Maneuver Center of Excellence (Mcoe) Libraries Mcoe HQ Donovan Research Library Fort Benning, Georgia

Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Libraries MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library Fort Benning, Georgia

Report date: 1944-1945

Title: Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945

Author: Allied Expeditionary Forces

Abstract: Operations in Europe of Allied Expeditionary Force on 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945, Information and Education Division, War Department Special Staff for use in the Troop Information Program, published by Army Times, 1946. Includes information on the Battle of the Falaise-Argentan Pocket, the Advance to the Seine, Buildup of the Allied Navies, Ardennes Counteroffensive, and plans for the 1945 Campaign, Operation to Reach the Rhine, Crossing the Rhine, Envelopment of the Ruhr and the Junction with the Russians, Final Phase and the Surrender. Include maps.

Number of pages: 97 p.

Notes: From the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA. Documents collection. Call #: D767.6 .A12

Classification: Unclassified; Approved for public release D 767.6 Report by Supreme Commander.. it 12 Opns. in Europe of tF

4.; -' J

:11F

Report br THE SUPREME COMMANDER TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE OPERATIONS IN EUROPE- of the ALLIED -EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 6 JUNE 1944 to 8 MAY 1945

Distributed by Information and Education Division, War Department Special Staff, for use in the Troop Iiformation Program. ,f) T7s 6 .4

& lop 4%

P tsfihAd by Army Times, 1419 Irving ., ., Washington 10, 1A.C CONTENTS

PREFACE: SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS IN 7 NORTHWEST EUROPE...... PLANNING AND PREPARATION...... 9 The COSSAC Plan...... 9...... 9 Development of Plan OVERLORD."...... 10 Logistical Problems...... 0...... 16 German Miscalculations..17 Preparatory Operations..... *.... 0...... 18 Enemy Capabilities...... 20

THE ASSAULT...... a...... 22

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LODGEMENT AREA..28 THE BREAKTHROUGH. 34 = :ij THRAKHOG...... "...... 34!:!:

THE BATTLE OF THE FALAISE--ARGENTAN POCKET 39

THE ADVANCE TO THE SEINE.0a...... o...... 42

THE BUILD-UP AND THE ALLIED NAVIES...... 46 THE ADVANCE FROM THE SEINE TO THE GERMAN BORDER...... :.....j...a...... 52

CONSOLIDATION ON THE FRONTIER...... a& o...... 56

THE ARDENNES COUNTER-OFFENSIVE..... r...... ,e 62

PL4NS FOR THE 1945 CAMPAIGN...... a...... ,. 67

OPERATIONS TO REACH THE RHINE...... ,...... 71

CROSSING THE RHINE...... 77 THE ENVELOPMENT OF THE RUTIR AND THE JUNCTION WITH THE RUSSIANS ...... 82

T~EFINAL PHASE ... ,...... ,....,..... ,. 89

THlE SURRENDER.. i....*:.. . .-...... ,...... 1. 93

CONCLUSION.... r ...... t..• . '~ ... a-*#ir 95

t p

- 6 t-~ Maps

The Assault .. 23 Establishment of the Lodgement Area...32

The Breakthrough...... 36 Battle of the Falaise.Argentan Pocket...... 40 Advance to the Seine ...... a43 ...... Advance from the Seine to the German Border...... 54 Consolidation on the Frontier ...... *.&...... 58 Ardennes Counter-offensive...... , ...... 65 Operations to Reach the Rbine...... 72

Crossing the Rhine.....0 ' . .r...i...,...... 79

The Envelopment of the Ruhr...... ,... 86 V

DIRECTIVE

TO SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

(Issee fl Febrnr 794) .. ,i 1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for liberation of*Europe from Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force. 2. Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate Channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing An area that -will facilitate both ground and air operations. agains the enemy. 8. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be prepared at any time to take iinmediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the enemy - on your front, to effect a reentry into the Continent with such forces as you have avail-" able at the time; a general plan for this operation when approved, will be furnished for your assistace. .,

4. C . TYe are responsible to the Combined Chefs of Staff and will exercise command generally in accordance with the diagram at Appendix [reproduced on page six]. Direct communication with the United States and British Chiefs of Staff is authorized in the interest of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary logistic support. 5. Logistics. In the United Kingdom the responsibility for logistics organization, cbncentration, movement, and supply of forces to meet the requirements of your plan will rest with British Service Ministries so far as British Forces are concerned. So far as United States Forces are concerned, this responsibility will rent with the United States War and Navy Departments. You will be responsible for the coordination of * logistical arrangements on the continent. You will also be responsible for coordinating the requirements of British and United States forces under your command. 6. C rdinotion of operations of otkr Porces and Agencies. Is preparation for yw asault on enemy oecupied Europe, Sea and Air Forces, agencies of sbo mge,mb- vFersionadpropaganda, acing under a variet o authorities, are now i asti YU my recommend my v tio ix these activities which may seem e oy desirble 7. Relatioship 1. United Notions Forces in other areas. Responsibility will rest with the Comined Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operationso the Forces of the U. S. S. B. for your guidance i timing your operations. It is understood that the Soviet Forces wil launch an offensive at about the sam time as OVEgR- LORD with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western front. The Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theatre, will conduct operations de.signed to assist your operation, including the launching of an attack against the south of France at about the same time as OVERLORD. The scope and timing of his "operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You

/ 4 1

- .- 'I 6

and recommendations, regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your attk from the United Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will place under your command the forces operating in Southern France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command. You will submit timely recommendations compatible with this regard. P. Rogationahip with AlliAd Govwmct--the re.esablishmt of Civil Governments &ad Liberated Allied Territories and the administration of enemy territories. Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.

CHAN OF COMMND

i W....S. CI.NWS OF STAFF

.... --L.. -- .. ----.. -

mml imwi wLawf

(4 PREFACE

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS IN NORTHWEST EUROPE

The broad strategy behind our main effort against the German war machine included as a highly desirable preliminary the successful conclusion of operations in North Africa and their extension across Sicily to the Italian mainland. With these accomplished, with the Mediterranean "flank" freed for Allied shipping, and with the necessary special equipment built or in sight, we were at last in a position to prepare for the final crms Channel assault which had been agreed upon since April 1942 as our main operation against Germany. It was correctly believed that only on the historic battlefields of France and the Low Countries could Germany's armies in the west be decisively en. gaged and defeated. America and England-the Western Allies--could not be sufficiently strong to undertake the assault against France until June 1944, but the broad tactical plans for the operation were completed and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in August 1943, prior to my assumption of command of the European Theater in February 1944. As part of our basic strategy, and in accordance with the task given to the Strategic Air Force under the Casablanca Directive in January 1943, the bombing of Germany, begun early in the war by the British Bomber Command, was intensified in, May 1943 and continued with mounting strength to the end of the campaign. Neither the contemplated invasion of Europe nor the direct attack on the German industrial and economic system would be feasible until we had achieved supremacy over the German Air Force. This struggle for air supremacy, which had been going on throughout the war, was given added impetus by a new directive (known as POINTBLANK) in January 1943 which aimed at subjugating the enemy air force by the spring of 1944. In the event, German air might was thoroughly dominated by D-day and we were free to apply the immense strength of the Allied air forces in the manner we wished and to launch the invasion confident that our plans could not be seriously upset by the German air force. In addition, air bombardment had disrupted the German communications system, immeasurably aiding our ground forces by impeding enemy movements. Our main strategy in the conduct of the ground campaign was to land amphibious and airborne forces on the Normandy coast between Le Havre and the Cotentin Peninsula and, with the successful establishment of a beachhead with adequate ports, to drive along the lines of the Loire and the Seine Rivers into the heart of France, destroying the Ger- man strength and freeing France. We anticipated that the enemy would resiot strongly on the line of the Seine and later on the Somme, but once our forces had broken through the relatively static lines of the beachhead at St-Lo and inflicted on him the heavy casualties in the Falaise pocket, his ability to rehist in France was negligible. Thereafter our armies swept east and north in an unimpeded advance which brcught them to the German frontier and the defenses of the Siegfried Line. Here enemy resistance stiffened, due primarily to the fact that he had fallen back on long-prepared defenses. At the same time our own offensive capabilities were less- ened because our forces had, in their extremely rapid advance, outdistanced supply lines which had been maintained only by herculean efforts. By mid-September our armies in the north and center were committed to relatively static warfare and faced the threat of stabilization. This was true also on our southern flank, where forces landed from the Mediterranean against the south of France in mid-Augut had swept north through the Rhone Valley to link with the Central Group of Armies and close the Belford Gap. At this time we planned to attack quickly on the northern front in an effort to establish a bridgehead over the lower Rhine while the German armies were still reeling from our blows, but the airborne operation launched at Aruhem was not altogether successful in this respect, although considerable ground* was gained md our r positions in this area improved. Coincidentally with approving the Arnhem operation. it was directed that operations be undertaken to clear Antwerp as a supply port on the wth, esitid to ear coetinued offensive actio. This was acomplished in November. While our forces moved slowly in attacks launched at selected points on the front to close the Rhine, the enemy on 16 December launched a desperate and last counterattack designed to throw our campaign into disorder and to delay our planned advance deep into Germany. The attack was not without its immediate effect upon us, but the Amrdy&defense by our forces followed by our rapid and continuous counterattacks brought home clearly to Germany's military leaders that this last effort had failed completely and that the Nazi war machine faced inevitable disaster. My plad was to destroy the German fnces west of the Rhine along the entire. length of the front in a series of heavy blw beginning in the north, and it was my especation that *e enemy would, as be ld done in Normandy, stand without giving ground in a futile attempt to "fight it out". west of the Rhine. Moreover, their air forces were used intensively to destroy his mobility. By March, when our forces crossed the river north of the Ruhr, at Remagen, and at various points, to the south, resistance en the eastern bank was again redueed to resemble that in Frace following the breakthrough, patieulary because the enemy, m4taking our intentions, crowded a great part of Ms remaining fbres into the Bahrma. Our attack to islate the Ruhr had been planned so that the main effort would take place on the front of the Northern Group of Armies with a secondary effort on the Central Group of Armies' front. This secondary effort was to be exploited to the full if mcess seemed aminent. Clariag te left bank of the Rhine throughout its length released the meet required to strengthen this secondary effort. With the capture of the Remagen bridgehead and the destruction of enemy forces west of the Rhine, the anticipated opportunity became almost a certainty. Or forces were now able to bridge the Rhine in all sectors sad they fanned out in great mobile spearheads through. western Germany, disrupting communications, isolating one unit from another, and in the area of the Ruhr completing perhaps the largest double envelopment in history, rendering that great industrial area useless to support what was left of the Nazi armies. As our forces moved rapidly eastward with the main effort in the center, to establish eontact with the advancing Russian -rmies at the Elbe, and in turn to swing swiftly north and south to cut off any remaining refuge, the German High Command reluc- tantly recognized defeat and belatedly initiated negotiations which terminated with unconditional surrender on 7 May 1945. In these campaigns the United States of America and Great Britain worked as one nation, pooling their resources of men and material. To the Combined Chiefs of Staff, through whom the directives of the two governments were expressed, we constantly accorded our admiration for their well-devised system of command by which they applied the concerted national efforts. Their political leaders, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister, also contributed immeasurably to the success of our armies in the field; eee they had committed themselves to a course of action they never failed to give us a ppaL

enemy units are based upon contemporary reports received at SHABF . Often these reports wore not clear or were fragmen- tary. The narration of oar operations in full and accurate detail will be more adequa~tely performed bey historians, who, aided by te complete records, will be able to present in their true nqetve S. magnificent achievements of each .f the maci- 9 PLANNING AND PREPARATION The COSSAC Plan In June 1942, I was ordered to t( e, the organization was called turn-ardund for sh4pping. On the England with instructions to begin COSSAC, and, with a staff composed other hand, its beaches, while favor- preparation for United States par- of both United States and British per- atble to the actual landing, lacked ticipation in a cross-Channel attack sonnel, work began upon the creation good exits to the hinterland. Also the against Fortress Europe which had of the assault plan against Fortress area was the most formidably de- been agreed upon by the American Europe. By July 1943 the Outline fended on the whole French coast and British governments in April of Plan for OVERLORD, as the oper- and was a focal point of the enemy that year as the Allied principal effort ation was called, was ready for pre- fighter air forces disposed for defense. in the defeat of Germany. Some plan- sentation to the Combined Chiefs of Moreover, the area did not offer good ning, in cooperation with Admiral Staff. In August of the same year the opportunities for expansion of the Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, General Sir Combined Chiefs, with the concur- lodgement zone and # woul have Bernard C. T. Paget, and Air Chief rence of President Roosevelt and been necessary to develop, the beach- Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, all of Prime Minister Churchill, approved head to inelue either the Belgian the British forces, was undertaken the plan at the Quebec Conference ports as far as Antwerp or the Chan- immediately following my arrival, but and ordered the completion of its de- net ports westward to inclde IA this had not proceeded beyond the tails insofar as this was possible prior Havre and Rouen. informal, conversational stage when I to the arrival ot a Supreme Com- A second area eonsidered s e received orders to take command of mander. Cotentin Peninsula where it was rec- the Allied attack in Northwest Africa, In the creation of the plan, COS- ognized that the assaulting fores decided upon on 26 July. As a result SAC had been instructed on 25 May, would tnitially bae a reaeonble of these conversations it seemed clear through a supplementary directive chance of acess and would *14- that the Normandy region offered the from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. tionally gain the Valuable poet of greatest chance of success in an in- that the target date for the operation Cherbourg. Tis a a, however lacked vasion of Europe, although some in- was to be 1 May 1944, and that simul- suitable airfields and migt ho be- dividuals favored a more direct at- taneous landing-craft lift for the as- come £S1*fr te assault troops tack against the Calais area. saulttforces would be lim4ted to craft since the enem aould, with rela The successful conclusion of the sufficient to load five divisions. A light forces, &Aed the neck .a te campaign in North Africa was neces- total, of 29 divisions in a& was to be peninmsa, botdfg Allied troops with- sary before the attention of the Allies available for the assault and imme- in the beachhead and denying them could be devoted to a full-scale attack diate build-up. Of these, five infantry any expansion b1 the interio of upon Nurope, but at the Casablanca distons were to be simultaneously France. Conference, In January 1948, the loaded in the landing raft, three to Iu the camsesector tse fe"s CoMed Chiefs ot Staff felt that the assault Initially with two in the Im- were relativel 7 lgMand the ae time had come at least to aseolve the mediate follow-up. In addition, two were of high eapecty mad Outline tactical plans for coss-Chan- akborne divisione were to be em- from the prevallng winda The tei- nel operations. They directed that ployed and two other infantry dl- rain, moreover, was u table for ai- prparations be undertaken for an vision were, to follow as quickly as field development and for tha- emergency return to the Continent in turn-around shipping became avail- solidation and sutsent e musk the even that Germany suddenly able. In all, then, nine divisions were o fthe beachhead. Air support t tte should weaken sufficiently to permit to be initially employed in the assault Initial area at s a ditance m our landing in the lace of light or and immediate follow-up period. The the English coast presented the calf negligible resistance. While prepara- remaining 20 divisions were to be difficulty. From a beachhead I the tions for such a hoped-for contingency available for movement to the lodge- Caen sector it was believed that -ft were necessary, the chief problem ment area as quickly as the build-up would be possible to seize lbs was the planning for the full-scale could be achieved. tany ports between Cherbowg mo assaut to be launched against the The faet that simultaneous landing- Nantes, ad troug them to baM - Ckmttnent as early as possible in 1944. eraft lift for only five divisions had up sufficient forces forte- .be . Some eonsideration was given to the been allotted made mandatory a defl- advance eastward. 1,In v e of these coakmo, It possibility that a return to the Con- nite concentration of effort. The basic tinent in force might take place late factor in determining where the Ini- was decided that the ital lanDi n In 1943, but a review o the build-up tial assault was to be made lay In on tbhe Contimmt shou be effected figures of United States forces in the tbe requirement that the lodgement in the Caen area with the abeeqeet United Klngdov Indicated that this area should contain sufficient port seizure of a lodgement aream pris- would be impossible and that no facilities to maintain a force of some ing the Cherboeurg-BrittWany ports. large-scale attack eould be under- 36 to 30 divisions and enable that The assault Itself, according to to taken until 1944. fore* to be augmented by follow-up COSSAC plan, was to be launhe Accordingly, in preparation for the shipments from the United States or with a short air bombardmenO of Mte day when a Supreme Commander elsewherq of additional divisions and beach defenses, after which three as- should• be appointed to command the supporting ults at the rate of three sault divisions would be lade em Allied forces, the Combined Chiefs of to fire divisions per month. the Caen beaches, followed by' to Staff named Lieut. Gen. Sir F. E. For such purposes, the Pas-de- equivalent of two tank brigades and Morgan to the post of Chief of Staff Calais region offered advantages in a regimental combat team. At the to the Supreme Allied Commander that its proximity to England would same time, airborne- forces wgre ear- ¢designa~te4. Using ,the initials of this faclitt air suptt a a quick marked for the epes .t the i 30

of Caen, while subsidiary operations bourg would be taken and the beach- ports. The beachhead would be con- were to be undertaken by commandos head extended to Include the general solidated on the left flank along the and airborne units to neutralize cer- line Trouville - Alencon - Mont - St - Eure River from Dreux to Rouen and tain coast defenses and to seize im- Michel. By that time it should have thence along the Seine to the sea portant river cros4ings. The object been possible to land some 18 di- while Chartres, Orleans, and Tours of the assault forces was to occupy visions and to have in use about 14 were occupied. As soon as lines of the general line Grandcamp-Bayeux- airfields from which 28 to 33 fighter- communications in this area were de- Caen. 1 type squadrons could operate. veloped and sufficient air forces es- Action subsequent to the assault Later operations based upon this tablished, operations would be insti- and early build-up was to take the plan were necessarily to be dictated tuted against Paris and the Seine form, under this initial plan, of a to a large extent by enemy reactions. ports, with subsidiary operations to strong thrust southward and south- If he proved sufficiently weak, an clear the Biscay ports for the recep- westward with a view to destroying immediate advance might be under- tion of additional United States troops enemy forces, acquiring sites for air- taken to seize Le Havre and Rouen. and supplies. fields, and gaining depth for a turning More probably, however, it was felt In a broad movement into the Cotentin Penin- outline, this was the that it would be necessary to take plan proposed for the assault upon sula directed on Cherbourg. When and bring into use the Brittany ports Nazi Europe. Following approval by sufficient depth had been gained, a first in order to build up forces suffi- the Combined Chiefs of Staff and in force was to advance into the Coten- cient to breach the line of the Seine accordance with their instructions, tin and seize Cherbourg. At the same upon which it was expected the ene- the COSSAC organization proceeded time a thrust was to be made to my would make a stand with the bulk with more detailed planning, and by deepen the beachhead southeastward of his forces. For this purpose a 29 November sufficient progress to cover the establishment of addi- had tional airfields in the area southeast thrust southward would be made to been made to permit of directives of Caen. It was estimated that within seize Nantes and St-Nazaire, followed being issued to 21 Army Group and 14 days of the initial assault Cher- by Brest and the smaller Brittany to the United States First Army.

Development of Plan.OVERLORD

During the period of this staff plan- and shortly after my arrival in Lon- been demonstrated in previous cam- ning for OVERLORD, I was person- don on 15 January, 1 was able, with paigns-Air Chief Marshal Sir Ar- ally occupied with the Mediterranean them and my other commanders, to thur W. Tedder as my Deputy Su- campaigns and was not In close touch reach an agreement which altered preme Commander, General Smith as with the plans evolved for the cam- the OVERLORD operation in this my Chief of StaF, and Lieut. Gen. paign in Northwest Europe, nor did respect. Sir Humfrey°M., Gale as Chief Ad- I during this period know that I While my appointment as Supreme ministrative Officer. General Morgan would ultimately be connected with Commander did not become official remained as Deputy Chief of Staff, the operation. In December, however, until the receipt of a directive' from his detailed knowledge of tactica? I was notified by the Combined Chiefs the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 14 plans making him absolutely indis- of Staff that I had been appointed February, and while the status of my pensable. Supreme Commander of the Allied Headquarters - to be. known as Relationship, between SHAEF and Expeditionary Force and that prior SHAEF-was not recognized until the Headquarters of my Commanders- to amuming command in England the following day, the basic work of in-Chief for the Navy, Army, and Air early in January I was to return planning continued during this tran- Forces was established on the oper- briefly to Washington for conferences sitional period. The staff brought into ational planning level through a with General George C. Marshall and being as COSSAC came under my Joint Planning Staff which closely in- the Combined Chiefs. control and was greatly expanded as tegrated the work of all. The Head- Prior to leaving my Headquarters the pressure of time and the vast quarters of COSSAC had been located in North Africa, I was able early in scope of our work required. at Norfolk House, St. James's Square, December 1943 to see a copy of the I patterned my Headquarters upon with an annex at 80, Pall Mall, and Outline Plan of OVERLORD and to the closely integrated Allied estab- it was here initially that my own discuss it with Field Marshal (then lishment which it had been my policy Headquarters came into being. How- General) Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, to maintain at AFHQ in the Medi- ever, I was convinced by past experi- who was to command 21 Army Group, terranean, and in this respect I was ence that a Headquarters located In and with my Chief of Staff, Lieut. fortunate in obtaining for my staff the heart of a great clty would not be Gen. (then Maj. Gen.) Walter B. men whose proved ability had already as unified as one located elsewhere. Smith. I instructed them to consider Accordingly SHAEF was moved in the plan in detail upon their arrival to Bushy Park, near Kingston- 4 'IThe text of the directive is repro- March in England because, while agreeing duced at the beginning of on-Thames. Here we studied the op- with the broad scope of the operation tis report. It should be noted that the U. S. eration in'detail and ironed out all and the selection of the assault area, Strategic Air For es in Europe and the numerous and frequently vexing I nevertheless felt that the initial the RAF Bomber Command problems relating to so vast an under- assaulting forces were being planned remained under the coitrol taking. In insufficient strength and committed of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The chief changes which we were en toe harrow a front. This they did, to make In the assaut plan wer l

considered at the first meeting which we decided that the salt tent Obef of Staff on 23 January, and I held with my Commanderap-In-Chief should be widened isincle the .,at tWe san time I brought up the at Norfolk Homm on 21 January. Varreville beaches on the eastern sub et of the target date for the Field Marshal Montgomery (Com- side of the Cotentin Peninspla' itself. operation manding General, 21 Army Group) A strong foothold on the peninsula In the original plan, the target date Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay and a rapid operation to cut its neck for the D-day assault had been l May. (Commander of the Allied Naval Ex- would greatly speed up the capture A new factor, however, which made peditionary Force), and Air Chief of the port of Cherbourg. me doubt that the date could be ad- Marshal Sr Trafford Leigh-Mallory For the operation against the neckl hered to was our deficiency is assault (Commander of the Allied Expedi- of the Cotentin to be successful, it craft for the larger five.d41ision at- tionary Air Force) reviewed opera. was believed that two airborne divi- tack. In the COSSAC plan, three dition OVERLORD as a whole with me sions should be employed in support visions in the assault and two Imme, and were in agreement upon certain of the troops assaulting the Varreyllie diate follow-up divisions, a total 4f amendments to the plan. beaches, still leaving one airborne five, were to be preloaded in assault The COSSAC plan called for an division to hold vital bridges in the craft. Sufficient craft for five divisions initial assaulting force of three di- Orne-Dives Rivers area to the north- had been planned. The .-new plan, visions. I had felt when I originally east of Caen. Field Marshal Mont- calling for five divialons in the as- read the OVERLORD plan that our gomery and Admiral Ramsay were in sault, still retained the two follow-up experiences in the Sicilian campaign agreement on this point, but Air Chief divisions, required therefore sufficient were being misinterpretqd, for, while Marshal Leigh-Mallory saw technical craft to preload mwen divisions. There that operation was in most respects difficulties which it was necessary to was considerable doubt that the addi- successful, it was my conviction that consider closely. tional craft could be made available had a larger assault force been em- It was his feeling, both them and by 1 May, and I informed the Com- ployed against the island beachheads subsequently, that the employment of bined Chiefs of Staff that, rather than our troops would have been in a posi- airborne divisions against the South risk failure with reduced forces on tion to overrun the defenses more Cotentin would result In landing that date, postponement of the tar- quickly. Against the better prepared losses to aircraft and personmnel as get date for a month would be pre- defenses of France I felt that a three- high as 75 %-80 %. In the fae of this ferable if I could be assured of then division assault was In insufficient estimate, however, I was mll son- obtaining the strength required. My strength, and that to attain success vinced of the absolut& nece7ity of planneas had advised me that a in this critical operation a minimum quickly overrunning the peninsula months' additional production of as- of five divisions should assault in the and attaining the port of Cherbourg', sault craft In both Great Britain and initial wave. Field Marshal Mont- vital to the support and maintenance the United States would go far toward gomery was in emphatic agreement of our land forces. Without the air- supplying the deficiency foreen for with me on this matter, as were also borne divisions an assault against the the earlier date. Admiral Ramsay and Air Chief Mar- Varreville beaches would have been From the air point of view, the shal Leigh-Mallory, even though a most hazardous, since our attack here extension of the target date\ would larger assault force raised great new could only be on a one-division front. afford a longer opportunity for the problems from both the naval and Behind the landing beach was a la- strategic bombing of Germany and air points of view. goon, traversed only by a few cause- the wearing down of German air In addition to increasing the as- ways; the exits of these had to be strength. It addition, the tactical sault force from three to five divi- captured from the rear, or elm the bombing of railheads and transpor- sions, I felt that the beach area to strip of beach would quickly becme tation centers, the preliminary soften- be attacked should be on a wider a death trap. In addition, this beach Ing of fortifications on the Channel front than that originally envisaged. was separated from the other four coast, and the diversionary heavy air Particularly, it was considered that beaches to be assaulted by an estuary attacks in the Pas-de-Calais could be an attack directly against the Coten- and marsh lands which would have undertaken with greater thorough- tin Peninsula should be included In effectively prevented the junction and ness. The training of the invasion the plan, with a view to the speedy link-up of the forces for several days, forces, and particularly the troop- conquest of Cherbourg. In the event permitting the enemy in this seator carrier crews for the airborne oper- that our troops were able to attain a more easily to dislodge us and threat- ations, could also be carried on more high degree of surprise in the attack, en our right flank. Support by the ,thoroughly. they would be in a better position to airborne troops was essential, and I The Navy, moreover, desired addl- overwhelm the strung-out defenses ultimately took upon myself the tional time for the training of the before the enemy could regroup or heavy responsibility of deciding that assault craft crews and for the de- mass for a counterattack. Conversely, the airborne operation against the livery and assembly of the extra ves- in the event of strong resistance, we Cotentin be carried out. The decii sole needed in the enlarged attack. would be more advantageously situ- one taken, was loyally and efficiently From the naval viewpoint a post- ated, on a wider front and in greater executed by the airborne fores, and ponemen t of the target date to the Sforce, to find "soft spots" in the do- it is to them that immeasurable credit first of June was preferable to any fenee. for the subsej[uent access of the briefer postponement, say of two The original COSSAC plan included western operation belongs. The Sir- weeks, since an early June date guar- the beachhead areas from Courseules borne landing losses proved only a anteed the favorable tides necessary in the east to Grandcamp in the west. fraction of what had been feared, for the beach operations as Well as We decided to ew, end this area east- amounting In fact is les thkO%. aft! moon. wan! is include te Onistrebam Fgrom the strategic pon of view beaces feelig that this would Is- fores emploed in the initialasut Unpostponement seemed desirable, cliazte the seilure--by rapidly seer- is w den the m'ea of atteid, amd to sine weather conditions at the end big the eastern flan-mof the impot- emnplthe siarborne fores I,, .be of May would be, likely to be more ant foa point of Cc ad the wt Cotenta rather tha St Case, favorbl for the mounting of a .. e. Russian oew is assist

%-I 12

the OVERLORD operation. Addition- It should be noted here, however, by the G-3 Division of my staff under tly, the situation in the Mediter- that had It been possible to adhere MaJ. Gen. H. R. Bull and his deputy, ranean might be sufficiently resolved to the initial date, the weather would MaJ. Gen. J. F. M. Whiteley. Constant by that time to preclude the necessit) have been much superior for the in- revision of the plans was necessary of an operation against the South o vasion than was the weather encoun- throughout the early months of 1944, France closely coordinated with on. Lered during the first week of June due primarily to the continuing un- western assault. The German forceb During the first week of May, in the certainty as to the exact number of In that theater might be so heax-ib, full-moon period, the Channel wa assault craft to be made available engaged by our armies that a diver- consistently calm and the skies cloud- for the loading of the troops. Even sionary and containing assault would less, ideal both for naval and air op- with the extra month's production of not be required in direct and imme- erations. The weather was strikingly craft in both the United States and diate assistance to OVERLORD. similar to that which favored England the United Kingdom, It seemed that The Combined Chiefs of Staff duiing the disastrous days of Dun- sufficient lift would not be forthcom- agreed on 1 February that OVER- kirk. In the first week of June, on ing, and it became necessary during LORD would be mounted with a tar- the other hand, the Channel was this period to consider drawing craft get date not later than 31 May. We choppy at best, with heavy seas run- from either the Mediterranean or. the indicated that tile exact date of the nink most of the time. The skies were Pacific to round out the figure needed. assault should be left open and sub- overcast, and days of rain hampered This entailed a constant exchange of Ject to weather conditions prevailing air operations. The full extent to views between Theaters and between during the first week of June. Later, which this unfavorable weather In- by Headquarters and the Combined on 17 May, I set t4une as the "final" fluenced our operations will be con- Chiefs of Staff untl the problem was date for the assault, subject, of sidered later in this report. finally settled-as late as 24 March. course, to last-minute revision if the With the settlement of the basic Since the problem was also related weather should prove unfavorable. problems essential to firm planning- to the mounting of operation ANVIL, The selection of this date was based the size of the assault and the target the assault against Southern France primarily on tidal and light condi- date-the Army, Navy, and Air from the Mediterranean, reference tions. It was necessary that the tide Forces were In a position to develop will be made to the matter again in be sufficiently low to enable the initial their final plans for the attack against this report. Suffice it to say here. assault elements to land and prepare the tRormandy beaches. The best however, that before firm planning lanes through the heavy obstacles method of controlling the effort of can be undertaken on any major am-, which were above water only at or the Strategic Air Forces was still un- phibious operation, involving, as such near a low tide. Also, this tidal con- der discussion and will be referred to an operation does, the forces of both dition had to coincide with a period later in the section on "Preparatory the Army and the Navy, the primary of sufficient light to permit visual Operations." Immediately under my factor of assault craft must be defin- bombing by aircraft of the beach de- command in the pre-D-day period itely determined. This decision should fenses and bombardment by the naval were the Commanders-in-Chief al- be made as early as humanly possible, vessels. The dates of 5, 6 and 7 June ready mentioned, Field Marshal for it is a matter of the first priority. were all acceptable on this basis, but Montgomery, Admiral Ramsay, and Based upon the COSSAC plan for any postponement beyond these dates Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory. the assault, together with the re-t would have necessitated waiting until With 21 Army Group, Field Mar- visions as to date and size of attack 19 June for a similar favorable tidal shal Montgomery had under his com- which have been mentioned, the final period. This later date would have mand the Canadian First Army (2 plan produced by 21 Army Group and necessitated the acceptance of moon- Corps) under Lieut. Gen. H. D. G. approved by Supreme Headquarters less conditions. Crerar; the British Second Army (1, thus came into being. Strategically, the postponement of 8, 12, and 30 Corps) under Lieut. Broadly, the army plan of attack the target date proved to be a sound Gen. (then MaJ. Gen.) Sir M. C. involved a D-day assault on a ive measure. By 1 May, the original date, Dempsey; the British airborne troops divisional front on the beaches be- our forces in Italy were still encount- (1 and 6 Divisions) under Lieut. Gen. tween Ouistreham and Varreville ering heavy resistance south of Rome F. A. M. Browning; and the United with the immediate purpose of estab- along the Gustav Line, while Russian States First Army (V, VII, VIII, and" lishing beachheads to accommodate forces were occupied in the Crimea XIX Corps, with the attached air- follow-up troops. The initial objec- and still forming for a western at- borne troops of the 82d and 101st tives of the attack included the cap- tack. By the first week in June, how* Divisions) under General (then Lieut. ture of Caen, Bayeux, Isigny, and ever, Rome had fallen, Kesselring's Gen.) Omar N. Bradley. While plans Carentan, with the airfields in their forces were in retreat, the Crimea called for eventual organization of vicinity, and the essential port of had been cleared, and Germany was American and British ground' forces Cherbourg. Thereafter our forces nervously predicting an all-out Rus- each under its own commander, di- were to advance on Brittany with the sian offensive. Furthermore, the enemy had been keyed up to a I May rectly responsible to me, the initial object of capturing the ports south- assault was foreseen as a single bat- ward to Nantes. Our next main aim Allied offensive from the United tle, closely interrelated in all its was to drive east on the line of the* Kingdom, to judge from his "invasion parts, and requiring the supervision Loire in the general direction of Parisj any day now" feelers. The month's of a single battle-line commander. ant north across the Seine, with the delay served perhaps to lull him Into All agreed on this necessity. purpose of destroying as many as. believing that we would now net at- The army plans for the assault and possible of the German forces in this tack until some time in July. The subsequent build-up period were pre- area of the west. month's postponement also guaran- pared, pursuant to periodical direc- Because it was ultimately intended teed, as events proved, the availability tives from Supreme Headquarters, by to supply the United States forces of assault craft and shipping to move en- the planning staffs of the American gaged in Europe directly from Ameri- the staggering number of men and and British Army Headquarters, co- can ports, American troops were as- vehicles required for the D-day as- ordinated by 21 Army Group Head- signed the right flank in the opera- quarters, and subsequently reviewed tdons. They wm t take Cherbour; J _.

and the Brittany ports as supply reduction of the peninsula and the flank and with another thrust toward bases, while the British, driving east Brittany ports from First Army on Metz, passing north and south of and north along the coast were to this same date. First Army, then, Paris in the event the Germans de- seize the Channel ports, as far north freed o4 the responsibility for Brit- termined to hold It as a fortress, join- as Antwerp, through which they were tany, was to turn its forces south and ing up with Gen. Jacob L, Devers' to be supplied directly from England. east along the Loire, reaching a line forces coming from the south to cut On the right, American forces of beyond Angers-Le-Mans by D-day- off Southwest France; penetration of General Bradley's Ffrst Army were to plus-40. the Siegfried Line, still with the main assault the Varreville (Utah) beach British and Canadian forces, land- effort in the north; elimination of the and the St-Laurent (Omaha) beach ing on the Ouistreham (Sword), German "forces west of the Rhine Lieut. Gen. (then MaJ. Gen.) J. Law- Courseulles (Juno), and Asnelles either by decisive defeat or by pres- ton Collins' VII Corps was to land (Gold) beaches were in the mean- sure whtet' ould' force their with- with the 4th Infantry Division in the time to protect the left flank of the drawal, with particular ephasis on assault on Utah beach just north of Allied forces against what was ex- the area from Cologne-Bonn to the the Vire Estuary. During the early pected to be the main German coun- sea; a power crossing of. the Rhine morning hours of D-day the 82d and terattack from the east. An additional north of the Ruhr, coupled with a 101st Airborne Divisions were to drop important task was to gain the secondary effort via the Ftankfirt in the area southeast and west of ground south and southwest of Caen, Corridor, the two thrusts to joinfn Ste-Mere-Eglise where their mission favorable for the development of air- the general area ot Kassel, endreltu% was to capture the crossings of the fields and for the use of our armor. the Ruhr. Thereafter It was'antici- Merderet River, secure the line of The first assault was to be made by pated that the destruction of twnh]1. the Douve River as a barrier, and three divisions of General Dempsey's ing German strength would be omi. assist the landing of the 4th Infantry British Second Army: the 3 Canadian This estimate made at this" '6t Division at the Beach. By the end of and 3 British Infantry Divisions of date is particularly interest " itd ' D-day, we anticipated that VII Corps, 1 Corps, and the 50 Infantry Division the proposed scheme of mWantii- with the airborne divisions under of 30 Corps. British 6 Airborne Divi- was practically identical witt command, would control the area east sion was to be dropped behind the which was followed during the Cam- of the Merderet from just south of beach defenses to secure the vital paign. Montebourg to the Douve. bridges over the Caen Canal and the Later in this report is described Lieut. Gen. (then Maj. Gen.) Leon- Orne River between Caen and the the supporting air plan, suocms il ard T. Gerow's V Corps planned its sea, together with certain other ob- which was vital to the attainment of attack on a 7,000-yard stretch of jectives in that locality. These forces the ambitious objectives presorlbed beach known as Omaha, on the north- with follow-up troops, advancing for the land forces. Also necessw Wto ern coast of Calvados near St-Laur- southward, were to occupy territory an understanding of the whole batt4 ent. One combat team of the 29th Inland to a line Vire-Falaise, includ- is a knowledge of the Informatii '2~ A Infantry Division on the right and Ing the Caen road center, by about we possessed, prior to the as one combat team of the 1st Infantry D-plus-20. regarding the enemy dispositio p, *Division on the left, both under the After occupation of this area, the summary of which Is also Ineludd '1 command of the 1st Infantry Division, British forces were to continue ex- in a subsequent chapter. were to assault in the initial wave. pansion along the general line of the In the initial phases of OVE- The primary objective of VII Corps. Seine, advancing on the left of the LORD, Field Marshal Montgomlay, & I supported by the airborne divisions, American divisions until, by D-plus- whom I had designated as tactial was to cut the Cotentin Peninsula 90, the general Allied front was to commander of the early land battles against attack from the south, and, stand on the Seine from Le Havre to was to have operational controlof al driving northward, to seize the port Paris on the north, and along the land forces, including the United of Cherbourg-we hoped by D-plus-8. Loire from Nantes to Orleans, Fon- States First Army until the growing While Cherbourg was being taken, tainebleau, and Paris on the south btild-up of thd American forces made troops of V Corps and follow-up and east. In the west the Brittany desirable the establishmbnt of an it- forces were to drive south toward Peninsula was to be fully occupied. dependent Army Group. When sui.- St-Lo, seizing the city by D-plus-9. By D-plus-90 the armies were to be cient forces had disembarked on the With the reduction of the Cotentin ready to take Paris, force the crossing Continent, a United States Army Peninsula, the forces engaged there of the Seine in strength in an advance Group was to come into being, equal and follow-up forces subsequently northward to the Somme, and con- both operationally and administra- landed were able to turn south, Join tinue east along the Marne in a drve tively to the British 21 Army Group, with the forces landed over Omaha, toward the German frontier. which latter was to continue nider and drive to a line Avranches-Dom- Early in May 1944 after I had ap- Field Marshal Montgomery's eom- front by approximately D-plus-20. proved Field Marshal Montgomery's mand. Although no definite time wab Forces of General (then Lieut. plans for establishing our forces on set for this, it was estimated that it SGen.) George S. Patton's Third Army the Continent, and for placing them would take place when the Thid were, during this period, to be landed in position prepared for eruption from Army had become fully eperatiomal; across the American beaches and the lodgement area, the planning staff the date was also dependent, . initially come under the operational presented their visualization of the course, upon the progress of thIS- control of First Army, passing to the several lines of action which might tial land battles beyond tb ' bombk- control of Third Army when its Head- be followed Bor the continuance of head area where, as aleay be quarters moved to the Continent at the campaign, isp to and including out, simplicity of command hm a zm- about D-plus-30. While First Army the final period, for a drive jut the row space was desirable. was to make Lu initial turning move- heart of Germany. The ftvood Mn.h In the matter of na ed t am ment into the Brittany Peninsula in of action was sketched on a map of be said be that aM nlatio.... the direction of St-Male, it was the Continent. It contemplated an ad- between America and Br an vance on a brood front with toe main were ampeth a Sew.D O planned that Third Army, with its Set - growing tor s wouM take over the oenata'l- e m o1S ofam k-a-daa d na- ' 34

9 ferences in methods of military sup- parison with the forces to be em- Rear Adm. C. Douglas-Pennant. ply and administration, it was early ployed in this great amphibious as- In order to insure the safe arrival agreed that no unit lower than a sault. The extent of the problem of of the assault troops on the beaches, corps of one nationality would be berthing, loading, and moving the the Navy was to provide adequate placed under command of the other forces involved may be realiset with covering forces to protect the flanks nationality except where unavoidable the knowledge that over 5,000 ship' of the routes of our assault and was, military necessity made this Impera- and 4,000 additional "ship-to-shore"' with mine sweeping vessels, to clear tive. craft were to be engaged in the Chan- the Channel ahead of the assault To carry out the mission of in- nel operations during the assault ancd craft. For this latter purpose 12 mine vading Western Europe, there were build-up period. That everything sweeping flotillas were to be em- to be available, by D-day, In the went according to plan is a remark- ployed. Once within range of the United Kingdbm 37 divisions: 13 in- able tribute to the hard work, co- beachhead area, the heavy naval guns fantry, 10 armored, -and 4 airborne. ordinated effort, and foresight of the were to neutralize the enemy coastal These were to be employed in the am- thousands engaged in the Initial plan. batteries, supplementing the work of sault and subsequent build-up period ning and training, and, as Admiral the Air Forces, and then, as the land- in France. As the campaign pro- Ramsay stated in his report, to the ing craft drove inshore, there was "courage to gressed, the flow of divisions to the of the tens of thousands in be an intense bombardment of the Continent was to be maintained at a the Allied navies and merchant fleets beach defenses by every gun that rate of three to five divisions per who carried out their orders in ac- could be brought to bear. month, and this flow was to be aug- cordance with the very highest tradi- Some consideration had Initially mented by the divisions entering the tions of the sea." been given to the possibility of as- European Theater with the assault With the. expansion of the assault saulting at night in order to obtain against Southern France from the from a three-divisional to a five- the fiaximum surprise, but it was de- Mediterranean. Ultimately, at the divisional attacking force, Increased cided that the lessons of the Pacific time of the German surrender, I had naval forces were necessary both to should be adhered to, and that, pos- under command a total of 90 divi- protect the invasion fleet en route sessing superiority in air and naval sions: 61 American, 13 British, 6 and to bring added fire power to bear forces, the assault against strong de- Canadian, 10 French, and 1 Polish on the beaches. Then were allotted fenses should take place by day. This These divisions, with antiaircraft, by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on was palpably advantageous to the antitank, and tank units habitually 15 April 1944. The chief units In the Navy in the coordinated movement attached, averaged about 17,000 in final naval forces included 6 battle- of a vast fleet in relatively narrow combat strength, well over twice the ships, 2 monitors, 22 cruisers, an& waters. H-hour variedifor most 6f the strength of Russian divisions. In ad- 93 destroyers. five assault forces, due to varying dition there were three French divi- Under the naval plan the assault beach conditions such as the necessity sions which were not completely area for the naval forces was bound- for higher tide to cover certain rock equipped, and lesser units of Czech, ed on the north by the parallel of obstacles and the length of time Belgian, and Dutch forces on the 490 40' N, and on the west, south, and needed to remove enemy obstruc- Continent, as well as the units of the east by the shores of the Bay of the tions. Force "U" was to touch down French Forces of the Interior. Our Seine. This area was subdivided into at 0680 hours while Force "J" was Headquarters estimated that, at two Task Force Areas, American and not to land until 35 minutes later. times, the value of these latter French British, the boundary between them With the success of the assault forces to the campaign amounted in running from the root of the Port- determined, the naval forces were to manpower to the equivalent of 15 en-Bessin western breakwater in an maintain swept channels between divisions, and their great assistance 025' direction to the meridian of France and England through which in facilitating the rapidity of our 0'40' W, and thence northward along supplies and reinforcements could be advance across France bore this out. this meridian to lattitude 490401 N. shuttled to the Continent. In view of The initial success of the land Within these defined areas, the West- the initial limited port facilities and forces in the assault against North- ern Task Force, operating in the the fact that we did not anticipate west Europe was dependent upon the American sone, was under the com- seizing the Brittany ports for some operations of the Allied Naval Expe- mand of Rear Adm. A. G. Kirk, and time after the assault, the Navy ditionary Force under the command was the Eastern Task Force, operating in also ehlirged with providing for the of Admiral Ramsay. In his operation- the Britsh none, under the command establishment off the French coast al orders isued on 10 April, he clearly of of Rear AdS. Sir P. L. Vlan. The five artificial anchorages (Gooseber- defined the Navy's mission to those Western and Eastern Task Forces ries). Two of these were subsequent- under his command: "The object of were again subdivided to include, ally to be expanded into major artificial the Naval Commander-in-Chief bs the together, flive asault forces, each re- harbors safe and timely arrival of the (Mulberries); through these' assault sponsible for the landing of an assault forces at their beaches, the sover of the bulk of our stores were to be un- their landings, and subsequentiy division upon one Of the five beach the areas, and two follow-up forces. The loaded during the early stages of the support and maintenance campaign. To provide oil and gasoline and the assault forces were known for the rapid build-up of our forces ashore." In bulk, the Navy was also to set up American sone as Force "U" ad To accomplish this mission success- tanker discharge points oft the French Foree "0" (Utah and Omaha) and fully months of detailed planning coast and to establish cross-Channel were under the command respectively submarine pipe lines. and training, closely coordinated with of tear Adm. D). P. Moot and Vice By 36 April, the five naval assault the ground and air forces, were neces- AdS, (then Rear Ads.) 3. L. Hall, forces were assembled in the follow- sary. Jr. Per the British zone the assault Reports on the North ing areas: Force "U," Plymouth; African and forces were similariy known as Force Sicilian Campaigns have made Force "0," Portland; Force "8S," men- "S," Force "3," and Force "0" tion of the magnitude Portsmouth; Force "0," Southamp- of the naval (Sword, Juno, and G]old) and were forces Involved, but the sea power ton; and Force "3," Isle of Wight. commanded by Rear Adm. A. 0. Tal- The two follow-up forces, Force "B" disayed there was I. fade by em- bet, Commodore G. N. Olver, and and Force "L," were assembled In is the Falmouth-Plymouth and. Nore eration, however, indicated the need stallations were to be attacked begin- areas. In addition to the berthing to employ them for a much longer ning not later than D-minus-21. By problems inherent in the assembly of period-about three months-and a neutralizing the fields, we were cer these seven forces, other space had plan was finally adopted which aimed tain to limit the maneuverability of to be found for the many ships and at the crippling of the French and German fighter forces, compelling craft which were assigned the tasks Belgian railway systems and the con- them to enter the battle from fields of supply, maintenance, repair, and sequent restriction of the enemy's situated a considerable distance from reinforcement. The berthing problem mobility. The plan had a wider con- the Normandy beaches. was one of major proportions, but it ception than the dislocation of the This preparatory bombing program was solved, as Admiral Rtmsay re- enemy's lines of communication in was placed in effect as scheduled and, ported, by making use of every avail- the zone in which the land forces as D-day approached, the intensity able berth from Milford Haven to were to be deployed. It was looked of our attacks increased and the pre- Harwich. Many units had, addition- upon as the first of a series of at- paratory phase gave way to the as- ally, to be berthed in the Humber, at tacks, which as they spread eastward, sault phase. In the assault itself, the Belfast, and in the Clyde. Would ultimately affect the whole air forces were assigned the tasks, The concentration of ship in south- German war effort. The adoption of ,in conjunction with the navies, of ern ports was bound, we felt, to be this plan entailed a major effort by protecting the cross-Channel move- detected by the enemy and would the Strategic Air Forces. ment of our tforces from enemy air thus give him some indication that In the preparatory phase, the strik- and naval attack. They were also'to our assault was about to be launched ing power of the Tactical Air Forces prepare the way for the assault by In order to confuse him in this re- was to be directed against rail tar- destroying the enemy's radar instal- spect, arrangements were made with gets, bridges, airfields in the vicinity lations and 1 by neutralizing coastal the British Admiralty to have the of the assault area, coastal batteries, batteries and beach defenses between large number of commercial ships radar stations, and other naval and Oulstreham and Varreville, the area destined for the Thames and also the military targets. In addition to re- of our attack. Additionally, the air ships to be used in later supply con- serve aircraft, these forces had oper- forces were to provide protective voys to our forces on the Continent ationally available 2,434 fighters and cover over the landing beaches and, held in Scottish ports until the oper- fighter-bombers, and 700 light and by attacking the enemy, reduce his ation was under way. The concentra- medium bombers. ability to reinforce and counterattack. tion of shipping thus spread itself The program of attack on rail cen- Subsequent to the establishment Of automatically throughout the whole ters and bridges was designed to de- the beachhead, the Tactical Air British Isles and was not confined to prive the eneiny of the means for the Forces were to support the land a single area. As was the case against rapid concentration of men and mate- troops in their advance inland from Sicily, we did not believe that the rial and to hinder his efforts to main- the assault beaches. growing preparations and the size of tain an adequate flow of reinforce- During the assault it was planned our forces could be entirely concealed ments and supplies, forcing him to to maintain a sustained density of from the enemy. We hoped, though, move by road with resultant delay, ten fighter squadrons to cover the to be able to confuse him as to the Increased wastage in road transport beach area, five over the British see- time of the assault and the exact and fuel, and increased vulnerability tor and five over the American. An beachhead area of attack. In this we to air attack. Blows against the rail- additional six squadrons were to be were to be successful for a variety road centers were to be started about maintained in readiness to support of reasons which I shall consider D-minus-60 and were to cover a wide the beach cover if necessary. Over later. area so as to give the enemy no clue the main naval approach channels The air plan in support of the am- to our propsed assault beaches. Short- we agreed upon a sustained density phibious operation consisted of two ly before D-day, however, the attacks of five squadrons centered at 60 miles parts, the preparatory phase and the would be intensified and focused on and three at 80 miles from the south assault phase, and was brought into key points more directly related to coast of England. Additionally, a being under the direction of Air Chiet the assault area but still so controlled striking force of 33 fighter squad- Marshal Leigh-Mallory, commanding as not to indicate to the enemy the rona was to be held In reserve for the Tactical Air Porces. These forces. area itself. use as the air situation might requir, composed of the British Second Tac- Attacks against coastal batteries, subsequent to its initial employmet tical Air Force and the U. S. Ninth airfields, bridges, and other targets as escort to the airborne formations Air Force, were to operate in direct in the preparatory period were The total fighter aircraft which we support of the land armies. The Stra- planned in such a manner that only allocated for the D-day assault - tegic Air Forces also would be given one-third of the effort expended would as follows: definite tactical responsibilities dur- be devoted to the target threatening Beach Cover...... 54 Squadrons ing critical periods, although their the success of our assault. The pre- principal mission ivould be to con- liminary attacks upon the bridges in ,Shipping Cover ...... 15 Squadron tinue their attacks on the industrial Northwestern France were scheduled Direct Air Support... 36 Squadrons potential of Germany, with emphasis to begin on D-minus-46 and to be Offensive Fighter now placed on the facilities for air- intensified in tempo as P-dlay ap- Operations and craft production. They had also defi- proached. The ultimate purpose of Bomber Escort...... S quadron nite tactical responsibilities at criti- these attacks was to isolate the battle Striking Fo e..... 33 Svjdo cal periods of the battles. area from the rest of France by' cut- Total...,. .14 1 Squad Until January 1944, the view had ting the bridges over the Seine and been held that the heavy bomters of the Loire below Paris and Orleans, The photographic reeounaOiWNs the Strategic Air Forces could make respectively. The attacks upon the units of the Allied " Fores wee sufficient direct contribution to the airfields had a similar pur'pose. With- the $rst to begin aetre asaddirs* in a assault in a period of about a fort- 130-mile .radiust of the battle preparations for the ft-OMeul d t- night before P-day. Further coasid- area, all enemy airfilds ad Sr In- M". umathe u.SLMacRn am*~

.~ I. ~ A~# N$

a year, much vital information was the detailed accdracy of the Informa- tasks accomplished by these recon- accumulated which contributed very tion gathered was of great importance naissance units was the series of greatly to the ultimate success of the in the preparatory phase of the oper- sorties flown to obtain low-level ob- assault. The variety, complexity, and ation. One of the most remarkable liques of underwater beach defenses.

Logistical Problems

In support of operation OVER- ditionally, a number of subsidiary American troops and supplies in the LORD it had been proposed at the assaults by Commandos and Rangers United Kingdom continued under the Casablanca Conference that an as- necessitated craft for 5,000 personnel. direction of Lieut. Gen John C. H. seltagainst Southern France be, Beyond this, the nature of the ter- Lee. Planning for BOLERO, the name mounted from the Mediterranean to rain, the heavy beach defenses, and by which this logistical program was coincide closely with the timing of the large rise and fall of tide in the known, had begun In the United the assault against Northwest France. Channel demanded the use of a very Kingdom as early as April 1942. The I had been engaged in the planning much larger number of engineer per- small original staff was divided for phase of this operation, known ini- sonnel and personnel for work on the North African (TORCH) opera- tially as ANVIL and subsequently as the beaches than would have other- tion, but expanded in 1943 and 1944 DRAGOON, prior to leaving my com- wise been necessary. The scale of the as the OVERLORD task became mand In the Mediterraneap, and felt problem may be understood by the larger until by D-day, the ComThuni- then that its contribution to the fact 'that we Intended on D-day and cations Zone establishment contained downfall of the enemy would be con- D-plus-1 to land 20,111 vehicles 'and 31,500 officers and 350,000 enlisted siderable. I continued to recognize 176,475 personnel. The vehicles in- personnel. By July 1943 some 750,- its importance after leaving the Medi- cluded 1,500 tanks, 5,000 other 000 tons of supplies were pouring terranean Theater, fully conscious tracked fighting vehicles, 3,000 guns through English ports each month not only of the psychological effect of all types, and 10,000 other vehicles and this amount was steadily in- upon the enemy and upon Europe as from jeeps to bulldozers. creased until in June 1944 1,900,000 a whole of the double asault, but of This explanation helped to clarify tons were received from the United the great military value the southern our needs, and the Combined Chiefs States. Much of this material was blow would have In splitting all ene- of Staff recognizing the situation, used to supply the troops already army forces in France and of thus as- met It by suggesting that the ANVIL rived In England, and other amounts sisting OVERLORD. assault be postponed rather than were stored for use as OVERLORD Initially we had hoped that the mounted simultaneously with OVER- progressed, but the stock pile ear- ANVIL assault could be mounted LORD. Field Marshal (then General) marked for the American forces, over with three divisions or, at the worst, Sir Maitland Wilson, as Supreme and above basic loads and equip- with 2 divisions, building up to a Commander In the Mediterranean ment, was a full 2,500,000 tons for strength of 10 divisions in the follow- Theater, and the British Chiefs of the invasion alone. By 1 June also, up. However, on 23 January 1944, it Staff in London, had at one time sug- the number of U. S. Army troops in became necessary to recommend to gested that the ANVIL operation be the United Kingdom had risen from the Combined Chiefs of Staff that canceled chlefly because of weakness 241,839 at the end of 1942 to 1,- some consideration be given to rein the Initial assault and the length 562,000. di- ducing the ANVIL assault to one of time required to build up sufficient The operation of transporting sup- i vision, maintaining as a threat until forces. However, this was held to be plies from the United States to the enemy weakness justified its employ- inadvisable from the strategic point United Kingdom was facilitated by ment. This recommendation was of view and contrary to the decisions the fact that cargoes were discharged necessary because of our shortage of reached at Teheran. The military ad- through established ports and over assault craft for the enlarged OVER- vantages to be gained through a established rail lines. Additionally, LORD operation. We hoped that force of an additional ten or more large quantities of materials for the craft in the Mediterranean, originally divisions operating on our right flank Invasion were made directly available allocated for ANVIL, would th be after clearing Southern Prance would, from British resources within the freed for our use. I believed, be of extraordinary value United Kingdom itself. These condi- The Combined Chiefs of Staff did later In the campaign. Accordingly, tions could not, of course, exist on not agree with thias proposal and on on 24 March, ANVIL was postponed the Continent and plans were ac- the basis of planning data available from a target date of 31 May to one cordingly made to overcome the diffi- to them stated that sufficient craft of 10 July, some four weeks after culties envisaged. It was recognized would be on hand to mount an OVER- the OVERLORD assault, and the that the major tonnage reception on LORD assault of seven divisions (in- craft necessary to round out our full the Continent would be over the Nor- cluding the two follow-up divisions) needs were In part drawn from Medi- mandy beaches during the first two and an ANVIL ot two divisions. terranean resources and allocated to months, with the port of Cherbourg These figures did not coincide with our use. Although the question of being developed at an early date. those of my own planners and the ANVIL was to reappear and the tar- Successively, it was anticipated that discrepancy was explained to the plan- get date to be agaln postponed to 15 port development would proceed In ners at Washington by my Chief of August, our problem in the mount- Brittany the major effort i that was 1 Staff. It pointed oat that the d4- lng of OVORLORD had been settled area to e an -artificial port at Qui- felons Involved hi the assault each and the prior tr of our needs hn the beron Bay with complementary de- larger operation establise. actUAlly represented a division pths veiopmet f tke existing ports of a rmsma na te andl In- While the problem of assaut craft Brest, Lorlent, St-Nazaire, a n 4 as a.m seer asa to &-t Wants. Whl these wecebeg N brought into use the flow of supplies the beachheads. The German philoso- subsequently, throughout the cam- over the beaches was to be aided by phy was: "Deny the Allies the use ol paign, under sustained attack as the the two artificial harbors (Mulberry ports and they will be unable to sup- result of the feats of maintenance "A" and Mulberry "B"). As the cam- port their armies ashore." For this performed by our administrative or- paign progressed, it was anticipated reason the chain of Atlantic and ganizations. that the bulk of American supplies Channel ports from Bordeaux to Ant- A captured enemy document, writ- would flow directly from the Unitec werp was under orders from Hitler ten by a division commander, perhaps States through the Brittany ports, himself to fight to the last man and pays as great a tribute to all the while the Channel ports to the north the last round of ammunition. The forces responsible for bupply of the including Ostend and Antwerp, would Germans fully expected us to be able front-line troops as could be found. be .developed for the British armies to make a landing at some point on He wrote: These expectations, however, did not the Channel coast, but they were materialize, due primarily to enemy nevertheless certain that they could "I cannot understand these Amer- strategy and the vicissitudes of the dislodge us before supplies could be icans. Each night we know that we campaign. That both the Americai- brought ashore to maintain the have cut them to pieces, inflicted and British supply systems were able. troops. They had no knowledge of heavy casualties, mowed down their in spite of this, to support the armies our artificial harbors, a secret as transport. We know, in some cases, to the extent they did is a remark- closely guarded as the time and place we have almost decimated entiro bat- We are able tribute to the flexibility of their of our assault. The impossible was talions. But-in the morning, organizations and to their persever- accomplished and supplies came suddenly faced with fresh battalions, of men, ance In a single purpose. ashore, not afterwards to support a with complete replacements and weapons. The importance of the steady sup- force beleaguered on the beachheads. machines, food, tools, This happens day after day. If I did ply of our forces, once landed, may but actually with the troops as they be gauged by reference to Gerwan not see it with my own eyes, I would landed. The Germans were, by virtue to give this kind strategy. This was intended to in- say it is impossible sure that our supplies should never of our initial supply, denied the op- of support to front-line troops so far be permitted to begin flawing into portunity of dislodging us and were from their bases."

German Miscalculations

While our plans developed and the the Allies by the shortest road di- Shipping arrangements were made the same end in view. Surplus build-up of supplies and men in readi- rectly to the Ruhr and the heart of with was directed to the Thames ness for the operation continued with Germany. Such an operation would shipping an enormous concen- regularity, we had been studying the have to be mounted mainly from, Estuary where tration was already assembled in possible action which the enemy Southeast England and the Thames preparation for the invasion, while might take in the expectation of an area. Concentrated in the Pas-de-Ca- craft were moored at Dover, assault against him mounted from lais was the German Fifteenth Army, landing Thames, and at certain East the United Kingdom. In any operation which had the capability both of in the Anglian ports. as large as OVERLORD it was pal- shifting its forces to Normandy prior pably impossible to keep from the to the assault if the intended area Further support was afforded by enemy the fact that we intended, dur- of the attack were to become known the aerial bombing program. The ing 1944, to launch an attack against and also of quickly reinforcing the distribution of bombing effort was so Europe. Where, when, and in what divisions in Normandy, after the'as- adjusted as to indicate a special in- strength t h e attack would be sault. terest in the Pas-de-Calais. It was launched was another matter, and Acting on the assumption that this also hoped that the bombing of the I was not without hope that he would would be the German estimate we' V-1 sites would be misinterpreted in not necessarily appreciate that our did everything possible to confirm our favor. Finally the large and very target was the Normandy beaches. him in his belief. Without departing visible components of the artificial Indeed we had some reason to believe from the principle that the efficient harbors, which were subsequently set that the enemy expected numerous mounting of the operation remained up on the Normandy beaches, were attacks from many quarters and was at all times the first consideration, anchored in Selsey Bay immediately continually uncertain as to the we took every opportunity of concen- before the invasion, a point farther strength of any of them, unable in trating units destined ultimately for east than originally proposed. his own mind to determine or dis- the Normandy beachhead in the east After the assault had gone in on tinguish between a threat which we and southeast rather than in the 6 June we continued to maintain, for had no intention of launching, a di- southwest. In this way it was hoped as long as possible, our concentra- version in strength, or an all-out that the enemy, by his observations tions in the southeast and our dis- main assault. Thus, he was stretched based on aerial reconnaissance and plays of real and dummy shipping, to the utmost in every theater. radio interception, would conclude in the hope that the enemy would that the Normandy beach- We thought that to the German that the main assault would take estimate head was a diversionary assault and High Command an assault upon the place farther to the east than was in main and positive blow Pas-de-Calais would be the obvious fact intended. As a result of these that the operation for the Allies to undertake. measures, we also felt that had an would fall on the Pas-de-Calais when diversion had fulfilled its purpose. Not only was this the' shortest sea enemy agent been able to penetrate the The German Fifteenth Army r- journey where the maximum air our formidable security barrier, his mained immobile in the Pas-de- cover would be available, but a lodge- observations would han pointed to Q sconted until the latter part ment In the Pas-de-C&las would lead the same soclsiM. n

of July by what We now know ftom between Britain aid Iteland *4aS sus- diplomats t their couriers tIe aid high-level Interrogation was the pended to prevent the leakage of out of the United xtingdem aid sub- threat Of attack by out forces in the information throtigh Dibltin, where Jetted hitherto ImIMMune eotrespofd- *outfieast of rngland. Not Until 25 German agents ontrittilied officially to ettdb to denbofthib. At My fbqtst Until 19 July did the first division of the Flf- represent their goe'nitiefit. til 1 this hi *M lailitiied teenth Army advance Westward in a April, also a a teslt of a etttest Jtitne. belafted and fruitless attempt to re- made by me, the British Government Lastly, it Wts tibtridorcd expedIeflt Itofttee the clumblit Normandy imposed a visitors' baiton the coastal on 25 MAY to impose a af'tifllJ Stout, areas where owit assault was belhg delay of ten days 01f the fmrivardtfig fiery pteeaution was taken against mounted and extending itland tO a of all Atnetrzatt talh to the United leakage of our true operational in- depth of 10 miles. States aid nlheWhefo Mid tO deby to tentions against Normandy. The BecaUSe even thIe most fritefndly Aineticafl P009offfigl tftif-Atltfitic highest degree of secrecy 'was main- diplomats might uutu11tetifl laly dis- telejlhotle, EtdIo, ujtd 6jl§ facilIties. taltied throughout all military estab- close vital itiformatioln Which Would The mail if all britigh filitafy pet- lishments, both British and Ameri- ultimately come to the ears Of the sonnel due to taqke art in the Not- eta, but additional broader measures enemy, the British tlovetniffient took mandy operation had been, bfln Step Of Shotta the general public Were the further titpfetdefnted within Fnglafnd itself, subject to strict restricting diploitfitid pttl#iegf. On fieetikfy ag t-day approached. cesctiphl uifies April OnUI robruary, all civilian travel 17 April It banff d the talovetetft of 6

Preparatory Operations / Experitionary Air Force. The effort operations Incident to by land, sea, and air-should be re- Preparatory of the three separate commands was way. sponsible to me and under my direc- the assault were already under coordinated, under my direction. These were the special concern of tion, at least during the critical periods preceding aid / succeedhl the through the Deputy Supreme Com- the Air Forces and the Navy, and mander, Air Chief Marshal Tedder. consisted, apart from the Tactical assault. Prior to my arrival in the Theater. Air Forces' operations already con- I stated these views to the Com- primarily of the strategic bined Chiefs Of Staff. At the stme the C0mbitled Chiefs of Staff had ap- sidmed, a combined bnmtbet o ti~e and the Chan- time I set folkh thi nlecessity for eon- proved hentbiag of Germany against tbennany nich iWOted to afford train- centrated bombing of the rail net- platn nIe exercises designed bo/nbilgtOf sttiS illi- ikg to the assault forces. work Of NorthWest uprope and par- the atfategid ticularly Prantie, to Which there Was dusttial Mid flfitary tttet 1 th/e fly a decision taken by the Com- that Uhiets of 9taff, prior to my considerable opposition, the tefsldfis fiteih. it had bbef detefffalie4 bled #tlnfitbilit lf'1 pitf- Aftrial in the Theater, command of for which will be considered shortly. tlermtly'S ly i Sil induettii N ndis- bombing forces-the I felt strdogly about both these mat- stes2 the strategic pensable to the German war Viott: ltAF Bomber Command and the ters. SubmftineS, airetaftj Will beAfthg, nited States strategi Air Porces In a fl'We of tile matter, the doinbited Chiefs of Staff, WhO Were oil, rubber, and cotitffiiettieala Of (composed of the rWifteenth Air Force o1, aiid Theater and the aware of my problems, gave me O- these sit targets, aijrraft, in the Mediterranean became the thtbe kilg ,thl Air Forte in the European erational control Of the air forces comnitinications Were to occupy thco1tlufing Thettre)-ultimately rested with the from 14 April. The Strategic Air WhiCh t the Air Votes iabtled Chiefs themselves. This I orces after this date were to attack attentiojf Of Strategia deiti had beef taken with the German tilitaty, industrial, and ee- th toth t the war, The lomlbtfig attaels aiel thise targets Wre to of coordinating strategic nomic tafgetS Intan order of priority *00066e sthe all establilShed Within the Thgater ald assist mateialt in weahefnibg bofmbinig against Germany from of- the muropean Theater approved by the Combined Chfefs. 5110t111o Otflity t6 r6tist et Ids. ithin t0 aid etr of the United Additthally, t117 Were to be avall- fefiles afi1ttieasurably *nt-ail Command inltheir advanet, States Stlrateic Atr rorces rested able to e up ll call for ditret sup- gfowlfd.forces With General (then Lieut. Oen.) Carl port of land and naval operations All indispensable condition to the A. Spatt and command of the RAF when needed. This was a role for success oftfrNormandy 5s5tt Wlu, Bombe Command with Air Chief which they had not previously been at the #ely least, subffieont eentral of Marial Sir Arthur Harris, The Stra- normally Used, buit the Salerno cam- the irttto tIUuetthOtiidxulli filb- tOWi0 Air Forces were thUs not under palM had afforded convincing evi- land and sftbsequentltk on the beSl- Mt direct orders, their commanders defle Of their effectiveness for the head of outlinVlbi frowS 04&d nup- putrpose. plies. In anticipation Of D-ap, there- intfig instead responsible directly to r Ahe Comlined Chiefs in Washington. ii the final command soet-up of the fore, the Allied forces were fitet co- While Understanding the long-range air forees, then, the ommatiders of cerned With weakening the German Motive whIth brought this decision the Strategic Air Forees (RAP Bomb- Air Force through attacks on Its Ste bing, I was nevertheless die- er COmmand and the United States installations and resources an the 8StisifSd'With the arrangement feel- Strategic Air Forces) reported to Su- ground and on the Fores Itself in the is that, since responsibility for the preme Headquarters independently as air. Quite apart from the ditet S- prifcipal effort against Germany fell did also Air Chief Marshal Leigh- sistance these attacks lent to the Spot my Headquarters, all the forces Mallory, commanding ,the tactical success of our iandings, they vete * betlplyed within the Theater- forces which comprised the Allied essential also as a preliminary to the a

intensive bombing of German indUs- tion centers. But the enemy was able, nation. try. through factory reconstruction and With mastery of the t' a4led We Were aware that the Germans dispersal, together with the develop- in the spring of 1944, itbeeame m0te had planned, as far back as July 1942. ment of Jet aircraft, to maintain into read}ly possible for the Alied It to develop an air force equal to the 1945 a fighter force of a theoretieai tegic Alttones to 0O04tHttts their task of smashing any invasion. Their strength by no means negligible. Nev- power overwhdlthinfgly Faisflt the aircraft expansion program had as ertheless, it still was not qualitatively decliningaoil relrves of OWmay. it§ ultimate goal the production of good and proved incompetent to per- The attack againet the GerMAt Oil some 8,000 combat aircraft per form successfully for anytsubstantial industry eammenood In Aprilt ad month. It was also estimated that the period any of the normal missions of eottlinUed until the termnllation Of enemy planned to have a first-line an air force. operations, Within tl nfirst mOnth of t0 strength of 10,000 aircraft1 adequate- By D-day the Strategic Air Forces attack Germah production fell to ly supplied by reserves in depth and together with the Tactical Air Forces percent or Its previous Mual OA- a steady flow of replacements. Con- had so successfully performed their pacity, Sd by December $644 It hkad siderable progress had been made mission of disrupting enemy com- fallen to a mere tO eroent, Thisso with this program before the growth munications that there was a chronic percont itself was #MPnyetet as of Allied aircraft strength In this shortage of locomotives and cars, re- the result of h4oulean toa0c Whisk Theater permitted the ifntensive scale pair facilities were inadequate, coal diverted manpower and ilbf hourls of air fighting which began in May stocks were reduced to a sit days' from other eqitajip emential India. 1943. Commencing with that date, supply, and 1 4 bridges and tunnels tries, sueh h asft example, thipi0- oit attacks upon Oeftman aircraft leading to the battle area were im- duetin of the new anw inellious production cetteti checked the pto- passable. The cotnunieations chaos weapons of war With whleh kerlY had fatal effects upon hape" to teie the Iude o the 0fM' Jected increase of manufactute, but thus produced filet. the German Air Force was able, the enemy's attempts at reinforce- nevertheless, to survive 1943 with its ment after our landings. The subsequent shortage of o11 front-line strength little changed. In The initial attacks upon the com- brought on by our operations con- December 1943 the Germans planned munications system in France were tributed to the complete collapse of to produce 3,000 single-engine fight- undertaken as the result of an ex- the German bomber fores and must ers per month, thus indicating that tremely difficult decision for Wieh I have had its effect upon the decline their production program was inflU- assumed the efll responsibitity. I was of the U-boat menace. Immobility enced as much by the necessity for aware that the attacks upon the mar- from oil shortage caused the capture cOUntetiflg the Allied bombing often- shaling yards and rail centerS, by both of tens f thouMfil of 4erman Sol- sive as for stopping a possible ground the Strategic and Tactical Alt Forces. diers and thU destruction s teir ittasiotn. would ptofl costly in treneh lives. vehicles. lAek of oil and eoittMl- Beginning in Januaty 1944, how- in addition j a very important part of catiasshattere dbfair b e ad ever, the assaults upon aircraft pro- the Fretich economy Would for a con- meat retaride diisI0 MAirriftil 10 duetioii eenters were Intensified and siderable period be tendered Useless. reihforce the Nim andy retffi the offset ot these attaeks was such On separiate occasion both Prime Jun. ]M DeeffibOr, When von na4- that the German Air oree had been Minister Chibrthill and General Koe- 0tedt's f0esa Stake i thO ttle robbed by midsummer of most of its nig, Ovifmmandet of the Freneh Forces of the AreAne, man6y uNit hd to prodtion dapseitY and also deprived of the Interlor, Skod that I teeon- set atViwitl ettelfely liuited s of tie £deuht reserves necessary to elder my desition to bomb these par- plies of f Wet, hoping tespeMVrl to maintain its froht-line strength. ticular targetsl General Koenig9 r- overun Gat' posltMO69)so lshlkthat These conditions resulted not only quested ones that ho be permitted to tiptured st eMk toils support their from damage to production centers participate as a membet of a retiew furtheriatd ce, Withift 6e0mn t the relative neces- oil situatin Wl s M dp0rt@ IMnt but also from such other factors as board to determine o attrition of aircraft and crews in air sity of bombing centers of popUla- the reaotity And repair pregraMt ar battles, shortage of aviation gasoline tiot; With regard to the loss Of the dhdtidustry was given the for training purposes, and disruption French lives, however, he took a highest pritity in the national wet of communications. As the invasion stern and soldierly attitude, remark- effort, above airuraftand su44mar0e1 date approached, a clear sign of our ing: 411t is war," I Was aware of all prodIctli Md il othir aetAMrtiMfl superiority in the air was the obvious the implicatifs inherent in mu de- Iil ,dUtilh to the stratflo bmb'l unwillingness of the enemy to accept cision, even of the hearturendlng Ig of t ,aifatt, ait eRs fllS ' the challenge to combat which we possibility that our FreOh Allies tofs taigets, we weo, Lringthle initiated wth large-scale fighter might be alienated from us. Never- campaign, to sail upon the Strategic sweeps over his territory. Our D-day theless, for purely military reasons, Alt Foreus *0f taOtical tppotit, At experience was to convince Us that I considered that the comtunticatiofs the time of the breakthr0ough in fl-t the carefully laid plans of the Ger- system of France had to be disrupted. mand, adn seeiral times se, 'i man hgh Command to oppose The iate of a continent depended eluding the j fttle of the Arfnet. ILOttf with an efficient air fore in upon the ability of our forces to seise strategic bombers Were employed i great strength wore completely frus- a foothold and to malitain that foot- strength to ttack enemp positions, trated by the strategic bombing oper- hold against everything we expected supply bases imsetl6telv sujpowtiug ations. Without the overwhelming the enemy to throw against us. No the eneat front, aid etrnggolat mastery of the air which we attained single factor contributing to the Sc- ad commanietibs eantest willth by that time our assault against the cess of oar efforts In Normandy,could the battle area, in thes Inoes Continent would have been a most be overlooked or disregarded. Mill- tastiest aeslstanee, the kJratsle Mhr hazardous, if not impossible, under- tart"events, I believe, Justified the Petees aided ituiell Is tht- taking. decision taken, and the t~rench peo- ing the deisichl of hitite Iskcur fat. This mastery of the air Was main- ple, far from being alienat~d, se- While the breiparatory air oje tained throughout 1944 and 1945 by cepted the hardships and ent]ering attesns of both the U ratuie ant The. ecatlalu attacks against predue- with a reais worthy os a t-s i. Meat S F~ortes wart Vf f I

:%, . , :.,,,. S

Intensity as D-day approached, the there was an -unfortunate loss of life the extent and nature of the exer- naval and assault forces were en- in the sinking of two LST's. In other cises. Our air superiority had driven gaged in Channel exercises designed respects the exercises were successful his reconnaissance planes from the not only to afford final training to and valuable lessons were learned, skies, the watch kept by our naval the troops and crews but also to test relating not only to the movement forces was unceasing, and the secur- enemy reaction to our mounting and handling of the task force ships ity precautions taken effectively neu- preparations. During the assembly of but also to the assault against tralized the efforts of any agents the five assault forces in the areas beaches. Areas such as Slapton Sands whom he may have employed. Fol- of Plymouth, Portland, Portsmouth, in southwest England, similar to lowing the E-boat attack upon Force Southampton, and the Isle of Wight those which the troops would en- "U," the German radio had, for ex- which was completed on 26 April, counter in France, were used for ample, simply announced that ships considerable enemy E-boat activity practice purposes. of a Channel convoy had been tor- was noted which was primarily re- Subsequent to Exercise TIGER, pedoed and sunk, indicating that the connaissance rather than offensive In further Channel exercises involving German command was unaware that nature. On 26 April the first full-scale the other task forces' were under-_ the ships were assault craft and not exercise, TIGER, involving Force "U" taken during the first week of May. the usual merchant ships in convoy. under the command of Admiral Moon, Considerable enemy reaction had been We also knew that the enemy was took place from the Plymouth area. anticipated, but the exercises pro- aware In other instances of our pur- Owing to the fact that one of the ceeded without any undue interfer- poses, but preferred to reserve his escorting destroyers was damaged in ence or even attention on D-day itself rather a collision during t e night of 26/27 from the ene- forces for use April was not on hand when the as- my, In certain cases it seemed appar- than to expend them against loca attconvy was attacked by E-boats, ent that he lacked information as to exercises.

Enemy Capabilities

la our planning for the assault, ft able, the enemy was also in a position malned in the Pas-de-Calats. The was necessary-and increasingly so to use 130 U-boats forthwith and to bombing of the Seine bridges and a D-day approached-to take into reinforce these by D-plue-14 to a other communications served to iso- eouslderation the normal enemy capa- tota of 200. Against the anticipated late the battle zone from immediate bilities which he might employ attacks from these craft, the navy reinforcement aid the diversionary against our attack. We assumed that was to undertake preliminary mine plans were respopsible for holding the enemy, once aware that a ,full- laying outside the channels of our strategic reserves away from the Nor- scale invasion was under way, would approach. Aircraft of RAP Coastal mnady beaches. Thus, although dis- throw everything he possessed on the Command also were to maintain a posing of 60 divisions, the enemy's land, sea, and in the air against the constant patr91 in sufficient density immediate capabilities for their em- assault. We accordingly made prepar- and over such an extended stretch of ployment were considerabty reduced. ations to counter his reaction. Men- the Channel that no U-boat would be Apart from the estimates of not-- tion has already been made of the capable of reaching the battle area mal enemy capabilities, one unusual enemy's capability in the air and the without first surfacing and becoming danger hung as a threat over OVER- over-all disruption of his plans as the vulnerable to attack. In the event that LORD from July 1943 through D- resnt of strategic bombing of the any enemy vessels proved capable, in day. The Germans were emplacing German Air Force production re- spie of these measures, of reaching what appeared to be rocket or pilot- sources and of the tactical bombing the task forces and assault convoys, less aircraft sites on the Channel of airfields In the vicinity of the as- the Navy's protective screen of ships, coast, and while the weapons ap- sault area. In spite of his losses, together with the considerable air peared to be largely oriented on Lon- nevertheless, it was anticipated that umbrella supporting the task forces, don, there was the possibility that he mfiht, by carefully husbanding was felt to be in sufficient strength our concentration of shipping in the the fighters and bombers remaining to neutralize any serious threat. ports of southern England would to him, attack the invasion forces The enemy had, as early as Febru- prove an attractive target and that with furious---if brief-air effort. ary, disposed of 53 divisions in the the mounting of the operation would Against this, our covering squadrons west under the supreme command of meet with interference from the new of fighters were allocated as already Field Marshal von Rundstedt. By 3 menace. The staff consequently gave outlined in the air plan for the as- June his strength in France, Bel- some consideration to changing the sault. gium, and Holland had been increased areas where the amphibious forces In additiQn to air attack, the ruth- to 60 divisions, including 10 panzer were to be mounted, but, because less and even reckless employment of type and 50 infantry divisions. Of other places did not have adequate all enemy naval forces was also ex- these, 36 infantry and 6 panzer di- facilities and the whole naval plan pected. We estimated that the enemy visions were located in the general would have had to be altered, we was capable of employing within the coastal area opposite England, from adhered to our original plans. De- first few days of the assault the fol- Holland to Lorient in western France. fensive and offensive countermeas- lowing forces: 5 destroyers, 9-11 In the immediate area of our Nor- ures against the threat were taken, torpedo boats, 50-60 E-boats, 50-60 mnandy assault the Germans had con- and the Pas-de-Calais area, where the R-boats, 26-30 "M" class mine sweep- centrated 9 infantry divisions and 1 majority of the sites were located, era, and 60 miscellaneous local craft. panser division, while their greatest was subjected to severe and continual In addition to the surfae caft avail- stresgthf-- Flfteenth Army--4 bo %bingwhich served to dela the a employment of the V-weapons until proached I had visited the greater and was noticeably present when the after our assault had been launched. part of the divisions to be engaged final plans of all the commanders With our land forcei assembled in in the operations as well as air force were formally presented at St. Paul's the areas where the assault was to installations and several of the larger School, 21 Army Group Headquarters be mounted and with the Channel naval ships. Without exception, the in London, on 15 May. exercises under way, I felt that the morale of the men was extraordinar- With the planning and preparatory final decision as to the launching of ily high and they looked forward to period completed, It now became the assault should be made from a the immediate task confronting them necessary to make the supreme de- forward command post located near with sober confidence. This same con, cision for Which I was lesPonsibl- the Invasion bases on the Channel fldenee, born of the long hours of the designation of the etaect day for coast and, accordingly, my tactical headquarters were set up in the vi- arduous preparatory toll, existed the assault against the continent of einity of Portsmouth. As 1 June ap- within all echelons of the services Europe.

A0 22 THE ASSAULT

June 1944 saw the highest Winds airborne operations, and during the gets along the shores and artillery and roughest seas experienced in the hour preceding the landings from positions farther inland. The sea- English Channel in June for 20 years. the sea large areas of temporarily borne forces bore witness to the From 1 June onward, my com- clear sky gave opportunities for the inspiring moral effect produced by manders and I met daily to correlate visual bombing of the shore defenses. this spectacle of Allied air might our last-minute preparations and to The sea was still rough, and large a'nd its results as they drew in toward receive the weather forecasts upon numbers of our men were sick during the beaches. which we had to base our final de- the crossing. The waves also caused During the remainder of the day, cision as to the date of launching some of the major landing craft to the heavy bombers concentAated the assault. The provisional D-day lag astern, while other elements were their attacks upon the key centers was 5 June, but the meteorological forced to turn back. of communication behind the enemy's predictions which came in on the As evenits proXed, the decision to lines, through which he would have 3d were so unfavorable that at our launch the assault at a time when to bring up his reinforcements. meeting on the morning of the 4th the weather was so unsettled was Fighters and fighter-bombers of the I decided that a postponement of at largely responsible for the surprise AEAF roamed over the entire battle least 24 hours would be necessary. which we achieved. The enemy had area, attacking the German defensive By that time part of the American concluded that any cross-Channel ex- positions, shooting up buildings assault force had already put out pedition was impossible while the known to house headquarters, straf- into the Channel, but so heavy were seas ran so high and, with his radar ing troop concentrations, and destroy- the seas that the craft were com- installations rendered ineffective as ing transport. During the 24 hours pelled to turn about and seek shelter. a result of our air attacks, his con- of 6 June, the Strategic Air Forces By the morning of 5 June condi- sequent unpreparedness for our ar- flew 5,309 sorties to drop 10,395 tons tions in the Channel showed little rival more than offset the difficulties of bbmbs, while aircraft of the tacti- improvement, but the forecast for which we experienced. cal forces flew a further 5,276 sorties. the following day contained a gleam The weather was not the only cir- The lightness of the losses which of hope. An interval of fair conditions cumstance surrounding the Allied we sustained on all these operations was anticipated, beginning late on landings which was contrary to the is eloquent of the feeble enemy air kthe 5th and lasting until the next enemy's expectations. Apparently he reactions and testifies to the effec- morning, with a drop in the wind had assumed that we hould make tiveness of our diversionary opera- and with broken clouds not lower our attempt only when there was a tions. Such reconnaissance and than 3,000 feet. Toward evening on new moon and on a high tide, and defense patrols as were flown by the the 6th, however, a return to high that in choosing the place of main Germans were mainly over the winds and rough seas was predicted, assault we should pick the immediate Pas-de-Calais area while over the and these conditions were then likely neighborhood of a good harbor and assault beaches and their approaches to continue for an indefinite period. avoid cliffs and shallow, dangerous only some 50 half-hearted sorties The latest possible date for the waters. In point of fact, we assaulted were attempted. Our heavy bombers invasion on the present tides was shortly after low tide, when the were permitted to carry out their 7 June, but a further 24-hour post- moon was full; we landed away from allotted tasks without any interfer- ponement until then was impracti- large harbors and at some points ence from enemy fighters. One result cable as the naval bombardment below sheer cliffs; and the waters of this absense of opposition was forces which had already sailed from through which we approached the that our own fighter-bombers were their northern bases on the 3d would shore were so strewn with reefs and able to operate in small units of one have had to put back into port to subjected to strong currents that the or two squadrons, thus permitting refuel and the whole schedule of German naval experts had earlier de- their all-important harassing attacks the operation would thus have been clared them to be impassable for to be more continuously maintained upset. I was, therefore, faced with landing craft. and their activities to cover a wider the alternatives of taking the risks While our assault forces were toss- field. Not until two days after the involved in an assault during what ing on the dark waters of the Chan- initial landings did the enemy rein- was likely to be only a partial and nel en route for France, the night force his air strength over the in- temporary break in the bad weather, bombers which were to herald our vasion zone to any appreciable extent or of putting off the operation for approach passed overhead. Shortly As the night bombers were finish- several weeks until tide and moon after midnight the bombing coming their work in the early hours of should again be favorable. Such a menced, and by dawn 1,136 aircraft 6 June, the Allied sea armada drew postponement, however, would have of RAF Bomber Command had drop- in toward the coast of France. The been most harmful to the morale of per 5,853 tons of bombs on 10 se- crossing had, as Admiral Ramsay re- our troops, apart from the likelihood lected coastal batteries lining the ported, an air of unreality about it, of our losing the benefits of tactical Bay of the Seine between Cherbourg so completely absent was any sign surprise. At 0400 hours of 5 June, and Le Havre. As the day broke, the that the enemy was aware of what I took the final and irrevocable de- bombers of the U. S. Eighth Air was happening. No U-boats were en- cision: the invasion of France would Force took up the attacks, 1,083 air- countered, the bad weather had driv- take place on the following day. craft dropping 1,763 tons on the en the enemy surface patrol craft On D-day the wind had, as foreshore defenses during the half-hour into port, the German radar system east, moderated and the cloud was preceding the touchdown. Then me- was upset as a result of our air attack well broken, with a base generally dium, light, and fighter-bombers of and scientific countermeasures, and above 4,000 feet. This afforded con- the Allied Expeditionary Air Force- no reconnaissance aircraft pitt in an ditions which would permit of ear swarmed In to attack individual tar- appearance. Not until after the naval * 1! .4 '1 - Ia,

escort fleets had taken up their posi- ciple was lacking in depth. areas. The enemy was so cOnuist tions and commenced their bombard- Appreciating that one of ojUr chief in the strength of his "w611" "pt ment of the shore defenses was there initial objectives would be the cap- when our Iandias&#ame upon M any enemy activity, and then, taken ture of a port, the enemy had de- he had not the mobile reserves nosea unprepared as the Germans were, it veloped heavy frontal defenOe Lut- sary to stem ou' advance and peeve was mainly ineffective. We achieved Ing 1943 at all the princil hoabors out establlshmwt of a lodgemeat a degree of tactical surprise for which from Den Holder to Brest. As the area. Therein lay the main fiot' e we had hardly dared to hope. The invasion threat grew, Oherboufg and hind our suooeSs folloWing tA6 e naval operations were carried out Le Havre were further .tress*zeod, barkations. almost entirely according to plan. while heavy guns were inetal to The asUtttoa of *OaRa& Is The damage to his communications btock the entrance to the Do& of the France by FI t1W&Sai EwIn& N by the. Allied bombing caused the Seine. Between the port$ stfit&ed a met during te Wffter ot 1941.104 enemy to remain in t-he dark as to line of concrete defense 0 tflON, lnd was marked by & vtrire datsfi oft the extent and significance ot the air- coastal and flak batteries, e.Ag salf- and intensIA44tim0. Of t*4 t alSI borne landings which had already contained, heavily protected work already In ptoro, bd thiS been carried out. He was still uncer- air bombing and lavishly equipped. continued up to the te?? E? ea whisk tain as to whether he had to deal These positions were usually deloS our landings took isC WMI Ae with invasion or merely a large-scale for all-round defeoe, their frontal castAl flat Were 4&ilted Ad te raid while our first assault wave was approaches were mined, Srid whtoe defense ptoi sttsf gthee4 wIth plunging shoreward to discovor the pospible artificial flooding *o sed thicker coneftting "aint the thra truth about the vaunted Atlantic to ghard the rear approadhe& Pled. of alt attack, a progrsl WM eot- Wall. heavy and medium guns, AtnSd to menoed in I'ebruary 1644 of setftg The layout of the defenses which bombard approaching shippingf, WO up continuous belts of taetstmet the Allied armies had to breach in sited well forward at the ft,4S the obstacles qAglast Ilag unit, &elIe order to establish their beachheads beaches, while divisional OttLet Gf the entire lnt 0$ sA ObOis W of rench soil had been largely de- light and medum guns, Which wot vaision. beaches. It ou hind I termined by the Germans' experience to lay down a barrage on the b6e8ou this means to delay ot forse as the at the time of the Dieppe raid in 1942. themselves, were located some two vital moment a teh4owa, f)ea This raid convinced the enemy that to three miles inland. Behind. thes tha wee l Mvua thus any attempt at invasion could, and defenses, however, there we 4W should, be destroyed on the beaches ondary defense line to oheak At./" h AM #bshesaflat' themselves, and the defense system vad ng aras It they uou4 on stauem-ncu. a sld*tegba sabsequently eonstructed on this pon- in pentrtmtg bore *0 b6ae 'A

tetrahedrons, timber stakes, stee. ings the higher command remained ious DD tanks upon which we relied "Element C," curved rails and ramps in a state of utter ignorance as to the ro provide fire support for the infan- -- were developed to cover high- and true extent, scope, and objectives of try clearing the beach exits. These low-tide contingencies, and most of the assault. The German gun crews were launched at Sword, Utah, and them had affixed mines or improvised were driven into their bomb-proof Omaha beaches, and, although late, explosive charges. The program was shelters. until our forces were closE ceached land at the two former; at not completed by 6 June, and the inshore, and the sight -which ther' Omaha, however, all but two or three obstacles which our men encountered. confronted them was well calculatei foundered in the heavy seas. At the though presenting considerable diffi- to cAuse panic. The terrible drumfire remaining beaches the tanks had to culties, nevertheless fell short of cur- of thh heavy naval guns especially be unloaded direct to the short by, the rent German theory. Few mines were Impressed the defenders, and the LCT's, which were forced, at consid- laid on t xe actual beaches, while the moral effect of this bombardment fol- erable risk, to dry out for the pur- mine fields at their exits were often lowing a night of hell from the air pose. Fortunately the beaches were marked and proved less troublesome was perhaps of greater value than its sufficiently fiat and firm to obviate to our troops than we had fearec material results. Such return flire as lamage to the craft. might be the case. was made from the heavy batteries Despite these difficulties, the land- Despite the massive air and naval was directed mainly against the bom- ing proceeded, and on all but one bombardments with which we pre- ,barding ships, not the assault forces, sector the process of securing the faced our attack, the coastal defenses and it was generally inaccurate. The beachheads went according to plan. in general were not destroyed prior close-support fire from destroyers. Meanwhile, four and a half hours be- to the time when our men came armed landing craft, rocket craft. fore the first seaborne troops set foot ashore. Naval gunfire provad effective and cyaft carrying self-propelled ar- upon the shore of France at 0630 .in neUtralizing the heavier batteries, tillery, which blasted the beaches as hours, the air transport comman& Sbut failed to put them permanently the infantry citme close to shore, was had commenced dropping the air- out of action, thanks to the enormous particularly effective. borne assault forces on either flank thickness of the concrete casemates. The men who manned the static of the invasion zone. In this opera- Air bombing proved equally unable beach defenses were found to be a tion, the biggest of its kind ever to to penetrate the concrete, and after very mixed bag. A large proportion date attempted, 1,662 aircraft and the action no instances were found of them- were Russians and other 512 gliders of the U. S. IX Troop ai¢damage done by bombs perforating non-Germans, but with a Teutonic Carrier Command and 733 aircrarfi the covering shields. Such of the guns stiffening, and under German officers and 355 gliders of 38 and 46 Groups. -m were silenced had been so reduced Of the German troops, many com- RAF, participated. b sheilflrel through the ports. The panies were found to be composed of In the British sector, the very ac- SPre'f l-day bombing had, nevertheless. men either under 20 or over 45 years curate work of the Pathfinder force **.4yed the completion of the defense of age, and a large proportion were enabled the RAF groups to overcome Works, and the unfinished state of of low medical. categories. Their mo- the difficulties arising from the use some of the gun emplacements rend- rale was not of the best: the lavish- of different types of aircraft, carry- ered them considerably less formid- ness of the defenses and the concrete ing various loads at various speeds. i ableThe than defenses anticipated. on the beaches them- protection to their underground liv- and the 6 Airborne Division troops ing quarters had produced a "Magi- were dropped precisely in the ap- selves were also not destroyed prior not Line complex," and, having gone pointed areas east of the Orne River. to H-hour as completely as had been below when the bombing began, they Thanks to this good start, all the hoped. The beach-drenching air at- were not prepared for so prompt a main military tasks were carried out, tacks, just before the landing, at- landing when the bombs stopped fall- and at a lower cost than would have tained their greatest success on Utah ing. The field troops who manned paid In using any other arm of bo~ch, where the Ninth Air Force been the mobile artillery and many of the the service. The party charged with '. bombed visually. below cloud level. works between the heavy batteries, the mission of securing the Benol- But elsewhere patches of cloud forced on the other hand, were of a different over the Orne and the aircraft to take extra safety pre- ville bridges caliber and offered a stout resistance Caen Canal was particularly success- cautions to avoid hitting our own to our landings. By themselves, how- exactly as planned, in troops, with the result that their ful. Landing ever, they were powerless to prevent over one I bombs sometimes fell too far Inland, a compact area of just our gaining a foothold. square kilometer, the troops went especially at Omaha beach. - The high seas added enormously Into action immediately and secured Nevertheless, the air and naval to our difficulties in getting ashore bombardments combined did afford the bridges intact, as required, by Awkward as these waters would have 0850 hours. The tactical surprise invaluable assistance in insuring the been at any time, navigation under achieved, coupled with the confus- suocess of our landings, as the enemy such conditions as we experienced 14 h;.hinselfN bore witness. Although the ion created by the dropping of ex- S strongly protected fixed coastal bat- called for qualities of superlative sea- plosive dummy parachutists else- manship. Landing craft were huNled- where, caused the enemy to be slow teries were able to withstand the rain on to the beaches by the waves, and of high explosives, the field works to react, and it was not until mid- many of the smaller ones were day that elements of 21st Panzer behind the beaches were largely de- swamped before they could touch stroyed, wire entanglements were Division counterattacked. By that down. Others were flung .upon and time our men had consolidated their broken 4pwn, and some of the mine holed by the mined under-water ob- fields were set off. Smoke shells also positions and the enemy's efforts to stacles. Numbers of the troops were dislodge them were In vain. During blinded the defenders and rendered swept off their feet while wading useless many guns which had escaped the day reinforcements were safely through the breakers and were landed by glidfers, against which the damage. The enemy's communications drowned, and those who reached the network and his radar system were German pole obstructions proved in- dry land were often near exhaustion. effective; the operation went off like thrown into complete confusion, and It was, moreover, not possible on dulring the critical periodwof the land- an exercise, no opposition was en- every beach to swim in the amphib- countered, and' by nightfall the di- 26

inland had been made and reinforce- apparently relied upon the flooding had been fully resupplied and of the rear areas here to check any vision ments were coming in over the was in possession of all its heavy force which might attempt a land- beaches. To the west, the Canadian This formation continued lag, and the beaches themselves were equipment. 3 Division landed on Juno beach, flank firmly until our only lightly held. Complete surprise to hold the in the region of Courseulles-sur-Mer lodgement area had been consoli- was achieved and a foothold was ob- and Bernieres-sur-Mer. Though met and the break-out eastward tained with minimum casualties, al. dated by considerable shelling and mortar relieved It of Its though it was here that we ha4 across France tire, the troops succeeded in clearing expected our greats lsM Tht responsibility. the beaches by 1000 hours and flank, at the base airborne troops having seied the On the western pushed inland toward Caen. Peninsula, the causeways through thelnuindted of the Cotentin In the 30 Corps sector, the British airborne forces of the 82d hinterland andIrerented the enemy American 50 Division landed on Gold beach, were faced with from bringing,p enAfonts, the and 101st Divisions near Asnelles-sur-Mer. Although difficulties. Owing to 4th Division strw*nothwest to- greater initial strongpoints on the left flank caused atmospheric condi- ward Montebourg, on the road to / the cloud and some trouble, the enemy opposition failed to lo- Cherbourg. tions, the Pathfinders as a whole was found to be less than fixed for the the factor, of tactical cate the exact areas anticipated, and the defenses at the Apart from the inexperi- '.light parachute drops, and rear of the beaches were successfully surprise, the comparAti0Yl. pilots led to wide we sustained on all ence of some of the overcome. During the day Arro- casualties which supplies. The Omaha were in dispersal of troops and manches, Meuvaines, and Ryes were the beaches except of the to the success of 6,600 parachut$ elements occupied and a firm footing was ob- large measure due over 101st Division were scattered tained inland. the novel mechanical contrivances area 25 miles by 15 miles in ex- which we employed and to the stag- an It was in the St-Laurent-sur-Mer 60 percent of their equip- gering moral and material effect of tent, and Omaha beach, where the lost in consequence. sector, on the mass of armor landed in the ment was V Corps assault was the operation repre- American leading wqves of the assault. The use Nevertheless, launched, that the greatest difficul- an improvement upon those of large numbers of. amphibious tanks sented ties were experienced. Not only were in Sicily, and the great to afford fire support In the initial undertaken the surf conditions worse than else- with which the troops stages of the operation had been an gallantry where, causing heavy losses to am- fought enabled them in general to essential feature of our plans, and, phibious tanks and landing craft their mission success- despite the losses they suffered on accomplish among the mined obstacles, but the Gliders flown In during the account of the heavy seas, on the fully. leading formations-the 116th In- considerable casualties, beaches where they were used they day suffered fantry of the 29th Division at Vier- reinforcements were introduced proved conspicuously effective. It is but ville-sur-Mer and the 16th Infantry the night of 6-7 June. While doubtful If the assault forces could during of the 1st Division at Colleville-sur- 101st Division held the exits to have firmly established themselves the Mer-had the misfortune to encoun- beach and struck southward without the assistance of these wea- Utah ter at the beach the additional Carentan, the 82d Division, pons. Other valuable novelties Inv toward strezjgth of a German division, the heavy shelling In the Ste- eluded the British AVRU (Armoured dwite 352d Infantry, which had recently area, also established Vehicle Royal Engineers) and the MfEgise reinforced the coastal garrison contact with the troops pushing in- "flail" tank which did excellent work Against the defense offered in this land from Utah beach early on 7 in clearing paths through the mine sector, where the air bombing had The element of surprise was fields at the beach exits. June. been largely ineffective, the naval as effective in the western as In the The enemy's confusion in the fac guns were hampered by the config- eastern sector, and the enemy him- of our assault was very clearly shown uration of the ground which made bore witness to the confusion in the telephone Journal of the Ger- self observation difficult and were able created by the American troops in man Seventh Army Headquarters to make little impression. Exhausted cutting communications and disor- which subsequently fell into our and disorganized at the edge of the ganising the German defense. The hands. Although Field Marshal Yon pounding breakers, the Americans of the Utah assault could Rundstedt claimed on 20 June that success were at first pinned to the beaches have been achieved so con- the Germans were not taken by sur- not but, despite a murderous fre from spicuously without the work of the prise', the evidence of this document the German field guns along the forces. told a very different story. Convinced airborne cliffs, with extreme gallantry, they seaborne assault on the Brit- that the main Allied assault would The worked their way through the enemy sector was carried out be delivered in the Pas-de-Calais, the ish-Canadian positions. The copt was heavy; be- to plan, and despite the Army HQ was at first of the opinion according fore the beaches were cleared some substantial beach- that the Normandy operations were rough epproach, 800 men of the 116th had fallen and heads were established on D-day. of a diversionary nature and unlikely a third of the 16th were lost, but by even In the 1 Corps area, on the left flank, to inc7[ude seaborne landings, British S Division assaulted Sword their unflinching courage they turned after the airborne• operations had what might have been a catastrophe beach, west of tYulstreham. The in- been followed by the opening of into a glorious victory. itial opposition ashore was only the naval bombardment. When, on The American 4th Division (VII moderate, although light batteries 8 June, an operation order of the Corps) assault on the Utah beaches shelled the landing craft as they U. S. VII Corps fell into the Ger- just west of the XVIre Estuary met came~ln to beach. The obstacles were mans' hands, they concluded that with ihe least opposition of any of forced, the DD tanks swam ashore while this unit was In charge of all our landings. Moreover, an error in to give fire support, and by 1050 the Cotentin operations, the V Corps navigation turned out to be an asset, hours the powerful coast defense mentioned in the order must embrace since the obstacles were fewer where battery In this sector was taken and all the Anglo-American forces as- the troops actually went ashore than elements of the assault forces had the Calvados area from the on the sector where they had been saulting advanced to Colleville-sur-Orne. By to the Seine. The enemy as- intended to beach. The enemy had Vire evening a considerable penetration S

mated, I view of the anticipated During the next five days our forces further landings in the Pas-de-Calais, prevention of this Junction was re- worked to join up the beachheads Into that the Allies could not afford to garded by the enemy as second In one uninterrupted lodgement employ more the& two area importance only to 'the defenoe corps else- and to of where. Introduce into this area the Caen, but on 10 June patrols of the supplies of men and materials neces- two American corps made On D-day, because of the chaos contact, sary to consolidate and expand our and on the 12th Carentan In communications produced by our foothold. fell. The bombing, Germans made desperate but fruit- the Seventh Army HQ did In the British-Canadian sector, not less efforts to recover the town and hear of the Calvado landings chief Interest contered in the thrust until 0900 reestablish the wedge between our hours, and then the in- by the British 3 and Canadian 8 Di- formation forces. Our initial lodgement area was both meager and in- visions toward Caen. Exploiting the accurate. was now consolidated, and we held It was not until 1640 hours success achieved on D-day, they that Army an unbroken stretch of the French learned of the Utah sea- pushed southward, and, despite heavy borne assault, coast from Quineville to the east bank having previously re- casualties, succeeded on 7 June in ceived reassuring of the Orne. reports as to the reaching points some 2 or progress 3 miles Meanwhile, on and off the beaches, being made against the air- north and northwest of the city. How- borne forces the naval, mercantile marine, and dropped in that area. ever, the enemy fully appreciated the Meanwhile at land force supply services personnel noon, the German danger in this sector and, employing LXXXIV were performing prodigies of achieve- Corps had optimistically, the tanks of 21st Panzer and 12th but prematurely, ment under conditions which could announced that the SS Panzer Divisions, counterattacked attempted hardly have been worse. Enormous landings by the V Corps successfully in ideal tank country. troops as was the burden imposed upon these at St-Laurent had been con- This countprattack penetrated nearly pletely smashed." services even under the beat of con- Thanks to such mis- to the coast, and drove a wedge be- information ditions, the actual circumstances of and to a faulty estimate tween the two Allied divisions, pre- of the situation, our landings increased the difficulties Seventh Army de- venting a combined attack upon Caen cided by of their task very considerably. The the evening of D-day that for the time being. Subsequent events the landings problems of unloading vast numbers near the Orne consti- showed that the retention of the city tuted the chief of men and vehicles and thousands of danger in the area was the key to the main enemy stra- so far invaded, tons of stores over bare beaches, and took steps to tegy, and during the struggles of the commit its strongest strewn with mines and obstacles, and most readily following weeks the Germans fought available reserves were complicated by the heavy seas in that sector. furiously to deny us possession and Little was known of which would not permit the full use the strength to prevent our breaking out across or objectives of of 'the special landing devices, such the American land- the Orne toward the Seine. Farther ings, and the operations as the "Rhino" ferries, which had in the Coten- west Bayeux was taken on I June ti continued to be regarded simply been designed to facilitate unloading and the beachhead expanded inland. a a diversionary effort which at thie stage of operations. Th. could Meanwhile the Allies had their first easily be dealt with. This beaches and thetr exis had to be estims.te of experience of the enemy's skill and the situation dominated cleared and the beach organizations the enemy's determination in holding out in forti- policy, with fatal results, set up while the fighting was still in during the fled strongpoints behind our lines. ensuing days. progress close by, and on either flank Although German claims of the effect On 7 June the unloading had to be carried on I toured the assault of these strongpoints in delaying the area by destroyer, in under fire from German heavy artil- company with development of our operations were Admiral Ramsay, and lery. Off shore, enemy aircraft, al- talked with greatly exaggerated, it was undeni- Field Marshal Montgomery, though absent by day, laid mines each General ably difficult to eliminate the suicide Bradley, and the Naval Force night, requiring unceasing activity by Com- squads by whom they were held. The manders. All were disappointed our mine sweepers. By 11 June, de- in the biggest of these points was at Douvres unfavorable landing conditions spite these complications, the ma- and in the Canadian sector, where the longe4 for an improvement chinery of supply over the beaches in the underground installations extended weather that would enable our was functioning satisfactorily. Initial troops to 300 feet below the surface. It was to exploit to the full their discharges of stores and vehicles were initial not until 17 June that the garrison successes. After noon on about 50 percent behind the planned this, day here was compelled to surrender. the weather did show some signs schedule, but against this we could In the American sector the V Corps of moderating, and a chance set the fact that consumption had was assault forces, having overcome their offered for us to catch up in part been less than anticipated. Reserves initial difficulties, reached the line of with our delayed unloading schedule. were being accumulated and the sup- the Bayeux-Carenoan road by mid- On Omaha beach, which continued ply position as a whole gave us no day on 7 June, and on the next day to cause us most anxiety, General cause for concern. The artifitial har- established contact with the British Bradley reported some improvement, bor units were arriving and the inner but in view of the check received here 50 Division on their left flank. On 9 June, reinforced by the Zd Infantry anchorages were already In location. I decided to alter the immediate tac- During the first 6 nys of the opera- Division, V Corps advanced rapidly tcLplan to the extent of having tion, 326,547 men, 54,186 vehicle, to the south and west, reaching both V and VII Corps concentrate the. and 104,428 tons at store won line Caumont-Cerisy. Foret-Isigny by upon effecting a link-up through brought ashore over the beaches. 11 June. Reinforcements then stiff- Carentan, after which the original These figures gave the measure of ened the German defenses, particu- plan of operations would be pur- the way in which all eencernqd, by larly in the hills protecting St-Lo. At sued. Of the morale of the men their~untiring energy and courg, the other end of the American whout I saw on every sector during zone, triumphed over the difficulties which the enemy rushed forces to bar the day I cannot speak too highly. the confronted them. Cherbourg road at Montebourg. In Tlheir enthusiasm, energy, and fit- On 11 June, with the linking up of the center there was a stern struggle ness for battle were an inspiration the beachheads, the stage was set for to link the two beachheads across the to behold. the battles of the ensuing 2 months marshlands of the Vir Estuary. The 9 during whit hi the fate of France was

4 27

Rommel hkd, with such fatal mis- to be decided. The enemy never suc- halted through lack of fuel, reinforce- to reach the battle judgment, pinned his faith. ceeded fully in recovering from the ments were unable and by 13 From 11 June onward the enemy confusion into which he was plunged area for the same reason, Army had no fuel strove desperately but vainly to con- by the surprise of our attack and the June the Seventh from which the beachheads which he had effects of our air and naval bombard- dump nearer than Nantes tain qnable to prevent us from secur- ment. During the first 5 days of the issues could be made. Ammunition been fall of Car- orders of 7 June that the campaign all the symptoms developed was also scarce, and the tng.JIe the Allies were to be driven back into the which were to characterize the Ger- entan was explained as due to forces lacked sea were already obsolete; the aim man's resistance in the subsequent fact that the defending things were lacking, now was to save Cherbourg, to at- battles. Desperate attempts to repair shells. These not pos- to Seestablish the wedge be- the shattered communications system not because the Germans did tempt but between the Cotentin and Calvados at met with little success while the Al- sess the means to wage war, of supplies to and to hold fast on the lied air forces continued their on- cause the movement Carentan, im- eastern flank by denying us possession slaught against the enemy lines and the fighting zone was practically the city of Caen. The next 6 weeks far to the rear. At some critical mo- possible when the Allied domination of All this ments Army lost touch with corps, of the skies was so complete. were to see the failure of all three failure to regain corps with divisions, and divisions explains the enemy's of these aims before the moral and the initiative following his loss of it" were ignorant of the fate of their material superiority of the Allied j6:' through the regiments. Already the panzer divi- when our forces broke which armies. sions were reporting that they were Atlantic Wall defenses upon

4t ZS ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LODGEMENT AREA

After the success of the assault the enemy lost the Initiative and battle, and his six nearest Infantry operations had gained us a foothold never subsequently succeeded in re- divisions were brought in by 19 June. on French soil, there followed six gaining it. The hand of von Rund- But it was not until the beginning weeks of grueling struggle to secure of stedt, endeavoring to remedy the July, when the scale of the Allied a lodgement area of sufficient depth errors of his lieutenant, became ap- effort was no longer in in which to build up a any doubt. striking force parent after the first 2 or 3 weeks that reinforcements of such magnitude as to enable began to arrive us of the campaign, when desperate at- from more to make distant locations. full use of our potential ma- tempts were made to form a mobile terial superiority. The process took armored striking force in reserve; This process of reinforcement was longer than rendered we had expected, largely but it was too late. The enemy had hazardous and slow by the owing to the adverse combined weather condi- been forced, by reason of his short- efforts of the Allied air tions whch repeatedly forces and the interrupted the age of infantry, to use his armor in French patriots. De- flow of men and spite the comparative stores across the purely defensive roles. Once this ar- speed with Channel. which tracks The enemy fought tenaci- mor was so committed, our constant could be repaired, our ously to contain prolonged bombing our beachheads, pressure made It impossible for the campaign against though he rail centers was at no time able to enemy to withdraw his mobile forces and marshalling yards collect the strength had effected to constitute a for more appropriate employment un- a marked reduction In serious offensive threat. the operating efficiency Consequent- til early In August, when the break- of the rait systems of ly our operations fell somewhat be- through of the United States forces northeast France and Bel- hind the planned glum, and schedule, but we on the west flank had already sealed by D-day 27 percent of the were able to locomotive build up our armies to the fate of the German Seventh Army. servicing facilities, 13 per- a power which made it possible, when cent of the locomotives temselves,. Lack the breakthrough came, not only to of infantry was the most im- and 8 perelt of the other rolling regain the time lost but to outstrip portant cause of the enemy's defeat stock had been destroyed. All but two the anticipated rate of advance. in Normandy, and his failure to rem- of the Seine bridges below Paris were edy this weakness was due Our immediate need was to expand primarily cut by Allied bombers before D-day, to the success of the Allied threats our shallow beachhead inland to a and during the absequsot weeks leveled against the Pas-de-Calals. depth sufficient to secure the beaches these surviving ones were siso de- This threat, which had from enemy gunfire in order that the already proved molished, together with the principal of so much value in misleading build-up might proceed without in- the road and rail bridges across the Loire. enemy as to the true terruption. We also 'had to capture objectives of Thus the battle area In Normandy our invasion preparations, the port of Cherbourg, which was was main- was virtually Isdlated exeept for the tained after 6 June, essential to permit the rapid Inflow and it served routes which led into it trowgh the most effectively to of the vast stocks of war material pin down the Ger- Paris-Orleans "gap" between the two man Fifteenth required for future operations. Army east of the Seine rivers; there the roads and railroads while we built up our strength in the inevitably became Then, as our strength grew, we congested and af- lodgement area to the west. I cannot forded rich needed space In which to maneuver opportunities for sabo- overemphasize the decisive value of tage and so dispose our forces that the and bombing. The Tactical Air this most successful threat, which Forces also, by best use could be made of our mate- a series of concen- paid enormous, dividends, both at the trated rial assets and a decisive blow be attacks against Junctions on time of the assault and during the the edge of t1he tactical delivered at the enemy. To this end area during operation of the two succeeding the first few we had to secure Caen and establish days following the as- months. The German Fifteenth Army, sault, drew a line bridgeheads across the Orne and beyond which all which, if committed to battle In June enemy Odon Rivers, to eliminate the possi- rail movement was impossible or July, might possibly have defeated by day. This bility of the enemy's driving a wedge line of interdiction origi- us by sheer weight of numbers, re- nally ran through between the Allied sectors east and Pontaubault, Fou- mained inoperative throughout the geres, Mayenne, west of the Vire River, and to Aleneon, fDreux, and extend critical period of the campaign, and our hold upon the southern Evreux, but was readjusted as the part of only when the breakthrough had been the Cotentin Peninsula. ground situation developed. achieved were its infantry divisions The consequence of these attacks Meanwhile, the enemy found him- brought west across the Seine-too upon enemy communications was that self in a dilemma. He had pinned his late to have an effect upon the course the Germans were compelled faith on Rommel's policy of concen- of victory. to de- trating upon the train their reinforcement troops in beach defenses, and A certain amount of reinforcement when they failed to prevent the eastern France, after a circuitous ap- es- of the Normandy front from other tablishment of the Allied proach over a disorganized railway beachheads, parts of France and from elsewhere he lacked any alternative means of system, and then to move them up to in Europe did take place, but it was combating the threat offered. Rom- the front by road. Road movement, meel's confidence in his mines fatally slow. The rate of the enemy's however, and build-up in the battle area during the was difficult by reason of concrete was indeed to the critical oil shortage, apart from have disas- first 6 weeks of the campaign aver- trous results for the Germna Army. tbhe exposure of the columns to Allied aged only about half a division per There being no system of defense in 'bombing and strafing. During the, day. By 16 June he had committed depth, when the beaches were first six months of 1944 the German forced his four nearest panzer divisions to oil production was reduced by at least

4# S

German Air Force, apart from spo- on the maximum scale possible even 40 percent as a result of the bomb- radic fighter-bomber attacks by under the most adverse conditions. ing of the plants by the Strategic Air flights of 20 to 30 aircraft on the During the first week of the cam- Forces, and the outcome was seen in assault area, were limited to ean- paign the Tactical Air Forces flew the trials of the enemy reinforce- tious patrolling by day and sea- some 35,000 sorties in direct support ments and supply columns as they mining by I small number of heavy of ground troops, and by their per- struggled toward Normandy. Whole bombers at night. We were now to sistent blows in subsequent weeks divisions were moved on seized bi- reap the fruits of the long struggl against their targets behind the ene- cycles, with much of their- impedi- for air supremacy which had cost my lines- transport, communica- menta on horse transport, while the the Allied air forces so much effort airfields, fuel heavy equipment had to follow as tions, strongpoints, since the start of the war. Following troop concentrations-- best it could by rail, usually arriv- dumps, and the enemy's failure to take effective degree of confusion ing some time after the men. The. they caused a action against our forces during the that was essential to 275th Infantry Division, for instance, and dislocation initial stakes of the assault, ho rein took a week to move 150 miles from the success of our breakthrough mained on the defensive, being chief- was our air Fougeres. It began the journey by late July. So complete ly concerned with the protection of weather all train but was halted by bombing, mastery that in 'fine his bases, stores, and lines of com- a then the French seized the horses enemy movement was brought to munication. Aggressive support of which had been collected to move the standstill by day, while at night the his ground forces was noticeably division by road, and the destination attacks were continued with the aid lacking, and even defense of their was eventually reached on foot, move- of flares. Von Rundstedt himself re- positions against our fighter-bomber ment being possible only at night be- ported that the Allied tactical air- attacks was weak and desultory. cause of the perils of air strafing by craft controlled not only the main The enemy was, i fact, in an awk- Panzer battlefield areas but also the ap- day. The 9th and 10th SS ward predicament: To take the of- I Divisions took as long to travel from proach routes to a depth of over 100 fensive when his numerical strength *! : eastern France to Normandy as from miles. Even a single soldier, he was so inferior to that of the Allies Poland (where they had been sta- claimed, was not immune from at- was to court disaster; yet to remain tioned) to the French frontier; while tack. always on the defensive would mean the men of the 16th GAF Division, An important factor in insuring slow attrition and a decline in ground having left The Hague by -train on the auccess of our close-support air force morale because of the absence 18 June, were forced to make a grand operations lay in the establishment of the air cover which had played tour of Holland, Belgium, the Rhine- of landing strips on French soil, so large a part in the victories of could land, and eastern France before they from which our fighter planes 194,0. eventually reached the front on 3 operate. Work began on the prepa- The number of GAP planes aval- July. Traveling under such sondi- ration of these strips as soon as we able for employmeqt In the invasion tions, the reinforcements arrived in obtained a footing on shore, and, area had been built up during the Normandy in a piecemeal fashion, thanks to the brilliant work of our six weeks prior to the assault, but an- and were promptly thrown Into bat- engineer services, I was able to this increase in strength was neu- 9 June tle while still exhausted and unor- nounce on the morning of tralized by our air forces, and post- 1940 ganized. By mid-July, units had been that for the first time since D-day reinforcement proved less than from milked from Brittany, the southwest Allied air forces were operating expected. The GAF fighter bases, of D- and west of France, Holland, Poland, France. Within three weeks from Bordeaux to Belgium, were sub- op- and Norway; only the Fifteenth Army day, 31 Allied squadrons were jected to attacks of such scope that bases. in the Pas-de-Calais, waiting for a erating from the beachhead the enemy was unable to concentrate use of new invasion which never came, was All thfs extremel effective is fighter resources over the battle superiority was pos- still untouched. our great air one, and his planes were thus denied very considerable Meanwhile the Allied air forces en- sible despite the D effective employment. Normally the striking power Joyed absolute supremacy over the diversion of our Luftwaffe fighter activities were Bin- preparations to battle area, as indeed over the whole against the eiemy's ited to defensive patrolling behind Kingdom by means of Nazi-occupied western Europe. attack the United the Germans' own lines, an average and heavier rocket During fine weather, a normal total of flying bombs uf 300-350 sorties per day being first flying bombs of over 1,000 United States heavy projectiles. The flown in fine weather, with a max- during the night of bombers by day and over 1,000 RAP fell on England imum of about 450. There was oe the regular attacks heavy bombers by night was die- 12-13 June, and some enemy activity against the three days later. Attacks patched on strategic missions. Their commenced beaches, and bombing and sites were difficult by top-priority targets were the German upon the V-1 attacks against shipping. It was a reason of their smallness, the effec- oil refineries, synthetic oil production reflection of this enemy weakness nature of their camouflage, their plants, and dumps, laut they were also tive that on 14 June RAW bomber Com- comparative mobility, and the ease some $50 available for use, at my request. be repaired. mand was able to send against tactical targets connected with which they could heavy bombers against Le Havre and considered with the Ngrmandy front. Unfortu -' For this reason it was Boulogne In daylight, the first dow- the supply stely the prevalenzt bad weather pre- more profitable to attack light operation in force by the Com- serv- vented our full use of the air weapon, dumps, transport facilities, and mand since early in the was, and delay prog- operations being repeatedly reduced ices. Blows designed to lost only one aircraft on the opera- massive concrete or canceled for this cause. ress on the larger, tion. structures, of the exact purpose of The weather, however, failed to the enemy planes did come which we were at the time saill un- When stop the AEAF (Allied Expeditionary up, they showed a marked tendency certain, also required the attentions Air Force) from constantly hammer- 12 June of large formations of heavy planes, to avoid combat. Only on ing its tactical targets. While i fine react in any considerable dropping the biggest types of" bombs. did they weather as many as\,4,000 sorties a wasn to the intensity of the strength when a mass onslaught day were flown by aircraft of this In contrast.. 1.448 the activities of the made on French airfields by earned, Ie a{tacks were continued Allied air effort, 30

Fortresses and Liberators of the U. campaign. At the bottom of the scale Allied forces already ashore S. Eighth Air Force--the and largest came the foreigners who had either those which force of heavy he expected to land in bombers hitherto air- volunteered for or been pressed into the Pas-de-Calais. borne on a single mission. On this the service of Germany. These men For these reasons, therefore, he occasion the enemy suffered severely were dispersed throughout fixed gar- committed all his availablfe armor at the hands of the Allied fighters risons and infantry divisions in order and a considerable part of his in- and failed to reach the bombers. The that adequate supervision could be fantry to the battle in the Caen sec- )reluctance normally shown to en- exercised over them, but it was from tor, thus rendering easier the task gage our planes was doubtless in their ranks almost exclusively that of the Allied troops in the west but part dictated by the need to con- deserters came. denying us access to the good tank serve a depleted strength; but there The abortive plot of the German and airfield country toward Falaise. was also a noticeable lack of or- miltary clique to assassinate Hitler, His secondary aims, which crystal- ganization and experience on the part which astonished the world on 20 lized as our strategy became clear of the German pilots. The persistent July, seemed to have little effect to him, were to maintain a wedge RAP night bombing attacks of the upon enemy morale. The details were threatening to divide the United past had led the German command little publicized by the German au- States forces in the Cotentin from to concentrate on the training and thorities, and the majority of the those in Calvados, to prevent the development of night fighters, with soldiers apparently regarded the cutting of the Cherbourg Peninsula, the result that day fighter pilots were facts as presented to them by the and to block the way to Cherbourg generally of a poorer standard and Allies as mere propaganda. Nor did itself. He fully appreciated the im- rarely a match for their Allied oppon- the subsequent Himmler purge of portance to us of securing this port- ents. As a consequence of this weak- non-Nazi elements in the ariny pro- indeed, he overestimated the neces. ness, our forces-both on operations duce any marked change in the out! sity of it, being ignorant over the battle area and of our on long- look of the rank and file. artificial harbors project range strategic daylight missions- and prob- The struggle which took place ably understimationg our ability to frequently encountered no air op- during this period of the establish- use the open beaches-but his short- position whatsoever, and the over- ment of the ladgement area, follow- age of infantry and preoccupation all weekly Allied losses averaged ing the success of our initial assault, with the Caen sector only 1 percent of the impaired his aircraft em- took the form of a hard ability to ployed. slugging defend it. match on the British sector of the Our strategy, in the light of The quality of the German ground these front, with the city of Caen as its German reactions, was to forces with whom our armies came hit hard focal point. Here the enemy concen- in the east in order to contain in contact varied considerably. At the trated the bulk of his strength, while Onemy main strength there while the top of the scale came the troops con- the men of the U. S. First Army solidating our position of SS panzer and parachute units, in the west. fought their way up the Cherbourg The resulting struggle around considerably better than those of the Caen,. Peninsula to capture the port itself, which seemed to cost ordinary infantry divisions. Their so much blood subsequently regrouping and consol- for such small teritorial morale, backed by a blind confidence gains, was idating their position to the south thus an essential factor in ultimate Nazi victory, was ex- in insuring in prepartion for what was to prove our ultimate success. tremely good, and whether in attack The very ten- the decisive breakthrough at the end acity of the or defense they fought to a man with defense there was suffi- of July. cient proof of this. fanatical courage. But in the Infantry As I told the press By his anxiety to prevent the correspondents divisions we found opponents In- at the end of August, capture of Caen and the eastward every foot ferior, both physically and morally, of ground the enemy lost extension of our beachhead, the en- at Caen to those against whom we had fought was like losing ton miles emy to some extent contributed anywhere in North Africa. The lack of air and to else. At Caen we held him the accomplishment of our initial with our artillery support, the break-down of left while we delivered the plan insofar as the capture of Cher- ration supplies, the non-arrival of blow toward Cherbourg with our bourg was concerned, and from right. mail, the unsoldierly behavior of D- plus 6 or D-plus-7 the battle devel- The some of the officers, the bombing of enemy's tenacity in the east oped in general as foreseen. This home towns-all tended to lower the en- did not mean that the Allied forces in emy anxiety in the east men's spirits. Perhaps two-thirds was mani- the west enjoyed a walk-over. The of fested from D-plus-1 them were under 19 or over 30 years onward, fol- terrain through which they fought lowing the failure of age, and many were of our attempt to was overwhelmingly favorable to the obviously seize the city tired of the war. Nevertheless, of Caen in our first defense. In the close "bocage" coun- they rush inland. It had not yet reached the dangerous was vital for the tryside, dotted with woods and or- enemy to deny us the itate of indifference. Their inborn Seine Basin: chards, and wth its fields divided by partly as it afforded Teutonic discipline and their native the last natural high tree-topped pmbankments, each courage enabled barrier defending the V-1 and V-2 in itself a formidable stubbornly, them to fight on sites; partly because he needed the antitank ob- and it was only toward stacle, armor was of little value, and the end river ferries to bring over supplies of the campaign in France tlre infantry had to wage a grim that their morale and reinforcements to his divisions broke momentarily. struggle from hedgerow to Many in Normandy; partly because he hedgerow who were so-called non-Nais and bank to bank, feared a thrust on Paris which harassed by in- saw no hope for Germany other than would numerable cut off all his forces snipers and concealed ma- through Hitler, and thought it better to the west; chinegun partly because posts. For this type of war- to go down fighting than to he foresaw a threat suffer a to fare, experience gained by some of repetition of 1918. Le Havre, which was an invaluable Moreover, it can- our units in their intensive pre-in- nat be doubted base for hil4 naval craft operating that the governmen- vasion exercises in the battle-training t4 propaganda~ against the approaches to the as- on V-weapons had a areas of southwest sault area; but perhaps most of all England proved considerable effect in strengthening valuable, as they because he wished to avoid the pos- had there been morale in these early stages of the taught to fight in country sibility of a link-up between those resembling4 that in which they found themselves 31

following an 80-minute bombardment to dislodge us, not because they were at grips with the real enemy. in fighting spirit, but because of the outer defenses, but the enemy lacking After the fall of Carentan on 12 were put into the battle piece- at first fought back stoutly. By 25 they June, marking the effective junction meal as soon as they could be brought June, however, our men Were fight- of the two American beachheads, the scene. In his efforts to prevent ing in the streets while the thunder to the enemy became anxious concerning the enemy found it of the German demolitions in the port a breakthrough, the drive of the 82d Airborne and 9th to employ his forces in area reverberated from the surround- necessary Infantry Divisions which, striking of about 200 infantry ing hills. At 1500 hours on 26 June, small groups towards St - Sauveur - le - Vicomte, by 15 to 20 tanks, a proc- the joint commanders, Maj. Gen. vou supported threatened to cut the neck of the ess which proved both ineffective and Schlieben (land forces) and Rear peninsula and thus isolate Cherbourg. British forces com- Adm. Hennecke (naval forces), de- expensive. The Although the 6nemy's 77th Infantry the enemy to continue these spite having previously exacted no- pelled Division had been brought up from by 1 July any chance he surrender pledges from their men, tactics, until Brittany to assist, his available forces may have had of mounting a large- gave themselves up. The Arsenal were not sufficient to cope with this at any one point had been held out until the next morning, and scale blow thrust as well as with the more direct completely destroyed. By their un- other fanatical groups which even threat to Cherbourg leveled by our ceasing pressure they had never al- then continued to resist had to be 4th and 90th Infantry Divisions which the inititaive to pass to the eliminated one by one. A certain num- lowed were pushing north on both sides of enemy and had never given him the ber of the enemy still remained to the Montebourg road. The enemy con- necessary to withdraw and be rounded up in the northwest cor- respite centrated, therefore, on counterat- mass his armored resources. ner of the peninsula, but on 1 July tacks from the south In an unsuccess- had their commander, Colonel Keil, was Nevertheless, in the east we ful endeavor to recapture Carentan captured with his staff and all re- been unable to break out toward the and reestablish the "wedge," while sistance in the northern Cotentin Seine, and the enemy's concentration deploying a considerable mass of ar- Caen sector came to an end. of his main power in the tillery to bar the way north at Monte- had prevented us from securing the It was the Judgment of Rommel bourg. The town eventually fell on 19 ground in that area we ao badly June, but meanwhile the enemy weak- that, with Cherbourg in our himself needed. Our plans were sufficiently ness In the center led to the evacu- of the beachhead hands, elimination flexible that we could take advantage Pa- was no longer possible. The admis- ation of St-Sauveur on 16 June. of this enemy reaction by directing was tantamount to a confession trols of the 82d Airborne Division sion that the American Forces smash out of the failure of his own policy of entered the town on that day, and of the lodgement area in the west a concrete "wall" to frus- on 17 June the 9th Infantry Division relying on while the British and Canadians kept on the very beaches. reached the west coast at Les-Mol- trate an invasion the Germans occupied in the east. and St-Lo-d'Ourville, The next few weeks were to see the tiers-d'Allone Incessant pressure by the Second north and south of Barneville. The enemy making a frantic but unavail- Army to contain the enemy's strength had formed two battle groups, Ing effort, under von Rundstedt's enemy was therefore continued by Field one of which was to defend Cher- supervision, to create the mobile Marshal Montgomery during July. bourg and the other to escape to the striking force necessary for an elastic Simultaneously, the United States but when the peninsula was defense. But it was too late. south, forces in the Cotentin proceeded to of the "escape" force was of the enemy, after cut, part This inability fight their way southward, alongside trapped. The forces isolated to the success of our landings, to the initial those which had landed east of the included the bulk of two in- reserve with which north form an adequate Vire, to win ground for mounting the fantry divisions, parts of two others, regain the initiative and drive Us to attack which was to break through the naval and garrison personnel sea became very apparent and into the the German defenses at the end of In Cherbourg itself. Once in the British- employed during the fighting the month. Field Marshal Montgom- VII Corps had reached the west coast, sector. While the U. S. V Canadian ery's tactical handling of this situa- was unable to reopen his inland from its Cal- the enemy Corps pushed tion was mastery. By this time, I to the north. to the south and corridor vados beachhead was in no doubt as to the security of Caumont, a heavy, seesaw The Montebourg defense having east of our beachhead from any immediate fought by the Second Army been broken by 19 June, the advance battle was enemy threat, and the chief need was with two panzer on Cherbourg continued. Valognes in the Tilly area, for elbow room in which to deploy the bulk fell on the following day, and three divisions initially providing our forces, the build-up of which had As our pressure infan-try divisions (the 4th on the of the opposition. proceeded rapidly. We were already reinforcements were in- right, 79th in the center, and 9th on increased, approaching the stage when the ca- enemy from two the left) under VII Corps closed in troduced by the pacity of Cherbourg, the beaches, and but these on the city. The German attempt to other armored divisions, the artificial ports would no longer proved inadequate. On 28 June, the hold us at Montebourg, as personally established a bridge- be adequate to maintain us, and it ordered by Hitler, proved to be an British 8 Corps was imperative that we should open 4,000 yards wide and error of judgment, since, when the head some up other ports, particularly those in deep beyond the Odon line was forced, the units which re- 1,000 yards Brittany, so that we might make our state near Mondrainville. The great- treated to Cherbourg were in no River great attack before the enemy was armored 4ivlsious pf organization to maintain a pro- er part of eight able to obtain substantial equality in the battle by the tracted defense of the city. Had the was now flung into infantry, tanks, and grtillery. The attempt to halt withdrawal taken place earlier, Cher- enemy in a fruitless danger we had to meet was one of a cut the Allied bourg might have been able to hold the advance and to position of stalemate along the whole the river. Despite out as long as Brest did subsequently. corridor north of front, when we might be forced to 4eprived us The lesson had been learned by the the bad weather, which the defensive with only a slight fdepth air support, the bridgehead tin3.e the fighting reached Brittany. of full of ioagememt area behind us. o was reinforced and stood firm. The An attack on Cherbourg was - The indomitable offensive rlt cream of the SB panzer troops failed launched on the afternoon of 22 June, I '82

Alied animating all sections of the mor from the eastern to the western forces prevented such a situation evident that the enemy continued to sector, where the 3d 89 Panzer Dlvi- from arising; but It wa hart going regard the defense of Caen as the -Sion had been the only armored unit all along the front, and the first half matter of greatest importance, and In action. P*4zer Lehr now Joined it Of July was a wearing time for both 700 of his available 900 tanks were west of the Tire. On 11 July, Panzer sides. While the Second Army battled still located in this sector. They were Lehr's counterattack was smashed 'furiously against tho enemy armored now under command of Panzer Group by the 9th and 30th Infantry Divi- strength tothe east, thi First Army West, which held the sector east of sions and on the same day the U. S. struggled forward ta both sdes of the Irome River facing the British First Army oened a new the Vire. drive east Second Army. Following the estab- ot the Tre and directly toward St-Lo. lishment of the Odon bridgehead, in- It bad b -MY -Intention that Gen- Promising gains were made, but the terest in the Second Army area was eral Bst$ ;' or.uhould German strike 2d Parachute Corps rallied focused on a Canadian thrust toward to prevent any breakthrough at St.Lo. Caen from the west which led to bit- lls. but t 14*j'orgaulse and ngtoOp 3n lew of the strength af this op- ter resistance by the Germans at Car- start besing made poston to fe First p$qaet, where untio 3 ZW Army, which a three-dw duel (4-6 th *tdance was eaused the aduce to be disappoint- July) for the possession & lborif bug*iaesg, Owing to the of the - ingly slow although General Bradley field was fought be~ween the Cana- clot uat of ountry and the attacked unceasingly with everything dian 3 Infantry Division and the atrocious wt ,. The enemy re- 12th he could bring into action, Field SS Panzer Division. sisted' 6tej talong the whole front. Marshal Montgomery In the VIU Corees rvolent had decided to On 8 July, Field Marshal Mont- fight- redouble the efforts bg raged on the eastern gomery mounted his full-scale assault J& **I LfrflsY1-du-Puits ank and, as he said, area from 4 to 0 uly, to "put the upon Can. Applying the prineples when the wind up the enemy by seizing Oaen" enemy's strongly organtped positions which kA had first employed with in preparation for establishing a such were finally bron.l VI Corps, at- success in North Africa, he con- bridgehead across the Orne. When centrated tacking i terrainl ntriet4d by a maximum of striking tWhi had been done, the Second Army power on one swampy land, suffered heavy loses sector to achieve a could either drive south with Its left breakthrough. The for small gains along the Carentan- attack was pre- fank on the Orne or else take over ceded by Periere highway. XIX Corps attacked an air bombardment of the Caumont sector in order to free nearly 500 RAF "heavies," supple- woe. -the Vire and established a more American troops for the thrust mented by effective naval fire rtd*phead at St-Jean-de-Daye then from toward Brittany. HMS Rodney, Roberts, and Beftst, t.:.rueksouthward. The Germans, for In spite of his reinforcement of and by land artillery. Although six tA u11s V^ St Us&.met., WWas badekas"bassa te-.ar bombb- U

Ing and te wound Mttack, the result line with a newly ar ied Ifantry was to paralyze the enemy, who broke division, a fresh attaek necessted faW tvlsda s d .Mehad before our attack. The bombing hav- its hasty recommittal. These cotin- 540,M4 - t s a*id hSed ,t ig cut off their supplies, they ran ual Allied Jabs compelled the enemy at k t .1f O Cf em, ked out at ammuniation and rations, and to maintain his expensive policy of ,wtdoiad .,baino, eo It"S we oocupied the whole of the town frantically "plugging the holes" to tan comm d peet had been north and west of the Orne. Our ad- avert a breakthrough. So long a the vance was made difficult by the debris pressure continued, and so long as wMe not ,em, Jm, 6mW of his and ertering resulting from the the threat ito the Pas-de-Calais proved psCdrhn. in the wet (,atlde bombing, and the enemy still held effective in preventing the move of the Pase-Qtais) bad tot pet been the Faubourgih de Vasceiles across infantry reinforcements from there committed to the ,b, mnd those the river. across the Seine, the enemy had no were not .ready so mbat. His six divisions in Brittany had already The entry into Caen was followed alternative but to stand on the de- Seventh Army and been bled to help hold the ne in by a renewed thrust to extend the fensive and see the to Normandy, hile In the southern half Odon bridgehead, and the capture of Panzer Group Weqt slowly bleed of France there were gnly 12 divi- Maltot on 10 July threatened to trap death. All that he could do was play denying us ground by fight- sions left, of wich but 7 or 8 were the enemy In the triangle between the for time, for every defensive position. actually available to guard -the coasts, Orne and Odon. The threat produced ing hard thanks to the action of the Maquis vigorous enemy reaction again, the Meanwhile, to the west, the steady Inland. The southwestern part of the fighting for possession of Hill 112 pressure of the First Army forced the cont bad been prectleafy rva- being especially bier. Once more enemy gradually back through the aied of effeav field units. OOyth the enemy wa forced to bring back close countryside, strews with mines, FMftee Armya Inthe Pas-Ge-CAlis inao 4s6 battle the armored elements toward the line of the Lessay-Periers- 19 divieions S m v S left mob- which he had been in pm s of re- St-Lo road, where he had decided to lot SeenM- pieg in Se lo by Infantry and make his main stand. His defense Maniely- aiting withdawing 6o fer a strong strik- was weakest at the westorn extremity -te ON- UiN8uaw nsasa log Sine In veen%. A few days later of this line, but in the 9t-4.4 eetor nemeseS of Sor tying bm ho made a t withdraw- he showed a lively aniey -to bold In twoSSpe d'raluions, but the his important road Junction,4te ap- SeM ttw cae reey on tore of which was esectie!in the 14-17 July 0d ba, zot only to success of our plan 2 a break- AIeaso psi bdho bfla however, St-Lo bkein e huw"stel back, but through. On 18 July, taneweeaoaer the S*tafv m whmlwe owhad saing 9h had udeniebly woV=th In S.oodAsge - samd neco- feR to the 29th DIvisokmnadtie RDaM,- 4we ORd J400 Mae"hmr waf and 30th Infantry Divins, west of noie!Po" of dividing an M9 pan- decsiebe Mt feeto*b"W at &1-l into to battle groups. St-Lo and across the Vire, ad round we hadgaied our footing In Onlyas.IS& S Panser Division, reached high ground suitable for France; in the second we had re- wear from a log period of activity launching the breakthrough attempt tained the Intiative while expanding elia ting In t de feat before Caen, Thus, by 18 July, both S. Frt and onsolIdatIng&or lodgemewtIMoWe se WhihremdaiadsRond1° t PI efmbeWt relidne In Se Ir- nowv aitained In reserve, and the and Second Armies had tke u and building up our strengthIn morn big atak Kth amd east of Caen positions from wich o break- and materials in ediness for9a. flich materislsed on 18 July pot an through attacks were to be borted. decisiveo bow n efollow. end to its relaxation. We now had the requisite room to The enmynew sc This continuing failure by the ene- maneuver, and our divisions in the remedying the fta4 siftuation late my to form an armored reserve eon- field had been built up to 15 U. S. whilch Rommeira reliance on the At- stitutes the outetanding feature of (including 3 armored) and 15 Brit- lantie Wall bad -led him following the the campaign during June and July: ish and Canadian (including 4 ar- achievement of cur ladings. It 'w to it we owed the mwcessful estab- mored), against which the enemy had a coincidence that our old opponent lishment of our lodgement area, safe 27, 8 of which were armored. On ac- of Africa should bestruck down sa from the threat of counterattacks count of the losses which we had the eve oft the Second Army attack which might have driven us baclI inflicted, however, the actual strength across the Orne, which was to be the into the sea. Every time an attempt of the enemy was no more than the precursor of the breakth-rough in the w&s made to replace armor in the equivalent of six panzer or panzer- weaL. 34 THE BREAKTHROUGH

From the beginning of the cam- the much-needed ports, while the lowed by the infantry of 1 Corps and paign in Normandy, I agreed with German Seventh Army and at *least Canadian 2 Corps on either flank. Field Marshal Montgomery and Gen- part of Panzer Group West could The enemy at first proved unable to eral Bradley that our basic policy be encircled and crushed between the regroup his armor to meet the thrust, should be so to maneuver and at- U. S. forces to the west and the while the 21st Panzer and 16th tack as to pin down and destroy sub- British and Canadians to the east. GAF Divisions, which bore the brunt stantial portions of the enemy in The execution of the attack, were- too disorganized our immediate front in order later of this plan opened promisingly. The by the bombing to offer much resis- to have full freedom of action. The enemy, as we had hoped, tance. By the afternoon, the 11 alternative would have been merely was deceived as to our intentions on the Second Armoured Division had reached the a pushing-back, with consequent ne- Army front by the operations Bourguebus area, the Guards were cessity for slowly battling our way in the Evrecy-Esquay area on 16 at Vimont, and the 7 had advanced p toward the ultimate geographical ob- and 17 July. The reserve which to the south beyond Demouville. jectives. By the third week he had been trying to form in July, Toward evening, however, enemy our forces were in position to launch with two armored divisions was hur- re- sistance stiffened and he was able the all-out attack, which, in accord- riedly broten up and part of one of them to counterattack with 50 tanks south ance with this strategic idea, was to was brought westward over the and southeast of Bourguebus. By break through and destroy the enemy Orne to counter our threat. Con- nightfall, he succeeded in establish- divisions then with difficulty attempt- sequently our drive to the south and ing a strong antitank screen ing to contain us In our lodgement southeast of Caen across the river with on 18 guns which had escaped the bombing, area. By throwing all our weight July achieved complete tactical surprise. and this effectively halted our ad- into an offensive at this stage. I felt vance on the line Emieville-Cagny- confident that we should not only The attack was preceded at dawn Soliers. On the following days the achieve our objectives but that, in oh that day by what was the heaviest weather, which had relented to per- the long run, the cost of our victory and most concentrated air assault mit the massive air effort of the would be less. hitherto employed in support of 18th, broke once more, ground operations. The operation was turning the low- The enemy's reaction had lying country con- a fine example of Anglo-Amerloan of the battle area into vinced us that we should strike a sea of mud air cooperation, in which over 2,000 which afforded an hard with our left and then follow effective check to further aircraft of RAF Bomber Command tank oper- through promptly with our right- ations. and the U. S. Eighth and Ninth hand blow. In both cases, the whole Air Forces took part, dropping a total This break in the weather weight of our air power was to be also de- of over 7,000 tons of bombs. While layed the First Army attack employed to support the ground at- which RAF Halifaxes and Lancasters drop- was scheduled for 19 July. tacks. We agreed also that the main Here, as ped over 5,000 tons of bombs in less at Caen, General Bradley and attacks were to be supported by I had than 45 minutes on the area decided that an aggressive action all along the line south overwhelming air of the river over which the bombardment was to pin down the enemy's local re- ground a necessary pre- assault was to be requisite to the serves. He had no major reserves made, United success of our plans. States planes attacked It was not, immediately available, and we the enemy however, until 1E July did concentrations that not fear any serious counteroffensive. to the rear and on the skies cleared sufficiently to the flanks. In the carpet bombing. permit this air effort. Meanwhile the In the Second Army sector, vigor- fragmentation bombs were used to men of the First Army were com- ous thrusts in the Evrecy-Esquay break the enemy resistance without pelled to huddle in their foxholes area through the Odon bridgehead causing extensive cratering which under the dripping hedgerows in en 16-17 July were to be in the na- would have hindered the advance of conditions of extreme discomfort, ture of a feint to distract the enemy's our tanks. At tie same time, a strong while the enemy, similarly en- attention and to cause him to with- naval bombardment was made to trenched behind the natural de- draw more of his armor westward supplement the air effort. fenses of the country, was alert to across the Orne to meet the threat. Although only temporary in effect, every movement. It was not unntil Then, on 18 July, the main British- the results of the bombing were de- after 6 days of waiting, more miser- Canadian thrust was to take the form cisive so far as the initial ground at- able to the American troops than of a drive across the Orne from Caen tack was concerned. Actual casualties any others in this campaign, that toward the south and southeast, ex- to the enemy, in his foxholes, were the opportunity for action came on ploiting in the direction of the Seine comparatively few, but he was 25 July. basin and in Paris. On the following stun- ned by the weight of the bonbing day, General Bradley would The plan of the attack was that, launch and a degree of confusion his major attack across the Periers-. was following a heavy air bombardment ,caused which rendered the opposition St-Lo road at a point west of St-Lo. of the enemy positions, the First to our advance negligible for some Army Having achieved a breakthrough, he was to advance on' a three- was to swing his spearheads west- hours. At the same time, the spec- divisional front west of St-I, with tacle of our mighty air fleets roar- ward te Coutances, in order to the general line Marigny-St-Giiles as iso- ing in over their heads to attack had late the enemy divisions between the primary objective. Three more a most heartening effect upon our St-Is and the coast, and then strike divisions were then to pass through own men. The attack was led by the down through Arranches, creating, the first wave, turn westward, and 7, 11, and Guards Armoured Divis- if possible, an open flank. By this strike for Coutances and Granville, ions under 8 Corps, commanded by means we could then operate thus ,cutting off the enemy in the into Lieut. Gen. O'Connor. These struck the Brittany Peninsula to open up area Perlers-Lessay. These first two4 across the river at 0745 hours, fol- waves were to be launched by VII S

Corps, with VIII Corps subsequently In their dug-in poitions, btIft o.- three Ind an vkon muWSa taking up the battle in the Lessay duced great confusion. Communiea- ptoer af, we mot m a aOM sector and advancing along the coast tions broke down and supples from enem we W'a on our right. the rear were cut off. During the ac- Th a w st wk tual bombing the bewilderment of the is the sector frothg theO l British- As the outcome of the enemy, was such that some men un- States armies: Although threepuss operations, Canadian-American joint wittingly ran toward our lines and dtiions VWr thwe, at e a a I env4saged three possibilites. Firpt, four uninjured tanks put up white nerd stregth wsl S1 - of fine weather, there given a spell flags before any ground attack was to hope for such was good reason launched. Again, as at Caen, this wita s wet S First measures of success by both the stunning effect was only temporary. the Orso, " le s e. and Second Armies that our forces The closeness of the a4r support The advenee Sfret. a=eOw might encircle the enemy west of progress, but by mdnight YE Corm Vire and so eliminate his units as given in this operation, thanks to our recent experiences, was suoh as had aosed Iw Perters-3t-L--oetM practically to create an open flank. &ada 36 July %s lot mty id In this case, it would be unnecessary we should never have dared to attempt a year before. We ha imdeed 2d and 3d Armored -Divin to to detach any large forces for the and made enormous strides forward In au the attack. oson, MaSlgp, enquest of Brittany and the bulk St-Glles were-takes and the St-Le- of our strength could be devoted to this respect; and from the two Caen operations we had learned the Coatances road eut. On the same day completing the destruction of the acros the need for a quick ground follow-up VWI Corps tasked enemy forces in Normandy. As a road to the wet on the conclusion of the bombing, Periers-S-Lo second posstbility, the enemy might The Germans eentinued for the avoidance of cratering, and VU Corps. succeed In establishing a defensive and, as for attacks upon a wider range of to counterattack vigorously, line running from Caen to Avranches, swung westward. targets to the rear and one the flanks the Allied thrust in which case the task of gaining Coutances, It became clear of the main bombardment area. Our toward Brittany would require another large- to retain technique, however, was still not yet that the enemy intended scale thrust on the right flank. as long as possible tn order perfected, and some of our bombs that town Thirdy, f, as seemed very unlikely, his trop fell short, causing casualties to our ththe might extricate the enemy could manage to block from the north. n advance beyond this Caen- own men. Unfortunately, perfection During " July the town of SAvranches line, we had ready a In the employment of eq paratively and lAea were taken, and special amphibious-airborne opera- new tactics, such as thi elose-snp- Perters "de many. mines and booby-trap tion designed to seize Brittany in the port carpet bombing, is attainable the advance on Coutances was pushed enemy's rear. As the situation stood onty through the process of trial and ahead, led by the armored units. at that time, the conquest of Brittay error, and these regrettable losses Pockets of resistance were bypassed was still an all-important aim of our were part of the inevitable price of Among those who lost by the tanks and left to be mopped policy in order that through Its ports experience. was Lieut. up by the infantry. The enemy mean- we might receive and maintain the their lives on this occasion Gen. Lesley J. McNair, whe was while struggled to withdraw his additional divisions with which we watching the preparations for the at- forces through Coutances, but the planned to pursue the battle across from a foxhole in the front infantry elements in the coastal see- France. We could not then envisage tack a heavy blow to tor had commenced their retreat too the full extent of the defeat which line. His death was States Army and a source late, and our air forces took heavy the enemy'was to sustain in Nor- the United me personally. tW1 of the vehicles streaming south- mandy. of keen sorrow to At the commencement ot the ward along the roads converging on On the morning of 25 July an area ground battle, VII Corps, in the sec- the city. The enemy forces north of 5 miles long and 1 mile wide to the tor west of St-Lo, had under com- Coutances at this time comprised ele- west of St-Lo was blasted by 1,495 mand the 2d and 3d Armored'Divis- ments of three infantry divisions heavy bombers of the Eighth Air ions and the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 30th (77th, 243d, and 853d), 2d SS Pan- Force and 388 aircraft of AEAF Infantry Divisions; while VIII Corps, zer and the 17th SS Panzer Grena- dropping over 4,700 tons of bombs. in the Periers-Lessay sector had the dier Divisions, and battle groups of At the same time, medium bombers 8th, 79th, 83d, and 90th Infantry the 265th, 266th, and 275th Infantry attacked troops and gun concentra- Divisions with the 4th Armored Di- Divisions. The German Command tions southeast of Caen, and fighter- vision. The battle began with the ad- concentrated primarily on evacuat- bombers with bombs and rocket vance of VII Corps at midday on 25 ing the 8 formations, leaving the projectiles attacked targets behind July; the 9th Division was on the remainder vo their fate. the American assault area. The total right flank, 4th Division in the cen- On 28 July the escape route of AEAF sorties for this day was ter, and 30th Division on the left, through Coutances was sealed with 4,979. Of all the planes employed with 1st Division and the armor In the capture of the city by the 4th in these massive operations, only 6 the rear. At the same time our VII, Armored Division, which, with the heavy bombers, 4 light bombers, and XIX, and V Corps maintained their 6th Armored Division, formed the 19 fighters were lost. These were pressure along the remainder of the spearhead of VIII Corps. These two chiefly the victims of flak; the army front. South of Cacn, the Cana- formations then pressed on south- enemy fighters offered more combat dian 2 Corps simultaneously ad- ward with gathering speed to the than usual, but did not succeed in vanced southward astride the Falaise Sionne River, while VII Corps, spear- penetrating our fighter screen and road. bonded by the 3d and 3d Armored reaching the bombers. The American advance was met Dtrislons, continued to attc south- westward toward Granville ant As in the case of the bombardment with intense artillery fire, from posi- Arranches. The enemy withdrawal of Caen a week earlier, the air blow tions not neutralized by the air bomb- following the loss of Coutances, be- preceding the ground attack west of ing, on the left flank, while on the into a disorderly did not cause a large number right German parachute units re- tian to degenerate St-Lo retreat, and 4,50.0 pisam W e S of casualties to the enemy sheltering sisted fiercely, The ordinary Infantry taken during the 24 hours of 28 July. Our pressure on this sector was not, Althougk mine fields were laid to If further reinforcements were to however, able to prevent the move slow the pursuit, and German arm- be provided for the Seventh Army, of 2d Panzer Division from the east ored units fought a stubborn rear- and Panzer Group West, the majority bank of the Orne across to the Tessy guard action, the advance was not of them would have to be drawn area, where it made a stand to cover checked. The 5th Parachute Divisioh, from the Fifteenth Army in the Pas- the general withdrawal from Cou- Panzer Lehr Division, and 353d In- de-Calais. Of the Seventh Army itself, tances. Elements of two infantry fantry Division were almost com- only the infantry division in the divisions with a small proportion pletely accounted for by this of Channel Islands and parts of thle two time, the 2d Parachute Division although, in accordance with German were also divisions in Brittany remained un- being brought to the battle area practice, they were recohnstituted at from committed. In the southwest of Brittany to bolster up the a later stage of the campaign. enemy's France, the German First Army had front. Prior to the arrival of 'these Meanwhile, on 28 only two limited-employment infan- July, XIX Corps, reinforcements, the enemy troops op- advancing south from try divisions, three training divisions, St-Lo, reached posing the United States sector, while Tessy-sur-Vire, while and a panzer division (which was en- V Corps at- nominally consisting of nine in- tacked south of gaged against the Maquis). The Nine- the Foret de Cerisy fantry, two parachute, one panzer against stiff resistance teenth Army, In, the southeast, had by 3d Para- grenadier, and two panzer divisions, chute Division. already sent three infantry divisions Farther east, in the had an estimated combat strength British-Canadian of to the battle area, only one of which sector, the Cana- only three and a half infantry, one dian 2 Corps advance toward had been replaced; one fleld-type In- Falaise parachute, and three panzer-type di- had been halted fantry division, six limited-employ- by a strong defen- visions. Against the British sector, sive belt of antitank ment infantry divisions, and a panzer guns, dug-in from Caumont to Cabourg, were tanks, and mortars. The division remained. The double threat Canadians nominally eight infantry and five were probing the defenses, of the Maquis and of Allied landings with the panzer divisions, of a real strength aid of magnificent on the Mediterranean coast support by the not exceeding that of -made it RAP five and a half inlikely that much 83 Group, and considerable infantry and three more would be and a half panzer forthcoming losses were inflicted on the enemy. divisions. for Normandy from this. soure, with the poellbe eeeption 3q of elements of the panzer division, act as my representative, with au- ever, he was defeated by the com- Holland had contributed three lim- thority, under my supervdsion, over bined First Army frontal attacks and ited-employment divisions to Nor- the entire operation as coordinator the Second Army flank drive toward mandy, and its coast-guarding units of activities. This arrangement con- Vire. The British pifensive in the were seriously stretched. Replace- tinued from 1 August until 1 Sep- Caumont sector was preceded by an- ments from within Germany had be- tember, when my operations staff and other smashing air bombardment by gun to arrive in the battle area, but communications were established and nearly 700 RAF heavy bombers, sup- the strength of the divisions oppos- I assumed personal direction of the ported by over 500 AEAF light and ing the Allies continued to decrease. two army groups. medium bombers, which, a usual, Many units had been compelled in Following the capture of Coutances had a paralyzing effect upon the ene- the recent fighting to use service ele- our plan was for the Third Army to my. Prisoners stated that the con- ments, engineers, and artillery per- drive in the western sector, breaking fusion was so great that effective sonnel as infantry, and othersrhad through Avranches into Brittany and unit fighting was rendered impossible been cannibalized to maintain the seizing the area Rennes-Fougeres, for at least 12 hours, although the stronger divisions. thence turning westward to secure Allies last some part of this advan- It was at this time that the effec- St-Malo, the Quiberon Bay area and tage through not launching the tiveness of our threat to the Pas-de- Brest, and clearing the entire penin- ground attack immediately after the Calais began to decrease as the Ger- sula. Meanwhile the First Army cessation of the bombing. Enemy at- mans found themselves faced with a would advance south to seize the tempts to deny us the high ground more immediate danger in the shape area Mortain-Vire. west of Mont Pincon and the valley of the breakthrough in Normandy At the same time the Second Army of the Vire were frustrated; Le Beny- We were anxious to maintain the was to concentrate on a thrust in Bocage was captured by the 11 Ar-. threat for as long as possible, al- the Caumont area, side by side with moured Division (S Corps) on 1 Au- though its greatest function-that of that of the First Army on Vire. The gust and, following heavy fighting, keeping the Fifteenth Army inactive enemy in this part of the front had Vire was entered on 2 August only to during the crucial period of the as- only some four regiments in the line, be itemporarily recaptured by two SS sault and establishments of ,the lodge- reinforced with an occasional dug-in panzer divisions on the next day. ment area-had already been com- tank, and a great opportunity ap- There was a bitter struggle for some pleted with such extraordinary suc- peared here for a striking blow which, days before the enemy was finally cess. The first moves from the Fif- with General Bradley's offensive in forced back from this sector. Farther teenth Army area westward over the the west, might bring decisive results. to the northeast, Villers-Bocage was Seine coincided with the launching Rapidity of action was the vital fac- taken on 5 August and Evrecy and of the U. S. First Army attack on 25 tor now: We could not afford to wait Esquay, southwest of Caen, on the July, when the 363d Infantry Divi- either for weather or for perfection 4th. sion began to cross the river, while in the details of our preparations. By these combined efforts of the other prepared to follow it. The enemy was reeling and it was First and Second Armies, the flank Following the success of our initial imperative that we should not allow of the American salient was safe- breakthrough in the west I consid- him time to readjust his lines, shift guarded. The enemy, having finally ered that, in order fully to exploit his units, or bring up reserves. Our decided to us4 his Fifteenth Army re- our advantages, the time had come policy must be to indulge in an all- sources to reinforce the Normandy for the establishment of the U. S. out offensive and, if necessary, throw front, was now at last replacing, with Third Army. This officially came into caution to the winds. the newly acquired infantry, the ar- existence under General Patton on Our advance in the west continued. mor which he had hitherto kept 1 August, taking over command of On 29 July VIII Corps' armor crossed massed east of the Orne to prevent VIII, XII, XV, and XX Corps, while the Sienne, south of Coutances; two any possibliity of a breakthrough V, VII, and XIX Corps remained witb days later Avranches fell to the 4th there toward Paris and the Seine. the First Army. The two armies were Armored Division; and on 31 July the The armor so freed he proceeded to placed 'under command of General 6th Armored Division reduced the ele- transfer westward toward the Vire Bradley, whose leadership of the First ments resisting at Granville. No ef- area in support of the Seventh Army Army had been so brilliantly success- fective barrier now lay between us troops struggling to prevent a col- ful. General (then Lieut. Gen.) C. H. and Brittany, and my expectations of lapse of the front there, and to pro- Hodges succeeded him as Command- creating an open flank had been vide the necessary weight to hurl ing General, First Army. realized. The enemy was in skstate against the flanks of the Third Army. Earlier, on 23 July, the Canadian of complete disorganization and our Resistance accordingly stiffened as First Army, under General Crerar fighters and fighter-bombers swarmed four panzer divisions arrived from had also become operational, having over the roads, shooting up the Jam- east of the Orne, followed by a further under command initially the British med columns of German transport to panzer division and an infantry di- 1 Corps, to which was joined the such effect that our own advance was vision from across the Seine. Canadian 2 Corps on 31 July. The slowed by the masses of knocked-out Following ,the capture of Granville army took over the eapternmost vehicles. The enemy infantry was in and A -ranches, the Third Army ad- coastal sector of the entire front. no condition to resist us,, and only vance continued against negligible With the British Second Army, tin- the weary, badly battered armor put resistance into Brittany. The passage der General Dempsey, it now formed up any considerable fight. of the Selune River was assured by 21 Army G~oup, commanded by Field At the same time the British the 4th Armored Division's capture Marshal Montgomery. launched their ,thrust south of Can- of its dams on 1 August and then My own operational headquarters mont. The enemy was attempting, this division struck southward to cut was at this time in process of moving with two armored divisions, to estab- the neck of the Brittany Peninsula, to the Continent, and in order to lish a hinge in the Percy-Tessy area while the 6th Armoredi Division insure unified control during this on which to conduct operations de- turned westward toward Brest. The critical stage of our operations Field signed to prevent a collapse of the airborne operation which we had pre- Marshal Montgomery continued to entire Normandy front. In thiS, how- pared to assist I "turning the ti *\ U

ner" into Brittany was rendered un- lapsed so completely that there was F. F. I. In the task of reducing Brit- necessary by the unimpeded rapidity hardly any resistance offered by or- tany. The overt resistance forces In of the ground force advances. On 2 ganized units a b o v e company this area August the 4,th Armored Division was had been built up since in the suburbs of Rennes, and the strength. The Germans, realizing the June around a core of.S. A. S. troops 6th Armored Division reached Dinan, impossibility of formihg any defen- of the French 4th Parachute Bat- bypassing St-Malo. Combat commands sive line on which to hold the penin- talion to a total strength of some of these two divisions, followed by sula, accepted the inevitable and 30,000 men. On the night of 4-5 Au- the 8th, 79th, and 83d Infantry Di- abandoned the interior of Brittany gust the Etat-Major was dispatched visions, now proceeded quickly to in order to concentrate their avail- to take charge of their operations. overrun the peninsula. On 4 August, able strength to defend Brest, St- As the Allied columns advanced, these Rennes was in our hands, and while Nazaire, St-Malo, and Lorient, the French forces ambushed the retreat- one column drove on from there ports which they estimated to be our ing enemy, attacked isolated groups toward Nantes another secured Fou- principal objectives. The forces left and strongpoints, and protected geres and Vitre, continuing south- to them for this purpose consisted of bridges from destruction. When our ward toward the Loire. By 6 August some 45,000 garrison troops, together armor had swept past them they the line of the Vilaine River was held with elements -of the 2d Parachute were given the task of clearing up from Rennes to the sea, thus com- Division and three infantry divisions the localities where pockets of Ger- pleting the cutting off of the penin- -in all some 75,000 men. Inland, mans remained, and of keeping open sula, while to the east the 5th in- only small pockets of resistance re- the Allied lines of communication. fantry Division reached the Loire mained, and these were bypassed by They also provided our troops with River between Nantes and Angers, the armored columns and left to be invaluable assistance in supplying in- Nantes itself falling on 10 August. mopped up by the infantry and the formation of the enemy's dispositions Meanwhile the 6th Armored Division local French Forces of the Interior. and intentions. Not least in import- had traversed Brittany 4o the west By the end of the first week of Au- ance, they had, by their ceaseless and was standing before Brest. gust the enemy had been forced harassing activities, surrounded the The opposition encountered by everywhere ito fall back into the ports Germans with a terrible atmosphere General Patton's flying columns in under siege by the VIII Corps. of danger and hatred which ate into the course of this sweep was negli- Special mention must be made of the confidence of the leaders and the gible, for the enemy's flank had col- the great assistance given us by the courage of the soldiers.

*1 30 THE BATTLE "OF THE FALAISE-ARGENTAN POCKET

first week of August, over, because of the enemy's stubborn Mortain. In stern defensive battle During the these units of VII Corps stemmed the the enemy col- resistance in the Brittany ports, these the completeness of attack. Great assistance In smashing flank was such supplies had to be brought from the lapse on his western the enemy's spearhead was given by were realized and beaches and from Cherbourg all the that my best hopes the rocket-firing Typhoon pjanes of w-h the oppor- way down the west side of the Coten- we were presented the Second Tactical Air Force. They toward the rear tin and through our still narrow tunity of operating dived upon the armored columns, in Normandy to effect corridor at Avranthes. of his forces and, with their rpeket projectiles, de- I felt that the It was the precarious nature of this an encirclement. stroyed and damaged - many tanks a knockout supply route that now dictated the chance$ of delivering in addition to quantities of "soft- there were so favorable that, enemy's strategy, a strategy which, blow skinned" vehicles. The result of the for the Brittany while initially it appeared sound, ulti- despite our need vigorous reaction by ground and air unwilling to detach for mately helped us to accomplish our ports, I was forces was that the enemy attack was major forces from the object of shattering the two German their capture effectively brought to a halt, and a fighting in Normandy. armies in Normandy. As had been main armies threat was turned Into a great vic- the German Seventh shown, the arrival in the Caen sector Into the ranks of tory. For once, the weather was on Panzer Group West had of infantry reinforcements from east Army and our side, and coiditions were ideal cream of the enemy of the Seine at the end of July en- been drawn the for our air operations. If our planes Europe. Our tactics abled the enemy to move armor to- forces in western had been grounded, the enemy might adapted ito take ad- ward the Vire, to prevent an imme- must again be have succeeded in reaching Av- eneny's reactions. The diate collapse of his entire front when vantage of the ranches in his first rush, and this destruction of these our breakthrough was achieved west encirclement and would then have forced us to depend would afford us complete free- of St-Lo. This armor was now massed armies for a time on air supply to our troops action throughout France. in the Mortain area and brought un- dom of south and east of the Avranches cor- it was decided virtually to der unified command, with the In- Therefore ridor, necessarily restricting their upon Brittany. The of driving westward through turn our backs tention capacity to maneuver. VIII Corps of the Third Army alone Avranches to the coast and thus cut- this check and the high would be left with the task of re- ting off the U. S. Third Army from Despite the enemy pprsisted ducing Brittany ports, while the re- its supply bases. This was the first losses sustained, being in his efforts to mainder of our troops, supported by occasion since the commencement of for the time to Avranches, and the the maximum weight of our air effort, the campaign two months earlier that break through during the following could concentrate on the annihilation the enemy had been able to assemble battle contidtued attacks of the panzer of the main body of the enemy. his armor into a strong striking force days. The fierce divisions were met with stubborn re- of the Third Army, strik- of the traditional panzer type; and XV Corps sistance by.U. S. VII Corps, while our south on the left flank of VIII it was desined to be his last panzer ing tactical air forces continued to afford the towns of May- offensive u n t 11 von Rundstedt Corps, 6ccupied magnificent support in bombing and and Laval on 6 August, and our launched his desperate thrust from enne strafing the enemy concentrations. this corps to advance the Siegfried Line against the First plan was for To maintain the weight of his attack, to the east, supported by XII Army on 16 December. The group thence the enemy brought up further ar- XX Corps as these became assembled east of Mortain for the Corps and mored reinforcements, and the fight- From Le Mans a spear- drive on Avranches consisted of the operational. ing continued heavy and confused was to turn northward, advan- 1st SS. 2d SB, 2d and 116th Panzer head around the hills at Mortain. From through Alencon toward Argen- Divisions, with elements of the 17th cing there the Germans could look west- the same time the Canadian SS Panzer Grenadier Division, and tan. At ward over the level plain across First Army would continue its thrust supporting infantry: a formidable which they had hoped to drive to a view to an eventual force. The importance which the ene- on Falaise with Avranches, and perhaps the fact that with the Americans at Argen- my attached to the operation was link-up they thus had their objective within thus drawing a net around the shown by the withdrawal of his long- tan, view contributed to the persistence to the west. range bombers from night mine-lay- bulk of the enemy forces of their efforts. the British Second Army ing off the beaches (almost their sole Meanwhile It was not until 12 August that the Army would close in employment since 6 June) for use in and U. S. First first signs became evident that the the north and west respectively. support of the ground thrust. from enemy had resigned himself to the difficulty and danger The attack was launched on 7 Au- Our greatest impossibility of attaining his objec- of this plan lay in gust, while other elements of the in the execution tive and at last was contemplating of supply to the Third Seventh Army counterattacked at the problem a withdrawal. As on former occasions, General Patton's lightning ar- Vire to safeguard the flanks of the Army. the fanatical tenacity of the Nazi exploiting the enemy's armored drive. General Bradley had mored thrusts, leaders and the ingrained toughness already imposed upon correctly estimated the enemy inten- open flank, had of their men had led the Germans Is our Services of Supply an immense tions, had taken his own dispositions burden. This was successfully shoul- concern as cling too long to a position from in ample time, and had no which military wisdom would have dered only by dint of gallant and to the result. When the blow fell, the dictated an earlier retreat. Already unceasing efforts by the personnel of 4th, 9th, and 30th infantry Divisions, by 10 August it was difficult to se columns, the capacity the 3d Armored Division, and part the transport how the enemy's ooeste--'taek, £6- of which was heavily strained. More- of the 3d Armored Division were sear adtt tat tbW rernnWled a des- Meaawhfe tm r. S. First pore etort be ab~i tgpraray Army nealy 5100 heavies of the H ht pushed southwast from Air a mit dageroa ftt Vire against Force laid a carpet in front tluta, stubborl tratance of a sotl achieve dees nOW. while the Blitish Canadia Second Army attack w k i.e h reached forced the enemy from Bretteville itself. The By 10 August, folowvng a covoer- his dootinatitg enemy fell back position ou Mont Pin- to the line eo. at GeneralBta&es Headquar- eo_-(soUth of the Lalson River be- of Aunay-sur-Odon) and tween Potigny and tem it was deided to estee the op- on Mairieros, where 13 Aunt occupied Thury-1ar- he successfully hold the Onadians ouasdly icr e buielr"*Zerod biy court. Six dayt earlier, the Second for several days. Not until 14 August o. ew ta o e1Gwered a. Amy had eqhlished 1'd .A, a bridgehead was this line broken, following a tread hM peti.ed east- across the Orne below Thury-Har- further heavy air onslaught, woo teCapture 14 IM, at 0 court t Qrhnbosq, and en Au- in the teeth of 17 August Falaise was finally occu- furious opposition. This EAdMWakd *sof htw nosth sajient was pied. From our landings in June un- created In supoort of the Canadian til that day, the enemy resistance in First Army thrust down the Caen- ew et Ue ared *mw"batalu at this sector had exacted more Alled r Mgoih At S a someftZ ops Falelse road. Still, as ever, the Caen &m" begwet bloodshed for the ground yielded ChMaeads toward sector remained the most sensitive than in any other part of the cam- part of the front in the north, and paign. Without the great acrifices O*wdn to p ieAtnmlm em,the the Allied progress 30Amask a.* guarding was slow and made here by the Anglo-Canadian 49 -w eecelrelhg dearly bought against the strongest armies in the series of brutal, slug- Md Amt XY Corps defenses yet encountered in the cam- ging battles, first for Oen and then paign. The Fifth Panzer Army, re- for Falaise, the spectacular advace ILaI& ~ dn~e road placing Armored Sb te 3* i n Group West, now made elsewhere by the Allied forae n t he defended this sector. On 7 August, could never have som" about. An tft -t vm~Mma mada over 1,00W heavy bombers of the RAF With the Third Army trees at Ai- were employed, to soften up enemy gentan and the Canadias at Falase, Jbfith,i rm"1v~W&a concentrations between Caen and the stage wa set for the "Bittle Ari"~ie adton, of the-Ldllowlng 4sf thle Pa"cetof " t" . eMa Nouw gling to keep open the gap between get away; but the 326th, 353d, 363d, forces swept down upon the choked masses of transport, and there was the two towns through which to ex- 271st, 276th, 277th, 89th, and part no sign of the Luftwaffe to offer any tricate his forces from the west. By of the 331st Infantry Divisions, with opposition. With the U. S. Third 13 August, the withdrawal from some of the 10th SS Panzer and 219t on the Seine, the Ger/tan Montain eastward toward Argentan Panzer Divisions, were trapped. Those Army fighter force had been compelled to was under way. Infantry reinforce- armored forces which escaped did so retire to airfields in .the east of ments were beig brought hurriedly at the cost of a great proportion of France, too far away for them to across the Seine- five divisions their equipment. be able now to give anassistance crossed during the week preceding Until 17 August, there was a steady to the ground troops In Normandy. 12 August-but it was too late now seep eastward through the gap, but for them to be able to save the situa- then came a convulsive surge to get Back inside the pocket, the con- tion. In the pocket, the enemy's stra- out on the part of all ranks; and the fusion was still greaier, and the des- tegy was to line the southern lip orderliness with which the retreat truction assumed. Immense propor- through Argentan with his armor to had hitherto been carried out c0- tions as our aircraft and artillery defend against the American forces lapsed suddenly. The 12th SS Pan- combined in pofnding the trapped as he extricated what he could zer Division, aided by the other ele- Germans. Allied guns ringed the through the gap, while a strong de- ments which had managed to escape, ever-shrinking "killing-ground," and, fensive barrier against the Cantadians counterattacked from outside the while the SS elements as usual fought was established with the 12th SS pocket tojassist the remainder, but to annihilation, the ordinary German Panzer and 21st Panzer Divisions at as the gap narrowed they were forced infantry gave themselves up in ever- Falaise. By this means, resisting to abandon their efforts and look to increasing numbers. By 20 August fiercely, he managed to hold open their own safety as the advance of the gap was finally closed near the jaws of our pincers long enough the Third Army to thet Seine threat- Chambois, and by 22 August the to enable a portion of his forces to ened a new trap behind them. All be- pocket was eliminated. The lovely, escape. As usual, he concentrated on came chaos and confusion as the wooded countryside west of Argen- saving his armor and left the bulk remaining forces in the pocket strug- tan had become the graveyard of the of the infantry to their fate-a sub- gled to get out through the dimin- army which, three months earlier, ject of bitter comment by prisoners ishing corridor by Trun, which was had confidently waited to smash the from the latter units who fell into all that remained of the escape route. Allied Invasion on the Normandy our hands. A considerable part of the Road discipline among the columns beaches. What was, left of the Seventh 1st SS Panzer, 2d SS Panzer, 9th SS fleeing toward the Seine became non- and Fifth Panzer Armies was in head& Panzer, 12th SS Panzer, Panzer Lehr. existent, and vehicleq plunged madly long flight toward the Seine, and a 2d Panzer, 9th Panzer, and 116th across the open country in an effort further stand west of the river was Panzer Divisions managed thus to to avoid the blocked roads. Our air impossible.

11%

~'kt ALt 42

THE ADVANCE TO THE SEINE

My decision, following the collapse delaying action until they stood upon advance to the east had progressed of the enemy's western flailk at the he frontiers of Germany. so rapidly that ours men were on end of July, to concentrate upon the The enemy, appreciating our need the threshold of the enemy's home- encirclement and destruction of his for the Brittany ports under the land, and I wished to employ all the forces in Normandy,' and to use al- Lerins of our original plan, fortified weight we could muster to deliver most the whole of our available lre and rejected all appeals to sur- a knock-out blow which might bring strength in order to attain this obr r'enlder. Although the progress of our Germany to her knees before her ject, marked a considerable departure eastward advance must have made exhausted armies could reform and from the original Allied plan of cam- the' garrisons realize that the ports renew the struggle on the Siegfried paign. Under this, as already ex- they held were no longer necessary Line. Already, on 5 September, the plained, a primary objective had been to the maintenance of our forces, they Third Army had been freed from the the capture of the Brittany ports. continued to hold out in their usual embarrassment of commitments in through which it was intended to iii- tenacious fashion, no doubt with the the west, far from the areas where troduce the further divisions freint intention of proving thorns in our its main forces were operating, by the United States necessary to insure flesh after the manner of the British the transfer of VIII Corps to the the completion of the German defeat. stand at Tobruk in 1941. newly created Ninth Army, under The capture of these ports had been The desperate defense which the Lieut. Gen. W. H. Simpson. After envisaged as a task for the Thir'd enemy was prepared to offer was re- the fall of Brest, however, this army Army as a whole, but in order to vealed in the violent and bitter strug- also was moved into line on the Ger- accomplish our new plans for the gle to secure the capitulation of man border, leaving the task of Normandy battle it was necessary to St-Malo, and still more so in the containing the remaining enemy in move the bulk of General Pattons fighting which took place at Brest. Brittany to the French Forces of the forces eastward to carry out the great By 8 August practically all resistance the Interior, who maintained tho encircling movement. in the peninsula had ceased siege during - outside the succeeding months, The prospects of inflicting a do the ports, and our forces had taken under difficult conditions, with such celve and annihilating defeat apli up their positions preparatory to at- equipment as it was in our power to the Seventh Army and Panzer Groulp tempting the reduction of these provide. Although these troops might West had been so good that I had no strongholds. At St-Mal, the town not be able to secure the capitulation hesitation in making my decision. If was occupied on 14 August, but the of the German garrisons, I felt cer- their units could be shattered in Nor- garrison held on grimly in the Cita- tain that the latter were now in mandy, then I knew that there was del, which did not capitulate until no condition to addpt a policy of no further German force in France the 17th. Even after that the enemy aggression. capable of stopping us, particularly batteries on the Ile de Cezembre, While VIII Corps was occupied in' after the Franco-American DRA- commanding the harbor approaches, Brittany, XV Corps of the Third GOON forces landed on the Mediter- continued to resist until 2 September Army pushed eastward and then ranean coast on 15 August and pro- despite bombardment by HMS Malaya north to Argentan in the move to ceeded to occupy all the attention of on 31 August. encircle the German forces in Nor- the German Nineteenth Army. In the At Brest the resistance of the gar- mandy. While the enemy was still event that we obtained the victory rison of 30,000 men under Genera] struggling to escape through the which I anticipated, the Brittany Ramcke was more prolonged not- Falaise-Argentan gap, General Pat- ports would be isolated without hopv withstanding the air and naval bom- ton with XI and XX Corps began of relief, and they would no longer bardments which we used to supple- his dash eastward, across France represent a vitally important factor ment the land attacks. Determined to north of the Loire in-,another wider in our build-up considerations, since hold on to the great port, which had encircling movement. As the battle our rapid advance eastward be would been his chief Atlantic base for the of the pocket drew to a close, XV assured and our reinforcements could U-boat campaign against Allied ship- Corps also joined in this advance, be introduced through the Channel ping, the enemy had to be driven leaving V Corps of the First Army ports nearer to the front line as these back in house-to-house fighting before to complete the task of closing the were cleared. he finally gave in on 18 September. gap north of Argentan. With his Events demonstrated that the de- When at last the Allies gained pos- main forces trapped and broken in cision to throw the maximum weight session, they found the port installa- Normandy, the enemy had no means into the Normandy struggle rather tions so completely wrecked as to of checking the Third Army drive, than detach substantial forces to lay be capable of rehabilitation only to the brilliant rapidity of which was siege to the Brittany ports was fully a minor degree, and our plans for perhaps the most spectacular ever justified. Even though the battle of the introduction of trans-Atlantic seen in modern mobile warfare. The the Falaise-Argentan pocket did not troop convoys to the once magnificent three corps, each spearheaded by an accomplish the utter annihilation of harbor had to be abandoned. armored division, raced headlong to- the German armies in Normandy, they were broken as an effective The heavy price which the enemy's ward Paris ad the Seine with an im- repistance had compelled us -to pay petus and spirit characteristic of flghting force, and our way across for this barren prize convinced me their leader, at once guarding the France was opened. While Franco- that the further employment of large flank of the armies to the north and Amaerican armies forced their way up numbers of our troops to secure the seeking fresh objectives of their own. the valley of the Rhone from the reduction of the remaining enemy The primary objective of the Third south, our forces swept across the garrisons in Brittany-at Lorient, Army advance was to deny to the north of France and through Bel- St-Nazaire, and Quiberon Bay-was enemy the use of the key lines of gins without a check by any major not worth while. At that time outr communication running through the

I I

Paris-Orleans gap, between the Seine hope of supplies from the%southeast, Air power again played an import- the rapidity of and Loire Rivers. As has already been had to retreat toward the ferries ant part in making this advance posible. To each of the seen, the cutting of the bridges over lower down the river a his only divisions was attached a those rivers had compelled the enemy means of escape. armored to to route part of his supplies and re- Meanwhile X1U Corps, on the fighter-bomber group belonging of inforcements from the east to Nor- southern flank of the Third Army, XIX Tactical Air Command the U. S. Ninth Air Force, providing the mandy through this gap, and now It pushed through Vendome to reach "eyes" of the eolumns and smash. was vital that we should out It, not Orleans on 17 August, bypasuing the ing the enemy's troop concentration, only to prevent the German forces small groups of the enemy mustered supply system in ad- in Normandy from receiving their at the Loire crossings upstream fron' armor, and vance of the ground forces. The necessary supplies, but also to bar Tours, Advancing parallel with X11 the most convenient line of retreat CorDs, on Its left flank, was XX closeness of the air-ground liaison in this work was one of the remarkable from their doomed positions. We had Corps, whose patrols reached Fon. features of the advance and produced Prepared an airborne operation de- talnebleau on 20 August, During the suooessful results, to accomplish the seisure of following days the tanks swept like extraordinarily signed over the task the land a sickle around the southeast of The air arm also took this strategic area ahead of the advances, but, as events proved, Gen- Paris to Molun, driving the enemy of watching the long flank of eral PFatton's rapid moves made this back across the Seine, Other elements Loire and of preventing any danger- there. unnecessary. By 17 August-2 days forced their way past the strong- ous concentration of the enemy and bombing ot the small before the earliest possible date for points defending the LOing and Strafing their the airborne operatlon-Chartres and Yonne lvers, and by 25 August the parties of Germans prevented coalosuia into an exective force, Dreux were captured, and the routes spearhead of X1U Corps was 40 miles running to the south of Paris were east of Troyes. The pursuit toward and the Third Army was thus able to pursue Its advance untrammeled by virtually blocked, On the 19th the Germany continued, so that within troops t process was completed when XV 1 month of the day on which the the necessity of detaohinbg Corps reached the Seine at Manted- Third Army became operational is protect Its fak. France it had not only broken out The obie difloulty t the drive Qospilourt: with this important om- mut aom unl gttu Penter i1 Allie alnds, of Nprmr4tr and thtrouhf Urittany 4astwar4 arse :not me hut hl securled the line of the 4ve the armed ponition enpounte'd as MT0 to NorqAndy from Paris Already Itself were severed. Below this point, 4nd h~d advanced 140 wIles 1*pyPR4 from the problems of supply. at the beginning of August, whop 49 bridgps acrops the river remained IPris to within 60 milep of the gqq4rQ Patton's won were ovae' O10, ;444 the e y, 4prved of all Qems born. a

running the Interior of Brittany, the ations In France were rendered un- stand to guard his last ferries as the necessity of transporting from Cher- necessary. remainder of his beaten army bourg and the beaches the gasoline, When our troops had reached the streamed across the river. amaunition, and other supplies Seine at Melun above and Mantes- Following the elimination of the needed to maintain the flying arm- Gassicourt below the city, the position Falaise pocket, the U. S. First Army ored olumns had, as previously men- of, the German garrison in Paris be- took over from the Third Army the tioned, imposed a severe strain upon came intolerable. Not only were they forces attacking northward toward our supply organization. Now that faced with a threat of encirclement. the mouth of the Seine, while the the spearheads were far on their but the Allies were at Versailles, British and Canadians closed in from way across France to the east, these ,t4reatening a frontal attack. Within the west. Day by day the enemy-held difficulties were multiplied a hun- the city, the police went on strike and territory west of the river shrank. dredfold. With the Brittany ports defied ,the German authorities when The Canadians having overcome either wrecked or remaining in Ger- the latter laid kiege to the Prefecture fierce resistance in Cabourg and other man hands, all the materials of war of Police on the Ile-de-la-Cite on 19 coastal strongpoints, the enemy had still to pass through the over- at- August. The traditional barricades tempted a delaying action on the line worked Normandy bases. As the appeared in the streets, the resistance of the Touques River. But that bar- Third Army neared the Seine, truck movement came into the open, and rier was forced on 24 August, transportation became utterly inade- and, for over a week a strange, skirmish- supported by the naval guns offshore, quate to cope with the situation, and ing battle was fought through the the eastward advance continued. we were compelled to have recourse Ev- city. While General von Choltitz, the reux had fallen on the preceding to ak lift, hy troop-carrier planes, day, German commander, made no at- and now Lisieux was cleared. supplemented by heavy bombers, in On 25 tempt to destroy the bridges or other August Elbeuf was captured, order to enable the speed of the ad- and by Installations, a truce to enable the the 30th the last remaining pockets Tace to be maintained. It was at garrison of 10,000 men to withdraw had been eliminated; apart fart planned to allot planes for this from the broke down, and the enemy troop~s beleaguered garrisons in Brittany, no task sufficient ,to lift an average of retired into the hotels and public German soldier remained west of -the 1,004 tons per day to the Third Army buildings which they hed turned into Seine who was not in forward bases, but when the capture Allied hands. strongpoints. Our bridgeheads were linked up along ot Dreux rendered the projected air- For the honor of being the first the whole borne operation in the Paris-Orleans length of the river, and Allied troops to reenter Paris, the our forces were pouring over in con- ga unnecessary, this figure was in- French 2d Armored Division was tinued pursuit. The enemy's crasdto 2,000 tons per day. disor- brought up from the Argentan sector ganization was such that any attempt Invaluable as tWs air lift proved, where it-had formed part of the Third to make a stand on the eastern bank however, t the use of he planes for Army spearhead In the original en- was out of the question, particularly such a Purpose was inevitably attend- circling move resulting In the battle with the Third Army providing yet a ed by otier draw-backs. The required of the pocket. On 24 August the divi- further threat to his line of retreat. numbers could only be provided by sion's tanks were in the outskirts of Cice again, therefore, the accom- Withdrawing craft from the newly the city, and on 25 August their com- plshments of our ground forces had rested FirAt Allied Airborne Army. mander, General Leclerc, received, the rendered unnecessary a projected air- This army had been instructed to surrender of the German commander. borne operation designed to facilitate prepare for operations, not only to During the past 4 years this division the overcoming of a potentially diffi- seize the Paris-Orleans gap, but also had fought its way from Lake Chad, cult obstacle. The battle of western to assist in crossing the Seine and across the torrid wastes of the Sa- France was over, and the liberation the Somme should the enemy attempt hara, to play a notable part in the of the entire country had been as- a stand on the lines of the rivers, and victorious Tunisian campaign, had sured. On 31 August General Hans later in breaching the Siegfried Line been brought to England, and had Eberbach, commander of the ill-fated and In crossing the Rhine. Because come thence to assist in the libera- German Seventh Army, was captured of the obligation of making ready tion of metropolitan France. For with his staff while at breakfast at for these undertakings, the withdraw- these men to accept in Paris the sur- Amiens. lug ot the planes caused considerable render of the enemy, under whose That the enemy embarrassment to the Airborne was able to extri- dominion their country had lain for cate a considerable Amy's commander, Lieut. Gen. L. H. portion of his so long, was a fitting triumph in the forces via the few Brereton, whose program of training crossings left to odyssey which took them from Cen- him following our was thereby interrupted. He justly advance to Elbeuf tral Africa to Berchtesgaden. was due to the skill with pointed out that there was a risk that which he Meanwhile, following the XV Corps organized his system continued cargo carrying would ren- of ferries and thrust to the Seine at Mantes-Gassi- pontons. These had der the troop carrier commands unfit been established court on 19 Adgust, the 7kth Infan- earlier, following our bombing of the for a successful airborne operation. try Division had established the first Since the procedure and training re- bridgehead across the bridges, as a means of transporting river at the supplies and reinforcements to Nor- quired for the two functions were In nearby village of Rollebois on 20 many respects diametrically opposed, mandy, and now they were to prove August. The remainder of the Corps invaluable as combined exercises by airborne troops a means of escape. proceeded to press down the west Some of the pon tons and the air transport personnel were were cunningly bank in an endeavor to deny to the hidden of the utmost importance. I consider, under camouflage against the enemy the lower crossings and thus banks by day to avoid however, that my deelsion to use the detection from to cut off .the only remaining escape the air, and then swung across the planes for ground resupply purposes routes of the elements which had stream at night. By such means, 27,- was justified by the fact that thereby struggled through the jaws of the 000 troops were tt'ansported over the the speed of ou armies, advances Faluise-Argentan gap. In this opera- river at a single crossing is three tion our forces encountered was maintained, and as a consequence stiffen- days. ing resistance as they advanced, and Nevertheless, o this the projeted airborne oper- the losses sustained at,Utbeu the enemy made a desperate by the Ge rmans at the Sen were I 46

enormous. The dense concentrations By 25 AUgust the enemy haS lost, prepared by the Russians of those of tanks and vehicles along the road3 in round numbers, 400,000 killed, guilty of atrocities in the east; it leading to the crossings afforded ideal wounded, ot captured, of which total was not likely that surrender would tarkets for strafing and bombing at- 200,000 were prisoners of war. One be forthcoming from such men. In tacks from the air, and whole col- hundred thirty-five thousand Of these fact, although we might have reached umns were annihilated thus. On the priseers had been taken since the the military conditions of 1918j the river itself, during the seven days beginning of our breakthrough on political conditions which produced preceding 23 August when the exo- 25 July. Thirteen hundred tanks, the German collapse in that year dus was at its peak, 16 barges Were 20,000 vehicles, 500 agsault guns, were still rsm0ta, destroyed, 10 ptobably destroyed and and 1,500 field guns and hearier ar- flehind the strategict Thoks for 116 damaged, and 3 large river tillery pieces had been captured or our Rudeesd lky the maniy ators em- steamers were sunk. Over 2,000 destroyed, apart from the detruction bodied in the etdellewo6 Of the Allied sorties a day were flown by aiteraft inflicted upon the Normandy coast teamwork. This, aS in t. Mediter- of AlAF on these missiotis, while dMfenges. rallea iamptaign, &hai [demoistr- hundreds of planes of the Strategic its ability, ytcadiig throtgh all The German Ailt Force Wlso had ted Air Forces added their weight to the services, tO bvedte thie iot a.- taken a fearful beating. two thou- attacks. These attacks were not car- Verse coliditiohd. bdspitt diffiulesdt sand three hundred and seventy-eight ried out entirely without opposition, to the effrcfd i4jUAtiot et aircraft had been €4estroyed in the due for since the beginning Of the battle commanders aid the bt6deh of man- air and 1,167 on the ground, in addi- of the Falaise pocket the Luftwaffe taining signal dinithilcatidbt ovoi tion to 270 probably destroyed atd come up in greater strength than long didtaftef tfId it t&$didt han. had 1,028 probably damaged in the air. Ing for some time past in a desperate ef- situtiont, the eanintiid sytetfi, These figures are all the imore re- fort tO assist the Getman gtoufld based Upon cofipiet iatet'-Allicd con- markable when one considers the forces. The enemy suffeted severely fidence, fundtioted smo0thly through- depleted strength of the Luftwaffe in this air effort, however, and the out the caigt n. losses dustained-ceoupled with the and the feebleness of its attempts to the Allied operations. In assessing the reshM fOC Vie thrust counter effects of the Third Army's tory, one must takl iato se"ghtvil eastward which necessitated a rapid fy the end of August the tmorale only -the achieveinents tIa-the teld on withdrawal to more distant bases of the enemy, as retesled in the but the care/and foftight which the part of the Germand fighter squad- prisoners who passed through the were applied tO the preparstiong be- rons--were such as to produce a Allied cages, was distinctly lower fore D-day. It was to the meticulous marked decline in the scale of the air than it had been a month earlier. care in planning and preparation by opposition subsequently encountered. A lack of determination *Ka partic- my staff, supportSd reSiltely in all Although the rush crbssing of the ularly tictiecable among the iflfantry, important aspeets by the Conbined lower Seine, planned to be made by whose outlook, for thet most part, Chiefs of Staff5 that to owdd such 21 Army Group and the U. S. First was one of bewilderment aid help- essential factors as--the degre of Army in phase With the Third Army lessness. This state of mind was pro- suprise achieved if out landings, the advante through the Paris-Orleans duced by the rapidity of the Allies' excellence and s0tcieney of our am- I gap, had been somewhat delayed by movemeftt, their oterwhiltfiifl9 su- phibious equipmeat, and the superb the stubborn natitre of the enemy's periority in equipment (buthf Oh the organization which la behind the rearguatd actions, the elimination of ground and in the air), and 'by the miraculous aehievmtftts of our sup- the last German pocket west of the Germans' own toges of ah s and ply and mainteflnee sletitod, river nevertheless marked the com- transport which had left thet w*ith- pletion of a great vietory. The Ger- out the necessary means of tfntinttlg 'While it is true that *htwe hOped man Seventh Army and the Frifth an adequate defense. Ott t Straf- that the tactical dsvelopaliet of the Paner Army had been deilsivfly 0- Ing attacks had espectallY eotLtrib- first few dais woUld yield ,us the fasted, and into the debacle had been uited toward breaking the enemy's territory south and sotheasit of drawn the bulk of the fighting spirit. The great majority Of the en- Casa, so suitable for the construec- strength of the First ahfd FIfteenth listed men from the ordifaty In- tiont of necessary airfields and for Armies. Since our landings 0h 6 Jftne, fantry divisions stated that thy Wten exploitation of our strenigth In armo?, of the enemy's higher coimanders, glad to be out of the war, but the the fact remains that in the bread elite of tht jS formations three field marshals, and one amy stil e- strategic development we attained commander had been difthssed or tained something of their former our anticipated line1 of f-Dplus9 incapacitated by wounds, atid I army arrogant self-confidene. Mafty of the two weeks priot to thdt date an d in commander, £ eorps commanders, 16 denior oefter wetO now prepared to substantial accordance with our divisional omtfmandets, anid I fortres rdeognise the inevitability Of defeAt, planned strategic Ptoftaf. Moreover, commander had been killed or cap- but the younger ones, in whom the I am convinced that w*ithout the btil tured. Nazi spirit Was strongest, still pto- liant preparatory work of our joint STho enemy's losses in men and claimed the invincibility of the Ger- air forces-a belief in the effective- equipment since thO commencement man cause. The army as a whole. ness of which was the tory corner- of the campaign had been enormous. despite its losses, had clearly hot stone of the original invasion con- 9f his panzer divisions, the equiva- yet reached the stage of mass morale ception-the nture could never lent of five had been destroyed and collapse, and, as events subsequlently logically have been undertaken. Ia further six severely mauled. The showed, the escaping elements were The greatest facto? of all lay ii equivalent of 20 infantry divisions still capable, when given a Pauslfo? the fighting qualities of the soldiers, had been eliminated and 12 more (in- breath, of renewing the struggle with sailors, and airmen of the United Na-. cluding S crack parachute divisions) all their old determination on the$ tions. their valor, stamina and do- •had been badly cult up. Three divi- threshold of the F~atherland. Of the totion to duty had proved beyond s ions were trapped in lirittany and generals participating in-the for- praise, and contihued to be so s another division was isolated in the maady campaign, it ii interesting to the liattle of France gave place to Channel ISnAd. - that all appeared em IM flit til. Batte of Gemn. 446 THE BUILD-UP AND THE ALLIED NA VIES -

The landing in Northwest Europe 000,000 tons, had to be prepared and flank; his coastal forces were mass- being the largest amphibious opera- fitted into the complex plan of the ing at Cherbourg and Le Havre to tion ever undertaken, the problem subsequent build-up. These mer- prey upon the approaches; and his of supply to the armies on the far chant ships presented a peculiarly aircraft were nightly engaged in lay- shore entailed' an organization of delicate problem, as the 70,000 men ing mines. It was, moreover, not only unprecedented magnitude and com- who sailed them were not under di- with the human antagonist that our plexity. I have already indicated the rect naval discipline. Nevertheless, navies and mercantile marines had to obstacles which faced my logistical their crews surrendered many of the contend. The weather during June, planning staff during the months of age-old privileges of the sailor in 1944 was the worst experienced for preparatory effort. There was a strug- their willingness to become part of that month during the present cen- gle to acquire the necessary shipping the great invasio machine, and dur- tury. The gales which had threatened and landing craft, a struggle to col- ing the months following D-day they us with disaster on D-day itself con- lect the requisite tugs, a struggle served the cause with consistent tinued to hamper our operations against time to prepare the novel courage and devotion to duty. throughout subsequent weeks, cul- devices, such as the various elements The lightness of our losses at sea minating in the great storm of 19-22 of the artificial harbois upon which and in the anchorages compared with June, the effects of which were so we so greatly relied; eventually there the number of ships involved is the serious as to imperil our very foot- was the herculean pre-D-day task of best measure of the success with hold upon the Continent. After the assembling the vast armada in the which the Allied navies kept the gales came the fogs of July, which ports of southern England in such a seas and held the enemy at bay from once more held up the cross-Channel manner that it might be loaded and the invasion area. Behind this suc- shuttle services. Through all this the sailed to schedule and yet achieve the cess lay in part the experience gained perseverance of the seamen kept the seemingly impossible in escaping the in the expedition to North Africa in armies in the field. attention of the enemy. Events were 1942, but off France, operating in The principal handicap to the to show the success with which these much More difficult waters, the prob- 'build-up after D-day sprang from the and many other difficulties were over- lems facing them were often new shortage of landing and ferry craft come. I must also acknowledge the and always far more complex than following the serious losses among work of my Chief Administrative Offi. those encountered earlier. In this the mines and obstances during the cer, General Gale, of whose abilities operation we staked our all in many assault. Also, apart from the invalu- I had received full evidence during respects upon unknown factors, and able dukws, many of the minor land- the campaign in North Africa and to the skill with which the navies ing craft proved too lightly built for Italy, but whose achievements in that met the unexpected our initial vic- continuous service in waters as rough theater were dwarfed by his accom- tory was largely due. New enemy de- as we experienced, and this was par- plishments in the invasion and liber- fense devices and weather of un- ticularly true of the rhino ferries, ation of Northwest Europe. precedented foulness even for this the serviceability of which rarely When the anxieties of D-day wA'e capricious English Channel alike rose over 50 percent. Another major over, the burden of responsibility of failed to overcome this ingenuity and worry arose from the losses we suf- those in charge of our logistical determination. Such adverse factors fered in motor transport ships from services was in no way lightened. might prevent our supply from at- mechanical defects and enemy action. Some problems might be solved by taining the theoretical maximum, T6 overcome these difficulties we experience, but new ones were ever but from D-plus-2 onward, except Were compelled to resort to "drying arising. The smooth running of the for the great storm later in Sune, out" LST's and coasters on the shuttle service across the Channel, there was never any real danger of beaches. Such a process had previ- the efficient transfer of supplies to our maintenance failing, and the ously been thought too dangerous to the armies over the beaches and armies never went short of food for attempt, but having been adopted as through the ports, the protection of men or ammunition for guns. On 1 a desperate expedient on D-plus-l, the supply routes, and safeguarding July the Chief Administrative Offi- it proved so successful as to be con- of the packed anchorages as the cer was able to report that the com- tinued as a regular practice. The only build-up progressed, remained the manders in the, field had complete drawback was a slower turn-around responsibility of the Allied Naval freedom of action as far as supply and consequent tendency for shipping Commander, Admiral Ramsay. His arrangements were concerned. to accumulate off the far shore. untimely death on 2 January 1945 By D-plus-5 we had in the main By thus profiting from the lessons was a great loss to the Allied cause. successfully overcome the initial The handling of experience, the Allied navies and of the large number struggle to get the beachheads or- of varied mercantile marines were able to land craft employed was a most ganized. We had cleared the enemy praiseworthy over 500,000 men by D-plus-9, and feat on the part of from all the beaches; the Allies had Admiral Ramsay the millionth man stepped ashore in and the Task Force linked up along the whole of the in- Commanders France on D-plus-28. Apart from the responsible for the exe- vasion coastline; the first units' of cution of his orders. Over 5,000 ships the artificial harbors were in posi- personnel landed, a million tons of stores and nearly 300,000 vehicles and craft were employed in the action and the build-up forged ahead were put ashore by D-plus-38. At the tual assault, and in addition over steadily. The enemy was still in a end of August, when the German 2.000 Allied merchantmen, with an position to bring gunfire to bear upon armies were in flight eastward be- aggregate displacement of some 4,- the beaches and anchorages on either yond the Seine, but while we were 4W still basically dependent for our tivity following the Quebec Confer- low tide they would ret frmly on build-up on the Jjeaches, Cherbourg, ence in August 1943, when the out- the roeky foreshore. Seven miles at and the artificial harbors, the Allied line of the harbor project was ap- piere, with 16 pierheads, were armies under my command exceeded proved, the Mulberry scheme occa- planned. Outside the ring of Phoenix 2 million men. For them over 3 mil- sioned me and my staff many a head- caissons and Corncob blockships was lion tons of stores had been brought ache. Some of the prototype units to be a further floating breakwater ot across the Channel, together with evolved promptly sank when tried out 200-foot steel Bombardon units, de- over 400,000 vehicles. at sea (although their models had signed to provide a sheltered anchor- Thus, despite the trials of wind behaved excellently in the storms of age for Liberty ships, within which and weather and the persistent at- experimental tanks); labor difficul- they might stransfer their cargoes to tacks of an ingenious enemy, the ties caused hold-ups in construction, ferry craft. The enclosed area at each necessary rate of reinforcement to and securing the necessary tug allo- Mulberry was to extend some two our land forces was maintained. Our pations was in doubt up to the last miles in length and one mie in wdt. build-up outstripped that of the Ger- moment. Confusion, moreover, was In all, 400 units, totaling 1,H0,0" mans, deceived as they were by our occasioned by the division of respon- tons, had to be towed aow-ea, latent threat to the Pas-de-Calais and sibility between the Admiralty, the Channel, and 160 tugs were reured hampered by our air attacks upon War Office, and the British Ministry to make 35 heavy tows daily is order thbir communications. of Supply. The Minister of Labor per- to complete the installation 1W S A great part of the men and sup- formed the miracle of raising the target date of D-plus-18. plies were landed over the beaches by necessary workmen from a labor-ex- The accurate and sueeefuDl fprm- the splendid effort of naval and en- hausted Britain, however, and the lng of the Mulberry unts reprwled gineer personnel who handled this construction of the huge concrete a triumph of skill for the two navie difficult operation. Despite the delays caissons in pits beside the rivers, into respectively responsible for the in- occasioned by unfavorable weather, which on completion they were floated stallations off the American and BrS the rate of discharge over the beaches by breaching the retaining tanks, ish beaches. The sinking of the Goose- was maintained at a high level. At was typical of the ingenuity and re- berry blockships began on D-plus-1, Omaha beach, for example, the daily source by which difficulties were met and by the following day OAt average of supplies unloaded from and overcome. Not least of our anxi- Mulberry tows, which had set out ea D-day to 30 September was 10,000 eties was the fear that the enemy the morning of D-day, had Memved tons, the daily rate reaching nearly should learn of our intentions, par- off the French shores. The flbtie- 12,000 tons for the critical period of ticularly in view of the large amount tion of the harbors la c&*w July and August. At the smaller Utah of easual labor which had to be emq gested waters, under oW ae4s, / beach, the daily average from D-day ployed, but events proved that the during the early stagso ow k through September was 5,000 tons, secret was well kept,, a remarkable gigantid enterprise was a tok of el and during this period upward of achievement considering the thou- tree complexity, but t was e 750,000 men debarked at this one sands of men and women, who had a ditiously and accurately carried out point. Since Cherbourg did not begin hand in the work, of constr74otion. and in the course of the two weeks to function in volume until August, Ibdeed, so complete was the ignor- followIng 6 June 'the portsraidl and only approached a 14,000-ton ie f the enemy a1 to o~r inten- took shpe. By the morning of D- daily average in September, the im- tions, and so locking wa he in air pke-5 the Weekihip breakwaters in portance of the beaches to our supply reconnaissance when the plans were both harbors were completed, and a& is easy'to appreciate. being put into effect, that it was not the Gooseberries were In tl uA" Another factor of Importance was until mid-July, when the scheme was except at Utah beach, work on wbtc pretieviy completed, that he rea- had been kindered by enemy gamft. the novel expedient upon which we By D..p-a-1O al 'the Gooseberrie stake4 much of our chanee of suc- Used the existence and purpose on the eess, the artificial harbors. Although Mulberry. Then he failed to apre- were eomp4eted and the Mulberfts our plan of operations called for the cieae its true significance, a uming "4pereent so. The towing o tse seizure of Cherbouug at an early it to be an improvised measure foreed huge, ceumbersome caisson and realized that the Germans upon us by the extent of his Lo- seetkomn opf and perieadi we date, we ma- might leave the port in such a condi- lilons at herbowg ad the ravages sqeiderab hampered hr he tion as to preclude As fu ll e for of the storms. ttmed bad weather, and uo a meuy weeks fllowing its apture. Under the fuel scheme, ve shel- thldlof the Whole u=its 10t in The Mulberry artificial harbors were tered anchorages, known a Goose- tMasit brcgh tis oc. Br 1$ judged essential to etsure the dis- berries, where landing craft could June, however, lengths of pier were charge of cargo, under conditions opetate when an on-shore wind might already In vse; the Mulberries as a that would be relatively independent otherwise hamper their unloading, whoc were about 90 pereent eom- of weather during the crucial early were to be constructed with mnken t, and over t,0 bn e stores stages of the campaign. When the blockships, one Gooseberry to each a day wee being MaS in s time came for the execution of the of the five assault beaches. Two of British harborLone. June, broke bem scheme, the Mulberries were sub- these anchorages wore subsequently On that day, 19 storm which at one time seemed jected to strains of a severi~ty far to be expanded into complete Mul- great aS our work to de greater than we had believed likely. berry harbors, each the size of Dover certain to ,bring boon unit- Nevertheless, although the American and coating some $100,600,000. A ater. The weather hadl harbor bad eventually to be written Mulberry was to consist of a break- tied since D-dsy, but the os-shoe which now blow up wooS of as a total less, the British Mul- water of sunken blockahips, supple- gale worst known in June her 4* years berry, which suffered less, was re- mented with sunken concrete cais- past. The Mulberries ook isc futll paired and continued to function. It sons, each 200 feet long, known as force of the mountainous en dr-iven W'as o tremedous aid to ear oper- Phoenix. Within the shelter thus pro- by the gale, and the situation wasS Miensl durn the summer. vided, LSTs and coasters could dis- the worse qinoe the storm had sot In the months of continued experi- charge their cargoes on to" floating been .xpectk and so forot of it metand lovetcha construetlonal so- Whale pier, so contrated that at 0t ,-~'

were received. All unloading, except view of the damage sustained the the Scheldt made safe for our ship- for a few ammunition and fuel car- original plan for the St-Laurent Mul- ping that the beach Installations and goes which were taken off by intrepid berry would have to be abandoned, the Mulberry became superfluous. dukw crews, had to be suspended, although the remaining blockships Throughout the summer of 1944 they and shipping in the congested an- could be strengthened to provide a represented an essential factor in the chorage was soon in difficulties. The shallow anchorage for barges and success of our operations. 'Without storm continued for 4 days. During small craft. The Arromanches Mul- them our armies could not have been that time, tows caught in passage berry, having suffered less, could be adequately maintained in the field, were lost, and craft and ships off the repaired and completed; moreover. and the men who worked them with beaches dragged their anchors and by decking in the caissons and mak- so much gallantry and devotion de- were dashed ashore. To add to our ing other modifications, it was serve the gratitude of liberated Eu- troubles, the enemy's new Oyster thpught that it could be made to last rope for their share in, our victory. mines were activated by the move- until October or possibly longer. Sal- Of the natural ports which fell into ment of the waters and caused fur- vaged material from St-Laurent was our hands before the opening of Ant- ther casualties. By 21 June the Mul- available to complete the three dam- werp, only Cherbourg, third biggest berries themselves began to disinte- aged piers. This scheme for the report of France, had a capacity that grate, particularly the United States habilitation and winterization of the would appreciably lighten our sup- Installation, which was in an even Arromanches harbor was approved ply problems. The small harbdrs more exposed position off St-Laurent and the work was at once commenced. along the Norman coast, such as than the British one at Arromanches. In the accomplishment of the work, Ouistreham, Courseulles, and Port- The Bombardons of the outer break. I was given loyal and effective help en-Bessin, had their value, particu- waters broke adrift and sank; the by the British authorities, although larly during the early days of the Phoenix caissons shiftec; and the the difficulties facing them were le- campaign, but their capacities were angry seas'poured through the gaps, gion. The supply of labor was a par- small, and the same was true of Gran- pounding the ferry craft against the ticularly serious problem at a time ville, St-Malo, Morlaix, and the other piers and smashing them to pieces. '-hqn the repair of V-bombed houses harbors uncovered by our subsequent Only the blockships saved the situa- in London drew heavily upon the re- drive south through the Cotentin and tion from becoming one of completed sources. United States general service into Brittany. Brest, when it even- disaster. troops and naval construction per- tually fell to us after stubborn re- During 22 June the fury of the gale sonnel were made available to assist sistance, was so fully destroyed that, gradually abated, but the seas con- in this respect. By great efforts and in view of its remoteness from the tinued to run high and hinder the jmcrifices on the part of all concerned, main battle front, It was considered work of salvage. Atter the Mulberries the work was accomplished. Although useless to attempt any major rehabili- had been so near completion and the the winterization modifications had tation. beach organization had got into its yet to be finished, the harbor was Cherbourg, however, represented a stride, it was appalling to contem- virtually completed and the storm cardinal factor in our basic logistical plate the damage wrought by the gale. damage repaired by 20 July. At the plans. The sea and airborne landings Despite the gallant efforts of the tug end of that month nearly 4,000 me&, in the Cotentin, as has been shown, crews and other personnel to save over 400 vehicles, and over 11,000 had been expressly designed to facili- the shipping, efforts which cost them tons of supplies were disembarked tate Its early capture so that we heavy loss of life, some 800 craft within its shelter during a single per- might use its valuable harbor as an were stranded on the beaches, and iod of 24 hourq. Throughout the sum- all-weather base through which to the greater part of these suffered mer and autumn the achievements of introduce supplies. The enemy, on damage. Wreckage was strewn over the Mulberry exceeded our best hopes, the other hand, fully appreciated the the sands along the whole Invasion for, although the planned rate of importance to us of an early seizure coastline. Some 600 craft were even- supply discharge was 6,000 tons a of Cherbourg, and when his attempt tually refloated on the 8 July spring day, the actual average, from 20 June to defend the city failed he under- tides and a further 100 a fortnight to 1 September, was 6,765 tons. took, with typical Teutonic thorough- later, but the resulting shortage of The course of our military fortunes ness, the task of rendering the har- ferry craft was a serious blow which was to make the utmost demands bor unusable. hampered us throughout the sutn- upon the means upon which we were Cherbourg's commander surrend- mer. so completely dependent for supply. ered on 26 June, and the U. S. Port Of the Mulberries themselves, that Although by September we had de- Clearance party began the work of at St-Laurent was so shattered as to feated the enemy decisively in Nor- tidying-up o*the following day, al- be irreparable. Due to the scour and mandy, he knowing our necessities. though nests of resistance among the sea action, the main Phoenix break- clung obstinately to the western ports dockyards were yet unsubdued and water at St-Laurent was broken and of St-Nazaire and Lorlent, as well as the guns of the breakwater forts pre- the blockships had sunk some 10 to to the Quiberon Bay area (which we vented minesweeping. While certain 12 feet below their original level. At had planned to develop into a major major facilities survived, such as the Arromanches the Phoenix breakwater harbor), while demolishing the in- breakwaters enclosing the great an- could be made good, at least tempo- stallations at Cherbourg and Brest so chorage and some of the drydocks, rarily, and the line of blockships had thoroughly that It required many the extent of the enemy demolitions held. The treat value of these latter weeks' wop'k before they could be represented a formidable task to was such that on 23 June, while the the stored to full capacity. Under these clearance personnel. Seventy-five per- seas still ran high, 4,500 tons of circumstances the open beaches and cent of the cranes had been destroyed, much needed supplies were unloaded the Mulberry continued to be the over a dozen vessels had been under the shelter still afforded. The sunk main channels of supply to our armies to block the dock entrances, and outer Bombardon breakwaters were during the period when their drive quantities of every kind of mine had completely wrecked and had to be eastward across France forced logis- been sown. abandoned at both anchorages. Such equipment as was tical demands to a peak. It was not not On 26 June It was d~ided that in destroyed had been immobilized until Antwerp had been captured and by the removal of vital parts and the 49

came at the end of July and the skilled labor had been evacuated. clearance work. Subsequently, how- were enemy retired eastward. The task of mine sweeping was ever, these teething troubles of the fraught with difficulties and dangers, overcome and further lines were laid During the early stages made some day- even when the forts had been re- over the shorter route from Dunge- campaign the enemy attacks upon the anchorages duced, but by 19 July the port came ness to Boulogne. These provided our light fighter-bomber into use ana unloading began. At main supplies of fuel during the win- with bomber and proved very in- first the disembarkation of stores ter and spring campaigns. planes, but these abandond. t was mainly by dukws, but through 'For the protection of our" cross- effective and were soon in conjufic- the summer work on the harbor in- Channel shipping routes and hence Night raiding (sometimes craft attacks), con- stallations went on at a feverish pace. for the successful maintenance of the tion with surface casualties. We By the end of August, Cherbourg was armies in France we were dependent tinued and caused this connection that, a'W;-g handling an average of over 10,000 upon the ceaseless work of the Allied found in naval antiaircraft fire,.wfl tons a day, and by the beginning of Navies, assisted by RAF Coastal Com- though was not, es 6 October, when the work of recon- mand. These kept constant Watch, to good, fire discipline among the large 844A tA . struction was completed, its capacity such good effect that the shipping enforce shipping. 4 em-mOft was as great as, If not greater than, losses we sustained due direct ene- fleet of merchant Bltnd Snftiag had been the case before the war. my action were extremelly small ,in bled for the build-up. without orders resulted In theJos of; supply of fuel proportion to the vast tonnage In- The cross-Channel some friendly planes, and evnut*11aiy, OVER- volved. / for our armies in Operation the Allied Naval Commander was a special problem. his main LORD constituted The enemy concentrated forced to prohibit all-night antlitr-. beaches and an- Although the lines of communication eflorts against the craft fire by merchant ships. over which the fuel had to be chorages. From landward, although both bombs and torPe- brought, from the United Kingdom our penetrations soon insured the Although does were dropped by the night raid. to the battle front, were not as long freedom of the central beaches from era, their chief effort was devoted as those to North Africa, the rate of artillery fire, the flank ones re- to minelaying, supplementing the ac- consumption was far higher. During mained objects of attack. The rb- tivities in this respect of the surtace the assault phase we had naturally to duction of the Cotentin Peninsula craft based on Le Havre. The mining rely upon canned gasoline, but by 3 removed this menace on the west, aircraft were awkward enemies with July bulk supply was being intro- but Swdrd beach-the easternmost which to cope; they frequently op- duced by ship-to-shore pipe line from of the British sector-continued to erated in single sorties, up to a tankers to storage dumps, thus af- be exposed to enemy shelling as well trotal of 50 a night,, the planes flying fording a considerable saving of time as to attacks by E-boats, explosive in low and dropping 'their mines and tonnage. For the period when the motorboats, and human torpedoes out of range of the shore defeUses. armies had attained the strength to based in the Seine area. The result- Such attacks were carried out on enable them to break out from their ant losses were considerably greater every night but one from 6-30 June lodgement area and sweep across than those in other sectors, and, and tookL toll of our shipping by however, as well as for the after restrictions had been repeated- France, reason of their persistence. later stages of the campaign against ly Imposed for these reasons, the deby the enemy off Germany, novel devices were em- cision was taken on 13 July to The mines' laid ployed, the experimental character of abandon'the beach pe'rmanently for our anchorages provided the biggest navies, which was second in daring only to unloading purposes. problem facing the Allied pres- the artificial harbors projects. To counter the menace of enemy since they included two novel, sure-actuated types, one of which The scheme, developed jointly un- shelling and to afford support to our could not be swept at all with the naval and military auspices, was troops advancing inland, the navies der gear available and the other only by the name of PLUTO. In carried out many heavy bombard- known under certain weather conditions. order to save shipping, to increase ments of the enemy batteries, de- The task of the mine lweeping'fiotil'-s of supply, and to prevent fensive positions, communications, the rate las was thus often thankless and- with the armies' mainte- and supply dumps. On the eastern interference always hazardous, for though they by bad weather, submarine flank the configuration of the ground mance detonated large numbers of 'mines to be laid across the made observation difficult, but the pipe lines were and worked tirelessly *ith their ac- of two types armies were warm in their praise Channel. The pipes were customed braver7r. under often ap- -.Lthe Hais and the Hamel, each of of the support given to them by the palling Weather conditions, some diameter and heavy naval guns. The characteristic which was 3 inches in mines inevitably remained and our discharge 250 tons of ingenuity of the Navy was seen in expected to shipping necessarily suffered casual- The first lines were the device of rocking the ships to gasoline a day. ties. Serious as these losses mtght Isle of Wight to the raise the angle of theguns so that planned from the be, they were, nevertheless, not so distance of they might engage -targets beyond vicinity of Cherbourg-a heavy in proportion to the total num- 56 miles. It was hoped to have ten normal range; and the effectiveness as ma- lines operative by D-plus-75, giving of the firing was seen when the cap- ber of ships we employed to affect our build-up. The, 2,500 tons of gasoline daily. ture of the strongly casemated bat- terially losses reached their peak in thie days As was to be expected with so ex- tery at Houlgate (which had been pri- the great perimental a scheme, many obstacles marily ,responsible for the shelling immediately following had the were encountered. The laying of the of Sword beach) revealed that three storm of 19-31 June, which many of the lines was a hazardous process, and out of its four guns had sustained effec of "ripening" subsequently the casual- the storms of June and July repeat- direct hits. The ships intervened vig- mines; but Despite edly interrupted the work. The first orously in,th battles ashore, both ty rate gradually declined. the mines weeper Hais line was completed by 12. Au- to break up enemy concentrations for the depletion of gust, and a second by the 2St, but counterattacks and to supplement strength through the losses incurred, "explosive leaks and stoppages resulted in fur- the barrages preparatory to our own the development of ther delay before either line could be advances, and this intervention was sweeps" and the use of nets to catch continued until the breakthrough drifting mines partially reduced the operated, bad weather preventing N

dangers. It was not, however, until way inevitable in our crowded an- tained operational authority over the August, when the land advances chorages, we suffered a number of actual assault area. forced the enemy to abandon his casualties from these devices, used Against the bases in England from air bases for others farther east that in conjunction with more orthodox which our convoys sailed across the his mining activity effectively died weapons, but the enemy also paid Channel the enemy made no piloted down. The extent of the menace may heavily for his use of them. On 2-3 air raids, but did make some use of be seen from the fact that by three August, for instance, a determined flying bombs. A few of these missiles months after D-day the number of attack 'was launched on the British which fell in the Portsmouth-South- mines swept off our invasion ports anchorages by human torpedoes and ampton area early in July hit land- and beaches totalled one-tenth those explosive motorboats, under cover of ing-craft bases but failed to cause swept in all theaters combined from ' diversionary raids and E-boat as- any damage to the shipping itself. the beginning of the war to 6 June. saults. We lost a destroyer, a trawler, The primary object of attack, from The threat to our supply routes and an LCG, while other craft were 18 June onward, was always London, from enemy destroyers was virtually damaged; but on the German side the bombs being employed essentially removed on 9 June when Force 26 at least 20 explosive motorboats, 30 as terror weapons. Two LST's were human t met and annihilated four enemy ves- torpedoes, and 1 E-boat were damaged there at Deptford docks, but sels off the Ile de Batz following deptroyed, and 2 more human tor- there was little direct interference pedoes their interception by RAP Coastal were caught in the net. with our build-up, and the work of Command aircraft. Attacks by light The submarine threat proved mark- loading proceeded without undue in- coastal craft, however-E- and R- edly less serious than we had antici- terruption. The gigantic concrete "secret boats based initially upon Cherbourg pated. When the assault was first weapon" installations In the and Le Havre-were carried out launched, the enemy U-boats we're Cherbourg Peninsula and the Pas-de- against the assault area with a per- concentrated in the Biscay area, but Calais, designed to enable V-missiles sistence equal to that of the air min- at once began to move toward the to be assembled and launched under Ing effort. Although the enemy never Channel. RAF Coastal Command, conditions of immunity from Allied dared to interfere with our build-up however, had established a system of air attack, were captured before com- by day, his craft made forays against air patrols covering the whole of the pletion. our anchorages almost nightly from western approaches to guard against For our freedom from effective in- D-day onward. A certain number of this menace, and its operatibns were terference by V-weapons we were In- E-boats was transferred to Brest fol- highly successful. U-boats approach- debted to the air forces, whose lowing the fall of Cherbourg, but per- ing our supply routes were spotted, sistent attacks--flrst upon the chief menace thereafter became the experi- sunk, or forced to abandon their mis- mental establishment at Peenemilnde concentrated in Le Havre, from which sions, and during the eritical first 10 and subsequently upon the opera- operations were directed primarily days of the invasion there was no tional installations In France and th~e against the British anchorages. To evidence of penetration by a single Low Countries--uccesfully guard against this, a protective delayed craft. Later on, occasional U-boats the enemy's preparations until they screen was established on our east- got through under eover of bad were too late to check our operations. ern flank, and it was but rarely that weather, but the results obtaified The attacks against London were the raiders succeeded in penetrating re- were Insignificant. garded as a ierious menace and this barrier and destroying our ship- one In close liaison with the air watch- of my tasks ping within. Our own coastal forces while I had control of al ers, Allied naval forces maintained a the air forces was to allot air were continually engaged in repelling effort constant blockade along the Biscay to reducing the enemy the enemy, and the pursuit was often scale of attack and Channel coasts from the Gironde against followed under the guns of the hos- the capital. In spite of the to Den Helder. From the ateet of many tasks tile shore batteries. The German imposd on the air forces the campaign the Allied naval su- forces suffered severely from attri- in ennectios with OVERLORD It premacy off western Europe was not tion, our close blockade effectively was still posidble to make many suc- seriously challenged, and apart from preventing any appreciable reinforce- cessful attacks on the V-weapon or- the raiding of the assault area by ganization, ment. Successful air attacks were also and the apparently large locally based small craft the enemy diversion made by Bomber Command against of effort was In fact re- was compelled to restrict his actvi- duced, the docks at Le Havre, singing a num- as ar &a poasibie, by oelecting. ties to attempts by blockade runners olortunftes for attack ber of E-boats and other craft at when the to sneak from port to port, hugging weather was unfavorable their moorings. When Le Havre fin- for higher the shores, under cover of darkness priority tarwets. ally fell to our forces in September, The bombardment of or foul weather. Several such convoys London following the danger to our western Channel our landings was a wpre intercepted and broken ap, and routes and anchorages from mrface desperate and )U-conceived measure, by the and of the year 68 enemy ves- attack was practically ended. for more profitble results would cer- sels, from destroyers to small mer- talty have been achieved had the The German fondness for war gad- gets was as marked In the chantmen, had been sunk at mea, main weight of the attack even then naval as while over 200 more had been seait- been directed agalnst the ports along in the military and aeronautical tied, sunk, or Immobilized In ports. the south coast. The enemy's vindic- spheres; on one occasion the naval Considering the enormous quantities tive hatred of the British people and commander on our eastern flank re- of shipping which we employed, our his underestimation of the Londoners' ported that this protective net was own losses were negligible. By mid- powers of endurance, together with "bulging with secret weapais." July the position was suiclently sat- his own blind overconfidence in the Among these devices, In addition to isfactory te permit release of some effects of the new weapon, enabled the mines already mentioned, were United States destroyers ,Ior service us to continue our build-up and suc- human torpedoes, explosive motor- in other theaters, and on 25 July the cessfully to establish boats, radio-controlled glider bombs, ourselves on the Admiralty resumed general control soil of France. and even an occasional V-i flying of the Channel from Admiral Ram- Our communications system was bomb, the latter arriving probably say (Allied Naval Commander Expe- satisfactory. The Admiralty, the RoY- more by accident than design. As ditionary F~orce) who, however, we- 51

Post Office Jointly achieved the feat a speed of up to 40 miles a day, and performed temarkable feats, and of laying a cross-Channel cable, giv- our transport services were taxed to work which under normal conditions ing three telephone and six telegraph the limit. The incentive offered by the would have refiuired Ixonths was circuits, as early as D-plus-4, and a chance of a smashing victory, how- completed in a matter of days. number of further cables were subse- ever, drove the men in whose hands With the resistance offered by the quently installed, affording adequate the maintenance of supply, rested to retreating enemy at a minimum, fuel signal facilities with our bases in the feats of superhuman accomplishment was a more vital requisite than am- United Kingdom. When the break- In the light of the difficulties they munition. Approximately a million through came in France at the end had to overcome, It seems, when one gallons of gasoline were needed at the of July the speed of the advances im- looks back upon those amazing days, front every day to enable the armored posed a heavy strain on the communi- well-nigh incredible that at no period columns to maintain the headlong cationpersonnel. Although the spear- up to the time when we stood upon rate of their advance. Trucked sup- head units necessarily relied largely the threshold of Germany was the plies could not by themselves cope on radio, a line network of great com- momentum of the drive retarded with this enormous demand, but pipe plexity was required In their rear to through lack of essential needs. The lines, both for aviation and ordinary cope with the amount of traffic in- spectacular nature of the advance was purposes, were laid in the wake of volved. CiVilian communications were due in as great a measure to the men the armies from the beachhead stor- of limited value in consequence of who drove the supply trucks as to age tanks. Our experiences in North lack of maintenance during recent those who drove the tanks. Africa and Italy had taught us much years aggravated by war destruction, The three essentials were food; In the matter of pipe Ines, and as and within 4 months of D-day the ammunition, and gasoline; and to'get many as 30 miles of 6-inch pipe were Allies laid over 100,000 circuit miles these up to the armored spearheads now laid in a single day. By early ; of line. in as expeditious a manner as pos- October the system was dblivernig j Within France, the organization of sible the system known as the "Red 4,500 tons of gasoline daily from thei our supply system did not present any Ball Express" was instituted. By this, main distributing point nev Paris, major problems until our armies a circular one-way traffic route was apart from the considerable quantl- Q achieved their breakthrough. While established across France from the ties being drawn from it at other! we were consolidating our hold upon beachheads to the fighting zone and points Intermediate between there the lodgement area, the supply dumps back again. All civilian and local and Cherbourg. to maintain the forces when the military traffic was debarred from Despite all these efforts and Ao- fighting became mobile were steadily using the "Red Ball Highway," and complishments, however, my auiiet7 built up, and ,the coastal area from along it the corvoys swept at high over the successful maintenance ofU the Cotentin to Caen developed into speed day and night, Inin unending supplies essential to support our con-. one immense depot, the biggest in stream. Similarly on the railroads, tinued advance increased as the lnes- history ever assembled on an invaded many of them single-track lines never of communication lengthened. Tht territory. When the breakthrough intended for such heavy usage, the Third Army maintenance In part came, however, a great strain was trains, each loaded to capacity, lar was stretched to the limit, and, w21 imposed upon the maintenance sys- pushed eastward, traveling nose to previously described, we had to em- tem, not through any inherent fault tail in a manner that defied all the ploy transport aircraft to carry. pvqr-' in that system but by reason of the normal rules of safety. 2,000 tons a day to keep the spots unexpected circumstances u n d e r To keep all this traffic rolling heads going. The enemy's . failure to which the advances occurred. The would have been 1%possible but for make a successful stand on any of the enemy's tenacious defense of the the very fine work'of the engineers, river lines freed us momentarily from Brittany ports and my decision to who had to contend with the damage the necessity for airborne operations concentrate all available strength caused not only by the enemy but by which would have taken away the fully to exploit the opportunity for a our own attacks preceding the ad- p}lanes from the task of keeping the decisive victory offered in Normandy vance. The roads were strewn with ground forces supplied, but it was necessitated, as already indicated, mines which had to be detected, evident that sooner or later such a the abandonment of the original plan wrecked German vehicles which had situation would arise when we came for these harbors to be brought rap- to be pushed aside, and bomb craters up against the main frontier defenses idly into use as the main arteries which had to be filled. There were of the Reich. through which to supply the Ameri- bridges Which had to be rebuilt and As will be indicated in due course, can armies on the right flank. the rubble of ruined towns and vil- the difficulties of supply eventually This meant -that we had to rely for lages through which paths had to be forced a halt upon us when we our maintenance at a most vital peri- driven. On the railroads there were reached Germany, but the very ra- od of the campaign upon the original again bridges to be constructed as pidity of our advance across Fran'e supply lines through Cherbourg, the well as wrecked trains to be cleared, had made that inevitable. In conse- Arromanches Mulberry, and the Nor- torn-up rails to be replaced, and the quence of the enemy's denial to us of mandy beaches. Some cargoes were frightful chaos produced by our the Brittany ports and the unexpected unloaded through the minor harbors bombing at every major junction and situation of having to support a dash and over the beaches of northern marshalling yard to be remedied. So of such length and speed entirely Brittany, but they represented only a greatly had the French railroads suf- from our bases on the Normandy small fraction of our total needs. The fered that over 900 locomotives and shore, only a miracle of hard work bulk of the supplies for the Third a third of the rolling stock used had and brilliant improvisation by the Army had to be transported by the to be shipped over from Allied sources supply services had carried our ar- long, roundabout route down through in England. Thanks to the untiring mored spearheads so far. Without the Cotentin and then eastward efforts of the men and the excellence the magnificent work performed by around the German pocket resisting at of their mechanical equlpment, all these men in coping with peculiarly Falaise and Argentan. The Third Ar- this work was successfully accomp- arduous problems, the sweeping vic- my, when It got into its stride in the lished at an unprecedented rate. tory which liberated France would dash across France, was advancing at Bridge-building parties especially not ha~e been possible. '-,.

z THE ADVANCE FROM THE SEINE TO THE GERMAN BORDER

As our armies swept north through First Army under General de Lattre mand (6 and 1 Aitborne Divisions), the Pas-de-Calais and into Belgium de Tassigny and the United States the United States IX Troop Carrier and east toward the German border, Seventh Army under Lieut. Gen. Command, and RAP 38 and 46 the size of our forces and the extent Alexander E. Patch, were designated Groups. In view of the important of our front made it necessary for the 6th or Southern Gfoup of Armies, roles that the airborne divisions were me to take direct control of the land under command of General (then to play in the development of our forces operating on the Continent. Lieut. Gen.) Jacob L. Devert. campaign, and also in order to unify Until 1 September the command sys- Each of these three Groups of Ar- the highly specialized and integrated tem had fUnctioned effectively, ex- mies was supported by its own Tac- planning and training, I felt that an actly as planned and in accordance tical Air Force. The Northern Group Army designation rightly belonged With the developments of the tactical of Armies was accompanied by the to General Birereton's Headquarters Bhd strategic situation. Full credit Second Tactical Air Force under Air and to the troops, even though, in for -this Was due to the Commanders- Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham and the strict sense of the word, the 41- in4Jhief, to all Senior Commanders, the Central Group of Armies by the visions did not operate as an inde- and to the higher staffs of all Serv- Ninth Air Force under Lieut. Gen. pendent army unit once they had ieee, Wlo consistently worked to- (then Maj. Gen.) Vandenberg. The been committed -to action. Our first gether a an efficient Allied team. Southern Group of Armies had, in use of the airborne divisions under Change in the command set-up was the advance from the south, been the newly constituted command set- nsomary, however, due to the di- supported by one Fighter Group and up Was to be ok 17 September, to verging lines of operation and the auxiliary units of XII Tactical Air assist in seising the Rhine crossings seed for having a commander on Command. When the Southern Group at Nijmegen and Arnhem after the each of the main fronts capable of of Armies came under my control, rapid advance by our land armies. handling, with a reasonable degree this Air Command wag augmented Although It of independence, the day-to-day op- was originally intend- with units of the Ninth Air Fotce, ed to employ ithe airborne units to stations in each sector. These opera- but later the air support ol the South- close the Paris-Orleans gap against fOna wets to be guided by directives ern Group of Armied was to be con- the enemy retreating from Normandy, Meled filem my Headquarters. stituted as the First Tactical Air General Patton's advance had been Therefore, when on 1 September Force. - so rapid that the area was completely my operational Headquarters opened The Tactical Air Forces in support overrun by our land forces and an officially on the Continent and Field of the Army Groups reported to my airborne operation was unnecessary. Marshal Montgomery's responsibility Headquarters through Air Chief Mar- We had subsequently considered em- for arranging for coordination be- shal Leigh-Mallory, while the remain- ploying them to assist in seizing suc- tween 21 Army Group and General ing over-all air control exercised by cessively the crossings over the Sleine Bradley's forces terminated, Field me continued as it had originally and the Somme, and lastly in the Pas- Marshal Montgomery continued to been planned in April, the United de-Calais area to cut off the retreat command 21 Army Group which was States Strategic Air Forces and the of the 9erman. Fifteenth Army. All also designated the Northern Group RAF Bomber Command reporting in- these areas were rapidly gained by Of Armies. As from this date General dependently. Air matters were, as al- our ground forces, a alear Indication Bradley's 'command was known as ready stated, coordinated through ci the tremendous forward strides the 12th or Central Group of Armies my Deputy, Air Chief Marshal Ted- being made by our armor and infan- and onsisted of the United States der. try. By the time the Airborne Army Pirst Army under General Hodges, There was no change in the Naval was first employed in the Arnhem- the United States Third Army under Command system at this time, except, Nijmegen area, enemy resistance had GOneral Patton, and the United States that Admiral stiffened and we had, begun the long Ninth Army under General Simpson. Ramsay's Headquarters were moved to France early in Sep- and grueling grind, in part unex- The Franco-American forces com- tember. Later in September control pectod, which was ultimately to take 1kg from the south were not at this of the Strategic Air Forces passed us ift force tcross the Rhine. tne under my control, but I planned, from me to the Commanding General It was our plan to attack north- with the approval of the Combined of the USAAF and the Chief of the eastward in the greatest strength ChiOlts of Staff, to assume command Air Staff jointly. posible. This direotion had been of them on 15 September, when it By 1 September also a new and chosen for a variety of reasons. First, was estimated that contact would important command unit had been the great bulk of the German Army have been securely established with formed within our Expeditionary was located there. Secondly, there the Central Group of Armies. Actual- Forces. All British and American was the great desirability of captur- ly, first contact was reached prior to Airborne Forces were placed under ing the flying bomb area, not only to this on 11 September when troops of the single command of General Brere- remove this menace to England, but the French lt Armored Division met ton on 8 August to form the First also to deny to the enemy the propa- troops of the French 3d Armored Di- Allied Airborne Army. Chief com- ganda value which he enjoyed on the vision in the vicinity of Sombernon, ponents of this Army included the home front and In the army from the but formal command did not pass to United States XVIII Corps (82d, attacks on London and talk of new my Headquarter, until the 15th. 101st, and 17th Airborne Divisions), weapons which would "decide the 'ihese forces, consisting of the French tio Brts Air borne Troos orn- war," A tlhrd reason for the north'. 63t eastward attack was our imperative was supported by naval forces includ- cupied on 4 September by the 11 Ar- need for the large port of Antwerp, ing the battleship Warspite and the moured Division of 30 Corps. By 29 absolutely essential to us logistically monitor Erebus, which bombarded August the British bridgehead. at before, any deep penetration in enemy installations with 300 rounds Vernon had extended, at its de"-et strength could be made into Germany. of 15-inch shell. By noon on the 11th penetration, 12 miles north of th-' Fourthly, we wanted the airfields in the northern and eastern outskirts ot, Seine. On the 30th they fnade an ad- Belgium. Finally, and most import- Le Havre had been reached and at vance of 25 miles from this point, ant, I felt that during the late sum- 1130 hours on the 12th the city sur- taking Beauvais, while another col-!t mer and early autumn months the rendered with Its garrison of 7,000 umn of the 11 Armoured Division lower Rhine offered -the best avenue troops. reached a point only 25 miles south of advance into Germany, and it Meanwhile other forces of the Ca- of Amiens after a 30-mile advance. seemed probable that through rapid- nadian First Army had swept north- On the following day they raced on ity of exploitation both the Siegfried eastward along the coast, taking, in to Amiens, took the town, established Line and the Rhin# River might be addition to Dieppe, the small ports of bridgeheads across the Somme, and crossed and strong bridgeheads estab- Fecamp, St-Valery-en-Caux, Le Tre- pushed farther to the northeast. At lished before the enemy could recover port, and Abbeville. Etaples fell on the same time other British units sufficiently to make a definite stand 4 September and the Somme River, turned northwest and attacked to- In the Arnhem area. In furtherance which we had anticipated as a pos- ward the Channel. On the morning of of this plan strong United States sible barrier, was crossed in force. 1 September, British armor took Al- forces marched abreast of the North- Calais was surrounded and the out- bert, about 12 miles northeast of ern Group of Armies to the northeast, skirts of Boulogne reached on the Amiens, and Bapaume, 28 miles while three United States divisions 6th. On the 8th the Canadians over- northeast of Amiens, while later in were completely immobilized In orher ran Ostend and after capturing the the day Arras was cptlpred by th, to supply additional logistical support turned east toward Bruges which Guards Armoured Division of 30 port for the Northern Group. At the was entered by patrols on the 9th. In Corps. Meanwhile Amiens was turned same time the entire airborne forces the meafitime other troops of Cana- over to the infantry, which had come were made available to Field Marshal dian 2 Corps had driven toward Dun- up from the south, and another ar- Montgomery. kirk, Investing that city by the 11th. mored column of the Guards A?- ' Secondary to this main effort in On the 11th also Blankenberghe, be- moured Division moved north to tak' .- the north was the desirability of push- tween Ostend and Zeebrugge, was Doullens, about 23 miles east of ing eastward with some force in order taken by the Canadian 4 Armored Abbeville, to link up with the French and Amer- Division. A part of the armoured column lean forces advancing from the south, Thus, within two weeks of the which took Arras turned east on the so as to clear all Southwest France Seine crossings 'the Canadians had next morning and captured Douai, as the cheapest way of protecting our driven north, clearing large sections while the main force continued to the; flanks and rear. In addition, a drive of the "flying bomb coast," and north- north. On the morning of 2 Septem- along the Verdun-Metz axis would east toward the Scheldt Estuary. ber it made slow progress, but during enhance the opportunity for surprise Along the coast they had forced the that afternoon and the following' day and maneuver, thus requiring the enemy to hole up in a few ports it gathered speed and advanced 60 enemy to extend his forces, and leav- which he was to defend tenaciously. miles in 36 hours, crossing the Bel- ing him in doubt as to the direction Boulogne, with its garrison of 10,000, gian border east of Lille, taking of the Allied main thrust. did not fall until 23 September and Tournai, where the Lille-Brussels From the time when our armies Calais until the 30th, both to the road was cut, and then turning east first crossed the Seine in force to the Canadian 2 Corps, after heavy bom- along this road. At noon on the 3d employment of the airborne army in bardment by Bomber Command. Dun- this column was 28 miles from Brus- Holland on 17 September, our ground kirk was surrounded, but since the sels, and late on that same day it forces made prodigious strides. Along use of the small harbor as a port was reached the capital, which had been the Channel coast the Canadian First not essential, I did not feel that a hastily evacuated by the enemy. On Army began advancing on 30 August strong effort should be made to take 4 September part of this column from the Elbeuf bridgehead above it. As in the case of the Brittany turned east and feached Louvain, the Rouen on the Seine and from bridge- ports, I decided that it would be pref- rest continuing north and entering heads below the city. On 1 September erable to contain the enemy, esti- Antwerp with the 11 Armoured Di- both Rouen and Dieppe were taken, mated at 12,000 troops, with the vision, which had moved rapidly the forces first entering Dieppe con- minimum forces necessary rather north from the Arras area, taking sisting of battalions of the Essex, than to attempt an all-out attack. In Lille on the way. By evening the dock Scottish, Royal, and Hamilton Light the northeast, the Canadian adtance area was being cleared, and on the Infantry and the Royal Regiment Sf toward the Scheldt Estpary formed 5th, with Antwerp firmly in their Canada which had fought there on the lower jaw of a trap closing on hands, the British spread out to the 19 August 1942. the Germans, the other jaw consist- west and reached the outskirts of Le Havre was cut off, but the gar- ing of British forces which had cap- Ghent, which fell the following day. rison rejected an ultimatum to sur- tured Antwerp. Still further west another ar- render on 4 September and the city The British advance n the right moured division which had begun an was invested. Attacks against it were of the Canadians to Antwerp and the attack northwest from the Amiens supported by heavy aerial bombing D~ztch border had been spectacular area on the morning of 2 September during which mere than 11,000 tons during this period. From their bridge- made rapid progress in the direction were dropped on the city, half this head at Vernon their armor swept to of Calais and Dunkirk and on the 3d total being dropped on the 10th. On Antwerp, a distance of some 195 reached Aire, 27 miles south of the 10 September also the final ground miles as the crow flies, in less than latter town. This area was subse- attack was launched by the British four days. The advance b~gan on 30 quently taken over by the Canadians. 49 Infantry Division operating with August and Antwerp, with its port moving up from the south. a.e canzatin Firat Aw. This attac ihatallaions virtually intact, was oc- Asthe British forces approacheS 2 I uloser to the aermu hombland, re- east,, beginning an pqu4liy spectacular vanced 13 miles, and the next day sistance stiffened and the. rapid ad- drive on a three-corps front toward another spurt of 20 miles carried it vapces which had made the capture Namur, Liege, and the German fron- close to Montdidier. By 2 September of Antwerp possible came to ;n end. tier. On the right, VII Corps grossed XIX Corps had reached the Belgian X9owever, by attacking northeast from the Alsne on 29 August, and Soisons 'border south ofTournal, registering Louvain on 7 Septemberp 30 Corps was cleared of enemy forces by the an advance of more than 60 miles was able to establish a dep bridge- 3d Armored Division, which also lib- in 2 days, A a ovejr the Albert erated Laon the 04 il, seixe next day after stiff As a result of these operations, bourg Leopold 'after a bitteo and fighting. This division continued its VII and XIX Corps out off a large fluctuating battle, and bY the 12th rapid Advance, while lnfantry sup- C~rman force in the pocket that lay Cross the Dutch border to reach a ported it and protected its flank, and between their advancing column. point Peven milps from Eindhoven. on 1 September reached a point 30 This pocket extended from Mons to ]Driving east from Bourg Leopold, miles northeast of Laon, In the next the forest of Compiegne, where Qer- elements of 30 Corps advanced al- two days the column advgnced 40 man Infantry resisted stubbornly the most to the Meusq. miles, crossing the Beligian border in advance of V Corps. The latter unit, the Hirson area and roechJg While the Cadans414 suit llritloh Char- forming the center of the First -tIUe moved northeastwar In a groat lerol and Mons. Army's drive northward, nevortholoM kifslxdrive which stvsohked Wo On tho rirst Army's l ft, a similar made good progress on the 0ls Corn' LI P4 from the CPinel Oaot to Ver- drive nrthward from the mctops plmgno-St-Quentln, realchl a lne pOp, nd northward to Antwerp qnd b10g46964 ares had Pao aceomp- east of CambrAl n the 34. Pthrlng ]pl. hoyer, the American First Army IhheA6 hr 4 pFAp$41* MoVIng 04olumn of the psot -three datys omr .,004 prior gdor Qpneal jo4gos poured gcrQ~ 414 c'erpnV per4 ae by the ;d oners were captured at the top of the t h e Seine oridgeheaqs between Armored iision. Gaining Momen- pocket, in the Mons area. ,4ptes-Gassicourt and Melun to the tv 1 gP 1Q Au4qpt tis force ad- On 4 September the Firt Arwz

9 U began a wheel to the east, V Corps ward. On the 31st the column which moving to the righrflank and cross- The Third Army's advance involved took St-Dizier pushed on to Corn. herculean tasks ing the Meuse north of Sedan on 5-6 in the matter of sum- mercy on the Meuse, while the X.X ply. At the Moselle September. That town fell enemy resistance to the 5th Corps turned east on the axis Rheims- Armored Division on 6 September. had stiffened and the problem oftsp- Verdun-Metz. The following morning ply became and in the next few days advance Increasingly acute, to th units of the XX Corps entered Ver- extent was rapid across Belgium and Lux- that General Patton's forca dun, 'and crossed the Meuse to reach were partially immobilized embourg, 'on a 65-mile front. The and physi- a point 6 miles to the east on the cally incapable of mounting same division liberated the city of assaults road to Metz. On the 2d this column on a large scale or of oontinulug a Luxembourg on 10 September, and pushed on another 7 mIles to Etain, pursuit had by the 11th, V Corps had reached the the opportunity offored. while the XII Corps advanced to the This was in ameasure elso true German frontier and the Siegfried of vicinity of Nancy. Meanwhile, be- the defenses. Farther north, VII Corps whole front facing east against tween these two columns, other cross- Germany and our positions units captured Namur and the Meuse here be- ings of the Meuse were effected, and came relatively stable on crossings near Dinant on 4-5 Sep- a line run- on 2 September St-MihIel was taken. ning from the First Army's sector In tember, then continued to advance On the 4th patrols operating up to the Aachen area south along the Ger- down both banks of the river toward the Moselle failed to find the enemy man border to Metz, Nancy, and Liege. Stiff resistance in this area in any strength, except at Pont-a- Epinal, was broken; Leige fell on 8 Septem- Mousson, about 13 miles south of On ber, and by noon on the 9th our forces 11 September patrols from Gen- Metz. Here, after patrol clashes in eral Patch's Seventh Army had estab- reached Limbourg, 13 miles south- the morning, the Germlns withdrew lished contact with patrols of General west of Aachen. Here resistance in- to the right bpnk of the river and creased, and extensive mining and Patton's Third Army west of Dijon, shelled the town as we moved up to but contact in force was not flially numerous road blocks with anti-tank it, On the 5th we reached the im- established until a Seventh Army guns were encountered. Nevertheless, portant communications center of on 10 September further advances column, driving north against enemny Nancy, on the left bank 28 miles opposition, joined force with were made, and at 1723 hours VII the above Metz. right wing of the Third Corps artillery for the first time Army west shelled German territory. On the 1th Crossings of the Moselle were made of Epinal on 21 September. This action. reduced the both Eupen and Malmedy were cap- against enemy opposition beginning sze of the pocket west of the Belfort tured. XIX Corps had paralleled this on 7 September. By the 11th we had Gap and straight- ened the line which as a result now advance: by 11 September it was at established ourselves In strength on extended almost due south .froin the edge of Maastricht, and farther the east bank of the river between Epinal to the Swiss south had crossed the Meuse. Metz and Nancy. While some of ien- frontier, In spite eral Patton's forces moved southward of the fact that use of the Belfort In less than 2 weeks, then, the from Toul for a distan e of 30 miles Gap as an escape route was now pre- First Army had crossed the Seine in to compress the Belfort area vented, the enemy continued to hold fbrce, swept across France, Belgium, through which the German Nineteenth Army on stubbornly In this whole area, evi and Luxembourg, and brought the waLs withdrawing, dently pursuing his usual policy of war to the threshold of Germany, The other forces crossed the Moselle not yielding an inch except under bitter struggle for Aachen and the on the l9th s d began the turning movement noreast pressure. This policy reacted to our Roer bridgeheads was to follow. ot Nancy which was to result In the fall advantage since it kept the enemy In the Third Army zone of advance, of the city to the XII Corps on fully engaged and unable to withdraw on the right of our forces, General 11 September. forces to aid In the north, where the Patron's troops had crossed the upper airborne operation against the lower Marne In the vicinity of Vitry-le- In the Metz area General Patton's Rhine was taking place. Along the Francois on 29 August, On the 30th, forces had captured Aumetz on the whole line the war was to resolve It- 4th Armored Division of XII Corps 11th and driven.to ThIonville, 12 self into slow, hard fighting (with the moved on to St-Dizler, 17 miles to the wiles north of Metz, by the 13th. The few exceptions which I shall now con- east, while to the north the 80th In- city Itself was stubbornly defended sider) until after the (Iernian coon- fantry Division captured Chlons-stir- end the siege was to be long anl t-,rattack in irecember and the open- Marne and advanced 8 miles north- irduous, uig of our own offensive in FebraVtar CONS OLIDA TION ON THE FRONTIER

stream from the bridge and surprised In part, the slow-down along the The first landings of the main air- and overcame the German forces Germany was due to my borne forces were made on 17 Sep- front facing holding tbe northern approaches. our greatest tember and follow-up troops and re- decision to employ The British meanwhile had seized strength in the north to attain flank- inforcements continued to be flown the southern end, and that evening, bridgeheads across the lower in on succeeding days in spite of un- ing after mines had been removed, the the main fortifications favorable weather on several oc- Rhine beyond armor crossed the bridge and ad- In view of the casions. Initial losses en route and at of the Siegfried Line. vanced 2 miles to the north where fact, however, that the main high- the dropping zones were very slight con- it was held up by an antitank screen. way to Berlin-the plains and level and bore out General Brereton's tention that heavy bomber effort on During the next few days there fields of northern Germany-lay be- was cpnfused and heavy fighting In north, and flak positions immediately preceding. yond the Rhine in the the area between Nijmegen and Arn- was un- an airborne operation would great- that the southern country hem and it was not until the 24th rapid ad- ly reduce casualties. These attacks suitable for the desired that British infantry reached the by had been undertaken by "heavies" of vance and continued exploitation lower Rhine in force and artillery and for- both the RAF Bomber Command reason of its mountainous began lending fire support to the be- and and the U. S. Eighth Air Force. ested terrain, my commanders leagured 1 Airborne Division on the the de- which neutralized enemy airfields in I were in full agreemnt as to northern bank of the river. sirability of exerting our strongest the vicinity of the dropping zones and of pressure in the north. The attractive flak positions en route. By the 19th, By 23 September the position forces. 1 Airborne Division had become possibility of quickly turning the British Second Army ground the so precarious that the Second Army German north flank led me to'ap- advancing from the south, had made gave 30 Corps permission to with- prove the temporary delay in freeing contact with all of the airborne troops the vital port of Antwerp, the sea- except those to the north of the lower draw the division if the situation ward approaches to which were still Rhine in the Arnhem area. Here the did not improve. 30 Corps ordered in German hands. British 1 Airborne Division was hold- every risk to be taken to relieve the ing out heroically gainst greatly division on the 24th, by which date The operation to seize the bridges superior forces, including a quantity the forces on the northern bank had over the Rhine was made up of two of armor, the presence of which in been forced into a pteadily contrac- parts. The airborne operation, known the area had been estimated by my ting perimeter approximately 1,000 had as its purpose the as MARKET, intelligence staff. This, in the out- yards by 1,500 yards. The shelling, capture of the vital bridges over the ,come, proved t be effective against mortaring, and strafing of this area the Waal, and the lower Rhine Maas, the tactical power we could apply. by the enemy was incessant, and on at Grave, Nijmegen, and Arnhem. 25 September, Corps finally ordered forces employed in the airborne T'he British Guards Armoured Di- The the withdrawal of all forces across S. 824 vision had pushed north on 17 Sep- operation included the U. the lower Rhine. This was effected Airborne Division, the 101st Air- tember, but met heavy resistance t and 2,163 men of the 1 borne Division, the British 1 Air- slowing its advance into Eindhoven, that night Airborne Division withdrew under 1st which had been taken by the 101st borne Division, and the Polish cover of darkness, infiltrating in British 1 Airborne Division. Firm contact was Paratroop Brigade. The small groups through the enemy lines dropped established between the two forces Airborne Division was to be and across the river. Casualties had the Arnhem area, on the 18th, and the Guards Arm- farthest north in been heavy, the division losing in the U. S. 82d Airborne Division in oured pushed rapidly north to Grave, which had fallen to the 82d Airborne killed, wounded, and missing some the Nijmegen area, and the U. S. 7,000 men. 101st Division in the St. Oedenrode Division. The area between Grave area north of Eindhoven. In rapid and Nijmegen was held by this lat- While the crossing of the lower support of the airborne troops, ter division and the armored ad- Rhine was not completed, the opera- armor and infantry of the British vance to the town was consequently tion brought very positive and im- Second Army were to advance north- rapid. Nijmegen itself, however, was portant advantages to our forces. ward from the general line of the held by the -enemy, as was also the Repeated enemy attacks against the Albert and Escaut Canals. Passing extremely important road bridge thin line of communications had over the bridges held by the airborne crossing the Waal. This bridge, a temporarily necessitated withdrawal troops, the armor was to push on to modern 5-span structure of steel and of armor from Nijmegen to keep the the Zuider Zee and thus, if success- concrete, some 6,000 feet in length, single road open, but the line was .ful, cut off the land exit of enemy was a valuable prize, since, without ultimately held and supplies went troops in western Holland. The land it, the river would have been a through even under constant shelling. operation, known as GARDEN, was formidable obstacle. An attempt by As the line was strengthened with to take place on a very narrow front armor to get through to the bridge the arrival of stronger infantry units, with only one road as a line of com- failed on the 19th in the face of the corridor was gradually widened muniction for a considerable part heavy fire from antitank guns sited on both sides. British forces pushed of the way. The axis of advance lay in houses near the approaches. On west in conjunction with northward through Eindhoven, St. Oedenrode, the following day, however, a regi- attacks by other British and Canadian Veghel, Uden, Grave, Nljmegen, Amn- ment of the 82d Airborne Division forces to establish a firm line event- hem, and Apeldoorn. crossed the rlver In assault boats up- ually running along the Wasi and _z_ hr

Maas. To the east the corridor was tion, and in support of the amphib- forces, attacking also widened to bring the Northern over terrain made ious elements, Canadian forces at- extren~ely difficult Group of Armies into line with the by flooding, and tacked north of Antwerp toward the suffering Central Group and within striking heavy casualties, advanced South Beveland Isthmus in mid- with great gallantry distance of Kleve. Bridgeheads had against stiff ene, October. On 24 October, having over- my resistance been firmly secured across the Maas to capture the strong', come resistance at Woensdrecht and and Waal and the watershed points of Veere and Middelburg anid between thus insured their flank protection, the two was to serve as a wipe out enemy opposition. By 9 No- valuable the Canadian 2 Division turned west corridor for a later advance vember all resistance had ceased ant to the and advanced slowly actoss the nar- Rhine. some 10,000 troops had been £il row neck connecting South Beveland tured, Operation MARKET had been the including a division 0r with the mainland. Progress here was mander. largest airborne operation under- particularly difficult, the troops of- With taken by the Allied forces up to this the capture of South 114tt ten having to fight waist-deep in land time. Between 17-30 September, and Walcheren the land ap, water while the Germans offered proaches 20,190 troops had been dropped from to Antwerp were now freed; strong resistance. but the Scheldt aircraft by parachute, 13,781 had Estuary had still to The Canadian forces continued be swept of landed in gliders, and 905 were air- mines before the 0ol0 their advance, however, and by mid- could become useful. This work landed on a wee strip made ready by day on 27 October had reached the at the preceding airborne troops. In once undertaken by the Navt itit line of the canal at the west end of Antwerp addition to this total of 34,876 became a port of supply t the Isthmus. Crossing thin at its our forces with troops, 5,280 tons of Oquipment and the unloading of the southern extremity, they ]ressed first supplies, 1,927 vehicles, and 568 ar- ships on 26 November. The ai,0 forward to within 2% Miles of tillery pieces were transported by my, however, recognizing the imoflt the British 52 Division who had been ajr. In all, the supporting air forces, ance of the harbor to us as a stipp#1 landed on the south shore of South who showed great gallantry In cop- base, began at this time the luittinch Beveland on the night of 26-26 Octo- tinuing to fly supplies to the iso- ing in considerable strength of V-i ber, and by the 29th they lated forces, flew over 7,800 sorties. effected a and V-2 weapons against the d .. juncture with them. By the 30th the My decision to concentrate our ef- and town area. While the # MM whole of South Beveland had forts in this attempt to thrust into been were erratic in about the saffe 4 cleared and the British and Cana- the heart of Germany before the gree as those launched against UM dians continued their attack enemy could consolidate his against London area, they nevertifl4 de- the causeway connecting fenses along the Rhine had resulted the Isthmus caused considerable damage i M with Walcheren. in a delay in opening Antwerp On Waloheren district, killing both civilian aid mlii. and the ehemy consisted in making the port available as our tary personnel as well as diartti . of the remnants of a division, main supply base. I took the full forced communications and supply work to back with severe losses from South responsibility for this, and I believe brief periods. Great credit is doet ti Beveland, and elements that the possible and actual results of the Ger- citizens of Antwerp for sustaiinng thO man Fifteenth Army which had made warranted the calculated risk in- attacks as London had done nd 1i volved. Had our forces not pushed their escape by sea across the Scheldt unflinchingly going about their t - from -the trap in which they north and east to hold the line of had been which were of assistance to caught with the seizure of Antwerp. the Maas and Waal well north of forwarding the war effort. In a41 Against Walcheren the Canadians at- Antwerp, the port itself would have tion to attacks from the V-weapon tacked from the west, while amphibi- bees in constant danger not only against docks and shore installatio f ." from a blow possibly synchronized ous forces, landed on 1 November at the enemy also employed large fl&ti.t both Westkapelle and Vlissingen, with the later breakthrough in the bers of E-boats and midiget submS .. moved east and Eifel, but from independent attacks north, converging on ines against our naval craft and ship the strongpointe of the island. launched at close range from Hol- These ping, but all these attempts at die land. forces, consisting of the Royal Marine rupting our flow of supplies wetO 4 88 Brigade (Commandos) and two With the completion of the MAR- successfully countered by vigorofl battalions of the 52 Infantry Division, KET-GARDEN operiation the North- naval and air measures. had been ern Group of Armies was instructed successfully landed from While the Arnhem-Nijmegen opel' naval to undertake the openlng of Antwerp assault craft under heavy fire. ation and the attack upon the ap-' Great credit for the success of as a matter of the first priority. While the proaches to Antwerp were the me the city and port installations had amphibious operation is due the sup- spectacular successes during the iat- port craft of the fallen virtually intact to 80 Corps on British Navy, which ter part of September, the month of unhesitatingly 4 September, the harbor had proved and in the highest October and early November, the traditions and was to continue to prove useless pf the service attracted to slugging matches along the rest of themselves the point-blank to us until the Scheldt Estuary had fire of the the front facing north and east were land batteries, thus permitting the been cleared of mines and South commandos and equally important for the general de- Beveland and Walcheren Island, assault troops to gain velopment of the campaign. Our two the shore with much lighter F commanding the sea lane to the casual- immediate objectives during the peri- ties than otherwise harbor, had been reduced. The op- would have been od were, first, to advance east to the the case. The air forces eration to achieve this involved the also, oper- Rhine and north to the Mass and, ating In great strength despite employment of amphibious forces, ap- second, to use the space between our pallingly difficult weather and the joint naval, air, and ground conditions, front and the Rhine as a "killing lent invaluable support throughout force planning was immediately un- ground" in which to engage the one- the operation, a feature of this sup- dertaken and worked out during the my either in a large decisive battle port being the accurate bombing latter part of September and early by or so to maul him that when the aircraft of the Bomber Command October at the Headquarters of the Rhine had been reached he would whioh succeeded in breaching the Canadian First Army. have little left with which to resist dikes. ) A.. an integral part of the opera- our crossings and prevent a breakr h.thrbee Converg ing g r ound. through leading to mobile warfret. a w qo 0 WIN! !I -- lp- p 7 -

.N.. 59

Although we were not to reach the southern point of the breakthrough without Air Chief Marshal Leigh- Rhine as quickly as we had hopqd, being about 8 miles north of Aachen. Mallory, might better function as an or yet to engage the enemy in a de- Within the next few days the two integral part of my own Headquar- cisive battle except as he himself remaining main roads into Aacbhen ters. SHAEFUAir Staff thus came into created it in his December counter- from the north were cut and the de- being on 15 October and the planning offensive, the continued daily losses fender isolated. Concurrently with and operational staffs became part which he suffered in both personnel of these attacks the First Army attacked my Headquarters. Shortly after this, and equipment contributed to weak- eastward against Stolberg, where on 14 November, Air Chief Marshal ening him so that when our main heavy house-to-house. fighting took Leigh-Mallory, en route to his new blows ultimately fell victory was in- place. On 13 October the First Army command, was'reported missing. His evitable. By the end of September troops entered Aachen from the east loss to the common war effort cme.- total enemy casualties, including and by the 19th, in spite of resistance as a keen personal blow to me and killed, wounded, and prisoners, to- from fortified cellars and buldngs, to the members of my staff. taled approximately 1,000,000 men, had cleared half the city, which was With the opening of Antwerp our including those swept into our net now in ruins as a result of our bomb- supply problem was considerably with the rapid advance of General ing and shelling. Following the suc- eased, but the Germans had profited Devers' forces from the south and cess of our assault, enemy resistance by our earlier logistical handicap t6 their junction with General Bradley's gradually weakened and the final reinforce their Siegfried defenses troops west of the Belfort Gap. The surrender of the first large German with hurriedly formed Volksgrena. isolated remnants of the German city to Allied forces took place on 21 dier divisions. These divisions initial- First Army in Southwest France gave October when the garrison save in to ly had very low combat value, but themselves up in piecemeal groups to troops of the 1st Infantry Division of both General Bradley and I felt thaI the French Forces of the Interior and VII Corps. After the fall of Aachen unless the Siegfried positions eW0I4 to our own forces, the largest single the First Army's offensive operaitions be speedily attacked the relativo body consisting of 20,000 troops who were curtailed until the November strength q; the opposing forces would. surrendered without even attempting offensives which were mounted along gradually become more favorable-'to resistance after being trapped south the entire front.-; the enemy. of the Loire. Our fontined hard- peript On the Third Army's front Nancy My plan of campaign at this fought battles during the next three had fallen on 16 September, but Metz, included an advance on .of- months were to increase this total by the fronts strongly defended by its outer ring the Northern and Central Groups midJanuary to 1,500,000, a figure Of of forts, was to remain in enemy Armies to the Rhine, which we indicative of the steady attrition be- it hands until our offensive ulimately necessaw to hold froh its mouth Ig inflicted on the enemy. In spite to reduced it on 22 November. South of Diisseldorf at least, if not Bonn,-or of these losses, however, German Metz, along the line of the Moselle, Frankfurt, before a large-scale troops continued to put up strong re- " e the Third Army pushed eastward tration beyond the river into Gef S sistance, battling with a stubbornnesm slowly until its line extended roughly could be attempted. With the s0on and Teutonic fury born of the des- parallel with the river to a depth of perats knowledge that they were defensive barrier which the Rhine 20 to 25 miles. Farther sotth the would afford our armies, it wqald fighting on their own "holy soil." Seventh Army and the French First become more easily possible to GoC- Our logistical situation, coupled with Army, probing slowly Into the area centrate power at one point for the the fact that the terrain was suitable of the High Vosges across the Moselle breakthrough, leaving relatively thin- to the defense, aided the enemy. Ad- from Epinal and against the Selfort ly held positions along the rest of -the, ditionally, during this period we ex- Gap area, brought their line up to front. berienced weather conditions which conform with that of the Third Army. The eastward drive by 21 Army admirably suited him. The rains The relatively static warfare of Grouptbegan on 15 November, but which fell im November were *a October had thus brought us into progress was slow over ground made worst known on the Continent in position for the limited offensives extremely difficult by the severe many years and created flood con- which we were mounting for Novem- weather and it was not until 4 De- ditions along our whole front, reduc- ber. cember that the last enemy pocket Ing the lesser roads to quagmires and During the month f October an on the west bank of the Maas was impeding tank operations and veb4e- administrative ehane hA been cleared. A direct advance across the ulr novement. AM then factors placed in effect which wea to bring Maas to the Rhine was judged Sn made it more easily possible for the the Tactical Air Forces more closely practicable and extensive regrouping enemy, exploiting a comparatively under the control of my Headquar- would have been necessary for a drive static situation, to mine and booby- ters. Prior to 16 October the Allied southeast from the Nijmegen area trap the areas ahead of no, contrib- Expeditionary ir Force, under Air along the relatively dry watershed uting further to our problems. Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, had separating the two rivers. To accom- Is spite at then difleultlea we maintained osepaate Headquar- plish this latter penetration t would achieved much. The First Army ters, reporting to m through my have been necessary to reduce the troops had entered Germany 1 the deputy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder. In frontage of the Northern Group of Trier region on 11 September and In October, however, we were informed Armies in order to gather strength *h Aachen area east of Eupen on that the Air Ministry desiqed to at the point of attack. Due to limi~ta- th* 12th. At Aachew the enemy re- transfer Air Chief Marshal Leigh- tions in strength, 21 Army Group sited bitterly but by the 20th the Mallory to a post of greater respon- itself was incapable of holding the city was under attack from three sides sibility in the China-Burma-India whole of its frontage and attacking and subject to heavy shelling. On the Theater, where;, because of his lon at the same time, and 12th Army K north side, which was still open, the experience, his presence could be best Group would have had to take over First Army launched an attack across employed to further the ends of tMe a portion of the line. This could only the German border on 2 October and war. It was with great reluctance that have bebn done by 12th Army Group in the first two days breached the I agreed tn this change, but once it at the expense of weakening the Mi-afla Limo on a 2,mlie front, .the had bee wade I felt that the ADA, Asehen attack, a course which we and accurately executed; direct hits the Ardennes on 16 December upsetof- to me. I therefore de- these plans, and made the final not acceptable were secured on the structures. These to postpone further major op- fensive on the i9th an impossibility cided attacks, however, failed to destroy Third Army Group until the in view of the need for the erations by 21 the dams, partly because bad weather ead made ade- Army to contain and subsequently drive toward Cologne precluded the concentration of the in the central sector. counterattack on the southerni flank quate progress necessary weight of bombs and also sector the offensive of the breakthrough. In the Aachen because of the enemy's ability to ad- Ninth Armies was On the 6th Army Group front the by the First and water level. General Bradley after an just the November offensive of the French launched on 16 November the First Army to air and therefore orderd First Army was launched on the hour and a half of intensive to capture them. The First i,200 maneuver 14th. Within a week the Belfort Gap artillery bombardment. Over for the dams Army began the attack been breached and our troops United States heavy bombers dropped was had on 13 December and the attack the Rhine. Belfort was on fortified positions north of had reached bombs still in progress when the subsequent by the 22d. and west of Diiren. Later cleared of all resistance Eschweiler enemy counteroffensive was launched accomplished on the day RAF bombers also attacked The breakthrough, in in the Eifel. the flank of the itself and Jillich, practically the 18th, turned Ddiren Meanwhile, south of the Ardennes, Vosges and these towns. The offen- German positions in the obliterating Third Army offensive toward the in two main di- the forced a general withdrawal in front sive was launched which started on 8 November from Aachen to- Saar of the Seventh Army sector to the rections, eastward made excellent progress. North of troops, and northeastward north, where Seventh Army Ward Eschweller bridgeheads established East of Aachen Metz several after launching their attack simul- toward Geilenkirchen. across the Moselle in the Thionville was driven entirely out of taneously with that of French First the enemy area were linked together by the 14th, he had partially held Army, had been struggling slowly Stolberg, which days later troops operating while our own and four forward along the roads leading for some 6 weeks crossed the Ger- in the re- from the bridgehead through the Vosges passes. The towns forces were entrenched places. To 21st our man frontier in several Raon-l'Etape, Gerardmer, mainder of the town. By the and of Blamont, Esch- the south Metz was surrounded with other lesser villages troops had penetrated into fell and St-Die, cut off, b~tt, while the city itself the passes through weiler, which fell after heavy fight- which controlled on 22 November, teven of the forts de- the following day. Meanwhile the hills, had been stubbornly ing on continued to resist and the difficult had moved farther along fended by the enemy, for as long as the fighting of mopping them up was not into the Hiirtgen For- task they remained in his hands the High the right flank until 13 December. By Aachen, and gains accomplished Vosges stood as an impassable wall est, southeast of also, the Third Army's our troops with- 5 December, protecting the Rhine plain to the in this sector placed flank had pushed eastward from of Diiren. right east. With the outflanking move- In attacking range area to the Saar in Geilenkirchen had the Metz-Nancy ment to the south these towns fell To the north with the advance from and the Ninth conformity to advancing Seventh Army troops, fallen on the 19th a stretch of the slowly un- Thionville, closing and the 44th Infantry Division, Army continued advancing length. Three the river over 16 miles in exploiting the strategic pos- til by-3 December it had reached in the rapidly con- bridgeheads were secured advanced to Saarebourg, Roer River. The First Army was was sibilities, Saarlautern area and contact fell on the 21st. Meanwhile, forming to the south more slowly which made with the main Siegfried de- Division, op- Fourteen at first, and eventually the French 2d Armored Still. fenses. These defenses at the Third the 44th divisions were employed erating on the right of seventeen, Army's front of attack south of and sector by the First and Infantry, bypassed Saarebourg in the Aachen Merzig on the Saar River were the and at the height of penetrated the defenses in front of Ninth Armies, strongest sections of the Line, guard- no fewer than ten di- the Saverne Gap, capturing the town the offensive ing the triangle between the Moselle line togeaer on itself the following day. Also on the visions were in the The forward line, con- the maxi- and the Rhine. 23d, columns pushed both north and a 24-mile front, this being no very great depth, to de- tinuous but of east of the town and broke out into mum which it was practical bank of closely followea the east On the 23d, the ploy. In spite of this concentration the Rhine plain. the Saar. The rear line, of greater Division reached the very large-scale strategic and French 2d Armored aMd strength, consisteO of a zone of forts city was air attacks, the progress had Strasbourg, but, while the tactical about 2% miles deep, passing in some of and the fighting bitter. The rapidly and easily cleared, been slow front of Lebach and continuing to on our advance here the outer ring of forts continued delay imposed through the Saarbriicken Forest to improved de- offer resistance until the 27th. was a testimony to the the forward line 10 miles east enemy had rejoin On the 24th the eneiny launched fense works which the itself. Following the our break- of Saarbrticken a counterattack from the northeast, constructed following Army's rapid advance, these in Sep- Third against Saarebourg, with through of the Siegfried Line attack so that directed defenses slowed the expectation of being able tember. additional log- the seeming some regrouping and cut the corridor which Seventh While the Ninth Army had reached istic~tl support was necessary prior to the Roer by 3 December, General Army. had rapidly extended to the to reassuming the offensive. While # considered it imprudent to Rhine . Initially some ground was Bradely I had hoped tl~at the Third Army cross the river while the Sqhmidt the 44th Infantry Division would\ have been able to achieve lost, hut Dams, which controlled the flooding enemy to a standstill and complete victory in the Saar, I had fought the of the Roer Valley, remained intact earlier positions. To the nevertheless set a time limit for the regained in enemy hands. The German Sixtb 79th Division, which had operation. The Third Army's final east the Panzer Army had moved west of the mopping up in the rear of the attack was to begin on 19 December, been Rhine by this time, and had the Division, re- after which, regardless of results, French 2d Armored American forces crossed the Hoer northward advance and, divisions were to be transferred to sumed a the enemy, releasing the fioodl waters, made rapid progress the north to assist in the main effort with the 4 4th, would have been in a position to trap Haguenan, which was takebn against the Rhine and into Germany. toward the attackers. Air attacks on the The German counteroffensive through on 12 December. dams were called for at short notice 61

On the right flank the French troops of 'both armies advanced of Wissembourg. Our progress In the First Army's advance down the Rhine steadily through the Vosges to tight- Saar and Wissembourg sectors con. plain was slowed by enemy counter- en the ring around German forces tained 14 enemy divisions,.and hAd attacks across its lines of communi- stubbornly defending their positions it been possible to continue the ad' cation. After reaching the Rhine on in the area about Colmar. vance the enemy would, have been the 20th, French armor turned north On 27 November, In view of the compelled to divert forces from .tlnk and by the 22d cleared Mulhouse in strategic opportunity afforded our north, thus.directly aiding our main an advance sQ rapid that part of the armies to attack into the Saar Basin, effort in that sectot. Meantime, the staff of the German Nineteenth Army I directed the Seventh Army, after enemy forces driven from the Vosgeu was captured as it fled from the city. rapid regrouping, to attack maintained their bridgehead west The German counterattacks against north- ot ward to breach the Siegfried' the advancing columns' lines of com- Line the Rhine in the Colmar areS, whick west of the Rhine, launching munication forced a temporary with- the at- the French First Army, weakened by' tack west of the Pfalzerwald In con- drawal from positions gained along their recent offensive junction with the southern flank of operations: at the Rhine east of Mulhouse, but by the Central Group of Armies. This short of trained infantry replc... the 27th this ground was recaptured. advance from the south and, south- ments, were unable to. "liquid&tp. Between the northern columns of west directly aided the Third Army's This the Seventh Army which bridgehead area, which WMs to.. had reached operations against the Saar. By mid- the Rhine In the Strasbourg become known as the "Colmar Poa0*6 area December the Seventh Army had and the southern et," columns of the crossed the German frontier on a later exerted a profound -£t French First Army which had ap- 22-mile front and penetrated well adverse effect on our operations ,zfr proached the river near Mulhouse, into the Siegfried defenses northeast til it was finally eliminated, THE ARDENNES CO UNTER - OFFENSIVE

carried us from the beaches been coordinated with an assaut by As a result of the decision to deploy tion, had from Hol- scrifice paratroopers and infantry our maximum effort in the Aachen to the Siegfried Line, his futile. land. sector and to sustain the successful would not be altogether prepara- Is all, the enemy employed three progress of the Saar-Wissembourg The attack started, after secrecy, on armies for the battle, the Fifth Pan- operations with the balance of avail- tions of the very greatest General ser Army and the Sixth Panser Army able forces other stretches of the Saturday, 16 December. arrived at my Head- supported by the Seventh Aray, to- front were weakly held. In particular Bradley had Just on replace- taling some 14 infantry and 10 pan- the Eifel setor of some 75 miles be- quarters for a conference we received word that ser grenadier divisions. Field Marshal tween Trier and Monschau was held ments when of the American vot Rundbtedt was i peronal by no more than four divisions. In some penetrations with the enemy charge, and from field orders sabee- this disposition of our forces I took line had been effected, that this was qeently emtured we obtained eon- a calculated risk, based on the' ab- ubling tanks. Sensing thaz a mere local fStnatioa of our beif that this at- sence of strategic objectives or large something more I immediately advised Gen- tack was in the nature of a final, depots in the area and also on the attack, the 10th Ar- desperate blow Into whicher relatively difficult terrain. eral Bradley to move mored Division from the south and avaliable reserve was thrown. In ad- When the attacks from Aacben the 7th Armored Division from the dition to the main attacking forces, toward the Roer had to be suspended north, both toward the flanks of the the enemy employed one panzer bri- pending the capture of the river dams attack. Army Commanders on both god. which operated i American and the southern thrusts began to flanks were directed to alert what equimeut with the mission of spear- slow down, however, it was noticeable divisions they had free for instant heading German combat units and that the German panzer units started movement toward that region if ne- spreading panic and confusion in and to withdraw from the line, their cessary. My own staff acted at once immediately behind our front line. places being taken by Volksgrenadier to move our reserve divisions for- Parties of paratroops were dropped divisions. All intelligence agencies ward. Of these movements, the most throughout the battle area and par- assiduously tried to find out the loca- significant and important was that ticularly in the Malmedy area where tions and intentions of these panzer of the 101st Airborne Division, which about one battalion was employed, units, but without complete success. was in.SHAEF reserve and which was while small paratroop units and My Headquarters and 12th Army directed to Bastogne. agents who had remained behind dur- time that a active in at- Group had felt for some The following mornIng, the f th, ing oar advance were through the Ardennes key bridges and counterattack General Bradley returned to his own tempting to sabotage since American the rear as was a possibility, Headquarters to keep a close grip on headquarters as far to stretched very thinly first time also since forces were the situation, and during that day Paris. For the to provide troops for rose to there In order and the next t became clear that the our landing the Luftwaffe and because Field to the attack elsewhere enemy was making an all-out effort give active combat support Rundstedt had gradually only by engaging Marshal von to split us and throw our campaign ground forees, not six infantry by placed in this quiet sector into disorder. nw air forees off the ground but divisions, a larger number than he attacking the airfields and installa- The enemy's general plan, as we required for reasonable security. tions throughout Belgium. On 1 'anu- initially analyzed It and as events However, we did not consider it high- ary, for example, the German Air subsequently confirmed, was to break ly probable that von Rundstedt Force attacked our airfields in Hol- through our thin line of defenses In would, in winter, try to use that re- land and Belgium with the largest a sudden blitz drive to the Meuse in gion in which to stage a counter- concentration of planes employed the Liege-Namur area. Having seized offensive on a large scale, feeling" sines D-day. Some 800 sorties were Liege, which was our key mainte- certain that we could deal with any flown in an all-out air offensive and nance and communication center such effort and that the result'would losses to our planes on the ground feeding 12th Army Group from the ultimately be disastrous to Germany. were considerable, although on this north, the enemy hoped to drive rap- Nevertheless, this is exactly what the one day alone German losses amount- idly and with as much strength as enemy did, employing for a second ed to 300 aircraft. possible to Antwerp, our great port time the plan of campaign and stra- confirmation had been of supply. Seizing or destroying this, As soon as tegy which had made his first break- of the enemy's he would have made our supply posi- received of the extent through In 1940 a complete success, a breakthrough, tion practically untenable and would effort to bring about and taking advantage of a period of I Immediately ordered the cessation our air at the same time have split the Brit- bad weather which prevented of all attacks along the whole front In order fully ish armies, together with the Ameri- power from operating. and the gathering up of every possible desperate risk which can Ninth Army and part of the First, to appraise the reserve to strike the penetration on the enemy undertook in making this in the north from the American and isolating both flanks. My plan was to hold venture it must be recognized that French forces in the south, and making possible their de- firmly the shoulders of the penetra- he aimed his blow, above all, at the them tion, particnlarly the Monschau area will of the Allied Command. If he struetlon in detail by attacks from on the north and the Bastogne area could weaken our determination to Holland In the north and by his strik- prevent enemy pene- maintain that flaming, relentiess of- ing force in Belgium. The attack upon on the south, of the Mouse or in the tene/ e which, regardtless of his neac- Antwerp itsei~f would proebably have trtln west p

Liege-Namur area, and then to coun- denied him the important area of terattack with General Patton's Army strutted to make absolutely certain St-Vith during the critical early days. in the general direction of the safety of his right flank in the Bastogne- The momentum of the breakthrough Cologne. This counterattack was to Trier region from which a new offen- was further reduced by the arrival in sive be followed by an attack by the forces by !the German Seventh Army the battle area on 18 December of the under Field Marshal Montgomery, di- still threatened. He was also to attack 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions, rected as the result and progress of by phase lines, holding all' forces care- moved from reserve in the Reims area General Pattoh's fully together in order to avoid any operations should to the command of 12th Army Group. indicate. I directed General risk of dispersion or wastage of Devers The 401st Airborne Division, rein- also to reach out as far as strength before Field Marshal Mont- possible forced by armor, then held the vital to gomery was in wposiiona' to Join the his left to relieve Third Army, and road center at Bastogne although to make available every single attack from the norti. United completely surrounded for 5 days and States -division that Prior to the 32d tke weather had he could, retain- under constant attack by forces many ing as his own mission merely been most unfavotable. From the the times superior in strength. The com- covering of vital communications. 16th to the 22d the enemy had the He mitment of these divisions, however, was told to give ground if necessary advantage of being able to attack removed the last Theater Reserve and In order-to. keep his thus-stretched under cover of a thick ground fog the 11th Armored Division, newly forces Intact. This order was given which deprived us of practically all arrived from England, was directed verbally on the morning of 19 De- air assistance apart from limited and to assemble rapidly In the Reims area cember at Verdun, where I had di- extremely hazardous missions. His to protect the center and to meet a rected all Interested ground troops were able, as a result, ground and air head-on attack on the Meuse if neces- commanders to assemble. Later to move against our defending forces I sary. The 17th Airborne Division was amplified this order by directing with maximum surprise. On the 22d, him also ordered over from England to to be ready to move back however, the weather began toiam- to the gen- help the 11th Armored Division se- eral line Belfont-Vosges prove and our air forces commenced in order to cure the Meuse line south of Givet: save the troops their paralyzing attacks upon enemy in the pocket lying To reestablish and maintain a re- between the Vosges, the Rhine, and communications at -the same time that serve, additional infantry divisions the Siegfried Line. The the Third %Army attack was launched same general then in England were brought to the instructions were given northeastward from the Arlon-Lux- to Field Mar- Continent in advance of schedule. shal Montgomery with respect to the embourg area. Since the enemy ini- northern flank. As the week wore on we succeeded tiated the attack, prior planning of in bolstering up the northern shoul- On 19 December, when It became air operations (such as for the Nor- der of the penetration, at the same apparent that General mandy battle) was impossible. The Bradley's left time collecting a United States Corps flank was badly separated from his object of our air attacks against the under General Collins for use in coun- right and that the enemy's rail system, carried out in situation of his terattack. From the south, General own Headquarters, spite of the bad weather (both in the located at Luxem- Patton began a transfer of six divi- bourg, limited his command and target area and 4er the bases in com- sionseto the north of the Moselle. The munication capabilities England), was to force back the ene- to the area 21 Army Group likewise ceollected south of the penetration, I realized my's rallheads; the mounting of their reseire and placed a corps under that It would offensive and the continued supply of %e impracticable for Liewt. Gen. Horrocks In the Brussels him to handle the American forces the German forces were largely de- area. The flanks of the -penetration at both north and south of the large pendent on rail communications. The Monschau and Echternach were held salient which we heavy bomber attacks achieved their being created. I and the salient gradually stabilized therefore fixed a boundary object and made the closer-range at- running by these measures. However, the east and west through the tacks against rbad movements all the breach in penetration directly westward was our lines, generally on more effective in helping to strangle, the axis Givot- still moving and, while on the north PrUim, giving both places Inclusive to von Rundstedt's efforts. Throughout it had been possible with "the 17th the Northern Group. All the period the Strategic Air Forces forces north Airborne Division and the 11th Ar- of the boundary, Including the major battered marshalling yards east of mored Division to cover the Meuse part of the U. S. irst and Ninth the Rhine and blocked centers of bridges adequately down as far as the Armies and part of the Ninth Air movement such as StLVith, while Givet, south of that the crossings re- Force, I placed respectively under the medium and light bombers ot the mained alarmingly weak. To defend operational command of Field Tactical Air Forces destroyed bridges, Mar- them I directed-that all available rear shal Montgomery and Air Marshal headquarters, dumps, and other tar echelon troops and service units as Coningham, Commander-in-Chief gets In the battle area. The fighte. of well as six French infantry battalions the Second Tactical Air Force. This bombers ranged far and wide In and be moved to the Meuse itoprotect the beyond the battle Area creating havoc left General Bradley suitably located crossings at all costs snd in no event to command the forces on the in enemy road and rail movement, south- to permit any bridge to fall intact ern flank of the salient, comprising into the hands of the' enemy. their efficacy In starving the enemy S mainly the U. S. Third Army and of fuel, food, and ammunition being ' Because of the SXIX Tactical Air Coinmtand, consid- difficult situation in amply testified to by ,prisoners. A eon-. the region of Bastogne, where the certed attack en the German S erably reinforced. Air 101st Airborne Division and ether Force airfields on 24 December helped I The full brunt of the enemy assault elements were steadfastly holding to reduce the activity of the enemy out against greatly superior forces, fighters and thus afforded our was met first by the four divisions fighter- General Bradley felt that he should bombers still greater opportunity for • Ardonnes sector:• start General Patton's Third Army 10 the 4th, 28th, and concentration on ground tapgets 6th. Infantry Divisions and the 9th attacking to the Armorod Division. In spite of being northward from the rather than on air fighting, which had Arlon-Luxembourg area no later ,than up to this time been as intense as any bypassed.and divided by the penetra- Friday, 22 December. General Patton • tion, these the enemy had proved capable of of- rces slowed: the enemy was authorzed to begin the attack, thrust and t e7th Anmnored Division fering since D-day. batt prior: to launching it he was in- The 4th Armored Division of Ihe S

Third Army, attacking northward and the reopening of direct communi- of the Ardennes, the enemy had also, and oontaining against heavy resistance toward Bas- cations between General Bradley's as a diversionary measure, mounted an attack on the togne, was able by 26 December to Headquarters and General Hodges' 6th Army Group front with the ap- make firm oontact with the defenders First Army, the operational command parent purpose of regaining the A1- of the important'road net there, who of the First Army reverted to the saceLorralne plains westward to the had meanwhile been supplied by air, Central Group of Armies. The U. S. Vosges. It had initially been our plan and to check the enemy's advance on Ninth Army was retained within the to press the attacks *against the ene- that flank. This attack also drew Northern Group of Armies under my in this sector and to establish an strong enemy forces away from the Field Marshal Montgomery. easily held defensive line on the north of the salient. By the 26th The German counteroffensive had Rhine in order to be in a position to also, additional reserves had been so opened on 16 December and had been move forces northward for the main disposed along the Meuse as to relieve brought under control by the 26th. attack into Germany. The Battle of anxiety over this sector, and it was Th,- initiative in the battle had passed the Ardennes had made it immedi- then clear that the enemy had failed to our forces shortly therealter, and ately necessary to transfer to the In his main intention. By the itime the by 16 January, 1 month after the north strong forces under command German drive was halted, the enemy initial attack, our forces were in a of General Patton prior to attaining had breached a 45-mile gap in our firm position astride the Houffalize objectives in the south. The lines from Echternach to Monschau road network, ready to counterattack our fuU 6th Army Group had, as a result of and had penetrated over 60 miles strongly into enemy territory. Within the shift northward of these forces, westward to within 4 miles of the this month, the enemy, although f ail- been compelled to abandon the plans Meuse near Celles. ing to reach even his Initial objec- had nevertheless to clear the territory wet of the As soon as the enemy's advance tives on the Meuse, succeeded in stopping omr attacks Rhine, ad was left with only tbe had been checked, my intention was minimnum fores required to maintain to cut his lines of communication into against the Rubr and the Sar. Op- wih of- the detensie ean M original tie. the salient and if possible to destroy erations to deal the enemy occu-pied our Moreover, it was faced with an un- him by launching ground attacks fensive had a fall and the 10t, healthy utttlao I&lbs ease 5 tme from both north and south in close weeks were not, even by eertain regrolping was C1mar potke. coordination with continued heavy completed. A to the mounting of a After Beal DeverW o bad air attacks designed to extend paraly- essential prior by our forces, and throush the Vose Mosntahm sis of movement and communication full-scale offensive bokes i had appeared to Mm over a large area. Simultaneously the at that time I estimated -that the ene- in November, r offensive German tones strat"e air effort which had been my attack had delayed that The mailng CW aPo ket cmld amd employed so effectively in the battle operations by at least six weeks. In need area was released to resume its nor- addition to this disrwtion of our WCOl be qsliwly mpe up by the Strategic Air Forces had Consequently he b]ad, mal tasks. effort, the Prench Army. with The counterat1mck from the north, of necessity been drawn Into the bat- aeording to pka, turned north aimed at Houffalize in the center of tle, thus .leaving oil, aircraft, and the -bulk of his forces to assist Gen- Ger- the salient, was launched by the First communication targets deeper in eral Patton whe ad fundamentafy for neartly a Army on 3 January on a two-corps many free of attack the same offensive pote O mriIng front, with a corps of the British Sec- month. the Rhine Line. Itta expeeted that end Army conforming on the west The counteroffensive, ,however, was as soon n the Colmar pocket bad flank. On 9 January, the Third Army, not without its effects upon the ene- been reduced, the French Army Itself which had been maintaining strong my. Land and air forces had been would be capable of bolding AI Al- pressure in the Bastogne area, carefully built up for months, and sace-Lorraine and the entire Seventh launched a fresh attack also directed suplies, particularly of fuel, had been Army could be employed north and towards the Houffalize road net. Both carefully hoarded for this all-out ef- east oe the Vosges sretor. As time these attacks were hampered by ad- fort. During the month ending 16 went on, however, the enemy was verse weather over snow-covered January, my commanders estimated able to stabilize the Colmar pocket, mine fields and were met by stubborn that the enemy suffered 120,000 seri- and to reinforce the rea. Conse- enemy resistance. Slow progress was ous casualties and lost 600 tanks and quently, when -the German thrust made, however, and the gap between assault guns. He also lost about 1,620 came through the Ardennes in great the attacking armies had by 10 Janu- planes-a severe blow-and his fuel strength, we had on our extreme right ary been narrowed to some ten miles. stocks, after nearly a month of large- flank, Instead of e strong, easily By this time the enemy had begun to scale effort, were reduced to a bare defended lie we eapeeted, a setuation withdraw from the western tip of his minimum. The tactical aircraft claims that was inherently w ek from a de- salient, but still strongly opposed our for the month included also over fentsive standpoint. The entire TI pressure against his northern and 6,000 motor transport destroyed and Corps wW lyinRg the east 51 the southern flanks. Nevertheless, on the 7,000 damaged, together with some Voes facing north, wh2e the U. . 16th, attacking forces of the First 550 locomotives destroyed and over 3d Indantry Diison bad to he malt- and Third Armies established firm 600 damaged. By the end of our own tulned wtb Sc Fvnc i Army In contact at Houffalize and turned their counteroffensive the enemy had lost order to sustain the integit of our full strength eastward against the re- 220,000 men, includIng 110,000 pris- lines in the Colmar pocket. The dan- treating enemy. St-Vith fell to the oners of war. More serious in the ger, clearly reognise by all *f us First Army forces on the 23d and by final analysis was the widespread die- from the tart, was tha C eoemy the end of the month our line was Iiuslonment within the German Army wold attempt to hr .... tw. approximately what it had been at and Germany itself which must have alon the wet 51 the Voses end at the beginning of the breakthrough, accompanied the realization that the the -~ time pibl tr to epts while advance forces attack~ed beyond breakthrough had failed to seize any with a secondary Stack free the this In the direction of Bonn. really important objective and had Colmar pocket. In thjs event, VI With the establishment of contact achieved nothing decisive. Corps would not only.vs been un- During the r~ouses. of th M between the First and Third Armies _l.top o e r S rest of the tmat, bWt would give General Devers the e$bueset the movement -the Preeop were kept aebtalty have had to turn and fight possible defensive line along-W eat- informed. AA the pljes mystallsed, Its way out of an awkward situation. ern flank, since our forces had failed howevtr, the French became con- In view of this unsatisfactory posi- to gain the Rhine, and he would be vinced that a withdrawal from the tion, and because General Devers' enabled to collect into his own re- Strasbofrrg area would have unfor- local reserves should manifestly be serves at least two armored divisions\ tunate political repercussions in their stationed west of the protective moun- in the regions south of the Siegfried country,. bringing about perham ea teA barrier, I ordered a general with- Line and west of the YVagu. this the downfall of the de Geufle Gov- drawal of the VI Corps ine to the would have given us #pot to ernment. They were so convinced Of Vosges, retaining th the area north employ two U. S. Divisl as a the necessity of putting up a fight for of Strasbourg only light reconnais- SHAEF reserve farther to the ,orth, Strasbourg, rather than of voluntar- sance elements that would have had leaving General Bradley fwe to- de- ily withdrawing to a better defensive to withdraw under any sizeable ene- vote his entire power to the t4essive. line, that they were prepared to de- my advance. This move would, of General Devers planned-to exute fend the city with the few French course, have "exposed Strasbourg to this movement by stages, -and *nM troops that could be hurriedly gath- occupation by enemy forces and it could be completed wq hl , ered together. These would have beeS would have forced the left flank of had to leave the two MYbt:. toi*r bottle and so indt - the French Army to swing back into uled for SHARP reserv ]ped,0"- however, that'u e it woud, hlowvor, cotrol. Throughout *.6' A*tb ae~wnacmzaa

£ ....-1 -)j : 3 .. - [] 66

After closely studying the French unrest generally. Clearly, the preven- shaping up into two prongs were views in the matter, and recognizing tion of such a contingency became a made on 1 January in the direction the political importance of Stras- matter of military as well as of po- of Rohrbach and toward the Saverne bourg, I felt compelled to alter the litical necessity. Pass, southeast of Bitche. Six days original plan for withdrawal. Origi- The plan was accordingly altered later the enemy succeded in pushing nally, I had considered that the mat- so that VI Corps r~erely withdre troops across the Rhine, a few miles ter of Strasbourg was merely a con- from its sharp salient and its left north of Strasbourg, and gained flict between military and political rested in the Vosges with its righ' ground in a thrust northward from considerations and that I was com- extending toward Strasbourg. In thr he Colmar pocket. This latter drive pletely Justified in handling the ques- meantime, preparation of defensivc hreatened to overrun the Alsatian tion on a purely military basis. How- positions in the Vosges went on, con- Plain and to Isolate Strasbourg. Gen- ever, as I studied the French views ducted mainly by service troops. Ir eral Devere' forces ffiflicted heavy it became evident that the execution view of my order to go over to tht losses upon the enemy and with vig- of the original plans for withdrawal defensive, to withdraw from the sali- orous countermeasures, in spite of might have stich grave consequences ent, and to place in reserve or send the difficulties under which they lain France that all our lines of com- northward all available divisions bored, succeeded in stabilizing the munication and our vast rear areas the enemy made some progress line so that no military essential m I g h t become seriously affected against our lines with a total forer -round in the Vosges was lost and through interference with the task estimated at 14 divisions. Betweer trasbourg itself no more than threat- of he service troops and through civil Saarguemines and Neunhofenjattack. oned. 67 PLANS FOR THE 1945 CAMPAIGN

By early 1945, the German oil sup- which we could advance to the heart ply was critically short and there was were sites suitable for three divisional of Germany and defeat such enemy a growing transportation crisis which assaults on a 20-mile front, in addi- forces as were left to oppose us. The was already affecting every aspect of tion to one possible, though difficult, first of these was from the lower the German war effort. Our successful further side. Flooding conditions west Rhine, north of the Ruhr and into land ldvances had disrupted the Ger- of Emmerich would quite likely pre- the North German Plain; the second man air defense system, had enabled clude any extension of this assault was from the Mainz-Karlsruhe area us to install blind-bombing aids on area until after June. In the Mainz- and thence northeast through Frank- the Continent, and had Increased Karlsruhe sector there were sites for the furt toward Kassel. The former axis depth to which fighter escorts could five divisional assaults, with a pos- of advance, apart from offering the accompany the bombers into Ger- sible sixth south of Karlsruhe. In most suitable terrain for mobile op- many. All these factors greatjy in- addition to these two main sectors, erations-the type of warfare which creased our bombing power and there was one site on each side of re- we wished to force upon the duced the capacity of the German enemy Cologne which would accommodate Air in order to exploit our superior Force to resist mo- a single divisional assault crosiang, attacks. bility-afforded the quickest means but this would prove tactically diffi- By 16 January, the Battle of the of denying to the Germans the vital cult, and, once across the river, Ardennes was substantially conclud- Ruhr industries. the The northern and forces would be faced with ed. The First and Third Armies had eastern unfavor- exits of the Ruhr could be able terrain. The nature joined' hands through the salient at of the coun- cut by enveloping action on the part try likewise militated Houffalize, and their junction marked against the un of 'the ground forces, while the south- of sites between the achievement of Coblenz and Beon tactical victory. ern ones could be interrupted by air except At midnight on under conditions of very light 17-18 January, the action. On the other hand, the im- First opposition. Army reverted to command of portance of the Ruhr to the enemy Another factor which had to b General Bradley's 12,th Army Group, was such that he was likely to accord taken into account in and the Allied line once more took it first priority In his defense plans; planningthe Rhine assault operations was the up the order in which it was ranged so that the rapid deployment of a technical opinion of the engineers along the threshold of Germany at superior force across 'the Rhie would that until March there would be a the time when von Rundstedt's of- be essential to Allied success. An ad- danger of ice hampering the cros- fensive interrupted our invasion vance on the southern axis from ings and bridging. Below Mainz sum- preparations a month earlier. The Mainz toward Kassel would also se- mer floods, following the melting of task now was to regrasp the strategic cure to us an indusrial zone, in the the Alpine snows, would make it im- initiative and resume the advance. Frankfurt area, and would therefore perative to complete the construction In planning our forthcoming spring also be likely to afford us an oppor- of permanent bridges by May. This and summer offensives, I envisaged tunity of destroying considerable estimate differed from earlier techni- the operations which would lead to enemy forces. It would, moreover, cal reports in that it indicated the Germany's collapse as falling into offer suitable airfield sites from which advisability of a March-April attack, three phases: first, the destruction of to support further advances. On the whereas the engineers originally be- the enemy forces west of the Rhine debit side, however, the advance lieved that conditions on the and closing to that river; second, the would Rhine be over terrain less suitable would render unwise seizure of bridgeheads over any such at- the Rhine for armored operations, although tempt between from which to develop 20 November and late operations once Kassel .had been reached the Al- May. into Germany; and third, the destruc- lies could either push north to com- tion of the remaining From the logistical aspect, there enemy east of plete the encirclement of the Ruhr, the Rhine and was available to the Allied armies the advance into the or northeast toward Berlin, or east- sufficient bridging equipment heart of the Reich. This was the same ward toward Leipzig. and per- purpose that had guided all our ac- sonnel to launch nine assault cross- From the Mainz-Karlsruhe sector, tions ings, and, In addition, one unopposed 6 since early 1944. a thrust might also be made eastward crossifig of the Rhine. After the cross- The immediate aim was to be the toward Niirnberg, but this, important ing had been effected, it was esti- smashing of the enemy west of the as it was later to become, was not of mated that our lines of Rhine, in order to reduce -to a mini- communica- immediate concern in the long-term tion would enable mum the forces which us to build up to would be avail- planning on which we were engaged a maximum able to oppose of some 35 divisions our crossing of the in January. We still held to the hope river north of the Ruhr, leaving some 56 and subsequent adv'ance. A sec- for opportunity to effect a massive ondary divisions (counting, scheduled ar- purpose was to give us a double envelopment of the Ruhr, to maximum rivals) for holding and secondary ability for concentration be followed by a great thrust to join along operations. chosen avenues across the up with the Russians, but we could Rhine, with None of the considerations above maximum economy of not then foresee to what extent the security troops on other portions of mentioned indicated any change In the front. The forthcoming Russian offensive, in its form which these op- sweeping advances, might influence the decision arrived at during our erations west of pre-D-day planning, that Is the Rhine were to our strategy in this direction. that the take was largely dependent upon the main thrust of the Allied armies for With respect to the local geograph- geographical factors whith would the crossing of the Rhine and the ical factors governing our choice condition our progress in the later of isolation of the Ruhr should be on Rhine-crossing sites, the Mainz-Karls- phases. the axis north of the Ruhr. Without rube sector was more favorable than Once we had that vast industrial region, Germany crossed the Rhine, that north of the Ruhr. In the latter, there were two would be incapable of continuing to main avenues by bstween Emmerich and Wesel, there wage war, especially when the er- the maximum scale would be required had been accomplished. The only link pected Russian offensive had en- between my Headquarters and that if the successful passage of the main gulfed the Silesian industrial area Marshal Stalin was through the Allied armies was to be assured. of which alone was comparable to the medium of the Allied Military Mis- The strength of our land forces, at Ruhr in productive capacity. Since we sion in Moscow, and it appeared most the time of planning in January, was could not attack the Ruhr frontally, difficult to learn of Soviet intentions. 71 divisions, but this figure did not we must bypass it; and the most fav- Up to the end of 1944 I had received accurately represent their effective orable terrain lay to its north. I was no Information on matters affecting value. Many of the American divi- equally certain that this main effort the Russian grand Strategy, although sions were seriously understrength in on the north should be accompanied I had expressed my willingness to infantry, and, although strenuous by a secondary effort as strong as afford any such information con- efforts were being made to find the our means permitted after the main, cerning my own over-all plans as necessary replacements both by ac- northern thrust had been provided the Red Army migh desire. At celerating the flow of reinforcements for, from the Mainz-Karlsruhe area Christmas time, however, following from the United States and by taking in thel general direction of Kassel. upon a message which I sent to the from rear echelon employ- Thus the maneuver would constitute fit men Combined Chiefs of Staff explaining ment, it was obvious that some time a great double envelopment, which the difficulty with which I was faced must elapse before these men could would encircle the Ruhr and the mass to evolve plans while become available for front-line duty. in attempting of the enemy forces which were cer- still ignorant of the Russian inten- For the moment, the Finch divisions tain to concentrate in its defense. tions, President Roosevelt secured on our southern flank were depleted With this In mind, the first task from Marshal Stalin his agreement to relatively low combat effective- must be to initiate operations west of to receive our representative in order ness. By the time- at which we esti- Rhine and north of the Moselle discuss the correlation of our the mated we should be ready to cross to which should destroy the enemy in respective efforts in the forthcoming the Rhine, in March, the Allied that zone and bring our armies on to spring. strength would, under the existing Rhine north of Diisseldorf to per- the build-up program, have risen to 85 According, in January, my deputy, mit preparation for the ensuing main divisions, including 6 airbbrne, with Air Chief Marsial Tedder, accom- That done, we must direct our attack. 5 to 8 new French divisions organ- panied by Maj. Gen. Bull (G-3) and to eliminating other ene- main effort izing, training, and equipping for Brig. Gen. Betts (G-2), journeyed to forces west of the Rhine which my possible later employment. It was Moscow for this purpose. The con- still constitute an obstacle or might also hoped that the existing French ference proved conspicuously suc- threat to our subsequent a potential would have their combat cessful. In the course of a discussion When the enemy divisions crossing operations. value largely restored. ranging over many aspects of the cleared from the west had thus been As against the Allied power, it was forthcoming campaigns, Marshal we must seize bridgeheads over bank, difficult, as the situation then stood, Stalin was acquainted with the na- river both in the north and the the to calculate the likely strength of ture of our own plans, including the the Ruhr, we must south. North of the enemy in the spring. This depend- timing. He, in turn, responded with of the Rhine the maxi- deploy east ed partly upon the extent to which a full explanation of the great four- of divisions which we mum number he might be able to draw reinforce- pronged offensive, involving from of maintaining there, were capable ments from Italy and Norway for the 150 to 160 division, which the Red south, on the axis Mainz- while to the Western Front. It would depend also Army was preparing to launch. He we must deploy Frankfurt-Kassel, upon the destructive effects of our further gave us an assurance that, forces as might be available such continuing winter operations, which, in the event of the main offensive the estimated 35 di- after providing as always, I was determined to pur- being halted by bad weather, the required for the principal visions sue vigorously. Finally, it depended Red Army would still conduct local north of the Ruhr. thrust upon the degree to which events on operations which he believed would The primary task of the southern . the Eastern Front would engross the so pin down the Germanilarmies as draw away enemy units force was to enemy's attention. If the worst hap- to permit no major movement of di- which might otherwise oppose the pened and the anticipated Russian visions from east to west during the advance In the north. It was main spring offensive proved weak and in- difficult period of the spring thaw. to force the enemy to dis- essential effectual, the enemy was estimated As events shdwed, the success of this so that we might perse his strength, to be capable of maintaining as many gigantic offensive proved even greater possible crossings and lines use all as 100 divisions in the west. But if than had been anticipated. In the to establish in of communication the Russian offensive proved as meantime, fortified by Marshal Stal- a concentrated western Germany successful as we hoped, it seemed un- in's assurances, we were able to pro- force of sufficient size 'to complete the likely that more than 80 divisions ceed with our own operational plan- conquest. Flexibility had to be an could be spared to meet our attack, ning. plans, as the possi- essential of our while the German logistical potential- In addition 'to his preoccupation bility of failure to secure the neces- with the Russian forces, the enemy in one or another ities would be corresponding im- sary bridgeheads was certain to be seriously hampee Logis- paired. sector could not be overlooked. in the forthcoming operations on our must therefore be Now that the time was approach- decal preparations front by the logistical difficulties to switch the main ef- ing for what, we trusted, would be made rapidly which had been imposed upon him to south if this should the final blow to Nazi Germany, a fort from north by the attacks of the Allied strategic Whatever the oppo- closer coordihation with the Russian prove necessary. air forces from the west, while in might be, the fact remained High Command and mutual under- sition the east the vital Silesian industrial the crossing of the standing of our respective plans be- that in any case region was soon to be overrun by the Rhine, en the narrow frontages avail- came essential. Our first liaison with Soviet armies. Despite superhuman able, would be a tactical and engi- Moscow had been effected late in efforts to keep the lines open, the neering feat of the greatest magni- 1944 when air operations necessi- German railroad system was gradu- tude. Use of airborne forces, air sup- tated the establishment of a coordi- ally breaking down under the weight port, and amphibious equipment on nated bomb-line, hut little further U of ever-increasing air blows. The at- On the Allied tacks upon the facilities side, I was satisfied safely eoneentrate the gret S t behind the that our tactical air Ardennes front had forced the forces were required for or intended men rail- stronug enough to fuflll nfl. heads back nearly to the Rhine. the tasks a the ri"r neth of aom whkh would face them when or Heavy destruction had also been in- of- &ad,by the neroes ot economyy ew fensives began, and that the strategic where, provide reasonable flicted u~on the enemy's airplane in- air strengt dustries, forces were fully capable of carry- for a scondary effort. Moreover, although dispersion of ing out the plants and the construction their planned programs. At- enemy-would find hkself at +besme of under- tacks on oil installations, ground factories Jet aircraft disadvantase as thsat at whio h is had enabled him to and armament factories, and make some progress with his jet air- naval possession of the Siegfried Lin had and communications targets were craft production---the most serious to formerly placed ns. We would have be the chief objectives of the heavy the opportunity of threatening threat with which we were faced. But bombers, him at planes with an overriding priority a number of points along would be of little avail without of coordination the line, fuel, and with the ground force forcing him to disperse his defending t was against the German offensive operations. refineries and synthetic The air staff forces, and thus making easier the plants-that fully explored the possibility our greatest effort was directed. of de- task of our troops invading the Reich Al- stroying the 31 Rhine bridges though some recovery had behind at the points selected for our attack. been ef- the enemy armies west of fected during the the river, For these reasons, we considered autumn and early in the same way that in the winter, the heavy blows previous that before attempting any major at' struck at the summer we had cut the lines of end of the year once more brought com- orations east of the Rhine It was munication over the Seine and Loire ementil to destroy the mai production down to an extremely behind enemy critical the German Seventh Army In armies west of the river, altheg it figure. The gamoline produced Normandy, but during did not consider such might not b e worth the time Md oe4 Jaauary was likely to be no a program practicable. more than 100,000 It was be- to tndulge In protracted operation to tons (20 percent lieved that to undertake of the destrue- redue a strmg but ebetled the pre-raid amount), and there tion of so many was bridges as an addi- bridgeheadsthtat a prospect of a further drop to tioDal target syetem might realm ki. about hfthis would involve GOerman hands. When the Ckmbind igue with the In- too great a dversion eim- tenficatMion from the wes O ftaff cresed loS a of our aka k the Iu strategic effort, and pear future. In ftt, with tbe that the tomw abilty to mi emo- weather was nlikely tain teleus bilisation of to afford the -noh of e R a" probably the whole Ruhr requisite number of Yisual ad In t synthetic bombing Maefs-Frankfut are&- -r t to fuel idustry . esimul- days. Certain key bridges taneous were to be f~roalmatmy disoss, stoppae of the great mta- *acked, however, In conjunction Was9pointed latious at Brn, out tu s&a VWu deS be to Lmma, ad Pots, wft a tmsveree blocking of om- and th tbreat" - VKwe dCMnat sew o Bfle of She Russian-ad- mudattons within each batle area vaaes to the atc plW In which would 14mit the enmys teti- Sn1ea, the Gemse M Industry was sit to the eat of that rivet Give. -dmobilit. a situsa facing a graver erisfs then ever be- , however, where we could torand this at a time when opera- itham ltter r pet, Me euMy operate without fearor the OuMrily w- avoeed hw the tomen rmquirements we" akely to dvntages ae- of our flanks and without ....lu ris to a point kgher SamInmy aigfrom has strong defensive for defensivo purposes mo fsg uesfirst prlou -pe a .epost a the Siegried fortftatlons, than we could afford, I et oetde t months. ad behind them the great barrier of of our abilty to carry ott the pleas the Rhine Itsef. These defense were already Indicated, puttfg the extet k wa to tbie oft offensiv that we entremely formidable, and apm rom weight into the northern thrt bt pinned our faith to eounterbalance the cost of piercing them on a selected at the same time striking In the soUth the numerical superiority which the fron, their chief value to the enemy and retaining flexibility enough to enemy enjoyed over ue In reet to y In the fact that they would en- switch the main effort iftthe dtuation his jet aircraft. Had the program of able him to coneentrate sfely for so required. Moreover, the simple fact production which the mftwaffe en- counterattack at our Hnes of com- remained that destruction of enemy visaged been Put Into effect, or air munication. That capability was forces should be easier on the mastery in well weal the spring of 1945 would demonstrated ot the Rhine have when the Ardennes than on the east. been precarious, for our own thrust had been production launched, and, al- Of the 85 divisione which were to had not enabled us to though that tempt had been de- meet the be at my d1sposal, 35 were tentatvely jets on equal ternms. For- fe&ed, the possibility of furtber, tunately our bombing campaign, both alocated for the northern thrust. Of though necessarily weaker, offensive the up)on the production eentere and upon re "inder, I estimated that lonl rmained. To meet this we would 26 were necesay the airfields from which the Jet planes for defense and have to sa*ton a lalong our etended reserve purposes operated, so limited their numbers if we held the line line more troops than we could afford, of the Rhine, and potentialities that the German whereas as many as 45 effort was toe little and any concentraion onowr part and too late. So for an attak a a given point would would be required were the northir for as orthodox aircraft were assaul to be attempted flhe the con- ent4ail a dangerous wekening of corned, despite ret of the front was substantiall a numericaj[ strength other sectors, unless before striking that was still considerable, west of the river, with the enemy the fuel our decisive blow at the heart of Ger- situation and the growing dearth capable of striking us from behind of many we ourselves possessed such a trained plots wore so acute that his Siegfried fortifications. the defensive line as the enemy himself German Air Together with .their suggestion that Force was never in a enjoyed. I was conviniced that only position seriously to interfere I shiould concentrate upon the single with the Rhine could fulfill this require- our operations heavy drive in the north rather than after the great but ment. Once we held the Rhine sub- costly effort made on run what might, except in the cir- New Year's stantially throughout Its length Day, when we cumstances described, have proved .a. some 800 aircraft raided should possess such a line as could dangerous risk of weakening the Al- Allied airfields in Belgium and Hol- be held with minimum forces along lied efforts by overdispersal, the Com- lead. the inactive seetois. Thus we could bined Chiefs of Staff submitted for manders to direct the forthcoming this officer Is also known as the my consideration a proposal by the Ground Commander of the entire battles would in any way secure bet- British Chiefs of Staff that a single force. But when there is more than ter coordination of effort. On the ground commander for the whole one Army Group in a single Theater, contrary, the appointment would, in front north of Luxembourg be ap- there cannot logically be an over-all fact, have necessitated a duplication pointed, to exercise, under me, oper- "ground commander", separate from of personnel and communications ational control and coordination of the Theater or Supreme Commander. which could have resulted only in all ground forces involved in the of- Each Army Grcqup should normally decreased efftciency, while such func- fensive which was to take us across occupy a well defined channel of tions as the allocation of forces and the Rhine. This suggestion was based advance. A special case supplies between the Army groups strategic upon the assumption that all the re- would be one where a series of armies were already performed by my own mainder of the front would remain be operating, each in a dis- Headquarters. would on the defensive, contrary to my tinctly separate geographical area plans. I pointed out that, under these In this connection, my views as and without close tactical relation- plans, the Ruhr marked the logical to the place of a so-called "ground" ship, one to the other. In this case that division of command zones, and C-in-C in a theater commanded by each Army Commander would be di- Field Marshal Montgomery would be a single supreme commander are rectly subordinate to the Theater in charge of all the forces-the Cana- roughly as follows: Ground forces Commander, since an Army Group dian Army, British Army, and U. S. should ordinarily be commanded ac- Commander could serve so eeful Ninth Army-that were to participate cording to the possibilities, frequent- funetion. in the northern offensive to capture of close ly determined by geography, These convictions, together with the Ruhr. In the center, during the supervision. Battlefield battlefield the outline operational plans which operations preceding the Rhine cross- through command eltends upward had been worked out, were explained ing, General Bradley's 12th Army Corps, Army, and Army the Division, to the Combined Chiefs ot Staff when Group, comprising the U. S. First and This last com- Group Commander. they met at the Malta Confereneo in Third Armies, would concentrate pri- the highest ground commander is the last week of January, on their marily on an offensive through the a logical function mander who has way to the Tripartite Conference In Siegfried Line along the axis Prtim- of the Theater separate from that the Crimea. My Chief of Staff, who Bonn, with its left swinging north to who, at the same Commander and attended the Malta Conference AS support the Ninth Army and its right freed from time, can be sufiently my representative, assured the Com- swinging south to flank the Saar. logistic, and civil broad strategic, bined Chiefs that we would seize the South of the Moselle, General Devers' entire attention problems to give his west bank of the Rhine at the cross- 6th Army Group, with the U. S. Sev- The next higher com- to the battle. ing sites in the north as soon as this enth and French First Armies, would the Army Group Com- mander above was feasible and without waiting to remain on the defensive at first, sub- whatever name he is mander, by come up to the river throughout Its sequently operating to clear the Saar as Supreme or Theater called, such length. We undertook further to ad- Basin and close to the Rhine when necessarily controls Commander, vance across the Rhine In the north the Germans had been driven out of broad strategy and commands air with maximum trength and complete the zone north of the Moselle. and sea forees, and therefore is the addi- determination as soon as the situa- The existing Army Group system only one In position to bring to collect of command thus fitted naturally Into tional strength to bear to influence tics In the mouth allowed us front Is the operational plans which we had the action. When the ground the necessary forces and carry out the and extent evolved, and I could not see how the such that configuration assault without Incurring unreason- by a appointment of a C-in-C Ground permit close battle supervision then able risks. Forces over the Army Group Coin- single Army Group Commander,,

A OPERATIONS TO REACH RHINE In conformity with our strategic plans for operations into to take advantage of the check we the Ninth Army's right the heart had imposed flank. It we of Germany, the main effort upon the enemy there.1 hoped to commenpe GRENADE in the General Bradley not Allied operations west of the Rhine was instructed to in- later than 10 February. flict the maxmum losses upon the was to be in the northern sector, with Opoation VERITABLE was hay a view to seizing Germans, to seize any opportunity the crossings north of breaching launched- on the target date of 8 of the Rulr. All our other the Siegfried Line and. operations if successful, to Fpbruary, but the weather conditions were designed primarily to assist advance northeast this on the axis Prilm-Euskirchen. could hardly have been more unfav- northern operation, to gain secure The attack was to be orable. January had been exception- flanks so as to permit of the heaviest pressed with all ally vigor as long as severe, with snow lying on the concentration with which to force there was any rea- ground through a sonable chance of securing the month, and when crossing in the north, and eventually a decisive the thaw success, but, as an alternative, set in at the beginning of to provide the bases for a secondary we February, the ground had to be ready to pass quickly to became ex- effort which would again assist the tremely soft and water-logged, while planned main the defensive in the Ardennes and to effort. launch floods spread far and wide in the area Operations west the ne attacks in the north- of the Rhine were ern sector, over which our advance had been to be developed in three distinot planned to take place. The difficulties phases. The latter offensive, comprising thus imposed were immense, Operations and the Phase I was to consist primarily VERITABLE and GREN- men had sometimes to fight waist- ADE, was to of the operations known be under the control of deep in water. The privations which as VERI- 21 Army Group. TABLE and GRENADE, by which The U. S. Ninth they underwent were appalling, but Army was to remain repsectively the Canadian Army and under the com- their spirit was indomitable, and they the U. S. Ninth Army were to advance mand of Field Marshal Montgomery overcame their personal for hardships to the Rhine below this purpose and was to be built with great gallantry to inflict DIsseldorf. In up to a major addition, the U. S. First a strength of four corps, total- defeat upon the enemy in some Army was ing twely of to seize the line of the divisions, the rats of build- the fiercest fighting of the whole war. Erht west and up being northwest of Cologne, thus determined by the progress Under such conditions insuring of operations it was in- the security of in the Ardennes. In evitable that out hopes for our communications Operation a rapid between Aachen and VERITABLEm, the target breakthrough should be disappointed, Mftnchen-Glad- date for which bach. As soon as these operations was to be not later andrthe fighting soon developed into than 8 February, the Canadian began, the existing offensive in the First a bitter slugging match in which the Army was to conduct a strong Ardennes was to give place to a policy offen- enemy had to be forced back yard sive from the Nijmegen area south- of aggressive defense designed to by yard. When the attack was first contain the German east between the Rhine and the Maas. launched the enkemy's reaction was divisions fighting carrying there and to the thrust as far as the gen- slow, but our own difficulties gave widen the breaches made eral in the Siegfried line Xanten-Geldern, clearing him a chance to consolidate his de- Line. South of the the whole Moselle our forces area and stablishing a fenses. The Germans' trouble were to remain on firm flank lay, as the defensive, such along the Rhino. The at- usual, in their lack of mobility, for local operations tack was as were necessary to contain to be made on a two-corps the stocks of gasoline which they the Ger- front, British man forces on their 30 Corps on the right had laboriously a4cumulated for -the front being con- and Canadian ducted with the maximum 2 Corps on the left, Ardennes offensive were now exhaust- economy while British 1 Corps was both of personnel and of ammunition. also to be ed and the incessant Allied air at- under command of the During Phase II, while the Rhine- Canadian tacks upon the fuel-producing plants, Army. In all, seven infantry and four crossing operations were prepared the roads, and the railways caused and instituted armored divisions, with tour infan- the situation daily to deteriorate still in the north, the ene- try and my was to be driven five armored brigades, were further. back to the river to be employed. north of its confluence If, as was hoped, dry Apart from the German Army's with the Mo- ground conditions selle in order that the main prevailed, the logistical difficulties, moreover, it bridge- basis of the operation was head's lines of communication should to be speed was considerably weakened in nu- be absolutely and violence, the armored columns merical strength on the Western secure. Our southern passing forces were then through the enemy lines and Front by the date when VERITABLE to initiate an offen- disrupting sive to capture his rear areas. As events was launched as compared with that the Saar Basin and turned out, state begin their" advance the of the country army's state at the beginning of Jan- to the Rhine Is was the very that sector. reverse of what had uary. During the closing stages of been desired. Finally, in Phase the Ardennes Battle, when the failure I, white re In order that northern bridgehead Operation GRINADE of the offensive was seen to be in- was consoli- might be launched, 12th Army dated and exanded and the Group evitable, the Sixth Panzer Army had Central was to extend its left wing north- Group of Armies remained on the de- been withdrawn from the line to com- fenuive north of ,the Moselle, the re- ward as far as Jillich, and the Ninth mence a Army would then hold a front weary and unhappy trek mainling forces in the south were to / on the across Germany to the Eastern Front. Roer River from Jillich to Roemond. complete their operations to roseh With it went the remnants of some Prom the right portion of this the Rhine so thlat the Allies Would front seven panzer aitd panzer grenadier it wee to launch a strong attack hold the attre left bank. to- divisions, two panzer brigades, and ward the Rhine, with its rigrht flank During the latter, half of January threq infantry divisions, a forces which on the line Jitlich-Neuss. T'he and the beginning of February the offen- included oonsiderably over half the sive was to be carried up to the Rhine Central Group of Armies continued armor which had confron~ted us when between D~isseldorf and MOrn. to fight hard is the Ardennes secto 11th von Rundstedt launched his attack AryGrop was ftially ispo~ e Is mid-Deember. As against these

A> 72

Sdepartures and some 150,000 serious the reinforcements - #battle casualties, sent to, the Western Front Were insignificant in both quality and quantity. Now that the Allies were once more- on the general offensive, all -hope of aurenewel malerOGM4.auv by the- enemy disappea-red and, it .. soOn became merely a,, qneationu of how losg von Rundsate dtskil nd. the stubborn spirit of hb deplwted

sir battle west of the RhIW.. AWs the desperate commitment of formations piecemeal to the fighting, which we had first witnessed in Normandy, was repeated. The enemy's chief assets for the moment lay in the weather and the terrain, but these could never. compensate for the seasoned fighting forces which he had lost.' During the first 6ays of VERI- TAMJ good progress was made through the forest ealled Reichawald and to the outskirts of Klove, but fierece rstance was then eneount- ered. The opposition on the southern -edge of the forest was particularly violent. NeverthsiemS, Kleve fell by 12 February and on the 13th the forest was oleared. On'the following day the Rhine was reached opposite Ammerich, and on the 16th the Kal- kar-Goch road was crossed, although German fores of the First Parachute Army continued to resist strongly in the Goch sector. The town itselt fell on 21 February, two, days before Operation GRENADE was launche& Despite the comparative slowness of our progress, VERITABLE achieved its strategle objectives. We gained a footing on the west bank of the Rhine In the area where ou) major crossing operations were subse.- tquently to be launched, and, equally important, heavy louses were inflicted on the Germans west of the river. Moreove!, the offensive steadily drew InlAse enemy's slender reserves and thus cleared the way for very rapid progress by the Ninth Army when operation GRENADE was initiated on 23 February. L GRENADE had of necessity been repeatedly postponed on account of the ground conditions..The Nintb Army was ready to strike on the target date appointed, 10 February, but the state of the terrain enforced de. lay until the floods should subside. Apart from the effects of the thaw, aggravated by the heavy rains which followed the melting of the snow, the enemy was in a position to flood the area further by reason of his eoni- trol of the Roer dams. The First Army was instructed to concentrate on the capture of these prior to the launching of GRENADE,, and in heavy fighting its forces pushed hard F.

toward their objectives through ex- and east of that city. The troops defi- with the Third Army advance, and tremely difficult country of broken nitely sensed ultimate victory and the Rhine was to be reached in the hills covered with forests. The first were irresistible. army zone. The Third Army was to of the seven dams was reached on Meanwhile, the First Parachute seize bridgeheads, over theQ11 River, 4 February, and the last and most Xrmy had been fighting stubbornly on which its forces at'preI l.tood, important one-the Schwammenauel to hold the continued, pressure by and then, when so ordrnt -trive Dam-on 10 February. The controls the Canadian Army between the hard eastward to .sILflen on some of the dams had been hit Rhine and the Maas tarther north. Coblenz area andom t by our air bombing 4n December, but but the advance of the Ninth Army ance of the enemy fro&& Ak the damage had been partially re- now threatened its rear and its with- of the Rhine between tb"* d paired, and before the enemy was the Ahr. If the enemy drawal became inevitable. Althougb . compelled to atbandon the Schwamme- an armored division fought hard to weak, the Third Army> a nauel Dani, he opened the sluices. retain the wooded area south of Ma- subsequent stage, to obtW The water poured 4 down the valley, rienbaum and keep us back from the head over the Moselle to, tb&< ."% causing the level of the Roerp to rise Rhine, on 4 March the two Allied east, to faeilitate the oper#i S. about 4 feet, and it was not until 23 armies made contact In the Geldern were to be initiated in,that February that the flood subsided suffi- area and the success of the combined We had good reason to hops- '\ ciently to permit the launching o+ sweeping success VERITABLE-GRENADE operations in these operad .. -- GRENADE across the river. was assured. By 5 March there were for the enemy's forces, reduqe& The attack was begun, in clear no enemy left west of the Rhine be- they were both by their contribuatiat moonlight, by VII Corps of the First tween Neuss and Homberg, but the to the Eastern Front and by Army, over the Roer south of Diren Parachute Army struggled bitterly to heavy casualties inflicted on theft.. at 0330 hours. An hour later, XIX retain its last bridgehead across the our armies, had, in the VERIrAB&$r and XIII Corps of the Ninth Army river in the Wessel-Xanten area. It GRENADE campaign, shown th commenced their crossing of the river was not until fI0 March that thig selves inadequate to contain .i$* i in the Jilich sector. The attacks were bridgehead finally collapsed, the ene- taneous Allied attack on a bt " preceded by 45 minutes' intensive my blowing the bridges behind him front. The same policy of conveaj artillery bombardment which effec- as his last forces withdrew to the major thrusts which hail proved * tively reduced enemy interference east bank. On the following day the cessful In 21 Army Group sector- i4 with our' initial assault, but consid- task of mopping up the whole area now about to be repeated by 1)*M erable difficulties were experienced on the west bank was completed. The Army Group. Apart from the damag- from the mines sown in the river and prisoners brought our total captured ing losses which the enemy had in' from the swiftness of the current since D-dty to over 1,000,000. curred, the fighting spirit of his ar- which rendered the passage of the While the Ninth Army was push- mies, taken as a whole, had under- assault boats extremely hazardous. ing to the Rhine in its sector, the gone a decline, and at certain points However, bridgeheads were speedily First Army was exploiting its suc- his defensive system was manifestly gained and consolidated. Once across cessful crossing of the Roer and disorganized, Few-if any-trained the river, our forces met their chief thrusting toward Cologne. This op- reserves outside the west were be- opposition from the German artillery, eration, however, may more correctly lieved to be available, and in the which also bombarded the bridging be considered as part of those which hard fighting which had taken place sites, while the enemy infantry gen- comprised Phase II of the whole cam- since the New Year virtually all the erally fell back after rallying for paign west of the Rhine. It was in- reserves in the west had been com- only one real counterattack. The ene- tended that the First Army should mitted tg thedefensive battle. Under my also made a considerable air close in upon the river from the the circdmstances, it seemed to me bombing and 'strafing effort against northwest and the Third Army from that the enemy's only course would be the bridges, but they were unable to the southwest, eliminating the ene- to do as he had done in the north and hold the advance. my north of the Moselle. While these make as orderly a retreat as possible Our offensive rapidly gathered mo- operations, known under the general to the east of the Rhine, though it ap- mentum. VII Corps cleared Dtiren by name of LUMBERJACK, wete being peared likely that he would-try to hold 25 February, Jilich had fallen the executed, 6th Army Group, south of small bridgeheads. on the west bank. day before, and the enemy recoiled the Moselle, would remain basically Our plans were 'designed to prevent a north and northeast of Linnich as the on the defensive, while in the north safe withdrawal over the river. Nfn.th Army armor passed through 21 Army Group would complete its Meanwhile the increased hammer- the infantry to thrust forward its preparations for theforthcoming ma- ing of the fuel installations in Ger- spearheads. While the First Army jor assault across the Rhine north of many, which followed the improve- forces pushed toward Cologne, those the Ruhr. ment in weather conditions after of the Ninth Army were directed to- The plan of 'Operation LUMBER- January, had made the enemy's situ- ward Miinchen-Gladbach and Greven- JACK was for the First Army to ation more grave than ever in this S broich. The speed of the advance in- seize the high ground east of the respect. The Februry~output fell to creased daily, and whole" units of the Erft River northwest of Cologne and a total only 14 percent of normal, German Fifteenth Army surrendered to close to the Rhine south of Dilssei- representing barely half the mftti- as their lo~ses in both men and dorf. Farther south, the roa4 center mum requirements to maintain full- ground began to tell. By 1 March the of Euskirchen was to be captured, scale military effort. The effects of industrial center of Mfinchen-Giad- bridgeheads established over the trft this and of the transportation crisis bach had been clearedt, Grevenbroich in that sector, and forces concen- in Qermany were seen not only on had fallen, Neuss was entered, Venlo trated for an advance to the south- our own front but also on that facing reached, •and Roermond found aban- east. Cologne was then to be Invented the Russians, where, despite the S doned by the enemy. With General from the northwest, and, at•the appro- transfer of the Sixth 'Panser Army, Simpson, the Ninth Army Command- priate moment, a strong attack' on a the enemy had shown him~elf In- Ter, i visited Miinchen-Gladbach to narrow front was to be d~iven sotth- capable of mounting am.. effeetive catch a glimpse of the fighting north east from Euskirchen Wo converts counterattack to ste the growing

li--- - lr I tide of Soviet successes. * ress of our operations south of the for the damaged structut"e, and on Operation LUMBERJACK fulfilled Moselle permitted, I ordered General 17 March the center span (which had expectations. In the First Army drive. Bradley, when he telephoned me to been damaged in the Germans' un- with VII Corps, toward Cologne, report the occurrence, to put not less successful last-minute attempts at heavy opposition was for a time en- than five divisions onto the far bank. demolition on the 7th) collapsed into countered east of the Erft Canal, but Partially anticipating this decision, the river. Although a disappoint- the three armored formations brought General Bradley had begun the ex- ment, this had no serious effect upon up to block our advance were dis- ploitation of the bridgehead immedi- our operations, for by this time a persed by our air attack, carried out ately the bridge fell into his hands. number of supplementary floating lb strength. The Erft bridgeheads A combat command was rapidly bridges had been constructed, and Were expanded, and on 5 March the passed across, and by 9 March we the build-up of the forces on the east advance elements of VII Corps were held a lodgement area some three bank continued without interruption. entering Cologne. By the afternoon miles deep. It was several days be- While III Corps of the First Army of the 7th the city was entirely In fore the enemy recovered sufficiently was establishing the bridgehead at our hands, the enemy resistance hav- from his surprise and overcame his Remagen, V Corps, on its right flank, Ing collapsed once the Allied forces transport difficulties -to send rein. struck to the south to make contact had reached the outskirts. The un- forcements to the threatened sector, with the advancing spearheads of the trained Volkssturm left as a forlorn and by the time they arrived the Third Army. The German Fifth Pan- hope when the regular forces with- bridgehead had been enlarged and zer Army, disorganized, offered little drew over the Rhine, blowing the strengthened to a degree Which ren- resistance, and the Allied thrust bridges behind them, were capable of dered its elimination impossible. Ene- made rapid progress. Bad Godesberg little fight. On the same day that my armored forces were again, as in and Bonn fell on 9 March, and on Cologne fell, the remainder of the Normandy, committed to battle piece- the following day the link-up along enemy evacuated the west bank meal as they arrived on the scene, the Rhine with the Third Army forces north to Dfisseldorf. This success had and no concerted major attack was which had closed to the river in the a profound effect on our subsequent mounted on a scale sufficient to effect Andernach area was accomplished. operations, as the divisions which a serious penetration. Such efforts as Considerable elements of the Fifth would have been used to invest Co- the enemy did make were unable to Panzer Army were cut off to the west logne became available to assist in check the further expansion of the by these converging drives; they exploiting the great opportunity we bridgehead; and as its area grew, the fought courageously to the last, but were shortly to be offered. north-south autobahn east of the it was the courage of despair, and Farther south, the progress of the river, so vital to the enemy, was they made no organized attempt to First Army was even more spectacu- severed. By 24 March, when our main force a way out of the trap. lar. III Corps attacked southeast in attacks eastward from the Rhine be- During February, the Third Army accordance with the operational plan, gan in the north, the area held by the had been engaged in making the rolled up the disorganized enemy First Army at Itemagen was 25 miles necessary preparations for its subse- eonfrouting it and closed to the long and 10 miles deep, and within quent push to the Rhine. XX Corps Rhine at Remagen on 7 Marcb. It it three corps were poised ready to had eliminated enemy resistance in ws here on that day that occurred strike! the Saar-Moselle 1triangle by 23 Feb- one of those rare and fleeting oppor- In the meantime the enemy had ruary, and bridgeheads had been es- tunities which occasionally present made desperate efforts to destroy the tablished over the Saar at Ockfen and themselves in war, and which, if bridge while the security of the' Serrig in the teeth of violent op- grasped, have incalculable effects in lodgement area was still dependent position. The Siegfried defenses were determining future success. In his upon It. Long-range artillery was penetrated, and Trier fell on 2 March. confusion before the rapidity of the brought to bear on It, and the Ger- Farther north, the German Seevnth Allied thrust, the enemy failed to man Air Force put up the strongest Army had been forced back success- complete the destruction of the La- effort of which it was capable in at- ively over the Our and Prtim Rivers, dendorff railroad bridge across the tempts to cut the structure by bombs, despte extensive minefields and obsta- Rhine. Before he could rectify his rocket projectiles, and cannon fire. cles, and on 4 March the first bridge- mistake, a small spearhead of 9th All these efforts proved equally un- heads were gained across the Kyll. Armored Division with the greatest successful. The air battles over Re- The Third Army advance to the determination and gallantry had magen provided the Luftwaffe with Rhine now began. VIII Corps, spear- seized the bridge-the only one to be its greatest test, and it failed. The headed by 11th Armored Division, loft intact by the Germans through- umbrella established over the vital broke through north of Kyllburg on out the entire length of the river. area by the U. S. Ninth Air Force 5 March, 4th Armored Division of The Remagen bridge was not in a effectively disrupted the attacks, and increasing rapidity, it reached the sector from which it had been In- the enety's losses, both to our fighter Rhine at Andernach on the 9th-and .tended to launch a major thrust plans and to the heavy concentration linked up with the First Army, as eastward, butt 1 at once determined, of AA guns established on the river already described, on the following at the expense of modifying details bhnke, were severe. day. To the south of VIII Corps, on of T'he plan of campaign, to seize the The enemy onslaught nevertheless 5 Marsh, 4th Armored Division of golden opportunity offered to us. It made the area extremely uncomfort- XII Corps, with great boldness, was obvious that possession of a able, especially for the engineers who charged along the north bank of the foothold ever the Rhine here would carried out, with consl~cuous gallan- Moselle, parallel' to Viii Corps, to- constitute the greatest possible threat try and determination, the dangerous ward its confluence with the Rhine. as a supporting effort for the main work of repairing damage and of This objective was attained on 10 attack north of the Ruhr. In order, strengthening the bridge to bear the March, large quantities of enemy therefore, to exploit the situation and enormous strains to which it was equipment being captured In the establish an adequate bridgehead, subjected and which it had never process. By the next day, the left consolidated in readiness for an of- been intended to undergo. These bank of the Rhine from Coblenz to fensive therefrom as noon as the prog- strains eventually proved too much Andernach had been cleared, and the enemy had virtually been eliminated chief activity on the Seventh Army expanded. The Germans were, in along its length north of the Moselle, front was in the Saarbriicken-For- fact, completely misled by the Allied thus acemplishing Phase II of the bach area, where bitter fighting took tactics. Following the Third Army's operations to close the river. place and restricted Allied advances swift arrival on the Rhine north of The stage was now set for the were made. the Moselle they had expected its initiation of the joint offensive oper- Following the Third Army suc- forces to er4pt through the Remagen ations by the Third and Seventh Ar- cesses north of the Moselle, the time bridgehead. Instead, when the Third mies south of the Mosellewhich had had arrived for launching Operation Army turned southeast, the enemy been anticipated as Phase III of the UNDERTONE, the major offensive was taken off balance, being utterly campaign west of the Rhine. In the south of the Moselle, with the ob- unprepared for such a development. 4;th Army Group sector, operations jectives of destroying the enemy west No real opposition to the XII Corps during January 'and February had. of the Rhine and closing on that river drive was offered, and the unready, in 'accordance with our over-all plan. from Coblenz southward. By this enemy forces were brushed aside as been mainly of a defensive nature. means crossing sites for the establish- the Allies swept up the Rhine. At Such local operations as had been ment of bridgeheads would be se- the same time, Coblenz was occupied. conducted were designed to eliminate cured in the Mainz-Mannheim sector and by (9 March the river bank Was the dangerous situation created in' and more enemy forces would be cleared from there as far as thk*-,' the south, as I have earlier described. drawn away from the area where our Bingen bend. On the 22d all resist-. following the enemy attacks in sup- main effort was shortly to be made ance ceased in Mainz and on the tol' port of his Ardennes offensive and in the north. To this end, the Seventh lowing day Speyer was reached...i our weakening of 6th Army Group Army was to assume control of ele- The enemy was still holding out it> when divisions had to be moved ments of the French forces known the Siegfried positions in the RU&! ' northward to meet the major threat as the Groupement Montsabert and valley west of Karlsruhe, but, w t Chief among the tasks which had then attack in the general direction the escape routes across the river, >j to be accomplished was the destruc- Homburg-Kaiserslautern-Worms. It cut by the Third Army advances it" tion of the Colmar pocket. An attack was to breach the Siegfried Line, their rear, his situation was now was launched by the French I Corps destroy the enemy in its zone, close hopeless. General Patton's aggressive against the southern edge of the on the Rhine, and seize a bridge- tactics culminated in a surprise night pocket on 20 January, but this at head. Meanwhile the French Army crossing of the Rhine on 22 March. first made little progress, partly be- was to protect the right flank of He sent over the U. S.,5th Division cause of bad weather. North of the the Seventh Army and to conduct without formal preparations of any pocket the French II Corps fared an aggressive defense along the kind and with negligible losses. similarly. However, we had assembled Rhine. In cooperation with the Sev- Thus, before our main "power" cross, and turned over to the French First enth Army effort, General Bradley ing 9f the Rhine was attempted by Army the U. S. XXI Corps, composed was instructed to launch a thrust by 21 Army Group, we were already'in of the 3d, 28th, and 75th Infantry the Third Army forces southeast possession of two sizeable bridge- Divisions, and the 12th Armored Di- across the lower reaches of the Mo- heads in the south. Farther west the vision, under Maj. Gen. Frank W. selle, with the object of turning the German units were in a state of (i Milburn, to carry the brunt of the German line and thrusting deep into chaos and their positions were rap- battle by an attack between the two the rear areas of the forces facing idly overrun and enveloped. By 26 French corps. Its efforts quickly be- the Seventh Army. He was also to at- March an end came to all organized came effective. Lack of reinforce- tack the nose of the Saar salient. resistance west of the Rhine, and ments caused the enemy resistance On 15 March the offensive began. Phase III of the operations to close p to crumble at the end of the month While XX Corps of the Third Army the river was over, with the added and at the same time the weather struck from the Allied bridgeheads accomplishment of two Rhine cross- improved. Before our three-corps at- over the Saar and Moselle into the ings completed. As, Phase III closed, tack the German disintegration de- forested hills of the Hunsriick from while we were rounding up the veloped rapidly: Colmar itself fell on the west, VI and XV Corps of the broken remnants of the enemy First 3 February, and by the 6th the enemy Seventh Army, with the French ele- Army, surrounded to the west, we was mainly east of the Rhine-Rhone ments under command, attacked had launched our carefully prepared canal. The evacuation of the disor- north between Haguenau and Saar- main effort in the nortl in our in- ganized remnants across the Rhine briicken. The former attack met with vasion of the German hinterland was then in progress, and with the stiff opposition from the enemy's pre- over the last great barrier remaining collapse of opposition at Neuf Brisach pared positions, but the southern to its defenders. on 9 February all organized resist- thrust took the German First Army All these operations west of the ance west of the Rhine in that zone by surprise and following the cap- Rhine had, like those in France. ceased. In the course of the opera- ture of Haguenau on the first day, been greatly assisted by the vast tion the enemy suffered over 22,000 a number of deep penetrations were weight of Allied air power which we casualties and considerable losses of made. Zweibrdicken and Saarbriicken had been able to bring .to bear in their equipment; the German Nineteenth were occupied by 20 March and re- support. While the long-range stra- Army was virtually destroyed. sistance in the western portion of tegic effort was maintained against After the elimination of the Colmar the front became disorganized; but the fuel and industrial targets in the pocket, interest In the 6th Army the defenders in the Siegfried Line heart of Germany, a steady offensive Group area centered in the Seventh farther to the east stood trm against was kept up against the enemy lines Army zone, in front of the Siegfried the Allied attacks. of communication westward across defenses. The French Army main- It was at this point that the In- the Rhine. In addition, the heavy tained the defensive along the Rhine, tervention of the Third Army across bombers were also employed in di- A and its left wing ass'umed responsi- the lower Moselle became devastat- rect support of the ground tactical Vbility for the front as far north as ingly effective. XII tlerps had at- operations whenever the weather fBischweiler. During the latter half tacked across the river en 14 March, conditions permitted. They were fur- and the bridgehead gain was rapidly ther, during this period, engaged Is i f February and early March the S

the extensive and remarkable Ruhr would spread the paralysis through- Ninth Army and then for the destruc- interdiction program, which will be out Germany. It was a bold scheme, tion of the German forces north of metioned later. demanding great skill and daring on the Moselle by swift convergng blows The weather, although persistently the part of all involved. Confounded materialized in almost exact accord- bad, could not halt the operations of by the widespread nature of the blow, ance with his diagrammatic plans. the tactical air forces, whose per- the enemy's attempts at defense were Moreover, his constant concern was to formance was never more magnificent completely ineffective. see that at the culmination of each thaI during this time. The ground The whole of the Allied campaign offensive his forces were so situated M4yAnoes Were supported resolutely west of the Rhine had gone accord- as to undertake the next succeeding bY these tactical forces; their opera- ing to plan to an extraordinary de- step without delay for regrouping, tions At Once warded off the German gree, and my fullest hopes were and from such direction as to surprise Air Force attempts at interference realized. Two features of the opera- and confuse the enemy. He went Into and at the same time greatly con- tions upon which I had not origi- the attack with instructions for each tributed to the disorganization of nally calculated were the rapid cap- unit to look for and to seize any tile German armies opposing us, ture of the Cologne area and the opportunity to cross the Rhine. ttalag and bombing the enemy seizure of the Remagen bridge. Both Finally, the 6th Army Group, poti011 afid causing havoc In his these events turned wholly to our which had been confined heretofore SVp!Y Sy4teM. Particularly note- profit, for, thanks to the flexibility largely to a holding, protecting, and Worthy Was the work of the First of our plans, we were able to take supporting role, was suddenly un- Tastial Air Force in support of the full advantage of the opportunity leashed with the Seventh Army 14Mr ofensive, when 8,320 sorties which the prizes offered without brought up to a strength of 15 United 61e fnown in a single week, with sacrifice of our planned objectives. States divisions. We knew that the seAIs of 2,440 motor vehicles, 85 In each of the three phases of the enemy was at that time discounting Armfiored vehicles, 146 locomotives, campaign, two converging armies the strength of the Seventh Army and aid 1,741 railroad cars. In addition, had thrust to the Rhine and cut off that he felt relatively safe lying in oVer 2,000 motor vehicles and 100 and destroyed the German forces the Siegfried Line facing General arlbored vehicles were damaged and which had been disposed to bar their Patch's forces. No defeat the Ger- ee 300 rail cuts made. These great way. We had attained along the man's suffered in the war, except tints played an important part in whole length of the Rhine in Ger- possibly Tunisia, was more devas- faUring the success of the ground man territory the economically de- tating in the completeness of the de- campaign in the southern sector. fensible frant upon which I had in- struction inflicted upon his forces By this time the broad pattern of sisted as an essential prerequisite to than that which he suffered in the Sir-ground operations had become al- the launching of the concentrated Saar Basin. Yet this attack was con- Smst a fixed one-subject to acdjust- thrusts over the river which were ducted by portions of two Army Ment of details to terrain, weather, to strike at the heart of Germany, Groups and, though a boundary be- hostile communications, and so on. and in the process we had~eliminated tween such large forces is ordinarily Faith in the ability of the Air Force her own future defensive abilities. considered one of the weakest tacti- to intervene effectiviely in the ground The armies which she now so sorely cal spots in a major front, no real battle was the vital feature of the needed to man the last great natural difficulty was encountered in coordi- original invasion plan; the general barrier left to her had been broken nation and unification of the battle. scheme thus used for the isolation of to pieces in fruitless attempts to Although I personally kept in touch the battlefield, for direct action halt our slashing blows among the with details and was in position to against selected targets, for air cover, floods of the lower Rhineland, in the make tactical decisions when such had by now been so perfected that Eifel, and amid the hills and forests proved necessary, the real reason for teamwork was easy and the results of the Saar Palatinate. this lack of confusion and for the obtained were regularly decisive in Field Marshal Montgomery's at- incisiveness of the whole operation is the area of attack. tack, in the extreme north, got off on to be found in the identity of tactical In connection with the Allied air 8 February, exactly as 1ilanned. The training, organization, and mutual aetivities during the early months Ninth Army was to join this attack confidence among all the divisions ef 1945, the operation known as on 10 February, and was ready to and commanders participating in the CLARION, carried out on 22 Febru- do so. Field Marshal Montgomery battle. The whole operation was char- ary, Is worthy of special mention. and I had already agreed that while acterized by boldness, speed, and de- Narly 9,000 aircraft, from bases in the Ideal situation would be for the termination, and the victory was so England, France, Holland, Belgium, Second Army and the U. S. Ninth complete that when General Patton and Italy, took part in this gigantic Army to attack almost simultaneous- thrust a division across the Rhine enslalbght, which involved targets ly, yet, realizing that flood condi- on the night of 22-23 March, he was 6overin an area of a quarter of a tions on the Roer River might hold able to do so with almost no reaction million square miles, extending from Umiden to Berlin, Dresden, Vienna, up the Ninth Army indefinitely, we from the enemy. were fully prepared to accept a S I unhesitatingly class General anad Mulhouse. The aim was to at- weeks' delay in the Ninth Army at- Bradley's tactical operations during task incidental communications fa- tack in the confidence that the shift- February and March, which witnessed ellities, auth as railroad signal points ing of German reserves to the north anid gratde crossings canal locks, the completion of the destruction of and would facilitate victory In that sec- the German forces west of the Rhine, juntiens, in order to aggravate the tor. EventS fully justified this esti- as the equal In brilliance of any that rowing diffiulties experienced in mate. The Ninth Army's attack across American forces have ever condutoted. beeping open the German life lines. the Rerf River on the 23d rapidly The cooperation during the latter K had been found ifr experience that converged with the Canadian Army part of this period between General seek local attacks, complementary to and we held the Rhine in the Wesel Bradley's 12th Army ]te ones, had far-reaching effects Group and Gen- region. eral Devers' 6th Army Group was a his blowing dewn enemy movement, In the 12th Army Group, General a avs hoIped that CLARION superb example of Grand Tactical co- Bradley's plan for supporting the peraton on the battlefildlt w CROSSING THE RHINE When the time came for launch- in battle had been crippling, and ning i January, and even before ing the main assault across ithe Rhine. these Inevitably caused a deteriora- D-day. Its fundamental features were the Allied armies under my com- tion in the morale of all but his elite the launching of a main Sttack to the mand had been built up to a total units. The SS and the armored divi- north of the Ruhr, supported by a strength on the Continent of nearly sions were for the most part made up strong secondary thrust from bridge- 4,000,000 men. The difficult man- of fanatical Nazis whose faith in the heads in the Frankfurt aret. . power situation with which we had cause they served could be shaken by initially on Kassel to co been confronted during the Ardennes little less than annihilation; yet the envelopment of the r' time was soon Battle had been remedied and we to come when even quently, offensives would ti were once more at full strength, with their commanders, realizing the fruit- from the bridgeheads to any ,o every unit demonstrating an unbe- lessness of further struggle, would Ing organized forces and lievably high morale and battle ef- surrender their units rather than see their destruction. fectiveness. their men slaughtered to no purpose. In the execution of thisbplnth In the 6th Army Group 'sector the In the ordinary infantry divisions. seizure of the Remagen br o . French divisions had been reformed spirits were again as low as when was a factor of Sret a and strengthened, while the passing they had fled eastward from France Apart from-the effot its s th. of -winter facilitated the reemploy- to gain the shelter of the Siegfried had already produced upon ment of the colonial troops for whom Line in the preceding autumn. More- man defenses, It afforded us a base active operations had been impracti- over, as his losses grew, the enemy from which we might the more rap- cable during the very severe weather. was forced more and more to entrust idly accomplish thp aim of encircling To the American armies had been his defense to the ragged army of the Ruhr. Moreover, its existence added fresh divisions from the United the local Volkasturm who might, in forced the Germans to man an east- States; andito 21 Army Group had s o m e cases, fight courageously west line along the Sieg River, become British and Canadian reinforce- enough in the protection of their cause of the immediate threat im- ments from the Mediterranean The- homes, bat as field units were at times posed upon the indlstries of' the Sor. The Combined Chies of Staff as much a liability as an asset. Ruhr. The forces now gathered with- decided, at their Malta Conference at Such were the troops now ranged in the bridgehead could maintain a the end of January, that the situation along the Rhine to bar our crossing. pressure to the north, squeezing the on the Italian Front was such as to The front was too long for them, Ruhr frontally while enveloping it on permit the transfer of up to five di- shrunken as their numbers were since the eastern flank, and at the same visions from the Eighth Army to the January. While the Allies had gained time strike southeast to Frankfurt. Western Front. The move of three the economically defensible line be- In the latter area the crossing of our divisions was to commence forthwith, hind which to concentrate in safety forces over the Mainz sector of-the and ,two more were to follow as soon for the overwhelming thrusts about river would thus be assisted, and Our as the situation in Greece allowed. to be launched in the selected sectors, general build-up for the southern at- In addition, a corresponding propor- the enemy, lacking the reconnais- tack would be accomplished rapidly. tion of the Twelfth Air Force was to sance to obtain definite information Consequently we were able to launch be transferred with the ground forces. as to our intentions ,could only spread a southern supporting offensive in The complicated process of moving his forces as far as they would go strength on a much earlier date than the units to France and northward and wait for the blow to fall. we had originally expected to be fea- across the lines of communication of Under these conditions the success sible; and this, in turn, had an im- the Southern and Central Groups of of our operations appeared certain, a portant effect in determining the fu- Armies (called Operation GOLD- conviction which I felt was undoubt- ture Allied strategy within the in- FLAKE) was carried out efficiently edly shared by the German General terior of Germany. and smoothly, and the security pre- Staff. Continuance of the struggle The plan of OPeration PLUNDER, cautions taken were completely suc- was now merely evidence of Hitler's the great assault across the Rhine cessful in concealing from the Ger- fanaticism. The enemy's northern sec- north of the Ruhr which was to con- mans what was afoot. By the time the tor, where our chief weight was to stitute our main effort, Involved the 21 Army Group offensive across the be brought to bear, had been weak- use of three Allied armies. Under the Rhine came to be launched, these ened by his movement of forces south- command of Field Marshal Montgom- latest units to arrive were ready to ward to meet the threat which had ery, the U. S. Ninth Army on the play their Part in it. already developed from the Remagen right and the British Second Army on The enemy mow found himself in bridgehead. Even had the situation the left were to attack over the river an undnviable position. He had, as there been such as to allow the enemy between Rheinberg and Rees. They we had hoped, and attempted to com- to disengage and return his forces to were to capture the communications pel, elected to stand and fight west the north (which was far from being center of Wesel and then to expand of the Rhine, and the results had the case), his lack of mobility was their initial lodgement area on the been disastrous to him. Beaten in the too greatly reduced to enable them east .bank southward to a distance open field and behind his ftontier to arrive in time to meet us while sufficient to secure the roads through fortifications, he was now in no con- our foothold on the east bank north Wesel from enemy ground action. dition to hold fast In the defensive of the Ruhr was stillprecarious. northward to enable the river to be line to which he had been compelled The plan of campaign for crossing bridged at Emmerich, and eastward to retreat. His powers of resistance the Rhine and establishing a strong and northeastward to secure p firm had been reduced by increasing short- force on the far bank was, thanks to bridgehead of adequate size fvq which further offensive operations ages of weapons, ammunition, and the success of the operations west oil which resulted from. our attacks of the river, basically the same as could be developed. The Ninth Ari.. a kisis war economy. His ooe that envisaged hi oqr long-term plan- mausut was to be launche seuth t

- 4 7Z*~i 4 V4~.t~ A~ Weeel, with its main bridging area at Coblens. In principle, It was a aircraft. Now, as throughout the cam- at Rheinberg, and its principal initiai repitition of the air plan for the paigti In 1ttrope, their work Provided task was to be the protection of the original Invasion. Along this line the armies With exttemely full and Army Group right flank. The Second were 18 vital railroad bridges ann accurate intelligence information. Attm? was to assault north of Wesel viaducts, the destruction Of which Conversely, the enemy's failure, from si tO concentrate first on tile cap- would. It was estimated, cut every D-day onward, was partly 4ue to his tilre of that town in order that the main rail route from the RUhr to the own lack, bY reason of hiS air weak- Ninth Army might commence bridg- remainder of the country. Three of ness, of the fadilities which the Allies lirthere, The Second Army was also the lines, running through the targets enjoyed in this respect. to Wfide the river at Xanten and at Bielefeld, Altenbeken, and Arms- As 28-94 Match-approached, the Lees, berg, carried about half of the total target date for Operation PLUNDR, TO assist the advance of the Second traffic between them and were thus the Atrategic and tactical air fotee Army, the First Allied Altbortle Army of partletilar Importance. attacks upon tihe coffttnutcations in Was to drop XVIII Airborne Corps Some of the bridges had earlier re- the battle area were initetslifled. In (ammprisihg the U. S. 17th and Brit- ceived incidental damage, but the addition, dtinfig the 72 hourg pre- ish 6 Airborne Divisions) north and main interdiction program began on ceding the assault, a numfiber, of at- northwest of Wesel to seize the key 21 rebruary. During the next month, tacks were made upon etietny bat- terrain in that area. This airborne 40 major blows were struck by heavy racks and caxips in the vicilit~t of eperation (known as VARSITY) was, aid medium bombers, apart from the planned bridgehead. DefenOds unlike those previously conducted by many fighter-bomber attacks de- which the Getthans were observed to the Allies, timed to follow the com- signed to cut the bridge approaches be constructingi around the toW*na mencement of the ground assault, it and hamper the Germans' frantic Of- and villages, with a View to turning being hoped thereby to achieve an forts to carry out repairs. In the them late strongpelnts, were alto iditional element of surprise. course of the attacks the RAP used. bombed and strafed, Inditidtlal tar- The Canadian Army, on the left for the first time, its 22,000-pound gets of particular importknce wtei flank, was to take no active part in monster bombs, with devastating re- allotted to the pilots Of froeet-firitig tile asault, but was to hold firmly sults. The operations proved singu- Typhoons especially experienced In the line of the Rhine and Maas from larly successful: by 3.4 March, 10 of the technique of pinpdiit attacks. SinSriCh westward to the sea, to the bridges had been destroyed, two Among the buildings desttoyedl it lftutre the absolute security of the seriouhly dafnaged, and two more these opetations was one believed to exibttift9 bridgehead over the Rhine were damaged, though possibly pass- house the headquarters of thd Ger- at Nijffiegen, and to guard the Scheldt able. The aim in view, that of Inter- man Twetty-fifth Army. Apart fron E0stuarl , the port of Antwerp being rupting the enemy's all-important the casualties inflicted in such at- now practically the only place where traffic out of the Ruhr and at the tacks, it cannot be doubted that they afflective enemy Interference behind* same time preventing the large-scale produced a seriots moral effect Upon Stir liit could be achieved, Follow- movement of supplies from central the enemy, who, after enduring thtle ikg the successful establishment of and southern Germany to the armies days of unremitting hiell from the air, the Secotid Army bridgehead, the Ca- in the threatened area on the lower was in no condition to meet tle Ldifhn 2 Corps was to be passed over Rhine, was fully realized, and the frontal assault when it was laufiohea. the Rhine at Rees by the Second results were immediately evident Important in the aerial preparatig Army aitd to operate to secure Em- when our ground forces set foot on for Operation PLNDrR were the akerik. Where the Canadian Army the east bank. Allied attacks upon the enemy ir WOUld then be responsible for the The German communications net- force bases in northwest GermaFtt. bohettuction of another bridge. work running west of the interdic- As earlier stated, the thief threat It will be seen from the nature of tion line toward the Rhine was also which the enemy could exercise these operations that the cutting of heavily attacked from the air during against our airpower lay In his jet coimunieations from the Ruhr was the weeks preceding the assault aircraft. The Allied production f a matter of the first importance in across the river, A very important these machines lagged behinl that fa1iitating the establishment Of a operaton comprised blows delivered of our opponents, and In the air it btidgehead on the east bank of the by Bomber Command on 11 and i2 was difficult to counter their attacks. Rhitne north of the industrial area. March. On the 11th a record was es- We therefore decided that the best I shall deal in due course with the tablished for the load of bombs insurance against their possible ii- Prfdgres Of the land forces in ac- dropped oft a single target in one raid terference with our Rhine-cressifig etplishing Its encirclement and re- when 1,079 heavy bombers rained operations was to employ our heary duction, bUt it must here be noted some 5,000 tons on the Essen rail bombers to render the enemy's Jet that already, when the attack was center. The record was surpassed on airfields unusable. A number of fields latttiid over the river in the north, the 12th when 1,108 heavies dropped possessing the extra-long runways the Allied air forces had achieved the 5,487 tons on Dortmund. These com- necessary to enable Jet planes to take practical denial to the enemy of the munications attacks were energeti- off were located within range of the Rtiti' resources and at the same tiee caly supported by fighters and fighter- battle area and reconnaissance re- id isolated the battle area ftom the bornbers of the RAF Second Tactical vealed that the Germane were cobi- t'egtof Germatty. Air Force and the U. S. XXIk Tactical centrating their machines on thorn. The plan of the air forces' Ituhr Air Command. The resulting chaos These fields were accordingly sub- isoliationl program was that, prior to was such as to prove far beyond the jected to severe blows f~rom 11i Maldh thUt establishment of the 21 Army powers of the Reichshahn repair or- onward, while the f'uel dumps id Ofl' ip btidgehead, the northwestern ganluatien to remedy, despIte Its im- auxiliary installations were attacked area of Germany should be cut off mense efforts to keep the lines open. at the same time, the consequence fromn the central and southern re- Mention should be made here of the was that the enemy lost a lar-ge num- gions by the drawing of a line of excellent work perf~ormed, in prepara- ber of planes on the ground, and the interdidtioni running in a rough curve tion for the ground assault, by the runways were cratered and rendet~ed atthwafl from Bremen to the Rhine Allied photographic reconnaissanue temp~orarily unusable. Before repaira asid be *kustwa our &rV~ld Mass - *#to &aossthe MUMb1 On 4 MOO'R Ofe Alilid Air Movse Roew 16m 6~,0 Ilterfift *Sa 1j4QG 01it valutes while Mlkbgtit t.WNI tha 109 $"omy pl~ess in tim sit, la Ali these prrE Mti opefretios, as 40A 4 MArdhi Itself,. fAt Mlt fotes *#?a Igretell with euoellont Wiither *onitleISU, olear Oki"e, and peiot ViilIIty portaittihg visual blaitg and greatly aselitiftf the I WOW.le foe'aIs plaking out tholt tigu* fe* Apart from the airbetne landiti *pstationU, frialk I shall eenoidot be- I#Wj Mie sildfes blowil reach~d thk VpSk 411 J*'Atareh, Prior to the At- o~ NV-.0'S the transport pilide And Iue'~M 4#lath Air h'.tu. aad the flei 'I~Mtie Alt k'orse ile*bM At- t"bIm Noe enemy Ask posIiion, *hk 46 eti I&t htfernnl With 11o Sit'koe~ 41emeikim £t tw~o 14IN. *46 01eb0fl redtadS At"# 16 i£insiadl 606itafiMoe with tim wt iNtse meslimA banIb~ts itStk4d" U teWfis *heh wrte htthr/AriM #6106, or ieedue~ ex stet. MAN M, meortu± Atoe ab the enl~iy forwarda poseltiol giereily *ofo toilifhy stuefed 604 bofibed, whid affh~d N- the (Ietiman supply hliug Thb V11h64 Weight of te ilkth Air Piofti bOM11- eti. Apfiti frojh ike dilii 6f L01- mretr tited tat Sitbotft* Nroitoo1 *ias emiit~ lIt tfid AttsekA UPo the

7Trd mfir ivteionaty af 6009b tibueo *ets elte eoadvatil ddfluf lie day'. Ose kusedro end Itty befmev Of the 10f'iltlant Alt Poi-de, WithAf grab## Of Siee. go.* 1,800 1011f Itla tlir t~fis biei to ibil A104 bloks whit. dtitet forcs frdiM Itil were raiding sairleldi iti the lififl. Oydr Befrlin Itself fightet Of the Eighth Air Fordt oilbd 61)1Y@P. Thl i1d 146,OI1fuliY fulflled ItM oh- jebt fit dPSwhftk Mleffll fghtftg IWSY fteM 48 RWe hin Attle AM'A. Tue 1- bait dIiv I s u efIMd but by RAP §bM&P diffithfid; which attafted the fill MWkOI bf 9tNkAPdO SI W0ll al all tittlit ill tile Ittihrt. fit IhL1dut- Ing two 4 dityk, li-Il Mareh. Ah,fi 6an id fli*ih eli fotee. Mod ih DleltIAn wntem Iap jwd 1".I fib*e d~ff 49jOd fff't~ Rhifilf &W Thd thib Of tis 10HfIiA Alshlti Abroad the RAhlft rof mentsti tht lir#0e6 Aftd Mdot difeult &hillo L ijetfiell sidsfleinll I se mua da Ade eOt of Mar!1t0816h width 6f ale Rhin' had the stn' 81 its empraett indeed wafts Ifiek thlt With~tit thf opbritidtib *lfildl ine tiun1ed whiak wets tto trdeS 0 P0h11tai*s an the fat b9Ak to A&fJ S

aum, the success of the crossing After spending the night on the servation posts west of the river and Ninth was struck by the courage of trons- miglht well have been a matter of west bank of the river in the the Prime port pilots flying relatively slow air- doubt. The variations in the river Army area I met, next day, Great Britain, who wa. craft steadily along their allotted level also presented unusually diffi- Minister of by the Chief of the Im- routes in spite of heavy flak barrages. cult problems for, apart from the accompanied Staff, Field Marshal The two divisions established con- seasonal fluctuations, there was a perial General toured the west bank of tact with each other during the after- danger of artificial floods being cre- Brooke. We the ferrying of noon and with the 15th Division by ated by the enemy's ability to de- the river to witness and to visit nightfall. Their positions were rap- molish the Aams located on the east- troops and supplies reflected the idly consolidated, and on the 25th, ern tributaries. A special flood-warn- troops, all of whom state of enthusiasm and mo- the 6th Airbotne Division commenced ing system was instituted to guard highest the Prime Minister and a swift advance eastward with the against this threat. rale. Both Field Marshal Brooke, who expressed 15th Division, while the 17th Air- therefore necessary to treat It was themselves as extraordinarily de- borne Division, after linking with the as an amphibious opera- the assault lighted with the complete success ot main forces of Ninth Army, followed the fullest sense, involving tion in our operations of the past 45 days, suit. naval as well as military forces, since made a brief visit that afternoon to Operation VARSITY was the most the equipment available to the engi- the east bank. successful airborne operation carried neer elements of the armies was alone crossing, thanks to the out to date, and its brilliant results' insufficient to cope with the task. The initial the preparatory artillery reflected the great strides made in Months previouslY, exhaustive experi- weight of were generally this aspect of warfare since the land- ments had been carried out on rivers fire and bombing, only slight opposi- ings of D-day, 9 months earlier. Much in Britain giving bank and current effected against were ob- of this was due to the coordination conditions similar to those of the tion, and firm footholds bank of the river. secured by the units of the First Al- Rhine in order to determine what tained on the far the ferrying of lied Airborne Army. The glider land- ferry craft were most suitable and On 24 March, while steadily, the ings and parachute drops had been what loads they could carry. The further troops proceded were expanded carried out with accuracy, while the LOM and LCV (P) craft were chosen Allied bridgeheads was made with the air- supplies dropped shortly alter the for the purpose and these were trans- and sontact during the main landings were virtually 100 per- ported to the Rhine, partly by water- borne forces flown in was successfully cent recovered. The timing of the way and partly overland on special morning. Wesel sectors the ene- had achieved the element of trailers built to stand the great cleared, and in most attack surprise which had been planned, and strains involved in transit across my's confusion and disorganization in the uncoordinated rapidity with which the forces roads ravaged by war. The immense were reflected the Only at Rees did and established their posi- difficulty of this feat may be judged resistance offered. reformed stubbornly landing also resulted in from the fact that the craft measured the defenders hold out tions after accurate fire to being extremely low. as much as 45 feet in length and and bring heavy and the casualties sites. As may be seen from the composition were 14 feet wide. British and Ameri- bear upon the bridging the forces involved, VARSITY was can naval forces were built up to The airborne landings in the Wesel of operation in the fullest operate the ferry service, and valu- area, coordinated by the First Allied an Allied victory won represent- able experience was gained when Airborne Army, commenced just be- sense, and the in the annals some of the craft were used in the fore 1000 hours and continued until ed yet another triumph cooperation in the Remagen area early in March. The 1300 hours. The 6th Airborne Divi- of Anglo-American common fight. fact that an LCM could take such sion was flown from bases in East loads as a Sherman tank or 60 men, Anglia in 669 planes and 429 gliders From 25 March onward the suc- and an LCV (P), bulldozer or 35 of the RAP 38 and 46 Groups and cess of our assault north of the Ruhr men, may serve to indicate their value the U. S. IX Troop Carrier Command, was assured. Rees was reduced on in the initial stages of our main as- while the 17th Airborne Division was that day and the Allied bridgbheads sault in the north. brought from the Paris area in 903 were quickly expanded. Enemy resis- the IX the flanks, but The offensive was heralded, at planes and 897 gliders of tance was stiffest on XVI Corps 2000 hours on 23 March, with a Troop Carrier Command. Fighter es- during the following week an hour's corts on the approach flights were of the Niith Army, on the right, be- - great artillery barrage of east duration, directed against the provided by the 213 RAF Fighter gan to press south into the Ruhr, , bank of the Rhine and extending Command" and by 676 Ninth Air while on the left Emmerich was through the zone where the airborne Force planes. Nine' hundred aircraft cleared by Canadian 2 Corps by 30 forces were to be dropped and lanqed of the British Second Tactical Air March. The Allied troops continued on the next day. At 2100 hours, as Force provided cover over the target to pour across the Rhine, and, with soon as the barrage was lifted, the area, while 1,253 fighters of the the airborne units coming under com- British I Commando Brigade com- Eighth Air Force established a screen mand of the Second and Ninth Ar- menced the assault on Wesel. This east of the Rhine. As a result of this mies, the main thrusts eastward to town had been so heavily and accu- protection, coupled with the measures encircle the Ruhr and strik6 into the rately bombed by Bomber Command taken against enemy airfields, not heart of Germany began. The great that it was captured with only 36 one transport was molested by hostile operation of forcing the lower Rhine casualties. During the night the main aircraft. Some losses were sustained had proved successful to the fullest attacks went in. In the Second Army from AA fire over the target, but the extent of my desire. some, 15 Division led the 12 Corps total of 46 planes destroyed (3.98 Meanwhile, in the sector of the assault north of Xanten, and 51 Di- percent of those employed) was re- Central Group of Armies, operations vision crossed in the 30 Corps sector markably low considering the fact were proceeding equally well. There, astride Rees. South of the Lippe Ca- that, to insure accuracy of dropping as has been stated earlier, the main nal, 30th and 79th Divisions launched and landing, no evasive action was object was to establish a firm lodge- the Ninth Army ssanunmder the taken. I witnessed as much of this ment area in the Frankfurt region ma of XW Coa osersion as could be seen frmo- from whic an Mvaaeeo strength pea

could be made toward Kassel. This Corps to 4the southeast, Litabourg Was Finally, on 1 April, the French Ii lodgement area was to extend from overrun and the advance sontinued Corps established a bridgehead 10t the Neckar River in the south to the toward the Main RiVdf. At the same^ the Ftench Army at Philippsburg, Sieg River in the north, and eastward time, the Third Army was clearing and there built up a base on the east as far as Eberbach, Hanau, Giessen, this river from trankfnt to the bank fttdniWhish subi(ltintly to and Siegen. To create this base for Rhine. strike soathekst toward StttgArt and our future operations, the First Army These sweeping advances complet- to clear the right bank of the Rhilne was to undertake an offensive south ed the demoralization of the enemy as far as the Swiss border. from the Remagen bridgehead, while forces in the sector. Taking advan- Thus the Rhine barriet, the Third Army and the Seventh tage of this, VIII Corps of the gteat- the Third eat natural obsta-le with Army crossed the Rhine mainly be- Army established new bridgeheads Which the Allied armies had been faced tween Mainz and Mannheim. This over the Rhine at Boppard and north since the landings in France, had been direction of movement from the Re- of Erauback on 25 March. The Rhine breached all along the line, al magen bridgehead had been decided here flows between hills which fall .tbe upon promptly after the securing of cost to our forces had been flkatteSU sharply to the banks of the river, cally, small. that foothold. It completely surprised The enemy had oait. presenting country more difficult for ted the German High Command. the same error as in flomadj, a crossing operation than aIty Which and with the same fatal flfllt& 9i0 In the execution of these plans we can be well imagined. Despite the ad- characteristic refusal to admit tlAi-- were again vantages thus offered to the defense. greatly aided by the re- cal defeat had proved his undoing. sults of the dash the enemy's resistance, though and daring with iii- Instead of carrying out a planned which tially heavy, was short-lived. the operations west of the On the withdrawal to the strong defensive Rhine had been following day two carried out. The mote dressings at positions afforded by the great river, sweep which General St. Goarshausen Patton had con- and Oberwesel were which his inferiority in men and ducted across the lower Moselle and effected with equal SUcdesst by VIII equipment' indicated as the logical up the west bank of the Rhine, to- Corps. The forces thus put across the course, he had chosen to stand and gether with the heavy blows of the Rhine struck hard to the east and, fight a hopeless battle in front of the Seventh Army and the continued ag- after Bad Sehwalbach had been taken Rhine. The result was that he wa. gressiveness in the First Army on 28 March and Wiesbaden on the then too weak, when the withdrawal bridgehead, had so utterlt disorgan- 29th, all enemy activty in the area was eventually forced upon him, to ized the enemy and so largely de- soon ceased. ?arther east, Aschaffen- hold the line which nature had of- stroyed his forces in the region that, burg and Frankftirt wete also clearbd fered to him. Spread out along the although he had managed to blow the by '29 March, and the whole Allied vast front, his btoken and depleted last bridges as the escaping remnants lodgement area in the Prankfurt re- forces could not hope to withstand struggled across, he was in no condi- gion was securely establisled. Mar- the overwhelming weight hurled tion to defend the east bank. General burg had been taken by V1 Corps, against them in the concentrated Al- Patton, as before mentioned, seized and the armored adVance,6n KXassel lied assaults. Moreover, once we had the opportunity thus offered, and on was alteady under WaY. gained a bridgehead his lack of me-- the night of 22-23 March, as our The success of the UNDIERTONE bility rendered him incapable of main, carefully prepared crossing in operationis west of the Rhine had rushing reinforcements to the threat-' the north was poised for its massive equally favored the Seventh Army in ened area, and the breach onoe made blow, the 5th Division of XII Corps its river crossings. Pland had been could never be slosed. The elan of crossed the Rhine in the neighbor- prepared for, an airborne operation in the Allied armies had sealed Ger- hood of Oppenheim, south of Mainz. this zone, by the U. A. lath Airborne many's fate in the operations whieh The bridgehead gained grew swiftly, Division, to assist the frontal assault, had preceded the crossing ot the and by the evening of 24 March it but the weakness of the enemy fol- Rhine, and now they were pouring was 9 miles long and 6 miles deep, lowing his defeat in the Baafr rendered over the river to surge with the sante while 19,000 prisoners were taken in it unnecessary. I intended that this victorious impetus to the innermost 24 hours. The remainder of XII Corps situation should be so explorted as to parts of the country. crossed the river, seized Darmstadt enable the Seventh Army to take over Von Rundstedt had failed In Nor- on the 25th, and swept on to capture the sector south of the Main, and its intact the Main bridges at Asehaffen- first bridgeheads were accordingly mandy and had been removed from burg. established near Worms on 26 March. his command as the penalty. Later Once again, initially heavy opposition he had been reinstated to conduot the While this success was being ex- on the east bank dwindled in the face ill-fated offensive in the Ardennes plolted, the First Army steadily ex- where, in 1940, he had achieved his panded the Remagen bridgehead with of Allied superiority, and the four small most spectacular success in the in- advances by V. III, and VII Corps. footholds gained by XV Corps were swiftly consolidated into a firm vasion of France. Now, with the Allies Theern flankenemy's continued effortd against.to prove the fruitless, north- over the Rhine, he was again is- lodgement area extending southward missed; and with him wont the last to the Neckar, a link-U9 with the hopes and by 26 March he was compelled to Third Army being effected s~llth of of Germany's survival, Kenel-. withdraw over the Slog River. On the Darmstadt on the 27th. Oni 28 March ring was brought from Italy to as- Ssame day the resistance sume the forlorn bask of holding to- on the south- the Neckar was crossod, Afid on the emn flank of this bridgehead, which gether the beaten armies of the west had previously been light, collapsed following day Mannhelin sfttrfendered. The advances from this bridgehead in the last mnth of their eaietee, completely. In a rapid "thruSt by V also into Gernany htd begttk,. THE ENVEL OPMENT OF THE R UHR AND THE JUNCTION WITH THE RUSSIANS

If the Nazi leaders, in appointing and to act independently of the occupy, organize, and govern the [(esselring to the command of the higher command. In consequence, parts of Germany already conquered the to German forces in the west, expected Kesselring found himself increas- and thus permit other armies him to repeat his defensive successes ingly unable to exercise any real con- concentrate on their task of bring- the war to the speediest possible of Italy, they were to be sadly dis- trol over the situation, and the or- ing appointed. With the Rhine crossed, ganization of the Western Front conclusion. At first, the Fifteenth he had here no Gustav Line, no Monte collapsed completely. Only one thing Army was responsible, under the 12th Cassino, upon which to make a stand. was certain: By Hitler's order, the Army Group, for the administration of territory west of the Rhine be- So completely had the Germans re- fight was to go on. lied upon their ability to hold out It thus seemed evident that the tween Bonn and Homberg, together command of the reinforced in the Siegfried Line that east of of prolonging resistance for any with containing the enemy the Rhine there were no artificial enemy had no hope of ever rees- 66th Division and St-Nazaire. barriers ready to halt our progress tablishing a line in Germany capable garrisons in Lorient Later it was to extend the area un- other than hastily constructed local length of time in retreating to the armies defense works. Any other defenses so-called "National Redoubt" in the der its control as the other on a larger scale existed only as Alps, where he might be able to hold advanced eastward. The Allied plans, now never to be realized. the immensely strong natural de- military government organization Nor had Kesselring the unified fenses against our attacks for a con- was working smoothly and, apart individ- resolute forces which had withstood siderable period. At the same time, from isolated outbreaks by the Allied attacks in his former com- he would probably continue to re- ual Nazi fanatics, was experiencing mand. During March, an average of sist in the "fortresses" of western little trouble with the population. 10,000 prisoners had fallen into our France and Dunkirk, where his troops The Ruhr had been isolated by air In addition to hands every day, apart from the were still under siege, in the Chan- action early in 1945. the heavy losses in killed and wounded, nel Islands," in the Frisian Islands, the direct damage to factories, and the divisions which had been in Norway, and behind the floods of transportation system had been pro- weak when the Rhineland battles Holland. Knowing the Nazi mental- wrecked; and the coal and steel there, on which the German began were now reduced to mere ity, I had little expectation of an duced had skeletons. The total of enemy cas- immediate all-embracing collapse and war economy largely depended, ualties from the opening of the Allied an abrupt termination of the struggle been, for the time being, denied the spring offensive on 8 February rep- through complete surrender while enemy. Before operations deep into resented the destruction of a score these outposts remained unsubdued. the German interior could safely be of full divisions. The task which the Allies had now umdertaken, however, the Allies had, to undertake lay in so exploiting the following the Rhine crossings, to Within a week of the crossing of success of the Rhine crossings as to complete the encirclement of the Allied spearheads were the Rhine, the effect, in the shortest possible time, Ruhr and the elimination of any thrusting eastward, isolating corps the complete defeat of the broken danger from the pocket which would and divisions, and cutting off one armies immediately before us. We be thus created. With this vast arm- Despair gripped army from another. had to thrust forward our armored ory in Allied hands, and the Russians the German forces as never before, spearheads with the maximum speed in control of its Silesian counter- and the disintegration of the entire that logistics would permit, and to part, Germany's power of continuing Western Front developed rapidly. Al- divide and destroy the enemy before to wage war would be destroyed even of exercising unified ready the task he could withdraw into such defens- were her armies to be preserved in- command over the German detach- ible positions as those afforded by tact. The essential weapons, ammuni- ments was becoming almost an im- the mountains of the Redoubt. tion, and fuel produced by the Ruhr, possibility. Communications were be denied t# them, and even In order fully to carry out this would breaking down, and reports filtered the local factories dispersed about policy of speed and violence, how- through so slowly that Kesselring bombs ever, our attacking armies had, as Gernany to escape the Allied could never be sure what the posi- would be brought to a standstill far as possible, to be freed from the tion at a given moment might be lack of raw materials, for responsibility of holding down the through By the time information had been bulk of which they were yet ever-growing rear areas in Germany. the received and instructions sent back dependent upon the Ruhr and Siles- There was a danger that the detach- to the armies, the Allied advance ian resources. guards had probably pressed forward ment of forces for security purposes 50 miles and the entire situation in the overrun territory would so I determined, therefore, befjre had been transformed. Under such weaken the combat formations as launching any further offensive east- cirQumstances, the local commanders seriously to limit their powers of ward into Germany, to carry out the were increasingly compelled to make rapid advance. For this reason, on policy originally envisaged of envel- their own decisions, irrespective of 30 March the U. S. Fifteenth Army oping the Ruhr by converging thrusts what might be happening elsewhere, was activated, its function being to- from the two bridgeheads at Wesel U

thanks to the rapidity of the 12th move would entail in the armies' were forced Army Group build-up east of the back everywhere except present condition. The tactics of the along the bank Rhine which our position upon the of the Rhine. Mean., battle of the Falaise pocket were while t river line had permitted, was now h e ammunition factorles therefore repeated on a far greater ceased capable of being made in far greater production, and what little scale. Yet in the Ruhr there was no and Frankfurt. The southern drive. was available could not be trans,- objective like the cutting of the ported to strength than would otherwise have the front. Fuel and food Avranches corridor to justify the likewise been possible. Accordingly the could not be supplied Where 21 German obstinacy; here our armies Army Group and 12th Army Group they were needed; the rail system were in strength all around the was ineffective were instructed to concentrate on for this purpose since, enemy, and there could be no ques- achieving a junction in the Kassel- apart from the damage it had suf- tion of a threat to our supply lines. Paderborn area, while the 6th Army fered, the network was thinnest As for the Ruhr resources, even where Group was to protect the right flank the fighting was hottest, in though still In German hands these the as far north as the Hohe-Rhtjn hill southern Sauerland. Shortage of were obviously of no value to the mass. The First Allied Airborne weapons was as grave as Qlsewhere bulk of the armies which were now Army was to be prepared to in the German armies; rear echelons assist cut off from them to the east. the advances by carrying out were stripped to arm forward ones, a one- The enemy may have entertained division air drop in the Kassel area but even then the latter often lacked ideas of holding out in the Ruhr to seize the airfields ammunition of the correct calibers. there -and the for some time and thus constituting Eder River Dam. The rapidity with By 13 April, signs of disintegration a threat in our rear which would which the ground forces progressed were evident, resistance becoming prevent our further progress rendered this relatively small while scattered and the enemy giving them- air- his remaining armies regrouped. "borne operation unnecessary. Pre- If selves up in such numbers that the so, he had seriously miscalculated. disposal viously we had seriously of the prisoners constituted considered Events were to show that the Ruhr the greatest airborne operation yet a difficulty. It was clear now that could not support its defenders, des- attempted. The outline plan was to there would be no question of *tarw pite its armament works and employ about seven airborne and fuel ing a stubborn remnant Into submis- production plants, while the armies infantry divisions in seizing a large sion. The main industrial towns in to the east were in no condition area in the Kassel region, where by to the north were cleared, and on 14 regroup and reform any sort of blocking all roads and operating on effec- April the pocket was split in two at tive line. Each of them was remaining German units from the hard put Hagen. The eastern half collapsed on to maintain its own position, rear, all these could be destroyed in and 16 April, when 80,000 prisoners wan there was no hope of filling place. The rapidity and decisiveness the gap taken in the 24 hours, and on 18 AprIl in the center of the front created of our air-ground operations made by the pocket was finally liquidated. The the trapping of the 21 divisions this operation completely unneces- of total bag of prisoners reached the Army Groups B and H. Through sary. Under the Ninth Army in the that immense figure of 325,000, including gap the Allied armies were north, while XVI Corps probed south- shortly 30 general officers. Originally we had ta pour eastward, since the ward into the industrial area, XIX German estimated that only 150,000 could be troops which should have been bar- taken. Corps swung around its left flank Twenty-one divisions were de- ring their path were, instead, on and drove eastward. Meanwhile VII the stroyed, including three paSaSr, march to Allied prison camps. Corps of the First Army, spearheaded panzer grenadier and three parahvW Immediately by the 3d Armored Division, struck the encircling move divisions, and enormous quantities ot had been booty north from Marburg, which had been completed, operations were fell into our hands. What H t- instituted taken bn 28 March. On 1 April the to render Innocuous the ler may have expected to prove a forces in the two armies made contact near Lipp- pocket. The densely fortress to hold us back from eenn) built-up Ruhr area stadt, and the encirclement of the offered many ad- Germany had given way after 186aM vantages Ruhr, which might be said to have to the defense, and it was and by now the main front wa my intention, begun with the air forces' Inter- should the enemy con- 100 miles dietant to the east. tinue to resist diction program In Fabruary, was firmly, to content my- Once the process of eliminating the completed. selt with compressing aim into a enemy forces in the Ruhr had reaohed small area where only a fewAdivisions a stage when they The operation constituted the prdsented so wPo would be needed t6 contain him, and tential threat to our largest double envelopment in his- security, there to starve him into surrender. main avenues tory. Inside the pocket we had trap- by whi we SAd Even it the Ruhr itself could supply thrust deeper into ped the whole of the German Army Germany l b- its garrison with adequate means of fore us. Group B and two corps of Army defense, it was clear that so popu- In the north, a route Group H, including the picked troops lay aoross te lated an area, containing many hun- North German Plain towafl who had been massed in March to Sc Eeb gry civilian mouths, eould not also tic and Berlin. Berlin defend the southern approaches of was the sYmh feed indefinitely the huge armies of victory before the eyes ot the Ruhr against the immediate of- which It suddenly found in its midst. fensive which the enemy had erron- Allied soldier from the day we sat Meainwhile the remainder of our eously expected us to launch north- foot in Normandy; but other gains forces would devote themselves to the ward from the Remagen bridgehead. would spring from an advance to the more important tasks facing them The decision of the High Corn- northern sector, gains which wereS farther east. least madto hold on in the Ruhr as important as those is be de- can be At first the trapped enemy showed rived from eplalned only by the German's capture ofth Ger m in- spirit, and Field Marsha l Model, .who nate insistence upon fighting capital. By a thrust to the Balti, f where Was in command, attempted .to strike he stood In preference to carrying should cut off from the main enmyV out from Hamm in the out north and armies those elements Which nfl a withdrawal, no matter what Siegen in the so~hth. These attempts, the odds located in Denmark, Norway, rb against him; and coupled however, like the cooperating, coun- with west Germany, and Holland, at eoo this, perhaps, went some realiza- terattacks by the enemy ao of armies out- depriving them of supplies an pl the difficule which any side the pocket, were abortive,sd of the forces in the center of Ger- executing this thrust, Ninth Army Dutch, and of occupying Denmark many. Furthermore, we should gain reverted from the 21 Army Group to and Norway, and the political and the north German ports and thus the operational command of 12tb psychological effects of an early entry deny the enemy use of his naval bases Army Group on 4 April. into Berlin were all advanced as rea- and ship-building yards, bringing to While General Bradley's forces sons in favor of early operations in an end the activities of the subma- were thus engaged in the center, the the 21 Army Group sector. out that we had rines and other craft which had for operations of the Allied army groups Our reply pointed important advan- so long preyed upon our supply in the north and south were to be of not forgotten the the conquest of routes. Finally, we should link hands a limited nature, designed primarily tages to be gained by a with the Russian forces sweeping to support the principal offensive. north Germany. It was merely across Pomerania to the north of Field Marshal Montgomery's 21 Army question of timing that was at issue. Berlin. Group, after completing its present Our plan for an advance in the cen- In central Germany, a route was operations to the Leine River and ter was itself intended to facilitate I was con- open to us through the gap in the Bremen, was to strike toward the such a conquest which, enmy's line created by the trapping Elbe on the northern flank of the vinced, could more easily be achieved of Army Group B in the Ruhr. An 12th Army Group. it was also to be once Germany was cut in two. It was easy advance was thus offered from prepared to establish bridgeheads vital that we should concentrate for Kassel, through Erfurt and Leipzig, over the river. General Devers' 6.th each effort in turn rather than allow to Dresden. This would again bring Army Group was to protect the south- our power to be dispersed by at- our forces to an important industrial ern flank of the central advance west tempting to undertake too many pro- area, the richest still left to the Ger- of Bayreuth, and meanwhile to pre- jects at once. mans after their loss of the Ruhr and pare for a later thrust of its own Despite appearances on the map, Silesia. There also we should be able along the axic Niirnberg-Regensburg- the North German Plain does not in to meet the advancing Red Army, and Linz to prevent any concentration of reality afford such favorable terrain In so doing we should cut in half German resistance in the south. for a rapid advance as does the cen- what remained of Hitler's Reich. When the central thrust had tral sector at this time of year. Be- In the south, an axis of advance achieved its object, the principal task tween Kassel and Leipzig we should was available through Niirnberg and was to be an advance to the Baltic be moving over a plateau with no Rqgensburg, by the Danube Valley and the cleaning out of the whole major river obstacles, whereas the into Austria, where the Russians were northern area from Kiel and Liibeck northern area is intersected with already threatening Vienna. A thrust westward by the 21 irmy Group. The waterways and the 'ground was in a on this axis would also enable us to Ninth Army would, if necessary, condition to make heavy going. Pre- isolate, and then penetrate, the Re- again be used to assist Field $arshal vious experience of the Germans' doubt in western Austria into which Montgomery in this work. After the thoroughness in bridge destruction we now knew the enemy intended requirements for these northern op- also served to indicate the advisa- eventually to *ithdraw as many of erations had been met, we should be bility of advancing across headwaters his forces as possible. The prevention able to direct the 6th Army Group, rather than \the lower reaches of of such a withdrawal was a major with perhaps the Third Army, south- rivers when speed was an essential objective in any operations which we eastward down the Danube Valley factor. might execute in the south. and Into the Redoubt. Berlin, I was now certain, no Weighing the relative advantages It will have been observed that in longer represented a military objec- which would accrue from an advance all the possible lines of advance into tive of major importance. The Rus- in strength in either north, center, Germany following the Ruhr encircle- sian advance and the Allied bombing or south, I decided that an offensive ment the question arose of effecting had largely destroyed its usefulness, first in the center would prove the a junction with the Russians. In fact, and even the government depart- most effective. With Germany once with the approach 46f our respective ments were understood to be in proc- cut in two, the enemy remaining in forces from east and west, it was ess of evacuation. Military factors, eaeh portion' could then more eco- now essential that operations on the when the enemy was on the brink of nomically be eliminated. Such a cen- two fronts should be coordinated, and final defeat, were more important in tral thrust, moreover, would afford necessary to learn something of the my eyes than the political considera- us the nsrximum degree of flexibility Russians' Intentions in order to know tions involved in an Allied capture of for future operations, as we could best how to exploit such success as the capital. The function of our forces subsequently switch forces rapidly to our own plan of campaign might must be to crush the German armies the north or to the south as the situ- achieve. I therefore informed Marshal rather than to dissipate our own ation should indicate. Stalin of my general plan to strike strength in the occupation of empty General Bradley was accordingly first in the center and subsequently and ruined cities. Moreover, the Rus- instructed to launch an offensive with to effect a link-up with his forces in sians were practically on its outskirts the Central Group of Armies from the Regensburg-Linz area with a (30 miles away) and it was a matter the Kassel area, where he now stood, view to neutralizing the Redoubt. of serious concern to avoid entangling toward Leipzig, establishing the right Marshal Stalin replied that this of foroes in areas where, due to diffi- flank of his advance on the line Bay- scheme coincided entirely with the culties of communication and diffi- rcuth-Erzgebirge. He was to seize Russian plans in respect to both the culties in language, unfortunate in- any opportunity of capturing a central and southern sectors. cidents might occut. bridgehead over the Elbe River and The decision to concentrate first Kassel was cleared on 4 April, and to be prepared for operations farther upon a major thrust in the center within the following week the main east, but it was anticipated that these nevertheless gave rise to some mis- Allied advances to the east were be- would, be unnecessary as the speed givings. The desirability of bringing gun. On the southern flank, the Third of the Russian advance would prob- the U-boat war to an esid, of opening Army, headed by X.X Corps, encoun- ably lead to a junction with them on up supply lines through the north tered only scattered opposition, with the Elbe, if not west of the river. To German ports, of acquiring the use little more than road Mlocks to bar assist the First and Third Armies in of Swedish shipping, of relieving tite It. progress in the country north of 31

the Thuringian Forest. Weimar was tains, containing some 10,000 enemy subsequent occupational zones or reached on 11 April and Erfurt troops, were almost encircled, but otherwise. Both fronts should be 'free cleared the next day. By the 13th. attempts to reduce this pocket met to advance until contact was immin- Jena had been cleared and the 4th with strong resistance. The garrison ent, after which an agreement should Armored Division was at the out. succeeded for some time, with the be reached between the local com- skirts of Chemnitz. The enemy retired aid of the dVrcult terrain, in holding manders concerned as to any read- southeast into the Erzgebirge along the Allied inloads to a minimum. justment of lines which operational the frontier of Czechoslovakia, al- while striving to keep open a corri- considerations might render desir- though he still clung to the town of dor to the east near Bernburg. The able. This policy met with Chemnitz as a pivot to the north, the ap- encirclement was nevertheless com- proval of the Co'inbined Chiefs where the south Saxon cities were of pleted when this corridor was severed Staff and of the Soviet putting up a stiff resistance to the High Cpm? on 18 April. A desperate attempt by mand, and instructions accordingly. First Army. At the same time that the von Clausewitz Panzer Division were issued to the armies XX Corps was advancing to the north und4 my to relieve the garrison by a dash command. The arrangement of Czechoslovakia, XII and VIII Corps worked across some 50 miles of Allied-held smoothly and, in accordance of the Third Army, farther south, with an territory was foiled, and opposition agreement rea6hed with pushed through Bayreuth and Neu- the Soviet. within the pocket soon weakened High Command when the stadt toward the mountains of the contact The last organized resistance in the was imminent, the boundary was Bohemian Forest forming the south- Harz ceased on 21 April. temporarily fixed in the centralsn.5 western border of the country. On 18 16 Meanwhile, althouth the Allies had tor along the easily April the Allied armies set foot in identified 1JiM 1 penetrated to the southeast of Leip- of the Elbe and Mulde Czechoslovakia. Rivers, .' zig, the enemy fought back strongly subsequent readjustments t&: On the left flank of the First Army, to its west and southwest, After 2 zonal boundaires for occup ayt the Ninth Army continued the ad- days of bitter struggle the p09th Di- purposes was carried throug hi. vance to the northwest which it had vision of V Corps cleared theity on out incident after the cesflitMwt.flf commenced under the 21 Army Group 19 April. The enemy salienrwhicb hostilities. . ,, following its successful envelopment had extended westward from theiine While the Central Group of the north of the Ruhr. XIX Corps of of the Mulde to the Leipzig-Halle had been pushing eastward established a bridgehead over the to':dl area had now disappeared and Allied Germany, the Northern Weser at Hameln on 6 April and and 8o • elements cleared to the river. Groups had each in their pushed rapidly ahead, south of Bruns- rw On 25 April patrols of the 278d sectors been carrying out wick, to reach the the.o) Elbe south of Regiment, '.09th Division, under V tions assigned Magdeburg to them durling 2ba on 11 April. On the next Corps, which had probed eastward period. day, Brunswick fell and the first from the Mulde, met elements of the Under the 21 Army Group, bridgehead was gained on the east Russian 58th Guards Division in the Second Army was, by my iutru I bank of the Elbe by the 2d Armored Torgau area, on the Elbe. The Junc- to adsnce toward Bremen-ant Uaw Division. A second bridgehead, south tion of the Eastern and Western burg, thereafter thrustingt.,o,. of Wittenberge, was achieved by the Fronts had been effected, and Ger- Elbe (gaining a bridgehead It tbn 5th Armored Division of XIII Corps many was cut in two. The object of opportunity offered) and thw on 13 April. tr,. the central thrust had been achieved protecting the northern flankOt4 tl).- From Magdeburg to Wittenberge, The problem of liason with the Ninth Army in the 12th Army G,,r0 - the enemy showed himself ready to Russians had grown more pressing Meanwhile the Canadian Armyb- evacuate the west bank of the river, during the advance across central to open up a supply route to. " but he fought hard to deny us pos- Germany, strategical questions be- north through Arnhem and tW*An4 session of Magdeburg itself, which ing replaced by tactical ones as the operate to clear northeast only HoilU-" fell to XIX Corps on 18 April. time of junction approached; but the coastal belt eastward to . Very strong counterattacks were also solutions were not forthcoming until Elbe, and west launched against Holland, in that ordIt. the bridgeheads, the last minute. One of our prin- of priority. The operations were, is:., - and these were so severe as to com- cipal anxieties concerned the mu- many respects, similar to those cp - pel the Ninth Army, on 14 April, to tual identification of opr respective red out in France by the same abandon the two footholds originally Array forces, both In the air and on the Group in the preceding obtained. But a third, summer. at Barby, held ground. Already, at .the beginning when the Second Army drove across'.. firm, as enemy attempts to destroy of April, our tactical air forces had the rear of the Pas-de-Calais while' the bridges by floating mines down come into contact and shots had been the Canadian. Army mopped up the river proved abortive. the So rapid mistakenly exchanged, and we con- enemy along the coast. had been the thrust to reach the Elbe sidered it of the utmost importance The SOcond Army advance was that a number of German pockets that all possible arrangements should made with the 30 Corps on the left had been bypassed on the way. The forces in these, before being mopped be made to insure proper recognition flank, the 12 Corps in the center, in order to prevent errors and and the B Corps on the right. Resist- up, attempted to harass the Allied possibly tragic incidents which might ance at first was slight ,and good lines of communication, but with result in later recriminations. Fol- progress was made. North of Mflnster, little success. lowing recommendations by the Army the German First Parachute Army The First Army offensive, south of Group commanders, a system of rec- troops were scattered, Rheine was the Harm Mountains, got under way ognition signs and signals was event- taken on 3 April, and enemy hopes by 11 April, and rapid progress was ually, arranged by 20 April. of a stand on the Weser-Ems made agaifist generally disorganized canal In regard to the terrltori~l ques- were frustrated. On 6 April, the 8 resistance. On 14 April the 3d Ar- tions affecting the •junction of the Corps established a bridgehead over mored Division of VII Corps reached fronts it did not seem to me prac- the Weser on the southern flank, and Dessau, just south of the confluence ticable to restrict our operations to continued the advance to the Elbe, of the Elbe and Mulde Rvers. In the a demarcation line prepared in ad- whiq h the 11 Armoured Divisioft course of this thrust, the Hant Moua- vance, either em the basis of the reached at Lanenburg en iSApil

~Q A li

001.- ...... I K' n

Farther north, the 12 Corps, against ted by the floods, beyond which no advance on Stuttgart from the Pforz- stiffer resistance, reached Harburg, further Allied advance was made in heim-Ludwigsburg areas. on the south bank of the Elbe ep- this sector. It was rightly felt by In the execution of these plea the posits Hamburg, on 20 April. South Field Mershal Montgomery that an oppooion encountered was generally of Bremen, the advance of the 30 advance into Holland would occas- steady, despite the losses incurred by Corps was stoutly contested. The ion great tdditional suffering for that the enemy. While XXI Corps, in the Allies were at the outskirts of the unhappy country and that the quick- Seventh Army sector, penetrated to city by 22 April, but very bitter est and most economical way to free Schweinfurt by 11 April, stiff resis- fighting took place before the 3 and the country was to complete the tance met the Allied thrusts at Wtirz- 52 Divisions finally crushed all op- destruction of the enemy forces else- bqrg and Heilbronn. At the latter position on the 26th. where. place -the enemy defended the Neckar Meanwhile the Canadian Army was The principal task of the 6th Army River line against VI Corps for some probing into Holland. In a thrust Group during the first half of April days and then fought in the town for northward, the Canadian 2 Corps, was, as previously indicated, the pro- a week before it was cleared on 12 conforming with the Second Army on tection of the right flank of the 12th April. A salient thrust as far as Its right, initially met heavy oppo- Army Group thrust -as far east as Cralisheim by the 10th Armored Di- sition from the First Parachute Bayreuth. To accomplish this, the vision on 7 April had to be temporar- Army, but broke out on 6 April and, Seventh Army was ordered to ad- ily abandoned in the face of the ene- while some elements turned north- vance with all speed to a line Lud- my pressure. By 16 April XV Corps west, others advanced northeast to- wigsburg -Crailsheim -Nilrn-berg -Bay- reached Niirnberg, but'again several ward Oldenburg. Resistance In north reuth, linking with the Third Army days' hard fighting was required be- Holland collapsed and the sea was in the Bayrtbth area. The Bayreuth- fore the city was cleared. reached on 15 April., By the 21st, the Ntirnberg autobahn was to be cut and In the French Army sector, resis- whole area, apart from a small tip NiTnberg itself captured, after which tance In the Rhine Valley was Initially in the northeast, was cleared as far the army was to be prepared to at- stiff, but soon weakened. Karlsruhe south as Harderwijk on the eastern tack toward Regensburg and Linz. fell on 4 April and Baden-Baden on shore of the Ijssel Meer. To the west, The French lirst Army was to ad- the 12th. The enemy defenses to the the lUssel River line was stubbornly vance its Rhine bridgehead force to south now collapsed before the defended at Deventer and Zutphen, the 1ue Lichtenau-Pforzheim-Lud- French I Corps. By 15 April, Kehl but the former town fell on 10 April wigsburg, capturing Karlsruhe and was taken and the way cleared for and a bridgeheAd was established Pforshelm. When the prinicipal bridging to be started at Strasbourg. oer the river. In th southern sec- bridgebeMd had been adequately built As the withdrawal to the south up tor of the army sojieo, the Canadian up, the area east of the Rhine was the right bank of the Rhine contin- 1 Corps attacked from Nijmegen, to be cleated far enough sooth to ued, the enemy was forced to con- sbtring to the lower Rhine by 5 enable a new bridgehead tp be esta]- form by retiring in the Black Forest Apitfl, and Arnhem was ctptured on to the east, and the situation was the 15th. The enemy now withdrew lished at Strasbourg. The troops there prepared for the capture of Stuttgart "Wortress Holland" behind the would then cross the Rhine, after by Allied t pincers converging from G0ubs and New Water lines, protec- which the main effort woeld be an northeast and southwest. U THE FINAL PHASE

The division of Germany accom- to Berchtesgaden in the national Re- vealed underground constructlonal plished by the Junction with the Rus- doubt. Some of the departments had activity. It was believed that some sians at Torgau produced immediate already left the city, but the main subterranean factories had been es- and far-reaching consequences. The body now found that, with the Allied tablished in the area, but ifany con- enemy's difficulties of command link-up on the Elbe, It was too late. siderable numbers of troops were to which followed the loss of Army An impassable barrier had been be maintained there they would have Group B in the Ruhr now reached drawn across the country, and the to rely for their supplies, bot o, their climax, and all chance of re- way to the Redoubt was cut off, In food and ammunition, upon pre, storing effective unity to the armies consequence, Hitler and his intimate ly accumulated stocks. facing. the western Allies irrevocably henchmen stayed on in Berlin. disappeared. The enemy found him- North of the dividing line Iipe'. 4 Although the Redoubt was self split into virtually independent not, tria Gran some 50 enemyS therefore, to be the last seat commands in the north and south, of the visions were likely to remain to Nazi government, the possibility re- with no means of coordinating the moppe4 up, and 6f these the. 94y mained that it would still be the formidable ' operations in the two zones. Each had elements were these2 .001 scene of a desperate stand by the to fight its own battle as best it could. the First tarachute Army. Althoua$ fanatical elements of the armies south The moral effect of this situation it was not conceivable that reslstazq of the dividing line, together with was immene, and a weakening of the could loag be maintained in tn those which might retreat northward resistance previously offered in both North German ,Plain, it was possi'l out of Italy. These armies, totaling north and south was at once evident. that some withdrawal might be ' about 100 nominal divisions, included During the first 3 weeks of April over temped into Denmark and Norwsj the bulk of the remaining German a million prisoners were taken with a view to make a last stand in by armored and SS fornations, our armies, and losses and up those countries, while "Fortress Hol.. evstained at to 30 paner division might conceiv- sawc a rat inevitably land" would also continue to hoI., brought on col- ably be concentrated behind the lapse in every sector. The Russians, out behind the- water barriers. The mountain barriers. In addition, 'most prevention moreover, were of such a withdrawal,_ now fighing their of the surviving German jet fighter way into Berlin, and the government, by means of a rapid Allied advanea. plane strength was located in the already partly evacuated, was to the Baltic, thus became the pri- . . rend- south. The conquest of the Redoubt ered powerless. mary objective of our operations in. area thus remained as as important the northern sctor.- At the saMemepethe paralysisof objective of the Allies, deqe the For the subsequent reduction of the German administrative system as collapse of the rest of Germany. In a whole, which had set In as a result Norway, in the event that the Ger- ,4 1 the event of determined resistance, its garrison there continued to hold of Allied air action and since spread man reduction would constitute a formid- its isolation had been effected, Z rapidly as the 12th Army Group ad- after able problem, and speed of movement a task force was assembled in Scot- vanced eastward, gripped the entire was therefore essential to forestall land under the command of lest. country. The autocratic nature of the in the enemy's retiring Into the area Gen. Sir Andrew Thorne. system was such that, with its main- time to fortify it against our attacks. On the central German Front, al- spring disabled in Berlin, the parts Extending some 240 miles in though elements pushed forward, as throughout the rest of Germany auto- length and 80 miles in depth, the matically ceased to function. Com- described, to meet the Russians at Redoubt comprised the western half Torgau, munications finally broke down, the it was necessary to halt the of Austria, with small portions of main Allied forces on the Nnes of postal servioes came to a standstill, Germany to the north and Italy to the Elbe and Mulde Rivers and the and the complete Isolation from his the the south. It was bounded on Erzgebirge. For home In which the German soldier this decision logisti- north by the Bavarian Plains, on the cal now foumd himself sapped hfs last factors were mainly responsible, south by the Dolomites and Carnie as well as the aim of powers o resistance. With his world concentrating Alps, on the west by the Swiss fron- forces now on the north collapsing about him, he lost all heart and south tier and the Rhine Valley, and on the flanks. The rapidity of our advance ft the fl.k7. The horror pictures east by the Lageneurt Easin ad the ad the large seals vos which the which the Ne s hd painted with eastern extremity ot the Nlew Tau- such lurid colors in their anti-Bolshe- operation was conducted had strained ern.AWithin it lay Berchtesgaden and our supply organization to an un- ilk propaganda began to have an Hitler's "Eagle's Nest." precedented degree, and it could s wmry different from that envis- not, The whole area was atremely at the moment, be further stretched. aged by their originators. Instead of mountainous and thus uheultable for As in the dash across France In being steeed to a last msperhuman large-scale airborne operations, while 1944, it was possible now to maintain effrt, the soldier, confused and its- the roads ino it followed narrow the momentum of the armored col- iflusioned by the helplessness of the valleys which could easily be held by umns in their-swift advances only units to which he had once been determined defenders. The snows and by the expedient of airborne supply. proud to belong, became concerned solely with his individual danger of avalanches limited the pos- In executing this task, the carrier desire to sibility of any military operations to planes accomplished remarkable be with his family in whatever fate the •summer months between 'May and feats, and, invaluable as they had might be overtaking •them. October. Although there was no cr1- proven throughout the campag in Pvwto the Allied adane across deuce of any eonlee sstem of de- Northwest Nurop, the "iy ha- entral germony, evidence had been fenes along the naturalrapts cars" were never more essential te received that the government was some progress appeared to hame been in these concluding stages of the war. preprn to evacuate Berlin a~d made in this rsspect aong the north- Landing on improvised airfilids close :l4he.f l ... O - _ ,

7 ~N.., S - ' 'a N

While the hold thus gained on the in pockets temporarily surrounded of the opening up of the port of neck of the Danish Peninsula was enemy, 1,500 IX Troop Car- Bremen, Bomber Command carried by the being consolidated, other forces C-47's, supplemented out a heavy attack on Heligoland on rier Command crossed the Elbe and turned down for the 18 April in order to neutralize its by heavy bombers stripped its right bank toward Hamburg, over 20,000 sorties dur- defenses and thus facilitate a com- purpose, flew which surrendered and was occupied nearly 60,000 tons mando landing if such an operation ing April to carry by the 7 Armoured Division on 3 10,255,509 gal- became neemsary. of freight (including May. At the same time, the 30 Corps the forward ele- At the same time that the 21 Army loA of gasoline) to completed clearance of the area be- forces. Making Group concentrated on its principal ments of the ground tween the Elbe and the Weser. flights from French thrust to Lfibeck, a similar advance their outward On 8 May, the U. S. XVIII Air- mornings, the planes was to be made in the southern zone bases in the borne Corps was in contact with the afternoons bearing down the Danube Valley toward returned In the Russians along the line Wismar- casualties and Linz with the object of effecting a thousands of evacuated Schweriner Lake-Grabow. While Ber- of war who bad further junction with the Russians. Allied prisoners lin was in flames, a new offensive by during the advances. The static situation in the center now been liberated the Red Army during the last week it would permitted the use of the Third Army Without such assistance of April had taken Stettin and swept armored for this purpose, while the 6th Army have been impossible for the rapidly westward across Mecklen- to achieve the sweeping Group devoted the whole of its at- divisions burg, driving disorganized remnants sces which attended their oqw- tention to the problem of the Redoubt farther south ad west. of German armies before It. Now, stiets. with the Junction of the Allied fronts, forces in the center were Even when the Danube offensive While er all resistance in northern Germany the Mulde and Elbe Rivers, had subdivided the enemy's forces in halted on ceased. we turned to the completion of Ope. the south, t might still be possible orations in the north and south, con- for the Redoubt to hold out, and the By the end of April the enemy had centrating upon two principal ob- Third Army was therefore instructed, finally abandoned all attempts to from east Jeetives of further subdividing the in addition to its ptineipal thrust, to stem the Allied advances turned enemy's remaining armies and of seize Salsburg, while the Seventh and west simultaneously. He neutralizing the areas already des- Army, under the 6th Army Group, his back upon the western Allies to cribed where he might the moot was to advance along the axis Warz- concentrate all his remaining forces effectively make his last stands. burg-Munich, penetrate the moun- in a last desperate effort to hold was too Accordingly, in the northern sector tains, and subsequently to occupy the back the Russians, but it the 21 Army Group with the U. S. fortress area. We made available to late. As his armies were forced far- XVIII Airborne Corps under com- General Devers the un of the U. S. ther and farther back, the troops mand. was directed to fulfill the 13th Airborne Division to assist in gave themselves up in thousands to tasks upon which it was at present these operations if it should prove the Anglo-American armies in their engaged west of the Elbe, to seize necessary. Farther west, the French rear. While the Second Army was crossings over that river in the Brit- Army was to mop up the Black For- thrusting unopposed to the Baltic, ish Second Army zone, secure Ham- eat region and clear along the Swiss the American units standing on the burg, and advance with the utmost frontier, and subsequently to enter Elbe were receiving wholesale sur- speed on the general area of Kiel. Austria if the situation required. renders from the enemy retreating Lfbeck. This done, Field Marshal In the execution of the 21 Army westward across the river and into Montgomery was to be prepared to Group operations in the north, the their arms. One corps alone took conduct operations northward to resistance encountered by the Brit- 300,000 prisoners in the course ofi liberate Denmark, using, if necessary, ish Second Army in Its attacks toward a single day. an airborne assault to force the Kiel Bremen and Hamburg was persistent. In northeast Holland and along Canal. Meanwhile operations were to Following the fall of Bremen on 26 the coastal belt eastward, the Can- continue to achieve the clearing of April, however, the situation changed. adian Army continued its operations the coastal belt, and to reduce the The main Allied effort was now trans- to clear the area, taking Oldenburg enemy naval bases and fortifications ferred to the sector of S Corps, which on 2 Mpy, after overcoming stiff re- which threatened the approaches to launched an attack across the Elba sistance, and -driving on beyond. In Hamburg. The Allied naval and air at Lauenburg on 29 April. Weak op- western Holland, however, no fur- foro were to assist in these opposition only was offered-chiefly by ther ground advances were made erations, but the nature of the de- local defense battalions and labor across the flood barriers behind fenses made it possible that their services-and across the river the which the German Twenty-fifth Army reduction might prove lengthy and bridgehead was quickly enlarged. lay entrenched. difficult, in which case the avail- Simultaneously the U. S. XVIII Air- The situation confronting noin ability to the Allies of the German borne Corps, now fighting in a ground western Holland was one of peculiar ports might be delayed. The ques- role, effected a crossing to the south difficulty. Civilian conditions there tion of the subsequent opening of and was attached to the Second Army had deteriorated steadily for some either Hamburg or Bremen, or both. to provide flank protection for fur- months, and after the advances of was also dependent upon the condi- ther advance.. On 1 May, the 11 our armies to the east had isolated tion in which we should find their Armoured Division broke out of the the area from Germany, the posi- port installations, but first priority British S Corps bridgehead to dash tion of the population became des- was to be accorded to Hamburg. On across Schleswig-Holstein to the Bal- perate. It was imperativd, therefore, ii the eastern flank of the 21 Army tic and entered Liibeck on the after- that steps should be taken by the Group, operations toward Berlin noon of 2 May, thereby sealing off Allies to relieve the growing distress would have to await the develop- the enemy in Denmark. On the same before wholesale starvation took monte of the situation following the day, the British 6 Airborne Division, place. The strength of the German accomplishment of the more import- under XVIII COrps, reached Wismar, defenses was such, however, that to ant tasks outlined above. farther east along the coast, while in- mount an operation on a suffciently In view of the great importance land Sokwerin was attained. large scale to Insure successwol have necessitated a serious weaken- progress against a tottering enmy. area on 22 April, and at Ing of the main armies in Germany Donauwr Although the defenders held out at 2 days-later. Pockets ot the enemy just at the time when it was all- RegenSburg until 26 April, XX Corps created south of the river by the eao important that we should press home established bridgeheads across the verging advances were eliminated, the attacks which were bringing Danube east and west of the city on and Augsburg was cleared by about the final collapse of the enemy the 25th, and then advanced sou th- Corps on the 28th. Farther west, the there. Moreover, even had we been east down the right bank while XII Ulm area was reached by VI Corps able to launch an offensive against Corps western Holland at this moment, the did likewise north of the river. which, after a pause occasioned by By 2 May, the north bank had been the moves of the enemy would have opened the dykes flanking French cleared of the enemy as far as Pas- units, drove to flood the whole country, ruining on toward the Alpine sau, and the 11th Armored Division foothills. The infantry its fertility for many years to come, pissed through shot ahead to receive the surrender the armor and bringing further miseries to its to penetrate the moun- of Linz on 5 May. With 'this lengthen- tains, whore the terrain served to people. ing of the XII Corps line, the Third We warned General Blaskowitz, slow progren more than did the op. Army took command of V Corps, from the German commander, that the position of the enemy. On I May, the First Army, for operations into Innebruck opening of the dykes would consti- was taken, and the 10d Czechoslovakia on its northern flank. tute an indelible blot upon his mili- Division o VI Corps Pushed e0 to By an attack eastward across the tary honor and that of the German the Brener Pass. frontier, Pilsen was captured on 6 Hero at Vipituo Ol tSe lin Army, and pointe odt i him that May. • side of tho border, a junetio was the retention of Holland could not inapede the coming cllapse of G er- These operations were carried out effected during the morning at 4 in full coordination with the Russians May with the 88th many before our advances. Mean- Division of the approaching from the east. The Amer- U. while, Seyss-Inquart, the Nazi Com- S. Fifth Army which, alter the ican troops advanced to the line Bu- defeat el the enemy forees missioner for Holland, offered a in ZWy, dejovice-Pilsen-Karlsbad, but were had -struck into solution by proposing a truce. If the the Alps frm the there halted while the Red Army south. The danger Allied forces were to sontinue to of an enemy Met cleared the east and west banks of stand in the Redoubt stand on the Grebbe Line as at pres- was finely the Moldau River and occupied eliminated, and on the following ent, no further flooding would take day Prague. South of Czechoslovakia, the the enemy*Nineteenth Army place and the Germans would cease eapits. agreed provisional line of junction lated, followed by the whole all represive measures against the of Army ran down the Budejovice-Linz rail- Group G Dutch, at the ime time cooperating on 6 May. Among the prim road and thence along the valley of oners taken in the course in the intr~ductton of relief supplies. of the A- the Ems, where contact was effected pine campaign was The Combined Chiefs of Staff having the most formi4 in due course. able of my former antagonists, accorded me a free hand in the mat- th South of the Danube, XX Corps now retired Field Marshal von ter, my Chief of Rund- Staff met Seyes- crossed the Isar River on 29 April, stedt. Inquart on 80 April, a Russian repre- at the same time clearing the north While the. Seventh sentative being present and concur- Army wa bank to the Danube confluence. On smashing its way into the Redoubt. ring in the action taken on behalf of 1 May the corps reached the Inn the French First Army was his government. Methods of introduc- complet- River at Braunau and proceeded to ing the destruction of the enemy fin%. ing food by land, sea, and air routes close that river in its sector. On its ther west. Following the collapse of were agreed upon, and the movement right flank, III Corps crossed the the German resistance in the Black of the supplies which the Allies had Danube in the Ingolstadt area on 26 Forest sector, the French broke held ready commenced forthwith; the April, and, advancing southeast, es- through with great speed. On free dropping of food 1had indeed 33 tablished bridgeheads over the -Isar April, French I Corps thrust to the already begun. on the 28th, in conformity with the east of the Black Forest to reach Seyss-Inquart was impressed by the Seventh Army offensive farther west. Lake Constance, and the corridor arguments put forward by the Allies On 2 May, III Corps reached the Inn was widened on the next day. Then, that, recognizing the hopelessness of at Wasserburg, securing the Miihl- turning northeast, an advance was' the position, the German garrison dorf bridges intact, after which the made to Ulm, where contact was 4 should surrender at once instead of sector was taken over by the Seventh made with the Seventh Army forces waiting for the inevitable; but that, Army. on 24 April. This action created three he said, was a decision for the mili- The final thrust by the Seventh pockets of the enemy: one in the" tary commander, over whom he had Army also began on 22 April; follow-' southern Black Forest, one in the no control. Blaskowitz would not ing the fall of Niirnberg two days Stuttgart area, and one north of Sig- consider capitulation so long as any earlier. On the right flank, XV Corps maringen. Meanwhile another French form of resistance continued in Ger- moved down the Danube and then force drove up the right bank of the many. struck south to With the relief of the Dutch thus Munich, which was Rhine to the Swiss frontier at Basel captured, in the face of some oppo- and then east to complete the process assured, no useful purpose could be sition, on 30 April. The enemy at- of encirclement. By 20 April, the served by attempting inroads into tempted to move an SS Panzer Divi- Allies were along the .Swiss border "Fortress Holland" at this time sion to block th~e Allied when advance along from Basel to Lake Constance. Stutt- the final collapse of all German re- the Alpine foothills, but was power- gart itself had been cleared on 21 sistance was imminent. The Cana- less to check our progress. On 4 May, April, and by the 27th organized re- dians accordingly held fast on the the 3d Division of XV Corps cleared sistance had ceased in all the pocket Grebbe Line until the enemy garri- Berchtesgaden, while other troops despite the strong opposition offered son surrendered with the remainder occupied Salzburg, and the entire in some places, aided by difficult ter- of the forces in northern Germany. enemy sector between there and Linz rain. in the south, the thrust of the fell apart. After being relieved by the Seventh Third Army down the Danube Valley 'Meanwhile XXI and VI Corps had Army in the Ulm sector, the French began on 22 April and made rapid crossedw the Danube in the Dillingen armor now drove along the northern

6 A' the entire cam4paign. As the Eastern to sea only on rare occaqions through- shore of Lake Constance and turned Invariably to be closed together, out the war, then south across the Austrian border on and Western Fronts tot h desn.tioa aS however, c opportunities for em- hounded 30 April. Feldkirch w e4apture d n drive crippled back to theirb08 plon nt of the strofe bomber 4 May, and the advance wm eAn- A14d Sr force repeat- forces grew more and more limited, where the ued up the Il and Kloster Valleys to undid any repair work attempt- former strategic targets having now edly penetrate the western end of the Re- units lay helpless in become tactical ones. The chief occu- ed, the hea-vy doubt and to make contact with the the northern ports as these fell into pation of Bomber Command and the Seventh Army there as the enemy advancing armies. Eighth Air Force by the beginning the hands of the capitulated. three of the larger ships were of May consequently consisted of Only Apart from the main activities of in anything approaching a condition flying food supplies to the Dutch French First Army, operations action when the last the civilian population and of evacuating for effective were also carried out at this time by bases surrendered. The coastal casualties andliberated Allied pris- naval under the control of had ceased to operate during French forces oners. craft 6th Army Group on the Franco-hal- April, and t wa left to the sub- force' work in ian border and against the German The tactical air marine forces--th 6ly truly sue- armies pocket which had continued te hold close support of the advancing cesful naval weapon of whic the south went on, but out at the mouth of the Gironde. Ex- in the north and enemy had enjoyed the use-to carry tensive air operations supported the their operations also were restricted on the fight to the end. by the danger of hitting advanced latter offensive. The penetration over principal objectives Russian elements and the large By & May the the Ala into northwest Italy were bees achieved I bodies of prisoners who, having of the Allies had executed as a diversionary measure and the war I krope broken loose from their camps, were every sector, to aseet the 16th Army Group init at sa ad. Nowhere as streaming westward along the roads. was virtually breakthrough across the plain of there still In em- The last major offensive by the tac- the Continent was Lombardy. As such, they fulfilled all German army capable of tical planes was in the south, where istence a that was expected of them. Opera- to fight. attacks were concentrated ahead of continuing tions against the Gironde enclave armies under my the Third Army advance down the To the east, the were launched on 14 April, after re- were jeting andm with Danube Valley, destroying the ene- command peated postponements since October allies from the Baltic my's remaining dulps of fuel and their Russian 1344 necessitated by the demands of Alps. To the south, they had other supplies in that area, and cut- to the the more important battles elsewhere. their comrades in Italy, ting the few communications still linked with Long isolated, and now demoralized already the enemy had made available for their distribution. where by the Allied successes on the main Nasl "fort- Of enemy offensive activity I the formal surrender. Of the fronts, the defenders were incapable resses," the nmtial Redoubt had air there was nosign. As the area left of any extended resistance. Fighting penetrsted while Its intended to the German decreased, the con- "beem ceased in the Royan sector north of dispersed and broken gestion of planes on the remaining garrison lay the river on 18 April and 3 days later walls; Norway was iso- airfields grew worse, and the num- outside its the Pointe de Grave on the south and doomed; Dunkirk, the ber o aircraft destroyed on the lated bank fell. The final elimination of and the Channel Is- ground mounted in proportion. The Brittany ports, the enem ywas achieved with the re- helpless; md Holland demoralization of the German Air lands were duction of the Island of Oleron on 1 Denmark had Just capitulated. Force personnel was too far devel- and May. Farther north the St-Nazaire- The German war machine which ope4 for any suicidal effort to be Lorient "fortress" held out until the sought to dominate the world made with the jet aircraft squadrons had final surrender of all the German overwhelmed and crushed to a left in Austria and Czechoslovakia, lay armies. never before experienced in and by the beginning of May practi- degree In these concluding stakes of the of modern armies. The cally the only flights undertaken were the history war, the Allied air forces continued moment had come for Germany to support for the purpose of desertion. to afford the Invaluable make her final acknowledgement of which had been such a vital factor The end of the German Navy was put defeat. in insuring oar successes throughout even more unspectacular. Having S THE SURRENDER

During the spring of 1945, as the tiations with AFHQ made clear to render to the Anglo-Amelean forns, sky grew darker over Germany, the the Germans that the Allies would While thousands Nazi leaders had struggled desper- of Germans fle- discuss no' terms and would accept ing westward gave themselves ately, by every means in their power, up unconditional surrender only. By 26 daily, Admiral Friedeburg, the to whip tl ir people into a last -ow April the deterioration of the enemy's head of the German Navy, supreme eff rt to stave off defeat, aceso position which followed the Allies' panied by Field Marshal Busch's chief hoping against hope that it would be splitting of his armies in Lombardy of staff and two possible, if only they could hold on other Offlioers, 140 and Venetia led to renewed appeared at Field Marshal Mont I W' long enough, to save the day by di- proaches; and, on the 29th, German cry's Headquarters on 3 M tron. N viding the Allies. Blinded as they representatives signed the terms of asked to be allowed to iaxttet* were by their own terror and hatred St surrender, by which all hostilities in Third Pafizer, Twelfth, aid * of "bolshevism," they were Incapable Italy were to cease on 2 May. first Armies, which had beh of understanding the strength u*Mtfl of the This capitulation by the German the Rtissians, and to be bond of common interest existing be- pemnit d " armies facing south in the Alps led pass refugees through tween Britain, the United States, the AllietliffS inevitably to an abandonment of the Into Schleswig-Holstein. Their and the Soviet Union. &W struggle by those who, behind them, desire was to avoid thl necemitt As soon as it became clear that a of had been driven back into the moun- surrendering to the Zussian. war on two fronts had become Im- ldl tains before the Allied 6th Army Marshal Montgomery, howoter, possible to maintain, the Nazi gov- a.- Group offensive. On 2 May, Wolffr fused to discuss capitulation ernment set itself to obtain, if *tk asked with whom the surrender of them on these terms, though 1W possible, a truce in the west in order fi the North Alpine arba should be formed them that IndividuAl s$ / rI that all its remaining forces might negotiated. He was told to apply 4 be concentrated in an to who gave themselves up wol 1g I attempt to General Devers, but warned that only check the treated as prisoners of war. Th (SUP rolling tide of the Russian unconditional submission would be man advances In the representatives thett BUN east. In March an acceptable. On 5 May the repfesent- to Field , approach was made Marshal Keitel, the Chit d to this end ative of General Schulz, commanding the German through the British High Commando, f t Embassy In Army Group G, accepted the Allied further ilistruatlons, Stockholm, but the meanwhilt flt offer was, of terms at Haar, in Bavaria, and the lng the AiesM course, rejected out of hand. to follow the ttatiI German First and Nineteenth Armies German armies closely to tdaid shanL Even after this rebuff, however, accordingly laid down their arms. the Germans clung On 4 May, r-ledeburg atnotnod to their fond The surrender was officially to take that he had hopes of an reeived permission frftH Allied rift, and a last effect at noon on 6 May, but both his superors desperate attempt to create to mak6 sneonditloal a schism sides at once announced the termina- surrender of betwen the Anglo-Americans and the all German artS tion of hostilities in order to obviate forces, land, sea, and air, Is the Russians came as late as the lest further loss of life. northwest Germany (ineluding week in April, Himmler, claiming the Rumors of an Impending local Frisian Islands, Heltoland, and all that. he spoke for the German Gov- capitulation In the north also reached ernment because other Islands), H6lland, Schleswig- Hitler was now "in- the Allies in mid-April. Field Mar- Holstein, capacitated," and Denmark. I had in-, approaehed the Swed- shal Beech, commanding the Ham- structed Field Marshal Montgomery ish Government, through Count Bern- barg area, was stated to be anti- that a capitulation covering these adotte, with an offer to surender all Nazi and willing to surrender, but areas might be regarded as a tactical the forces now fighting on the West- unable to do so until the Western matter and, as such, be dealt with ern Front. O*ce more th Alies re- Altlies reached the Baltic and cut him plied tha the only acceptable terms by him. It was arranged that a Rus- off from the possibility of the ar. sian officer should were of be present to a- Immediate and unconditional rival of die-hard SS formations from cept the German surrender submission on behalf on all fronts simultan- central Germany. General Linde- of his government. eouely. The instrument of Whereupon Himmler dis- mann,- the commander In Denmark, surrender was accordingly appeared signed on from the scene until, aftr was also understood to be ready to 4 May, and it became the effective at final capiulation, he was appre- yield at the same time as Busch, and 0800 hours on 5 May. hended as a fugittve from Justice and oh 34 Aprifan emissary appeared As laid down In my directive from met his death by suicide. in Stockholm to confirm this. It was the Combined Chiefs of Staff, no com- Hitler and his close followers do- urged that the British Army should mitments of any nature were made on termned tb carry on the fight. They make all speed to reach the Baltic the Allled side in accepting these personeally had everything to lose, before the Russians did so, for the local capitulations, and their terms notting to gain, by peace now. Amid Germans would under no circum- the were made subject to the provisions disillusionment of their armies stances surrender to the Red Army. of the subsequent general uncondi- and the ruins which daly multi- By 3 May, however, when the cap- tional surrender of all the German plied .in Germany, they deliberately ture chose to sacrifice the of Liibeck had severed Denmark armed forces. The time for this final remnants of and northwest Germany from the re- yielding had now arrived; unlike their country. mainder of the country, more im- Hitler, Admiral Doenits was ready Not all of their henchmen, how- portant figtures came within our to bow to -the inevitable. ever, followed their lead. Waff reach. en 55 As the Red Army had drawn On 4 May, it was learned th~at General Karl Wolff, the chief SS of- nearer to the Western Allies, Admiral Doenitz was sending a representa- ficer In northern Italy, in mid-Feb- Doenitz, upon whom the mantle of tive to my Headquarters on the fol- ruary approached Allied representa- the Fiihrer had now fallen, had in- lowing day, and that he had already tives with a view t6 a capitulation in structed his armies which had been ordered the the German U-boats to return Theater. Neo-a facing capt to Me aii and ass- to port in, earnest of his intention t

0- 17 )-Af 94 bring the war to a close as speedily the negotiations. Sod] arrived on the This declaration at last had the desired effect. Doenitz gave his ap- as possible. I at once notified the Rus- evening of 6 May. It was at once ob- proval for acceptance of my terms, sian High Command of this fact, and vious that the Germans were merely and at 0241 hours on 7 May the act they agreed with my suggestion that playing for time so that meanwhile of 'urrender was signed by Jodl on a Red Army officer should be ap- they could evacuate the largest pos- behalf of the German High Com- pointed to join with me in handling sible number of soldiers and civilians mand. My Chief of Staff signed for the surrender in order that a simul- from the Riussian front to behind our me, and General Suslaparov signed taneous capitulation on all fronts lines. They persisted even now in at- for the Soviet High Command. Gen- might be arranged. Maj-Gen. Ivan tempting to surrender the Western eral Savez of the Fpench Army, Suslaparov was accordingly delegated Front separately, going so far as to Deputy Chief of Staff for National to act on behalf of the Soviet High say that, whatever my answer might Defense, signed as witness. The terms Command for -this purpose. be, they intended to order their armies to cease firing upon the Anglo- were to become effective at midnight, time that Doenitz's At the same Americans. They asked for an ad- 8-9 May. was coming to Reims, Fiel'd emissary journment for 48 hours bbfore sign- In addition to the act of military Marshal Kesselring, as Commander- ing the final surrender, allegedly to surrender, Jodl signed an under- in-Chief West, transmitted a message enable them to get the necessary taking that the Chief of the German stating that he desired to send a orders to their outlying units, but High Command, with the Command- to discuss terms of plenipotentiary actually, It was clear, only to gain ers-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and capitulation. He was Informed that further respite for the purpose above Air Force, would appear at a time covered all Ger- unless his surrender mentioned. and place to be designated by the forces facing east as well as man Soviet High Command and myself 4 to those Isolated that unless west, In addition They were Informed for the purpose of executing formal negotiation was out of the agreed to my terms forthwith I elsewhere, %they ratification of the unconditional sur- question. negotiations and would break off all render on behalf of the German High by force Meanwhile Admiral Friedeburg ar- seal my fronf, preventing, Command. This meeting was held in any further westward rived at my Headquarters on the eve- if necessary, Berlin on the night of 9 May, when of German soldiers and ning of 5 May. He began by stating movement Air Chief Marshal Tedder signed in drafted a cable that he wished to clarify a number civilians. They tuen my behalf, and Marshal Zhukov for asking for authority to of points, but was bluntly told that to Doenitz, the Soviet High Command. General make full surrender, but specifying only unconditional surrender was ac- Spaatz of the United States Air would cease 48 ceptable. To this he replied that he that actual fighting Forces and General deLattre de after' signing. Since this solu- had ,no power to sign any document hours Tassigny (representing the French decision as of capitulation. The hopelessness of tion obviously placed the Government) were present as wit- the the German military position was to when fighting should cease in nesses. pointed out to him, and he was shown hands of the Germans, I refused to the act of military surrender whicb accept it; and finally told them that With this final capitulation by the had been drafted. unless all hostilities should terminate German leaders, the mission of the Friedeburg cabled a report of his on both fronts within 48 hours of Allied Expeditionary Force placed midnight that night, my threat to seal interview to the government, and under my supreme command on 14 by Doenitz that Gen- the western front would be carried was Informed February 1944 was accomplished. eral Jodl was on his way to assist in out.

LI S CONCL USION

Ish m pting very briefly to asses winter drew to a close before the factors underlying the Allied we It is difficult even for a professon!I sue- could strike the final cern in this ampaign, I would stress blow. soldier to apprectate the tremendous the importane of three episodes as The tht decisive phase in the power which was achieved on the bat- campaign being the most decisive In insuring consisted of the battles west tlefields and in the skies of western victory. of the Rhine during February and Europe by .the concerted efforts of the Marth. Once again the enemy played Allied nations. 7U rst of these was the battle As stated earlier in into our hands by his insistence upon this report, most of the Normandy beaches. We sailed of the 90 divisions fighting the battle where he stood. which fought for France, possesed of all the tac- in the later phases of In the lowland country between our operations tical information which an efficient the were habitually rein- Rhine and the Meuse, in the forced to intelligence service could provide, Eifel, a strength of 17,000 men and In the Saar, the armies by tank, but we had yet to take the measmure which tank destroyer, and antiair- had beentAtended to defend Germany craft attachments. O the toe we were to pet. We were An idea of their were shattered beyond recovery. shattering embarking upon the largest amphibi- The impact upon the Nazi war potential barrier of the Rhine lay machine comes ens operation in history against a from consideration of practically undefended before us, and the terrific firepower ocastline bristling with all the do- which they repo from that time onward there was no resent, of the mass of t mobdern Ingenuity eould devise, heavier Corps German force In existence capable of and Army artillery which and beatin the beaches lay the Gee- supported halting our forward march. The war them, of the inexhaustible moa ale of the weat which had supply was won before the Rhine was system that sustained not beam trIM hi fn--sa b,,te them, and of crossed. the flexibility with which sdiee the dark days of 1940. their efforts could be applied by means of the effi- Aswe stgged list to gai md Throcghout the struggle, it was cient communications system. For • to bold or footing in NOfmandy, In his logistical inability to maintain his behind the combat units the efforts we learned S. strength and alo the armies In the field 'that the enemy's of 3 millions of other men and wom- weakness ot these armies. We learned fatal weakness lay. Courage his forces en in uniform were devoted to main- b"t tho Gemnan soldier was stil the had In full measure, but courage was taining them in action. We could, in same stubbor fighter whom we had not enough. Reinforcements failed to effect, apply against the enemy on mat in Africa and I Italy, but we arrive, weapons, ammunition, and the Continent a force ) times as en, too, how slender wee the thread food alike ran short, and -the dearth large as the Allied armies which de- Uo which his existenc in France of fuel caused their powers of tactical feated Napoleon on the battlefield at depended. Dwag the months of Jun mobility to dwindle to the vanishing Waterloo. in addition, we had avail- ant July at the difficulties of com- point. In the last stages of the cam- able nearly 11,000 fighter and bomb- munlcatkon and supply which were paign they could do little more than er airplanes whose mobile firepower ultimaely to prove his undoing be- wait for the Allied avalanche to sweep could be applied at virtually any came manifest. k wea the that we over them. point we desired, as I have just de- were enabled to establih ourselves scribed, and whose annihilating e- en the For thi state o iffairs we had, Continent and to build up the fects are evidenced by the wreckage great above all, to be grateful to the work armies necessary to to achieve of a powerful nation's cities, MIdue- the liberatioof of the Allied air forces. Long before nroen . We learned tries, and communications, and by also, at we landed In France, the heavy this time, how inadequate the destruction of the air forces which was the bombers had begun their task of de- enemy's intelligence concern- defended them. To this power wae lng the Allied Intentions. Thanks to stroying the centers of production upon added the striking and strangling his at weakne s and eonsequent laek which the enemy relied, and the fruits of this effort force of two formidable naval fleets of reconnasa , he was comlete y were evident immediately working as one. misled by our diversionary opera- the land campaign began. Following Mention has already been made of tons, holding back until too late the the Invasiom, these strategic the skill and devotion of our service forces In the Pas-de-Calais which, blows at the heart of German Industry forces whose efforts, both in the field had they been rushed across the Seie were continued, and the tak and at home, made an essential con- when first we landed, might well have was also undertaken of cutting the supply lines tribution to our victory. To thema, turned the scale againft us. which linked the factories to the fronts. Meanwhile the and to the civilian workers of factory The second vital battle was that of tactical aireraft, by their Incessant and farm who provided us with un- the Falsise pocket. Here the enemy bombing and strafing of the enemy stinted means, we are forever in- showed that fatal tendency to stand before us In the field, broke his pow- debted. Our enormous material su- and fight when al the logic of war ers of resistance and prepared the periority gave us an unchallengable demanded a strategic withdrawal. BY way for the ground advances which advantage over our foes. While Ger- so doing, he allowed is Seventh struck toward the cenmter many's own war potential erumbled, Army to be encircled of Germany. and ground to Those ,thrusts, that of the Allies rose to heights wn- pieces, and the battle for France wa moreover, were made decided among the Mloody orchards with a rapidity which only the ex- precedented. No army or navy was pedient of airborne supply could sup- ever supported so generously er a and hedgerow of Normandy. As the'* port. The overwhelming Allied su- well. Never, during the entire cam- broken foce fled eastward we periority in the air was infdeed essn paign, were we forced to fight a rm- strained every effort to comp)letethi tial to our victory. it at once under- jor battle withouzt the weaos that overthrow before they could reach mined the basis of the enemy's were needed. the sheter of the Siegfried Line, hut strength and enabled us to prepare the More importan even than tie logistical burden was too great, and execute our own ground oper- weapons, however, was the and we bed (ta salt nSA the naty ations in complet secuct. indomitable fighting apiit of the.am of i

.o 1 96

Allied nations who wielded them. an Allied experiment unprecedented Forces in Southeast Asia, was lost in an airplane accident near Grenoble, The courage and devotion to duty in the history of the world has been France. The war service, the devo- which they exhibited throughout the carried out with decisive results. tion to duty, and the sacrifice of campaign, in the grim days of the In concluding this report it is with these two outstanding men typify the Ardennes counteroffensive as well a& regret that I am unable to record irreplaceable cost of the campaign of the dash across here the details of my personal and in the excitement represented in the lives of thousands France and later the advances into official obligations and gratitude to of officers and enlisted men and mem- midst of Germany, were unsur- those who served so devotedly at the bers of the women's services, of the It was the spirit that had Supreme Headquarters and at the passable. American, British, and French forces. enabled them to withstand the shocks other headquarters which cooperaW of Dunkirk and Pearl Harbor which so loyally and effectively with us. All of them died in the spirit ot brought us at the last to Lilbeck, to Nor can I make adequate recognition that -unity which Joined the Alies in Torgau, and to Berhtesgaden. of the collaboration of those many our common deals. To them, aM to Underlying this invincibility of individuals in civil;.and military posi- those who bear the ounds of battle, s irit was the confidence in Allied tions in Great Britain and the United we, their comrades M arms, render unity and the justice of -the common States with whom my duti4s brought most grateful and humble tribute. cause which permeated all who were me into contact, and whose efforts Under the arrangements made by engaged, directly or indirectly, in the aided in a major degree the accom- the Combined Chiefs of Staff fee the struggle. The comradeship which had plishment of our common task. Yet coutrl of the field forces, General been first exemplified in North Africa I know that all these would have me of the Army GeorgeC. MerhallO carried us to new triumphs in north- pay a final tribute to the memory of as their executive in transaittiU to wqst Europe. Within my own Head- two very senior and gallant officers me their order. and instrithmons. quarters the American and British who started the campaign with as Moreover, under that met Eietm- personnel worked harmoniously to- and who lost their lives before its guished. Secretary of War, Henry L. gether, obliterating all distinction of conclusion. These were Admiral Sir Stlmson, General Marshall wooal- national outlook in their zealous Bertram H. Ramsay of the Royal ways my direct pominlotrativ. sutr- service to a single organization, while Navy, and Air Chief Marshal Sir for in Aty capacity as a commander , in the field of battle the men of the Trafford Leigh-Mallery of the Royal of United States Army fore. To Allied armies fought shoulder to Air Force. At the beginning of the this great soldier-statesman, I ewe a shoulder under my supreme com- operation these officers were respec- particular debt for his friendly eoun- mand. tively my Naval Commander-in-Chief sel and constant support. There we Those civilian volunteers who and my Air Commander-in-Chief. nothing throughout the war .moei shared the rigors and dangers of cam- The fonner lost his life In an airplane ally sustaining as the knowledte tht paign that they might brighten the accident near Versatlle, France, while General Mashall eoneurred In the existence of our men have the assur- still serving in the same capacity. plans I was adopting and the mans ance of our warmest gratitude. \. The latter, relieved from my com- I was taking to put them iz~to effect. The United States of America and nand to take over the Allied Air Great Britain have worked, not merely as allies, but as one nation, pooling their resources of men and material alike, in this struggle against the forces of evil engendered by Hitler's S Commader, Germany. In the Expeditionary Allied Expedtlionary F7orce. Forces which it has been my privilege to lead, both in the Mediterranma Theater and in Northwest Eumpe, 13 Jul 19E.