policy of consistency.
Chile's policy to tpis conflict was determined to a large extent, as it was in the previous crises, by its rigid juridical interpretation of the Rio Treaty. According to
Chile, the Rio Treaty must be used with restraint and caution, since it is the most important instrument in the inter-American systan. In one diplomat's words:
When a state presents a demand based on Articles 6 and 9 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in the form as Panama has done on this occasion, it is qualifying another State as an inter national delinquent, on which should fall all^the weight . of force of the punishment of the Hemisphere.°
Moreover, Chile believes that the reason for putting into action the inter-American penal system should be clear: there should be a "series of conditions that are not alter native but copulative; among which exist an evident ag gression or situation that effectively put the peace of
17 ' ■ American in danger." In addition, the acts to which are referred in Article Six of the Rio Treaty should be "visible.
6 / OAS Council, Acta de la Sesion Extraordinaria, Febrero 4, 1964 (Washington: PAU), p . 24.
^Ibid., p. 27. -55-
g clear and undisputed." It is not enough, however, for just one state to qualify an act of aggression into these cate gories, but the Council alone must do this.
To Chile it was evident that the case of aggression invoked by Panama was not one of visible, clear, and uncontested acts. According to Mr. Trucco, Chilean Ambas sador to the OAS, the conflict was solved 48 hours after it began on January 9 and that after this date there was no major threat to the peace of the continent. In his speech to the Council Mr. Trucco stated that the crisis produced on the 9th and 10th of January may have justified at that time the application of the Rio Treaty based on Article Six, but that after this time there was no major hemispheric Q problem.
Chile's policy toward the Panama-United States conflict was due to a large extent to its analysis of the actual conflict. Accroding to Chile, the crisis was not one conflict but two. The first of these, which was concerned with the issue of flags, resulted in a series of incidents on January 9 and 10; the second conflict emerged when Panama demanded, as the result of internal political pressure, the
Bibid., p. 27.
9in an Interview, Mr. Trucco stated that even if Panama had invoked the Rio Treaty on January 10 he undoubtedly would have opposed a resolution to apply the Rio Treaty. In his view, the "aggression" committed was a series of acts between the United States troops and students which did not affect the security of this hemisphere. -56- revision of the 1903 Treaty. Panama, however, refused to believe that a dichotomous conflict existed, but instead interpreted the crisis as one central conflict: aggression of the United States against Panama. Since the first conflict had been solved by the Inter-American Peace Committee, according to Chilean officials, the only conflict at the
time that Panama invoked the Organ of Consultation was the
issue About the revision of the 1903 Treaty. Chile believed
that this aspect of the conflict was not aggression but a
"controversy" between the United States and Panama that could
be solved by better understanding, not by the application of
the punitive system.
In consonance with Chile's strict juridical interpre
tation of the Rio Treaty, Chile voted against its application
dn this occasion. Chile's vote was perhaps the most significant
one before the OAS Council during the I96I-I965 period
because it was the only country to vote negatively, while 16
other member states voted in support of the application.
A few days later Chile again maintained its consistent
position by abstaining from voting on the resolution creating
the general committee to investigate the conflict of January
9 and 10. Only Colombia followed Chile, while fifteen other
nations supported the resolution.
Even though Chile opposed the application of the Rio
Treaty, it also made its position very clear that it was
concerned with the crisis and would offer any services to
expedite a solution. In a personal message to the Ambassador -57-
of Panama from Foreign Minister Julio Philippi, Chile offered
"to cooperate through the appropriate mechanism of the inter-
American system in the task of finding an answer that will
solve the existing misunderstanding.
Chile's foreign policy toward the Panama crisis has
been criticized by some as being too legalistic, independent
and narrow--and even inconsistent.^^ To this writer, however,
Chile's policy was consistent, perhaps more so than those
countries that voted in support of the application of the
Rio Treaty. Chile during this conflict refused to be in
fluenced by any ideological considerations and pursued a
policy of law, based on traditional principles that have
guided its foreign policy.
Another crisis not mentioned in this study because of
' its insignificance in the hemisphere but which is important
in'illustrating Chile's consistent foreign policy is the
Lauca conflict of I962 . This controversy is significant
here because, first, it is similar to the Panama crisis and,
secondly, because Chile's policy during this bilateral conflict
is identical to that during the Panama-United States conflict.
The Lauca conflct, like the Panama crisis, was composed
of two problems: first, the actual conflict concerning the
river, and, secondly, the problem of "Bolivian mediter-
raneity." The actual conflict began on April l4, 1962, when
Chile began to divert waters from the Lauca River, which
10'Acta, op . cit., p . 33 •
l^It is claimed that a few influencial diplomats in the Chilean Chancery opposed this policy for being too legalistic. -58- begins in Chile and terminates in Bolivian territory, into the desert area of northern Chile. Bolivia responded by breaking off relations with Chile, charging it with ag gression and by requesting a Meeting of Foreign Ministers, based on Article Six of the Rio Treaty and Article 40 of the OAS Charter. After four meetings, on May 24 the Council of the OAS adopted a resolution refusing to call a Conference of Ministers. Chile supported this resolution because it believed that the conflict did not conform to the provisions stipulated in the Rio Treaty. The resolution, however, did establish the fact that a controversy existed and, as a result, provided to offer that the Bolivian and Chilean
Governments use the procedures established in the Inter-
American Treaty of Pacific Settlement (Bogota Pact) that both parties had already approved and ratified.
Since various procedures for pacific settlement are provided in the Treaty, more conflict followed. Bolivia, believing that the conflict was political in nature, chose
the procedure of mediation, which consists of submission of
the controversy to one or more American Governments not a part of the conflict. Chile, on the other hand, insisted on a juridical procedure either by recourse to arbitration
at law or through the International Court of Justice. The
result of the impasse between Bolivia and Chile was the
former's withdrawal from the OAS Council and other important
organizations of the inter-American system, and the beginning
12Ministry of Foreign Relations, Speeches and Documents-- Relations between Chile and Bolivia (Santiago), p. l4. -59- of the second aspect of the Lauca dispute--the problem of an outlet to the Pacific Ocean. This problem, as in the
Panama crisis, was the real conflict between Chile and
Bolivia. On December 30, 19^2, for example, the Bolivian
Foreign Minister made this very evident when he stated that,
"the Lauca question has been the vehicle used by Bolivia to call her people's attention to the problem of her mediter- 13 reanity..." It was not surprising, therefore, that within in a short time the river dispute was completely over shadowed by the problem of an outlet to sea. Since then efforts between Chile and Bolivia have been unsuccessful in resolving Bolivia's quest for a sea port. This problem has strained relations from the beginning of this century and will probably continue to be a major obstacle to Chile-
Bolivia relations.
Reactions of Political Parties and Groups
Chile's policy during this crisis is more significant when considered in the light of reactions by political parties
and groups of Chile. While few parties and groups protested
Cdile's policy openly, there was much verbal opposition from
political parties. The Government of Chile, however, refused
to be influenced by ideological considerations of the Left,
and instead pursued a policy based on principles of law.
One of the most influencial leftist politicians. Dr.
Salvador Allende, took this opportunity to criticize the
^^El Mercurio, January l8, 1964, p. 18. -6o-
United States of continuing a policy of colonialism by com mitting aggression against Panamanian students. In Allende’s view, there was no doubt as to what to do: apply the Rio
Treaty. Another senator to join Allende in accusing the
United States was Communist Contreras Labarca. Senator
Labarca criticized the United States before the Senate by accusing Dean Rusk of "continuing the practice of colonialism and imperialism."^^ In his opinion, Panama was sovereign over the Canal Zone and as such had a right to demand a new treaty. Moreover, both Allende and Labarca were opposed to Chile's policy because they judged it pro-United States.
Another Senator to oppose Chile's policy, though less vehemently, was Rodomiro Tomic, leader of the Christian
Democratic Party. Speaking on behalf of his party. Dr.
Tomic stated that the PDC "expressed complete solidarity with the aspirations of Panama by recognizing her sovereignty over the Canal Zone and the pain of her nation through the incidents it recently suffered.
Other parties expressed dissatisfaction with Chile's policy and opposition to the United States through public declarations. The Socialist Party Declaration, for example, urged that Chile support the petition by Panama that sanctions be applied against the United States because of its acts of aggression. In addition, it urged the other parties of the
l^ibid., p. 17.
15Ibid., p. 18. -6l-
FRAP to solidify with the "just cause" of Panama and to fight against occupation by the United States.The Com munist Party in its declaration condemned energetically the
"assault against the independence and dignity of Panama and expressed solidarity with the Panamanians in their strug- 17 gle for sovereignty." In a note sent to the Ambassador
of the United States in Chile the Central Labor Union (CUT)
expressed "the most indignant protest of the workers of Chile 1 R for the cowardly massacre carried out by the United States."
Despite the common dissatisfaction of the Left with
Chile's policy toward the crisis, Chile maintained a position
consistent with its principles of foreign policy. Chile
interpreted the conflict in strict legal terms and refused to
be influenced by ideological criticisms from leftist parties.
Its policy during the controversy was the result of its
belief that a lasting solution was possible only through
further understanding, not through increased regulation of
the Organization of American States.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid. CHAPTER VI
CHILE AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS
The Dominican Republic has one of the most unfortunate records of political development and stability in Latin
America. In the early part of this century the United States intervened on several occasions to protect the country from foreign creditors and to strengthen its internal political structure. Soon after the United States left the Dominican
Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo came to power and ruled unchallenged for over thirty years until his assasination in the early sixty's. The Dominican Republic was just begin ning to recuperate and develop a stable democratic system of government when disaster struck again--this time in the form of civil war in Santo Domingo.
There are perhaps just as many views of the cause and nature of the civil war as book and articles written concerning this disaster. It is, therefore, difficult to give an accurate account of the tragedy that took place. One news reporter who lived in Santo Domingo during the crisis believes that the cause for the conflict was the split of the armed forces into the loyal and rebel forces after Donald
Reid Cabral, the President, resigned.^ It is believed that one of the causes for the split between the loyalist and
^Tad Szulc, Dominican Diary (New York: Dell, Inc.), P. 10 -63- rebel forces was that the rebels, after taking control of the Presidential Palace and the Santo Domingo Radio Station, refused to accept a military junta and demanded instead the return of Juan Bosch, former President who had been ousted by the military two years earlier. Whether or not other factors caused the conflict in 'Santo Domingo is uncertain; what leaves little doubt is that a civil war erupted on April
24 which was to last for several weeks and cause the death of over 2,800 nationals.
During the early part of the crisis the rebels control led the majority of Santo Domingo, including the Presidential
Palace, where Mr. Molina Ureha had been installed as Acting
President after Reid Cabral had been removed. The loyalists, on the other hand, controlled San Isidro Air Force Base, which was later to become the headquarters for the loyalist-
United States alliance. General Wessin y Wessin, loyalist
commander in charge of the Air Force and a portion of the
Army from the Dominican Republic, began to use his forces
on April 26 to bomb the National Palace and to take control
of important routes in Santo Domingo. These efforts only
united rebels and intensified the crisis.
On Tuesday, April 27, rebel leaders Urena and Caamaho made an effort to negotiate through the offices of the United
States, under Ambassador Tappley Bennett. The United States,
however, at this time refused to enter the conflict. As a
result, acting President Ureha resigned and Col. Caamaho seems
to have taken control. At this time the loosely organized -64- rebels established a military junta so there would be at least a semblance of government in the country. Col. Pedro
Bartolomé Benoit was picked as president, though General
Wessin y Wessin still remained in control of the armed forces.
While this military junta was a government on paper only, it provided a means through which the United States could deal with the loyalist faction.
Had the Santo Domingo conflict remained completely an indigenous crisis, it is doubtful that it would have become an hemispheric crisis. When, however, the United States military forces intervened on April 28, the conflict became one of the most bitter conflicts of this decade. Perhaps one reason why criticism and protests against the United
States were so violent was that, unlike the Bay of Pigs, there was no disagreement as to the participation of the
United States. The facts were clear: in two weeks the United
States rushed into action a force of over 22,000 men, a flotilla of ships, including an aircraft carrier, and 275 planes.
The United States, in an attempt to justify its action to a continent where the principle of nonintervention is sacrosanct, made it clear that the purpose of the intervention was simply humanitarian--to protect the lives of United States
■.citizens in Santo Domingo. Speaking before the Meeting of
Consultation on May 1 Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker stated:
this is not intervention in any sense by the United States in the affairs of the Dominican Republic. United States forces were dispatched purely and solely -65-
for humanitarian purposes for the protection of the lives not only of the United States citizens but the lives of citizens of other countries as well.
It is doubLful, however, that humanitarian purposes were the sole justification for action by the United States in Santo
Domingo, for after military forces had terminated evacuating those in danger, the United States chose to remain and increase its military force. Senator Fulbright has argued that the danger of American lives was only a pretext for intervention.
/ In his view, the United States intervened for the purpose / of "preventing the victory of a revolutionary force which was judged to be Communist dominated.
One"of the knottiest problems concerning the crisis was the amount of participation by Communists. President Johnson had no doubts about their role when he stated the following:
"what began as a popular revolution that was committed to democracy and social justice moved into the hands of a band of Communist conspirators. In order to prove that the revolution had turned Communist, the State Department published a hardly convincing list of 58 names of Identified and prominent Communist and Castroite leaders. Tad Szulc, who has given one of the most detailed account of any reporter, has stated:
It may be that there was no alternative to the United States intervention in Santo Domingo, but the five weeks I spent there at the height of the ;crisis failed to convince me that there was a real risk of another Cuba.^
^Department of State Bulletin, May 17, I965, p. 738.
^The Congressional Record, September 15, 1965j p. 6 . ^Bulletin, op. cit., p. 7^5* -66-
The perplexity of the Dominican crisis is evident by the fact that this same observer later noted that, "the overwhelming majority of newsmen covering the Dominican strife at the time felt that diplomatic niceties notwithstanding, the President had no choice but to order the landing.
The intervention of United States military forces did not solve the conflict in Santo Domingo. Instead, the civil war became more intensified, so that by the end of the third week over I5OO civilians had died. In an effort to ease
the war an Inter-American Peace Force was established under
the authority of the OAS. The Inter-American Peace Force
took control of the forces of the United States as well as
the troops sent from Brazil and several Central American
nations for this purpose. The efforts by the peace force
were, nevertheless, unsuccessful, at resolving the differences
between the rebels and loyalists. It was not until the United
States "pressured" the Imbert Junta to accept Garcia-Godoy
as President in September that the conflict finally subsided.
Chile's' Policy Toward the Crisis
Chile's first action in the Dominican crisis was taken
on April 29, a day after the United States troops stormed
ashore, when the Chilean Representative of the OAS, Alejandro
Magnet, directed a note to the President of the Council in which
^Tad Szulc,"When the Marines Stormed Ashore in Santo Domingo," Saturday Evening Post, September 15, 1965j P- 65.
Bpiary, op. cit., p. 52. -67-
the Government of Chile urged that a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers he invoked. Chile's note, in conformity with Articles 39 and 40 of thé Charter of the OAS, was sent because of the "serious situation created by armed fighting in the Dominican Republic. The Council approved the resolution presented by Chile, and the Meeting of Foreign Ministers was convoked the following day. May 1.
Chile's request for the meeting was based--perhaps surprisingly--only on the Charter of the OAS, not on the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Admittedly, Chile neglected its tradition of strict 'adherence to the principle of non-inter vention, for it based its request only on the Santo Domingo civil war and ignored the Rio Treaty, which the United States had violated by intervening in the Dominican Republic. The writer believes that perhaps one reason for Chile's disregard for the action of the United States in its request is that
Chile- has believed that the Rio Treaty should be used in frequently because of the serious consequences which it brings when put into action. To dwell on this apparent inconsistenty in Chile's foreign policy, however, would be incorrect in the light of further events that took place. Indeed, Chile became one of the most vociferous critics of all Latin American countries of the intervention by the United States. As early as April 29 the Government of Chile noted that the presence of military forces of the United States in the Dominican
7 OAS, Informe Anual del Secretario General, I965 (Washington: PAU), p. 19. -68-
Republic, even if to protect lives, was contrary to the principle of nonintervention and, therefore, urged that t,he troops be removed immediately. Chile's opposition to the United States, while it took various forms, remained basic- aly the same as its declaration on April 29.
Chile's opposition to unilateral intervention of the United
States was twofold: first, the Chilean Government opposed the United States because it had violated the principle of non-intervention, the basis of the Inter-American system and one of the four pillars of Chilean foreign policy; secondly,
Chile opposed the intervention because it attempted to solve a problem by military force rather than through political measures. Chile's opposition, based on the principle of non intervention, was of considerable more importance because there is no principle more sacred to the people and Government of Chile than that of nonintervention. When President Eduardo
Frei, for example, addressed the new Congress, in May, I965, he drew the loudest applause when he stated that Chile would continue its traditional and invariable policy supportin non
intervention . During the crisis itself Foreign Minister Valdez
reminded the United States that, "the basic norm that has
governed the international policy of Chile is the principle of O non-intervention."
As a result of its rigid adherence to non-intervention,
Chile was not content with a few declarations protesting the
action of the United States. Instead, on May 1 Chile presented
8El Mercurio, May 1, 19^5, p. 17. -69- a draft resolution in the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers asking the United States to remove its troops immediately before any further action be taken by the OAS in the Domini can Republic. The actual draft resolution was as follows;
1) to request the Government of the United States to proceed, with the greatest speed compatible with its humanitarian mission, to terminate its unilateral action in, the Dominican Republic;
2) to request the Government of the United States of America to order its troops, so long as they remain in Dominican territory, to observe the most absolute neutral ity in the armed struggle that is taking place in that country.
3) to request the Government of the United States of America to place its troops in the Dominican Republic at the disposition of the Committee of the Meeting of Consultation until it complies with the request contained in the first paragraph of the operative part of this resolution.°
The failure of the other Latin American nations to support this resolution caused Chile to oppose some collective efforts of the OAS which were to follow.
At the same time Chile presented the resolution calling for withdrawal of the United States troops, the United States presented a proposal urging the Meeting of Foreign Ministers to form an investigatory committee of five representatives from I different countries to send to the Dominican Republic. Chile opposed this measure since it believed that this resolution
should follow the approval of the proposal calling for with drawal of United States troops. Chile, according to Alejandro
Magnet, was actually in favor of the establishment of a peace
^Decima Reunion de Consulta de Ministres de Relaciones Exteriores, Proyecto de Résolueion, Mayo 1 (Washington: PAU), p . 1 . -70- commlssion, but it could not support the proposal because acceptance would imply disregard for the unilateral intervention of the United States. Chile's opposition to the resolution of the United States may seem paradoxical with its action the day before, in which the Chilean Foreign Minister issued a public declaration requesting the immediate disposition to the Domi nican Republic of a committee "to obtain immediate re establishment of normality, and protection of life and human rights."10 Chile opposed the United States proposal because it believed that to support such a measure would have been detrimental to the juridical basis of the inter-American system, as well as to Chile's own foreign policy
In spite of Chile's opposition, the five-man peace com mittee was accepted by a vote of 19 to 0, with one abstention from Chile. Mr. Magnet in explaining his independent vote be fore the Meeting of Foreign Ministers stated that Chile could not agree with the resolution because there had been no guarantee that the unilateral'intervention of the United
States would cease upon arrival of the Committee. Here, as
in the Panama conflict, Chile chose an independent position,
not to be •Isolated,f but to conform with the strict observance of legal principle8--on this occasion the principle of non
intervention.
The second reason for Chile's opposition to the United
States was that Chile believed that the dispute in the Domi
nican Republic should be solved pacifically rather than through military measures. Chile has one of the most apolitical
^^El Mercurio, April 30, 1905, p. 1 ^ -71- military forces in Latin America, and, therefore, it has
opposed military governments and attempts to solve disputes
through military force. In Chile's view, to support the
military action of the United States would have been to
disregard one of Chile's basic principles of foreign policy.
What the Dominican Republic needed, according to Foreign
Minister Valdez, was civil leadership--not a military govern
ment. It is for this reason that from the beginning of the
civil war Chile opposed General Wessin y Wessin of the
loyalist faction.
In spite of Chile's opposition to militarism, on May
6 , 1965, Chile presented a draft resolution calling on
member states "to provide military, naval and air-force
contingencies for the purpose of forming an inter-American
force which would function under the authority of the OAS."^^
The purpose of the force was to act in assistance and at the
request of the Government of the Dominican Republic . In
addition, the resolution provided that the inter-American
force would act only as a neutral force, collaborating with
the OAS and the Government of the Dominican Republic in the
maintenance of peace and to assure the function of democracy.
The most important aspect of this resolution was that the use
of the force was conditional on the request of the Government
of the Dominican Republic. Since at the time of the crisis
Chile believed that there were two governments, one repre-
11 ' / Decima Reunion de Consulta, Proyecto de Résolueion por la Delegacion de Chile, Mayo 6 {Washington: PAU), p . II -72- senting the rebel faction and another the loyalist faction, the request for the inter-American force was conditional on two governments, not one. This force differed from the Inter-
American Peace Force that was created later in that it was to function only at the request of the Dominican Republic, while the latter force was to function at the request of the Meeting of Consultation.
To this writer, this draft proposal was partially incon sistent (at least it seemed so at a first perusal of Chilean documents concerning the crisis) with Chile’s traditional policy of non-militarism. Upon further investigation, however,
Chile's policy becomes more consistent and understandable.
The purpose for the draft proposal was not to solve a political dispute militarily, as it might seem to a casual observer, but to send a "police force" that would control a civil war in order that civilian authorities might once again form a constitutional government. According to Mr. Magnet, Chile's draft proposal while not an outwardly consistent measure, was the "best of all evils" at that time.
Thhugh Chile presented a resolution for a police force, its support of an inter-American force was not without qualifications. When another resolution was presented later at the Tenth Meeting on May' 6, Chile with four other countries
(Uruguay, Mexico, Peru and Ecuador) opposed the measure. While
^^Telephone interview with Abassador Magnet. -73-
Chlle ' s vote may seem paradoxical^ it was a logical and consistent part of Chile's interpretation of the Santo
Domingo crisis. Its refusal was due to two reasons: Juri dically, Chile opposed the Peace Force because there were no provisions within the Charter of the OAS that granted the Meeting of Consultation the power to establish such a force; politically, Chile believed that the establishment of such a force would imply that the OAS was supporting the statues quo and that any legitimate popular revolt would 13 be stopped by the Peace Force. Perhaps also significant was the fact that the Peace Force was created by the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers to function at the request of this organ, not at the request of the Government of the Dominican Republic as the Chilean proposal had prescribed. President Frei's oppostion to the Inter-
American Peace Force is well expressed in his own words:
My position is very clear: I believe that the problems of Latin America ought to have a political solution and not a forceful one. To the degree in which we center all of our effort in one military organization in order to contain popular movements, inevitably we will be bringing the destruction of democracy and pushing military^forces into functions which are not specific to it.
At the Second Special Inter-American Conference In Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, in the latter part of I965, a few countries tried to make the Inter-American Force a part of the OAS
l^ibid.
l4itFrel: Balance de un Via je, " Vision, Agosto 6, I965, p. 13. -74- organtzation, Chile opposed this effort vehemently. Ac
cording to Chile's Foreign Minister, a permanent inter-
American force would destroy the fundamental principle of
non-intervention and would give the inter-American system
negative and dangerous ideological connotations, would
destroy the fundamental principle of non-intervention, and
would pose the threat of dividing the system into irrecon- 15 cilahle blocs.
Another important aspect of Chile's foreign policy
during this crisis was Its emphasis on regionalism--an
emphasis on solving all hemispheric disputes either by
the OAS or through measures of pacific settlement provided
In the Pact of Bogota. As In the missile crisis of 1962,
Chile on this occasion urged that the conflict be solved
through the OAS, since no extra-continental country was
involved. Because of the nature of the crisis, Chile believed
that it was essential that the OAS remain impartial and
objective by recognizing both or none of the political
factions of the civil war. Specifically, Chile believed that
the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers should recognize
Col. Caamano Deno, leader of the rebel movement, thus giving
the Dominican Republic two different representatives, or
refuse to let the loyalist faction be represented.in the Council
of the OAS.
^^Mlnisterio de Relaciones Exteriores, Address by His Excellency Gabriel Valdez, November 22, I965I pi 81 -75-
The battle for OAS objectivity--though hard fought by
Chile--produced few results. One of Chile's first efforts to make the regional organization more objective was its support given to a proposal by the Committee of Credentials, of which Chile was one of its three members, that Ambassador
Jose A. Bonilla, who represented the Military Junta of
Antonio Imbert, be replaced by two representatives of the
Dominican Republic--one from each political faction. When the OAS Council rejected by a vote of l4 to 6 the proposal of the Committee, Chile resigned from its position in the
Committee.
In another effort to make the OAS more objective, Chile asked on May 15 that a communication sent by Col. Caamano to the OAS be read in the Meeting of Consultation. According to Fausto Soto, Undersecretary of State of Chile, this move did not mean that Chile recognized separately the regime of
Col. Caamano; all that Chile desired was that a pacific solu tion be reached without force or military action. Chile's request received little support when it was - first presented
to the Council. A week later, the request was finally approved and the letter was read. One newspaper in Chile, El Mercurio, noted on May 21 that the conflict about objectivity had become
so serious that there was a possibility that several countries would leave the .Meeting of Counsultation.^7 Perhaps the
conflict of Impartiality was overstated by this news reporter.
^^New York Times, May 9, 1965.
^^El Mercurio, May I6, 1965. -76- but it, nevertheless, conveys a part of the serious nature of the conflict.
Because of its impartiality and inefficiency during the
Santo Domingo crisis, Chile became dissatisifled with the OAS.
Chile's dissatisfaction with the OAS was particularly evident when the United Nations sent a representative to
Santo Domingo in the fourth week of the conflict. Ordinarily,
Chile would have opposed any intervention by the United
Nations in a regional conflict, as it had done in the missile crisis. But on this occasion Chile did not condemn or support the action. Speaking In reference to the intervention by the United Nations, Undersecretary Soto stated that, "it is a pite that the OAS has not acted in a more effective manner. In order to avoid interference by the Security Council.
In Chile's view the United Nations had acted correctly by intevening because the OAS had shown itself incapable:of solving the war.
Reaction by Political Parties and Groups
Internal political reactions to the Dominican Republic crisis present two interesting facts: there was almost a unanimous opposition to the intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic and, secondly, there was widespread support of Chile's policy of opposition to the United States.
The reason for this reaction is that in this crisis--as
18Ibid., May 11, 1965• -77- opposed to the Bay of Pigs invasion--there was no doubt in public opinion as to what part the United States had played in intervening on April 28 and thereafter: the United
States had clearly violated the sacred principle of non intervention. Capitalizing on what Chileans believed to be an obvious mistake by the United States, Communist and
Socialist senators--particularly FRAP leader Salvador Allende- / criticiezed the United States vehemently in Congress. The
Central Labor Union (CUT), one of Chile's most important left ist labor organization, had a large demonstration on the
7th of May in Santiago, the capital of Chile, in protest of the intervention by the United States. Similarly, the
Union of University Federations of Chile (UFUCh) had a demonstration for the same purpose, and it resulted in the injury of several policemen and students. This latter organization also sent a message to President Johnson in which it expressed indignation for disregard by the United
States for international law.
The most significant action taken by any party during the crisis was that by the Christian Democratic Party, which had
come to power the year before this conflict. The PDC's first action was a declaration stating its position in relation to
the conflict. The declaration reiterated Chile's own policy
or repudiation of intervention, and at the same time lamented
the "inoperation" of the OAS to deal with the conflict effect- -78- ively.^5 The declaration also called the Latin American nations to amek an effort to perfect the weakness of the inter-American system that was evident during the crisis.
The most important action by the PDC during the conflict was that it sent a personal representative to the Dominican
Republic as an observer. The PDC's representative, Fernando
Buzeta, took an active part in trying to resolve the conflict by proposing a coalition government. Buzeta's proposals, po however, were not acceptable to both sides.
In the Chamber of Deputies opposition to the United
States was so strong that the leftist parties took ad vantage and passed two resolutions in support of Chile’s policy opposing the intervention by the United States.
The first resolution was as follows: I a) to send a cable to the Chamber of Deputies of the Dominican Republic expressing its agreement in the• battle of the country in defense of its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and the right to direct itself by democratic norms.
b) to manifest its disagreement, which has been form ulated by our Government, that the United States invasion in Dominican Republic cease, that the foreign troops be removed and that the rights of international law be restored.
The second resolution was a measure supporting the policy assumed by the Chilean Government. Similarly, the municipal government of Santiago passed a measure--with full support of all parties--that protested the intervention of the United
States. In explaining the Conservative Party's support for
gPlbid., May 23, 1965.
Sllbid., May 6 , 1965, p. 1. -79- this measure. Councilman Thomas Püig stated that while the
United States did not have a juridical right to intervene
in the Dominican Republic, neither did the Communists in
Hungry or in Cuba. In his opinion, the United States had 22 erred just as Russia had in the missile crisis.
In conclusion, while the support given to Chile's policy was almost unanimous from parties and groups, it is unlike ly that individually expressed opinions and declarations of
these various parties and groups were of significant importance
in forming Chile's policy. In the -writer's view, Chile's policy toward the crisis was the result of a strict adherence
to its principles of nonintervention and non-militarism, not
the influence of internal or external political pressures.
^^Ibid., May 4, I965. CONCLUSION
Because of its small size and military weakness Chile has pursued an independent, narrow, and legalistic foreign policy.- - Acting in it» own self-interest, Chile has based its foreign policy on law - its best protection from nations larger and more powerful than herself, (Chile’s consistent allegiance to principles of international law has resulted in remarkably good relations with other Latin American nations and the United States, and more recently has con tributed to Chile’s emergence as one of the leading spokes men for Latin America in the world community.
Chile’s consistent record in foreign policy is due most importantly to its strict adherence to the principle of non intervention. Since the beginning of the Inter-American system, non-intervention has been the sine qua non of
Chile's foreign policy. Any efforts to undermine this principle has brought vociferous protests from both the govern ment and the public of Chile. During each crisis between
1961 and 1965 non-intervention was a central factor in determining Chile’s foreign policy.
A second principle that has guided Chile’s foreign policy, particularly in the period following Castro's ascent to power, is the strict juridical interpretation of treaties and agreements. The application of this principle during -81-
the period of this study led repeatedly to Chile's opposi tion to application of the Rio Treaty and to several resolutions presented before the Council of the O.A.S. and meetings of foreign ministers.
The principle of pacific settlement of disputes has also been an important guideline for Chile. Becasue of its aplitical military force, Chile has often emphasized the need to settle disputes pacifically through legal or political procedures rather than.through military measures.
In solving disputes and controversies Chile has been aided by a further principle: regionalism. By regionalism Chile means that all disputes between countries of this hemi sphere should be solved through the regional organization, the O.A.S.
■One of the most interesting aspects of Chilean foreign policy between 196I-I965 was Chile's refusal to deal
directly with communist intervention in Latin America
through Cuban efforts. During this period Chile supported measures condemning communism, yet opposed direct methods
for its elimination. Chile's answer to the problem was not
legal or political but economic. According to Chilean
officials, the only way to remove communism from Latin
America, was to eliminate first of all misery and poverty,
the breeding ground of communism. What was needed, in their
view, was a positive demonstration that democracy provided
not only political freedom but economic liberty as well. -82-
Furthermore, not only did Chile refuse to follow ideological considerations in its policies, it refused to be influenced ideoloically by Chilean political parties and groups from the left. Consequently, Chile's policy throughout this period remained almost immune to congressional opposition and public protests from leftists groups.
Historically, Chile's foreign policy has been guided by legal principles. The best example of this is its con sistent adherence to legal principles during the 196I-I965 period. It is, therefore, unlikely that Chile will make any radical departures in its'foreign policy in the near future. What seems probable is that Chile will continue a policy of strict juridical interpretation of principles and agreements, with a few minor developments leading toward a greater emphasis of other continents in its international relations.
Since President Frei took office in 1964 a few trends are already visible. The most important of these develop ments is Frei's desire for closer political and economic
ties with Europe and the Soviet bloc. Soon after taking
/ office President Frei's Foreign Minister, Gabriel Valdez,
Stated Chile's desires well:
My government's internation policy will be first and foremost a means of giving ex pression to the free spirit of Chile in the whole world. In conformity with this line of action we deem it necessary to maintain relations with all countries of -83-
the world, irrespective of their internal regimes, and conditional only upon our own decision as to wha.t is in this coun try's best interests.1
In consequence, Chile soon thereafter reestablished rela tions with the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary. Mr. Frei also made special efforts to restore Cuba to the Hemi sphere but was unsuccessful. More recently, Chile signed
55 million dollars worth of credit and technical assistance agreements with Russia, making it the second largest recipient (after Cuba) of Soviet aid. Chile has also achieved closer relations with Britain, France, West
Germany, and Italy. West Germany has already given economic aidto Chile and it is likely that France and Britain will provide some technical help in-the future.
The result of these developments, while not clear, is perhaps a decline in the importance for Chile of the members of the O.A.S,, particularly the United States.
Whereas in the last decade Chile was primarily limited to this continent, it is now becoming more concerned with extra-continental affairs. A further evidence of this is
Frei's proposal that the O.A.S, be knit to the United
States and Western Europe into a three-way relationship, which would provide closer contact with the Atlantic community.
n > ■^Address by Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdez before the Chilean Senate, January, I9 6 5 . -84^
Chile's foreign policy will undoubtedly become more
Important within the regional organization as it achieves greater recognition outside of the continent. Already
Chile's consistent juridical policies have exerted con siderable influence in regional affairs. As Chile continues to develop politically, economically and socially, it is probable that Silvert's assertion that Chile's foreign policy "does not call attention to istelfwill become less
i true.
^Kalman Silvert, Chile, Yesterday and Today (New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.), p . 203• A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
I . Primary Sources;
Declma Reunion de Consulta. Proyecto de Resolucion de Chile, Mayo'1. Washington; PAU., 19^5•
...... Proyecto de Resolucion por la Delegacion de Chile. Washing-tonT PAU, May 6, 1965.
Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Acts and Documents. Washington; PAU, I962.
El Mercurio. Santiago, Chile. All issues between I96I-I965 pertaining to the issues discussed in this study.
Mlnisterio de Relaciones Exteriores. Address by His Excel lency Gabriel Valdez. Santiago, Enero, 1965.
...... Discurso del Ministro del Exterior Gabriel Valdez. Santiago, Noviembre, I965.
...... Precencia Internacional de Chile. Santiago, All issues between 1962-1964.
Ministry of Foreign Relations. Speeches and Documents, Relations between Chile and Bolivia. Santiago, I965
New York Times. All issues between I96I-I965 pertaining to the issues discussed in this study.
Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers. Acts and Documents. Washington; PAU, 1964.
OAS. Acta de la Sesion Extraordinaria, November 12, I963. Washington; PAU.
.... Acta de la Sesion Extraordinaria, December 3, I963. Washington; PAU.
.... Acta de la Sesion Ordinaria, November 18, I963. Washington ; PAU.
.... Documents I-76 of the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Washington; PAU, 1962.
.... Communication from the Delegation of Chile, October 26, 1962. Washington; PAU.
-85- -86-
.... Expocision del Sr. Julio Philippi. Washington; PAU July 25, 1964.
.... Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Ap plications I96O-I964. Washington ; PAU, 1964.
.... Annual Report of the Secretary General, 196I. Washing- ton; PAU, 1961.
.... Annual Report of the Secretary General, 1962. Washing- ton; PAU, 1962.
.... Annual Report of the Secretary General, 1963-1964. Washington; PAU, 1964.
.... Annual Report of the Secretary General, I965. Washing- ton; PAU, 1965.
OAS Council. Acta de la Sesion Extraordinaria, February 4 , 1964. Washington; PAU.
...... Decisions taken at the Meetings, January- December, 1964. Washington; PAU, 1964.
Septima Reunion de Consulta. Actas y Documentos, Washington; PAU, 1961.
Sexta Reunion de Consulta. Actas y Documentos. Washington; PAU, 1961.
"United States Acts to Meet Threat in the Dominican Republic," State Department Bulletin, September I5, 1965. Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Acts and Documents. Washington; PAU, I965.
The Washington Post, Washington, D. C ., November 22, 1965.
II.Secondary Sources;
Abel, Elie. The Missiles of October; The Story of the Cuban Missile CrisisT New York; Macgibbon & Kee, I966.
Rutland, Gilbert. Chile; an Outline of its Geography, Economics and Politics. London ; Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956.
"Frei; Balance de un Viaje." Vision (August 6, 1965), p. 13 -87-
Fulbright, J. W. "The Situation in the Dominican Republic," Congressional Record. Washington: United States Congress, September 15, 19^5.
Gil, Federico. The Government of Chile. Boston: The Houghton Mifflin Press, 1966.
Halperin, Ernest. Nationalism and Communism in Chile. Cambridge: MIT Pr^ess, 1965•
Johnson, Haynes. The Bay of Pigs. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1964.
"Mr. Krushchev to President Kennedy," State Department Bulletin (May 8, 1961), p. 664.
Pike, Frederick. Chile and the United States, I88O-I962. Notre Dame : University of Notre Dame Press, I963.
Silvert, Kalman. Chile, Yesterday and Today. New York : Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., l965*
Szulc, Tad. "When, the Marines Stormed Ashore in Santo Domingo," Saturday Evening Post (August 21, 1965), p. 46.
Szulc, Tad. Dominican Diary. New York : Delacorte Press, I965.
Szulc, Tad and Carl Meyer. The Cuban Invasion: A Chronicle of Disaster. New York: Frederick Praeger, Inc., I962.
Time, January 27, I967, p . 27.
Time, January 17, 1964, p. 30.
III. Interviews :
Alejandro Magnet, Chilean Ambassador to the OAS.
Manuel Trucco, former Chilean Ambassador to the OAS.
Mr. Jorge Berguho and Mr. Mario Artaza, staff of the Chilean Embassy to the United States.