i - MASTER'S THESIS M-1185 I AMSTUTZ, Mark Robert I CHILE'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD HEMISPHERIC ISSUES, 1961-1965. The American University, Mj^., 1967 Political Science, intemation^ law and relations University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan CHILE'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD HEMISPHERIC ISSUES, I96I-I965 by Mark R. Amstutz Submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Signatures, of Committee: Chairman: , , - Date : I SA 7. Dean of Schoo. Date: iTé'y 'flMERIMN UNI\?ERS1TY LIMkAKV MAY 2 Ü wo/ bSiL TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE INTRODUCTION. I. CHILE AND THE CUBAN INVASION............................. 7 The Crisis. Chile's Policy Toward the Crisis. Reaction.; by Political Parties and Groups. II. CHILE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS...................... l8 The Crisis. Chile's Policy Toward the Crisis. Reaction by Political Parties and Groups. III. CHILE AND THE CRISIS AT THE EIGHTH MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS...................................... 29 The Crisis. Chile's Policy Toward the Crisis. Reaction by Political Parties and Groups. IV. CHILE AND THE CRISIS AT THE NINTH MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS............. 39 The Crisis. Chile's Policy Toward the Crisis. Reaction by Political Parties and Groups. V. CHILE AND THE PANAMA-UNITED STATES CRISIS.............. 50 The Crisis. Chile's “Policy Toward the Crisis. Reaction by Political Parties and Groups. VI. CHILE AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS................ 65 The Crisis. Chile's Policy Toward the Crisis. Reaction by Political Parties and Groups. CONCLUSION.................................................... 80 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................. 85 INTRODUCTION To the student of international politics, Chile has little economic or political significance in the world community. Too weak, small and underdeveloped to carry a position of leadership, Chile has most often been a passive follower in the world arena. Even in Latin America, Chile's importance and significance has been all but visible at first glance at the continent. Its small size is over­ shadowed by Mexico; its military power is insignificant to Brazil's; economically it lags behind Argentina. Upon closer investigation, however, Chile becomes a country of remarkable qualities and characteristics that calls for one's admiration and respect. Perhaps most outstanding is Chile's long record of political stability which has produced one of the most mature democratic systems in Latin America. The past one- hundred and forty years have been relatively free from any turmoil or intervention by the military, so often charac­ teristic of Latin American nations. Large scale.revolutions and dictatorships, caudillo regimes and military governments have all bypassed this nation. The result is that the chilenos are, in spite of strong social class divisions, a sophisticated people who respect law and order and the processes of representative democracy. In addition, Chile is a land rich in natural resources, which if used -2- effectively would make it more than self-sufficient, a country with a people of strong national pride and purpose, ; and one of the most scenic and panoramic countries in the continent, often referred to as the "Switzerland of Latin America." Chile's foreign policy, like the country, does not call attention to itself. This is due to several reasons: First, Chile has maintained close ties with the United States through the letter's economic aid and through Chile's willingness to follow a democratic system of government, as opposed to a communist system. Between 19^7 and 1958 the Communist Party was illegal, and since then it has made important progress, yet not enough to play a determining role in Chile-United States relations. The recent rise of the Christian Democratic Party to power in 1964 has produced many changes, one of which is a new emphasis on ties with the Communist block, but these minor changes are not likely to draw attention as did Guatemala in 1954 or Cuba from I96I to 1964. Secondly, Chile has followed a mature and consistent path based on law in foreign policy, and as a result its actions have not been dramatic or sensational. Because of the country's record of consistent adherence to law and principles, Chile's policies during conflicts and crises in the hemisphere have come as a surprise to few students of Chilean diplomacy. Thirdly, Chile's weak power and small size, in comparison to Mexico and Brazil, have contributed to the insignificance of its foreign policy. For -3- exaraple, Chile has followed a path in foreign policy just as independent and juridical as Mexico, yet few realize this fact. Indeed, two small countries that have followed a most interesting and independent course in their foreign policies have been Uruguay and Chile, not Brazil and Argentina, The purpose of this study and the reason for presuming on the reader's time is to make Chile's foreign policy more significant in the context of the international relations of Latin America. The writer has done this by analyzing Chile's policies during the 196I-I965 period toward issues of hemispheric concern. The writer has limited the area and time of study for two reasons: first, Chile has not had significant contact with the other continents, hence the information available is limited in areas other that Latin America; second, the author has chosen the period between I961 and I965 because, while it is one of the most interesting ones in the history of Chilean foreign policy, it provides an example of Chile's consistency to law and principles which have long guided its foreign policy. It would be absurd to describe Chile's foreign policy as immutable, for changes must occur if a nation is to adapt itself to new situations. But Chile's foreign pOlicy is characterized by the fact that while it" has changed its policies to new circumstances, it has remained faithful-- at least in its own eyes--to principles established long ago. Four of these principles were outlined at the Punta del Este Meeting of Foreign Ministers in I962 by Mr. Carlos Martinez -4- Sotomayor, Foreign Minister of Chile. These four principles were: democracy, human rights, non-intervention, and self- determination.^ Democracy to Chile does not necessarily mean adherence to a form of government such as that which the United States practices, but a form of government which provides dignity to the individual by giving him both political and economic liberty. Similarly, human rights deals not only with individual freedom but with economic aspects of I life, such as misery and ignorance. Non-intervention is without doubt the basic norm of Chile's foreign policy. During the crisis studied here the government of Chile reminded other nations on several occasions of its re­ sponsibilities to this principle. A recent example not discussed here of the sanctity of this principles is the vehement criticisms that emanated from Chileans in protest I to the United States for having "intervened" through Op­ eration Camelot, a study group designed to analyze the possibilities of subversion in Chile. The House of Deputies made a study of the incident, and subsequently issued a report which was approved unanimously charging the United States with intervention and asking the Chilean government to denounce the United States in the GAS and the United 2 Nations. The principle of auto-determinâtion, a corollary 1 El Mercurio, January 25^ 1962, p. 40. ^The Washington Post, November 22, I965, p. 2, -5- of non-intervention, has also been a basic guideline for Chile. Chile believes that it is indispensible that each nation have the right to choose its own political, economic and cultural way of life. Chile's one reservation to complete liberty in choosing a political system is that it must respect the rights of individuals. According to Mr. Soto- mayor, "There can be no auto-determination when human rights 3 are suffocated." In addition, the principle of non-militarism has been an important guideline of Chile's foreign policy, particularly during the period concerned here. Chile's opposition to settlement of controversies and disputes through armed forces is the result of her own tradition of an apolitical military force. The belief in pacific rather than forceful settlement of disputes has recently led Chile to take a position of leadership against the introduction of nuclear armaments in the Southern Hemisphere. Another guideline of Chile's foreign policy is the strict juridical interpretation of treaties. Chile believes that the basis of its foreign policy must be law, and the best method to enforce this is by interpreting treaties and agreements "strictly," even at times when inaction would be more suitable to its own national interests. The principle of sanctity of treaties has led Chile's policy to be charaterized as legalistic, narrow and uncompromising. ^E1 Mercurio, January 25, 1962. -6- Changes in Chile's emphasis in foreign policy have taken place during the last decade. The most significant of these is that Chile's concern is no longer centered on ideology. Rutland's assertion that it was "Chilean leader­ ship in the continent in an offensive against international Communism which is best known," is an anachronism today.^ Throughout this study ideology is not a primary consideration for policy formation; rather, concern is centered on econ­ omic measures that might indirectly forestall Communist expansion. Chile's answer to Communism in Latin America is not the imposition of sanctions but the provision of econ­ omic measures that will raise the standard of living and thus eliminate discontent on which Communism thrives. ii Gilbert Rutland, Chile; an Outline of its Geography, Economics, and Politics (London, 1956), p. 113. ' CHAPTER I CHILE AND THE CUBAN INVASION The idea of the Cuban invasion had its beginning in the early summer of i960, soon after it became evident that Castro had betrayed his intentions of a peaceful return to democracy.