The 29Th US Infantry Division As a Case Study in Manning And

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2014-01-07 On War Planning: The 29th U.S. Infantry Division as a Case Study in Manning and Training an Army during the Second World War

Benneweis, Douglas Russell

Benneweis, D. R. (2014). On War Planning: The 29th U.S. Infantry Division as a Case Study in Manning and Training an Army during the Second World War (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27201 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/1243 doctoral thesis

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On War Planning: The 29th U.S. Infantry Division as a Case Study in Manning and Training an Army during the

Second World War

Douglas Russell Benneweis

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE

STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

DECEMBER, 2013

PREFACE

The original intention of this dissertation was to conduct a transnational comparison of a Canadian and an American division during the combat phases of the Second World War as a case study for the raising of mass civilian armies. For a time I even considered adding a British division into the mix. However, clearer heads prevailed after a very short meeting with Dr. David Bercuson. Early research for this dissertation indicated the untold story of military history remains the manning and training policies utilized by warring nations. Historians have generally studied combat results and generated inferences about these important subjects without actually conducting the research necessary to fully appreciate and understand their significance. My dissertation eventually evolved into a comparison of these subjects within an American and a Canadian combat division as a result. I began with the 29th U.S. Division because, as a Canadian, I knew much less about the U.S. Army in WWII and wished to finish the more difficult of the two divisions first. 400 pages later I realized a comparison would prove impossible due to time and space constraints. Concentrating solely on the 29th Division as a result, I sought to deconstruct the notion that training, manning, and administering procedures always progress in an upward trajectory and that inherent flaws are inevitably discovered and rectified prior to combat. Moreover, I have always been struck by how little we know about the individual soldiers who fought the great campaigns that capture our imagination so vividly. Soldiers have largely been viewed from a collective standpoint within military history circles. Even John Keegan‘s seminal Face of Battle views infantry warfare collectively.1 Divisions and armies do not fail or succeed on the battlefield; individuals who compose those units fail or succeed. The influence of the individual soldier‘s social background on his training and combat experiences remains virtually ignored within military history circles. Military history and social history are usually viewed disparately, even within academic history departments. Social history conferences seldom contain substantial military components and the social side of military history is too often shunned at military conferences in favour of leadership, grand strategy, operational narratives, and weaponry. Great military leaders admittedly bear a heavy responsibility when planning and administering battles. However, the best laid plans of staff and command officers are useless without a willingness by common soldiers to vacate the comparative safety of a hole in the earth and move towards metal being hurled at them at supersonic speeds. In other words the individual private, section leader and platoon officer determine whether a great leader‘s plan succeeds or fails. The social backgrounds of a representative statistical sample of the 29th Division was therefore generated to afford the regular soldier an individual identity and to provide a better understanding of the relationship between individuals and battle outcomes. Going forward, such a shift of focus from the collective to the individual together with greater study of training, manning, and administering policies will provide a fuller understanding of how individuals affect battle outcomes and, more broadly, warfare in general. This work does not add to the accumulation of study on leadership, strategy, weaponry, combat performance, and battle outcome. It instead focuses on organizational, replacement, and manning policies and the training carried out within the 29th Division prior to the unit‘s initial

1 John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme (New York: Viking Press, 1976.)

i engagement in combat to provide a better understanding of the U.S. Army‘s combat results. Armies that prevail in combat owe their success to more than leadership élan and the weaponry they employ on the battlefield. I often placed heavy emphasis on the small details, though it was never intended as space-filling minutia. A central theme of this dissertation was to illustrate that careful attention to small organizational and policy details during training were fundamental precursors to a unit‘s battlefield successes. My long-term goal going forward is to carry out similar studies for the 3rd Canadian and 3rd British Divisions to complete the transnational comparative work I originally set out to accomplish. Division studies countenance multinational comparisons that hold the potential of reducing ad hominen explanations of battle outcomes. American, British, and Canadian divisions were relatively similar in size and organization during World War II and can thus be examined to discern similarities and differences, regardless of the size of each nation‘s army. Human nature dictates the killing and dying of battle has been and remains the most psychologically captivating fragment of military history despite, in a vast majority of cases, combat comprising only a fraction of a soldier‘s total military service. The time spent organizing and training soldiers to kill and die has been virtually ignored by historians. More nuanced study of the army‘s training and organization remains necessary because it represents a sine qua non to a broader and more complete understanding of the U.S. Army‘s combat performance during World War II. This dissertation examines the 29th Division‘s preparatory phase as a case study to better understand the combat successes and reverses experienced by the United States Army during the Second World War.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to take this opportunity to thank my advisor, Dr. David Bercuson, for his guidance and support during my doctoral process. Thanks also to the members of my committee, Drs. John Ferris, David Marshall, and Gavin Cameron. I wish also to extend a special word of appreciation to Drs. Elizabeth Jameson and John Ferris for their guidance during the SSHRC process and for frequent kind words of support. The encouragement and friendship offered by Dr. Patrick Brennan is greatly appreciated. I could not have written this dissertation without the expert guidance provided by Dr. Tim Nenninger, Chief of Modern Military Records at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland, whom I was extremely fortunate to meet at a Society for Military History Conference in Lisle, Illinois in 2011. Dr. Tom Langford of the University of Calgary‘s Department of Sociology provided insight and greatly appreciated assistance during the composition of this dissertation‘s statistical analysis. I express gratitude to Joseph Balkowski for his generous support and assistance as well as Major Kirk A. Pietsch from the 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department. I also wish to acknowledge and thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, as well as the Department of History and the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary for the funding necessary to complete this study. Finally, this work would not have been possible without the support provided by my wife and family for which I am and will remain eternally grateful. I especially appreciate the time and effort my wife, my parents, and my sister spent editing and proofreading. Any mistakes in this work are entirely the responsibility of the author.

iii

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my wife Alison, to my parents Doug and Sheila, and to each member of the 29th U.S. Division during World War II.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface…………………………………………………………………………………… ii

Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………..... iv

Dedication………………………………………………………………………………. v

Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………...... vi

Glossary of Terms…..…………………………………………………………………… vii

INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………. 1

CHAPTER 1…………………………………………………………………………….. 17

CHAPTER 2…………………………………………………………………………….. 45

CHAPTER 3…………………………………………………………………………….. 106

CHAPTER 4…………………………………………………………………………….. 160

CHAPTER 5…………………………………………………………………………….. 188

CHAPTER 6…………………………………………………………………………….. 224

CHAPTER 7…………………………………………………………………………….. 255

CHAPTER 8…………………………………………………………………………….. 285

CHAPTER 9…………………………………………………………………………….. 313

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………. 351

BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………. 378

APPENDIX NO. 1 ……………………………………………………………………… 389

APPENDIX NO. 2 ……………………………………………………………………… 399

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AEF American Expeditionary Force

AG Adjutant General

AGCT Army General Classification Test

AGF Army Ground Forces

AGO Adjutant General‘s Office

AR Army Regulations

ASF Army Service Forces

ASTP Army Specialized Training Program

AWOL Absent Without Leave

BAR Browning Automatic Rifle

BIRTC Branch Immaterial Replacement Training Center

CCC Civilian Conservation Corps

CRTC Combat Replacement Training Center

EM Enlisted Man

ETO European Theater of Operations

FA Field Artillery

FARTC Field Artillery Replacement Training Center

FDC Fire Direction Center

FFRC Field Force Replacement Command

FFRS Field Force Replacement System

FM Field Manual

FO Forward Observer

FSR Field Service Regulations

GFRC Ground Forces Replacement Command

GHQ General Headquarters

HE High Explosives

HMG Heavy Machine Gun

HQ Headquarters

IRTC Initial Replacement Training Center

LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized

LCT Landing Craft, Tank

LCT(R) Landing Craft, Tank (Rocket)

LCT(SP) Landing Craft, Tank (Self-Propelled Artillery)

LCVP Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel

LMG Light Machine Gun

M-1 Basic semiautomatic rifle issued to ground soldiers

MCLU Manual for Commanders of Large Units

MOS Military Occupational Speciality

MR Mobilization Regulations

MTP Mobilization Training Program

NCO Non-commissioned officer

vii

PRS Personnel Research Section

R&SC Replacement and School Command

RCT Regimental Combat Team

RTC Replacement Training Center

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

SOS Services of Supply

SSN Specification Serial Number

TM Technical Manual

TM Training Memorandum

T/O Tables of Organization

T/O&E Tables of Organization and Equipment

USATC United States Assault Training Center

VD Venereal Disease

VDCO Venereal Disease Control Officer

WD War Department

WDDPNGB War Department Directive and the Plan of the National Guard Bureau

viii

INTRODUCTION

The World War Two version of the American levee en masse produced mixed results when considering casualties incurred against battle achievements. The U.S. Army nevertheless represented a pivotal actor in the defeat of Nazi Germany. This dissertation examines the organization, manning, and training of the 29th Infantry Division during the Second World War.

The 29th Division, one of eighty-nine U.S. Army divisions that engaged in combat during World

War II, will serve as a case study providing a broader understanding of the U.S. Army‘s Second

World War experiences.

A combat division represented the smallest self-contained formation in the U.S. Army, making it an ideal formation for historical scrutiny. The infantry division was the cornerstone of the United States Army in the Second World War and the inherent complexities of raising and preparing a fighting division for combat remain underappreciated. War Department officials utilized a collective organizational configuration and a standardized training program. This enables the examination of one division‘s preparatory phase to provide a reasonably accurate portrayal of organization, manning, and training throughout the United States Army.

The 29th Division was first activated on 25 August 1917 under the command of Major

General Charles G. Morton. The units brought together to form the 29th Division were predominately from the Virginia and Maryland regions. The unit was originally composed of the

115th Regiment (which had been the Maryland ‗Fighting First Regiment‘,) the 116th Regiment

(made up of the 1st, 2nd, 4th, and part of the 5th Virginia Regiments,) the 175th (formerly the

Maryland 5th Regiment,) and the 176th Regiment from Virginia. Their individual histories dated back to colonial times and all four earned distinctive combat records during the Civil War.

Fighting honors were garnered on opposing sides however. Fifty-two years after the end of the

Civil War, army officials hoped the synergistic formation made up of former enemies would provide battle results greater than the sum of the division‘s parts. The division‘s original officers agreed the unit‘s shoulder patch should be half grey and the other half blue to commemorate the uniform colors of the two sides during the Civil War. The Korean symbol of eternal life, the monad, was chosen as the shape of the shoulder patch.1

ILLUSTRATION NO. 1 - Shoulder Patch of the 29th Division

1 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, The 29th Infantry Division Shoulder Patch and Pre-World War II History 2 Author‘s collection.

The ‗Blue and Grey‘ Division sailed directly from the United States to France, with advance units arriving in June, 1918 and the remainder of the division arriving a month later.

The division took up trench positions in the Belfort Gap region of France between the Vosges and Alps mountain ranges on the Swiss border. The area was relatively quiet which gave the men a chance to acclimatize themselves and train for life in the trenches, including gas warfare.3

The unit took up positions near the Meuse River mid-way through September and put in its first attack on 8 October.4 In the subsequent twenty-one days of fighting the division suffered 5,546 casualties while advancing seven kilometers and capturing 2,500 prisoners.5 The division was relieved on 30 October and was on its way back to the front from rest positions when news of the armistice reached the men.6

The 29th Division was deactivated shortly after the end of World War I only to be reactivated four years later as a National Guard division under the National Defense Act of

1920.7 Marylanders and Virginians were joined by Pennsylvanians and soldiers from the District of Columbia during the unit‘s second incarnation.8 The division came together on three occasions during the interwar years, while participating in maneuvers in 1936, 1939, and in upstate New York from 5-23 August 1940.9 The division was called into federal service once again on 3 February 1941 with General Milton A. Reckford in command. Reckford had

3 Raymond C. Cochrane, The 29th Division in the Cotes de Meuse, October 1918 (Army Chemical Center, 1959), 4. 4 American Battlefields Monuments Commission, 29th Division Summary of Operations in the World War (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), 12. 5 Records Group [hereafter, RG] 407, National Archives and Records Administration II [hereafter, NARA II,] Box 7533. Undated memorandum titled, History of the 29th Division. 6 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7533, Undated memorandum titled, History of the 29th Division. 7 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7840, Division History, 1. 8 Ibid., Brief History of the 29th Division, 1. 9 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, Pre-World War II History.

3 commanded the division‘s 115th Regiment during the First World War.10 Despite its humble origins the unit was destined to participate in many of the key battles fought to liberate the continent of Europe, including the iconic landings at Normandy on 6 June 1944. In spite of its relatively late entry into combat, the formation finished the war with 28,776 battle and nonbattle casualties - or 204% of its authorized organizational allotment - the fourth highest divisional total in the U.S. Army during World War II.11

Any historiographical survey of America‘s involvement in the ground campaigns of the

Second World War must begin with the U.S. Army in World War II series. Known more commonly as the ‗Green Books‘ the official histories of the U.S Army represented an enormous undertaking, eventually comprising 79 titles broken into twelve sections. Despite its impressive depth and scope, the series necessarily chronicles the U.S. Army‘s activities in very broad terms only because of the colossal amount of historical data accumulated by army officials during the war years.

Adding to the overall historiography were unit histories published by each of the army‘s eighty-nine combat divisions in the war‘s immediate aftermath. These summaries, often heavy on pictures and short on serious analysis, usually provided little other than a running narrative of a particular unit‘s combat experiences. Joseph P. Ewing‘s, 29 Let’s Go: A History of the 29th

Infantry Division in World War II, published in 1948, stands as an excellent example of the scope and format of postwar division histories.12

10 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, Activation and Training Prior to World War II, 1. 11 Peter Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945. (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1999), 252. 12 Joseph P. Ewing, 29 Let’s Go: A History of the 29th Infantry Division in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1948.)

A growing number of more comprehensive division histories have surfaced in recent decades. Maryland native Joseph Balkoski took an interest in the 29th Division during the 1980s and decided to write about the unit‘s experiences in Normandy. Balkoski published Beyond the

Beachhead: The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy in 1989.13 Four subsequent books detailing the division‘s wartime experiences have since followed. Balkoski will submit his fifth and final book on the division early in 2014. The five-part series focuses primarily on the division‘s combat encounters during the liberation of NW Europe. Other division histories written since the 1980s include John Sloan Brown‘s history of the 88th ‗Draftee Division‘ and

Michael Weaver‘s, Guard Wars: The 28th Infantry Division in World War II.14

The general historiography of the U.S. Army‘s Second World War experiences is at once extensive and incomplete. A variety of subjects such as the army‘s tactical and operational techniques and its overall effectiveness have received an abundance of attention from historians while others remain overlooked. For instance, the consequences of the War Department‘s

Replacement and Personnel Selection Systems to the U.S. Army‘s combat effectiveness remains underappreciated. The evolution and administration of the army‘s Replacement System and its effects on combat divisions during build-up and battle phases represents a critical subject. Army officials commissioned Lt. Colonel Leonard L. Lerwill in the early 1950s to study the nation‘s replacement system from Valley Forge to the conclusion of the Second World War. The

Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States

13 Joseph Balkoski, Beyond the Beachhead: The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1989.) 14 John Sloan Brown, Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986,) and Michael Weaver, Guard Wars: The 28th Infantry Division in World War II (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.)

Army was subsequently released in 1954.15 Lerwill necessarily utilized a top-down, shallow approach to a subject encompassing centuries of warfare and was therefore unable to devote specific attention to the Replacement System in World War II and its effects on individual units and individual soldiers. Few subsequent examinations even mention the army‘s replacement system and only in passing when it is.

The U.S. Army‘s Personnel Selection apparatus represents another subject virtually ignored by historians despite the system‘s shortcomings bearing tremendous consequences for army divisions during training and combat. Eli Ginzberg, James K. Anderson, Sol W. Ginsburg,

M.D., and John L. Herma concluded a three volume series during the late 1950s chronicling the Personnel

Selection System‘s growth and eventual shortcoming.16 Though the work was extensive, it did not include the consequences the misguided organization had on individual divisions and remains incomplete as a result. The subject of personnel selection within national formations requires comprehensive study going forward, not just in the U.S. Army but in the Canadian and British Armies as well.

U.S. Army training also requires a significant infusion of scholarly interest. Robert R.

Palmer, Bell I Wiley, and William R. Keast completed The Procurement and Training of Ground

Combat Troops shortly after the war ended.17 Part of the United States Army in World War II series, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops represented a seminal work in

15 Lt. Colonel Leonard L. Lerwill, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1954), 225-226 16 Eli Ginzberg, James K. Anderson, Sol W. Ginsburg, M.D., and John L. Herma, The Ineffective Soldier, Lessons for Management and the Nation, Vol. 1, The Lost Divisions, Vol. 2, Breakdown and Recovery, and Vol. 3, Patterns of Performance. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.) 17 Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast. United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops. (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948.)

6 the U.S. Army‘s historiography. However, contributors were forced to utilize a top-down conceptual approach in their work due to the complexity and exhaustive nature of the subject.

A comprehensive analysis of combat preparations from a divisional perspective affords a broader perspective on the U.S. Army‘s subsequent combat performance. No other factor affected a soldier‘s performance in battle more than the training he received prior to combat.

Historians generally characterize World War II training as having been standardized army wide though it most certainly was not.18 Some inductees were trained in Replacement Training

Centers while others were assigned directly from induction stations to an infantry division.

There they were taught the art of soldiering by the division‘s training cadres, each having their own idea of how training should be conducted.

The U.S. Army‘s tactical and operational battlefield performance on the other hand has received an abundance of scholarly interest. The historical opinion generated from this study can be separated into one of two distinct factions. Emerging shortly after the war and remaining unchecked into the 1980s, the first group supposed the U.S. Army bludgeoned a tactically superior German Army into defeat through a combination of brute force and overwhelming numerical advantages in manpower and equipment.

S.L.A. Marshall and Trevor N. Dupuy, for example, accumulated and cited statistics to prove their contention that the German Army was tactically and operationally superior to the

U.S. Army.19 Russell Weigley argued the U.S. Army‘s organization and doctrine focused too comprehensively on mobile operations as a result of its frontier legacy and was unsuited to the

18 See for example, Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, 5. 19 S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (New York: Quill Publishing, 1947) and Trevor N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions, and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill Press, 1979.)

Second World War battlefield as a result. Weigley concluded the army lacked the sustained punching power to conduct attrition warfare when opportunities for lightning movements proved infrequent and was therefore forced to rely on brute force to achieve victory.20 Martin van

Creveld surmised the U.S. Army consciously decided on this reliance early in the war and subsequently ignored the basic needs of the common soldier as a result. van Creveld also argued the army‘s focus on centralization during training and combat stifled individual initiative on the battlefield.21 Three noted British military historians arrived at similar conclusions regarding the performance of British and Canadian Armies in NW Europe, adding a seemingly insurmountable degree of credence to the theory that brute force and numerical advantages provided Allied forces with the keys to victory.22

A revisionary narrative surfacing during the 1980s rejected the brute force philosophy and countered that the U.S. Army displayed a combat flexibility that allowed it to adopt innovative, campaign-winning doctrines and tactics. John Sloan Brown first countered the brute force theory in Draftee Division and eventually arrived at the conclusion that the German Army was in no way tactically superior to its American counterpart.23 In Closing with the Enemy: How

GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945, Michael D. Doubler argued the U.S. Army experienced a steep learning curve in battle which allowed its divisions to become, ―more

20 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944- 1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981.) 21 Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Wesport: Greenwood Press, 1982.) 22 Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day, June 6, 1944 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), and John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (New York: Viking Press, 1990.) 23 See, Brown, Draftee Division.

8 effective instruments of national policy than is generally believed.‖24 Doubler concluded the arguments of Weigley, Marshall and the remainder of the brute force faction were incomplete and that with experience U.S. Army divisions became capable of closing with and destroying the enemy largely through organic means and not by having to rely on air and artillery assets as heavily as previously thought.

Peter R. Mansoor took the assertion of previous generations of military historians underappreciating the U.S. Army‘s combat effectiveness to new heights. Mansoor concluded in his seminal work, GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-

1945, that the vast majority of U.S. Army infantry divisions, ―developed into superb fighting organizations,‖ as a result of their being able to, ―adapt to changing conditions on battlefields across the globe, (their) use of intelligence, outstanding fire support, the ability to execute joint operations, and, most important, (their) endurance.‖25 Mansoor went so far as to label historians espousing the brute force theory as ‗revisionary.‘26

Whether they belonged to the brute force or innovative faction, no military historian has seriously considered the training, manning, and organizational policies utilized by the U.S. Army prior to combat. The subjects of personnel selection, training, and filler and loss replacement policies remain virtually untouched since the war‘s conclusion despite each representing a fundamental determinant of battlefield success or failure. This dissertation concentrates solely on the 29th Division‘s preparations for battle, focusing on training, manning, and organizational procedures conducted within the unit prior to 6 June 1944 at the expense of additional analysis of combat outcomes.

24 Michael Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994.) 25 Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, 4, 15. 26 Ibid., 5, 10, 13.

Chapter One utilizes a statistical study to analyze the social backgrounds of the soldiers composing the 29th Division. The empirical research and critical analysis was undertaken to grant the individual soldier an identity, to determine if he reflected the society from which he was drawn, to determine how a soldier‘s pre-service social background affected his wartime service, and to draw fuller conclusions about the nature and outcome of battle in the twentieth century.

Social research on military formations is not new. Sociologist Morris Janowitz broke new ground in 1960 by observing military formations as social institutions in The Professional

Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait.27 Historians Omer Bartov and Roger Reese followed with respective social investigations of the German and Soviet armies during World War II.28

None of these studies included any degree of statistical research like that conducted in Chapter

One, though the universal intent remains constant and that is to humanize an otherwise impersonal historical subject.

Detailed social statistics were compiled for a statistically significant sample of ordinary

29th Division soldiers. Personnel records were utilized to compare education, employment, marital status, age, rural/urban splits, and height/weight statistics for a statistically significant sample of the division and the relationship of these social influences on battlefield conduct.

Statistical data was gathered from the personnel files of individual soldiers housed in Record

Group 64, National Archives and Record Administration (NARA). Hard copies containing the

27 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960). 28 See, Roger Reese, Red Commanders: A Social History of the Soviet Army Officers Corps, 1918-1991 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), Roger Reese, Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the Red Army, 1925-1941 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), Roger Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Military Effectiveness in World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011) and Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

10 personnel information of approximately nine million American men and women who served during the Second World War are housed in St Louis, Missouri and are also available online.

There are no access restrictions to the personal information, though a lack of unit identification and frequent name duplication were obstacles to locating serving members of the 29th Division.

29th Division casualty lists containing names, serial numbers, and unit substantiations were utilized to verify statistical accuracy. The lists, located at National Archives II at College

Park, Maryland, were cross-referenced with serial numbers found on RG 64 personnel records to ensure that each soldier in the sample belonged to the 29th Division during training or combat in

Normandy. An arbitrary list of given names and surnames were applied to the 29th Division casualty catalogue to generate a random sample catalogue. Care was taken to select an equal number of infantrymen from each infantry regiment of the division.

294 American personnel files were randomly chosen from the 29th Division population.

A standard triangulated American division in the Second World War contained 14,253 men.

Thus, the American sample size provides a margin of error of 4.82%.

P=294 N = 14253 294*(1-294) = - 86142 -86142/14253 = - 6.0437802 Square root of 6.0437802 = 2.45841 2.45841*1.96 = 4.818

Applicable files were located, printed and tabulated in excel spreadsheets. A statistician was hired to ensure that social statistics gathered were processed accurately and reliably. The raw data was coded and entered into Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software.

Personnel from the various branches of service found in an American infantry division were contrasted. The significant proportion of replacements, for instance, reveals the importance of personnel selection and reinforcements systems to the U.S. Army‘s battlefield product.

Statistical analysis conducted on the 29th provided numeric and descriptive variables.

Numeric variables can be ranked and in this social experiment include age, education and height and weight comparisons. Independent sample t-tests were carried out for each variable. 2-tailed t-tests provide a comparison of means, and indicate if a significant difference existed between the means. In this experiment, 2-tailed t-tests were utilized to determine if the average value of y was significantly different in one division compared to the other or within branches of service in a single division.29 An arbitrary risk level known as the alpha level was set at .05. In such cases, a statistically significant difference would be found five times out of a hundred even if one was not in evidence.30

Descriptive variables, on the other hand, cannot be ranked and provide proportions rather than means. In this study, urban vs. rural, original vs. replacements, and married vs. single ratios were calculated. Cross tabulations were run to determine whether differences were significant through the utilization of Pearson‘s chi-squared tests. Pearson‘s test allows for an estimate of overall differences, though in this case the proportions themselves were of primary interest.

It was also necessary to calculate effect sizes in statistical experiments to determine whether the sample size was sufficiently large to provide reliable results. If it was not, the perceived results of an experiment may be due simply to chance or coincidence and not representative of the sample or a significant determination may be missed completely. In this experiment, Cohen‘s D was utilized to demonstrate whether the sample size was insufficient to detect potential differences that may have existed in the populations.

29 Peter J. Diggle and Amanda G. Chetwynd, Statistics and Scientific Method (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 112. 30 David C. Howell. Fundamental Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, 5th ed. (Belmont: Brooks/Cole – Thomson Learning, 2004), 151-152.

The Second World War coincided with an increased societal acceptance of social scientists in the United States. Chapter Two evaluates the development and implementation of the U.S. Army‘s Personnel Selection System during World War II and the role social scientists bore in this process. American leaders became convinced early in the war that a highly-scientific classification process producing an army of specialists would prevent a repetition of the widespread carnage and slaughter witnessed a generation earlier on the Western Front. The unfortunate result was a complicated, redundant, and often harmful induction and classification process that produced manpower shortages in the U.S. Army, especially in infantry formations.

Chapter Two‘s ultimate finding was that the U.S. Army‘s Personnel Selection System was responsible for manpower shortages to a much greater extent than its Replacement System.

Chapter Three assesses the aforementioned Personnel Replacement System and its effects on formations such as the 29th Division. In rehabilitating the replacement organization, Chapter

Three recounts the genesis and dramatic growth of a complicated, multi-echeloned administrative system following months of earnest War Department deliberations. Leaders pondered the benefits and detriments of feeding replacements into understrength units individually or in groups while remaining committed to a solution that avoided a repeat of the policy errors perpetrated during the First World War. The Replacement System proved as important to the U.S. Army during its build-up and training phases as it did during combat. It was forced to cope with tangential War Department organizational decisions and its reputation often suffered as a result. The ultimate arrangement was a complicated world-wide

Replacement System that performed admirably. For all the criticism the system has generated since the end of World War II there have been few serious suggestions how it could have been better structured and operated.

Chapter Four begins the study of training carried out by the 29th Division and the U.S.

Army as a whole during World War II. The means by which a national doctrine was decided upon and disseminated are considered along with the eventual organization the 29th Division carried into battle, a radical departure from the one the unit possessed when mobilized. A progressive and institutionalized training scheme was instituted shortly after the division‘s mobilization on 3 February 1941. A great deal of the division‘s early training focused on preparing pre-war guardsmen to train raw selectees assigned to the unit directly from Selective

Service Induction stations. Mobilization Training Programs served as a guiding light for the majority of these preparations. The division embarked on a series of large-scale maneuvers in the Carolinas during the fall of 1941 after progressing through individual, small unit, and large unit training. War Department officials ordered a return to the basics after the maneuver‘s dismal results. The 29th Division spent the intervening months between the end of the maneuvers and the attack on Pearl Harbor reviewing the results of the war games and instituting remedial training measures.

The 29th Division was considered an ‗old division‘ by War Department officials. ‗New divisions‘ were those mobilized after the standup of the Army Ground Forces (AGF) in March,

1942. Mobilization, manning, and training procedures differed substantially between ‗old‘ and

‗new‘ divisions. Chapter Five analyzes the comparative quality of inductee training afforded by

National Guard, Regular Army, and draftee divisions and by Replacement Training Centers.

The complicated nature of a World War II infantry division and the roles of command and staff personnel within the 29th Division are also scrutinized in Chapter Five, as are the division‘s triangularization process and its training routine after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Chapter Six investigates the ten month timeframe between the division‘s arrival in Great

Britain and the beginning of serious amphibious assault training in August, 1943. 29th Division members underwent basic refresher training after an acclimatization period specially designed to allow the men to become accustomed to their new surroundings. When begun in earnest the scope and intensity of military training progressed rapidly. Complicated division-wide preparations went far beyond readying infantry formations for ground combat. Training eventually became decentralized within the division, yet remained institutionalized army wide through a mandatory standardization policy. Replacements were continually woven into the division‘s fabric during the timeframe.

Chapter Seven reveals the surprising degree of interaction between British and American formations during training in Great Britain. Exchange programs were instituted and soldiers from both nations learned more about their coalition partners‘ training methods, tactical philosophies and organizational foundations. American soldiers attended British specialist schools in large numbers. The rise and fall of American specialist schools in Great Britain along with the worthiness of battle inoculation and rote drill are examined. Chapter Seven concluded with an examination of the efforts to build discipline, morale, obedience, and sustainable power arrangements within the 29th Division.

The 29th Division‘s training regimen was suddenly and irrevocably altered once the unit received word it had been chosen to take part in the cross-channel invasion. Chapters Eight and

Nine analyze the division‘s amphibious training program in the scant nine months between this notification and the unit‘s embarkation for France. Non-amphibious training continued within the division but at an abated intensity. Four phases of intensive assault training culminating in a live fire large-scale mock amphibious assault were conducted at two specially designed

15 amphibious training centers. It was a hectic time within the division. Manpower deficiencies, especially shortages in riflemen, continued to plague the unit into 1944. Replacements requiring administration, adsorption, and upgrader training continued to arrive. Some were barely trained at all. The composition and size of basic fighting units were altered specifically for the assault.

Serious amphibious training concluded in March. The 29th Division‘s die had been cast.

Combat alone would act as the final arbiter of the unit‘s combat preparations and organizational structure.

CHAPTER ONE THE 29th DIVISION’S EVOLVING SOCIAL COMPOSITION

The fact that much of our relationship with violence and war is determined by our social character suggests that to understand warfare and violence we need to understand the social……(W)ithout comprehensive sociological analysis there cannot be a proper explanation of violence and war.1

The 29th Division entered the bloodbath of Omaha Beach on the morning of 6 June 1944 as one part of a larger civilian army. Facing long odds, the division‘s initial waves were able to defeat a well-equipped and well-entrenched enemy on D-Day. The division also prevailed in the tough hedgerow fighting that followed and, indeed, for the rest of the war in Northwest Europe.

There are many factors that can account for the transformation of the 29th Division from a green

National Guard formation in early 1941 to its selection as an assault division in the greatest amphibious landing in history. One of the most important questions, surely, is who the men were that made up the 29th Division in the first place and how they and their unit changed in the forty month interval between mobilization and that fateful morning of 6 June 1944.

The average age within an army undoubtedly affected its ability to endure and prevail in sustained combat. The average age of a 29th Division soldier in 1944 was 26.0.2 Though it may have been slightly higher than expected, from the perspective of soldiering the 26 year-old average represented a perfect blend of maturity and life experience on one hand and youthful exuberance and feelings of invincibility on the other. The division was composed of an eclectic mixture of young and old, as men in their thirties and forties routinely fought alongside teenagers. The oldest serving infantryman was 40, while a 42 year-old engineer from the 121st

Battalion represented the oldest soldier in the division. The youngest serving members of the

1 Siniša Malešević, The Sociology of War and Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3. 2 The statistical information utilized in this chapter was derived from personal study of the 29th Division unless otherwise noted.

17 division were 19 year olds. The average age of replacements and original guardsmen were both

26.0, meaning the division did not grow younger or older during its forty month evolutionary phase.

The average age of an infantry soldier in the 29th Division was 25.9. The mean ages within the 115th and 175th Regiments both exceeded 26 years. The men of the 116th Regiment were significantly younger, however, averaging 24.6. This may explain why the 116th was chosen over the other two regiments to spearhead the invasion. Support units of the 29th

Division averaged slightly over 26 years of age. Engineers had the highest average (26.9), followed by artillerymen and support troops (26.2), and finally armored personnel (25.7). With the exception of the 116th Regiment, average ages in the 29th Division were remarkably similar and the differences were not statistically significant.

The division and assistant division commanders were both 49 years old during the campaign in Normandy.3 The average age of the eight 29th Division Regular Army regimental commanders was surprisingly high at 47.3, with three being substantially older than the division commander. The statistical age outliers for regimental commanders were 53 and 43. One of the two commanders aged 43 broke quickly under the stresses of combat, however, and the two oldest served admirably until one was wounded and the other was taken prisoner, which suggests youth may not have been a prerequisite for success at the regimental command position. The average age of a random sample of six 29th Division battalion commanders was 31.3. The 16 year age difference between battalion and regimental commanders indicated either War

3 Unless otherwise indicated, information hereafter pertaining to 29th Division officers located in, War Department Adjutant General‘s publication, Official Army Register (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1 January 1944).

Department officials believed the role of battalion commander required younger officers or they were dreadfully short of more suitably aged candidates.

A conscript army‘s training and combat effectiveness is also influenced by the occupational backgrounds of its soldiers. Employment experience facilitated maturity, knowledge, and the ability to adapt to changing situations. A soldier‘s pre-service employment history also influenced his views towards hierarchical institutions and his willingness to follow orders.

The United States was just coming out of the Great Depression in 1941. Nevertheless,

80.7% of 29th Division soldiers reported themselves gainfully employed prior to their induction.

The split between originals and replacements illustrated significant differences. 89.1% of guardsmen were employed on 3 February 1941 compared to only 78.8% of post-mobilization inductees, meaning the division came to have fewer employed soldiers as it evolved.

War Department officials assigned numerical codes to the 576 total occupations listed in the personnel records contained in RG 64. Farming (9.2%) was the most common occupation listed in the 29th Division sample followed by; taxi driver/chauffeur (7.14%), steel industry/manufacturing (3.7%), textile production (3.4%), musician/acting (2.7%), mechanic

(2.4%), clerk, welding, mining and carpentry (1.7%), table waiting, architecture, baking, and police/fireman (.7) and a judge and a teacher (.3%).

Sample results reinforced existing narratives of the United States as a manufacturing nation. The occupational fields of forestry, mining, and fisheries represented just 2.4% of the

American workforce compared to slightly greater than 19.0% in manufacturing jobs. Soldiers with pre-service trade and finance occupations were virtually nonexistent in the division, despite occupying a substantial proportion of the American workforce. Agriculture and government

19 were marginally underrepresented in the division compared to American society, while professional services (teachers, fireman, police, electricians, etc.) and the unemployed/student category were significantly overrepresented. Even with these exceptions, the division still represented a fair approximation of the American society from which it was drawn.

CHART NO. 1 - Civilian Workforce vs. 29th Division Representation

United States Workforce 29th Division Sample 4

4 29th Division sample results compared to occupational statistics located in, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part1, Series D 152-166, Industrial Workers of Gainful Workers: 1820-1940, 138.

The 29th Division was composed primarily of replacements by 1944 as sample results indicated 82.7% of the unit‘s fighting strength in Normandy was replacements. An even larger percentage of the infantry, 85.2%, joined the division in the years between mobilization and combat. The 116th Regiment contained the greatest number of originals, 21.3%, and the 175th the fewest, 3.3%. The differences in percentages of replacement between the infantry units of 29th

Division were significant. Non-infantry units in the 29th Divisions were predominately composed of replacements as well, though to a lesser extent. Artillery units at 32.4% had the highest number of originals followed by engineer battalions at 20%. 76.1% of all support units in the 29th Division were comprised of replacements. The 9% variance in replacement/original composition between support troops and infantry in the U.S. Division represented a statistically significant difference.

The 29th Division was never stripped of manpower to serve as cadres for new divisions, either because there was no need or because War Department officials bypassed the unit out of qualitative concerns. Nevertheless, few of the original pre-war National Guardsmen remained with the unit in June, 1944. Sample results therefore illustrate the vital importance of the army‘s reinforcement system as a manning device during its buildup and training phases. The high percentage of replacements in the 29th Division was a result of personnel selection decisions made by War Department officials. Social engineering and unscientific intuitive methods were used to cull perceived weak links from the crop of inductees and existing army manpower. The sample illustrated officials tinkered to a greater extent with the personnel composition of units where circumstance allowed them to do so, specifically with infantry units. Greater restraint was shown in technically sophisticated support units like artillery and engineer battalions where the production of replacements was comparatively more difficult. The validity of the entire process

21 was doubtful as a result its selective nature. Regardless, the flood of rejections and separations that ensued was a primary determinant of the manpower shortages that plagued the U.S. Army throughout World War II.5

The 29th Division was primarily composed of guardsmen from Virginia, Maryland,

Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia when it was called to federal service in February,

1941. Dwindling manpower reserves eventually precluded territorial reinforcement of American divisions during WWII, however, and the 29th Division became increasingly diverse. An inevitable result of this war exigency was an increase in the geographical heterogeneousness of

American army units. Indeed, the 29th Division‘s statistical sample found representation from 38 of the nation‘s 48 states.

TABLE NO. 1: 29th Division Sample Composition by State

State Frequency Valid Percent

Pennsylvania 53 18.2 Virginia 36 12.3 Maryland 35 12.1 New York 27 9.2 New Jersey 18 6.2 Ohio 18 6.2 Massachusetts 14 4.8 California 13 4.5 Texas 7 2.5 North Carolina 6 2.1 Washington 4 1.4 Illinois 4 1.4 Connecticut 4 1.4

5 Separation represented the accepted technical term for an individual removed from the army after having spent a significant period as a soldier. See for examples, RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Army Ground Forces: Study No. 7, 1, and RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Army Classification Methods, 7. See Chapter Two for a broader discussion of the issue of personnel selection in the U.S. Army during World War II.

Alabama 4 1.4 Kentucky 4 1.4 Tennessee 3 1.0 Iowa 3 1.0 Michigan 3 1.0 Indiana 3 1.0 Oklahoma 3 1.0 Georgia 3 1.0 Missouri 3 1.0 Rhode Island 3 1.0 Oregon 2 0.7 Vermont 2 0.7 District of Columbia 2 0.7 West Virginia 2 0.7 Florida 2 0.7 Montana 2 0.7 New Hampshire 1 0.3 South Carolina 1 0.3 Mississippi 1 0.3 Louisiana 1 0.3 Delaware 1 0.3 Colorado 1 0.3 Wisconsin 1 0.3 Arizona 1 0.3 Minnesota 1 0.3

Despite its pluralistic nature, eight states (Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, New York,

New Jersey, Ohio, Massachusetts and California) supplied nearly three-quarters of the division‘s strength. Soldiers from Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland accounted for 42.5% of the unit‘s composition in Normandy. 52.4% of the sampled men in the 115th Regiment were from

Pennsylvania, Virginia, or Maryland followed by the 116th at 45.9%. The 175th was the most diverse unit with only 27.9% of its members from the three principal states. Together, support troops from the three states totaled 40.7%. The percentages varied widely when divided into

23 branches – engineers (33%), armor (50%), and all other support troops combined (17.8%) were at or below 50%, while 70.6% of artillery units were composed of men from the three states.

Education represented another social factor that defined military culture within the U.S.

Army and influenced its battlefield product. The type and duration of education a soldier received prior to military service shaped his belief system and in large part determined how he learned during training and how he adapted and performed in combat. Moreover, education often governed a soldier‘s assigned role within the army as a result of War Department manning policies being defined largely by educational standards. Until Normandy, War Department officials overwhelmingly believed technological and mobile warfare would replace the stalemate and wholesale slaughter of the First World War and that highly-educated combat technicians were required to prevail under such conditions.6

Part of the rationale for American leaders building a technology-based army may have been to placate soldiers desiring technical training for their post-war careers. Job opportunities in new industrial trades and a sharp rise in vocational training in schools across the country during the interwar years led American soldiers to express a desire for technical training during their service.7 Many inductees expressed great displeasure after learning they had been assigned

6 See for example, James H. Capshew. Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in American, 1929-1969. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-143 but especially 1-3, and Melton, ―Military Psychology in the United States of America,‖ 740, 746, and Ginzberg, Anderson, Ginsburg, M.D., and Herma, The Ineffective Soldier, Lessons for Management and the Nation: The Lost Divisions, 32, and RG 337, NARA II, Box 248, General Correspondence, 1942-1948, Confidential Planning Survey prepared by the Research Division of the Special Service Branch, 2-3. 7 In 1940, 2.3 million American were enrolled in federally aided vocational programs. .S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part1, Series H 572-586. Vocational Programs, Federally Aided: 1918 to 1970, 378.

24 as riflemen.8 An internal AGF memo based on a poll of American replacements conducted in

1942 noted, ―(t)he dislike for infantry training is due perhaps to the higher education of the present soldier, who desires to be trained as a specialist along lines that will continue to benefit him after the war is over. It appears that it will be necessary to impress upon the mind of the infantry soldier a greater importance of his duties and the fact that mechanized and air units may take ground but that occupation is necessary to hold and win campaigns.‖9 War Department officials were unable to temper their own desire for a technologically advanced army and the unintended consequence of their well-meaning conviction was crippling infantry shortages that dogged the U.S. Army for the remainder of war. 10

The decision to fashion a technologically-based army forced the War Department to determine how to do so. Officials struggled to distinguish, for example, the fighting ability of a soldier possessing a Grade 12 education from a soldier with a grammar school education or how a high school graduate compared to a second year university student. Another question vexing

War Department officials was predetermining the most suitable occupational roles for soldiers with very different educational backgrounds.

8 Instead of using the term military occupational specialty, the U.S. Army often used the term job assignment. In a poll conducted on three infantry divisions, as high as 60% of respondents were unhappy with their classification. A foreknowledge of the relatively short life expectancy of an infantry soldier may have also influenced the degree of displeasure. Generally the higher the soldier‘s pre-induction education, the greater the dissatisfaction. The same report contained a poll asking soldiers how they spent their leisure time. See chart labeled , ―Percentage ‗Maladjusted‘ Out of the total Number of Enlisted Men at each education Level,‖ found in, RG 337, NARA II, Box 248, General Correspondence, 1942-1948, Confidential Planning Survey prepared by the Research Division of the Special Service Branch. 9 RG 337, NARA II, Box 248, General Correspondence, 1942-1948, HQ, AGF Memo Slip, First General Report of Planning Survey. Confidential Planning Survey prepared by the Research Division of the Special Service Branch, February 5, 1942. In the same report, it was revealed that after a year of training, less than 50% of the infantry felt confident with their training if the division were to soon enter actual combat. 10 See Chapter Two on the War Department‘s Personnel Selection Program for a broader discussion of this issue.

Social scientists and increasing numbers of military leaders came to believe recruits could be employed in roles best suited for their unique qualifications and personal talents through psychological testing during the induction process.11 Moreover, psychologists assured military and government leaders of their ability to cull from the induction stream recruits likely to break down under the stresses of combat.12 This appealed to military leaders looking to avoid the wasted time training a soldier destined to crack under the pressure of combat and to government officials eager to avoid a repeat of burdensome pension payments to ‗shell shocked‘ veterans of the First World War.13 Based largely on the results of psychological classification tests utilized during the induction process, historians have generally concluded the army received the bottom rung of available American manpower during World War II, with the infantry obtaining the intellectually weakest of that group.14

The 29th Division sample nevertheless revealed remarkably comparable education levels throughout the unit. Chart No. 2 illustrates the differences in education levels between infantry and support troops were not statistically significant. The division-wide education average in the

29th Division units for soldiers without any college or university was Grade 10.0. The overall average within 29th Division infantry units was 9.9. The 175th Regiment at 10.0 possessed the

11 Robert R. Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ in The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, eds. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast (Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, 2003), 4. 12 For a summary of the debate, see Ginzberg, Anderson, Ginsburg, M.D., and Herma, Patterns of Performance, 36. 13 See for example, Paul Wanke, ―American Military Psychiatry and Its Role Among Ground Forces in World War II,‖ The Journal of Military History 63, no. 1 (January, 1999): 130 and Colonel William S. Stone, ―Measuring Men for Useful Assignment,‖ in The Selection of Military Manpower: A Symposium, eds. Leonard Carmichael and Leonard C. Mead (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences – National Resource Council, 1951), 79, 80. 14 See for example, John Sloan Brown, Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 14-15, Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 18, and Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe,41- 42.

26 highest average grade attainment within infantry units, trailed by the 115th and 116th Regiments both averaging 9.8. 29th Division support troops averaged slightly higher at 10.1, with the artillery mean being the greatest at 10.4. The division‘s continued evolution did not feature significant changes in education attainment. Both prewar guardsmen and post-mobilization inductees averaged a grade ten education, though 9.5% of replacements had attended some form of post-high school education prior to their induction compared to only 2.2% of originals.

CHART NO. 2 - Education comparisons in 29th Division

100%

90%

80%

70% University or 60% College

50% High School Graduates 40% High School 30%

20% Grammar School 10%

0% 115th 116th 175th Armoured Support

Significant differences in average educational levels existed between soldiers of the 29th

Division and the general white male population in the United States. For example, only 33.7% of 29th Division soldiers were High School graduates compared to 49% of white males. 8.2% of

29th Division soldiers had attended university prior to military service compared to 11% of white males in 1940. Conversely, the 29th Division possessed fewer soldiers that quit school with a

Grade 8 or less education (28.9%) compared to white males nationwide (59.7%). A measure of average median school years attended for those without secondary schooling actually illustrated

27 that 29th Division soldiers (10.0) were educated longer than the average white American male

(8.4,) despite possessing fewer High School graduates.15

American G.I.s were indeed very well educated. A statistical survey conducted on the 3rd

Canadian Infantry Division during World War II indicated a significantly higher average grade attainment (10.0 compared to 8.8) in the U.S. Army compared to its Canadian counterpart.16 The sample illustrated that American recruits possessed a higher average pre-service education level than the non-commissioned officer in charge of their training. Recruits with graduate degrees receiving instructions during training and orders in combat from NCOs with a grammar school education would have been commonplace. The dynamics of such a scenario must have proved awkward.

The average American soldier from World War II was also much better educated than his

First World War counterpart. A 1942 survey of American replacements concluded four in ten recruits were high school graduates, nearly one in nine had attended college, and only one in three stopped with a grade school education.17 Conversely, only one in twelve First World War veterans had a High School diploma, one in twenty-one attended college and 80% stopped with a grammar school education.18 While, ―(e)veryone (wa)s aware of a rise in educational levels of the American Nation in the past generation,‖ sample creators noted that, ―perhaps not everyone

15 29th Division sample results against census data found in, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part1, Series H 602-617. Years of School Completed, by Race and Sex: 1940 to 1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 380. 16 The statistical survey of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division represented a parallel study to the one conducted on the 29th Division for this dissertation. 17 RG 337, NARA II, Box 248, Confidential Planning Survey prepared by the Research Division of the Special Service Branch, February 5, 1942. The impetus of the study was the Psychological Advisory Committee to the Special Study Group, G-2, General Headquarters, United States Army, White soldiers only were polled. 18 Ibid.

28 kn(ew) how enormous this change ha(d) been.‖ Calling it, ―one of the most rapid social changes in American history,‖ the study points out that nearly as many American youth were attending college in 1940 as had been enrolled in high school in 1916.19 Sample architects expressed surprise that selectees were not, in fact, even better educated than they were. Results illustrated that draftees were less educated than similarly aged white males from the general population, which went against reason given that, ―the better educated who marry late(r) and have few(er) children (were) less likely to be deferred for dependency.20 One logical explanation to the anomaly was that a significant percentage of high intelligence American males found a means of avoiding military service.

Chart No. 3 illustrates the degree to which World War II American soldiers were better educated than the First World War generation. 1940 census results indicate 79.3% of Americans aged 14-17 attended school regularly, as did 28.9% of 18 year olds. 49% of Americans graduated High School at that time compared to only 14.5% in 1917.21 The illiteracy rate amongst Americans was 6% in 1920 and had dropped to 3% by 1940.22 Census and the 29th

Division survey results indicating high literacy rates and general education levels in the United

States contradict persistent overseas complaints of low average intelligence levels amongst

19 Ibid. 1.7 million American attended High School in 1916 while 1.5 million were enrolled in Colleges in 1940. 20 Ibid. In this case, the sample was limited to white males between the ages of 21 and 27. 43% of selectees were High School graduates or College students compared to 44% of the general population. 21 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part1, Series H 598-601 High School Graduates, by Sex: 1870 to 1970, 379. 22 Ibid., Series H 664-668. Percent Illiterate in the Population, by race and Nativity: 1870 to 1969, 382.

replacements arriving from the Zone of the Interior.23 Moreover, a 1943 study of U.S. Army

replacements demonstrating consistently higher average intelligence test scores for infantry

soldiers over armor and artillery replacements raises further doubt about the accuracy of

psychological testing.24

CHART NO. 3 – Education Comparison of American Soldiers from the Two World Wars25

100%

90%

80%

70%

60% University or College 50% High School Graduate 40% High School Non-Graduates 30% Grammar School 20%

10%

0% World War I World War II

War Department officials prudently based command appointments on merit given the

grave responsibilities such ranks held. The frequent result, however, was Regular Army officers

in command of National Guard divisions. Guard officers and historians have lamented the

existence of a ‗West Point Protection Association‘ that ensured Regular Army officers generally

23 No examples were found in the 29th Division archives of complaints against replacement quality or intelligence. For army-wide examples see, Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 1-14. 24 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1, General Correspondence Years of Education and A.G.C.T. Score of Enlisted Replacements Now in Depot by Arm. 25 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3846, War Department, What the Soldier Thinks (Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1944), The Educated Soldier, Educational Background of Selectees in Two Wars, 7.

30 received plum appointments.26 However, the relative level of military education and experience predominately favoring Regular Army officers over their National Guard counterparts left War

Department officials little choice but to appoint the most qualified officers.

War Department officials nevertheless placed a great deal of trust in the 29th Division‘s part-time officer corps and allowed the cream of the guard officer crop to rise to the top during training and combat. Two guard officers went on to serve as regimental commanders in

Normandy. Six of nine infantry battalion commanders in the 29th Division, all five assistant chiefs of staff, the Adjutant General, all four artillery battalion commanders and the third in the division‘s chain of command were guardsmen on 6 June 1944.27 William Witte, an engineer from Baltimore, served as Gerhardt‘s G-3. The division commander considered Witte to be the epitome of, ―the classically brainy staff officer,‖ and as having, ―it all figured out. He‘s my

Napoleon.‖28

The division and assistant division commanders were West Point graduates and both passed successfully through a number of command and staff courses prior to their attachment to

26 See for example, Weaver, Guard Wars, 117, and Balkoski, Beyond the Beachhead, 102. In fact, a noted National Guard historian remarked that a majority of Regular Army officers commanded and recommended promotion within guard divisions without bias and proved to be, ―natural leaders and most helpful.‖ This, ―good work so often,‖ however, ―w(as) obscured by the chronic carping, needling and undercutting of the arrogantly ambitious that the truly dedicated and ethically-minded professionals too seldom w(as) noted, and the other category seemed to the harassed Guardsmen to be far the more numerous.‖ See, Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1964), 413. 27 The division‘s artillery commander and third in line for command was Brigadier General William H. Sands while Colonels Louis G. Smith and William C. Purnell served as regimental commanders. The assistant chiefs of staff were: G-1; Lt Col. Cooper B. Rhodes, G-2; Major Paul W. Krznarich, G-3; Lt Col. William J. Witte, G-4; Lt Col. Louis M. Gosorn, G-5; Captain Asa B. Gardiner, and the Adjutant General: Lt Col. Robert H. Archer, Jr. See, Ewing, 29 Let’s Go, 292, 309-311. 28 Balkoski, Beyond the Beachhead, 102.

31 the 29th Division.29 Six of the division‘s eight Regular Army regimental commanders attended

West Point and some form of additional specialized leadership schooling. The two that did not,

Colonels Eugene N. Slappey and Alfred V. Ednie, commanded the 115th Infantry Regiment during the Normandy campaign. The unit‘s relatively inferior performance in comparison to the

29th Division‘s other regiments in Normandy indicates a higher degree of military education may have better equipped regimental commanders to prepare units for battle and to lead them in combat.30

Newly-assigned officers were often dispatched to schools for educational upgrading during the 29th Division‘s early training. Field grade officers attended courses at Fort

Leavenworth‘s Command and General Staff School while junior officers were posted to branch and specialty schools across the nation. The 29th Division mobilized too early for its senior officers to be included in the ‗New Divisions‘ courses held at Fort Leavenworth from January

1942 to June 1943. A total of fifteen ‗New Divisions‘ courses were held in that time.31 The 42nd

Infantry Division was the lowest numbered infantry division whose officers took part in the course.32

In total, sixteen of the 29th Division‘s twenty-seven officers who served in Normandy at the rank of Lt.-Colonel or above attended some form of Command and Staff School course.

Eight attended the Command and General Staff School Long Course at Fort Leavenworth,

29 Unless otherwise indicated information hereafter pertaining to 29th Division officers located in, War Department Adjutant General‘s publication, Official Army Register (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1 January 1944). 30 See for example, Balkoski, Beyond the Beachhead, 156, 184-188, 245-250. 31 U.S. Army, Wartime History of the Command and General Staff School, 1939 – 1945 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School), January 1945 as quoted in unpublished thesis by Peter J. Schifferle, ―Anticipating Armageddon: The Leavenworth Schools and U.S. Army Military Effectiveness 1919 to 1945,‖ (PhD diss., The University of Kansas, 2002), 301. 32 U.S. Army, The Graduates of the General Staff and Services of Supply Staff Classes, 1941 – 1942 – 1943 (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff School), February 15, 1943.

Kansas prior to July 30, 1940.33 Two of the eight - Norman Cota (‗31) and Paul Goode (‗36) - were later posted to the school as instructors. The 29th Division‘s commander until mid-1943,

Leonard T. Gerow, had also attended the Command and General Staff School in 1926.

Eight more 29th Division officers – six of whom were guardsmen – graduated from one of eleven General Staff and Services of Supply Staff Class Short Courses run at Fort Leavenworth from 1941-1943.34 The division also maintained a constant detail at the Infantry School, rotating officers through junior officers‘ and field and staff officers‘ courses every three months. The

175th Infantry‘s future commander, then-Captain Arthur Sheppe of the 116th Infantry Regiment, attended the Infantry School in December 1940.35 Moreover, War Department officials posted five 29th Division guard officers - Cooper B. Rhodes, William J. Witte, Louis G. Smith, Louis N.

Gosorn, and Paul W. Krznarich - to the General Staff and Services of Supply Staff Class at Fort

Leavenworth in 1941 and 1942.

American soldiers were also influenced by the type of education they received, perhaps to an even greater extent than the number of years of school attendance. Pedagogical approaches represent a rare social link between soldiers. An individual‘s willingness to serve in a time of war, even if it meant he might be killed doing so, was in large part shaped by the type of education received prior to service.

The American school system experienced radical pedagogical changes between the turn of the twentieth century and the outbreak of the Second World War. The progressive education

33 The eight were: Norman Cota, 1931; Charles Gerhardt, 1933; Ollie Reed, 1933; Paul R. Goode, 1936; Charles Canham, 1939; James Hagan, 1939; Philip Dwyer, 1940; and Godwin Ordway Jr., 1940, see, Official Army Register. 34 By order of class attended, these were: Edward H. McDaniel, Cooper B. Rhodes, and William J. Witte attended the first course; Louis G. Smith the second; Eugene N. Slappey the third; Louis N. Gosorn the sixth; and Norman C. Atwood and Paul W. Krznarich the eighth, see, Ibid. 35 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7534, History of the 116th Infantry, Virginia National Guard, 51.

33 movement, for instance, ushered in a controversial and comprehensive shift in classroom pedagogical methods. Its rise to prominence in the 1890s marked a seminal shift in American education that continues to shape teaching methodologies to this day. Part of the larger

Progressive Movement in the United States, the progressive education era coincided with a dramatic rise in the number of American schools and overall school attendance. Its ascension as a legitimate pedagogical method was rocky and led to fierce debates over teaching methods, educational curriculum, and the fundamental role of schools in a democratic society.36

A key figure in the progressive education debate, John Dewey, remains one of the most influential educators in American history. It has been written of Dewey that, ―the present

American public school system likely bears his ‗fingerprint‘ more than that of any other individual.‖37 Dewey believed an inextricable link existed between democracy and education, wherein properly educated students would facilitate a superior society. His liberal educational beliefs were similar to those of the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau.38

Dewey believed in a progressive pedagogical system where children determined, to a degree, what should be taught rather than being subjected to a rigidly predetermined – and stale according to Dewey – syllabus. If they were taught what interested them, children would absorb information more efficiently and would become lifelong learners. Teachers would be required to adjust to a child‘s interests and abilities, rather than children adapting to a fixed curriculum.

Dewey also believed that experience was the key to learning and understanding. Rather than

36 Norman Dale Norris, The Promise and Failure of Progressive Education (Lanham, Maryland: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2004), 9-30. 37 William H. Jeynes, American Educational History (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007), 201. 38 Wayne J. Urban and Jennings L. Wagoner, Jr. American Education: A History, 4th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 405.

34 knowledge accumulation through reasoning, teachers would identify and guide students down the appropriate path of experience and learning.39

Overzealous progressive educators often misinterpreted and exceeded Dewey‘s original philosophies towards child-centered learning and less-structured curricula. 40 Dewey published

Experience and Education in 1938 in an attempt to clarify his views. Social and political progressivism waned in the United States after World War I. With it eventually went the pedagogical progressivism of Dewey, though moderately progressive administrative concepts survived to become a building-block of the modern American school system.41

Some of the educational methods used in classrooms across the nation likely suppressed a general willingness to sacrifice during times of war. Progressive education tenets espousing individualism and free-thinking were highly contradictory to the codes of military service and would not have been positive influences on the U.S. Army in the Second World War. Indeed, a company commander with combat experience in North Africa sensed the interwar education system hurt the U.S. Army‘s battlefield product because its soldiers had been taught that, ―war had never accomplished anything.….(and) that it was wrong to kill.‖ Many of his men had been mentally unprepared for the harshness of combat, and the kill or be killed mentality that prevailed, and had been wounded or killed as a result.42 Moreover, half of all conscripts responding to a poll conducted by the U.S. Army in 1943 felt they should have been deferred

39 Jeynes, American Educational History, 220. 40 Urban and Wagoner, Jr., American Education, 252. 41 Ibid., 281. 42 Captain Clarence A. Heckethorn, ―Battle Facts for Your Outfit: If I could Train My Company Again,‖ Infantry Journal 53, no. 5 (November, 1943): 10. Heckethorn‘s contentions may to an extent vindicate S.L.A. Marshall‘s theory that a large percentage of U.S. Army riflemen were reluctant to fire their weapon at the enemy. See, Marshall, Men Against Fire.

35 from the draft and military service altogether.43 The AGF‘s commanding officer, General

Benjamin Lear, lamented, ―the lack of aggressiveness manifested by the (American) soldier in

World War II,‖ and the, ―fact that the desire to get home held such a prominent place in the thinking of the men and officers.‖ Lear was convinced the average American soldier, ―had only a limited concept of America‘s role in world affairs, and of (his) responsibility as (a) soldier and citizen.‖44

Conservative educators were diametrically opposed to progressive pedagogical approaches. Though they also wanted children to enjoy learning, conservatives believed that teachers and parents largely knew what was pedagogically important for children to learn in order to become successful citizens and that it was the teacher‘s responsibility to make this preparation-based syllabus enjoyable for the students.45

Edward Thorndike, long considered the conservative counterpart to Dewey, was another influential American educational theorist. Thorndike espoused a connectionist theory that discounted the idea of intensive study as a proper means of instilling knowledge in a child.

Instead, he claimed that learning was heuristic and that it, ―involved the physiological union of a specific response to specific stimuli….(and) thus consisted of building a series of connections between specific stimuli and desired responses.‖46 He believed it was important for teachers to note what methods worked best to maximize children‘s learning and to utilize them more often

43 RG 337, NARA II, Box 248, Confidential Poll XXIX, General Correspondence, 1942-1948. 44 RG 319, NARA II, Box 134, Office of the Chief of Military History – Historical Manuscript File, AGF: 1942-47, Notes on Interviews of Lt. General Ben Lear by Lt. Col. K.R. Greenfield and Major. Bell I. Wiley, Ground Historical Section, 11 August 1945, 6. 45 Ibid., 219-220. 46 Robert S. Patterson, ―Society and Education During the Wars and Their Interlude: 1914- 1945,‖ in Canadian Education: A History, eds. J. Donald Wilson, Robert M. Stamp, and Louis- Philippe Audet (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd, 1970), 372, 374.

36 in the future.47 As part of his connectionist theory, Thorndike espoused two laws: the law of exercise that asserted, ―all things being equal, the oftener a situation connects with....or leads to....a certain response, the stronger becomes the tendency for it to do so in the future,‖ and the law of effect which noted, ―that what happens as an effect….to a situation-response, works back upon the connection to strengthen or weaken it.‖48

Links between Thorndike‘s pedagogical views and military service are unmistakable.

The pedagogical basis of ‗learning curves,‘ a reference to the speed with which military formations and leaders learn from their mistakes, can be seen in Thorndike‘s connectionist theories. His connectionist theories would also have served as useful templates in the development of quick, sound methods to conduct military training. Trainers would have been wise to heed Thorndike‘s advice on utilizing methods that produced the best results.

Thorndike also helped create the alpha and beta classification tests for the U.S. Army in the First World War. Many of the personnel selection tests conducted on Second World War soldiers were also based on these earlier models. Though he was eventually overshadowed by

Dewey from a teaching perspective, Thorndike‘s theories influenced the U.S. Army‘s military efforts to a large extent and his pedagogical approaches can still be seen in the nation‘s classrooms.

The methodological debate fostered dramatic educational changes in the United States prior to World War II. At the beginning of the twentieth century, educators in the United States argued for a continuation of schooling past the elementary stage for more Americans. Increased urbanization and industrialization intensified calls for trained blue-collar and white-collar

47 Jeynes, American Educational History, 237. 48 Edward Thorndike, The Fundamentals of Learning. (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers‘ College, Columbia University, 1932), 6.

37 workers. It was thought post-elementary education would not only supply these skilled workers by unlocking the ‗human capital‘ in American society but it would also improve citizenship and strengthen democratic ideals in the United States. Construction rates of new high schools soared and attendance increased rapidly. According to one economic historian, the United States was three to four decades ahead of France and England regarding post-elementary education.49 By

1940, fifty percent of the young adults in the United States had earned a high school diploma.50

Classes in American high schools remained relatively conservative prior to the First

World War, concentrating mostly on sciences and languages and not on vocational training.51

The increased importance of high schools in American culture soon generated debate over their role in society and the subjects that should be taught. Educational conservatives preferred a continuation of the humanist approach that prepared students for post-secondary school while liberals desired an education that, ―equip(ped) (students) for a broad spectrum of capacities in life.‖52

The National Education Association authorized a Commission on the Reorganization of

Secondary Education in an attempt to resolve the issue. The commission‘s final report, The

Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education, was delayed by World War I. Released in the war‘s aftermath, it called for American high schools to comprehensively serve as many needs in as many communities as possible by providing guidance in: good health habits; the ability to command fundamental principles such as reading, writing, oral and written communication; development of societal values through study of art, literature and music; an understanding of

49 Claudia Goldin, "The Human-Capital Century and American Leadership: Virtues of the Past," Journal of Economic History 61, no. 2 (2001): 267. 50 Urban and Wagoner, Jr., American Education, 275. 51 Jeynes, American Educational History, 199. 52 Ibid., 201.

38 future vocations best suited for the individual; the development of a civic awareness and morality; using leisure time to best enhance their mind, body and spirit; and instilling in the student a sense of initiative and personal responsibility.53

Comprehensive high schools were designed to provide academic, commercial and vocation curricula in one location. The underlying philosophy of high schools was to promote

‗social efficiency‘, while the principal goals were to provide a rounded education and to prepare students for their adult lives by identifying their strengths and weaknesses so they might be placed in suitable societal and vocational roles.54 It should be noted that the goal of high schools in America was not to promote social and economic equality. Instead, the intention was to expand access to higher education to those with geographical or economic barriers and to serve as a bridging instrument from adolescence to the job market.55

The junior high school also became a permanent fixture in American education during the 1920s. Junior high schools were designed to assist early adolescences prepare for the advanced pedagogical methods and syllabi they would soon confront in high schools. Another role of the junior high school was to classify the students based on their interests and their presumed occupational futures.56 Americans entering military service in World War II would face a similar type of personnel selection shortly after their induction.

President Roosevelt linked the importance of education to democracy and citizenship in a public address to the American people in August, 1939. Roosevelt summarized American

53 Herbert M. Kliebard, Changing Course: American Curriculum Reform in the 20th Century (New York: Teachers College Press, 2002), 46. 54 Urban and Wagoner, Jr., American Education, 272. 55 Morris Janowitz, The Last Half-Century: Societal change and Politics in America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 297. 56 Urban and Wagoner, Jr., American Education, 275.

39 educational strategies during the interwar years as a combination of progressive and conservative pedagogical approaches:

Everyone knows that democracy can not long stand unless its foundation is kept constantly reinforced through the process of education…What goes on in the schools…on the playground and in the classrooms, whether reflecting methods of control by the teacher, or opportunities for self-expression by the pupils, must be checked against the fact that the children are growing up to live in a democracy. That the schools make worthy citizens is the most important responsibility placed upon them.57

The president‘s remarks demonstrated the intrinsic links between education, democratic values, and citizenry. By extension, they also illustrate how education influenced an inductee‘s views towards duty, honor, and his eventual military effectiveness.

Education methods shaped adolescents‘ views towards local, national, and international matters and their views towards military service. Soldiers were exposed to a far greater degree of philosophy and social studies, possessed increased personal freedoms, and exhibited greater desires for personal expression and leisure time than previous generations, all of which influenced their beliefs and motivations during military service.58 The American soldier‘s high average education attainment facilitated a general ability to learn during training and to perform in battle. Moreover, the average American soldier was well-equipped to adapt when combat in

Northwest Europe demodernized and attrition warfare once again became prevalent.59 However, the type of education he received may have caused him to choose not to do any of these particularly well.

57 Charles Dorn, American Education, Democracy, and the Second World War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2. 58 Paula S. Fass, The Damned and the Beautiful: American Youth in the 1920’s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 366-367. 59 For more on the concept of battlefield demodernization, see: Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 4, 12, 16- 28, 33, 36-40, 45, 54. Combat in NW Europe demodernized but not to the extent of what took place on the Eastern Front between Soviet and German forces.

The United States was predominately an urbanized society by the Second World War.60

57% of 131,670,000 Americans resided in cities and towns containing a minimum of 2,500 inhabitants in 1940.61 The nation crossed the threshold of being a predominately urbanized society between the 1910 and 1920 censuses.62

The 29th Division was far more urban in nature than the general American society.

Sample results indicated 83.6% of 29th Division‘s soldiers resided in urban settings prior to joining the army. Within 29th Division infantry regiments, the 116th was least urban at 80.4% and the 175th was most urbanized at 88%. 84% of infantrymen from the three infantry regiments resided in urban settings prior to induction, nearly identical to the overall 29th Division average.

Support troops were more urban in makeup - artillerymen and engineers averaged over 90% while armored units - where mechanical aptitude gathered in the course of farm life would have proven useful - were still surprisingly urban in nature at 73.5%. Support troops in total averaged

83.0% urban. With means so close, there were no significant differences between the arms of the 29th Division. However, sample illustrating that rural populations were significantly underrepresented in the 29th Division - 83.6% against the national average of 57% - denoted another instance where the division‘s makeup was not representative of American male society.

60 The following conclusions should be looked upon as more of an indication of residence. In certain instances, it was impossible to verify whether soldiers residing in smaller urban centers should be classified as rural or urban on the basis of contemporary census thresholds. Those listing farming as their primary occupation at induction were automatically labeled as rural while judgments were made as objectively as possible the rare cases of fishermen and miners based on the size of the center listed as their primary residence. For a vast majority of the sample, however, the distinction was clear and the results can be viewed as a fair representation of the division. 61 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part1, Series A 43-72 Number of Places and Population in Urban and Rural Territory, by Size of Place, 1790-1970, 2. 62 Ibid, Series A 57-72. Population in Urban and Rural territory, by Size of Place: 1790 to 1970, 11.

The average height and weight within a conscript army provides a clear indication of the physical and fiscal wellbeing of the culture from which it was drawn. Moreover, the relative heartiness of an army affected its ability to endure sustained combat. A 1943 study found the average height and weight of American infantry reinforcements at Fort George C. Meade to be slightly greater than 5‘7‖ and approximately 150 pounds. Armored crewmen tended to be taller and lighter while artillery personnel were similar in height but lighter. A separate, broader study of AGF reinforcements calculated the mean height of surveyed infantrymen at 5‘73/4‖ inches compared to an overall ground force average of 5‘81/2‖ inches.63 The War Department‘s decision in 1943 to place increased focus on a recruit‘s physical stature during personnel selection classification examinations – at the expense of psychological testing – indicated a growing belief that an army‘s average size and strength were important components to battlefield success.64

It is reasonable to expect that married soldiers – some with children – viewed warfare differently than unmarried soldiers and that the two may have fought for different reasons and by different means. An army‘s cumulative marital status therefore affected its performance during training and combat. Sociologists and historians occasionally study the effects of military service on marriages but have virtually ignored the reverse.65

63 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1, Memorandum to The Chief of Staff dated 11November 1943, Improvement of the morale, efficiency and effectiveness of Infantry and Charts titles Height and Weight of Enlisted Replacements Now in Depot by Arm dated 9 November 1943, HQ, AGF Replacement Depot No. 1, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. 64 See Chapter Two for an expanded discussion of personnel selection methods in the United States Army during World War II. 65 See Eliza K. Pavalko and Glen H. Elder, Jr. ―World War II and Divorce: A Life-Course Perspective,‖ American Journal of Sociology 95, no. 5 (1990): 1213-1234 for a perspective on the effects of military service on marriages. For a rare example of the latter, see Samuel Stouffer, Edward Suchman, Leland DeVinney, Shirley Star and Robin Williams Jr., The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, 3 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 1: Chapter 4.

The Selective Service Draft in the United States allowed no exemptions for married men in the United States unlike, for instance, the Second World War Canadian Army.66 66.9% of the total American male population aged 20-44 was married, divorced, or widowed according to the

1940 U.S. census.67 Sample results indicating only 19.4% of 29th Division soldiers were married, divorced, or widowed demonstrated another area in which the division did not represent

American society and that a tremendous percentage of married men somehow avoided service military service in general and, more specifically, in the U.S. Army.

The division experienced a significant increase in married men during its evolutionary phase. 20.2% of replacements were married or divorced compared to only 5.8% of prewar guardsmen. The sample illustrated little statistical variance between infantry and support troops from the 29th Division. 80.8% of the infantry were single - 80% of the 175th, 80.3% of the 115th and 82% of the 116th. In comparison, 82.9% of support troops were unmarried: Artillery

(94.1%), Engineers (73.3%), Armor (72.5%) and other support units (90.9%).

Quantifying the effects of exogenous influences like marriage, education, and age on a soldier‘s military behavior represents a difficult proposition. Nevertheless, the extent of the U.S.

Army‘s ability to project battlefield influence rested with the collective efforts of its soldiers.

Broad statistical surveys such as the one conducted on the 29th Division in World War II grant soldiers an individual identity, lessen generalities associated with collective armies, and afford a profounder understanding of soldiers‘ pre-service influences and motivations that the study of tactics, leaders, and weaponry cannot be expected to provide. Sample results demonstrating the

66 See for example, E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Clarke Irwin and Company Limited, 1956), 147 and C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen‘s Printer, 1970), 413-414. 67 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part1, Series A 160-171, Marital Status of the Population, by Age and Sex: 1890 to 1970, 20.

29th Division in Normandy bore little resemblance to its original incarnation, for instance, revealed the fluid nature of military formations. Moreover, sample results indicated the unit was largely composed of replacements by June, 1944, which, in turn, demonstrated the fundamental link between the War Department‘s personnel selection and replacement systems and the U.S.

Army‘s battlefield product. Finally, the statistical study of the 29th Division provides a broader understanding of the U.S. Army‘s experiences during World War II and answers the clarion call of the historian Richard Kohn from 1977 to, ―study the American soldier ‗for his own sake.‘‖68

68 Richard H. Kohn, ―The Search for the American Soldier: Problems and Possibilities,‖ Paper presented the 1977 National Meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, October, 1977 as quoted in David R. Segal, Barbara Ann Lynch, and John D. Blair, ―The Changing American Soldier: Work-related Attitudes of US Army Personnel In World War II and the 1970s,‖ American Journal of Sociology 85, no. 1 (July, 1979): 96.

CHAPTER TWO PERSONNEL SELECTION

(N)o two persons are born exactly alike, but each differs from each in natural endowments, one being suited for one occupation and another for another . . .Now is it not of the greatest moment that the work of war should be done well? Will it not also require natural endowments suited to this particular occupation? Then, apparently, it will belong to us to choose out, if we can, that special order of natural endowments which qualifies its possessors for the guardianship of the state. — Plato's Republic, Book II.1

The War Department‘s leading psychologist quoted Plato in a 1941 article on personnel selection in the U.S. Army to illustrate that military classification had been carried out for centuries and to convince doubters of psychological classification to get on board. War

Department officials initially adopted and staunchly defended the classification system extolled by psychologists like Walter V. Bingham until rejecting it completely in June, 1944. By then infantry shortages had nearly crippled the army.

The original objectives of personnel classification in the U.S. Army during WWII were to husband industrial and military manpower resources more efficiently than had been the case in

WWI and to build a technologically advanced army composed largely of specialists.2

Classification and assignment strategies settled upon were utilized to, ―identify and place the drafted civilian in training positions where he c(ould) be developed most efficiently to meet military requirements.‖3

1 Walter V. Bingham, ―Psychological Services in the United States Army,‖ Journal of Consulting Psychology 5, no. 5 (1941): 221. 2 Every soldier was assigned a specialty during the personnel selection process, though only a percentage went on to become specialists. Specialists performed one or more of the hundreds of specialized tasks outside regular ground army duties such as rifleman or cannoneer. For examples of the many specialist positions, see, War Department, Technical Manual TM 12-427, Military Occupational Classification of Enlisted Personnel (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1944.) 3 RG 337, NARA II, Box 133, Memorandum from WD to AGF Chief of Staff, Classification and Assignment of Enlisted Personnel, 28 January 1943, 1, 2.

Personnel classification in any institution consists of alternative positive and negative selections. Individuals are chosen for constructive attributes or rejected for undesirable qualities.

The dilemma for War Department officials engaged in personnel selection during WWII was deciding which approach to take. Their choices were to: (a) define the soldierly characteristics they desired and then devise methods of determining who possessed these features or (b) outline qualities they wished to avoid and then determine means of rejecting or separating individuals possessing these unsavory characteristics. Military personnel classifiers faced a steep additional hurdle in also being expected to accurately predict an inductee‘s reaction to the unnatural situation of combat.

The personnel selection process began as a positive endeavor in which soldiers were chosen on the basis of constructive qualities, though the system became increasingly negative as manpower concerns worsened. Psychologists and psychiatrists proved incapable of predicting combat ability despite repeated assurances to the War Department of their ability to do so. The personnel classification experiment eventually failed because War Department officials never achieved the army they desired, regardless of how many inductees they rejected.

War Department officials approached social scientists for assistance with personnel selection prior to the United States‘ entry into WWII. Psychologists eagerly accepted the War

Department‘s invitation. Having sought greater societal acceptance for the past decade, psychologists were delighted by increased War Department support for psychological testing.

One psychologist remarked, ―that military psychology (wa)s (t)here to stay – even though it may have (had) its unpopular and unfunded moments.‖4 Another recalled, ―(w)ar brings many

4 Melton, ―Military Psychology in the United States of America,‖ 740, 746.

46 evils……to have the psychologists in the Armed Forces even if they have to work under wraps is not necessarily one of them.‖5

Representatives from the various psychological fields included, ―psychophysiologists, experimental psychologists, psychometricians, social psychologists, clinical psychologists, and not a few psychologists.‖6 They were primarily male (only twenty of the 1750 practicing female psychologists were utilized by the military) and their individual training varied. An educational background sample found 47% of psychologists utilized by the U.S. Army had PhD‘s, 47% had an MA while the remaining 6% possessed a Bachelor of Arts degree.7

Military and civilian psychologists were employed at institutions such as the Personnel

Research Section (PRS.)8 The PRS was formed in the War Plans Section, Executive Division of the Adjutant General‘s Office to determine methods of matching army occupations to inductees‘ employment and education backgrounds. It was, ―responsible for developing aids to correct classification of officers and men with respect to their abilities and skills, educational background, civilian and military experience, intellectual capacity, personal qualifications, special aptitudes and indicated best Army usefulness.‖9

Personnel Research Section psychologists conducted a number of personnel, ―research studies and technical applications for the benefit of military operations,‖ and assisted in the development of personnel selections tests. PRS staff helped create a specialist selection

5 Irving C. Whittemore, ―Counterpoint to ‗A Footnote to Military Psychology,‘‖ American Psychologist 2, no. 6 (June, 1947): 209. 6 Melton, ―Military Psychology in the United States of America,‖ 740, 746. 7 T.G. Andrews (Research and Development Group, Logistics Division, General Staff, United States Army, and Mitchell Dreese, ―Military Utilization of Psychologists During World War II,‖ American Psychologist 3, no. 12 (December, 1948): 533, 538. 8 Melton, ―Military Psychology in the United States of America,‖ 741. 9 Bingham, ―Psychological Services in the United States Army,‖ 222.

47 examination known as the Army General Classification Test (AGCT.)10 The AGCT was introduced and formally administered by the Personnel Research Section‘s successor, the

Research Council and Advisory Committee. The committee moved to New York City from

Washington, D.C. in 1943, primarily to develop specialist achievement tests for the Army

Specialized Training Program (ASTP.) Nearly two hundred psychologists were employed by the

Personnel Research Section and Research Council and Advisory Committee by the end of the war.11

Psychologists assisted with the development of numerous personnel classification tests besides the AGCT.12 Mechanical and Clerical Aptitude testing in particular was conducted in conjunction with the AGCT at Reception Centers. Mechanical Aptitude tests (begun in

10 Four versions (1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d) of the AGCT were utilized during WWII while a fifth (AGCT 3) was devised for use in the postwar U.S. Army. See, Capshew, Psychologists on the March, 102. 11 The committee, which supplanted the Personnel Research Section later in 1940, was also part of the Adjutant General‘s Office. See, RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Army Classification Methods, 1. 12 Tests developed by psychologists included: Classification Tests: General Classification Test, Non-Language Test, Visual Classification Test, Higher Examination, Officer Candidate Test, Women's Classification Test (Mental Alertness Test,) and Army Information Sheet (Minimum Literacy Test.) Aptitude Tests: Mechanical Aptitude Test, Clerical Aptitude Test, Radiotelegraph Operator Aptitude Tests: Mechanical Aptitude Test, Clerical Aptitude Test, Radiotelegraph Operator Aptitude Test, Code Learning Test, Battery of Tests for Combat [sic.] Intelligence, Identification of Aerial Photographs, Map Identification, Route Tracing, Battle Maps, Perception of Detail, Map Reading, and Map Orientation. Educational Achievement Examinations: Algebra, Arithmetic, English Grammar and Composition, French, General History, German, Inorganic Chemistry, Physics, Plane and Solid Geometry, Spanish, Trigonometry, United States History, Combined Algebra, Trigonometry, and Geometry. Trade Knowledge Tests: General Automotive Information Test, General Electricity and Radio Information Test, General Electrical, Information Test, General Radio Information Test, and Driver and Automotive Information Test. Warrant Officer Examinations: About 30 technical examinations. See, Staff, Personnel Research Section, Classification and Replacement Branch, The Adjutant General‘s Office, ―Personnel Research in the Army, II. The Classification System and the Place of Testing,‖ Psychological Bulletin 40, no. 3 (1943): 209.

February, 1941) screened potential specialists for knowledge of mechanical movement and comprehension, surface development, shop mathematics, and tool recognition. Clerical Aptitude tests (originated in 1940) consisted of 280 questions on, ―name checking, coding, catalog numbers, verbal reasoning, number checking, and vocabulary.‖13

Psychologists also labored in the personnel classification‘s complex apparatus.14

Psychologists identified as Classification Officers or Personnel Technical Officers conducted verbal interviews and administered psychological tests at Reception Centers. Classification

Officers were first trained at the War College prior to the establishment of the Adjutant

General‘s School at Arlington Cantonment, Virginia in June, 1941. The school was moved again

13 E. Donald Sisson, ―The Personnel Research Program of the Adjutant General's Office of the United States Army,‖ Review of Educational Research 18, no. 6 (December, 1948): 584, 585, 586. 14 Besides the PRS, two such examples were the Classification and Replacement Branch and the Classification and Replacement Division. The War Department‘s Classification and Replacement Branch, ―developed and supervised the Army program for the classification, testing, and original assignment of enlisted men and officers of the Army of the United States; conducted research relating to psychological and aptitude tests used throughout the Army; formulated separation classification procedures; maintained personnel-requirement and replacement-rate tables; and supervised the assignment and movement of personnel from reception centers and Army Service Forces replacement training centers.‖ Conversely, the Classification and Replacement Division was formed as part of the AGF‘s Adjutant General‘s office to assist with assignment procedures after the War Department bestowed greater classification responsibilities to the AGF. The organization‘s role was to, ―gather statistics, codify its needs, plan the distribution of its personnel resources, anticipate difficulties or crises, and recommend action to the War Department.‖ It was destined to play a significant role in the type and number of replacements chosen and trained as the army shifted from mobilizing units to the, ―maintenance of its……..units at authorized strength, the economizing of manpower by accurate classification and assignment, and the provision of replacements to units in combat.‖ See, RG 319, NARA II, Box 77. Personnel Utilization, and Assignment of Military Personnel in the Army of the United States During World War II: A Historical Account of the Activities of the Classification and Replacement Branch, AGO, and its Predecessors During the Period 8 September 1939 to 2 September 1945. Chapter 1, Introduction, Section III, Organization of the Classification and Replacement Branch, AGO, 86-89, RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249. History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ AGF, 1 March 1943, and General Service Administration, National Archives and Records Service. Federal Records of World War II, Volume II, (Washington, D.C.: The National Archives, 1951), 509.

49 in January, 1942 to Fort Washington, Maryland, where it remained for the rest of the war, producing thousands of classification officers in the process.15 Even with this extensive training and greater acceptance within the AGO most field army personnel continued to view psychologists as ‗crackpots.‘16 Some psychologists were even accused of developing classification exams that focused more on making themselves look good than accurately categorizing manpower.17

Most front line personnel selection psychologists ignored these criticisms. Psychologists strongly believed their primary contribution to the war effort was to analyze the army‘s manpower needs and the qualifications of available manpower and then match the two as closely as possible. In their minds, a properly trained army with adequate morale required extensive personnel selection. Psychologists believed their trade did not receive the respect it deserved because military officials failed to realize its potential and were convinced that any problems rested with the system‘s practitioners, not the system itself.18

Psychiatrists on the other hand performed fewer military functions than psychologists but were better accepted and were destined to play a greater role in the army‘s battlefield product.

Personal interviews conducted by psychiatrists constituted a pivotal juncture in the induction process, often determining whether an inductee was accepted or rejected. Unlike psychologists, the role of psychiatrists extended beyond the classification process. Mindful of manpower

15 Morton A. Seidenfeld, ―The Adjutant General‘s School and the Training of Psychological Personnel for the Army,‖ Psychological Bulletin 39, no. 6 (1942): 381-382. 16 Capshew, Psychologists on the March, 105. 17 Ibid., 107. 18 Walter V. Bingham, ―The Army Personnel Classification System,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 220 (March, 1942): 18, 19, and Edward G. Boring, ed., Psychology for the Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1945), vi.

50 limitations, psychiatrists were also given the important task of treating combat exhaustion cases in the hopes of returning the maximum number possible to frontline service.19

Actual induction procedures changed dramatically from the early mobilization of

National Guard units to the period of rapid army expansion following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The personnel classification process was relatively simple in the beginning but was destined to become increasingly convoluted and unproductive as the war progressed. Ground soldiers bore the brunt of its failures.

The induction of prewar guardsmen was a straightforward process carried out according to Army Regulation 130-10, National Guard: Call and Draft into National Service. Soldiers underwent physical examinations conducted under the authority and direction of Corps Area commanders. Induction instructions specified that physical examinations for pre-mobilization guardsmen were to be conducted at home stations. A guardsman‘s medical board results were considered final, though Corps Commanders retained the right to issue waivers exempting certain deficiencies in individual cases. Local civilian physicians often conducted medical examinations owing to shortages of army medical personnel, though the War Department preferred that, ―at least one member of each board be a medical officer of the National Guard of the United States.‖ Though medical boards retained the authority to disqualify older and inadequate enlisted guardsmen from active service, officers deemed ineffective could only be relieved from active service by orders from Corps Area Commanders citing, ―physical

19 Lieutenant Colonel Albert J. Glass, ―Psychiatry at the Division Level,‖ in Bulletin of the U.S. Army Medical Department, Combat Psychiatry, Experiences in the North African and Mediterranean Theaters of Operation, AGF, WWII, Section I. Psychiatric Treatment at Various Echelons, ed. Colonel Frederick R. Hanson, 9, Supplemental, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, Nov. 1949), 50-54.

51 disqualification as determined by a medical examining board as the reason for relief,‖ and only by the, ―direction of the President.‖20

National Guard Bureau officials soon issued official instructions for the legal separation of ineffective guardsmen from the 29th Division. Inductees slipping through initial screening but later determined to be unfit could be discharged for:

physical or mental disability, desertion, inaptness, undesirable traits of character, conviction by a civil court, dishonorable discharge pursuant to sentence of a court martial or military commission, and for other recognized military cause; (improper) age, erroneous induction; incorrect classification; necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety or interest; necessary to prevent impairment of the national defense effort; (and) dependency or home conditions occurring after induction.21

The number of guardsmen separated as a result of these provisions is unclear. The process did foreshadow excessive manpower losses resulting from stringent personnel classification procedures eventually conducted on an army wide basis. A means to an end became an end in itself when the personnel selection process grew increasingly convoluted and unmanageable.

The Selective Service Draft constituted the first round in the sequence of personnel selection trials experienced by non-prewar guardsmen or Regular Army members. 82.7% of the

29th Division‘s composition in Normandy was replacements, the majority of whom were classified and inducted into the army via the draft. This percentage continued to climb as casualty figures rose. Regular Army and Draftee divisions also relied on the draft for manpower.

In other words, a carefully organized and managed draft was a crucial element to the U.S.

Army‘s accomplishments in WWII.

Draft preparations began anew shortly after the conclusion of the First World War. A joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee was convened in 1926 to serve as an

20 RG 168, NARA II, Box 342. Induction of the National Guard of the United States, 1, 2. 21 RG 319, NARA II, Box 343. Memorandum to State Directors, Separation of Inducted Men from Active Military Service (IV), September 24, 1941.

52 organizational nucleus for the initiation and administration of future drafts in the United States.

By the outbreak of WWII the group had established a national headquarters and coordinated sufficiently with state governments to provide a foundation capable of administering the draft.22

ILLUSTRATION NO. 2 - Army Classification System

22 Harry A. Marmion, ―Historical Background of Selective Service in the United States,‖ in Selective Service and American Society, ed. Roger W. Little (New York: Publications of Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), 40 23 Personnel Research Section, The Adjutant General‘s Office, ―Personnel Research in the Army, II. The Classification System and the Place of Testing,‖ 206.

Despite the establishment of an apparatus capable of administering the selective service draft Americans nevertheless remained reluctant to intervene in another European war. Fierce debates over federalizing the National Guard and imposing a peacetime draft raged nationwide, but especially in Washington, D.C. President Roosevelt walked a political tightrope between anti-interventionist forces and those favoring increased military readiness. The military situation in Europe deteriorated sufficiently by the late summer of 1940 for a joint session of Congress to declare the existence of a national emergency on 27 August, 1940. This enabled the president to federalize National Guard units, a process allowable only when the United States was at war or by such a congressional declaration.24

With federalization of the National Guard already in progress, attention turned to the draft. President Roosevelt signed into law ‗An Act to Provide for the Common Defense by

Increasing the Personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States and Providing for Its

Training‘ less than a month after the declaration of a national emergency. The bill‘s architects were concerned members of Congress, not military officials. The act was originally introduced in Congress as the Burke-Wadsworth Selective Service Bill. The Selective Training and Service

Act of 1940 - as it was more commonly referred - was the first peacetime draft in American history.25

The bill was signed into law on 16 September 1940, the same day National Guard units began the induction process. It called on all males - twenty one to thirty five years of age - to register with local draft boards and, if randomly chosen and cleared by a local draft board, to serve one year or less in the military not beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere or within

24 Under Secretary of Defense For Personnel and Readiness, Military Compensation Papers, Sixth Ed. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 2005), 239. 25 Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparation, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950), 191.

United States territories and possessions.26 No more than 900,000 men could be in training at one time under the bill‘s provisions. A further joint session of Congress voted to extend the term of enlistment to eighteen months on 18 August 1941, though it allowed the Secretary of War to authorize the early release of select guardsmen after twelve months of service depending on the condition of national security. One excerpt of the bill called for, ―(t)he release of such persons from training and service and their transfer to a reserve component of the land forces shall be accomplished with a view to the early creation of a large trained reserve‖27

President Roosevelt nominated the president of the University of Wisconsin, Dr.

Clarence Dykstra, as the first Director of the Selective Service apparatus. The appointment of a civilian was carried out to offset societal concerns associated with a peacetime draft. Brigadier

General Lewis B. Hershey replaced Dykstra as director in mid-1941, remaining there until the end of the war.28 10 million men were eventually inducted into federal service through the draft.29

The WWII bill was similar to its First World War counterpart. It allowed for a rapid expansion of the nation‘s military forces, the provision of military training to a large swath of

Americans of serving age, and the elimination of manpower voids in National Guard divisions.30

An underlying principle of the Selective Service Act was the belief, ―that….military authorities could best determine where a man might most effectively serve, and that individuals should

26 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1983), 179. 27 RG 319, NARA II, Box 343. Executive Order, Extending the Periods of Training and Service, Active Military Service, and Enlistment of Persons in or Subject to training and Service or Active Military Service, August 21, 1941. 28 James A Huston, ―Selective Service in World War II,‖ Current History 54, no. 322 (June, 1968): 348. 29 Marmion, ―Historical Background of Selective Service in the United States,‖ 40, 41. 30 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 179

55 patriotically abstain from volunteering for this or that branch of the service.‖31 In other words, the draft was largely an expedient designed to foster the most efficient and orderly mobilization process possible. Moreover, manpower quality would not have changed substantially had volunteerism been used to a greater extent.

Inductions began in November, 1940 by which time some 16 million American males had already registered. A national headquarters was established in Washington, D.C. to oversee the entire process. Nonetheless, draft administration was primarily carried out at the state level.

6,443 local draft boards, each staffed by no less than three responsible citizens appointed by state governors, were responsible for the registration and classification of selectees chosen by the draft apparatus. The president nominated one or more physicians to serve on each state‘s draft advisory board based on the governor‘s recommendation. Their primary duty, in turn, was the nomination of physicians serving as advisors to, but not as part of, local draft boards.32

Physicians carried out extensive medical examinations during the peacetime phase of the draft, recording all physical defects regardless of their triviality. Physical examinations were conducted according to guidelines found in Mobilization Regulations (MR) 1-9. Physicians were ordered to utilize professional reasoning during the classification process and to use War

Department publications as guides only. Subjective interpretations ensued, resulting in erratic rejection and acceptance standards.33

31 Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 4. 32 Marcus S. Goldstein, ―Physical Status of Men Examined through Selective Service in World War II,‖ Public Health Reports (1896-1970)66, no. 19 (May, 1951): 587. 33 Gertrude G. Johnson, ―Manpower Selection and the Preventative Medicine Program,‖ in Personal Health Measures and Immunization, Vol. III, Preventative Medicine in World War II, ed. John Boyd Coates, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1955), 3-4.

Psychiatric screening was also conducted at local draft stations prior to the attack on

Pearl Harbor. It too lacked standardized procedures. Attending physicians conducted psychiatric screening as part of their general medical examination when psychiatrists were unavailable. Physicians based psychiatric judgments on vague and conflicting guidelines outlined in Selective Service Medical Circular No. 1 and Surgeon General‘s Circular Letter No.

19.34

A selectee‘s fate was then determined by the collective Draft Board. Its members weighed psychiatric and physical medical verdicts, their personal views, and general army requirements before categorizing a selectee as: (a) eligible for general service; (b) capable of

‗limited service‘ only; or (c) suitable for rejection.35

Draft Board responsibilities were drastically reduced after the attack on Pearl Harbor. A

Draft Board‘s ability to reject draftees was confined to those with readily obvious defects such as blindness, deafness, or lack of limbs. Draft Boards were also stripped of their ability to assign the ‗limited service‘ category. In addition, psychiatric examinations were no longer conducted at local draft stations after War Department officials determined that redundant and conflicting analyses occurred later.36 While state representatives continued to administer the draft apparatus, physicians thereafter performed cursory medical examinations only and categorized potential inductees in two groups - Classes I (men acceptable or potentially acceptable for general military service) and IV-F (those individuals mentally, physically, or morally unsuitable for general

34 Ivan C. Berlien, M.D. and Raymond W. Waggoner, M.D., ―Part II Administrative Considerations in the Surgeon General‘s Office, Chapter VIII, Selection and Induction,‖ in Neuropsychiatry in World War II: Zone of Interior, Volume 1, eds. Robert S. Anderson, Robert J. Bernucci, and Albert J. Glass (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 163- 165. 35 Goldstein, ―Physical Status of Men Examined through Selective Service in World War II,‖ 587, 588. 36 Ibid., 589.

57 military service.)37 All draftees were then forwarded to an Induction Station for a final verdict regarding rejection or acceptance.38

Though it generally performed well, the draft process was far from seamless. The system became swamped during the rapid and confusing mobilization that followed the attack on Pearl

Harbor.39 War Department officials allowed a parallel method of joining the Army until late

1942 in which volunteers could join and choose the branch they preferred. A survey of volunteers enlisting in the Army during 1942 showed that only five percent chose the infantry.40

Most chose the Army Air Corps, perhaps as a means of circumventing the draft and assignment to the infantry. The Navy and the Marine Corps also accepted volunteers until late 1942. Navy officials went so far as to promise commissions to university students if they joined the Navy and stayed in school. Though the Army directly commissioned a number of men early in the mobilization process, including many pre-mobilization 29th Division guardsmen, official policy thereafter held that potential officers be drafted and attend basic training as enlisted men before becoming eligible for a commission. This policy and the loss of so many potential officer

37 There were four eventual subgroups for inductees categorized as Class I: Class I-A – acceptable for any military service; Class I-B -- inductees with defects rendering them capable of providing ‗limited service‘ only (as manpower shortages worsened a majority of this subgroup were recategorized as Class I-A;) Class I-A Remediable – a category created on 26 February 1942 for draftees not to be inducted until the defects precluding categorization as Class 1-A were resolved; and Class I-A (L) – established in July, 1943 to solely designate ‗limited service‘ personnel (removal of the ‗limited service‘ classification from Class I-B allowed a clearer definition of its constituents ). Class IV-F remained the sole designation for mentally, physically, or morally unfit draftees. See, Goldstein, ―Physical Status of Men Examined through Selective Service in World War II,‖ 589 and Berlien and Waggoner, ―Part II Administrative Considerations in the Surgeon General‘s Office, Chapter VIII, Selection and Induction,‖ 165- 166. 38 Goldstein, ―Physical Status of Men Examined through Selective Service in World War II,‖ 589. 39 Admittedly, as would have any system subjected to the exponential growth experienced in the U.S. Army during WWII. 40 Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 5.

58 candidates to the Navy‘s university program led to the eventual inauguration of the Army

Specialized Training Program (ASTP.)41

Guard leaders hesitatingly accepted draftees in what had historically been a volunteer organization after political and military realities made it clear they had little choice. Guard officials sought and were able to obtain assurance, ―that the strength and organization of the

National Guard as an integral part of the first line of defense of this nation (would) be at all times maintained and assured.‖42 The assignment of selectees to guard units for training soon began.

The 116th Infantry, for instance, began administrative preparations for the integration of selectees on 18 April 1941. 240 arrived within days and by 13 May the regiment was at its modified war strength of 2,660 all ranks.43

85.1% of 29th Division veterans polled as part of a postwar survey responded positively to the draft.44 A sizeable percentage also favored a continuation of the draft and universal military service after the war. Despite its overwhelming favorability ratings, many 29th Division veterans nonetheless expressed reservations towards the draft – often while agreeing with its fundamental principles. Some suspected the draft was unfairly administered. One remembered how, ―(t)housands of men had escaped the draft because they had connections with the medical profession (during the draft induction process) or political (connections.)‖45 Another recalled how, ―none of the early draftees were bankers, etc.‖46 Uneven imposition of the draft was a

41 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3. Memorandum from G.H. Dorr to Dr. Arthur L. H. Rubin, Draft History of the ASTP, 5 September 1945, 3-6. 42 As quoted in Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 179. 43 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7534, History of the 116th Infantry, Virginia National Guard, 49. 44 Percentages derived from: United States Army Military History Institute [hereafter, USAMHI,] Carlisle, PA, World War II Veterans‘ Surveys [hereafter, WWII Survey,] 29th Division. 45 USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 6815. 46 USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 2596.

59 common postwar view amongst 29th Division veterans. To many, it appeared as though the,

―rich sure could avoid (the draft while) the poor ones served,‖47 that, ―a number of eligible young men escaped the draft by getting married or that their families had ‗connections‘ to get them deferred,‖48 or how, ―(i)t seemed that only the poor were being drafted into the frontline troops and the rich kids were drafted into the Navy or the Army Air Corps.‖49 A 29th Division veteran did not, ―feel (draft officials) were thorough enough in their examination of the background of the individuals. I found some men who could not speak English and a man who was an artist on the piano, and should never (have) been in the infantry.‖50 Another recalled,

―when I saw some of the physical misfits that were drafted I wondered how draft boards functioned when I could see lots of healthy civilians still on the street.‖51

Other 29th Division veterans had mixed views towards the draft. One agreed with the concept of selective service but felt he personally should not have been drafted, commenting that the draft, ―was not fair….To [sic.] much politics (and) too many ways to avoid the draft…. (He) was married, (of) reasonable intelligents [sic.], and could have been of more value as a civilian.‖52 Another 29th Division veteran believed the draft, ―was necessary, but (also) felt that it was somewhat unfair for it seemed that a higher proportion was selected from small rural villages….(and the WWII draft was unlike) (i)n the Vietnam era (when) it was too easy to escape the draft and (there was) no real punishment of draft evaders.‖53 Asked if the draft was applied evenly to all Americans, a 29th Division veteran responded, ―yes and no, it was necessary but not

47 USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 199. 48 USAMHI, WWII Survey Unknown No. 49 USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 141. 50 Underlining original to initial author - USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 9188. 51 USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 5095. 52 USAMHI, WWII Survey, Unknown Number. 53 USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 4798.

60 always fair.‖54 A final 29th Division veteran, who took steps to avoid being drafted, was against the concept of the draft altogether. He believed, ―that conscription (wa)s a violation of one‘s freedom, and (America) should (have) rel(ied) upon voluntary service.‖ Realizing, ―(t)here were obvious ways to avoid (the draft),‖ the same soldier enrolled in a, ―university (that) offered

ROTC/ASTP scholarships with prospects of deferment for study……(but that)…...(i)t (only) worked for a while.‖55

The next phase of the personnel selection process for draftees occurred at Induction

Stations. A panel of medical specialists conducted a second round of screening there, rejecting draftees with obvious physiological disorders such as tuberculosis or venereal disease.

Classification officers then tested each inductee‘s mental acumen, accepting only those capable of absorbing future training.56

Classification techniques utilized at Induction Stations varied widely by region and changed dramatically during the war. Local physicians performed unsanctioned psychiatric screening periodically, driving psychiatric rejection rates even higher. As rejection rates mounted, War Department officials became suspicious that many rejected inductees had feigned mental disorders to avoid military service or were being excused by medical practitioners with whom they were acquainted.57

The literacy question also vexed War Department officials. A great deal of emphasis was placed on an inductee‘s ability to read and absorb instructions contained in training pamphlets.

A War Department directive circulated in April, 1942 ordered the rejection of all illiterate

54 USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 5659. 55 USAMHI, WWII Survey, Unknown Number. 56 Bingham, ―The Army Personnel Classification System,‖ 20. 57 Berlien, M.D. and Waggoner, M.D., ―Part II Administrative Considerations in the Surgeon General‘s Office, Chapter VIII, Selection and Induction,‖ 164-165.

61 inductees. Screening at induction stations afterwards was crudely described as eliminating,

―draftees who were regarded as extremely dull,‖58 because, as a leading War Department psychologist exclaimed, ―the Army must not be burdened with the task of attempting to train and to supervise the mentally ill or the very stupid.‖59 The army lost in the process wholly or partially illiterate inductees who may have been very bright otherwise and capable of serving as replacement riflemen or in support roles that freed potential riflemen from administrative occupations.

Conflicting illiteracy standards resulted in widely varying classification interpretations.

The illiteracy rejection rate in November, 1943 in Boise, Idaho was 0.6% while in Oklahoma

City, Oklahoma it was 23%.60 Grounds for such variances and the prolific illiteracy rates amongst inductees – when the national illiteracy average for white Americans born in the United

States was only 1.1% – are unclear.61 An instruction subjectively ordering the classification of no more than ten percent of daily intake as illiterates (later reduced to five percent as manpower constraints worsened) confused the issue further.62

58 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Army Classification Methods, 2, and The Organization and Facilities of the Replacement System in the United States, 3. 59 Bingham, ―The Army Personnel Classification System,‖ 20. 60 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Army Classification Methods, 2, and RG 319, NARA II, Box 3,The Organization and Facilities of the Replacement System in the United States, 3. 61 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part1, Series H 664-668, Percent Illiteracy in the Population, by Race and Nativity: 1870-1969 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 382. 62 Staff, Personnel Research Section, Classification and Replacement Branch, The Adjutant General‘s Office, ―Personnel Research in the Army, II. The Classification System and the Place of Testing,‖ 206 and Goldstein, ―Physical Status of Men Examined through Selective Service in World War II,‖ 589

Illiterates were grouped with inductees suffering some form of physical handicap and categorized as ‗limited service men.‘63 War Department officials ordered the discontinuation of the harsh characterization in January, 1943, likely in response to worsening manpower concerns.

Despite the withdrawal, the Army struggled to determine: (a) who fit the characterization, (b) how to classify such individuals, and (c) what to do with them. It also released thousands of previously classified ‗limited service‘ personnel into the general replacement stream with no provision for their future military occupation. In the ensuing confusion, some were given their outright release from the army while the remainder floated between jobs. Manpower shortages later in the war resulted in many former ‗limited service‘ individuals serving as frontline infantrymen.64

The next stage of the personnel selection process for literates occurred at one of thirty-six

Reception Centers spread across the United States.65 Organized with microscopic precision,

Reception Centers were arranged by overhead charts provided by the War Department to allow a standardized arrangement of office chairs and desks. Despite the obvious requirement for speed and efficiency, the Army took considerable effort to ease an inductee‘s transition from civilian to military life:

The reception center (wa)s the new soldier‘s first Army home and his first experience with Army procedures…..In most cases, he w(ou)l(d) look upon reception center activities as indicative of what he may expect in the future. Accordingly, the impression made on the soldier during his stay……may have a significant influence in shaping his attitude toward the Army. The processing should (have) be(en) so conducted as to impress the soldier with the fact that, in traditional Army manner, it (was) meticulously planned and (wa)s……executed according to that plan. He should (have) be(en) given fair and considerate treatment. Unnecessary haste or unwarranted delays should (have) be(en) avoided……All reception center personnel who conduct(ed) any phase of

63 Inductees without physical or mental handicaps were labeled ‗general service.‘ 64 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Army Classification Methods, 2, 5, 9. 65 Bingham, ―The Army Personnel Classification System,‖ 20.

processing should (have) be(en) thoroughly trained in their jobs. Military personnel of the reception center should (have) be(en) exemplary in appearance and conduct. The reception center should (have) take(n) full advantage of the opportunity it ha(d) to instill in the soldier confidence in Army leadership.66

Recruits underwent psychological and physical profiling at Reception Centers before being issued clothing and equipment. Blood typing, immunization shots, a number of lectures and training films, along with personal decisions on insurance and dependency benefits, pay and bond allotments followed.67

Reception Center personnel referred to MR 1-9 and the newly instituted Army

Regulations (AR) 615-25 (1942) for classification guidance. Inaugurated to reduce the confusing guidelines in MR 1-9, AR 615-25 defined classification as the, ―process by which pertinent data concerning the enlisted man‘s education, intelligence, aptitude, previous military experience, civilian work history, interests, hobbies, and other qualifications are validly obtained and correctly recorded to be used as a basis for an assignment in which he will be of the greatest value to the service and will utilize his acquired skills most effectively.‖68

The psychiatric testing conducted at Reception Centers represented a pivotal juncture in an inductee‘s future. Personnel screeners were reminded that the U.S. Army had no room for,

―physical or mental weaklings, potentially psychotic or prepsychotic persons or those with behavior problems. Men who present behavior problems in the civilian community w(ou)l(d)

66 War Department, Technical Manual TM 12-223, Reception Center Operations (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), 1-2. This manual superseded Army Service Forces M-204, Induction Station and Reception Center Operation dated August, 1943. 67 Ibid., 1. 68 War Department, Army Regulations, No. 615-26, Enlisted Men: Index and Specifications for Civilian and Military Occupational Specialists, and Occupational Specifications for Non-English Speaking Men, Illiterates, and Men of Limited Mental Capacity (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), Section I paragraph 12, Page 1.

64 certainly present intensified problems in the service.‖69 The duty of Reception Center psychiatrists was to identify and reject individuals exhibiting any of these characteristics.

Military psychiatrists complied but mistakenly applied peacetime methods to wartime personnel selection. Holding the belief, ―that neurotic tendencies held (by inductees) prior to military service caused breakdown in combat….(and) that good pre(-)induction screenings and careful case histories should eliminate the vast majority of psychological casualties,‖70 psychiatrists were able to convince War Department officials of their ability to screen, ―not only……disabled (inductees,) but (also) those who would become mentally disabled.‖71 By sanctioning psychiatric screening War Department officials hoped to avoid costly postwar pension payments to combat exhaustion casualties as had been the case with shell shock victims of the First World War.72

Actual psychiatric screening techniques were often subjective and disjointed. Psychiatric information gathered at local draft boards and Induction Stations was seldom available to psychiatrists conducting subsequent interviews at Reception Centers. Recommendations were originally based on fifteen minute interviews between examiner and inductee. The interview duration was slashed to three minutes following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the rapid army expansion that ensued. The screening process devolved into a frantic encounter during which

69 Paul Wanke, ―American Military Psychiatry and Its Role Among Ground Forces in World War II,‖ The Journal of Military History 63, no. 1 (January, 1999): 131. 70 Ibid., 128. 71 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Annex 19, Statement of Colonel John M. Caldwell, Chief of the Neuropsychiatric Consultants Division, The Surgeon General‘s Office, 26 August 1947, 1. 72 Ginzberg, Anderson, Ginsburg, M.D., and Herma, The Ineffective Soldier, Lessons for Management and the Nation: The Lost Divisions, 31 and Berlien, M.D. and Waggoner, M.D., ―Part II Administrative Considerations in the Surgeon General‘s Office, Chapter VIII, Selection and Induction,‖ 164.

65 doctors attempted to measure an inductee‘s emotional state and forecast his ability to withstand combat stress in a matter of minutes. One psychiatrist remembered, ―(t)hese were hectic days during which my examinational procedure consisted of four rapid-fire questions, ‗How do you feel?‘ ‗Have you ever been sick?‘ ‗Are you nervous?‘ ‗How do you think you will get along in the Army?‘ One day I saw 512 men.‖73 Psychiatric examinations were conducted by civilian general practitioners when military psychiatrists were unavailable. A physician with no psychiatric training was discovered conducting psychiatric evaluations by slapping naked inductees in the abdomen and basing his impression of the man‘s mental state by how high he jumped. Other physicians passed or rejected inductees on the basis of the question, ‗do you like girls?‘ In another instance, naked inductees were rejected if exhibiting an undue amount of perspiration while standing at attention during the psychiatric examination.74

Potential psychiatric cases were classified into prearranged categories and sent to one of

584 Medical Advisory Boards where qualified psychiatrists determined whether they were to be discharged from the army altogether or certified as qualified for limited military service. Final decisions were based on a subsequent round of psychiatric examinations during which patients were tested to ensure they possessed sufficient moral fiber to withstand the rigors of combat.75

Inductees were also subjected to extensive psychological testing at Reception Centers.

The benchmark general intelligence examination administered there was the Army General

Classification Test (AGCT.) The test was designed to yield, ―a rough estimate of the individual‘s relative ability to learn,‖ and was composed of 140-150 multiple choice questions on

73 Ginzberg, Anderson, Ginsburg, M.D., and Herma, The Ineffective Soldier, Lessons for Management and the Nation: The Lost Divisions, 38. 74 Ibid., 38, 167. 75 Wanke, ―American Military Psychiatry and Its Role Among Ground Forces in World War II,‖ 131.

66 arithmetic, vocabulary, and block counting. Results were divided into five categories: I - Very rapid learner; II – Rapid learner; III – Average learner; IV – Slow learner; and V – Very slow learner.76 Test results were used by classification officers during psychological interviews that followed. Inductees scoring grades I-III were deemed sufficiently bright to continue with the classification process while slow learners in Grades IV and V were held back for further testing.77

68.2% of selectees assigned to the infantry between September, 1941 and February, 1942 scored in the top three grades of the AGCT. Comprehensive testing of white infantry replacements assigned to AGF divisions showed percentages scoring in the top three grades had fallen marginally to 66.3% during 1943. AGCT results became less favorable for the infantry as manpower shortages became increasingly severe. Just 59.4% of 44,819 replacements assigned from Reception Centers to Infantry Replacement Training Centers in April, 1944 for instance scored in the top three grades of the AGCT.78

Personnel Technical Officers (military psychologists) and inductees then met for an informal personal interview. Regarded as, ―(p)erhaps the most important single step in Army classification,‖ the personal interview provided Classification Officers detailed information on the inductee‘s pre-service, ―education, languages, main and second best occupations, job history,

76 Staff, Personnel Research Section, Classification and Replacement Branch, The Adjutant General‘s Office, ―Personnel Research in the Army, II. The Classification System and the Place of Testing,‖ 206. 77 E. Donald Sisson, ―The Personnel Research Program of the Adjutant General's Office of the United States Army,‖ 576, 582. 78 RG 319, NARA II, Box 124, National Average of Selectees by AGCT, Assignment of Inducted Men (White Only) to RTC‘s and Units by Arms or Service by AGCT, 1 Jan. – 31 Dec 43, and Distribution of selectees by AGCT Scores from Reception Centers to Replacement Training Centers by Branch, April 1944.

67 hobbies, leadership experience, and previous military training.‖79 Personnel Technical Officers also reviewed, ―test findings in light of each man‘s history in order to detect malingering, poor cooperation, emotional upset, and other factors tending to make the test score invalid…(and) for verifying the classification of ‗literate.‘‖80

Inductees were then passed to Classification and Assignment officers for distribution to specific branch Replacement Training Centers. Allocation decisions were made on the basis of classification results and monthly requirement bulletins provided by the War Department.81

Inductees reclassified as illiterates were interviewed to determine whether further educational assistance would enable them to benefit the army. If not, they were released from the army altogether.82

Inductees were assigned military occupational specialties (MOS) and specification serial numbers (SSN) after completing the lengthy personnel selection process. MOS‘s were used to,

―identify an Army job which comprise(d) one or more related duties and responsibilities normally requiring special knowledge and skills acquired through civilian training and experience supplemented by military training and experience, or military training and experience only.‖ Conversely, SSN‘s were, ―numerical code(s) assigned to an MOS for control, reporting

79 Staff, Personnel Research Section, Classification and Replacement Branch, The Adjutant General‘s Office, ―Personnel Research in the Army, II. The Classification System and the Place of Testing,‖ 208. 80 RG 319, NARA II, Box 77, Personnel Utilization, and Assignment of Military Personnel in the Army of the United States During World War II: A Historical Account of the Activities of the Classification and Replacement Branch, AGO, and its Predecessors During the Period 8 September 1939 to 2 September 1945, 216. 81 Bingham, ―The Army Personnel Classification System,‖ 21. 82 Arthur R. Kooker, ―Basic Military Training and Classification of Personnel,‖ in The Army Air Forces In World War II, Volume VI, Men and Planes, New Imprint, eds. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 540.

68 and requisitioning purposes.‖ 0745, for example, was the prescribed SSN for an infantryman with a rifleman MOS.83

ILLUSTRATION NO. 3 - Medical Processing at Reception Centers

AR 615-26 contained thousands of SSN‘s that correlated to civilian occupations with military jobs. MOS‘s were categorized into groups based on similarities in SSN‘s for ease of

83 War Department, Technical Manual TM 12-427, Military Occupational Classification of Enlisted Personnel, 1. 84 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5608, History of Medical Services in the Ground force Reinforcement Command ETOUSA, Appendix I: Neuropsychiatric observation and studies from April, 1943 to June, 1945, Medical Processing for Assignment.

69 use. Classification officers provided inductees an SSN on the basis of educational and occupational backgrounds. Classification officers cross-referenced SSN‘s to appropriate Army

MOS‘s, and subsequently referred to the Adjutant General‘s publication, Requirements and

Replacement Rates, Military Specialists to determine soldiers‘ most suitable military occupations. Printed to provide guidance for the assignment of inductees at reception centers, the publication compiled present army requirements and estimated those for the coming six months - due to the time lapse in selecting and training a replacement - and then converted these totals into rates per thousand SSN‘s. One month‘s publication, for instance, required the selection of 122 riflemen (SSN 745,) 95 cooks (SSN 060,) 16 rodmen and chainmen (SSN 191,) and so on per thousand draftees inducted. The obvious disadvantage of the system was that supply rarely met demand. Classification officers were nonetheless required to adhere to prescribed quotas found in Requirements and Replacement Rates, Military Specialists when allocating inductees, regardless of their backgrounds.85

SSN‘s under 500 were designated for MOS‘s converting directly to civilian occupations such as cooks, carpenters, and automobile mechanics. SSN‘s over 500 represented MOS‘s without a civilian occupational counterpart, such as Rifleman SSN 0745, medium tank crewman

SSN 2736, and light mortar crewman SSN 607. Soldiers with SSN‘s under 500 were usually capable of fulfilling a number of military occupations while those over 500, such as rifleman

0745, seldom did.86

Technical Manual 12-427, which superseded AR 615-25 in 1944, grouped MOS‘s in ten broad fields based usually on the functional relationships of the SSN‘s contained in the grouping.

85 Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 7. 86 RG 319, NARA II, Box 77. Personnel Utilization, Chapter 2: Basic Elements of the Personnel Classification and Assignment System, Section I Occupational Analysis, Occupational Classification of Enlisted Men, 97-98.

In certain instances, when a departure from functional alignments proved necessary,

―consideration (was) given to other factors such as qualification requirements, T/O needs, and the mission to be performed.‖ The ten fields were: (1) gunnery and gunnery control; (2) intelligence, reconnaissance, and security; (3) communications; (4) transportation; (5) supply; (6) maintenance; (7) medical; (8) construction and engineering; (9) technical; and (10) administration.87

These broad fields were then divided into subgroups. Certain subgroups such as light and heavy weapons of the gunnery and gunnery control contained military SSN‘s above 500 only:

511 – armorer; 604 – light machine gunner; 605 – heavy machine gunner; 607 – light mortar crewman; 745 – rifleman; 746 – automatic rifleman; 812 – heavy weapons crewman; 1607 – heavy mortar crewman; 1812 – light weapons NCO; 9745 – cavalry trooper. Others, such as classification and guidance subfield under the MOS heading of administration, contained only civilian SSN‘s: 262 – occupational counselor; 263 – psychiatric social worker; 275 – classification specialist; 289 – personnel consultant assistant; and 290 – personnel technician.

Still others, such as the surveying and drafting subgroup of the technical MOS field contained a mixture of both civilian and military SSN‘s: 004 – aerial photographer; 070 – draftsman; 071 – draftsman, mechanical; 074 – draftsman, structural; 075 – draftsman, electrical; 076 – draftsman, topographic; 136 – model maker; 191 rodman and chainman, surveying; 227 – surveyor; 228 – survey and instrument man; 230 – surveyor, topographic; 243 – geodetic computer; 387 – cartographer; 577 – survey and instrument NCO, Field Artillery; 1076 – observation draftsman.88

87 War Department, Technical Manual TM 12-427, Military Occupational Classification of Enlisted Personnel, 2, 9 – 15. 88 Ibid.

Enlisted men retained a 521 SSN (basic) classification during initial training and were assigned an MOS only:

(a) (t)hrough the completion of a course of training at a training center or service school, if it has been determined by proper authority that the course qualifie(d) a graduate in a specialty. Determination by proper authority (must have) include(d) clearance of military training programs with The Adjutant General‘s Office (Classification and Replacement Branch) for determination of the appropriate MOS to be assigned to graduates of various courses; (b) (t)hrough satisfactory performance of duties and responsibilities of a military occupational specialty in a unit or installation for a period of 60 days; (or) (c) (t)hrough civilian experience, when of such nature as to be a practical counterpart of an MOS and when proficiency ha(d) been demonstrated to the satisfaction of his commanding officer.89

The ‗basic‘ MOS caused considerable confusion between Replacement Training Centers

(RTC‘s) on one hand and infantry and artillery units on the other. RTC‘s interpreted a ‗basic‘

MOS as a recruit not yet in possession of a particular army job, while infantry and artillery units understood the term to refer to a common rifleman or cannoneer. To offset confusion, the War

Department advised, ―(e)ffective at once, the use of the term ‗Basic‘ w(ou)l(d) be discontinued, except at reception centers,‖ and that future unit requests for replacement riflemen or cannoneers would, ―be requisitioned under the title ‗Non-specialists.‘‖90

War Department officials published Circular No. 283 to clarify and better coordinate convoluted requisition procedures for overseas divisions. Copies of the circular were allocated to Division Classification Officers for dispersion. The circular contained sections for each of the major arms and was divided into four columns: (1) SSN, (2) MOS, (3) institute supplying the

89 RG 319, NARA II, Box 77, Personnel Utilization, and Assignment of Military Personnel in the Army of the United States During World War II: A Historical Account of the Activities of the Classification and Replacement Branch, AGO, and its Predecessors During the Period 8 September 1939 to 2 September 1945, 215. 90 RG 338, NARA II, Box 44, 29th Division memorandum dated 9 November 1941, reprinted from War Department Memorandum AGO, AG 341, Distribution of Ground Forces Replacements from Replacement Training Centers to Units, 25 September 1941, 3.

72 replacement, and (4) a breakdown of SSN/MOS‘s a replacement may have been capable of performing based on qualifications listed in columns 1 and 2.91

Column 4 was the key to Circular No. 283. Before its publication, units were required to requisition replacements with hundreds of different SSN‘s/MOS‘s in order to reach prescribed

T/O strengths. However, RTC‘s had previously stopped producing many superfluous

SSN‘s/MOS‘s in an attempt to streamline the training process and were instead concentrating on fewer, greater-encompassing specialties. War Department officials hoped to alleviate confusion by instituting a crossover system where replacements classified by specific SSN‘s might be able to perform a variety of MOS‘s - labeled ‗groupings‘ or ‗job family groups‘ - based on previous training that potentially qualified them, ―for one or more additional SSN‘s.‖92 The concept of military ‗job family classifications‘ resulted from the work of the Occupational Analysis Section

(OAS) headed by psychologists Walter V. Bingham and Carroll Shartle. A year‘s research at military bases across the United States combined with many years of previous experience scrutinizing civilian occupations allowed the OAS‘s Technical Board to develop the framework for Circular No. 283 by creating: (a) a means of transferring previous civilian occupations to military jobs and (b) ‗job family groups‘ that allowed the transfer of skilled specialists from one military job to another.93

91 RG 319, NARA II, Box 1, WD Circular No. 283, Enlisted Men – Requisition for Replacements Trained by Army Ground Forces, 6 November 1943, 1. 92 RG 319, NARA II, Box 1, WD Circular No. 283, Enlisted Men – Requisition for Replacements Trained by Army Ground Forces, 6 November 1943, 1 and RG 337, NARA II, Box 133, Memorandum from WD to AGF Chief of Staff, Classification and Assignment of Enlisted Personnel, 28 January 1943, 4. The lukewarm assurance that replacements ‗may (or may not) potentially qualify‘ for particular MOS‘s could not have inspired confidence in combat units perpetually short of riflemen. 93 Capshew, Psychologists on the March, 103-104.

Division Classification Officers were instructed to refer to Column 4 of Circular No. 283 when desired SSN‘s in Column 1 were unavailable. After locating the appropriate SSN in

Column 4, classification officers were ordered to place requisitions according to the primary

SSN in Column 1.94 Table No. 2 illustrates artillery and infantry groupings. Artillery units submitted requisitions to the 29th Division Classification Officer for an SSN 2531, 105-mm

Howitzer crewman trained at a RTC when requiring, for example, an ammunition handler, a first sergeant, a general laborer, or a cook‘s helper. Similarly, an infantry unit requiring a squad leader, an orderly, a duty NCO or a light machine gunner did not submit a requisition for any of these but instead requested a 745 SSN, rifleman. Units were then responsible for carrying out any necessary training upon receiving the replacement.95

An administrative paper trail followed a soldier from induction to his army release through death or discharge. WD AGO Form No. 20 (Soldiers Qualification Card) represented the army‘s primary source of personal information on individual soldiers. Begun at Reception

Centers, AGO Form No. 20 logged a soldier‘s previous military experience, his pre-service education and occupational backgrounds, and even his potential as an army entertainer. It also contained post-induction physical and mental test results, and classification in military specialties.96

94 RG 319, NARA II, Box 1, WD Circular No. 283, Enlisted Men – Requisition for Replacements Trained by Army Ground Forces, 6 November 1943, 1. 95 RG 319, NARA II, Box 1, WD Circular No. 317, Overseas Replacements, 31 July 1944, 13, 18. 96 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3. V Corps memorandum, Personnel Replacement Procedure, no date, 1.

TABLE NO. 2 - Rifleman and Artillery Crewman ‘Job Family Groups’

SSN MOS Institute Other Capabilities 0745 Rifleman RTC 0504 - Ammunition Handler 0505 - Ammunition NCO 0521 - Basic 0506 - Duty NCO 0656 - First Sergeant 0590 - Laborer 0604 - Light Machine Gunner 0607 - Platoon Sergeant 0652 - Section Leader, Gun 0653 - Squad Leader 0695 - Orderly 0746 - Automatic Rifleman 2531 105-MM Howitzer Crewman RTC 0503 - Liaison Agent 0504 - Ammunition Handler 0505 - Ammunition NCO 0521 – Basic 0521 (062) - Cook's Helper 0531 - Cannoneer 0539 - Chief of Section, Gun 0585 - First Sergeant 0590 - Laborer 0603 - Gunner 0604 - Light Machine Gunner 97 Division Classification Officers (DCOs) carried on the personnel management process once trained recruits were attached to infantry or armored divisions. DCOs, ―maintain(ed) and present(ed) in useful form for assignment purposes the data placed upon WD AGO Form No.

20.‖ Such officers were expected to be college graduates or possess, ―its equivalent as indicated by a high degree of experience attainment as a personnel manager, employment or placement service manager, supervisor of employment interviewers, educational or vocational counselor,

97 RG 319, NARA II, Box 1, WD Circular No. 317, Overseas Replacements, 31 July 1944, 13, 18.

75 etc.,‖ and also be, ―(w)ell oriented officers with excellent personalit(ies), analytical minds and demonstrated organizing abilit(ies).‖98

Division classification officers were ordered to carefully scrutinize each recruit‘s AGO

Form No. 20 before recommending, ―the assignment which he th(ought) w(ou)l(d) furnish commanders the skills as requisitioned and also a proper balance of intelligence and leadership qualities.‖ The incoming recruit‘s classification results were forwarded to company commanders, who carefully but quickly studied the individual‘s qualifications. The cards were then passed for long-term storage to the Unit Personnel Section of the regiment to which the company belonged. In that way company commanders simply requested and referred to the form when pondering future recommendations for schools, changes in grade, rating, or promotions.99

29th Division classification officers were reminded that Form No. 20, ―must at all times be accurate and available for use.‖ A V Corps memorandum noted the form acted as, ―the unit commander‘s certificate that the man (wa)s qualified to function in (a particular) position.‖

Listed in order of decreasing competence, entries noted, ―each specialty in which the man (wa)s known to be competent, and must (have) indicate(d) the date of qualification and the degree of skill as either semi-skilled or skilled. Any specialty in which a man ha(d) been erroneously rated

‗qualified‘ w(ou)l(d) be lined out and initialed by (his)…….commander.‖ Multiple SSN entries under Classification in Military Specialties when applicable were deemed of particular

98 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, War Department Memorandum, Qualifications of Officers for Assignment. 99 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, War Department Memorandum, Classification in the Field Forces, August 7, 1941, 1.

76 importance early in the war as a result of specialist shortages and the army‘s decision to rely so heavily on previous occupational skills.100

ILLUSTRATION NO. 4 - AGO Form No. 20 (Front)

101

The Carolina Maneuvers provided the War Department an opportunity to observe and criticize personnel management procedures in the field. 29th Division officers ignoring their unit classification officer‘s services or incorrectly completing AGO Form No. 20 were reminded that,

100 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3. V Corps memorandum, Personnel Replacement Procedure, no date, 1. 101 War Department, Technical Manual TM 12-223, Reception Center Operations, 28.

―field operation in the Army‘s classification procedure must be improved if the process of placing the right man in the right job (wa)s to be fully realized.‖102

ILLUSTRATION NO. 5 - AGO Form No. 20 (Back)

103

Classification and Replacement Branch officials had begun attempts to include classification officers in the T/O‘s of divisions and higher army formations in June, 1941 but were confronted with considerable resistance. The Chief of Staff and the WD G-3, along with most field officers, looked unkindly on the role of personnel consultants in combat divisions. A

102 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, War Department Memorandum, Utilization of Military and Civilian Occupational Skills in Units of Assignment, 18 December 1941, 2. 103 War Department, Technical Manual TM 12-223, Reception Center Operations, 29.

78 number of personnel consultants and personnel technicians104 were nonetheless attached on a conditional basis to select divisions beginning in the fall of 1941 as part of the 15% overhead allowed for ‗branch immaterial‘ personnel. A revised infantry division T/O containing provisions for a personnel consultant with the rank of lieutenant was issued in June, 1942.105

Once accepted, however, ―the usual lot of the personnel consultant was not a particularly happy one.‖ Personnel consultants bore no official role other than advising the commanding general on personnel matters. The Classification and Replacement Branch‘s official history declared a personnel officer‘s task, ―was to ‗sell his job‘ to all the people with whom he had to work. If he was thoroughly indoctrinated in Army customs, procedures, and thinking; if he possessed tact, judgment, and sound common sense; if he had a personality that pleased; and if he exercised a great deal of initiative, there was some possibility that he could create for himself a position of importance on the commanding general‘s staff.‖106 Not surprisingly, the elimination of the personnel consultant‘s position from the revised 1945 Infantry Division

T/O&E reflected a gradual souring opinion of psychological classification within the War

Department.107

Confusion and inefficiency were undesirable corollaries of the personnel selection system‘s remarkable transformation and growth. The system hurt the army‘s battlefield product more than it helped because it lacked a clear and institutionalized manpower policy. Its

104 Personnel consultants required a PhD in psychology and appropriate postgraduate experience. Personnel technicians were assigned to divisions if no personnel consultants were available. The prerequisites for personnel technicians were a PhD or one year of graduate school and suitable employment experience. See, Capshew, Psychologists on the March, 105. 105 RG 319, NARA II, Box 77, Personnel Utilization, and Assignment of Military Personnel in the Army of the United States During World War II: A Historical Account of the Activities of the Classification and Replacement Branch, AGO, and its Predecessors During the Period 8 September 1939 to 2 September 1945, 214, 215, 220. 106 Ibid., 220. 107 Ibid., 215.

79 mechanics were convoluted and to make matters worse the War Department frequently modified classification standards, ―without making clear the reasons for the change.‖108 At one point

Classification and Replacement Division officials lamented the existence of eight conflicting

War Department personnel selection directives on which classification officers were expected to base allocation decisions.109 Objective standards were virtually non-existent as a result and misdiagnoses were common.

The personnel selection process unfortunately shifted from being a positive exercise that attempted to provide the right people for the right job to an overly negative process that tried too hard to sift out undesirables. 545,000 soldiers were separated from the U.S. Army as a result of psychiatric screening carried out during WWII. 47% of the total were diagnosed as psychoneurotic, 30% as mentally deficient, inept, possessing a lack of adaptability, or having a psychopathic personality, 10% as psychotic, 9% possessing neurological diseases, and 4% having some other psychiatric disorder. In addition, 10% of all trained replacements awaiting overseas shipment at replacement depots were separated from the army as a result of psychiatric and psychological screening.110 Roving bands of psychologists travelled between theaters of war with orders to eliminate enlisted men, ―from combat units…..not capable of vigorous combat service.‖111

108 Ginzberg, Anderson, Ginsburg, M.D., and Herma, The Ineffective Soldier, Lessons for Management and the Nation: The Lost Divisions, 39. 109 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249. History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF. Utilization of Manpower, 25 January 1944, 1. 110 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Section 2, Economy in Utilization of Personnel, The Magnitude of the Neuropsychiatric Problem, 1942-1945, Table I. 111 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249. History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF. Utilization of Manpower, 6 August 1943, 1.

A further 1,850,000 Americans were rejected on the basis of psychiatric screening without serving a day in the Army.112 Standard procedures called for the rejection of recruits exhibiting any indication of psychiatric distress because, as one War Department official exclaimed, ―there (wa)s no classification for duty of military personnel with such mental diagnoses as psychoneurosis.‖113 Attitudes of, ―when in doubt, reject,‖ and, ―if there is any doubt, reject him, there‘ll be another better one in a few minutes,‖114 were leading causes of the army‘s manpower shortages during World War II and the War Department‘s controversial decision to limit the army to 90 divisions.115 3,447,000 more inductees were discarded because of physical defects. In total, 5,297,000 out of 18,000,000 - or 29% - of young American males examined for military service were rejected on account of physiological or psychiatric defect.116

The rejection rate for similar concerns in the First World War was only 2%. Of the 2%, 37% were disallowed for mental deficiencies, 25% for psychoneurosis, 17% for psychopathic

112 In addition to the aforementioned 545,000 separations. 113 Johnson, ―Manpower Selection and the Preventative Medicine Program,‖ 7. 114 Berlien and Waggoner, ―Part II Administrative Considerations in the Surgeon General‘s Office, Chapter VIII, Selection and Induction,‖ 162. 115 The War Department‘s choice to cap the army at 90 divisions remains a contentious decision. One historian noted, ―(o)f all the calculated risks taken by General George C. Marshall (Chief of Staff, U.S. Army) in World War II none was bolder than the decision in midwar to maintain the U.S. Army‘s ground combat strength at ninety divisions. Students of warfare will long debate whether the decision was as wise as it was courageous, as foresighted as it was successful.‖ See, Maurice Matloff, ―The 90-Division Gamble,‖ in Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History Department of the Army), 365. Another wrote, ―the provision of more combat divisions to overseas theaters would have resulted in fewer casualties over the course of the war…..The limitation of the number of divisions, when combined with the inability…..to adhere to the ―Germany first‖ strategy, resulted in a shortage of divisions when the Western Allies conducted their crucial campaign in France in 1944. This situation forced American commanders to keep their divisions engaged in battle more or less continuously during the campaign.‖ See, Mansoor, G.I. Offensive in Europe, 11. 116 Ginzberg, Anderson, Ginsburg, M.D., and Herma, The Ineffective Soldier, Lessons for Management and the Nation: The Lost Divisions, 35, 36.

81 personality, 15% for neurological diseases, 5% for other neurological disorders, and 1% for psychosis.117

TABLE NO. 3 - Rejection Percentage by Age of Inductee (AGF Sample)

AGE INDUCTED DISQUALIFIED % REJECTED 18-19 77744 32507 29.5% 20-24 67824 29971 30.6% 25-29 40934 28971 41.4% 30-34 34567 34225 49.8% 35-37 16303 22891 58.4% 237372 148565 118

An intensive year-long study of random AGF inductees, begun in January, 1943, illustrated rejection percentages by age bracket. The results, shown in Table No. 3, were discouraging. The rejection of 35.1% of American males in their twenties and 52.9% of inductees aged 30-37 indicated either critical flaws existed in the personnel selection process or that the quality of American manpower was shockingly bad.

The inexcusable loss of so many potential riflemen was compounded when the entire premise of psychiatric screening was eventually disproved. The awakening began late in the war and continued in earnest during the postwar years. Psychiatrists were eventually proven incorrect in viewing, ―mental illness as the result of the inability of certain individuals to cope with stresses that most people experience and not the result of putting normal people in abnormal

(combat) situations.‖119 A personnel selection study conducted late in the war found no link between rigorous pre-induction screening and decreased separations. The authors discovered

117 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Section 2, Economy in Utilization of Personnel, The Magnitude of the Neuropsychiatric Problem, 1942-1945, Table I. 118 Bernard D. Karpinos, ―Height and Weight of Selective Service Registrants Processed for Military Service During World War II,‖ Human Biology 30, no.4 (December, 1958): 294. 119 Wanke, ―American Military Psychiatry and Its Role Among Ground Forces in World War II,‖ 130 and Stone, ―Measuring Men for Useful Assignment,‖ 79, 80.

82 that discharge rates remained similar and remarkably high whether recruits were inducted under lax or vigorous screening procedures.120

Moreover, leading military psychiatrists eventually admitted that psychiatric screening did not accomplish what they had previously proclaimed it capable of. Dr. Willard Machle acknowledged at a 1951 symposium on army manpower selection in World War II, ―that the desirable objective of exclusion of men who w(ou)l(d) become neuropsychiatric casualties later…cannot be met without excluding too great a segment of the available manpower resources.‖121 Indeed, postwar research found combat exhaustion incidences were 43 per 1000 soldiers in 1944 compared to only 25 per 1000 in 1918 despite the introduction of much more rigid psychiatric screening procedures in the Second World War.122

Dr. Clements C. Fry confirmed Machle‘s admission at the same conference. Fry examined the service records of Yale and Harvard students originally diagnosed at induction stations or receptions centers as ‗misfits‘ but later accepted when manpower shortages became acute.123 Fry determined that a vast majority performed adequately or very well during army service despite being originally rejected as a result of psychiatric screening. Fry concluded that it was a, ―recognizable and accepted fact that many people behaved and functioned more successfully than was expected in the military service…..Of the total group of 1686 men in service 159 were discharged, 105 for neuropsychiatric reasons(.) (However) 90 percent of the

120 Lawrence S. Kubie, ―Technical and Organizational Problems in the Selection of Troops,‖ Military Affairs 8, no. 4 (Winter, 1944): 243. 121 Dr. Willard Machle, ―Implications for Physical Standards and Psychiatric Screening,‖ in The Selection of Military Manpower: A Symposium, eds. Leonard Carmichael and Leonard C. Mead (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences – National Resource Council, 1951), 251. 122 William C. Menninger, Psychiatry in a Troubled World (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1948), 345. 123 The ‗misfit‘ label was originally applied on the suspicion of psychosis, psychopathic personality, psychoneurosis, psychoneurotic tendency, depression, homosexuality, probable homosexuality, fear of homosexuality, orientation or the collect-all category of ‗other.‘

(previously diagnosed ‗misfits‘)…..with military records covered in our study served adequately or better from the time of their induction or enlistment to demobilization.‖124

Army officials inflicted other self-imposed manpower losses. Thousands of potential riflemen were rejected for inadequate dental fitness while vague War Department guidelines requiring soldiers to possess only an, ―ability to masticate the army ration,‖ led many replacements to throw away army dispensed dental appliances to avoid overseas service.125

Moreover, the National Guard Bureau and the War Department surprisingly allowed 94,000 guardsmen to voluntarily resign between the announcement of the National Guard‘s mobilization and the spring of 1941 when induction of Guard divisions had concluded.126

The War Department‘s rigid focus on the production of specialists further intensified already critical infantry shortages in the U.S. Army. 63 out of every 100 army recruits were trained as specialists in August, 1942. By September, 1943 that number had climbed to 90 out of

100 recruits.127 An additional 17,000 combat replacements were diverted in May, 1943 to form specialist formations such as quartermaster and military police units.128 Fifth Army‘s composition during the campaign in Italy testifies to the army‘s focus on specialists. Of the

200,000 strong formation, only 77,000 soldiers belonged to either an infantry or armored division. Moreover, less than half of that number belonged to a company or battalion that

124 Dr. Clements C. Fry, ―A Study of the Rejection Causes, Success and Subsequent Performance of Special Groups,‖ in The Selection of Military Manpower: A Symposium, eds. Leonard Carmichael and Leonard C. Mead (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences – National Resource Council, 1951), 142. 125 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 10. 126 Michael E. Weaver. Guard Wars, 22. 127 RG 165, NARA II, Box 100, Bureau of Public Relations Press Release titled Million Youths Voluntarily Enrolling in Pre-Induction Training Courses, dated September 26, 1943. 128 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 8.

actually engaged the enemy.129 An overwhelming majority of Fifth Army‘s strength had in fact

been classified and trained as specialists. A teeth-to-tail comparison of U.S. Armies from the

two world wars highlights the focus on specialists during WWII. 47.3% of the American

Expeditionary Force (AEF) was composed of ground combat troops while only 13% of its

manpower was employed in support positions. The numbers during WWII were 37.3% and

21.2%, respectively.130

CHART NO. 4 - Commissioned Replacements in the ETO (Feb.-July 1944)

Officers 9000 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 Feb 14 Feb 28 March 13 March 30 April 13 April 30 May 13 May 29 June 13 June 29 July 13 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 131 The army inducted sufficient manpower but suffered persistent infantry shortages

because of its focus on specialists. Charts 4 and 5 illustrate that the total number of enlisted and

officer replacements (from all SSN‘s) in the ETO actually grew from early 1944 to the midpoint

of the Normandy Campaign. Unfortunately, most of the surpluses were specialists requiring

129 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 16. 130 RG 319, NARA II, Box 124, Table I, The Army in the Two Wars: Aggregate Strengths. 131 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Replacement Pipeline, 6.

lengthy infantry conversion training before they could be used to offset chronic riflemen

shortages.

CHART NO. 5 - Enlisted Replacements in the ETO (Feb.-July 1944)

Enlisted Men 120000

100000

80000

60000

40000

20000

0 Feb 14 Feb 28 March 13 March 30 April 13 April 30 May 13 May 29 June 13 June 29 July 13 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 1944 132 The Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) represented another example of the

army‘s preoccupation with specialists. The ASTP was inaugurated in December, 1942 and

became operational at colleges and universities across the nation in April, 1943. Ostensibly, the

ASTP was inaugurated to ensure a ready supply of officer material for the U.S. Army and to

provide general, technical, and professional training at the collegiate level, ―in fields of

immediate value to the Army.‖133 Program creators envisioned a plan that molded

psychologically selected enlisted men into specialist officers through basic military training and

132 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Replacement Pipeline, 6. 133 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, School Division, Headquarters, ASF Memorandum on the Army Specialized Training Program, 1.

86 specialized secondary education.134 Despite its grand designs, the ASTP was primarily a response to a similar Navy program already in place. Representing the Army‘s chief rival for potential officer material, the Navy had previously developed a program that signed draft- eligible males attending college to an agreement allowing them to remain in school and to be deferred from the draft. Participants subsequently joined the Navy as commissioned officers when their services were deemed necessary by Navy officials.135

The ASTP‘s maximum strength was originally capped at 150,000 trainees, though this figure later became its minimum capacity as enthusiasm for the plan grew.136 College officials witnessing decreased enrolments sensed the ASTP represented an opportunity to reverse the trend. A shrewd university administrator reminded army officials the ASTP would ensure future supplies of, ―liberally trained arts groups and scientifically trained technical groups,‖ and would prevent the loss of this, ―seed corn.‖137

Administrative policies and training curricula were negotiated between War Department personnel and representatives of the American education system.138 Sharp distinctions of opinion existed within the War Department and the education system of how far the ASTP

134 Army training given to ASTP candidates was a modified version of training infantry training provided at Infantry RTC‘s. It consisted of thirteen 48 hour weeks of instruction. Participants also received specialized university education in the field for which they were most suited. See, RG 319, NARA II, Box 124, HQ AGF Historical Section, 15 May 1945, Basic Military Training for ASTP Candidates, 1, 2, 4. 135 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Memorandum from G.H. Dorr to Dr. Arthur L. H. Rubin, Draft History of the ASTP, 5 September 1945, 3-6. 136 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, School Division, Headquarters, ASF Memorandum on the Army Specialized Training Program, 11. 137 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Memorandum from G.H. Dorr to Dr. Arthur L.W. Rubin, Draft of History of ASTP, dated 5 September 1945, 3-4. It is clear in the memorandum that Dorr was an apologist for the ASTP. 138 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, School Division, HQ, ASF, Army Specialized Training Program, ASTP Training Requirements, Summary of Initial ASTP Policies Governing Training Requirements, 1.

87 should go in, ―‗teaching the men how to think,‘ and how far it should be related to specialized work to be done in the Army.‖139

Selection methods varied considerably throughout the program‘s tenure.140 Some aspiring ASTP participants, though qualified in every other respect, found themselves unable to attend due to financial limitations. In other words, the ASTP harkened back to days when well- off individuals could buy their way out of the draft. The President of Harvard University observed that the ASTP, ―was undemocratic (because) it made the exemption from the draft dependent on parental financial ability to send a son to college.‖141 A draft board member noted the irony in how, ―the thirst for education….had suddenly sprung up among well-to-do parents for the younger generation.‖142

The Army responded by assuming absolute control over the selection of ASTP candidates and the program‘s curriculum. Participants received basic training prior to attending college, and would be, ―on active duty (while attending) and not as college students in inactive reserve…..(T)hey were to be clothed, housed, fed, organized into units and paid as soldiers.‖

Financial imbalances nevertheless remained, as the army chose not to pay students‘ tuition fees.143

The long term viability of the ASTP began to be questioned soon after the invasion of

Sicily. The AGF was forced to respond to loss replacement shortages in the Mediterranean theater by stripping 26,000 infantrymen from divisions preparing for overseas service. The

139 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Memorandum from G.H. Dorr to Dr. Arthur L.W. Rubin, Draft of History of ASTP, dated 5 September 1945, 2-3. 140 Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 33. 141 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Memorandum from G.H. Dorr to Dr. Arthur L.W. Rubin, Draft of History of ASTP, dated 5 September 1945, 7-8. 142 Ibid., 7-8. 143 Ibid., 15-16.

88 administrative maneuver was particularly damning to the ASTP when it was revealed that a sufficient quantity of infantry replacements could have been produced had the program not reserved 26,000 valuable RTC slots for ASTP candidates. It only made matters worse when few of these candidates appeared at their appointed time and RTCs were forced to operate well below capacity.144

Increasingly severe infantry shortages soon led to calls for the program‘s cancellation.

General Marshall called for program reductions in a memorandum to the Secretary of War dated

10 February 1944. Despite Stimson‘s ardent support of the program, Marshall noted there no longer remained any justification for holding 140,000 men in the program, ―when it represent(ed) the only source from which we can obtain the required personnel, especially with a certain degree of intelligence and training…..If (the Secretary of War) fe(lt) that the Specialized

Training Program must be continued approximately at present strength, then the following action must be taken immediately: 10 Divisions, 3 Tank Battalions and 26 Anti-aircraft Battalions will be disbanded or deactivated. Even so we will still be short some 90,000 men and are now considering today whether or not we must disband combat units to meet the deficiency.‖145

The Secretary of War announced six days later that effective 1 April the ASTP would be capped at 30,000 students while the remaining trainees would be, ―released before 1 April 1944 and……distributed in grade in accordance with (Army) priorities.‖146 Participant morale disintegrated as it became apparent the program was failing. The ASTP was ignominiously cancelled later in April, 1944 as monthly intakes proved, ―too small to justify maintenance of a

144 Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 37. 145 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Memorandum from the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of War contained in, School Division, Headquarters, ASF Memorandum on the Army Specialized Training Program, 14, 15. 146 Ibid., 16.

89 special Basic Training Center.‖147 ROTC officers, to whom the Army was legally obligated, received commissions while disillusioned ASTP members were sent to frontline units as privates.148

29th Division veterans responding to the ASTP in postwar interviews generally had negative views of the program. A clerk who served in the division after being refused entry into the ASTP later stated, ―Am I glad I didn‘t get into the (ASTP.) Those boys wound up as inf(antry) replacements.‖149 Another 29th Division combat veteran signed a waiver to go to OCS on the promise of ASTP training after 17 weeks of basic training only to witness the program‘s demise. The soldier, a pre-med college student when drafted, remembered being, ―sad and angry

(because) a promise (had been) broken.‖150

ASTP officials were keen to protect the program‘s postwar reputation despite its turbulent wartime history. An academic and wartime administrator of the program holding the opinion ―that the principal value of the ASTP was to buy off the opposition of the small colleges to the eighteen year old draft legislation,‖ was disqualified from writing the ASTP‘s official history because he was, ―far less inclined to defend the program.‖151

War Department officials distributed a postwar questionnaire to 1731 universities and colleges to determine the ASTP‘s impact on institutions of higher learning. 326 of 853 respondents reported that armed forces programs had been conducted at their institution.

147 RG 319, NARA II, Box 124, HQ AGF Historical Section, 15 May 1945, Basic Military Training for ASTP Candidates, 9. 148 Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 37, 39. 149 USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 6815. 150 USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 225. 151 The officer deemed insufficiently sympathetic to the ASTP was Major Douglas Waples from the University of Chicago and member of the Army Specialized Training Division‘s, Curricula and Standards Branch. See, RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Memorandum dated 28 June 1945, author unknown.

Participation rates were understandably much lower at Women‘s, Theological, and African-

American establishments as well as at Junior Colleges.152

Responses varied but were decidedly negative. Program administrators observed that between ten and twenty percent of the men selected should not have been part of the program.

Most of the attendees were chosen largely on the basis of AGCT results, which did not select men on the basis of their academic background but was more of an indicator of general intelligence. This resulted in, ―many men lacking adequate preparation in mathematics and sciences (being) sent to be trained in a program that (was) very heavily loaded with these subjects.‖153 Sixteen respondents believed trainees did not understand why they were a part of the ASTP or what the general objectives of the program were.‖154 In a particularly harsh criticism of the program, one respondent noted, ―(t)he relationship between the civilian and the enlisted student seems to me to be deteriorating. There seems more of a tendency for the one to question the adequate war justification of the other. To a certain extent, the college seems to be split in two parts, one busy on the war and the other busy trying to escape the war. The place of all should be identified in a total war.‖155 An administrator from an institution declining participation declared, ―with the exception of the men who are to become doctors and….dentists,

(the ASTP) was not necessary. The great majority of the young fellows would have done just as well if they had gone straight into the service.‖156

A postwar history of the ASTP conducted by the AGF‘s historical section was equally critical:

152 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, The Effect of the War Upon Colleges and Universities, 3. 153 Ibid., 12-13. 154 Ibid., 6. 155 Ibid., 16. 156 Ibid., 22.

During a period when the War Department was issuing special directives designed ‗to prevent a breakdown of the replacement,‘ when extension of RTC training cycles was curtailing the flow of replacements, and when divisions in training were being disrupted to supply loss replacements, facilities and personnel for training approximately 25,000 replacement a quarter were idle, used neither for their normal mission nor for the task for which they had been converted. From May to October (1943) facilities at Camp Hood…..stood unused, manned by 257 officers and 1301 enlisted men doing nothing. Facilities and personnel at Fort Benning, sufficient to receive and train 2,000 men a week….were lavished on 427 men by mid-July, when 12,000 men should have arrived. This extravagant wastefulness resulted either from gross over-estimate of the number of ASTP candidates to be inducted, or from failure to induct them on schedule, or both.157

The ASTP represented one more example of the Army‘s desire to create a technologically-advanced force of specialists. Bureaucratic inefficiencies were simply by- products of a wasteful program. Navy officials have escaped similar criticism despite inaugurating the program on which the ASTP was based.158 Contextually, only 1.3% of total army strength and 1.5% of the AGF‘s manpower in the United States was dedicated to the ASTP in its first three training cycles.159 Though these percentages represented a significant percentage of the army‘s domestic strength, they were miniscule in comparison to manpower losses brought about by the personnel selection system. The ASTP may have exemplified the War

Department‘s focus on specialists but it amounted to nothing more than a minor contributor to infantry shortages in the U.S. Army.

The Army‘s preoccupation with specialists and its implementation of rigid classification standards created specific manpower issues for the 29th Division. The unit suffered perpetual deficiencies in combat arm replacements, all the while possessing excesses of difficult to absorb technicians and senior NCO's. In April, 1943, for example, the division was short 2,539 artillery

157 RG 319, NARA II, Box 124, HQ AGF Historical Section, 15 May 1945, Basic Military Training for ASTP Candidates, 9-10. 158 This may have been a result of the Navy not having experienced a similar manpower crisis or having focused so heavily on the production of specialists. 159 RG 319, NARA II, Box 124, Provision of Students to the Army Specialized Training Program by the Three Major Forces for the First Three Training Cycles.

92 and infantry replacements but was forced to carry excess specialists.160 The division continued to carry an excess of 250 technicians later that summer despite remaining short in the T/O aggregate.161 A 29th Division report summarizing training for the month noted an, ―acute shortage of enlisted personnel existed in all rifle companies and field artillery batteries.‖ A V

Corps addendum remarked that the shortages, ―seriously affect(ed) the combat efficiency of the

Corps.‖162

This striking imbalance was common in units training in England. Specialists were frequently assigned to V Corps for which no provisions existed.163 The 29th Division received one shipment of filler replacements in June, 1943 containing an excess of forty Technicians,

Grades 4 and 5. The division received 2,678 replacements during the month of which 347

(12.9%) were grades 1-5 despite the maximum composition of specialists in any shipment from those grades having been set at five percent in March, 1943.164 Personnel officers were not allowed to assign specialists to a position other than that designated in AR 615-26. The situation became particularly acute in July, 1943. Personnel officers repeatedly shifted specialists between units within the division or attempted to transfer their excesses to other divisions. Units were forced to simply carry overages when no other option existed even though the practice was officially discouraged 165

Division officials pressed V Corps for a definite policy whether the technical ratings of excess specialists could be terminated where no vacancies existed. The 29th Division

160 RG 338, NARA II, Box 1, V Corps G-3 Report, May, 1943, 2. 161 RG 338, NARA II, Box 65, V Corps, Overseas Replacement System, 20 August 1943. 162 RG 338, NARA II, Box 1, V Corps G-3 Report, May, 1943, 3. 163 RG 338, NARA II, Box 65, V Corps, Reduction of Technicians, 22 June 1943. 164 RG 338, NARA II, Box 65, WD Memorandum No. W600-31-43, March 1943. 165 RG 338, NARA II, Box 65, V Corps, HQ V Corps, Excess Technicians, 6 July 1943 and HQ V Corps, Excess Technicians, 29th Division, 29 June 1943.

93 commander noted in a memorandum to V Corps that the system was, ―not (in) a satisfactory condition,‖ and suggested the War Department study the situation to determine whether itself or the replacement command in England were to blame.166 V Corps forwarded the memorandum to

ETOUSA a fortnight later, adding, ―to reduce such men, often well qualified in their specialty, to the grade of private because of lack of position vacancies (wa)s an injustice to the men, and to assign them to a unit where there (wa)s no need for the qualifications (wa)s a waste of talent.‖167

To alleviate concerns the War Department announced in January, 1944 that surplus technicians were to wear the rank and receive the pay of their grade but were not to command troops on the basis of their rank and that T/4‘s and T/5‘s could only become an assistant squad leader in the case of a battlefield emergency.168 The order may have partially clarified a murky command hierarchy but it did little to solve the imbalance in riflemen and specialists faced by the

29th Division.

Field commanders became displeased with replacement quality shortly after the Torch landings in November, 1942 despite rigid classification benchmarks. WD G-3 officials responded by directing the AGF to impose even stricter personnel selection standards during the induction process.169 Not surprisingly, manpower shortages worsened as a result. Stricter classification standards resulted in fewer than 50% of inductees earmarked for infantry service actually reaching front line units.170 The AGF reported being deficient 139,500 enlisted infantry

166 RG 338, NARA II, Box 65, 29th I.D. memorandum to V Corps, Noncommissioned Officer Replacements, 29 June 1943. 167 Ibid. 168 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, World War II, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Book Four, Matters Affecting Replacement System – World-Wide, I, Allocation of Manpower, 2. 169 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 8. 170 Ibid., 15, 16.

94 replacements in July, 1943,171 and the fall of 1943 was said to have represented, ―the period of highest attrition in the whole history of the Replacement Training Centers.‖172

Separation losses and soaring rejection numbers received greater attention as infantry shortages intensified. The War Department blamed liberal classification provisions found in

Section III of Circular 161 (Discharge of Enlisted Men below Induction Standards) for excessive rejections.173 Their concern was justified - 55,000 trained soldiers were separated from tactical units between August and November, 1943 (on average, 500 men per division) on the basis of

Circular 161.174

Excessive personnel losses resulting from strict classification guidelines eventually forced War Department officials to implement corrective measures. Circular 293 was hurriedly released to combat worrisome separation and rejection rates. The directive, ―prohibited the discharge from the Army of men able to do any useful work.‖175 In addition, General Marshall took unilateral action to combat growing infantry shortages in early 1944. The Chief of Staff sought to reduce discharges by transferring physically and mentally competent soldiers toiling in overhead positions to combat units and replacing them with ‗limited service‘ individuals that

171 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249, History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF, Filler Replacement Situation, 23 July 1944. 172 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946,, 15, 16. 173 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249, History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF, Utilization of Manpower, 21 September 1943, 1. 174 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Army Classification Methods, 7, and Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 45, 46. 175 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Army Classification Methods, 7, and Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 45, 46.

95 might otherwise have been separated.176 Marshall cautioned General Eisenhower that current manpower restrictions necessitated better use of the nation‘s manpower:

Dear Eisenhower

The present manpower situation is critical. There is a shortage of planned strength by several hundred thousand men. The situation has been aggravated by a tendency to discharge men who could render further useful service, and the excessive use of physically qualified personnel in limited service positions. Since physically perfect men are not available in the quantities desired, the Army must be maintained with the personnel at hand, and it rests with the commander to do so. A commander who permits the discharge of any enlisted man, in preference to making the necessary effort to properly place and training him, fails to meet his responsibilities. There have also been indications of a lack of sufficient emphasis upon the preventative maintenance of the individual. Training in mental and physical hygiene, sanitation, and other preventative measures must be intensified. Unit commanders whose inadequate leadership is reflected in a high preventable sick rate, or high rate of discharge, or transfer for physical or mental reasons, must be replaced. The country cannot afford, nor can the Army tolerate, any wastage of suitable manpower. The necessary preventative measures are inherent in the proper exercise of command functions, and it is desired that the matter be given your prompt personal and continuing attention.177

Marshall also ordered greater focus placed on an inductee‘s physical attributes during personnel classification at the expense of educational and occupational backgrounds and psychiatric screening. In the process, the Chief of Staff hoped to relieve manpower shortages by reducing the number of rejections at induction stations and reception centers while also lowering the number of mental and physical breakdowns in combat.178 The shift of classification focus to physical endurance also proved necessary when it became apparent that the 90 division gamble

176 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the Preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Army Classification Methods, 5, 6 and RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249, History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF. Utilization of Manpower, 20 January 1944, 1. 177 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3, Memorandum from Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, 6 January 1944. 178 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249, History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF. Utilization of Manpower, 12 January 1944, 1 and 20 January 1944.

96 and the decision to triangulate infantry divisions precluded unit rotation and that War

Department officials had overlooked the importance of providing soldiers periodic breaks from the stresses of frontline service. The inevitable result of the misguided personnel selection system when combined with the lack of unit rotation was alarming numbers of psychological breakdowns within combat formations.179 AGF and War Department officials continued acrimonious debate over rejection standards on the grounds of psychiatric disability as late as

July, 1944 while units like the 29th Division were forced to suffer debilitating infantry shortages.180

The War Department eventually adopted a modified Canadian physical profiling plan following Marshall‘s call for increased importance on physical stature. The Canadian system, known as PULHEMS, classified recruits via a seven step process, each with a pre-determined number of grades. P referred to general physique, U to upper extremities, L to lower extremities,

H to hearing, E to eyesight, M to mental capacity, and S to mental stability.181 U, L, H, and E classifications remained the same in the modified American system, while P referred to physical capacity or stamina and S to neuropsychiatric characteristics and mental stability. The M portion of the classification system was dropped as AGCT results were deemed a sufficient indicator of an inductee‘s mental capacity. Number grades from 1-4 were assigned to each of the six divisions, with one being the top score and four the worst. Three profile groupings were then assigned to classify inductees: ―‘A‘ – E(nlisted) M(en) with a serial of 211211 or better; ‗B‘ –

179 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Army Classification Methods, 7, and Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 14. 180 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249. History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF. Neuropsychiatric Qualifications for Overseas Service, 12 July 1944, 1. 181 RG 24, Department of National Defence, Record Group 24, Library and Archives Canada, Box 1, J. Howard Fonds – Personnel Selection, X – PULHEMS, 98-100.

E(nlisted) M(en) whose profile (wa)s between 322231 up to 211211; (and) ‗C‘ – E(nlisted)

M(en) whole profile (wa)s between 333231 up to 322231.182

Additional measures designed to curb the production of excess specialists were subsequently instituted. The maximum allowable percentage of RTC graduates syphoned off for attendance at specialist schools was capped at 5% and henceforth they were not to be transferred to either the ASTP or to the Army Air Corps. Losses of trained infantry replacements were subsequently reduced, though Army Air Corps and ASTP officials often circumvented War

Department safeguards by cherry-picking top inductees at replacement centers before they could enter the AGF replacement stream.183

Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, later echoed

Marshall‘s call for greater emphasis on physical attributes as he grew to sense that physically stronger men were better prepared to withstand the rigors of combat.184 Changes of heart by the

Chiefs of Staff of both the War Department and GHQ represented the strongest possible rejection of the personnel classification system utilized by the U.S. Army for the majority of WWII.

Chart 6 confirms McNair and Marshall‘s late war transformations. The argument that young males from states like Texas, Virginia, Kentucky, and West Virginia possessing lower than average education levels were less capable of becoming successful riflemen was indeed a difficult proposition. Audie Murphy, a Texan with a Grade 5 education, fared well on the battlefield. Chart 6 also illustrates how closely psychiatric rejections mirrored education levels

182 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249, History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF, Physical Profile Plan, 18 May 1944, 1 and RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Army Classification Methods, 5, 7. 183 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 16. 184 Ibid., 17.

in most states, except where high percentages of white males quit school prior to completing

Grade Six. Similarities in states such as Massachusetts, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio,

Wisconsin, Colorado, Utah, and Oregon suggests psychiatric screening represented nothing more

than a redundant general intelligence test.

CHART NO. 6 - Rates of Sixth Grade Attainment or Less and Rejections for Military Service on Psychiatric Grounds, White Males, By State, World War II (per 1,000)

300

250

200

150

100

D.C.

Utah

Iowa Ohio

Idaho

Texas

Maine

Illinois

Florida Kansas

Indiana Oregon

Nevada

Georgia Arizona

Virginia

Louisian

Vermont Montana

Missouri

Alabama

Arkansas Colorado

Nebraska

Deleware

Michigan

Maryland Kentucky

Wyoming wisconsin

California

Oklahoma

New York New

Minnesota

Tennesssee

Mississippi

New Jersey New

Connecticut Washington

New Mexico New

Rhode Rhode Island

Pennsylvania

North North Dakota Dakota South

West Virginia West

Massachusetts

North North Carolina

South Carolina South New Hampshire New

Educational Achievement, White Males 18-34 (1940) - Sixth Grade or Less Psychiatric Rejections

185

185 Ginzberg, Anderson, Ginsburg, M.D., and Herma, The Ineffective Soldier, Lessons for Management and the Nation: The Lost Divisions, 172-173.

The personnel classification system‘s administrators produced reactive solutions to manpower issues that required proactive consideration. Many of the War Department‘s kneejerk responses, ―completely reverse(d) instructions issued only several weeks previously. On such occasions, induction examiners, including psychiatrists, were understandably confused and exasperated in their efforts to develop and maintain a consistent professional viewpoint toward selection for military service.‖186

A mid-war summary of the U.S. Army‘s personnel selection system illustrated the level of disconnect prevalent in classification circles. It described the typical inductee as, ―a young law school graduate who…….studied physics and engineering before entering law, whose hobby

(wa)s tele-type design, and who ha(d) just left a job as clerk in a patent lawyer‘s office. The classifier may (have) designate(d) his main civilian occupation as lawyer, his second best occupation as clerk, and his recommended army assignment as the Signal Corps, where, after a few weeks of basic training, he may (have) go(ne) to a communications school.‖187 Few, if any, inductees would have fit this profile and its use further demonstrates the War Department‘s fixation with specialists.

In another attempt to circumvent specialist shortages, War Department officials began to place, ―great(er) emphasis on the utilization of pre-induction skills of all E(nlisted) M(en.)‖

Classification officers were ordered to assign inductees with job and life experience to specialist positions, although the results, ―of such measures (was the) concentrat(ion) (of) the residue in

186 Berlien, M.D. and Waggoner, M.D., ―Part II Administrative Considerations in the Surgeon General‘s Office, Chapter VIII, Selection and Induction,‖ 163-165 187 RG 24, Department of National Defence, Record Group 24, Library and Archives Canada, Box 1, J. Howard Fonds, The Army Personnel System at Work, 3.

100 combat arms with consequent lack therein of intelligence and leadership ability.‖188 In other words, younger soldiers without a pre-draft career were more likely to be assigned to the combat arms regardless of AGCT test results and inductees with life experience capable of helping them learn more quickly in combat were usually assigned to specialist positions. This mandate worsened riflemen shortages and played a larger role in rifle companies receiving recruits less able to adopt on the battlefield than assignments based on AGCT results.

AGF officials criticized War Department policy for the allocation of so many inductees scoring Grades III, IV, and V on the AGCT to the infantry. Many historians later echoed this sentiment.189 However, it is not clear that depressed AGCT averages had any effect on the

AGF‘s fighting ability. The AGCT was never intended as a predictor of combat ability but was designed instead to identify and group potential specialists for training purposes.190 War

Department requirement bulletins used by Reception Center Classification Officers dictated assignment patterns to a far greater extent than AGCT scores. Military psychologists conducting the AGCT and other personnel selection examinations possessed a far greater degree of influence on the shape and identity of the U.S. Army than the AGCT itself. Anonymous personnel consultants toiling at Induction Stations and Reception Centers represented the final authority

188 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249. History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF. Utilization of Manpower, 6 August 1943, 1. 189 See for example, Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 3, 25, 42, Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, 41, and John Sloan Brown, Draftee Division, 14, 15. 190 Staff, Personnel Research Section, Classification and Replacement Branch, The Adjutant General‘s Office, ―The Army General Classification Test,‖ Psychological Bulletin 42, no. 10 (1943): 766.

101 whether illiterate, yet otherwise functional, inductees were accepted or discharged and dictated where and how those accepted would serve the army.191

Combat setbacks are often brushed aside and too easily attributed to inferior manpower quality assigned to the infantry on the basis of AGCT results. On one hand it is said the infantry was saddled with lower intelligence manpower and on the other the typical American G.I. is lauded for an inherent or learned ability to adapt quickly during combat.192 Both cannot be the case, unless AGCT results were fundamentally inconsequential. Moreover, it is entirely possible that inductees scoring in lower grades of the AGCT made better combatants. In that case the infantry got the cream of the crop.

First U.S. Army‘s Inspector General testified after the war that the Army had produced,

―too many MOS‘s.‖ The revelation had dire consequences for soldiers classified and trained as specialists. The time lag in allocating, training, and transporting greater percentages of inductees to the fighting arms forced the hasty conversion of specialists already in the ETO to riflemen.

Unfortunately, many former specialists:

had forgotten much of their basic infantry training…..(and) were……not ready to be committed to anything as vicious as the hedgerow fighting in Normandy. The tactical situation demanded that they be committed, however, in spite of the high losses that resulted because of their insufficient training. One division commander refused to

191 RG 319, NARA II, Box 77, Personnel Utilization, and Assignment of Military Personnel in the Army of the United States During World War II: A Historical Account of the Activities of the Classification and Replacement Branch, AGO, and its Predecessors During the Period 8 September 1939 to 2 September 1945, 217. 192 For the argument of low average intelligence levels in infantry units see, Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 3, 25, 42, Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, 11-12, 40-42, and Brown, Draftee Division, 14, 15. For the adaptability argument see, Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, 5, Russell Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 74, and Doubler, Closing with the Enemy, 4-5, 273.

102

accept personal responsibility for committing one shipment of replacements to action though his division was urgently in need of men to fight.‖193

Another postwar replacement system report provides a stark depiction of the effects on specialists hurriedly trained as riflemen:

Replacements in the principal categories of combat infantry were seldom available in adequate numbers and training to meet the needs of divisions (fighting in Normandy.) This was especially true in the case of infantry riflemen. The necessity of selecting all possible substitute MOS‘s for infantry riflemen resulted in the assignment to infantry combat units of replacements whose chances of surviving long enough at the front to learn how to live were reduced to a minimum. Infantry riflemen, automatic riflemen, machine gunners and mortarmen cannot be trained ‗on the job.‘ Only a vicious cycle of greater losses and greater needs of replacements result(ed.)…..(R)eplacements arrived at the army replacement battalion who, actually, were infantry in name only. The basic infantry training which these replacements had once received had been lost during intervening months of non-combat type assignments. At least 50% of the infantry replacements received were almost valueless as immediate combat infantry replacements…….The hedgerow warfare…..required thoroughly trained combat infantrymen. Excessive casualties resulted in the partially trained infantry replacements.194

The formation of an army composed largely of specialists was nonetheless appealing to a large percentage of American soldiers. A sample conducted in 1943, ―encouragingly

…….indicated that 78 percent of the men studied were doing military work related to their civilian occupational specialty.‖195 A separate survey noted that only seventeen percent of the men possessing useful civilian trades, ―were (being) used.…..in some activity different from

193 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Appendix 20, Statements by Colonel Rosser L. Hunter, 24 June 1947, 2. 194 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Report of Operations of the Replacement System within a Field Army in the ETO, 20 October 1943 – 8 May 1945, VIII Operation of the Replacement System within the Army Area on the Continent, 22, 23, 29. 195 John D. Millet, United States Army in World War II, The Army Service Forces: The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 100.

103 previous civilian experience.‖196 A parallel civilian occupation to SSN 0745 – MOS Rifleman did not exist in American culture. It is therefore difficult to understand why it was deemed encouraging that 78% of soldiers sampled were employed in a military occupation relating directly to their pre-service occupation. It does, however, manifestly illustrate why the army was perpetually short of infantry.

Psychologists and War Department officials badly underestimated the importance of riflemen. The multi-echeloned classification system cost the U.S. Army more than five million potential infantry replacements while providing few tangible benefits. The rush to develop and instill psychological screening in the U.S. Army generated a convoluted administrative structure and a systematic overlap of responsibilities between separate yet virtually identical organizations. The classification process became increasingly negative, but was never able to weed out perceived undesirables regardless of how many inductees were rejected. The justification for the adoption of such a complicated personnel selection in the first place is unclear, especially when considering how successful prewar 29th Division guardsmen proved to be on the battlefield and the simple classification system they were inducted by.

War Department officials eventually disavowed the personnel selection system after acknowledging that it harmed the army more than it helped. Until that admission army bureaucrats had sought:

men without any blemish – physical or mental, or emotional. For this reason during most of 1941 and 1942 it rejected among other men those who were illiterate and those who were suffering from venereal disease. Unfortunately the number of each, as well as the numbers rejected for other deficiencies (perceived such as various psychoses), mounted rapidly and soon reached a very high figure. Tremendous backlogs of rejectees with one or another handicap accumulated at each local Selective Service Board throughout the country. When the tightness in the manpower pool began to manifest

196 Palmer, ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality,‖ 10.

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itself the Army had to readjust its standards and be willing to accept men with defects that had previously been disqualified.197

The damage to units like the 29th Division had already been done by the time War

Department officials acknowledged the system‘s errors. Social scientists and War Department officials quick to blame the quality of American manpower for the system‘s faults were reminded by one postwar report that:

Statements are frequent that the Nation, and the Armed Forces, in (WWII) reached the ‗bottom of the barrel‘ of manpower. That (wa)s not so. It cannot be accepted that this nation remotely approached the burdens, the privations, and the losses of other nations……It cannot be conceded that the 12,000,000 men in the Armed Forces was not adequate to any situation which developed in the past war…..198

The United States never reached the bottom of the manpower barrel during WWII. War

Department officials and social scientists like Walter V. Bingham missed the key to Plato‘s oration on military personnel classification – ‗if we can.‘ History has proven that they could not.

The foundation of perpetual infantry shortages in units like the 29th Division was a misguided and inefficient classification system that failed in its attempts to create a technologically advanced army of specialists.

197 Ginzberg, Anderson, Ginsburg, M.D., and Herma, The Ineffective Soldier, Lessons for Management and the Nation: The Lost Divisions, 27. 198 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Section I, Allocation of Manpower, 1.

105

CHAPTER THREE THE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

The replacement (in the U.S. Army) is an individual assigned or destined for assignment to fill a vacancy in an organization.1

The history of the replacement in the U.S. Army dates to colonial times, though usage of the term ‗replacement system‘ only began during the First World War. Early U.S. Army replacement methods were based on European models, especially the British militia system.

Personnel procurement and their classification, training, and eventual unit assignment were administered by the army‘s recruiting services prior to World War I. Procedural alterations were instituted during the Great War, however, and separate agencies became responsible for (a) personnel procurement, (b) personnel selection, and (c) replacement administration.2

To complicate matters, however, there was no such thing as a distinct ‗Replacement

System‘ in the U.S. Army during World War II. Instead, a succession of frequently modified

War Department agencies, each having a particular responsibility for one aspect of the replacement ‗assembly-line‘ process, were involved in the production of individual replacements. The ‗assembly-line‘ process included the computation of loss replacement rates six months in advance and the subsequent assignment of inductees to branch specific replacement training centers. The replacement process also encompassed the recruit‘s training, and decisions on his shipment to a port of embarkation, theater of operation, and specific combat unit. The lack of an overarching and consistent hierarchical structure was the cause of most of the problems associated with the army‘s replacement system during World War II. This same fact makes it impossible to pin the system‘s difficulties on any one organization.

1 The official definition of a replacement according to the Dictionary of United States Army Military Terms. See, Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army, 1. 2 Ibid., 1-4.

106

Nevertheless, the convoluted and ever-changing replacement process utilized by the U.S.

Army during World War II ensued after years of planning and testing. War Department officials sought to build the best possible system and were willing to learn lessons from any available source, including the AEF‘s experiences on the Western Front. The WWI replacement system was never able to offset battle and non-battle losses. AEF officials attempted a unit replacement system to replace battle casualties but found the process unfeasible. A revised individual replacement system was eventually settled upon and utilized for the remainder of the war.

Separate depot brigades attached to combat divisions were responsible for the provision of trained filler and loss replacements on an individual, rather than unit, basis.3 In practice, however, depot brigades rarely supplied replacements from the various arms and services at proportions called for in division T/O‘s, providing at times too many of one qualification and none of others. Moreover, burdensome administration obligations often hampered the provision of sufficiently trained replacements:

Depot brigade officials soon found it necessary to devote so much time to the reception of men, the preparation of records, the administering of intelligence and trade tests, and to the performance of other tasks that they had little time for the training of recruits. The details involved in the reception, classification, immunization, and assignment of enlisted men finally became so complex that they took up all the time of the officers and men who were operating the depot brigades.4

3 A loss replacement represented, ―an officer, or an enlisted man or woman to be used to fill a shortage (regardless of grade) in the authorized strength of an active constituted unit, organized under a standard or special Table of Organization and Equipment or Table of Organization or in an allotment authorized by the War Department. Such shortage may result from the loss of individuals due to any cause other than….(l)osses due to rotational procedures…..(or) transfers.‖ A filler replacement referred to, ―an officer or enlisted man or woman supplied to provide initially the full authorized strength of a constituted unit local activated with War Department approval……Fillers are not be confused with (loss) replacements.‖ See, RG 319, NARA II, Box 1, WD Circular No. 317, Overseas Replacements, 31 July 1944, 2, 3. 4 Lt. Colonel Leonard L. Lerwill, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1954), 225-226.

107

Severe infantry shortages forced leaders to strip inadequately trained recruits from divisions still training in the U.S. to serve as hasty combat loss replacements in France. Reports surfaced of draftees arriving at the front with as little as two weeks of military training. General

Pershing pleaded for a better replacement system after witnessing firsthand the quality of replacement arriving in France. U.S. Army forces were short 119,690 replacements by October,

1918, 95,303 of which were infantrymen. Shortages forced the reduction of authorized division strengths by 4,000 soldiers and the size of rifle companies to 174 riflemen. General Pershing cabled the War Department in August, 1918, noting, ―(a)ttention is especially invited to the very great shortage in arrivals of replacements heretofore requested. Situation with reference to replacements is now very acute. Until sufficient replacements are available in France to keep our proven divisions at full strength, replacements should by all means be sent in preference to new divisions.‖5

Notwithstanding these warnings and the obvious need for individual replacements, the

War Department continued to mobilize new divisions for overseas service. Eleven infantry divisions earmarked for combat were eventually utilized to provide replacements as a makeshift solution to infantry shortages. Seven of these divisions were eventually skeletonized.6 Luckily the war ended when it did as the AEF estimated on 2 November 1918 its replacement requirements would be greater than 140,000 by the end of the month.7

The 29th Division suffered 5,500 casualties during combat on the Western Front and received nearly 5,000 replacements to cover these losses. The division‘s roster consisted of

5 Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army, 216. 6 RG 319, NARA II, Box 7, BKGD ‗Personnel Replacement System, U.S. Army, 1951-1958: The Personnel Replacement System in the U.S. Army, Notes, The Evolution of the U.S. Army Replacement System, and RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 4 - Mobilization of the Ground Army, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 1. 7 Ibid., 215, 216, 227.

108

20,946 all ranks at the end of the war, far below its authorized strength of 991 officers, 27,114 enlisted men. In other words at no point in the First World War did the unit come close to reaching its T/O strength even when accounting for War Department reductions.8

The decision to doggedly mobilize more combat divisions when circumstances clearly illustrated the need for individual replacements likely influenced the replacement system‘s organization during WWII. An AEF cable to the War Department on 2 November 1918 may have set the stage for the U.S. Army replacement system‘s structure in WWII. Incorporating the lessons of combat it noted, ―(n)ew and only partially trained divisions cannot take the place of older divisions that have battle experience. The latter must be kept numerically to the point of efficiency.‖9

War Department officials looked to develop a revised methodology that corrected the

First World War system‘s underlying administrative and organizational errors. During the process, they grew to appreciate the consequences of mobilizing an ever-increasing number of divisions. Each new division required a significant infusion of manpower during its build-up phase and replacements once it entered combat. In other words, it created a situation requiring more replacements while simultaneously depleting the size of the pool from which they could be drawn. As a result, War Department officials became intent on mobilizing fewer divisions during World War II and sought to maintain them at or near full strength through a complex and extensive individual replacement system. In this respect, the success of the ninety division gamble was largely dependent on a robust and efficient system of replacement administration capable of producing an adequate number of replacements to bring mobilized units to full

8 Raymond C. Cochrane, The 29th Division in the Cotes de Meuse, October 1918 (Army Chemical Center, 1959), 63. 9 Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army, 214-216.

109 strength and to replace casualties incurred by fighting divisions so that they could remain effective combat formations.

The average replacement spent approximately forty weeks in the replacement pipeline in early 1944; eight weeks between selective service call and induction, one week at a reception center, nineteen weeks training, three weeks for furlough and travel, two weeks at a zone of the interior replacement depot, one week at embarkation port, two weeks in transport to the ETO and four weeks at an overseas depot.10 Unlike highly-trained but unwanted specialists, a chronic shortage of riflemen resulted in infantry replacements spending little excess time in the pipeline.

The replacement system‘s gradual evolution included significant changes to the administrative procedures that governed replacement training.11 The War Department supervised replacement training conducted in tactical units prior to the formation of the AGF, while arm specific training schools were overseen by the Chief of their particular branch. The number of replacements initially produced by the replacement system was limited because the army lacked sufficient infrastructure to house, let alone train, the flood of draftees that followed the imposition of the draft. Consequentially, large numbers of inductees were assigned directly to units like the 29th Division for their basic training. The result more often than not was absolute chaos. Divisions formed cadres to be utilized as trainers, even if they were not qualified to act as such. Selectees arrived in intermittent batches. Trained recruits were shipped out as filler replacements and another batch of raw inductees took their place. In such cases, divisions acted more as manning pools and replacement schools than units training for overseas service

10 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Notes in the preparation of Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-211, 1954, Replacement Pipeline. 11 See Chapter Five for greater discussion on the replacement training methods.

110 and were precluded from conducting standardized training, deemed by GHQ as a foundation of all training in the U.S. Army.12

Inductees were also prepared for army service at branch specific Replacement Training

Centers (RTCs) when space permitted. RTC‘s were administered through a complicated shared system between the Chiefs of respective branches and designated area corps commanders.13 The

AGF assumed responsibility for all inductee training at RTC‘s and training schools with the restructuring of GHQ in March, 1942. The Replacement and School Command (R&SC) was established and given responsibility for branch specific individual training under the provisions of WD Circular 69.14

The R&SC was an administrative unit that carried out its training missions strictly through the agency of RTC‘s and Training Schools. Its formal mission was to, ―exercise command over the four service schools, including their officer candidate schools, and the four

I(nfantry) R(eplacement) T(raining) C(enter)s, three F(ield) A(rtillery) R(eplacement) T(raining)

C(enter)s, one C(ombat) R(eplacement) T(raining) C(enter,) and two B(ranch) I(mmaterial)

R(eplacement) T(raining) C(enter)s.‖15 RTC‘s received a greater degree of attention from the parent R&SC organization in comparison to training schools. AGF officials retained control of

12 ―Basic Principle in AGF Training Directives: (1) The integrity of the tactical unit. Since each tactical organization was to be employed in combat as a unit, and since teamwork would be a prime factor in its success, each organization from squad to army was to be trained as a unit rather than made up before deployment from individuals and groups that had been trained separately.‖ See RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 10 - Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 7. 13 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 2. 14 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 10 - Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 5, and RG 319, NARA II, Box 5, Mission of the Replacement and School Command, 1. 15 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 10 - Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 5, and RG 319, NARA II, Box 5, Mission of the Replacement and School Command, 1.

111 training doctrines while granting R&SC administrative command. AGF leaders circulated training directives, while G-3 officials conducted routine and surprise inspections, on which they based corrective training instructions. G-3 staff also devised and administered standardized tests that ensured uniform progress was being achieved. The Chiefs and staffs of the four combat arms – infantry, cavalry, field artillery, and coast artillery – previously in control of training were stood down and dispersed amongst AGF and Replacement and School Command

Headquarters.16

The allocation of inductees at reception centers during the army‘s build-up phase had been based on bringing mobilizing or expanding units to authorized T/O&Es. However, allocations could no longer be made on the basis of T/O&E percentages once American forces became engaged with the enemy. American leaders were slow in realizing this fact. Losses suffered to that point were a result of either accidents or sickness and broke evenly across all

MOS‘s. On this basis the, ―Quartermaster Corps had as large a capacity in replacement training centers as the Field Artillery, the Signal Corps a larger capacity than the Armored Force, (and) the Medical Department half as large a capacity as the Infantry. In the Infantry the number of replacements trained as riflemen, cooks and clerks corresponded to the number of men called for in T/O&Es of infantry units, without allowance for the fact that the casualty rate among riflemen would be infinitely higher than among cooks.‖17

Even as the army entered combat in North Africa the position of AGF officials nevertheless remained that the AGF was, ―primarily a training organization and its requirements

16 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 10 - Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 5, and RG 319, NARA II, Box 5, Mission of the Replacement and School Command, 1, 2, 3, 4. 17 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 5.

112 for personnel (we)re limited solely to those for units to be activated. The actual replacements requirement wa(s) limited to that necessary to replace deceased personnel, an almost negligible requirement.‖18 Only slowly did American officials realize the need to dedicate greater percentages of inductees to infantry training and never to the degree that was actually required.

Consequently, shortages of trained riflemen continued to plague the U.S. Army throughout 1943 and 1944.

Moreover, the search for a better means of harmonizing replacement supply and demand

- subsequently labeled as an ―educated guess‖ - continued to vex War Department officials.19

The process involved synchronizing predicted unit requirements six months in advance (due to the time lag in processing, training, and transporting a replacement to a front line unit) with the number of recruits passing through induction stations. The War Department retained authority,

―over the number (and types) of replacements to be trained,‖ after the formation of the AGF in

March, 1942. McNair, now the Commanding General of the AGF, gave little concern to the difficulties in estimating replacement needs six months in advance and remained convinced that the Adjutant General was fully capable of estimating monthly personnel requirements in all army formations.20 As a result, the Adjutant General carried on attempting to synchronize the supply of inductees from reception centers to RTC‘s and the assignment of RTC graduates to units.21

Beginning in March, 1943, however, War Department officials devolved the responsibility for the allocation of replacements to the AGF in an attempt to improve the overall efficiency of the replacement system. The War Department thereafter allocated inductees en

18 Ibid., 4. 19 See, Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army, 244. 20 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 11. 21 Ibid., 3, 6.

113 masse. AGF officials were then responsible for assigning inductees to a particular unit or replacement training center. The AGF now found itself in a position where it was able, ―to gather statistics, codify its needs, plan the distribution of its personnel resources, anticipate difficulties or crises, and recommend action to the War Department.‖22

ILLUSTRATION NO. 6 - Personnel Replacement System with the Formation of the AGF (March, 1942)

23 A constant theme of the U.S. Army‘s rushed mobilization was shortages of trained riflemen. The situation continued to worsen during 1942 and the invasion of North Africa exacerbated an already serious manpower crisis in the U.S. Army. Manpower requirements for

22 Ibid, 6, 7. 23 RG 319, NARA II, Box 6, Office of the Chief of Military History, BKGD ―The Personnel Replacement System U.S. Army, 1951-1958.

114 newly activated units had badly outstripped induction rates prior to the invasion and the subsequent need for loss replacements only made the situation worse. War Department officials advised the AGF on 28 July 1942 to divest 50% of the manpower of three infantry divisions currently in the midst of training to bring units earmarked for the North African invasion to T/O strengths. Additionally, the 76th and 78th Divisions were ordered to serve as manning pools until two zone-of-the-interior replacement depots could be opened. The two units halted training and instead received, processed, and stored RTC graduates.24

Repeated calls had previously been made for the establishment of zone-of-the-interior replacement depots during the early spring and summer of 1942. The War Department‘s stopgap measures alleviated filler replacement shortages and the dire need for zone-of-the-interior replacement depots until it was possible to launch one at Shenango, PA and another at

Pittsburgh, CA. However, manpower shortages to even staff the facilities delayed their opening until January, 1943. Until then the army was without a standardized method of housing trained soldiers awaiting overseas shipment.25 When opened, zone-of-the-interior replacement depots were ordered to, ―maintain replacements at the port, completely prepared and processed in accordance with (War Department stipulations,) and immediately available to fill vacancies in units, groups, and detachments awaiting embarkation at the port.‖26 The Army Service Forces was designated to administer the centers. 27

24 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 3, 6. 25 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 5. 26 RG 338, NARA II, Box 62, War Department Memorandum No. W600-47-43, Operation of Port of Embarkation Replacement Pools, 7 June 1943, 1. 27 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 10.

115

This decision carried heavy repercussions for future AGF replacements, especially those earmarked for the European Theater. Incensed War Department officials demanded changes after an investigation by the AGF‘s G-1, Brigadier General A.R. Bolling, illustrated deplorable conditions at the Shenango, PA. Depot. AGF leaders reluctantly assumed the role of administering and transporting replacements to frontline units in May, 1943. The ASF continued using Shenango as a replacement depot for its personnel under the modified system while the

AGF established two new overseas replacement depots at Fort Meade, Maryland (capacity –

18,000) and at Fort Ord, California (capacity – 8,000.) These facilities soon became the major embarkation points where staff re-checked blood types, provided inoculations, issued clothing and equipment, and gave replacements further physical and mental classification tests to insure suitability for overseas service. Those found unqualified during these subjective tests were unceremoniously separated from the army. 20,457 enlisted men and 1,352 officers were processed and shipped from Fort Meade and 6,947 enlisted men and 455 officers from Fort Ord in February, 1944 alone.28

The authorized capacity of AGF RTC‘s remained fixed at 203,000 in January, 1944 unchanged from 1942. At that rate War Department officials could count on the production of

400,000 replacements per year. The lack of increased production capacity coupled with the War

Department‘s decision to lengthen replacement training cycles threatened to reduce annual replacement output by 135,000 trained soldiers. The War Department had estimated in May,

1943 that 655,000 replacements would be necessary during 1944. Two months later the AGF told the War Department that to meet this number the capacity of RTC‘s would have to be

28 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249, History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF: 1 March 1943 – 31 December 1945, Overseas Shipments, 21 February 1944 and RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 10.

116 increased to 278,000 men. The War Department subsequently cut the number of army divisions to be raised for overseas service from 100 to 90 and lowered loss estimates for 1944. The revisions allowed the War Department to maintain RTC capacities at 203,000 and cut replacement requirement estimates for 1944 to 431,000. Noting a deficit of 31,000 replacements remained, the AGF proposed an increase in RTC capacity to 257,000 in February, 1944. AGF leaders entered 1944 convinced their actions had largely resolved the replacement system‘s qualitative and quantitative problems.29

This conviction, however, was, ―destined to be abruptly upset.‖30 Unexpectedly heavy infantry losses in Sicily and Italy produced intensified replacement shortages. The War

Department‘s continued focus on the production of specialists and the need to replenish divisions

- previously stripped of riflemen - on standby for overseas service in the U.S. made a bad situation even worse. War Department officials had estimated in May, 1943 that 58% of AGF‘s casualties in 1944 would be incurred by infantry units and set this as the percentage of inductees classified at reception centers for infantry training. The percentage was increased to 68% when the War Department was informed by the AGF in July, 1943 that RTC‘s were not capable of producing the numbers of ground replacements from all MOS‘s that the War Department expected. The War Department met the percentage not by increasing the proportion of infantry replacements being produced, but instead by lowering the expected production of replacements from all MOS‘s and decreasing the number of riflemen the least. The crafty bookkeeping was

29 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 14, 24. 30 Ibid, 14.

117 based on a downward revised expected infantry replacement requirement in 1944 from 380,000 to 293,000.31

The War Department took further action in February, 1944, ordering restrictions placed on further production of replacement specialists that could instead be shipped as riflemen and called on the AGF to loosen induction standards and increase the number of combat replacements entering the replacement pipeline.32 War Department and AGF officials also realized the importance of restocking the riddled divisions, especially those earmarked for overseas service in the near term. RTC‘s, however, proved incapable of graduating sufficient numbers of riflemen to simultaneously meet overseas needs and to return the stripped divisions to T/O&E strengths. The draftee demographic of early 1944 complicated the matter further.

Well over half of all potential inductees at the time were under 19 years of age33 or were married, in their thirties, and had children. American society balked at sending either group into combat.34

Another round of stopgap measures to resolve infantry shortages soon became necessary as there were simply too many specialists and not enough riflemen. Non-divisional infantry regiments were broken up and 35,249 trained enlisted men were stripped from zone of the interior units either training or on standby for overseas service to make up for shortages of

31 Ibid., 24. 32 337, NARA II, Box 1249, History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF: 1 March 1943 – 31 December 1945, 4. Overseas Replacements, 26 February 1944, 2. 33 The draft age had been lowered to 18 at the end of 1942. 34 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 18.

118 infantry loss replacements. 29,521 replacements were relocated from low priority units to offset these losses, resulting in a deficit of nearly 6,000 trained infantrymen.35

The War Department again revised its forecasted casualty rates in April, 1944 notifying formations that it then expected 70.3% of total battle losses to be incurred in infantry units. This late notice precluded any hopes of increasing the percentage output of rifleman from RTC‘s in time for the fighting in Normandy due to the six-month time lapse from a recruit‘s induction to his arrival at a front line unit. Dire shortages of riflemen resulted in Normandy when 90% of battle casualties occurred in infantry units.36 The extent of the localization of casualties to rifle companies seems to have remained a surprise to army leaders despite plentiful battle evidence from Sicily, Italy, and the First World War suggesting it would be so.

Altering priorities and an easing of Army Air Corps losses provided a momentary resolution to infantry shortages that the War Department and the AGF could not. Lessening aircrew replacement demands allowed the transfer of 24,000 surplus aviation cadets (who had been members of the AGF prior to selection for flying training) to the stripped divisions.

Additionally, the ASTP‘s elimination freed up a further 73,000 former students to act as filler replacements. 55,000 of these went to combat divisions and the remaining 14,500 to non- divisional units. All African-American ASTP personnel were sent to the 92nd Division.37 The

97,000 replacements proved sufficient to return depleted divisions to their T/O strength.

35 Ibid., 16. 36 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5610, Part II, Replacement System, Mothering 500,000 Orphans: The Gears of the Reinforcement Machine, 80. 37 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249, History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF: 1 March 1943 – 31 December 1945, 2. ASTP, 26 February 1944, 1.

119

However, the makeshift solution did little to improve the manpower situation in the ETO where units like the 29th Division suffered from shortages in infantry replacements in early 1944.38

The decision to replenish stripped divisions with former ATSP students and aviation cadets proved to be contentious with the American public. As it turned out, the divisions augmented by the two groups did not arrive in the ETO until August, 1944 or later. Rather than re-strip the divisions to meet replacement needs the AGF decided instead to send recently- graduated 18-and-a-half year old youngsters and married men - many of whom were in their mid- to late-thirties and had children - overseas as loss replacements. The judgment did not sit well with the American population as, ―(i)t seemed unfair to send these men directly into combat after 17 weeks of training, as individual replacements going overseas without the moral support of belonging to an organized unit, while many men of the intermediate age levels, or without family responsibilities, having been inducted two or three years before, remained……It was a question not only of fairness, but of the military value of the men concerned.‖39 A direct consequence of the faulty personnel selection system, therefore, was sending very young men and married fathers into combat.

The War Department responded by ordering that 18 year old youngsters and pre-Pearl

Harbor fathers would henceforth be sent overseas as loss replacements only after having served a minimum of six months in the United States. Realizing the unfeasibility of such restrictions, however, the War Department did an about-face within days and quietly announced that both age

38 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Report of Operations of the Replacement System within a Field Army in the ETO, 20 October 1943 – 8 May 1945 and RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 24. 39 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 18.

120 groups could be used immediately if all other replacement resources had been exhausted.40 In another attempt at mitigating public outrage, inductees under 18-and-a-half years of age were prohibited from being assigned to either infantry or armored training centers. The results were two-fold: youthful and married recruits were assigned to relatively safer arms and infantry replacement quality was diminished because the AGF was forced to accept, ―virtually all inductees over 18 ½ years old received by the (AGF)…..including the oldest inductees and those who were borderline physical cases.‖ Devastating loss rates within infantry units forced the

War Department to overturn the 18 year-old and pre-Pearl Harbor father policy in August, 1944.

Both groups were once again admitted to infantry and armored replacement training centers and readied for immediate overseas service.41

Ground Force Replacement Command‘s commanding officer, Brigadier-General Walter

G. Layman,42 took unilateral action in July, 1944 after the increased percentage production of riflemen from RTC‘s in February, 1944 failed to eliminate infantry shortages. Layman personally ordering 4,000 soldiers from overstocked field artillery, antiaircraft, and tank

40 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 21, 22. 41 RG 337, NARA II, Box 1249, History of Classification and Replacement Division Ground Adjutant General‘s Section, HQ, AGF: 1 March 1943 – 31 December 1945, Overseas Replacements, Enlisted Men Under 19 Years of Age, 28 February 1944, and RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 21, 22. 42 Brigadier General Walter G. Layman was born on 17 September 1888 in West Virginia. He graduated from Parkersburg H.S. and served in the First World War. Layman was a member of the inaugural Command and General Staff School 1927 class containing 212 students, graduating the following year. He attended the Company Officer‘s Course in 1922, the Advanced Course in 1927, Air Corps Tactical School in 1933 and was a graduate of the Army War College in 1935. Layman died of a heart attack in September, 1944 and is buried at the Arlington National Cemetery. He was posthumously awarded the Army Distinguished Service Medal for meritorious service to the government of the United States. See Official Army Register, 1944 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), 543.

121 destroyer units be converted and retrained as riflemen.43 Units were also ordered to comb their rosters for individuals presently serving as specialists who had originally been trained as riflemen. Layman‘s later comments suggest, however, that some units may have used the order to rid themselves of troublemakers and their least capable soldiers:

The type of service personnel which (wa)s being sent in for retraining seems to (have) be(en) of the lowest class and a casual examination of approximately 150 men who have been received so far indicate(d) that many of them will not be fit for training as riflemen.44

General Layman had warned HQ ETOUSA after a month of combat in France that First

Army replacement requests, ―exceed(ed) by 30 per cent the estimated losses by planners in arranging for the flow of replacements, and further, (because) the army‘s requisitions for replacements (we)re confined almost exclusively to the infantry rifle and heavy weapons personnel, a situation ha(d) arisen wherein the stockage of this type of replacement (wa)s being rapidly exhausted. (This) was brought about by the fact that approximately 90 percent of the casualties were infantry.‖45 Despite intensive reclassification efforts, 25,800 excess replacements from branches other than infantry languished in ETO replacement depots in early

August.46 Shortages of riflemen remained an extreme concern, however, and for a 24-hour period in mid-August, 1944 the stock inventory chart showed only one solitary infantry replacement available for use on the continent.47

43 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5610, Part II, Replacement System, Mothering 500,000 Orphans: The Gears of the Reinforcement Machine, 82. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid., 79. 46 Ibid., 80, 83. 47 Ibid., 80, 81.

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CHART NO. 7 - Weekly Strength Report of Officer Personnel in ETO Replacement System (1944)

9000

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

03-Jul 10-Jul 17-Jul

05-Jun 12-Jun 19-Jun 26-Jun

03-Apr 10-Apr 17-Apr 24-Apr

14-Feb 21-Feb 28-Feb

27-Mar 06-Mar 13-Mar 20-Mar

29-May 01-May 08-May 15-May 22-May 48 The reclassification of service personnel as infantrymen had actually begun in the United

States months prior to General Layman‘s unilateral decision. Beginning in April, 1944

converted personnel were given eight weeks of infantry training – later reduced to six weeks

owing to a desperate shortage of infantry - at nine non-divisional infantry regiments assigned by

the AGF as training units. Each functioned as a miniature replacement training center

specializing in the production of infantry replacements only. Converted infantrymen were sent

to the front as immediate infantry replacements after this short retraining stint.49 A combat

leader remarked that the morale of retrained specialists:

was definitely lower than that of any replacements we got from any place else. The reason was the same. They said they felt that their jobs were necessary for the war effort and that they should not have been called upon to come out and fight. Also that they had

48 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3943, History of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, Part II, Administrative File No. 571B, Chapter III, Personnel Accounting of Replacements, 6. 49 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 25.

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not been properly trained and indoctrinated and brought along as fighting men. They believed they had been thrown into a situation that gave them very little chance of survival.50

Charts Nos. 7 and 8 illustrate the rates at which replacement surpluses - officer and enlisted men - actually grew in most specialist MOS‘s as shortages of replacement riflemen and some artillery trades became increasingly acute. Heavy casualty rates subsequently ensued amongst specialists hastily converted to riflemen after years of non-infantry training. The decision also imperiled experienced riflemen who were forced to serve alongside and stake their lives on undertrained former specialists. A 29th Division veteran commented that it was,

―(d)isgraceful, former cooks, truck drivers, etc. being used as riflemen.‖51 The reclassification of specialists as riflemen and their subsequent high casualty rate was particularly galling to the 29th

Division‘s psychiatrist. Major David I. Weintrob noted, ―(t)he frequency with which (I) discovered from……personal interviews that a man had been trained as a driver, a mail clerk, a cook, a permanent MP, an officer‘s orderly and what not were truly remarkable. These men were thrust into combat insufficiently trained and certainly psychologically unprepared.‖52

A post-war history of the replacement system euphemistically dismissed the haphazard conversion process as having resulted from, ―greater-than-planned-for casualties (having) upset all the reinforcement plans…….and resulted in many a rear echelon typist ending up in the front

50 RG 319, NARA II, Box 7, BKGD ‗Personnel Replacement System, U.S. Army, 1951-1958: The Personnel Replacement System in the U.S. Army, Notes, Morale of Replacements. 51 USAMHI, WWII Survey, 6396 52 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3944, 29th I.D., Division Training Center, 1 and 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, HQ, 29th I.D., Meeting the Problems of Combat Exhaustion, 2 October 1944, 2.

124 lines with an M-1.‖53 Passed over were the scores of American lives inevitably lost as a result of the decision.

CHART NO. 8 - Weekly Strength Report of Enlisted Personnel in ETO Replacement System (1944)

120000

100000

80000

60000

40000

20000

17-Jul 03-Jul 10-Jul

05-Jun 12-Jun 19-Jun 26-Jun

03-Apr 10-Apr 17-Apr 24-Apr

14-Feb 21-Feb 28-Feb

06-Mar 13-Mar 20-Mar 27-Mar

01-May 08-May 15-May 22-May 29-May 54 The administrative process governing the replacement system in World War II eventually extended beyond the shores of the United States. The need for localized replacement administration organizations became increasingly apparent as the number of theaters in which

American units were engaged continued to grow. The administrative handling of overseas replacements had been left to theater combat commanders into 1943. This form of decentralized control caused administrative concerns in Washington, D.C. War Department G-1 officials found it difficult to estimate the replacement needs of the various theaters and argued field

53 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5610, Part II, Replacement System, Mothering 500,000 Orphans: The Gears of the Reinforcement Machine, 79. 54 Ibid.

125 commanders underappreciated complicated replacement procedures.55 Commenting on the existence of systemic problems, one WD G-1 official noted:

The (replacement) system under which we operated lacked sufficient flexibility. The spaces allocated for replacements and pipeline personnel in the Troop Basis were inadequate. The necessity for determining nine months in advance how many replacements would be needed required expert necromancy. A decision had to be made at least six months ahead of time as to how many men of each arm and service would be required as loss replacements……Personnel assigned rear area jobs were not kept indoctrinated with the thought that they might be called upon at any time to move to a more active assignment, and perhaps fight as infantry.56

War Department officials also objected to the manner in which theater commanders operated their distinct replacement systems, often refusing input from the War Department. The formation of unauthorized units and inefficient administrative systems, for instance, led to:

(r)eplacements……being used to establish Communications Zone Units not authorized by the War Department. Records showed that 20,000 replacements had stagnated in replacement depots for as long as twenty months. 35,000 replacements were lost and unaccounted for in the theater due to lack of an adequate control system. Combat trained replacements, which were in short supply, were being used for service type units.57

The War Department eventually created separate Replacement Commands in the ETO and the North African-Mediterranean Theater, using these inefficiencies as justification. The

Field Force Replacement Command (FFRC) was established - originally under the command of the Supply of Service - in October, 1943 to serve as the ETO‘s replacement governing body. It

55 RG 319, NARA II, Box 7, BKGD ‗Personnel Replacement System, U.S. Army, 1951-1958: The Personnel Replacement System in the U.S. Army, Notes, Notes by Lt. Colonel Jack L. Williams, World War II Replacement Commands. 56 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Letter from Brigadier General Robert W. Berry to Major General Orlando Ward, 26 March 1951, 5. 57 RG 319, NARA II, Box 7, BKGD ‗Personnel Replacement System, U.S. Army, 1951-1958: The Personnel Replacement System in the U.S. Army, Notes, Replacement Commands.

126

was located at Cheltenham, England under the command of then-Colonel Walter G. Layman,

formerly of the American School Center at Shrivenham, Berkshire.58

ILLUSTRATION NO. 7 - World-Wide U.S. Army Replacement Pipeline

59 The command operated under the direction of the Deputy Theater Commander and in

compliance with procedures set out in FM 100-10. It was charged with administering the

58 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3943, History of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, Part II, Administrative File No. 571B, Introduction, Secret Letter, HQ, ETOUSA, File AG 322, 1. 59 RG 319, NARA II, Box 6, Office of the Chief of Military History, BKGD ―The Personnel Replacement System U.S. Army, 1951-1958.

127 replacement needs of all ETO formations except Army Air Force units.60 Circular 66,

HQETOUSA, limited the responsibilities of Field Force Replacement Command to, ―insur(ing) that requisitions for personnel as loss replacements were filled promptly; that no requisitions for overstrength personnel were filled without specific authority from (HQETOUSA); that limited assignment personnel were utilized to the fullest possible extent to fill replacement requisitions under polices to be published from time to time by (HQETOUSA); (and) that (HQETOUSA) was kept advised of any unusual lowering of branch pool level in the Replacement System.‖61

The FFRC was subsequently designated as a separate and distinct command in ETOUSA by General Order No. 33 of 24 April 1944. The FFRC‘s complex apparatus - shown in

Illustration No. 8 – required careful administration to function properly. Colonel Layman remained in command, with a staff of nineteen colonels and majors, eleven captains and sixteen lieutenants.62 The 118th Infantry Regiment, 115th Field Artillery Battalion, 771st Tank Destroyer

Battalion, 745th Tank Battalion, Battery ―A‖, 635th AA, 3709th Quartermaster Truck Company, a detachment of the 102nd Cavalry Regiment, a medical demonstration platoon, and special cadres from ordnance and military police formations provided training troops for the FFRC.63 The organization underwent several subsequent name changes, becoming Ground Force Replacement

60 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3943, History of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, Part II, Administrative File No. 571B, Introduction, 1, 2, 3, 61 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3943, History of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, Part II, Administrative File No. 571B, Chapter III, The Problem of Requisitions of Replacements, 13. 62 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5610, Part II, Replacement System, Mothering 500,000 Orphans: The Gears of the Reinforcement Machine, 64-65. 63 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3943, History of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, Part II, Administrative File No. 571B, Chapter II, The Establishment of the Field Force Replacement System in the European Theater of Operations, 6.

128

Command on 11 June, 1944, Replacement Command in the fall of 1944, and finally Ground

Force Reinforcement Command in December 1944.64

ILLUSTRATION NO. 8 - Administrative Hierarchy of the ETOUSA Field Force Replacement Command

65 Specific replacement requisition methods utilized by the 29th Division were altered a

number of times during the war. The division initially submitted requisitions directly to the War

Department Adjutant General‘s Office on WD AGO Form No. 210, indicating an itemization of

replacement types required. The division G-1 studied individual arm and service Mobilization

64 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3943, History of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, Part II, Administrative File No. 571B, Introduction, 1, 2, 3. 65 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Functional Organization Chart: Overseas Theatre Replacement System.

129

Training Programs prior to the preparation of requisition forms to discern the quantity and categories of replacements available in the near future. The G-1 was also required to stipulate a specific company - rifle, heavy weapons, headquarters, service, or anti-tank - when requesting infantry replacements. Conversely, 105-mm, 155-mm, or headquarters battery were indicated for artillery replacements. The final step was listing a complete breakdown of MOS‘s required to fill individual slots within branch companies.66

The first practical test of the division‘s replacement apparatus came during the multi- phased Carolina Maneuvers. Large-scale U.S. Army rehearsals provided the 29th Division with an unprecedented opportunity to learn valuable administrative lessons such as managing its complicated replacement system during a mock battle. Administrative replacement SOP‘s were established, utilized, and rated in the maneuver‘s aftermath. Company and separate organization commanders forwarded daily replacement requisitions to regimental headquarters during the maneuvers. Replacement requests were amalgamated on WD AGO Form 211 by regimental staff officers and forwarded to division headquarters for consolidation by arm and service on

WD AGO Form 212 prior to being passed on to Army headquarters.67 Replacements were subsequently forwarded on the basis of these requests and their availability, according to the instructions described in Field Manual 100-10.68

Special provisions were drawn into maneuver plans to test the replacement system. GHQ alerted competing forces during one phase of the Carolina Maneuvers that approximately 1,000

66 RG 338, NARA II, Box 44, 29th Division Memorandum dated 9 November 1941, reprinted from War Department Memorandum AGO, AG 341, Distribution of Ground Forces Replacements from Replacement Training Centers to Units, 25 September 1941, 1, 2. 67 RG 337, NARA II, Box 389, Memorandum from GHQ, U.S. Army, Combat Replacements, GHQ-Directed Maneuvers, 17 October 1941 68 RG 337, NARA II, Box 390, GHQ, U.S. Army, Combat Replacements, GHQ-Directed Maneuvers, 13 October 1941.

130 replacements would be channeled through their respective systems over the duration of the exercises. Competing unit administrators were also warned that a further 500 replacements, arriving unannounced and together, would require immediate processing. In order to test prescribed replacement system procedures, SOPs would involve, ―replacements (being) forwarded to units from replacement training centers.…..(and) process(ed) through the replacement depot.‖69 3,282 replacements passed through the First Army Replacement Depot in the four days beginning 16 November and 2,463 of these were processed through IV Corps machinery alone.70

Army leaders studied maneuver outcomes and lessons learned to formulate recommendations to improve the replacement system. A number of conclusions were summarily dismissed as unfeasible. One suggestion called for the allocation of unassigned replacements to field armies at which time a personnel selection officer would choose an MOS and appropriate subunit for each replacement.71 Another rejected proposal was locating replacement depots well to the rear of the army with only, ―a small skeletonized force to handle the casuals within the

Army zone.‖72 Leaders elected to study the British replacement system to glean useful lessons and unanimously agreed that replacements should be forwarded unencumbered by useless impediments, only after having been completely checked out on personal weapons, and never to a formation in contact with enemy forces.73

69 RG 337, NARA II, Box 389, Memorandum from GHQ, U.S. Army, Combat Replacements, GHQ-Directed Maneuvers, 13 October 1941. 70 RG 337, NARA II, Box 328, GHQ, Comments on First Phase – First Army versus IV Army Corps Maneuvers, 1941, Section XIV, Prisoners of War and Replacements, 22 November 1941, 15. The 29th Division was part of IV Corps at the time. 71 RG 337, NARA II, Box 390, Final Report of the War Department Adjutant General‘s Section, GHQ Directed Maneuvers, Combat Replacement Systems, 2, 3. 72 Ibid., 3. 73 Ibid., 3.

131

A separate administrative report issued after the maneuvers called on the U.S. Army to,

―(a)uthorize, organize and activate four replacement depot headquarters and headquarters companies on a basis to be determined from a study of the recent maneuver experience, (so that)……all replacements coming to an army from outside the army combat zone……pass(ed) through the replacement depot serving that army.‖ The report suggested depots be located within marching distance of the replacement debarkation point to minimize road congestion, that more attention should be placed on the prompt delivery of good meals and adequate bathing facilities for replacements arriving at the front, and that each replacement should be adequately equipped and clothed upon arrival.74 Unfortunately, many of these important lessons went unheeded prior to the Normandy landings.

The 29th Division‘s replacement requisition procedure was altered after its arrival in

England. S-1 officers submitted requisition requests to the division G-1 who processed the requests by SSN on WD AGO Form 212 and passed the consolidated figures to V Corps HQ.75

Personnel officers were told to continue submitting requisitions each month for any unfilled slots regardless of the number of required attempts necessary to fill the position and were ordered to regularly appraise items 27 (Classification in Military Specialties) and 29 (Record of Current

Services) of each individual‘s AGO Form 20 to ensure that MOS and SSN matched whenever possible.76 V Corps forwarded its combined requisitions to SOS, ETOUSA on or before the 5th

74 RG 337, NARA II, Box 328, Proposed Plan for Combat Replacement System in the Theater of Operations, 1, 6. 75 For an example AGO Form No. 212 see, War Department, Field Manual 100-10 Field Service Regulations: Administration (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), 130-131. 76 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3, HQ V Corps memorandum, Personnel Replacement Procedure, no date, 2.

132 day of each month on WD AGO Form No. 212, attaching Form 211 as well to enable the assignment of replacements directly to the requesting subunit.77

The 29th Division was also required to submit specialist inventories to V Corps on a monthly basis. The inventory, compiled by the division classification officer from reports submitted by subunit counterparts, was divided into four categories. Column 1, ‗Required,‘ illustrated shortages of occupational specialists by SSN in reference to the division‘s T/O. The division commander could add an addendum to Column 1 if he felt the number called for in the

T/O was insufficient. Column 2, ‗On Hand,‘ counted the number of specialists present in the division. Specialists seriously ill, Absent Without Leave (AWOL,) or otherwise not expected to return were listed at the base of Column 2, by SSN, as ‗Absent.‘ Columns 3 and 4 denoted shortages and overages by MOS in the various subunits and were used to facilitate exchanges within a division and within the divisions of a corps as in-house attempts at achieving targeted

T/O‘s.78

Requisitioned replacements were, in turn, supplied to the 29th Division by Replacement

Depots located in the ETO. The official duties of overseas replacement depots were:

(a) (r)eceiving and processing replacements arriving from rear depots of the theater replacement command and assigning them as rapidly as possible to army units against requisitions approved by the Army..…..(b) (r)eceiving, processing, and automatically reassigning physically qualified returnees from hospitals to their former units whether requisitioned for or not and regardless of any overstrengths thereby created in units. Procedure applie(d) to personnel returning from leave or furlough through replacement channels.……(c) (i)nsuring that all personnel shipped forward to units (we)re completely outfitted with all items of clothing and equipment, including an appropriate weapon which has been zeroed and fired by the individual to whom issued……(d) (r)eturning to rear depots of the theater replacement command limited assignment personnel not suitable for assignment to Army units as well as all replacements not suitable for assignment to Army units by reason of inadequate records pending

77 RG 338, NARA II, Box 65, HQ V Corps, Personnel Requisitions, 12 May 1943. 78 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3, V Corps memorandum, Personnel Replacement Procedure, no date, 2, 3.

133

disciplinary procedures or unusable MOS‘s…….(e) (r)eceiving administering, and scheduling transportation for rotational personnel of the Army in accordance with current policies…….(f) (o)perating a training program if and as prescribed the Army commander…..(and) (g) (k)eeping Army AG Classification Section informed of current stockage levels.79

Depots were usually made up of five battalions, composed of three or four companies capable of housing, administering, sustaining, and training 300-400 combat replacements apiece.

Replacement depots made every effort to forward replacements to combat units in large, prearranged groups by the most suitable transportation means available. This was made easier when the War Department ordered that replacements were to be forwarded from the United States in,

―casual detachments, properly organized and in charge of a suitable number of officers and noncommissioned officers to maintain proper discipline and perform administrative duties.‖80

Replacement unit administrators were responsible for travel and rationing arrangements for replacements en route to the front and for notifying the receiving units, ―by the most expeditious means available of their departure and of their expected time of arrival.‖ 29th

Division units could therefore, in theory, make advance arrangements to facilitate an orderly distribution of replacements. The War Department reiterated that divisions should avoid integrating combat replacements when engaged in battle and that replacements should be assigned on the basis of specific MOS‘s.81 Combat realities soon proved both requirements unfeasible.

Seven Field Force Replacement Depots - 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th - were activated in late December, 1943. The command grew quickly in 1944; by the Normandy invasion, the

79 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, World War II, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Book Four, Matters Affecting Replacement System – World-Wide, I, Organization, 2, 3. 80 War Department, Field Service Regulations: Administration, 132. 81 Ibid., 132, 134.

134

4th, 5th, 10th, 11th, 12th, and the 14th through 20th Replacement Depots had also been activated.

Administrative duties were performed by overhead units within the depots.82

The duties performed by replacement depot personnel changed over time but were uniformly complicated and wide-ranging. Each depot was given specific responsibilities. For example, Depot No. 1 (10,946 man capacity) housed artillery replacements, No. 2 (2,200) was a staging unit for incoming replacements, No. 9 (8,266) administered armored force replacements and Nos. 3 (13,686,) 6 (10,276,) 7 (7,926,) and 8 (9,657) were designated as infantry replacement establishments.83

The 10th Replacement Depot was originally located at Lichfield, England. It marshaled replacements for a number of infantry divisions - including the 29th - stationed in England for training. The depot remained in England throughout the campaign in NW Europe, eventually moving to the appropriately named, Warminster, where its specific missions were:

(1) Receiving, classifying, supplying, and processing of casual personnel from all hospitals in the United Kingdom……(2) Forming personnel into reinforcement companies and shipping to the Continent the following: (a) Army Casuals. (1) Reinforcement companies consisting of both arms and services from First, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies…..(2) Reinforcement Companies consisting of both arms and services from Third and Seventh Armies……(b) Communication Zone Casuals……(c) All limited assignment infantry from the First, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies, and all limited assignment personnel below MR 1-9 from all Armies would be formed into reinforcement companies and forwarded to the 19th Reinforcement Depot, after the 10th Reinforcement Depot and G(round) F(orces) R(eplacement) C(ommand) Training Center No. 1 requirements had been satisfied…….(3) To insure that all casuals and/or reinforcement personnel shipped forward were completely outfitted with all required items of clothing and equipment, including an appropriate arm which had been zeroed and fired……(4) Selecting by potential MOS number limited assignment personnel below MR 1-9 requirements who required retraining in the training schools established at the 10th Reinforcement Depot and GFRC Training Center No. 1…..(5) Receiving,

82 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3943, History of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, Part II, Administrative File No. 571B, Chapter II, The Establishment of the Field Force Replacement System in the European Theater of Operations, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. 83 Ibid., 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

135

processing, and assisting in the assignment of WAC‘s from the Zone of Interior and the training of WAC‘s who were enlisted in the United Kingdom…..(7) Receiving, processing, and transferring to the Continent in proper reinforcement companies enlisted men having been AWOL from their organization when the latter embarked from the United Kingdom…..(8) Administering officers awaiting reclassification or courts-martial proceedings……(and) (9) Miscellaneous duties which might be added from time to time.84

Other depots went across the channel as soon as possible. First and Third Armies eventually received one or more replacement depots. Illustration No. 9 demonstrates the convoluted schematics of the replacement pipeline serving a field army. Four depots in total were operating from France by the conclusion of the Normandy campaign. The first unit to cross the channel was the 14th Replacement Depot on 6 June. It was composed of twenty-five officers, two warrant officers, and two hundred and two enlisted men, and was tasked with supplying replacements to First U.S. Army until other replacement depots arrived in France. A Field Force

Replacement Command detachment accompanied 14th Replacement Depot ashore to begin the process of establishing an Advance Headquarters, Replacement System on the Continent.85 The detachment consisted of nineteen officers and enlisted men along with four vehicles and was commanded by Colonel R.S. Miller. In total, Field Force Replacement Command planned to supply 34,500 replacements from D Plus 5 through D Plus 14 and another 12,000 by D Plus 20, mainly through 14th Replacement Depot.86

84 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3943, Administrative No. 571D, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, Administrative No. 571D, Chapter III, Echelonment of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command to the Continent, Movement of Mobile Reinforcement Units Within UK After D-Day, 28 and Chapter IV, Operation of the Ground Force Reinforcement Command on the Continent, 23, 24, 25. 85 Ibid., 2, 3, 12 and RG 498, NARA II, Box 3943, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, No. 571C, Chapter I, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, Introduction, 2. 86 Replacements by day: D Plus 5 – 4,500, D Plus 6 – 5,000, D Plus 7 – 5,000, D Plus 8 – 3,000, D Plus 9 – 3,000, D Plus 10 – 4,000, D Plus 11 – 2,500, D Plus 12 – 2,500, D Plus 13 – 2,500, D Plus 14 – 2,500 and 2,000 replacements per day from D Plus 15 to D Plus 20. RG 498, NARA

136

ILLUSTRATION NO. 9 - Replacement System Operating Alongside a Field Army

The number of replacement battalions comprising overseas replacement depots varied.

The 41st Replacement Battalion of the 14th Replacement Depot was responsible for supplying replacements to the 29th Division and the remainder of V Corps in Normandy. It was activated at

New Orleans, LA on 25 February 1943. On the basis of T/O 20-45, 1 April 1942, the 41st

Replacement Battalion was composed of a HQ and HQ Detachment and three companies (A, B,

II, Box 3943, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, Administrative No. 571D, Tab ‗B,‘ Troop Priority List: Replacement System, 12 May 1944, 1. 87 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Functional Chart of Replacement System Operating with a Field Army.

137 and C) with an authorized strength of eighteen officers and 117 enlisted men. Unit designations were altered when the battalion was authorized a fourth company in December, 1942. The 41st

Replacement Battalion would henceforth be composed of a HQ and HQ Detachment, a medical detail and the 309th, 310th, 311th and 312th Replacement Companies. Replacement Companies were administered by four officers and thirty-one enlisted men, the HQ and HQ Detachment by eleven officers and thirty-nine enlisted men and the medical detail by two officers and eight enlisted men under the provisions of the unit revision. The battalion was rated to accommodate and administer at any one time 302 officers and 3,655 enlisted men.88

The 41st Battalion was housed at Troborough, Somerset upon its arrival in the United

Kingdom on 12 April 1944. It was transferred to the First United States Army and the 14th

Replacement Depot after having served under the direction of 12th Replacement Depot for less than a month. The 1,425 replacements under its command at the time were transferred to the 89th

Replacement Battalion allowing the unit to undergo a vigorous training program for the upcoming invasion. Further orders were received on 9 May attaching the battalion to V Corps.89

Intricate ETO replacement plans called for the firm entrenchment of three replacement battalions of the 14th Replacement Depot on the continent by D Plus 4. The 41st Replacement

Battalion was designated to supply reinforcements to the 29th Division and the remainder of V

Corps, the 86th Battalion to XIX Corps, and the 92nd Battalion to VII Corps. The two remaining

88 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3943, History of Ground Forces Reinforcement Command: ETOUSA, Administrative File No. 571B, Formation of Replacement Detachments for Forwarding to the Continent, 2, 3, and RG 338, NARA II, Box 33, Forty First Replacement Battalion, Historical Report, 28 July, 1944, 1.. 89 RG 338, NARA II, Box 33, Forty First Replacement Battalion, Historical Report, 28 July, 1944, 2.

138 battalions of the 14th Replacement Depot, the 82nd and 87th Battalions, and headquarters troops of

14th Replacement Depot were to join by D Plus 10.90

The 41st Battalion debarked on 12 June 1944 at Easy Red, Omaha Beach. It received its first group of 250 replacements that same day after marching to a bivouac area near Formigny.

1,250 replacements were processed there before the unit moved to Rubercy on 14 June. The battalion forwarded 511 officers and 9,506 enlisted men to V Corps units via the ‗package method‘ between 18 June and 28 July. Of that number, 57 Officers and 1,931 enlisted men were hospital returnees. It also supplied a 1500-man replacement detail to assist the 5th Engineer

Special Brigade land badly needed supplies at Omaha Beach for eight days beginning on 20

June. The detachment was divided into two teams to allow a round-the-clock schedule until the flow of supplies ashore equaled First Army demands.91

As is often the case in most military operations, predetermined intentions and strategies went awry as soon as the 14th Replacement Depot debarked at Omaha Beach on D + 18.

Because the depot was perpetually short of T/O equipment and personnel, it never became operational and was eventually dropped from the First Army register. The 41st, 86th, and 92nd battalions were ordered to continue supplying replacements to their assigned corps through the methods utilized to that point. First U.S. Army submitted numerous requests for the transfer of a replacement depot to the Continent only to have each request denied by Ground Force

Replacement Command. The 3rd Replacement Depot was established towards the conclusion of the Normandy Campaign though Ground Forces Replacement Command (GFRC) refused to vest control of the depot to First U.S. Army. GFRC did, however, personally assure First Army

90 Ibid., 2. 91 Ibid., 2, 3.

139 leaders that the depot, ―would serve (First U.S.) Army as efficiently and with as much singleness of purpose as a depot under Army control.‖92

The 3rd Replacement Depot was flooded with 19,000 specialists shortly after its establishment in France, despite being rated to hold just under 14,000 replacements. The First

U.S. Army was unable, ―to order the reduction of (this specialist over-) stockage…..even though only a small proportion of it was usable to fill requisitions from Army units.‖ Despite possessing large numbers of replacements, the depot was seldom, ―stocked with more than 2,000 trained infantry replacements available for assignment to Army units……Instead of gaining usable replacement reserves as planned by the establishment of a depot within (First U.S.) Army area, replacement reserve was reduced and Army supply and transportation difficulties were vastly increased.‖93

Technically, the 41st, 86th, and 92nd Battalions fell under the command of 3rd Replacement

Depot but continued to supply replacements to previously assigned corps independent of outside orders. The three battalions - utilizing the lessons provided by stateside maneuvers and combat in Italy - positioned themselves as close to the front as possible to limit the distances required in transporting replacements to the front. A mobile classification unit - usually part of a

Replacement Depot‘s T/O - was attached to each battalion as a result of 14th Depot‘s termination.

Though the rated capacity of each was 1,200, the three battalions‘ average strength often

92 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Report of Operations of the Replacement System within a Field Army in the ETO, 20 October 1943 – 8 May 1945, VIII Operation of the Replacement System within the Army Area on the Continent, 22, 23. 93 Ibid., 24.

140 exceeded 2,800. In fact, one battalion was recorded as having housed 7,000 replacements for a short time during the Normandy Campaign.94

The final links in the replacement chain were Division Replacement Companies, whose responsibilities included receiving and processing loss and casual replacements. Replacement companies indoctrinated newcomers with a brief unit history and, when time permitted, imparted the most advanced combat techniques prior to matching replacements with units in need of replenishment.95

Streamlined replacement requisition procedures utilized by the 29th Division in NW

Europe differed from the ones previously used in England. The revised system, stressing simplicity and quickness of use, was based on lessons learned during the Carolina and Louisiana

Maneuvers and combat in North Africa and Italy. Division administrators passed personnel requests to respective Corps, who in turn forwarded the requests to Army Headquarters. Totals were audited, endorsed, and passed to replacement battalions for processing. Units usually received requested replacements within 24 to 48 hours. Emergency telephone requisitions were filled within 12 to 24 hours, though units were required to confirm the requests by completing

WD AGO Forms 211 and 212.96

The replacement system‘s ability to provide sufficient loss replacements during the

Normandy Campaign was due to a combination of good fortune, intelligent planning and the system‘s complex administrative organization. The strain on the replacement system was

94 Ibid., 22. 95 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, World War II, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Book Four, Matters Affecting Replacement System – World-Wide, I, Organization, 3. 96 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Report of Operations of the Replacement System within a Field Army in the ETO, 20 October 1943 – 8 May 1945, VIII Operation of the Replacement System within the Army Area on the Continent, 22.

141 reduced when casualties in NW Europe proved lighter than had been expected during the first three months of fighting.97 Moreover, the War Department pragmatically assigned a surplus

2,500 reinforcements to divisions earmarked for the invasion in early April, 1944 and encouraged them to use their own resources to build an even larger off-the-book reserve of replacements.98 Units subsequently provided infantry conversion training for surplus personnel in, ―overhead, service, antiaircraft, and other installations in the (ETO,)‖ prior to the invasion and employed these makeshift riflemen as some of the first combat loss replacements in

Normandy. Additionally, ETO Replacement Command was authorized to build a surplus of loss replacements, and did so by the end of March. It had, in fact, gone well beyond the authorized reserves by the time the landings in Normandy took place.99 Table No. 4 illustrates the

Replacement System‘s ability to maintain four principal infantry divisions at or near authorized strengths during the Normandy campaign:

TABLE NO. 4 – Numerical Presentation of Success Attained in Maintaining Effective Strengths Though Assignment of 2500 Overstrengths To Assault Divisions, European Continental Invasion, June, 1944 AUTHORIZED EFFECTIVE STRENGTHS OF: DATE STRENGTH 1ST I.D. 2ND I.D. 4TH I.D. 29TH I.D. 06-Jun-44 14248 15030 13627 13852 NO DATA 13-Jun-44 14248 18972 14448 13852 14844 20-Jun-44 14248 16425 14697 13817 14022 27-Jun-44 14248 15987 14748 15240 14966 04-Jul-44 14248 15803 15251 15573 15020 11-Jul-44 14248 15829 14824 14947 14614 18-Jul-44 14248 15389 14805 14664 12786 25-Jul-44 14248 15659 14959 14998 14901

97 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 26. 98 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, V. Initial Loss Replacement for Assault Divisions, 19. 99 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 26.

142

01-Aug-44 14248 15252 14059 13969 12887 08-Aug-44 14248 14574 14357 14343 12587 15-Aug-44 14248 14705 13777 14612 13651100

Unlike perpetual infantry replacement shortages, however, the decrepit state of morale within the replacement organization was the fault of the system‘s designers. A postwar summary noted replacements:

(a)lmost without exception……arrived dirty, tired, confused, and either frightened, cynical, or mutinous. Interrogation of replacements elicited an unchanging story of weeks or months in transit or storage without mail, pay, or relief from boredom. The invariable complaints of both officers and enlisted replacements concerned callous handling by Replacement System personnel, inadequate shelter, poor mess, and indifference to personal problems of replacements.101

Another account reported:

that at no time in a soldier‘s career was his morale more vulnerable and subject to progressive deterioration than while he was a replacement in the Replacement System during WWII. He was not supported by an esprit de corps and normally he had little opportunity to develop a close companionship with fellow replacements. He was entirely aware that while a replacement he was contributing nothing to the common cause and that when he was ultimately assigned to a unit it was to fill a vacancy in which he might be the next casualty…..Under (such conditions) a replacement‘s self-respect, pride and, consequently, his morale will deteriorate. The very best that can be hoped for is to lessen morale deterioration as much as possible.102

Army officials instituted a number of measures to improve morale in the replacement pipeline. One method grouped replacements into provisional platoons or ‗packages‘ at zone-of- the-interior replacement depots. Packages were composed of approximately thirty enlisted men of various MOS‘s and commanded by an officer, himself a replacement. Morale benefits

100 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Report of Operations of the Replacement System within a Field Army in the ETO, 20 October 1943 – 8 May 1945, VIII Operation of the Replacement System within the Army Area on the Continent, n.p. 101 Ibid., 34. 102 RG 319, NARA II, Box 7, BKGD ‗Personnel Replacement System, U.S. Army, 1951-1958: The Personnel Replacement System in the U.S. Army, Notes, Morale of Replacements.

143 included heightened familiarity and a sense of purpose. Packages traveled together and joined a

T/O division as a group.103 With the package system American leaders hoped to lessen:

the replacement‘s utter loneliness arising from the constant change in his associates with the result that he seldom was with others well known to him, from service under unknown and frequently changing leaders resulting in his feeling that there was no one upon whom he could depend for consideration and advice, and from the realization that he was but one individual in a tide, destination unknown. In short, the replacement stream was but a mass of bewildered individuals, each lacking the sense of ‗belonging‘ such as (wa)s possessed by members of a T/O unit……Throughout this long travel, interrupted by extended periods of stagnation in storage depots, it would be the exceptional replacement who could have acquired a friend (a buddy) who accompanied him to his final assignment. Normally replacements joined their unit as a group of mutual strangers.104

A division commander noted in a postwar interview that the morale of replacements was universally poor, except two occasions when groups of replacements arrived directly from the

United States. He attributed the positive morale to, ―the fact that they were a group of men who were trained together, moved to the theater together and were absorbed together in one unit.‖105

War Department officials considered package shipments but eventually rejected the proposition since it involved, ―sending…..50 inexperienced men into….a company… of 150 seasoned veterans, (thus) creating a situation of one platoon in the company being new and untried and the three other platoons being experienced. This ma(d)e your company unbalanced. Furthermore, your losses (would not) have…..been in one platoon, but (would) have been scattered throughout the company. To fill these losses by unit would (have) be(en) disruptive to the existing organization.‖ ETO units nevertheless adopted a smaller scale version of the package system during the winter of 1944-45 in which replacements were integrated into a unit, ―in small

103 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Book Four, Matters Affecting Replacement System – World-Wide, Section 4, Provisional Replacement Platoons (Packet Shipments,) 11. 104 Ibid., 10. 105 RG 319, NARA II, Box 7, BKGD ‗Personnel Replacement System, U.S. Army, 1951-1958: The Personnel Replacement System in the U.S. Army, Notes, Morale of Replacements.

144

‗packages‘……(consisting of) four-man ‗buddy teams‘…..developed in (the) AGF under the

‗buddy system‘ of training on combat courses.106

ETO Replacement and Classification Branch‘s AG and First Army leaders also discussed the unilateral use of ready-made ‗package‘ deliveries of replacements in March, 1944. The AG proposed, ―the grouping of (replacements) into compact, easily controlled ‗packages‘ for each arm and service in combat elements….in accord(ance) with the best casualty data available.‖

First Army sensed that standardized loss ratios, predetermined by Replacement Command, would be too rigid under combat conditions and proposed instead a plan in which subordinate units submitted advanced requisitions to army headquarters based on estimates of upcoming losses. The First Army rebuttal was accepted as the new SOP for the delivery of replacements in the ETO. Submitted requests, amalgamated and administered at army headquarters, formed the basis for the grouping of replacements in ‗packages‘ of 250 replacements for processing and shipment. First Army believed the plan provided, ―for the administrative advantages of a packaging system, and at the same time, (would) furnish units an assortment of skills more adapted to their needs than would be possible by use of (the) standardized packages.‖107

A ‗package‘ schedule was developed by First Army prior to the invasion that pre- assigned groupings to divisions and corps based on percentage MOS‘s. ‗Packages‘ composed primarily of riflemen were formed for infantry divisions and mixed groupings for other units.

The first ‗package‘ arrived in France on D+5. Each grouping retained a designation, such as

106 RG 319, NARAII, Box 134, Office of the Chief of Military History – Historical Manuscript File, AGF: 1942-47, Notes on Interviews of Lt. General Ben Lear by Lt. Col. K.R. Greenfield and Major. Bell I. Wiley, Ground Historical Section, 11 August 1945, 3. 107 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5610, Part II, Replacement System, Mothering 500,000 Orphans: The Gears of the Reinforcement Machine, 70.

145

O7B (O = Omaha Beach destination, 7 = D+7, and B = the second unit to land that day,) until being processed at the replacement battalion assigned to a specific corps.108

The scheme lasted a total of nine days before it was abandoned. The unpredictability of combat made it impossible to predetermine losses amongst the various arms on a percentage basis. Ground Force Replacement Command was instead forced to ship replacements,

―according to what was actually needed.‖109 Only 21,000 of the 35,500 replacements grouped into ‗packages‘ of 150 were actually shipped according to schedule with the remainder being broken up and fed through the replacement pipeline individually. Despite officially dropping the term ‗packages‘ on D+14, Replacement Command made continued attempts to congregate replacements in informal groupings to save time administratively and to, ―promote easy movement of groups of reinforcements to the Continent, and then later to forward depots.‖ By

November, 1944 1,383 formal and informal ‗packages‘ containing in excess of 300,000 replacements from all branches had been delivered to the continent.110 In terms of infantry-only

‗packages‘: 255 groupings containing 36,570 casual replacements and 917 groupings composed of 161,094 loss replacements arrived from the U.K., while the remaining 211 ‗packages‘ made up of 36,264 replacements were shipped directly from the United States to the Continent.111

Replacement administrators attempted other means of mitigating the effects of loneliness stemming from the impersonal nature of the replacement pipeline. The ETO‘s theater commander announced in December, 1944 that all use of the term ‗replacement‘ when

108 Ibid., 72. 109 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3915, Arrivals on the Continent from UK and Direct from ZI: D-Day Through 30 November. 110 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5610, Part II, Replacement System, Mothering 500,000 Orphans: The Gears of the Reinforcement Machine, 73. 111 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3915, Arrivals on the Continent from UK and Direct from ZI: D-Day Through 30 November.

146 describing units and individuals used to supplant combat losses would be succeeded by

‗reinforcement‘.112 The change was instituted to enhance morale as the term ‗replacement,‘

―indicated expendability, did not foster pride either in casuals or in replacement unit overhead, and resulted in personnel who were being moved forward through the Replacement System feeling that they were orpha(n)s belonging to no unit and that they were casuals in every sense of the word.‖113

ILLUSTRATION NO. 10 – Pamphlet: The Story of the Replacement

114

112 The term ‗reinforcement‘ was utilized by British Commonwealth formations in place of ‗replacement‘ throughout the war. 113 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3943, Administrative No. 571C, Chapter I, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, Theater Directives Affecting Mission and Operation of Ground Force Reinforcement Command, ETOUSA, 12. 114 Ibid., Cover.

147

In addition, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command published The Story of the

Reinforcement in a unilateral attempt at mitigating the negative aspects of the replacement pipeline experience. The colloquial pamphlet began by acknowledging the criticisms that the

Army had entered World War II with an unsatisfactory replacement system before going on to assure replacements that corrective measures had been instituted. Replacements were ensured from that point onwards the GFRC was, ―ready at a moment‘s notice to supply the varying personnel demands of the various Arms and Services,‖ so as not to, ―ever get caught short again.‖ The pamphlet reminded replacements that sacrifices at all levels of the Army were necessary for the system to work properly. Disgruntled replacements, unhappy with their assigned MOS, were reminded that military job assignments involved a complex process of matching personnel at induction centers with estimated needs six months in advance and, for this reason, the replacement operation could not be, ―geared to any one individual‘s desires to go places on his own schedule.‖115

The pamphlet also urged loss replacements to learn from casual replacements, who carried, ―an ace which (loss replacements) lack(ed) – experience. (The casual has) been up there before, and he knows what it‘s all about. For that reason he‘s a good man to know, for he can give you practical angles and tips which he learned the hard way…..And no matter how much soldier savvy you think you‘ve picked up in the States, the Casual still can teach you plenty.

Maybe somebody back home did fire live ammunition at you, but then it was only part of a training problem. The Casual has had live ammunition fired at him, too, but not from fixed

115 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3944, The Story of the Replacement, 1.

148 mounts.‖116 Loss replacements were also advised to ignore tall tales of battle and German invincibility from insensitive Casuals and were reminded that:

(m)ost of the Casuals you‘ll meet in the GFRC will be really anxious to help you…..So unless he‘s one of the few who like to throw a scare into new men, he‘s a good guy to latch on to. Anyway you‘re old enough to pick the right men to give you facts – not fairy tales.‖117

A similar pamphlet was published for the benefit of the casual replacement‘s morale.

The story of the CASUAL assured casual replacements that every effort was being made to return them to their original unit and that only, ―a few men are sent to new units, and then only because the old outfit may (have) be(en) overstrength or because the skill and training of certain individuals (wa)s urgently needed in another.‖118 Casuals were also urged to mentor inexperienced replacements and to refrain from inflating German fighting capabilities:

On your way back, you (the casual) are going to be close to a lot of new men going up for the first time, who will look to you as an expert, able to give them the lowdown. When they ask what it is all about, you can be the right guy in their careers as soldiers by handing out honest advice on how to get the job done. You can share all those practical angles which you learned the hard way. Because you know the ropes you can really help them. If you tell them what this deal for keeps is like, in the way they need to know, it will be one of the finest jobs you have ever done, and they will never forget it. On the other hand you can throw your weight around and be a heel. Either way we won‘t be checking up. It‘s just between you and some other guys who will be depending on you.119

Other methods were utilized to help acclimatize replacements to their new units. Most divisions went on in the aftermath of the Normandy campaign to create organic replacement training centers. Loss replacements were provided with a short unit history in these centers and

116 The term ‗casual replacement‘ indicated a soldier in the replacement pipeline who had previously served in combat and was the process of being returned to frontline service after a convalescent period in hospital due to sickness or wounding. See, RG 498, NARA II, Box 3944, The Story of the Replacement, 2, 3. 117 Ibid., 3. 118 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3944, the story of the CASUAL, 2-3. 119 Ibid., 3-4.

149 were given updated training in the latest combat methods. General Gerhardt issued instructions that replacements assigned to the 29th Division were to sew the division‘s blue/gray shoulder patch on their upper left uniform sleeve as quickly as possible to let them know they now had a home.120 Combat veterans were urged to do their part. A 29th Division veteran recalled how he,

―helped (replacements) get settled in (the) unit…..We were always glad to get some help and were very concerned about their well(-)being.‖121

ILLUSTRATION NO. 11 – Pamphlet: The Story of the Casual

122

120 Joseph Balkoski, From Beachhead to Brittany: The 29th Infantry Division at Brest, August- September 1944 (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2008), 91-92. 121 USAMHI, WWII Survey, 5659. 122 Ibid., Cover

150

Studies that dissected the replacement system‘s effectiveness began before the war ended.

In June, 1945 the Secretary of War directed two civilian advisors to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, Drs. E.P. Learned and Dan T. Smith, to conduct a sweeping investigation of the replacement system. Beginning with the War Department, the academics studied replacement system mechanics to the company level. The AGF was asked to recount its replacement system failures as part of the investigation. It subsequently settled on four primary weaknesses: (1) the quality and quantity of inductees, (2) RTC capacities insufficient to meet filler and loss requirements, (3) fluctuations to the length of replacement training and the syllabus utilized during training occurred too frequently, and (4) uncoordinated planning procedures amongst the various agencies overseeing the administration of the replacement system.123

Learned and Smith released the results of their study in 1946. Their finding included an indication that:

(t)here had been insufficient long-range planning of personnel requirements and resources; that no single War Department agency had adequate responsibility or authority for an integrated Army-wide personnel system; that the major commands and the theaters had not participated extensive enough in replacement planning; that in the formulation of strategic plans too much attention had been given to unit and too little to replacement requirements, with the result that the Army had been over-committed; and that Ground Force replacements had been too easily diverted to other uses.124

As corrective measures the committee recommended:

that G-1 WDGS be designated as the sole War Department agency responsible for personnel planning, and that its responsibility be exercised through a personnel resources and requirements branch. G-1 was to maintain a long-range master plan embracing all aspects of personnel procurement and distribution, and planning for operations by O(perations) D(ivisions,) G-3, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to proceed within the

123 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical section, AGF, 1946, 34, 35. 124, 34.

151

limitations which the plan imposed. Detailed planning of replacement production was to be decentralized to the three major commands, which would estimate requirements and resources of personnel on a world-wide basis, maintaining continuous liaison with the War Department and the theaters. All major changes in personnel policy were to be discussed and coordinated with the three commands and the theaters before they were issued. The committee (also) recommended that flexibility in the replacement system be secured by producing replacements against maximum requirements.125

An internal study later conducted by the AGF generally agreed with the War Department

Commission‘s recommendations. It dissented from Learned and Smith‘s recommendation of creating a personnel resources and requirements branch, favoring instead a continuation of the system in which requisitions were made based on requirements tables. It agreed most strongly with the recommendation of increased flexibility in the replacement system, noting, ―if replacements (had been) produced against maximum requirements, rather than against constantly revised estimates of minimum needs……many of the replacement troubles w(ou)l(d) (have) disappear(ed).‖126

The Learned Commission‘s probing study and subsequent recommendations would have paved the way for a steadier and more-efficient replacement system had the United States become embroiled in another war on the scope of the 1941-45 conflict. Conversely, the AGF review lacked inward study and its recommendations solved nothing. No amount of flexibility could have nullified inevitable setbacks when anything other than best-case occurred. All four deficiencies highlighted in its report to the Learned Commission were outside the AGF‘s administrative purview for most of the war. Its personnel selection errors were conveniently overlooked and its call for increased flexibility in the replacement system was meaningless.

AGF officials consistently blamed the quality and quantity of manpower as well as inadequate

125 Ibid., 34, 35. 126 Ibid.

152 training facilities and equipment but never any of their own policies.127 The AGF, in fact, devoted an entire postwar study to inadequate enlisted personnel quality as an explanation of organizational setbacks.128

Another postwar history of the replacement system affirmed the, ―key shortage in the

Army was of the infantry rifleman,‖ and that, ―(i)t was due primarily to the failure of Army planning staffs to properly estimate the number of casualties of this essential group.‖129 The same report contradicted itself two pages later by stating, ―the exact reason for the (infantry) deficienc(ies) cannot be exactly determined.‖130 The causes of infantry shortages were obvious: planning by best-case scenario and too heavy a focus on the production of specialists. AGF officials became equally culpable of producing too many specialists and too few riflemen after taking over personnel selection duties from the War Department. The AGF‘s ‗pass-the-buck‘ responses have nonetheless set the stage for the negative light with which the WWII replacement system has since been viewed.

The U.S. Army‘s Personnel Replacement System‘s design and operational results were hardly flawless. Nevertheless, the vast organization permitted all 89 U.S. Army combat divisions to remain viable fighting formations after suffering terrific casualty rates. The same cannot be said of most German divisions. A robust and underappreciated American replacement

127 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 10 - Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 42-50. 128 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Robert Palmer, Procurement of Enlisted Personnel for the AGF: the Problem of Quality, Study No. 5 (Washington D.C.: Historical Section, AGF, 1946). This study was one of the few postwar AGF studies actually published in Palmer et al., The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 2003). 129 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5610, Part II, Replacement System, Mothering 500,000 Orphans: The Gears of the Reinforcement Machine, 77. 130 Ibid., 79.

153 system was largely responsible for this and for averting a repeat of the replacement fiasco from the First World War. A post-WWII summary noted that the replacement system:

did accomplish its major mission. It overcame many obstacles; was covered with many brickbats; and had many difficulties which it could never overcome. But one indication of the success of the Reinforcement Command was revealed in the entries in a German officer‘s diary. Having battered a US division to pieces, the Germans laid plans for a knockout in the morning. But by morning the astounded Germans discovered they were faced again with a US division fighting at full strength.131

The complex ETO replacement system supplied 26,423 officers and 448,231 enlisted men between the invasion of France and the beginning of 1945, the equivalent of 33 infantry divisions. 59% of these were loss replacements, 35% were casuals, and 6% were specialists hurriedly reclassified and trained as infantrymen. 204,937 replacements were supplied to First

U.S. Army alone. The multi-echeloned ETO replacement command machinery numbered 2,502 officers and 20,989 enlisted men in 12 depots, 59 battalions and 240 companies at the end of

1944.132 The ETO replacement system‘s flexibility permitted the rapid shipment of 20,000 replacements by air and sea urgently requested by First U.S. Army during particularly fierce fighting in Normandy.133 The massive system handled over two million replacements between the 6 June landings and the surrender of Germany and at one point late in the war was the size of an average army corps.134

The replacement system functioned remarkably well from a numbers perspective and should not be unilaterally blamed for organizational problems that occurred in the U.S. Army. In response to a postwar survey, 87.3% of 29th Division veterans felt the replacement system

131 Ibid., 104. 132 Ibid., 63, 64. 133 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Report of Operations of the Replacement System within a Field Army in the ETO, 20 October 1943 – 8 May 1945, VIII Operation of the Replacement System within the Army Area on the Continent, 23. 134 Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army, 441.

154 performed adequately or very well.135 29th Division veteran comments on replacements ranged from: ―Great! Bring ‗em on. They were wanted (and) needed (and) soon became one of us…..As a whole, they never faltered (and) drew confidence from the vets surrounding them;‖136 to, ―(t)hey fell right into place..…without a ripple;‖137 and continued with, ―(t)here were never enough of them, especially in Normandy. The older ‗re-treads‘ from the

A(nti)A(ircraft)A(rtillery) were the best. Air Force the worst. Draftees in the middle – older the better.‖138 Other 29th Division veterans commented that replacements were, ―(v)ery good for the most part. Division training helped and (the 29th Division) seemed to get good

(replacements,)‖139 and that they were the, ―same as everyone else, if they didn‘t get wounded or killed during their 1st few days…..(We) tried to put them with veterans (to help them become acclimatized.)‖140

The replacement system garnered other tributes. The Deputy Commander of the ETO

Replacement Command testified:

All agree that the Replacement System has functioned 100 per cent. Combat commanders and all concerned are very much pleased….In spite of all difficulties the units have gotten replacements when they wanted them and the kind they wanted….Deliveries to divisions from corps reinforcement battalions within six hours of request, and arrivals in small units two hours thereafter were reported.141

A Newsweek correspondent labeled the replacement system, ―America‘s ‗secret weapon‘ – a system of battle replacements designed to compensate for casualties and replace worn-out troops

135 USAMHI, WWII Surveys of 29th Division soldiers. 136 USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 8533. 137 USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 2647. 138 USAMHI, WWII Survey, 2531. 139 USAMHI, WWII Survey, Unknown Number. 140 USAMHI, WWII Survey, 6396. 141 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5610, Part II, Replacement System, Mothering 500,000 Orphans: The Gears of the Reinforcement Machine, 67.

155 almost instantaneously. In the assault of Normandy, it worked so efficiently that there was not an outfit which went more than 48 hours with its maximum striking power deleted.‖142

Accolades aside, the creation of a flawless replacement system in a wartime army experiencing exponential growth was virtually impossible. Organizational defects became increasingly apparent and harmful as the war progressed. Frequent administrative and organizational changes often created chaotic situations, as did the absence of stable and uniform theater replacement command structures for much of the war.

Moreover, the morale-sapping nature of the replacement pipeline was greatly underappreciated by army leaders. Unusually high incidences of combat exhaustion represented a further manifestation of low replacement morale. Dr. Weintrob noted that 208 of 552 combat exhaustion casualties suffered by the 29th Division during a short period of fighting in Normandy had been replacements attached to the unit for mere days. Additionally, most of these exhaustion cases had been in the army for less than six months, of which four had been spent in training and the bulk of the remainder in transport or shifting between replacement depots.143

High combat exhaustion incidences amongst newly assigned replacements extended beyond the 29th Division. A report issued by General Board, HQETO in June, 1945 titled

‗Combat Exhaustion‘ noted, ―(w)hat…..may be called the ‗first type‘ (of combat exhaustion) occurred among troops in combat for the first time. It usually occurred either just before actual entry in combat or during the first five days of combat. The incidence of this type was particularly high among infantry replacements who had not been thoroughly trained for their

142 Ibid., 94. 143 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, HQ, 29th I.D., Meeting the Problems of Combat Exhaustion, 2 October 1944, 2.

156 assigned tasks and who were not integrated into their unit or indoctrinated with the spirit of the unit prior to the time that they participated in actual combat. (Underlining by the board).‖144

Historians have been especially critical of the replacement system. Stephen Ambrose, for example, commented, ―(h)ad the Germans been given a free hand to devise a replacement system for ETO, one that would do the Americans the most harm and least good, they could not have done a better job.‖145 A 29th Division veteran added to the litany of grievances noting, ―(j)ust before D-day, we received some young replacements. While still in England they replaced original National Guard members who suddenly developed many aches and pains as the time for invasion approached and were transferred to non-combat units……Generally we felt that the replacements were less mature and less trained that we were….(and were) less effective and less dependable. They just didn‘t seem to fit in.‖146

Nevertheless, the degree of criticism the system has received was not entirely warranted.

It is true that ETO formations were plagued by shortages of riflemen throughout 1944 despite lower than expected casualties and the existence of sufficient numbers of replacements.

However, the army‘s personnel selection system bears the greatest responsibility for these shortages. Army leaders failed to heed the lessons from the First World War and from early combat in World War II and remained focused on the production of specialists instead of riflemen. Moreover, radical changes in divisional organization inhibited the replacement system‘s ability to function smoothly. The system was conceived for an army of square

144 The words, Underlining by the board, are part of the text. See, RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Section 6, Introduction to Combat, 22. 145 Stephen Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 277. 146 USAMHI, WWII Survey, 4798.

157 divisions in which replacements would be fed in groups to the one regiment of four not in contact with the enemy.

The U.S. Army‘s replacement system was an important element to American ground victories in the Second World War. The army‘s organizational structure relied on the timely delivery of correct numbers of trained and hardy replacements and formations like the 29th

Division suffered when the system failed. The 90 division gamble increased the magnitude of a properly functioning replacement system. Approximately 2,500,000 American recruits were trained at Replacement Training Centers, just in the combat arms alone.147 The system‘s effectiveness was illustrated by the 29th Division‘s ability to engage the enemy at full strength in

May, 1945 despite having already been effectively wiped out twice in combat.

Army leaders went to great lengths to develop the best possible replacement system. The task was formidable and the system‘s complexities remain underappreciated. The result was a complex, multi-echeloned system that succeeded for the most part in providing sufficient replacements to an army fighting a global conflict. Indeed, the replacement system was, ―the life blood of the fighting army. By the infusion of new replacements, seasoned units (we)re able to continue operations indefinitely, while the recent arrivals (we)re more quickly taught the important lessons of combat through the close association with the experienced veterans.

These……lessons (were) learned through bitter experience.‖148 The final product may have been far from perfect, though many of the army‘s organizational and administrative problems

147 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 7 – Provision of Enlisted Replacements, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 1. 148 RG 319, NARA II, Box 7, BKGD ‗Personnel Replacement System, U.S. Army, 1951-1958: The Personnel Replacement System in the U.S. Army, Notes by Lt. Colonel Carl L. Elver in World War II Evolution of the U.S. Army Replacement System.

158 commonly associated with the organization were actually outside the replacement system‘s purview.

American officials took concerted efforts to repair system breakdowns. The replacement system‘s administration, the procedure for requisitioning replacements, and the method of replacement provision underwent frequent alterations during the war. Unfortunately, many were reactive decisions that hurt the final battlefield product. Moreover, the system‘s administrative apparatus was unquestioningly responsible for deplorable morale conditions within the replacement pipeline. System designers should have foreseen the loneliness element and incorporated morale enhancing strategies.

In context, however, the U.S. Army‘s replacement process performed quite satisfactorily considering the growing pains it was forced to endure. A better method of replacing combat losses has never been suggested. The organization‘s sheer complexity - especially in a rapidly expanding army composed primarily of civilians - may have doomed it to suffer significant breakdowns. The difficulty of producing an errorless replacement system is perhaps best summarized by the postwar comments of a 29th Division combat veteran who wrote, ―(c)ombat replacement for infantry is always a problem to which there is no ideal answer.‖149

149 USAMHI, WWII Survey, 3095.

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CHAPTER FOUR PRELIMINARY TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES

The Army is facing a grave responsibility…. To suddenly transform thousands of young men from every walk of civilian life to the status of soldiers in the Army…is a terrific undertaking.1

Training a military formation the size of the World War II U.S. Army represented a massive undertaking and the overall results were impressive in hindsight. Nevertheless, the process was understandably far from perfect and was fraught with disagreement, confusion, and change. Combat preparations present a valuable opportunity for insight into why an army functioned by certain means during battle. The doctrines adopted by the 29th Division and the training methods utilized to systematically incorporate these principles more than any other factor explain the unit‘s successes and failures in combat. In other words, there may be no better way of understanding an army‘s combat performance than by studying its training experiences.

Combat preparations for units mobilized by the War Department during World War II were similar in many respects but distinct in others, despite mandates for army-wide standardization. 29th Division commanders had no way of knowing when the division would join the fray. Most units expected imminent deployment and the 29th Division was no exception.

No one would have guessed the 29th Division was destined to train for forty months when the unit was initially mobilized on 3 February 1941. Undoubtedly the unit‘s combat preparations would have been different and more organized had its commanders known then what we now know. Early division training, especially after the attack on Pearl Harbor, was fraught with urgency. As the months turned into years, however, urgency was replaced by boredom, homesickness, and even resentment. The division‘s extended training timeframe did not ensure

1 RG 338, NARA II, Box 64, Undated letter from Brigadier General John P. Smith to Major General Campbell B. Hodges, Camp Beauregard, Louisiana.

160 it was adequately prepared for combat. Long periods of training may dull a unit‘s fighting edge just as easily as sharpen it. Moreover, a unit utilizing unsound techniques will never be flawlessly prepared for combat no matter how long it trains. Put another way, there was no intrinsic link between training duration and combat readiness.

Collective training and operational methods were developed through the lens of official

U.S. Army doctrine. Doctrine is defined as the, ―fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives.‖2 The application of common army doctrines offered, ―all commanders a firm basis for action in a particular situation…..(and) enable(d) the commander to utilize the flexible organization with which he (wa)s provide(d) to group his forces into task units most suitable for the accomplishment of his mission.‖3

One of the most influential American figures shaping U.S. Army tactics during the world wars was Emory Upton, a Union soldier during the Civil War. Upton represented the army‘s equivalent to the naval historian and geostrategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan. Upton achieved the rank of Brevet Major General in the Union Army by the age of twenty-six. As a result of his remarkable war record, Army officials commissioned Upton to develop and incorporate his innovative tactical philosophies on an army-wide basis. Upton sought to replace linear assaults with fire and movement tactics by non-linear formations.4 His modified tactics were later institutionalized in the U.S. Army and remained so innovative that many were utilized by the

2 William O. Odom. After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 3. 3 War Department, Field Manual 100-5 Field Service Regulations – Operations (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1941), ii. 4 Michael Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1639-2000 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003), 139.

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U.S. Army during the two world wars.5 Upton impressed General William T. Sherman so much that he chose Upton to travel abroad in search of the soundest international military organization on which to model the post-Civil War United States Army.6 The army‘s eventual adoption of a general staff system similar to the German Army model was largely based on Upton‘s recommendation.7

Upton was also a student of civil-military relations. He favored a heavily-officered, robust standing army and strongly opposed the idea of guardsmen serving as the nation‘s primary army reserve. Upton sensed political interference by meddlesome state governors and attorneys general represented the greatest obstacle to a well-managed and effective army, encouraging instead an army where professional soldiers made decisions clear of political interference.

Upton‘s civil-military reforms were eventually rejected based on his fundamental misunderstanding of the hierarchical relationship between government and military officials in the United States.8 Upton forgot or ignored the fact that constitutional framers had codified civilian control of the military to avoid the experiences of war-torn 18th Century Europe where the opposite had been the case.9

Notwithstanding this rejection, many of Upton‘s views remained popular within the leadership circles of the U.S. Army. Opponents of the National Guard - eventually labeled

Uptonians - in fact advocated Upton‘s theories well into the twentieth century. Lieutenant

5 Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 158. 6 Odom, ―After the Trenches,‖ 14. 7 Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 275-277. 8 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 139-141. 9 Jim Garamone, ―Why Civilian Control of the Military,‖ in U.S. Department of National Defense, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=45870 (accessed 4 October 2013).

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General Leslie McNair represented the U.S. Army‘s most influential Uptonian during WWII.10

McNair‘s low opinion of guard units was transparent in a memorandum to General George C.

Marshall in which he observed, ―(o)ne of the great lessons of the present war is that the National

Guard, as organized before the war, contributed nothing to national defense….The structure of the National Guard was pregnant with disaster for the entire nation.‖11 Efficient mobilization and training of Guard units was undoubtedly hindered by such views of the officer largely responsible for the process.

The doctrine adopted by the U.S. Army during World War II stressed offensive spirit and the utilization of training that developed, ―in the Army the ability and desire to take offensive action in combat. Although training (was to) include thorough instruction in defensive combat, it

(was to) be understood that such combat (wa)s only a means to a definite end – offensive action.‖12 Put another way, wartime American infantry divisions were philosophically geared for the offensive, which enabled them to deal, ―out death, destruction, and annihilation to the enemy‘s forces.‖ 13

The essence of U.S Army training during World War II and the methodologies to carry it out was contained in training literature such as War Department Mobilization Training Programs

10 Ibid., 199. 11 Date of memorandum unknown, though it fell somewhere between McNair‘s assumption of duty as the commander, AGF in March, 1942 and his death in July, 1944. See, William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958), 95, Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 181, and Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 199. 12 War Department, Field Manual 21-5, Basic Field Manual – Military Training (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1941), 1. 13 RG 338, NARA II, Box 65, HQ V Corps, Role of Commanders and Staff of a Wartime Division, 29 September 1942, 1, 2

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(MTPs.)14 War Department officials mandated that training literature reflect changes in,

―doctrine, methods, organization, equipment, and training technique.‖15 The War Department continued to generate, publish, and circulate Mobilization Training Programs until the end of the war, despite its Circular No. 59 specifically charging the AGF with, ―the development of tactical and training doctrine for infantry, field artillery, coast artillery, cavalry, and specialized combat units.‖16 29th Division administrators relied exclusively on MTPs for guidance during the formulation of training schedules for replacements assigned directly to the unit.17 Their influence on training philosophies and procedures may have been even more widespread as 29th

Division training memoranda were often virtual facsimiles of MTPs.18

MTPs were broken into two sections. The first governed the training of replacements from induction to unit assignment. This training cycle was further divided in two subsections, ―a shorter period of basic training, of variable length and content, and a longer period of technical and tactical training designed to qualify the replacement for a particular military occupation specialty.‖19 MTPs continued to regulate a soldier‘s training after assignment to a branch

14 See for example, USAMHI, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Military Publications, War Department, Mobilization Training Program No. 7-4, Infantry Training Program, Unit Training for Infantry Regiment (Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1 October 1943.) See Appendices 1 and 2 for MTP examples. 15 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234. Unpublished Draft No. 10 – Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 16. 16 Ibid. 17 See for example, RG 338, NARA II, Box 3898, HQ, 29th Division, Training Memorandum No. 16, 20 February 1942, 1, 2. 18 See for example, USAMHI, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Military Publications, War Department, Mobilization Training Program No. 7-3, Infantry Mobilization training Programs for Infantry Replacements at Enlisted Replacement Centers (Washington, D.C.: War Department, March 1, 1941) and RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, HQ, 29th Division, Training Memorandum No. 4, Annex No. 1, Infantry Training, 14 April 1943. 19 William R. Keast, ―The Training of Enlisted Replacements,‖ in The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, eds. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast (Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, 2003), 377.

164 specific army unit during the second subsection. A specific MTP was issued for each branch containing, ―a detailed breakdown of (applicable) programs……(and) specifying the subjects, total number of hours for each subject, and the breakdown of these hours by week of the cycle.‖20

Specific training schedules found in MTPs were divided into phases, beginning with individual training and progressing through platoon, company, battalion, and regimental preparations. MTPs were published in conjunction with MR 3-1, ―(t)o furnish a general guide for the continued training of infantry regiments which, except for a trained cadre of officers, noncommissioned officers, and certain specialists, are composed of enlisted men who have completed their individual training either in their regiment or other combat organization, or at an infantry replacement training center.‖21

American soldiers were trained according to directives found in Mobilization Training

Programs for a specific reason. MTPs were designed to provide standardized army-wide training enabling commanders to issue orders based on official U.S. Army doctrine and that their subordinates had been sufficiently and uniformly trained to carry out the instructions as quickly as possible and at the lowest possible cost in manpower and equipment.

The process was often subverted, though, as MTPs from the various arms were chronically inconsistent. Even common training subjects displayed widespread discrepancies as a result of little or no coordination between individual branch chiefs during the production of respective training programs. As a result, comparable training subjects were, ―treated differently in different MTP‘s and not even the titles of subjects were the same; what appeared as a single subject in one MTP might be listed as two or even three subjects in another. In particular, initial

20 Ibid. 21 War Department, Mobilization Training Program No. 7-4, 1.

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MTP‘s displayed wide divergences in the allotment of time to subjects common to all programs.‖22 The lack of standardization held potentially harmful consequences to combat divisions, their being composed entirely of various branch units. The reliance on MTPs nevertheless illustrates the degree of training standardization sought by War Department officials and the intrinsic link between doctrine and training. The soundness and collaboration of MTP directives and official doctrine were primary determinants of the U.S. Army‘s combat results during World War II.

The aforementioned official army doctrine was codified in official army manuals known as Field Service Regulations (FSR.) Three versions were published between the two world wars, during the years, 1923, 1939, and 1941. MTPs were generated based on the doctrines contained in the FSRs. The 1923 version was composed with the AEF‘s combat experiences still fresh in the minds of War Department officials. The vast technological, organizational, and tactical advances that occurred during the First World War provided an abundance of lessons in the production of the 1923 FSR. The manual stressed, ―skillful combination of all arms in support of the infantry attack to destroy the enemy……Tanks, mortars, machineguns, and accompanying guns greatly increased the capabilities of the infantry, transforming it into a small-scale combined arms team……Doctrine remained maneuver orientated, emphasizing envelopment over frontal attack and eschewing stabilized warfare in favor of ‗open warfare‘ techniques.‖23

Though technological advances rendered it obsolete by the dawn of World War II, the 1923 version is described as having, ―clearly marked the army‘s shift from a frontier constabulary to a force capable of modern combat,‖24

22 Keast, ―The Training of Enlisted Replacements,‖ 385. 23 Odom, ―After the Trenches,‖ 241. 24 Ibid.

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The U.S. Army‘s interwar doctrinal vision was nevertheless muddied after the publication of the Manual for Commanders of Large Units (MCLU) in 1930. The MCLU was based largely on the French military manual, Provisional Instruction on the Tactical Employment of Large Units. The American manual was designed to provide leadership philosophies for commanders of armies, corps, divisions, and special operation units. The MCLU was intended to act as a supplement to the 1923 FSR and not a substitution, though the two manuals were clearly at doctrinal odds.25 The 1923 FSR stressed the primacy of infantry, offensive spirit, and

―concentrated and simultaneous force in a battle of annihilation,‖ while the MCLU rejected the pre-WWI ‗cult of the offensive‘ in favor of, ―successive applications of force,‖ emphasizing overall army firepower and the primacy of the defensive.26 The MCLU also conflicted with the forthcoming 1939 FSR in that, ―the FSR embod(ied) the doctrine of the concentrated blow while the MCLU (wa)s based upon the idea of the successive effort.‖27

The 1939 version was released on the eve of World War II. The first major revision in

U.S. Army doctrine in nearly two decades included a host of changes, including a new title. The

1939 guidebook added Operations after Field Service Regulations along with the description -

Field Manual 100-5. The 1939 FSR reaffirmed the primacy of offensive action instilled in the

1923 edition, though it allowed for greater emphasis on defensive principles. The 1939 version has been characterized as recognizing the potential for increased battlefield mobility due to technological advances in motorization, acknowledging advances in aircraft technology, yet failing to include a revised doctrine that incorporated these advances.28

25 Ibid, 119, 120, 121, 222. 26 Ibid., 122-123. 27 Major General George A. Lynch, ―The Tactics of the New Infantry Regiment,‖ Infantry Journal 46, no. 2 (March-April, 1939): 98. 28 Odom, ―After the Trenches,‖ 132, 133.

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The 1939 FSR reflected a cash-strapped army attempting doctrinal modernization bereft of recent combat. The situation was opposite to what had been the case during the development of the 1923 FSRs and the 1939 version was poorer as a result. The 1939 version is noted to have, ―confirmed that the army still subscribed to an archaic concept of combined arms operations and had yet to address adequately the new challenges of mechanization, antitank defense, close air support, and antiaircraft defense.‖29 Its shortcomings are also reported as possibly illustrating, ―the stagnation of intellectual activity within the army,‖ and as having,

―clearly prove(n) that American Army doctrine had failed to evolve during the interwar years. If the U.S. Army had not been among the victors in World War II, the manual might have stood as a stark testimony to its intellectual bankruptcy.‖30 The inherent limitations of the 1939 FSR explain why it was so quickly superseded by the 1941 version.

In light of the 1939 version‘s inherent deficiencies, the 1941 FSRs sought to supplement battlefield firepower by coordinating armor and air assets with infantry and artillery units. The modified regulations also assigned a greater emphasis to antitank and antiaircraft defense.31 The

1941 version benefitted from increased funding and sought to incorporate lessons provided by large-scale maneuvers at home and from events taking place in Europe. Fire and maneuver advocates were buoyed by early German ‗blitzkrieg‘ successes and the 1941 regulations reflected a strong belief in the merits of mobility and offensive action.32 Units were left of fend for themselves when fire and maneuver failed in close-quarter combat situations, however, a less than ideal by-product of leaning too heavily on early German successes for doctrinal guidance.

29 Ibid., 137. 30 Ibid., 199, 241. 31 Ibid., 242. 32 War Department, Field Manual 100-5 Field Service Regulations – Operations, 5, 6.

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Once they became engaged in attrition warfare, formations like the 29th Division would pay a steep price as a result of this doctrinal error.

The 1941 FSR encapsulated U.S. Army doctrine throughout the majority of the Second

World War though it may not have been entirely unique in nature. War Department officials acknowledged in 1942 that, ―British tactical doctrine (wa)s generally similar to that of the U.S.

Army.‖ British Army doctrine likewise sought, ―(d)ecisive victory on the battlefield.‖ British officials determined this could, ―be achieved only by the offensive. Only by attack can a commander get control of two vital factors in war – time and space – and thereby seize the initiative…..The offensive spirit must be shared by all ranks down to the last individual soldier.

The most junior commander, rather than wait for orders, must use his initiative to reach his immediate objective, and, in default of a stated objective, must devise one himself…..The four basic factors……in the attack are: surprise, speed, simplicity, and concentration.‖33

The examination of FSR development illustrates a systematic inability to adapt to changing battlefield conditions within U.S. Army leadership circles. The 1939 FSR‘s influence on the U.S. Army‘s battlefield product during the Second World War was substantial. Recruits inducted during 1940 and 1941 were primarily trained according to MTP tenets based on the earlier, poorly-received manual. Revised MTPs were issued after the release of the 1941 FSR but incorporated few training improvements gleaned from the initial combat encounters of World

War II. An updated doctrinal manual was released shortly after the landings at Normandy though the latest revision had little effect on the Army‘s WWII battlefield performance because of the time involved in producing restructured MTPs, training recruits by those revised

33 War Department, Technical Manual 30-410, Handbook on the British Army with Supplements on the Royal Air Force and Civilian Defence Organizations (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), 187.

169 guidelines, and conveying them to fighting units. Most of the training in the U.S. Army during

World War II was therefore based on doctrine established prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Seeking to standardize training methods on an army-wide basis, War Department officials insisted that units rigidly adhere to MTP guidelines. The AGF set nine basic principles for units to follow during early training. (1) The primacy of tactical unit integrity was underscored in early training, ―since each tactical organization was to be employed in combat as a unit, and since teamwork would be a prime factor in its success, each organization from squad to army was to be trained as a unit rather than made up before deployment from individuals and groups that had been trained separately.‖ (2) Units were responsible for the administration and implementation of inductee training until sufficient accommodations could be created in

Replacement Training Centers. (3) Early training stressed general military proficiency. AGF leaders believed long-term military efficiency could only be achieved through sound initial training and specialized training must follow but not precede it. (4) Units followed a progressive four-phase training cycle that began with individual training and progressed through small-unit training, combined training, and large-unit training. (5) Systemic standardized testing was utilized at each echelon to assure, ―uniform training, early adjustment to exacting standards, and completion of the training mission(s).‖ AGF officials insisted on ―particularize(d)‖ assessments because, ―a testing program that left the determination of standards up to each commander would have been valueless because of the variation in the standards.‖ However, tests were conducted in such a manner, ―to interfere as little as possible with regular training.‖ (6) Elementary training was stressed during all four phases of training because, ―(t)he basic skill of the individual and of small units was the foundation of the efficient performance of large units.‖ (7) Units conducted spontaneous maneuvers with, ―realistic umpiring and immediate, detailed critiques,‖ to provide

170 soldiers, ―experience in large-scale employment under conditions approximating as closely as possible those they would encounter in battle.‖ (8) Troop schools held outside regular training hours should foster unit integrity while also imparting doctrinal and tactical lessons. (9) Units were urged to maximize training realism. AGF directives upheld, ―the closest simulation of combat conditions was the ideal…..and (was) approximated through such devices as the use of live ammunition, maneuvers, battle inculcation courses and rigorous tests.‖34

McNair encouraged a sense of urgency in early U.S. Army training. He reminded units,

―(w)e must hurry and we must keep on hurrying.‖ McNair was determined to adopt a training system that promoted, ―economy of time and concentration of effort.‖ The AGF‘s commanding general also sought to establish realistic training standards so that, ―every man, in so far as it

(wa)s humanly possible, (could) experience in training the things he w(ould) experience in battle.‖ 35

The 29th Division began, ―prepar(ing) itself for extended field service under actual or simulated war conditions, as a highly trained, thoroughly coordinated and aggressive team, at actual or expanded strength, acting alone or as part of a large force,‖ immediately after being inducted into federal service. Early preparations consisted of individual and small unit exercises, close order drill, tactical training in the use of ground and cover, mechanical training, care and maintenance of weapons, uniforms and equipment, and preliminary marksmanship courses.36

34 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 10 - Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 7, 8, 9, 30. 35 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, A Short History of the Army Ground Forces, Chapter II, The Inception and Mission of the Army Ground Forces, unpublished, no author, 28, 29. 36 RG 338, NARA II, Box 7, II Army Corps Training Directive, Training Memorandum No. 33, 12 December 1941.

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Company commanders prepared and administered day-to-day training schedules for platoon and squad leaders who ensured the training was properly executed during allotted hours.37

Initial training was structured in a highly organized fashion and broken into two initial timeframes. Initial preparations taking place between 24 February and 2 June consisted of individual and separate unit training up to the regimental level.38 The objectives of the first training period were:

(to build) proficiency in basic training and in combat principles for all units to include the regiment; completion of marksmanship and mechanical test; and (to) be well advanced in command post training…..(to) (t)rain the (individual) soldier physically and professionally to the end that he will be able to operate effectively under combat conditions as an individual and as a member of a combat teams….(to) (o)rganiz(e) and train…..separately and in combined teams the various command posts from battalion to division, inclusive…(and to) (d)evelop the organizational equipment and transportation of all units so that they may take the field on short notice and operate efficiently under combat conditions.39

The training conducted by the 29th Division placed special emphasis on, ―citizenship duties and unit esprit de corps, (p)hysical training and conditioning, (c)are and use of individual weapons and equipment, (c)are of the individual under field conditions, (u)se of cover, concealment and camouflage, (s)couting and patrolling, day and night, (t)arget and service practice with all weapons, (t)horough training of all specialists in the individual technique of their specialty, (m)ap reading….(p)ersonal hygiene, (c)are and proper wearing of the uniform,

(c)ustoms of the service and saluting, (and) (s)nap and precision in disciplinary drill.40

The 115th Infantry‘s training syllabus illustrates the progressive nature of early training in the 29th Division: Feb. 24 - Basic tactical training for the individual soldier; March 3 – Basic

37 No Author, ―Company Duties: A Checklist,‖ Infantry Journal 47, no. 6 (December, 1941): 25. 38 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, HQ 29th I.D. Training Orders No. 1, Training Program Feb.3 – Sept. 1, 1941, 3 February 1941, 1. 39 Ibid., 1, 2. 40 Ibid., 4.

172 mechanical training, tactical training for the individual soldier; March 10 – Basic, technique of fire, tactical training for the individual soldier; March 17 and 24 - Basic, Technique of fire, tactical training for the individual soldier, tactics of a squad; March 31 – Firing range; April 7 –

Basic, entrenchments, bayonet, tactics of a squad; April 14 – Basic, bayonet, grenades, entrucking and detrucking, tactics of a platoon, April 21 – Basic, grenades, tactics of a platoon, tactics of a company; April 28 – Basic, entrenchments, tactics of a company, battalion training, regimental command post exercise; May 5 Basic, tactics of a company, battalion training, night operations, regimental command post exercise; May 12 – Night operations, regimental training, marches; and May 19 – Regimental training, night operations, motor movements.41

Initial training was carried out on a 36 hour per week basis.42 MTPs standards were the guiding principles for the division‘s training. Infantry regiments trained in strict compliance with guidelines defined in MTP 7-1. Ancillary units utilized specialized branch MTPs for training guidance. Soldiers of the 121st Engineers rehearsed basic drills, squad, company, and battalion tactics, bridge, field fortifications, and road construction, along with demolitions - during both daylight and night-time hours - according to the tenets of MTP 5-1. The 104th

Medical Regiment utilized MTP 8-1, the 29th Signals Company employed MTP 11-1, artillery units made use of MTP 6-1, while quartermaster units used MTP 10-1.43

The second designated training phase ran from 3 June to 1 September and was devoted,

―to exercises in combined training of regimental, brigade, and division combat teams.‖ The

41 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, HQ 29th I.D. Annex No. 2 to Training Orders No. 1, Training Program Feb.3 – Sept. 1, 1941, Master Schedule of Training, Feb. 24 – May 26, 1941. 42 RG 338, NARA II, Box 7, II Army Corps Training Directive, Training Memorandum No. 33, 12 December 1941. 43 Ibid.

173 objective of the training period was the creation of a balanced fighting team from the division‘s component parts. As a result the second phase of training stressed:

(t)he development of team-play between infantry and artillery by the close association of units of these arms on the march, in bivouac, and in combat….(c)operative day and night operations…..(d)ay and night movements…..(t)he speeding up of operation by every legitimate means to include the adoption of standing operating procedure by commanders of all grades as outlined (in)….FM 101-5……(o)rganizing and perfecting appropriate systems of air and mechanized defense within all echelons of command……(and) (o)rganizing and perfecting appropriate systems of command, combat intelligence, liaison, supply and evacuation within all echelons of command.44

Preparations featured drills intended to progressively, ―complete and perfect‖ echelon training from squad to regimental levels. AGF instructions required soldiers to become certified as having fired all applicable weapons pending the outcome of ammunition shortages.

Commissioned and non-commissioned officers attended specialized training schools to further their training and leadership abilities. Inspections held in July ensured standardized progress was being achieved in the division.45 Many times it was not. For instance, the division was criticized for improper supply, fieldcraft, transmission of orders, motor convoy, and marching techniques, for unsatisfactory artillery and small unit tactics, organization of defensive positions and for a generally poor exhibition of leadership skill in a June 1941 II Army Corps training critique.46

The unit‘s master training schedule for the latter half of 1941 shown in Chart No. 9 further illustrates the degree of complexity that went into the planning and administration of division training. Of particular interest was the fact that the division had yet to conduct any

44 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, HQ 29th I.D. Training Orders No. 1, Training Program Feb.3 – Sept. 1, 1941, 3 February 1941, 2, 3. 45 RG 338, NARA II, Box 7, II Army Corps Training Directive, Training Memorandum No. 8, n.d. 46 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3896, Letter from II Army Corps titled, ‗Need for further training,‘ 14 June 1941.

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division field training (H,) specialist training (I,) or tactical unit training (J) prior to departing for

corps and army maneuvers in mid-September.

ILLUSTRATION NO. 12 - 29th Division Training for Prewar Guardsmen and Selectees: Feb. 3 – Sept. 1, 1941

47 The 29th Division‘s early training illustrated the degree of standardization it utilized

during combat preparations. Progress charts were ordered, ―showing the training conducted (to

that point) and the degree of proficiency attained by each individual within companies and

batteries and by each element of larger units.‖ Attendance records were kept and informal

47 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, HQ 29th I.D. Training Orders No. 1, Training Program Feb.3 – Sept. 1, 1941, 3 February 1941.

175 proficiency tests were carried out at the conclusion of each subject of training to ensure that progress was uniform and proceeding according to plan. 48

CHART NO. 9 – 29th Division Master Schedule of Training: 1 June – 31 December 1941

58th Brigade 88th Brigade Week of 115th Infantry 175th Infantry 116th Infantry 176th Infantry 54th F.A. Brigade 121st Engineers June 2nd C, D D C, D C, D C, D C, D June 9th D, E, F A D, E, F D, E, F D, E, F D, E, F June 16th - E A, D, E, F - A, D, E, F A, D, E, F June 23th A, D, E, F D, E, F B - - - June 30th B - D, E, F A, D, E, F - D, E, F July 7th D, E, F - - B D, E, F - July 14th - - - D, E, F - B July 21st - - - - E, F E, F July 28th D, E, G D, E, G D, E, G D, E, G E, G E, G August 4th - E, G - - - - August 11th E, G - E, G E, G - - August 18th ------August 25th E, M E, M E, M E, M E, M E, M September 1st ------September 8th ------September 15th ------September 23rd ------Oct. 1st - Nov. 30th N N N N N N Dec. 1st -Dec. 31st O O O O O O

A - KNOWN DISTANCE RANGE PRACTICE - RIFLE, MB, AND PISTOL B - COMBAT RANGE PRACTICE C - MOBILIZATION TRAINING PROGRAMS D - SELECTEE TRAINING E - INDIVIDUAL, SPECIALIST AND SMALL UNIT TRAINING F - REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM TRAINING G - BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM TRAINING H - DIVISIONAL FIELD TRAINING I - SPECIALIST, TEAM AN COMBINED J - TACTICAL UNIT TRAINING M - DIVISION ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE SERVICE N - CORPS AND ARMY FIELD TRAINING O - REVIEW TRAINING

48 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, HQ 29th I.D. Training Orders No. 1, Training Program Feb.3 – Sept. 1, 1941, 3 February 1941, 6, 7, 8.

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The value of the division‘s early training and the seriousness with which the men carried it out may have been limited. The 115th Infantry‘s official history recalled that it all, ―seemed rather pointless and foolish,‖ at the time, ―since there really seemed to be nothing for which to train. Most everyone knew that Germany had no designs on the Western Hemisphere…..and the

Japanese – well, the Japanese weren‘t worth bothering about….Selectees, draftees, inductees….arrived….bewildered….at the new way of life that was to swallow them up. It would just be for a year, though, they thought – just a year out of their life and then they would go back to the civilian life that would be the same as before.‖50

Nevertheless, the 29th Division‘s training objectives for the latter half of 1941 were to complete the basic training of selectees according to MTP guidelines and to continue progressive combined arms training. Units were directed to complete firing exercises, ―as far as availability of ammunition w(ou)l(d) permit.‖51 The month of December was dedicated to a review of division preparations carried out to that point and the institution of corrective measures for any glaring deficiencies. However, the grand army maneuvers set to take place in the Carolinas highlighted the division‘s training in late 1941.52

29th Division formations, engaged in decentralized combat preparations at training facilities across the north-eastern United States, congregated at Fort Meade during August, 1941 in anticipation for the unit‘s participation in the highly-anticipated First Army Maneuvers. The division set off on the first leg of its journey to the Carolinas on 13 September, eventually

49 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3897, 29th I.D., Annex No. 1 to Training Memorandum No. 10, Master Schedule of Training, 1 June – 31 December 1941, 1 June 1941. 50 Joseph Binkoski and Arthur Plaut, The 115th Infantry Regiment in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), 1. 51 RG 338, NARA II, Box 7, Training Memorandum No. 8, II Army Corps Training Directive, June 1, 1941-December 31, 1941. 52 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3897, HQ, 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 10, Training Program: June 1 – December 31, 1941, 1, 2.

177 arriving at Fort Bragg on 27 September after a two-week training stint at the A.P. Hill

Reservation.53 The maneuvers were held in a heart shaped area beginning near Charlotte, moving south-east towards Bishopville, South Carolina, then north-east across the Pee Dee River to Laurinburg, North Carolina and then more northerly to the Pinehurst, Aberdeen, southern

Pines area, before returning to Charlotte on a meandering westerly course.54 Brigadier General

Mark Clark, Deputy Commander of the Maneuvers, noted the area, ―(could) be classed as foothill country with numerous patches of woods, interspaced with open fields, excellent cover, fields of fire, and (that) maneuver (areas) (we)re available.‖55

The Carolina Maneuvers did not represent the 29th Division‘s first opportunity to participate in multi-division exercises since the First World War. The unit had already participated in three weeks of large-scale exercises near the Canadian border in upstate New

York during August and September 1940.56 However, the maneuvers were largely a ramshackle affair. As of April 1940 it remained unclear whether Congress would even allocate the funds necessary for the maneuvers to proceed.57 The sudden conquest of France and the Low

Countries by German forces likely jarred free the funds necessary to convene Regular and

National Guard divisions for combined training at the corps level.

The intent of the 1940 maneuvers was to serve as a training school for gathered units and to generate fighting men and a fighting field force.58 Doctrinally, units were to close with the enemy and secure a decision through offensive action. Leaders were urged to foster an offensive

53 Ewing, 29 Let’s Go, 3, 5. 54 RG 338, NARA II, Box 2, Map of Maneuver Area, Undated. 55 RG 337, NARA II, Box 328, Comments by Brigadier General Mark Clark, Deputy Director, 2- 3. 56 Ewing, The 29th: A Short History of a Fighting Division, 18. 57 RG 337, NARA II, Box 411, Training Memorandum No. 2, Headquarters, Director First Army Maneuvers, 1940, 16 April 1940, 1. 58 RG 337, NARA II, Box 411, First Army Maneuvers 1940, Final Report, 13.

178 spirit in the manner exhibited by the soldiers of the American Expeditionary Force.59 Sensing the likelihood that his country would soon become embroiled in the global conflict the commander of First Army, Lt. General Hugh Drum, added, ―(i)n view of the present world situation with the ever increasing danger facing (the United States,) we should comprehend th(e)s(e) objective(s) in a clear and cold analysis.‖60 Training began with basic refresher courses and small unit training designed to, ―emphasize the proper application of tactical principles in the employment of the squad, section, platoon, company, battalion, and regiment, to develop teamwork in combat groups and to harden the troops.‖ Two-sided brigade and division exercises then followed.61

National Guard units were reported to have exhibited tremendous improvements over the course of the maneuvers.62 The maneuvers also provided an opportunity for 2000 reserve officers to be slotted into divisions – including National Guard units – for an opportunity to,

―participate in field training in command and staff duties.‖63

Conversely, the 1940 maneuvers illustrated glaring shortages in trained manpower, equipment and modern weaponry. The total strength of the 29th Division during the maneuvers was 958 officers, 8 warrant officers and 8776 enlisted men, far below its authorized strength of enlisted men.64 A 29th Division artillery unit recalled, ―the famous First Army maneuvers along

59 RG 337, NARA II, Box 411, First Army Maneuvers 1940, Opening Conference, Lt. General Hugh Drum, 7 August 1940, 1, 2. 60 Ibid., 1. 61 RG 337, NARA II, Box 411, General Training Directive, Headquarters, Director First Army Maneuvers, 1940, 1. 62 RG 337, NARA II, Box 411, First Army Maneuvers 1940, Final Report, 14. 63 Ibid., 13. 64 RG 337, NARA II, Box 411, First Army Maneuvers, Critique by Lt. General Hugh Drum, 22 August 1940, 1.

179 the Canadian border (as a time) during which (the U.S.) Army feverishly prepar(ed) for war, employed stove pipe cannon, hired civilian coal trucks as tanks, and sticks as guns.‖65

The 1940 Maneuvers also demonstrated that many American leaders had become overly- enamored with the doctrine of German ‗blitzkreig‘ and perhaps misunderstood how it operated.

The commander of the 1940 maneuvers noted, ―(t)he advent of the motor and the catch phrases coming from the European war ha(d) given many an erroneous conception of actual battle – they appear to visualize battle as consisting primarily of motoring instead of fighting by a combination of fire superiority and tactical movements. As one of our famous generals put it – they do a lot of ‗blitzing‘ but little ‗krieging.‘‖66 Another officer wisely noted that German successes had, ―not come from technique or material but fundamentally from large numbers of highly disciplined men trained to handle their weapons and machines under any and all circumstances,‖ and that, ―(w)ars are still fought by men even though they use elaborate weapons.‖67

The Carolina Maneuvers held a year later constituted only one portion of the enormous

GHQ field exercises that took place in 1941 but were still a far grander affair than the New York exercises. Almost 50% of the army‘s overall strength at the time participated in the 1941 GHQ maneuvers, later described as, ―a central figure in th(e) (U.S. Army‘s) prewar mobilization period.‖ McNair considered the maneuvers an opportunity, ―to give small units experience in teamwork and combined arms.‖ The Chief of Staff referred to them as, ―combat college for

65 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7520, Excerpt from a speech given to the 111th Battalion in England on 3 February 1944 by Major Mullins, 4. 66 RG 337, NARA II, Box 411, First Army Maneuvers, Critique by Lt. General Hugh Drum, 22 August 1940, 3. 67 RG 337, NARA II, Box 411, Remarks by Brigadier General Irving J. Phillipson, Deputy Director, First Army Maneuvers, 22 August 1940, 1.

180 troop leading,‖ during which, ―mistakes (were to be) made and corrected……..(instead of during) battle.‖68

The 1941 Carolina Maneuvers consisted of a series of pre-determined sub-exercises, beginning with corps directed field exercises, command post exercises, and divisional maneuvers held between 6-18 October. The 28th, 29th, and 44th Infantry Divisions, totaling more than

65,000 soldiers, took part in Phase I.69 First Army then conducted, ―three separate and distinct maneuvers, designated as Field Maneuvers Nos., 1, 2, and 3,‖ during the second phase of the maneuvers, lasting from 20 October – 14 November. The final period ran from 16-30 November and was, ―used by GHQ for a separate Field Maneuver, prepared and directed by that

Headquarters.‖70 The 28th, 29th, and 44th Infantry Divisions were joined in November by a number of other units, including the 1st and 30th Divisions, which raised the total number of army participants in the 1941 Carolina Maneuvers to over 302,600. 71 The strength of the 29th Division during the 1941 war games was 871 officers and 14,152 enlisted men.72

1st Army‘s commanding officer, Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, urged his subordinates to, ―(f)ind the enemy, learn his strength, dispositions and movements. Insure that this information reaches the higher commander. Never lose contact with the enemy once gained….Utilize a portion of your force to develop the enemy. Make him ‗show his hand,‘ and then pin him down…..Strike with your main force, so as to destroy him….Coordinate all

68 Christopher R. Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1992), 5. 69 RG 337, NARA II, Box 72, Corps Training, August – October, 1941, Memorandum from General Headquarters, U.S. Army, dated August 25, 1941. 70 RG 337, NARA II, Box 412, First Army Maneuvers, 1941: Final Report, Address by the Deputy Direct, Opening Conference, 1. 71 RG 337, NARA II, Box 72, Army Training, August – November, 1941. 72 RG 337, NARA II, Box 390, List of Units First Army.

181 agencies – air, artillery, armored forces, in a concentric blow to insure destructive results.‖73

Drum also reminded commanders to focus on improving junior leadership in the First Army and noted the, ―welfare of the men in the ranks (wa)s a primary responsibility of commanders of all grades. Their daily tasks in camp or campaign are never completed until commanders personally know that their men are fed, have water, and in the presence of an enemy are protected against surprise and raids. The delegating of such matters to subordinate non-commissioned officers is contrary to true American leadership and tradition.‖74

The maneuvers were a swashbuckling affair, steeped with rapid advances and encirclements. Mobility was stressed during every aspect of the exercises to the point where,

―(i)nfantrymen spent half their time on trucks that were borrowed from the artillery and the quartermaster regiment, and even in horse vans borrowed from cavalry units.‖ The division‘s postwar history remembers the maneuvers as, ―great, sprawling, rapidly moving affairs, with units scattered miles apart in the hills.‖ To 29th Division infantrymen the maneuvers represented,

―truck-riding days,‖ during which typical orders consisted of, ―(y)our I(nitial) P(oint) is the crossroads in Cheraw; be sure you cross at 1900 (hours.) Your trucks will be there at 1800

(hours.)‖75 During one war game, ―a combat team of the 29th Division….converged on (the enemy force), halted the(ir) attack just south of the town of Albermarle….and by mid-afternoon had ejected the (enemy) from that town.‖ The next day, ―elements of the 29th Infantry Division again repulsed a mechanized attack against the rear of (its) corps….and drove this (enemy) to the

73 RG 337, NARA II, Box 329, First Army Maneuvers, 1941, Opening Conference Address by Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum. 74 Ibid. 75 Ewing, 29th Let’s Go, 6.

182 southwest out of the maneuver area. The attack…..gained momentum in the afternoon to such an extent that the 29th Infantry Division advanced in trucks.‖76

The 29th Division also participated in a number of separate exercises during the 1941

Carolina Maneuvers. The unit jumped off from Patrick, North Carolina in an attempt to encircle the enemy during II Army Corps Field Exercises (CFE) #3, held from 9-12 October. CFE #4, a two-day exercise beginning 14 October, saw the division acting as a blocking force. The unit was ordered to hold the enemy Blue Force north of a line running between Ruby and Cheraw,

N.C until darkness.77 German attacks rarely petered out when darkness fell, however, suggesting the maneuvers were unrealistic in certain respects.

Nevertheless, the maneuvers did constitute a test of character for the individual soldier of the 29th Division, who spent all his time outside, ―bath(ing) in…..cold swamp stream(s) that ran through the area, slapp(ing) at mosquitoes……worry(ing) about snakes……(and) absorbing the wet and cold of Carolina‘s autumn.‖ Buildings were considered, ―off limits,‖ and by the time the maneuvers ended, ―it got bitterly cold. There was ice on the water buckets in the morning, and gasoline and kerosene stoves were used in tents.‖78

Drum, 1st Army‘s commander during both the New York and Carolina maneuvers, testified that a great deal had been learned from the two sets of war games. Drum observed that,

―(f)or the first time the American people began to realize the deficiencies and shortages that

76 RG 337, NARA II, Box 412. First Army Maneuvers, 1941: Final Report, Section V, GHQ Directed Exercises, 28, 29. 77 Ibid., 16. 78 Ewing, The 29th: A Short History of a Fighting Division, 5, 6, 7.

183 existed in our Army, and began to demand a remedy. From the paper dream Army organization we had then, we have now developed a full-fledged Field Army.‖79

Army leaders also looked to field exercises such as the 1941 Carolina Maneuvers to point out doctrinal and tactical errors and to serve as a vehicle that provided solutions to these shortcomings. The analysis of one of the many field exercises held during the 1941 Carolina

Maneuvers typify the inward scrutiny and search for resolution prevalent in post-maneuver critiques:

More attention must be given to security both on the march and in bivouac areas……In the defense, frontages were entirely too great…….Infantry (wa)s not digging in…….The water discipline (wa)s very bad……One battalion of infantry continued to march on the road in column of threes, while its advance guard was in action against the enemy only (200) yards to its front. Infantry (wa)s not making proper use of concealment. There must be improvement in the tactical handling of small units.80

The 29th Division published an internal analysis of the 1941 maneuvers. To improve the division‘s training program, the critique included comments by observers and corrective actions for staff and command officers. Individual soldiers were urged to use their imagination to a greater degree. Commanding officers were reminded to do a better job liaising with other units, to utilize improved anti-aircraft measures, and to use deception techniques more frequently.

Units were instructed to pay particular attention in future training to patrolling and reconnaissance and on security measures such as, ―conduct of outposts, relief of outposts, identification of enemy, warning methods, measures against night attacks, and raids, concealment....(and) deception.‖ To improve cover and concealment techniques commanders were told to, ―remind troops constantly of (the) necessity for proper employment of cover and

79 RG 337, NARA II, Box 412. First Army Maneuvers, 1941: Final Report, Address by the Commanding Officer, Opening Conference, 3-4. 80 RG 337, NARA II, Box 412. First Army Maneuvers, 1941: Final Report, Comments of FM No. 1, 24 October 1941, 5.

184 concealment (and) (t)o teach them to estimate terrain and to visualize effects of hostile observation and fire. Train them to advance long distances like Indians without being seen. Play two-sided games, counting every man who (wa)s spotted as a casualty. Use best squads as demonstration teams in two-sided games with remaining troops as spectators. Then let all the troops try the same type of exercise.‖81

Grand maneuver warfare was also reinforced in the 29th Division critique. A recurrent theme was a failure by combat leaders to maneuver when checked. As a correction commanders were instructed to, ―(p)ush forward vigorously. Never hesitate and do not halt unless there is a good reason, (and) all units must be prepared to maneuver promptly if checked. Advance planning is essential in all operations…..so sudden enemy action w(ou)l(d) not hinder prompt fire and movement.‖82

Whether the 1941-42 GHQ maneuvers were designed to actually test the soundness of

U.S. Army doctrine or to simply reaffirm its flawlessness is not clear. Distinct operational approaches crystallized during the large-scale exercises. George Patton exhibited flair and daring on the mock battlefield while Hugh Drum remained patient and methodical. By a large margin GHQ officials favored wide envelopments and lightning thrusts and though, ―Drum‘s methods (proved) enormously successful (during the) maneuvers (they) held little appeal for

Marshall and McNair, who wished to forge the Army into a rapier, not a battle-axe.‖83 This may suggest the maneuvers were designed and administered to reinforce the doctrine of fire and maneuver, not test it, because AGF leaders were already convinced of its infallibility.

81 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3898, HQ 29th I.D. Training Memorandum No. 12, Analysis of 1941 Training and Maneuvers, 17 February 1942, 1, 2. 82 Ibid. 83 Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941, 87, 188.

185

The 29th Division‘s training in the aftermath of the Carolina maneuvers proceeded according to the 30 October 1941 GHQ directive entitled ‗Post-Maneuver Training.‘ McNair had originally intended for divisions to graduate to air-ground coordination training after the maneuvers. Units were instead forced to revert to an, ―intensive review of basic and small-unit training, up to and including the regimental combat team as prescribed in the War Department

Mobilization Training Programs,‖ as a result of the maneuver‘s dismal results. McNair determined it was, ―apparent that mobilization training as covered in mobilization training programs ha(d) not been mastered and that there (had been) a serious lack of leadership on the part of officers and non-commissioned officers in the application of the lessons learned in mobilization training.‖84

McNair directed that units undertake a four-month progressive review of basic and unit training at all echelons from section to regimental combat team. Commanders were ordered to review each MTP stage and to conduct standardized testing within their units to ensure adequate progress had been achieved before advancing to the next phase of training. McNair cajoled unenthusiastic instructors to utilize a renewed sense of optimism and passion during instruction periods to ensure, ―(training) standards (were raised) to new highs of thoroughness and quality.‖85 Combat preparations stressing, ―discipline, smartness, marching, use and care of weapons, use of cover, transportation, technique of collective fire, patrolling, tactics, teamwork in the combined arms,‖ and the, ―development of leadership among noncommissioned and commissioned officers,‖ continued into June, 1942.86 Maneuver results and the subsequent

84 RG 337, NARA II, Box 391, Memo to All Army Commanders and the Chief of the Armored Force from Lt. General Leslie McNair, 30 December 1941, 1. 85 Ibid. 86 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 11 – Training in the Ground Army 1942- 1945, Historical Section, AGF, 1948, 2.

186 return to the basics revealed the army remained operationally unready, as was the case in the 29th

Division after nearly sixteen months of training.

187

CHAPTER FIVE PREPARATIONS FOR OVERSEAS MOVEMENT

In some instances units that had been directed on one day to prepare for movement (overseas) in two or three months had to be informed a few days later to expect movement within two or three weeks. In other cases units were alerted and ―de-alerted‖ several times. In still others they were actually called to port, and their organizational equipment shipped to the theater, whereupon they were transferred back to a training status….1

The already complex process of preparing formations for overseas service grew increasingly complicated as the number of divisions the War Department mobilized continued to grow. Twenty-nine infantry divisions - ten Regular Army, eighteen National Guard and one

Army of the United States - had already been mobilized when the AGF was activated on 9

March 1942. The original twenty-nine were known as the ‗Old Divisions‘ while those coming later were referred to as ‗New Divisions.‘ ‗New Divisions‘ were raised and trained according to a complicated system developed in the final weeks of GHQ‘s existence.2 The process was the brainchild of General Mark Clark and later labeled by General John M. Palmer as the, ―finest piece of large-scale planning that he had seen in fifty years of army service.‖3

1 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Major Bell I. Wiley, Preparation for Overseas Movement, Study No. 21. (Washington D.C.: Historical Section, AGF, 1946), 6. 2 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 12 - The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 1. 3 William R. Keast, ―The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions,‖ in The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, eds. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast (Washington, D.C., Center of Military History, 2003), 435. General John. M. Palmer was in many respects Emery Upton‘s intellectual and organizational opposite. Palmer graduated from West Point as an infantry officer and served overseas in Cuba, China, with the AEF in France, and in Panama before teaching military sciences at the University of Chicago and chemistry at West Point. Palmer‘s subsequent work at the War Department impressed General John J. Pershing. Pershing made Palmer his operations officer during the early stages of American involvement in the First World War. Palmer went on to command a brigade in the 29th Division where he was impressed by the citizen soldier‘s performance in battle. This reinforced a long standing belief, contrary to Upton, that the U.S. Army should be composed of a small Regular Army supplemented by a large body of non-professional reservists. Pershing and Palmer

188

‗New Divisions‘ were built around an experienced cadre of 172 officers and 1,190 enlisted men capable of training draftees assigned directly to the unit from Induction Stations.

Division commanders, second-in-commands and artillery commanders were designated no less than 78 days prior to the unit‘s mobilization and received an intensive stint of specialized training prior to being assigned to their new post. Division commanders received a month of special training at Fort Leavenworth‘s Command and General Staff School, which was designed to smoothen the mobilization process.4 ‗Old Division‘ leadership was not so fortunate and combat preparations in these units were likely inferior as a result.

Infantry selectees assigned directly to New Infantry Divisions in 1942 also received a greater degree of standardized and progressive training compared to inductees allocated to formations such as the 29th Division. Each could expect seventeen weeks of basic training as prescribed in MTP 7-1, thirteen weeks of regimental training and a further fourteen weeks of field exercises and maneuvers at regiment and division levels.5

During the interwar period individual units provided basic training for newly inducted recruits under the authority of field armies, corps area commanders, and the chiefs of the arms and services. However, the War Department was compelled to adopt a radically different training system in 1940 to cope with the rapid expansion of the army brought about by the

successfully argued this position before a congressional committee in the war‘s aftermath. See Odom, ―After the Trenches,‖ 14, 15. 4 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 11 – Training in the Ground Army 1942- 1945, Historical Section, AGF, 1948, 3, and RG 337, NARA II, Box 234 Draft No. 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 1. 5 RG 337, NARA II, Box 70, Memorandum for the Chief of Infantry from Brigadier General Mark W. Clark, Deputy Chief of Staff, GHQ, Training Progress for New Infantry Divisions, 8 January 1942, 1.

189 introduction of the Selective Service Act.6 Distinct training organizations labeled Replacement

Training Centers (RTCs) were established to relieve units, ―of the burden of conducting individual training and (to) enabl(e) them to remain effective during combat despite (suffering) large losses.‖7 RTCs also provided, ―basic individual training of the soldier in general subjects including weapons and individual tactical training, and……progressive training in branch subjects, including the technical training of specialists and training with crew-served weapons.‖8

The massive influx of draftees following the attack on Pearl Harbor soon overwhelmed limited RTC capacity. War Department officials chose not to increase the number of RTCs and responded instead by assigning inductees directly to existing units for basic military instructions.

Without warning, units like the 29th Division were suddenly thrust into the role of mini-RTCs.9

Lesley McNair, GHQ‘s Chief of Staff at the time, cautioned the expansion of the Army through Selective Service imposed upon Regular Army and National Guard divisions, ―a major training task that (wa)s of the utmost importance to National Defense.‖ McNair warned Regular

Army and National Guard divisions that their overall war performance would be judged largely on the basis of how well they, ―receive(d,) train(ed,) and amalgamate(d) into their ranks……selective service trainees.‖10

McNair ordered units to begin preparing soldiers already under command to receive and provide training for soon to be arriving draftees. The War Department added that there be, ―no compromise as to quality (of training provided to inductees by mobilized units.)‖ Units were to

6 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 10 - Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 1. 7 Keast, ―The Training of Enlisted Replacements,‖ 369. 8 RG 319, NARA II, Box 5, Mission of the Replacement and School Command, 5. 9 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 10 - Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 3, 4. 10 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, War Department, Training, General, Reproduced at IV Corps HQ, 24 October 1940, 1.

190 organize training, ―to yield the maximum of progress in the minimum of time,‖ and were to,

―energize training by organizing and preparing it completely, and by conducting it so as to stimulate the interest and command the admiration of trainees.‖ Outstanding leadership during this process was to be, ―recognized promptly by promotion and increased responsibility,‖ while,

―(i)nadequate leadership (was to be) uncovered equally promptly and replaced.‖11

Commanders were reminded to utilize training time wisely and, ―that all (prewar guardsmen and regular army soldiers) should be occupied in duties which w(ou)l(d) contribute to an increase in the discipline, physical fitness and efficiency of the individual and the unit.‖12

These responsibilities included, ―the basic training of the soldier, with and without arms, physical training, calisthenics, physical development, condition exercise and athletics….military courtesy and customs of the service, (and) care and use of individual equipment, including weapons…marches and ceremonies.‖ In a somewhat contradictory fashion, however, priority over training was given to, ―duties connected with induction and processing, (and the) preparation of property and equipment for shipment and its loading into motor vehicles.‖13

Units were ordered to push ahead with training despite severe shortages of ammunition and basic equipment. Selectees were precluded from outside duties to allow the speediest possible training.14 A ‗county fair‘ system was commonly used to orientate newly-arrived recruits. Filler replacements shifted by platoon groups between display booths, each containing an instructor and various organic division weapons,. At infantry booths, draftees received instructions on the M-1 rifle, the carbine, and the BAR and, ―(t)hey watched in wild eyed interest

11 Ibid. 12 RG 338, NARA II, Box 64, Section IV, ‗Training,‘ Induction Memorandum Number 4, Headquarters Fourth Corps Area, Office of the Corps Area Commander, September 22, 1941. 13 Ibid. 14 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, HQ 29th I.D. Training Orders No. 1, Training Program Feb.3 – Sept. 1, 1941, 3 February 1941, 3.

191 the demonstration by cadrement of the ‗bazooka,‘ the 60mm and 81mm mortars, and the light and heavy machine guns…..At the artillery booth the men observed a gun crew going through the motions of loading and firing a howitzer and listened to an officer explain such terms as firing battery….survey, and fire direction center.‖15 Inductees were assigned to National Guard and Regular Army divisions on the basis of existing shortages, not by pre-service occupational or educational experience or by geographical affiliation.16 The process of delocalizing the 29th

Division‘s pre-1941 regional identity had begun.

The specific methods utilized during individual inductee training differed between RTCs and infantry divisions. Overflow recruits assigned directly to division formations were grouped into and provided basic military instructions within established tactical units such as platoon or companies.17 Formation leaders taught a wide variety of military subjects in this first scenario, acting in most cases as, ―jacks-of-all-trades.‖18 Conversely, recruits assigned to RTCs were trained by a number of instructors, each a, ―specialist in his subject, chosen not because of his command over the men he taught but for technical knowledge and instructional skill.‖19 The second method allowed standardized and centralized training, important to an army suffering from a limited number of experienced and qualified instructors. The RTC system was also

15 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 13 – Activation and Early Training of ‗D‘ Division, Historical Section, AGF, 1948, 11. 16 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, War Department Memorandum, Utilization of Military and Civilian Occupational Skills in Units of Assignment, 18 December 1941, 1. 17 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 10 - Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 9. 18 Keast, ―The Training of Enlisted Replacements,‖ 374. 19 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 10 - Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 9.

192 economical in terms of overhead personnel and training facilities and allowed, ―inexperienced instructors to concentrate on a few subjects.‖20

The advantages of the Replacement Training Center system, that utilized centralized and specialized training, ―under expert instructors,‖ and functioned according to MTP dictates, over training conducted by mobilized units were clear to War Department officials. In turn, tactical units like the 29th Division were ordered to incorporate the Replacement Center system of training because it promised, ―the results sought most rapidly….(and because of the initial shortage of qualified officers and non-commissioned officers needed) to conduct training of the high quality which (wa)s essential.‖21

The 29th Division began preparations for the reception and training of inductees shortly after its mobilization on 3 February 1941. Division training schools were instituted to prepare a cadre of guardsmen to provide untrained selectees with basic and advanced military training.22

The division established an organic Training Center to deliver centralized control and supervision of a training program similar to that being provided to inductees attending replacement training centers. Trainees would be housed and administered separately for the duration of the course. The training syllabus ensured gradual conditioning was utilized to avoid undue physical demand early on and was designed to follow the detailed program for enlisted trainees contained in MTPs. Selectees were assigned to regular duty within the division only after such training had been completed.23

20 Keast, ―The Training of Enlisted Replacements,‖ 373. 21 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, War Department, Training, General, Reproduced at IV Corps HQ, 24 October 1940, 2. 22 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 10 - Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 3. 23 RG 338, NARA II, Box 4, VI Army Corps, Training Memorandum No. 18, Training Centers, 24 February 1942.

193

Selectee training began in the 29th Division on 7 April 1941 and ran concurrent to individual and unit training for the remaining strength of the division. Louis G. Smith, the

115th‘s executive officer, commanded the division‘s Training Center, known also as the, ―little

IRTC,‖ whose capacity often exceeded 5,000 recruits.24 Recruits were formed into companies of

170 men for two weeks of basic drill and military training. Training cadres for each company consisted of a lieutenant, two sergeants, and four corporals. Ten further corporals or privates first class, one fireman, and three cooks were assigned on a regimental basis and remained with the class throughout its existence. Draftees were trained according to Detailed Programs,

Enlisted Replacement Centers instructions published in WD MTP‘s and not Unit Training Center programs utilized during the training of pre-war guardsmen. Special emphasis in early training was also placed on, ―the development of soldierly appearance, bearing and conduct, sound discipline, and precision in drill, and upon training in personal hygiene, weapons, and care of arms, clothing, and equipment.‖25

Following the completion of 84 hours of divisional training recruits were shifted to

Regimental Recruit Training Detachments for between four-and-a-half to eleven weeks further basic training. At the discretion of regimental commanders especially skilled recruits displaying a readiness for advanced training could be assigned to part-time or full-time duty after less than five weeks in the Regimental Recruit Training Detachment. From there draftees were assigned regular 29th Division duties.26 Selectees destined to become communication specialists were trained as a unit from the third to eighth week of training after which they would be, ―formed

24 Ewing, 29 Let’s Go, 10. 25 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3898, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 16, Training of Replacements, 20 February 1942, 1, 2. 26 Ibid.

194 into sections according to arms and given section and team training in addition to a continuation of their replacement center training.‖27

The virtues of unit training compared to the training provided at replacement centers - based on the results of combat - remains unclear. RTCs likely prepared inductees more thoroughly, however, as one postwar summary recalled that:

(t)he state of training (in units like the 29thDivision) was such that men who were themselves incompletely trained were called on to give basic training to raw selectees. Mobilization plans and regulations had made no provisions for assembling the cadres – officers and non-commissioned – of the National Guard units enough in advance to train them to receive and in turn train their units when mobilized……The National Guard had on its rosters many officers and non-commissioned officers who because of a lack of adequate training were not adept either in military skills or leadership. Some were over- age in grade or physically unfit; others were basically inept and had to be removed.‖28

When questioned on the relative merits of selectee training by divisions and Replacement

Training Centers General Benjamin Lear responded, ―emphatically that basic training in

(replacement training) centers was better than that received in (divisions.)‖ Lear determined that

RTC instructors benefited from repeatedly teaching the same subject to successive groups, which was not the case with division cadres training raw recruits. Lear sensed that divisional commanders were, ―concerned with the development of officers, staff, and NCO‘s as well as with the training of soldiers. (Conversely)……..RTC‘s commanders (we)re only concerned with the training of soldiers; in other words, they ha(d) a single objective. This ma(de) a difference.‖29

27 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, HQ 29th I.D. Training Orders No. 1, Training Program Feb.3 – Sept. 1, 1941, 3 February 1941, 3. 28Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Mobilization in the United States Army. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955), 604-605. 29 The interview of Lear, who assumed command of the AGF upon the death of Lt. General Lesley McNair in Normandy, was conducted by official army historians Lt. Colonel Kent Greenfield and Major Bell Wiley. See, RG 319, NARAII, Box 134, Office of the Chief of Military History – Historical Manuscript File, AGF: 1942-47, Notes on Interviews of Lt. General

195

Regular combat preparations and inductee training were stunted when the 29th Division was called upon to transfer a number of prewar guardsmen to mobilizing units. The division was destined to provide officer cadres to three new divisions as well as 1600 enlisted men to officer candidate schools between mobilization and March 1944.30 Thirteen officers (one major, one captain, and eleven lieutenants) were posted to the 117th Engineer Battalion in April 1941.

Twenty-nine officers (three majors, five captains and twenty-one lieutenants) were dispatched to the 80th Infantry Division a short time later and within a month another forty-four officers (one

Lt. Colonel, three majors, ten captains and thirty-one lieutenants) were shipped to the 83rd

Infantry Division.31

Training complexities reached new heights in the United States during 1942. Manpower shortages and the relative totality of the American war effort gradually convinced War

Department officials that some form of pre-induction military training was necessary for

American youths. The lowering of the draft age reduced the interval between high school graduation and military induction, and thus diminished the amount of time young men had to prepare for military service. A nationwide and volunteer plan christened the Pre-Induction

Training Program was therefore launched on 28 August 1942 to prepare young American males for military service.32

Officially, the program was designed to provide, ―the initiation, promotion and supervision of the special training of individuals prior to induction into the military service or

Ben Lear by Lt. Col. K.R. Greenfield and Major. Bell I. Wiley, Ground Historical Section, 11 August 1945, 3. 30 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7555, History of the 29th Infantry Division. 31 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, History of the 29th Division, 1941-43, While Training in U.S.A. and Great Britain. 32 Gerard Giordano, Wartime Schools: How World War II Changed American Education (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2004), 55.

196 employment of the War Department.‖ Philosophically, the program sought to inculcate a greater degree of martial spirit in young American males, to improve their physical conditioning, and to begin specialist training. The program‘s clientele in late 1942 consisted of, ―roughly two and a half million boys (aged) 16 and 17 (that) were destined for military service.‖ Approximately half of these future inductees were attending secondary schools at the time and the other half were,

―urged to take part-time courses of a pre-induction character in schools and colleges.‖33

Civilian experts studied Military Occupational Specialty Occurrence Tables to predict forthcoming specialist requirements while Army officials liaised with the United States Office of

Education to determine an appropriate training syllabus. Program enrollees received instructions in, ―basic mathematical and communications skills, map reading, first aid, health, hygiene and sanitation, physical conditioning, understanding of the nature and objectives of the war, and activities designed to facilitate a gradual transition to Army life.‖34

The Pre-Induction Training Section was officially recognized as part of the Manpower

Branch of the War Department in November, 1942. By February, 1943 the Office of Education had printed thirty-seven textbooks to assist pre-induction training being carried out in schools across the United States and articles describing the program‘s activities had been published, ―in most national and state educational journals.‖35 The lowering of the draft age and the establishment of the Pre-Induction Training Program illustrate how serious manpower shortages had become in the United States by the latter half of 1942. An official history of the program, which illustrates how closely the United States engaged in a ‗total war‘ effort, has yet to be written.

33 RG 319, NARA II, Box 1, History of Pre-Induction Training. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid.

197

A return to the 29th Division‘s training illustrates how severely the attack on Pearl Harbor stifled meaningful training for much of early 1942. The division provided guard details at key installations across the eastern states in the attack‘s aftermath. The 115th Regiment lost four months of valuable training time when its units were dispersed across Virginia and Pennsylvania to guard factories, bridges, railroad yards and warehouses.36 23 officers and 665 enlisted men of the 2nd/175th together with C Battery of the 224th F.A. Battery were selected to represent the AGF in a traveling Army War Show intended to stir American patriotism and sell war bonds.37

Coordinated division training was impossible with units scattered so widely.38

Remaining 29th Division formations continued training according to MTP guidelines. An analysis the division‘s training during 1941 illustrated excellent progress but also listed forty- seven deficiencies, including: (a) failure to follow proper sequence of instruction (during training)..…(f)ailure to adhere to training doctrine enunciated in FM 21-5…..(l)ack of close supervision of training….(l)ack of proper instruction……(i)nadequate knowledge of the technique of advancing the fire power of small units over varied terrain…(f)ailure to apply in tactical exercises the lessons learned in marksmanship and technique of collective fire instruction….(i)nability of company officer and non-commissioned officers to give oral order, especially fire orders….(i)nability to entruck and detruck in a prompt and orderly manner…..(f)ailure to perform well coordinated attacks with supporting tanks…(f)ailure to use effective antitank mines….(and) (f)ailure of commanders and staff to supervise the execution of orders.39

36 Binkoski and Plaut, The 115th Infantry Regiment in World War II, 2. 37 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7555, History of the 29th Infantry Division. 38 Ibid. 39 RG 338, NARA II, Box 4, VI Army Corps, Training Memorandum No. 14, Deficiencies in 1941 Training, 27 February 1942.

198

Training between 29 March and 15 May 1942 was conducted mainly at the battalion level. Regimental Combat Teams did administer two sets of proficiency tests to the squad level for each of their fighting arms.40 Echelons between platoon and division levels held command post exercises to, ―supplement unit and combined training….and to insure the indoctrination of all echelons above the platoon in: command functions and staff procedure in preparation for and the conduct of various types of military operations; the use of sound tactical and logistical techniques and methods; and to test plans and methods of contemplated military operations.‖

Commanding officers were instructed to refer to the Command and General Staff School‘s

Preparation and Conduct of Tactical Exercise (1939) for guidance.41

29th Division leaders were criticized in March 1942 for not following a, ―logical sequence of instruction,‖ in their weekly training schedules and for failing, ―to schedule training for the prescribed number of hours.‖ The rebuke originated from VI Corps and referred 29th officials to FM 21-5 for prescribed corrections.42 Division schools held on Tuesday and

Thursday evenings for regimental and battalion commanders and their staffs commenced 26

March 1942 during which students re-examined the tactical handling of an infantry division‘s organic units, with special focus on the infantry battalion.43

Units conducted platoon proficiency tests during March, 1942 to assess the evenness of training progress on a division-wide basis. Tests consisted of two-sided exercises during which,

―a rifle platoon, supported by a light machine gun squad and a 60-mm mortar squad, attack(ed) a

40 RG 338, NARA II, Box 4, VI Army Corps – Master Training Schedule, Period 29 March – 15 May. 41 RG 338, NARA II, Box 4, VI Army Corps, Training Memorandum No. 35, Preparation and Conduct of Command Post Exercise, 6 April 1942. 42 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3898, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 36, 3 April 1942, 1. 43 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3898, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 29, School for Commanders of Regiments and Battalions and their Staff, 25 March 1942.

199 defensive position organized and occupied by an enemy rifle platoon, reinforced.‖ Umpires judged attacking formations on:

(t)roop leading by platoon and subordinate leaders….(d)ecision and control….(r)econnaissance of leaders…..(t)ime required for leaders to estimate the situation; to make decisions; to formulate plans; and to issue orders….(f)orm brevity, clearness, and practicability of all orders….(e)xecution by units as a whole….(s)peed with which orders are executed….(f)ormation of units….(p)rompt engagement of surprise targets.….(u)se of flanking fire……(u)se of cover and concealment….(c)onduct of individuals in maintaining proper formations and technique of movements….(p)roper use of fire.‖ Defending troops were critiqued on the, ―(r)econnaissance of leaders; decision and control; brevity, clearness, and practicability of all orders….(e)xecution by units as whole….(s)peed with which orders (we)re executed….(s)election of positions…..(d)istribution of troops and economy of force….(s)ecurity, cover and concealment…..(and) (p)lan of defensive fire.44

Besides providing excellent standardized testing, two-sided exercises constituted outstanding training platforms. Units simply changed positions after running through an exercise once, which allowed soldiers to rehearse both offensive and defensive tactics. Post-exercise debriefings permitted units to learn not only from their own mistakes but also from their partners‘. Exercise instructions noting that, ―(d)ue to the shortage of both officers and enlisted men, the three rifle platoons of each company w(ould) be formed into two rifle platoons,‖ also indicate the 29th Division remained far short of its authorized strength.45

The division‘s nine infantry battalions conducted a series of complicated and thorough battalion proficiency tests beginning in April, 1942. A system was instituted where points were subtracted for errors committed at the various command levels within a battalion. Points were deducted during the approach to contact movement as a result of: the battalion commander giving inadequate instructions during the movement of the battalion to assembly areas; for each minute of delay after the first ten minutes by the battalion commander in departing to meet the

44 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3898, HQ 29th I.D. Training Memorandum No. 24, Platoon Proficiency Tests, 19 March 1942, 1, 2. 45 Ibid., 2.

200 regimental commander; not taking respective S-2s and S-3s to the meeting; the S-2 failing to add all data received on the situation map and to keep the battalion commander informed of this information; battalion commanders not sending forward quartering parties from each company to locate assembly areas; failing to maintain discipline; platoons failing to reach assembly areas on time (measured in fractions of minutes;) employing support weapons incorrectly; inadequate anti-aircraft defenses; improper cover and concealment; not digging in and taking other precautions against enemy attack upon reaching objectives; and a lack of secrecy discipline.46

During the attack phase, points were deducted for: battalion commanders failing to conduct a personal daylight reconnaissance prior to the attack and in not taking an artillery liaison officer along to plan supporting fire; failure to issue clear, concise, timely, and complete written attack orders that included the latest enemy information by battalion commanders, which resulted in companies or platoons assembling late or incorrectly; failure to provide flank protection during the attack; failure to prescribe a zone of departure and action for each company in the attack; failure to conduct proper terrain appreciation; and for allowing personnel to bunch up around battalion command posts. Rifle company and platoon commanders were docked points for: each minute of delay in initiating the attack from the prescribed time; failing to properly lay and locate company support weapons in advantageous defilade and concealment positions and to provide observers for each; failure to withhold adequate reserves; not feeding attacking soldiers adequately and not providing them with adequate supplies of extra ammunition; not making adequate personal reconnaissance prior to the attack; improper issuance of orders and lack of terrain appreciation on the same basis as that prescribed for battalion

46 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3898, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 35, Battalion Tests, 31 March 1942, 1, 2, 3.

201 commanders; and failure of reserve unit commanders adequately preparing for follow-up movements.47

The division instituted an innovative training program during the three week period beginning 17 May 1942. The interval was divided into three one-week phases and training was conducted by RCTs. Two formations conducted two-sided RCT exercises during week one to,

―(p)repare for combat firing proficiency tests….(to) (i)mprove the battle efficiency of platoons, companies, and battalions in all types of combat….(and to) (c)onduct schools for junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers.‖ The odd RCT performed ‗advance to contact‘ exercises predominately on foot in ‗combat imminent‘ formation. Division command held rifle, machine gun, and 81-mm mortar proficiency tests as well. RCTs simply shifted one position at the completion of the week‘s training allowing each to work with a different partner in two-sided exercises while also having a week alone to conduct proficiency tests and ‗advance to contact‘ drills.48

Physical toughness and a rigid adherence to disciplinary measures were also stressed during training in the spring of 1942. Training directives dictated that unit leaders impress upon all ranks under command the importance of reducing, ―slackness in cantonment, camp or in training (as it) inevitably mean(t) a fatal weakness in battle discipline.‖ War Department officials surmised from the lessons of battle waged to that point of the conflict that American,

―troops must be toughened and conditioned physically and mentally to withstand the most trying rigors of campaign, and that their leaders in all grades (we)re vigorous, resourceful, and determined in their attitude…..A complacent acceptance of routine procedure (wa)s to be

47 Ibid., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 48 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3897, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 46, Training Program May 17 – June 6, 1942, 1-2.

202 condemned…..(O)ur troops (must be) toughened in mind as well as body, both in the training period and later when committed to the harsh conditions of campaign. The weak in spirit and physique must be eliminated.‖49

The division incorporated a revised training program in June 1942 designed to perfect individual and small unit operations in all phases of combat. The amended syllabus placed special emphasis on reconnaissance patrolling during daytime and night-time hours, reduction of enemy strongpoints, maintenance of direction by compass during day and night in difficult and wooded terrain, defense of roadblocks, airfields, and against enemy river crossings, night attacks, antimechanized, antiaircraft, and anti(-)gas defense, guerrilla warfare, street fighting, stream crossings, operations in defiles, jungle operations and, ―(d)etailed, deliberate, and complete organization of a defensive position, including camouflage, siting of weapons, and complete plans of all fires.‖50 Units were ordered to undertake comprehensive exercises, ―wherein each man in each unit w(ou)l(d) be drilled in the part he (wa)s to play in the exercise.‖ Though the enemy was often assumed during early training, he was to be considered skillful in the use of,

―chemicals, aircraft of all types, armored forces, prepared fires, infiltration and guerrilla tactics and night operations.‖ A third of these problems were to take place at night.51 In addition, special division schools were introduced to, ―develop troop leadership (skills) and a sound knowledge of the employment of all arms.‖ Moreover, officers and non-commissioned officers attended evening conferences to familiarize themselves with the following day‘s training.52

49 RG 338, NARA II, Box 80, V Corps HQ Training Directive, April 17, 1942, 1. 50 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3897, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 50, Training Program – June 1 – November 8, 1942, 1, 2, 3. 51 Ibid., 1, 2. 52 Ibid.

203

War Department officials relied heavily on close order drill during preparations for combat despite a historiographical perception that the U.S. Army eschewed such individual- initiative killing training methods. Inductees spent five hours per training week in close order drill. The number of hours spent on close order drill jumped to seven once recruit training was completed and soldiers were attached to a unit.53 A Second World War veteran noted critically that close order drill, ―seemed to be the Army‘s choice item for basic training. We soldiers instinctively resented such treatment. To the American soldier blind obedience is and always will be anathema. Self-reliance, initiative, competitive cooperation - these are his national characteristics - and they are the qualities he can best develop….(T)he times in which close order drill prepared the infantryman for combat have gone the way of the phalanx and the square.‖54

The veteran summarized by calling on officers in charge of training to refrain from cloaking themselves in the mysteries of regulation, to keep trainees informed of the reasons they were being trained in certain manners, and to stress individual initiative and teamwork during combat preparations.55

Time lost on close order drill was reduced significantly in the latter half of 1942, when it was thereafter limited to movements to and from the field. Division officials were also ordered to keep parade drill to a minimum and that routine administration should be conducted,

―habitually…..after normal training hours.‖ The assignment of, ―(g)uard duty and overhead details,‖ to units preparing for overseas movement was also ordered, ―to be kept to an absolute

53 USAMHI, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Military Publications, War Department, War Department, Mobilization Training Program 7-1, Infantry Mobilization Training Programs for Infantry Regiments at Unit Training Centers and for Infantry Replacements at Enlisted Replacement Centers (Washington, D.C.: War Department, September 28, 1940), 10. 54 Walter Cerf, ―In the American Tradition,‖ Infantry Journal 59, no. 2 (August 1946): 37. 55 Ibid., 37, 38.

204 minimum.‖56 American soldiers as a result likely spent more time training for combat and less time on rote drill and guard duty in comparison to their British and Canadian equivalents, whose leaders remained convinced of close order drill‘s value as a training device.57

Infantry training, though an imperative and complicated process, characterized only a portion of the combat preparations carried out by the 29th Division between mobilization and combat. Command and staff officers at division, regiment, and battalion echelons also required considerable preparations, first to enable them to train their subordinates and eventually to lead them in combat. Medical, engineer, signals, military police, ordnance, and logistical members of the division also required lengthy and complicated instruction and training experience for the unit to perform adequately on the battlefield.

Divisions were encouraged during training to develop Standard Operating Procedures

(SOPs) that saved time and reduced friction in combat. 29th Division officials responded by compiling a number of SOPs that established, ―as routine…..procedure(s) to be followed in the absence of specific orders……reduc(ing)……many operations within the Division to a single habitual routine, in order to effect….(s)implification of training….(r)eduction of errors under stress, (and) (i)ncreased speed in marches.‖ The division instituted and rehearsed SOPs for march groupings, reconnaissance and security, march methods, marching, motor columns and marches containing motors, shuttling principles, motor movements, and rail movement. These

SOPs were to be used in combat situations requiring; development from assembly positions, intelligence measures, artillery support, priorities on roads, and combat from march formations.

56 Ibid., 3. 57 A prewar British recruits received 104 hours of close order drill) out of 420 hours of training prior to being assigned a regimental placement (nearly 25% of his total training.) Those hours were reduced slightly to 97 in 1937. See, David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 56, 57.

205

In addition, supply, evacuation, traffic control, motor and ordnance maintenance procedures and techniques for post-combat reports were outlined.58 Regimental Combat Teams were formally established according to SOP guidelines as:

115th RCT – 115th Infantry, 110th F.A. Bn., Co. A, 121st Engineer Bn., Co. A, 104th Medical Bn., and a detachment from the 29th Signals Company consisting of a wire team, radio car, and crew with motor messenger 116th RCT – 116th Infantry, 111th F.A. Bn., Co. B, 121st Engineer Bn., Co. B, 104th Medical B., and a similar detachment from the 29th Signals Company 175th RCT – 175th Infantry, 224th F.A. Bn., Co. C, 121st Engineer Bn., Co. C, 104th Medical B., and a similar detachment from the 29th Signals Company.59

ILLUSTRATION NO. 13 - Example of SOP Training in the 29th Division

Division troops separate from combat teams were divided into three groups: (a) a headquarters group consisting of division headquarters (less forward echelon), Headquarters and

58 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3897, 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 41, Standing Operating Procedure, 29th Infantry Division, 16 April 1942, passim. 59 Ibid., 1-2. 60 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7492, SOP Training in 29th Division.

206

Military Police company, 29th Division Signals Company, and the 29th Division Reconnaissance

Troop; (b) an artillery group formed of Division Artillery Headquarters, Headquarters Battery

Division Artillery (less forward echelons), 227th F.A. Bn., and any other attached artillery and (c) an auxiliary group composed of the remnants of the 121st Engineer Bn., 104th Medical Bn., 104th

Quartermaster Bn., and any other attached units other than artillery.61

ILLUSTRATION NO. 14 - Example of SOP Training in the 29th Division

62 29th Division Headquarters operated in two echelons: (a) the Forward Echelon or

Command Group consisted of the 29th Division commanding general and aides, assistant division commander and aides, division artillery officer, or his representative, Chief of Staff, General

Staff Sections (less G-1,) Commanding Officer, 29th Reconnaissance Troop, or his representative, Signals Officer, Anti-aircraft and anti-mechanized Officer, Engineer Officer,

61 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3897, 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 41, Standing Operating Procedure, 29th Infantry Division, 16 April 1942, 2. 62 Ibid.

207

Headquarters Commandant, Quartermaster, Surgeon, Headquarters and Military Police Company

(less detachments,) 29th Signals Company (less detachments,) and Liaison Officers, and (b) the

Rear Echelon composed of all officers of 29th Division headquarters and enlisted personnel of

Headquarters and Military Police Company not explicitly allocated to the forward echelon. The

Rear Echelon was located at a site chosen by the Division G-1, usually near a railhead or truckhead. If a combat situation warranted, the Forward echelon could be subdivided into, (a) an

Advance Command Group, consisting of the G-2 and G-3 (or assistants,) two clerks from each section and a Signals officer and personnel necessary to establish combat communications and

(b) the Rear Command Group composed of the remaining elements of the forward echelon.

Message Centers were to be established in both echelons of Division Headquarters whenever stationary. The 29th Division posted liaison officers to adjacent divisions and to the Corps

Headquarters to which it was attached, while each of infantry regiments in the division, division artillery units, adjacent divisions and attached or supporting units did the same at 29th Division

Headquarters.63

The single most influential member of a combat division was its commanding officer. A division commander, ―exercised tremendous influence on the training and action of the division.‖64 He was classified as the, ―BIG DECISION MAN,‖ who personified the unit‘s physical courage and stamina. His, ―personality or salesmanship…….dominate(d) and sway(ed) the division. If he (wa)s slow and faltering in his thoughts and actions the division w(ou)l(d) be like him. If he (wa)s quick and decisive in his thoughts and actions the division w(ou)l(d) also

63 Ibid., 3, 4. 64 RG 338, NARA II, Box 65, HQ V Corps, Role of Commanders and Staff of a Wartime Division, 29 September 1942, 3.

208 be like him.‖ It was essential that a division commander made, ―his decisions PROMPTLY.‖65

Inaction on his part was considered an inexcusable offence. The division commander alone was responsible, ―for all the unit d(id) or fail(ed) to do and for all policies, plans and basic decisions.

A division commander must be sagacious since, ―(a) (typical) command (wa)s temperamental; its morale (wa)s variable. Within a command a feeling of favoritism and unjust treatment and even jealously may…..develop quickly. Fixed ideas, indifference, and ignorance (must) be met and……..overcome. A commander must (have) foresee(n) and overcome these difficulties and his staff must (have) assist(ed) him.‖66

A division commander‘s orders were to be verbally issued to assembled unit commanders whenever possible. In fast moving situations rendering such actions unfeasible, the commander could, ―personally issue only salient features of the orders; consequent features, as for example administrative arrangements,….(would be) supplied then or subsequently by and to appropriate staff agencies. Regardless of the means or setting, however, orders were to always be, ―simple, clear, and…..(of) telegraphic brevity.‖67

Combat divisions were large and cumbersome commands requiring a complex network of staff assistance. A division‘s success during training and in battle depended in large measure on the ability of staff officers to assist the commander by devising appropriate strategies for the many scenarios the unit faced each day.68 Staff officers were told to anticipate problems and to continually seek, ―to smooth things out.‖69

65 Ibid., 1, 2. 66 Ibid., 3. 67 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3897, 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 41, Standing Operating Procedure, 29th Infantry Division, 16 April 1942, 3. 68 Ibid., 2. 69 Ibid., 3.

209

Division commanders were responsible for nominating competent staff officers and for ensuring that they carried out their duties promptly and efficiently. The division commander and his staff worked together to, ―build up and maintain a fighting spirit during the training period and to arouse troops to the highest combat pitch before battle.‖ In battle, ―(m)en f(ou)ght and die(d) for leaders.….(Therefore) (t)he role of the commander and staff of a wartime division

(wa)s to furnish the final spark that w(ou)l(d)………cause the division to ‗go forward and give victories‘ (to the American people.)‖70

An efficient staff was vital for a division‘s success on the battlefield. Staff officers made no basic decisions, did not act on behalf of the commanding officer, and spoke only in the commander‘s name if given prior permission. Staff officers should have been cooperative, loyal, industrious, and helpful and should have possessed a forceful yet pleasing personality, but should not have simply been ‗yes men.‘71 Staff officers rendered, ―professional aid and assistance to the general officers over them, act(ed) as their agents in harmonizing the plans, duties, and operations with various organizations and services under their jurisdiction in preparing detailed instructions and the execution of the plans of the commanding generals, and…….supervis(ed) the execution of such instructions.‖ At the same time, however, it was noted that staff officers,

―COMMAND(ED) NOTHING.‖72 Instead, they were required to produce battle plans, ―flexible enough to meet all possibilities and yet sufficiently definite to have any real practical value.‖

The everyday life of a staff officer entailed, ―just one plan after another. Not only must alternate

70 Final quote made in reference to President Abraham Lincoln‘s instructions to General Hooker upon naming him commander of the Army of the Potomac, ―Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.‖ See, RG 338, NARA II, Box 65, HQ V Corps, Role of Commanders and Staff of a Wartime Division, 29 September 1942, 1, 8, 12. 71 Ibid., 2, 3. 72 Capitals original. Ibid., 4.

210 plans for carrying out….certain course(s) of action (have) be(en) (prepared) for all eventualities, but plans for alternate lines of action (must) also (have) be(en) (formulated.)‖73

29th Division staff officers assisted the division commander and his direct subordinates by, ―acting and loyally serving as an ‗interagent‘ or ‗go-between‘ to the commander and his subordinates; anticipating, recommending, and preparing plans; collecting, assimilating and presenting pertinent information; assisting subordinate units execute command plans and orders - especially by ensuring orders (we)re followed correctly through instructive, constructive, and cooperative inspections; and converting and coordinating command decisions into directives and orders.‖74

A reliable Chief of Staff understood, ―his commander‘s desires and ways of doing things….(He) receive(d) his instructions from the commander and apportion(ed) the details among the subordinates; supervised their activities and require(d) them to cooperate and finally receive(d) their finished work; check(ed) and test(ed) it, and present(ed) the final draft to the commander for approval.‖ He was also, ―concerned with keeping abreast of, or ahead of, (all training or combat) situation(s),‖ in his role as the division commander‘s principal adviser and assistant.75

Well-trained and capable assistant chiefs of staff were also important to a smoothly operating combat division. Specially designated assistant chiefs of staff were nominated and trained to assist the division‘s chief of staff during training and combat operations. Most assistant chiefs of staff received a letter and number label. The letter ‗G‘ referred to staff

73 RG 338, NARA II, Box 22, HQ, V Corps, Staff Coordination Takes TNT!, 24 May 1943, 4. 74 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, Officer‘s School, Field Infantry, Maryland National Guard, Memorandum No. 1, 24 April 1939, 1. 75 RG 338, NARA II, Box 65, HQ V Corps, Role of Commanders and Staff of a Wartime Division, 29 September 1942, 6.

211 positions within a division or higher army echelon while the ‗S‘ label referred to regiment and battalion staff officers. The roles and duties of staff officers included:

The Executive. – …..(G)enerally the second in command and should always (have) be(en) the close confidant of the commander. If possible the commander select(ed) his executive as a man to loyally and efficiently advise him and supervise the execution of his orders. His specific duties (we)re: …..(c)oordinate the action of the command…..(d)irect and coordinate the staff…..(k)eep commander informed of situation (friendly and enemy)…..(p)repare estimates and plans…...(g)enerally command(ed) in the absence of the commander…..(and) (r)eview(ed) and coordinate(d) all orders and instructions.

G (S)-1. – …...(R)esponsible for all records and orders and for administration relating to personnel of the command as individuals. His specific duties (we)re: (p)reparation of all orders, reports, memoranda……(f)iles and records…..(s)tatus and replacement of personnel…..(h)eadquarters, quartering and shelter arrangements……(p)ostal service……(g)uard and military police…...(c)ollection and disposition of stragglers…..(and) (m)orale and welfare.

G (S)-2. – ……(R)esponsible for the collection, evaluation and distribution of enemy information, and the training and coordination of intelligence agencies. His specific duties (we)re: (p)lan for and collect all possible information of the enemy……(e)valuate and disseminate enemy information……(p)repare reports and estimates on enemy activities, capabilities and probable intentions……(t)raining and operation of all intelligence troops and agencies…..(s)upply and issue of maps…..(s)upervise use of codes and ciphers……(and) (c)oordinate intelligence activities within the command.

G (S)-3. – ……(S)hould have (possessed) a good general knowledge of the training, capabilities and function of all units of the command, since he is responsible for the organization, training and combat operation of the command. His specific duties (we)re: (o)rganization and mobilization…..(t)raining and training facilities…..(a)ssignment and attachment of units……(t)actical estimates……(p)lans and orders for troop movements and tactical employment…..(c)oordination of maneuver and fire action…..(u)se of attached, supporting and technical troops……(and) (l)iaison and communications.

G (S)-4. – ……(S)hould have (possessed) knowledge of the use of animal and motor transportation. He must (have been able to) anticipate the supply needs of the command and (to have) be(en) alert at all times for their needs and what can be obtained. His specific duties (we)re: (c)ontinuous survey of the needs of the command…..(p)rocurement and issue of all supplies…..(u)tilization of transportation……(p)rocurement and construction of shelter…..(s)alvage and burial…..(and) (s)upervise property responsibility, accountability and storage.76

76 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, Documents Relating to Training Period in the U.S., 1941-1942, 2-3. Note that S

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A V Corps memorandum titled, ―Staff Coordination takes ‗TNT,‖ instructed 29th

Division staff officers to determine techniques that warded off potential setbacks before they arose. The explosive component of the title referred to ‗technique not theory.‘ Staff officers were taught, ―to visualize future operations and to understand the capabilities of each fighting arm of an infantry division. Time, thought, and practical experience were necessary prerequisites for staff officers to function properly in any combat situation, not antiquated,

―theoretical, or ‗white collar‘ approach(es.)‖ Staff officers in other words were looked upon as coordinators that facilitated the smooth functioning of military formations during training and combat.77

The steady and efficient flow of supplies was another factor that determined whether a division succeeded or failed in battle. The 29th Division‘s extended training phase permitted organic supply formations the opportunity to refine administrative and procedural techniques prior to combat. Divisional supplies in the World War II U.S. Army were categorized into five classes:

Class I – Supplies such as rations and forage, that (we)re consumed at an approximately uniform daily rate under all condition, and that (we)re issued automatically without requisitions to Army units. Class II – Supplies such as clothing, weapons, and vehicles for which allowance are fixed by Tables of Allowance and Tables of Basic Allowances. Class III – Supplies such as fuels and lubricants for all purposes except aviation, including gasoline for all vehicles, diesel oil, fuel oil and coal… Class IV – Supplies and equipment for which allowances are not prescribed, or which require special measures of control and are not otherwise classified…..such (as) fortification materials (and) construction materials. Class V – Ammunition, pyrotechnics, antitank mines, and chemical warfare agents.78

77 Underlining original, RG 338, NARA II, Box 22, HQ, V Corps, Staff Coordination Takes TNT!, 24 May 1943, 1. 78 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3800, Definition of American Military Terms, n.d., 4.

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Training harmony was disrupted when mobilized divisions were forced to undergo major organizational changes in the midst of combat preparations. The War Department issued instruction for divisions to begin the triangularization process beginning on 6 June 1940.

Triangular divisions contained three infantry regiments where previous square divisions had consisted of four regiments divided between two brigade headquarters. According to the War

Department Directive and the Plan of the National Guard Bureau (WDDPNGB) newly-organized triangular regiments would be composed of three battalions, a headquarters company, a service company, and an anti-tank company. The revised battalion structure consisted of a headquarters detachment, a heavy weapons company, and three rifle companies. Three rifle platoons and a specialized weapons platoon formed a rifle company. Each rifle platoon was composed of three squads each containing twelve soldiers. The squad remained the basic fighting formation in a

United States Army infantry division following the triangularization process.79 On paper a squad consisted of, ―a sergeant (squad leader), a corporal (assistant squad leader and antitank rifle grenadier), an automatic rifle team (automatic rifleman, assistant automatic rifleman, and ammunition bearer), and seven riflemen, two of whom were designated as scouts.‖80

Triangularization advocates touted increased battlefield flexibility and mobility as the revisionary organization‘s primary benefits. War Department officials favored mobile formations during World War II, believing that fluid operations would replace stalemate warfare and that lighter, more-flexible divisions were necessary in place of the heavy, plodding square

79 WDDPNGB. RG 168, NARA II, Box 345, 118-119 80 War Department, Field Manual 7-10 Infantry Field Manual, Rifle Company, Rifle Regiment (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1942), 130.

214 divisions of the AEF.81 The unintended or unforeseen cost for divisions, however, was a vast reduction in manpower and organic firepower.

During WWI, American officials had implemented heavy ‗square divisions‘ consisting of two brigades of infantry, each composed of two infantry regiments, an artillery regiment along with a large number of ancillary troops to cope with the demands of warfare on the Western

Front.82 A WWI American infantry division comprised 991 officers, 27114 enlisted men and its principal armament consisted of 24 155-mm howitzers, 48 75-mm guns, 12 6-inch trench mortars, 260 machine guns and 16,193 bolt-action rifles.83

Conversely, the total strength of a WWII U.S. Army infantry division was 13,412, less than half the size of its WWI counterpart. The twenty-seven rifle companies comprising a triangularized division possessed just 5,184 soldiers, many of whom functioned in support or specialist roles. After triangulation, the 29th Division‘s firepower compared unfavorably to its square predecessor, possessing just 4,773 M-1 semiautomatic rifles, 81 60-mm and 18 81-mm mortars, 252 light and heavy machine guns, 36 105-mm and 16 155-mm howitzers.84 This comparative deficiency in manpower and firepower may account for many of the 29th Division‘s struggles during World War II.

The lack of manpower also limited a triangularized division‘s ability to provide regiments extended periods of rest while the division was engaged in sustained combat. Periodic breaks

81 See for example, Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, 253-254. 82 Doubler, Civilian in Peace. 172. 83 American Battlefields Monuments Commission, 29th Division Summary of Operations in the World War. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), 4. 84 Lieutenant Colonel Harry C. Ingles, ―The New Division,‖ Infantry Journal 46, no. 6 (November-December, 1939): 526-527 and Robert R. Palmer, ―Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat,‖ in, United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops. eds. Kent R. Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1987), 274, 301, 302.

215 from the rigors of combat were essential in reducing combat exhaustion rates and maintaining unit morale. Having one regiment constantly in a rest position, as was possible with square divisions, also provided the opportunity to assign and integrate combat replacements more efficiently.

The 29th Division received its triangularization orders on 11 March 1942. The 176th

Regiment was stripped from the division and sent to Washington, D.C. for guard duty as a result of the latest organizational developments. The division‘s Table of Organization and Equipment

(TO&E) was largely set for the remainder of the war following the triangularization process, though the unit continued to remain far below its allotted strength.85 Manpower shortages initially limited regimental strengths in mobilized National Guard divisions to 2,660 enlisted soldiers compared to 3,000 in their Regular Army counterparts. Regimental composition in

National Guard divisions not yet mobilized was set at 1,300.86

The division departed Fort Meade for the A.P. Hill Reservation shortly after completing the triangularization process. The men lived under canvas there and received such a degree of jungle training that many became convinced the division was destined for the Pacific Theater.

Aircraft identification was carried out in the field rather than in a classroom setting. The men dug deep foxholes and experienced friendly artillery fire passing overhead. On 6 July the

85 Ewing, 29 Let’s Go!, 8. 86 RG 168, NARA II, Box 345, War Department Directive and the Plan of the National Guard Bureau (WDDPNGB) for the immediate increase of the active units of the National Guard to full Peace Strength (Secret), contained in Memorandum for The Chief, National Guard Bureau, Chronological Report of Actions taken by the National Guard Bureau to comply with the Increases in the National Guard under Executive Order of September 8, 1939, and the subsequent induction of the National Guard into the Army of the United States, 118-119 and Palmer, ―Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat,‖ 301, 302.

216 division pulled up stakes and departed A.P. Hill Reservation for another round of maneuvers in the Carolinas.87

The 29th Infantry Division, the 2nd Armored Division and various corps troops formed

Blue Force during the second round of Carolina Maneuvers held in August 1942.88 29th Division units rehearsed reconnaissance techniques, planned and carried out a river crossing attack defended by ground troops and air assets, acted as an attacking force in a two-day, one-night scheme, and conducted an aggressive 3-day, 2-night field maneuver during which the division drove an enemy delaying force to retreat beyond a river obstacle.89 The division broke into subunits after each scheme to study exercise results and to implement corrective measures.90

During the maneuvers, staff officers took part in a Command Post Exercises that imparted lessons for the, ―(m)ovement to and occupation of command posts under cover of darkness….Command, staff techniques, signal communications (along with) operation, movement and security of command posts….The maximum use of all available reconnaissance units…Coordinated attack against an organized position supported by combat aviation….Cooperation of air and ground forces in an attack….Division attacks supported by combat aviation to reduce strong enemy centers of resistance…..(and, lastly,) (a)ir-ground communication.91

87 The maneuvers were the first large scale field exercises since the United States‘ entry into WWII. See, Ibid., 11, 12. 88 RG 337, NARA II, Box 94, Report of Attendance at VI Corps Maneuvers, August 4-7, 1942, Carolina Maneuver Areas, 1. 89 RG 337, NARA II, Box 94, Maneuvers, 1942, VI Corps, Tab ―A‖ – General (Incl[uding] Tr[aining] lists & brief of exercises), 2. 90 RG 337, NARA II, Box 94, Maneuver Training Program, IV Army Corps, August 16-27, 1942, 6 July 1942. 91 RG 337, NARA II, Box 94, Command Post Exercise 26- 27 July 1942, 6 July 1942.

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Maneuver leaders halted proceedings in response to disappointing early results and ordered units to conduct a week-long back-to-the-basics training session before scheduled exercises resumed.92 The heightened degree of exercise sophistication nevertheless illustrates the division‘s training progress between the 1941 and 1942 Carolina maneuvers. During one maneuver for instance, the division rehearsed the:

selection of position(s), refusal or echelonment of flanks….(u)se of obstacles…..(s)ecurity of flanks…..(o)rganization of wide front.….(o)bservation and fields of fire…..(p)rotection for infantry…..(c)ommunications…..(g)ood artillery positions in depth…..(c)oncealment of reserves from terrestrial and air observation…..(s)rong reserves centrally located with good routes for movement to front and flanks….(c)ooperative planning…..(u)se of covering forces…… (a)(nti)Mec(hani)z(ed) and A(nti)A(ircraft) defence……(d)etermination of hostile lines of action……(p)rompt movement of reserves to meet hostile attack…...(c)ooperation by all arms and echelons……(c)oncentration of effort at decisive points…… (c)amouflage……(and)(s)upply and evacuation.93

Division commanders received detailed post-exercise critiques listing instances where the division performed poorly and required actions to rectify these weaknesses. The 29th Division was criticized in Scheme C-5 for improper liaison between forward battalions, lax reconnaissance techniques and anti-aircraft defense while on the march, poor laying and servicing of communications wiring, and improper water discipline by a sergeant. Conversely, the division was commended for excellent night patrolling, ‗advance to contact‘ maneuvers, concealment, along with excellent gunnery, fire direction and survey by its artillery units.94

The 1st/116th was criticized during Maneuver C-6 for advancing without proper protection. The unit had been ambushed and was subsequently ruled lost by an attached umpire.

Later, Companies C and G, 116th Regiment (with the commanders named) advanced in a similar

92 RG 337, NARA II, Box 94, Small Unit Conference, VI Army Corps Directed Carolina Maneuvers, n.d. 93 RG 337, NARA II, Box 94, Maneuver, C-2, 14 July 1942 and Maneuver C-7, 1 August 1942. 94 RG 337, NARA II, Box 94, Memorandum on Maneuver C-5 to Commanding General, 29th Division, 29-31 July, 1942, 3 August 1942.

218 fashion and were lost when running, ―headlong into the enemy with all vehicles bumper to bumper.‖ In another instance a traffic jam occurred when Division MPs attempted to pass divisional units through one another during the night. Individual transgressions were also noted.

A large number of men were seen eating and drinking in restaurants during the maneuver and one officer (named with unit identification) was observed, ―moving about the maneuver area without identification….(and was) heard informing enlisted men that he was a person of some importance and that his pistol was loaded with ball ammunition.‖95

Division leaders were reprimanded in Maneuver C-7‘s after action report for being too general in mission assignments to air assets, for improper written and radio messaging techniques, for dispersing armored support too broadly so as to lose tactical control, and for weak information sharing between infantry and artillery battalions and regimental and division commands. The division was commended for improved signals communications, for ideal marching and movements by infantry elements upon contact with enemy forces, for providing hot meals to all troops daily, for concealment and camouflage methods, and for adequately supplying artillery ammunition.96

Despite their historiographical prominence, however, maneuvers did little to prepare the average 29th Division infantrymen for battle. When asked why he stopped a particular Carolina maneuver the director replied that, ―the mass of ground forces were in contact. Once contact is gained, you get very little more out of any maneuver.‖97 McNair halted another scheme because,

―the situation had been developed rather completely…..(and it) was becoming difficult to

95 RG 337, NARA II, Box 94, Memorandum on Maneuver C-6, 4-5 August to Commanding General, 29th Division, 1942, 9 August 1942. 96 RG 337, NARA II, Box 94, Memorandum on Maneuver C-7, 11-13 August to Commanding General, 29th Division, 1942, 19 August 1942. 97 RG 337, NARA II, Box 412, Critique of Field Maneuver No. 3 by the Director, 2-3

219 umpire.‖98 The inherent enigma of maneuvers was that they were usually halted just at the point where the individual riflemen was about to receive tangible benefits.

The maneuvers may have toughened the men physically but they did little to prepare the division‘s infantry component for combat in Normandy. Some maneuver participants failed to take the proceedings seriously. AWOL cases were rampant during the second set of Carolina maneuvers. Over a two week period beginning 15 November, IV Corps alone averaged 466

AWOL cases per day with a peak number of 606 occurring on 24 November.99 In one instance an exercise director reported seeing, ―two soldiers trying to thumb a ride from (a) police car. I knew immediately that something was wrong….and noticed they were somewhat intoxicated.

One was a sergeant and I asked him what he was doing along the road. He said….we belong to the engineers; we were on a reconnaissance and became lost…I told the two soldiers….(to) report yourselves intoxicated….In answer the sergeant straightened up and said….Not yet sir.‖100

Though they may have provided few benefits to the common infantry soldier, large-scale field exercises did afford medical units the opportunity to hone their skills under conditions approximating combat. Simulated and actual casualties were marshaled at aid stations and then collected at Clearing Stations located close to the front as per instructions set out in FM 8-15.

Clearing Stations, consisting of 60 cots, treated mild cases and performed minor surgeries only.

Simulated casualties were tagged with artificial casualty medical cards (in duplicate) and were not to be evacuated beyond Clearing Stations. Actual casualties of a serious nature were transferred to evacuation hospitals but were provided no special attention over simulated

98 RG 337, NARA II, Box 328, Critique of First Phase GHQ Director Maneuvers, Carolina Maneuvers by Lt. General L. McNair, 27 November 1941, 1. 99 RG 337, NARA II, Box 389, Report of AWOL‘s. 100 RG 337, NARA II, Box 412, Critique of Field Maneuver No. 3 by the Director, 1-2.

220 casualties to increase the exercise‘s realism and its value as a learning tool.101 In just one phase of the 1941 Carolina maneuvers, McNair documented that over, ―4,000 actual casualties (had been) evacuated effectively…..(and that) (t)he number and handling of artificial casualties was praiseworthy.‖102

Large-scale maneuvers also provided supply, communications, and transportation units a valuable opportunity to practice their trades under battle-like conditions and to incorporate corrective measures. McNair criticized both the First Army and IV Corps for failing to establish proper supply depots during fluid operations, though he did observe that, ―(t)he First Army plan of ammunition supply for its highly mobile tank-attacker and reconnaissance units was good.‖103

An AGF training directive reminded units to, ―operate the maneuvers strictly under field conditions and to give as much field training as (wa)s practicable to service units.‖104 A post- exercise summary of Quartermaster operations during the Carolina maneuvers recommended that units not think, ―of gasoline in terms of driving to a gasoline station to ‗fill up,‘‖ and reminded commanders that, ―(l)ittle attention (had been) paid to anticipated requirements by the individual units.‖ As a corrective measure the summary called for the incorporation of, ―a period (of remedial training).….(for) all units dealing with the distribution of….supplies in the field.‖105

The 1942 Carolina Maneuvers were cut short since participating units earmarked for the invasion of North Africa required a lengthy processing interval prior to embarkation. The 29th

101 RG 337, NARA II, Box 328, HQ First Army, First Army Maneuvers, Administration, 23 August 1941, 27. 102 RG 337, NARA II, Box 328, Critique of First Phase GHQ Director Maneuvers, Carolina Maneuvers by Lt. General L. McNair, 27 November 1941, 3. 103 RG 337, NARA II, Box 328, Comments on First Army versus IV Army Corps Maneuvers, November 16-30, 1941 by Lt. General L. McNair, 22 December 1941, 9. 104 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, HQ AGF, Training Directive for the Period June 1 to October 31, 1942, 1. 105 RG 338, NARA II, Box 6, Report of Quartermaster Operations, n.d., 3.

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Division departed North Carolina on August 17 and settled down at Camp Blanding in northern

Florida. The men anticipated a long stay there. After all, the division‘s four artillery battalions and the 1st/175th had been dispatched to Fort Sill for troop training purposes and the unit had been instructed to select an entire infantry regiment for dispatch to Fort Benning to act as a demonstration team.106 Remaining units conducted route marches, close order drill and bayonet classes, ran obstacle courses, and attended classroom courses on subjects ranging from chemical warfare training to military discipline.107 The training routine also included cleaning and inspections of equipment, schools for military courtesy, interior guard duty, ceremonies, and physical training. A broad order required officers to correct deficiencies in individual and small unit training observed over the past year.108

Units were advised to maintain a ―rigid adherence to the training doctrines and methods set forth in FM 21-5, ―in order to further the training of all individuals and units in offensive operations as quickly and efficiently as possible.‖109 As War Department officials considered the, ―proper mental attitude of a command,‖ a, ―prerequisite to combat efficiency,‖ commanding officers were instructed to conduct weekly lectures stressing proper military courtesy. Training in military courtesy was designed to inculcate a sense of self dignity and unit pride in each soldier, who should exhibit, ―a personal desire to present always a natural appearance of smartness, alertness, discipline, courtesy, and military bearing.‖ Commissioned and non-

106 Ewing, 29 Let’s Go!, 12, 13. 107 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3897, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 82, 22 September 1942. 108 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3897, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 73, 21 August 1942. 109 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 3, Training Program: October 20, 1942 – January 31, 1943, 1.

222 commissioned officers witnessing violations of military courtesy were ordered to take immediate corrective actions, ―whether on or off duty.‖110

The division was ordered to institute a revised seven-day-a-week training schedule in

October, 1942, reflecting a renewed sense of urgency in the U.S. Army. Weapons, bayonet, grenade, first aid, and camouflage training and continued troop hardening typified individual training while squad, platoon, and company training stressed day and night operations that included combined arms training. Instructors were urged to provide, ―(c)onstant explanation……to keep the individual soldier fully informed of the part he (wa)s expected to play, and its relationship to the success of the operation as a whole. Techniques taught and practiced in small unit training must (reflect) that which (wa)s desired in combat.‖111

On 6 September 1942 the division was suddenly alerted for overseas movement.

Confusion reigned, men and units were recalled and within three weeks the first 29th Division contingent sailed out of New York Harbor. The remainder of the division followed on 5

October, less than a month after having received notification for overseas service.112 The 29th

Division was bound for Great Britain after all, not the Pacific Theater. Few of the men could have guessed that nearly two more long years of training awaited them there.

110 RG 338, NARA II, Box 23, HQ V Corps, Change No. 2 to Training Memorandum Number 2, 10 September 1942. 111 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 3, Training Program: October 20, 1942 – January 31, 1943, 1, 2. 112 Ewing, 29 Let’s Go!, 12, 13.

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CHAPTER SIX EARLY TRAINING IN GREAT BRITAIN

The 29th Division crossed the Atlantic Ocean on the two great Cunard liners - the Queen

Elizabeth and the Queen Mary. The first contingent to sail landed at Greenock, Scotland in

October 1942. Some aboard the Queen Mary witnessed the tragic collision between their vessel and the British escort cruiser Curacao, which was cut in two and sank with the loss of 332

British sailors.1 29th Division soldiers were afforded little opportunity to experience the excitement of wartime England before the grind of combat training resumed.

American formations were assigned locations running from west to east in the southern portion of England upon their arrival. The 29th Division was quickly shuttled southwards by train and stationed at Tidworth in the Salisbury region. The division was formally attached to V

Corps on 13 November 1942. For several months V Corps consisted of the 29th Division and various headquarters troops only. Major General Gerow relieved Major General Hartle as commanding officer in July. V Corps served as the ‗Bolero‘ representative in the United

Kingdom between November 1942 and October 1943, providing initial accommodations for units arriving in the United Kingdom. V Corps also equipped undersupplied divisions arriving in the United Kingdom from the Zone of the Interior ―without avoidable delay,‖ and was responsible for generating and administering their training.2 V Corps headquarters was finally able to relinquish its ‗Bolero’ duties after First U.S. Army was stood up on 20 October 1943.3

The 29th Division experienced few organizational or doctrinal changes during the first half of its tenure in Great Britain. Training methodologies and schedules were virtually identical

1 Ewing, 29 Let’s Go, 15. 2 Zone of the Interior was simply another designation for the United States. See, RG 338, NARA II, Box 11, V Corps, Staff Study, An Analysis of the Mission of the V Corps: A Command and Staff Plan for Its Accomplishment, n.d., 2, 3, 4. 3 RG 338, NARA II, Box 30, HQ V Corps, Military History V Corps, 1 March 1944, 2.

224 to those utilized in the U.S. prior to the division‘s departure. In other words, besides a change in station very little had changed for the men of the 29th Division.

Initial training in Great Britain was conducted on a seven-day-a-week basis and rigidly adhered to the, ―training doctrines and methods……set forth in FM 21-5 and in WD Field

Manuals.‖ Training focused on enabling the division, ―to participate in offensive operations at the earliest date practicable.‖ Combat preparations were to be, ―intelligently directed so that each individual, including the last private in the ranks, c(ould) understand the reasons for the exertions he (wa)s called upon to make.‖ Subjects of instruction included disciplinary training and military courtesy, physical hardening exercises, weapons, bayonet, and grenade training, defense against aircraft, airborne troops and chemical weapons attacks, camouflage, and first aid training. Small unit training was also scheduled, ―up to and including the battalions.‖ Special emphasis was placed on balanced squad, platoon, and company training stressing, ―day and night operation(s.)…….Constant explanation w(as) given to keep the individual soldier fully informed of the part he (wa)s expected to play, and its relationship to the success of the operation as a whole. Technique(s) taught and practiced in small unit training (were to coincide with those) desired in combat.‖ Deadlines were established to ensure standardized compliance. Units were expected to attain by 31 December 1942, ―(p)roficiency in the use of all weapons – both individual and crew-served – to include functioning, supply, service of the piece, marksmanship, technique of fire and combat firing…….(and to achieve also) (p)hysical hardening of all individuals so that they c(ould) withstand for long periods the rigors of strenuous combat.‖

Within another month of training, units were expected to develop, ―teamwork in small units – squad, section, platoon, company and battery – to a state of proficiency which……enable(d)

225 these units to operate efficiently, either separately or as a part of a large team, under strenuous combat condition(s.)‖4

Individual training consisted of bayonet training, night fighting, river crossings, scouting and patrolling, cross training on crew served weapons, training in mine warfare and booby traps, proper use of concealment and cover, physical hardening, and the construction and defense of road blocks. Rifle platoons practiced tank stalking, patrolling, enveloping enemy positions, consolidating attack gains and preparing for enemy counterattacks, and adjusting to changing battlefield conditions - assisting a neighboring unit by attacking the enemy‘s flank, for example.5

The primary training objective during the first six months of 1943 was to quickly and efficiently prepare the division for active operations. Physical hardening was carried out, as were exercises rehearsing the tactical employment of all arms, the use of small arms, and the formulation of enhanced security techniques. All support branches except medical services were to be, ―trained to fight basically as Infantry, and to defend its own tactical locality, particularly when cut off on all sides by deep penetrations or envelopment.‖6

V Corps instructed 29th Division administrators to incorporate training that stressed individual initiative and battlefield adaptability. A central tenet of V Corps‘ training directives in early 1943 was increasing, ―the readiness of non-commissioned officers and junior officers to accept responsibility and the command of units during the absence of their superiors.‖7 A 29th

4 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th ID, Training Circular No. 3, Training Program: October 20, 1942 – January 31, 1943, 1, 2. 5 RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, HQ V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 16, No. 5, Infantry, 31 December 1942, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. 6 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, Training Circular No. 26 (29th I.D.) and Training Memorandum No. 16, Annex No. 7 (V Corps), HQ V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 16, Training Directive for Units of V Corps, 1 January – 30 April 1943. 7 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, HQ V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 16, Training Directive for Units of V Corps, 1 January – 30 April 1943, 4.

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Division veteran later noted the importance of this training philosophy: ―(the NCO‘s) were (the)

‗real‘ leaders, (they) were all trained to take over if need be and on June 6, 1944 – D-Day – it paid off.‖8

29th Division formations also experienced a return to the basics during the first four months of 1943. Officers and non-commissioned officers were instructed to redouble their efforts in mastering, ―the tactics and technique(s) of their arms and (to) be familiar with the doctrines of other arms and services operating as part of the combat team.‖ Troop schools, programs for officers and non-commissioned officers specializing in tactical operations, communications, chemical warfare, and instructor training were continued. Those teaching the teachers followed the provisions of FM 21-5 closely and made, ―full use….of demonstration units as …training aid(s) and for establishing definitive standards.‖9

Artillery preparations were particularly strenuous during the 29th Division‘s training in

Great Britain. The sheer scope and complexity of artillery practices required an extraordinary level of skill and professionalism from the unit‘s civilian soldiers. A wide array of specialists, each with particular duties, was necessary for the artillery complex to function properly and effectively. A 105-mm howitzer section in the 29th Division, for example, was made up of a chief of section, a howitzer squad, a driver, and a number of additional cannoneers provided as reliefs. The howitzer squad of each piece consisted of a gunner and seven cannoners numbered from one to seven, each with a different responsibility.10

8 USAMHI, WWII Survey, Unknown Number. 9 Underline original. RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, HQ V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 16, Training Directive for Units of V Corps, 1 January – 30 April 1943, 3. 10 War Department, Field Artillery Field Manual 6-75: Service of the Piece, 105-mm Howitzer, M2, Truck-Drawn (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1941), 16.

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Battery executives were considered an artillery unit‘s linchpin and, ―the source of inspiration to the firing battery.‖11 A successful battery executive was expected to, ―develop his powers of observation to that of an efficiency expert…..He must be the most energetic, enthusiastic and capable member of the firing battery,‖ and also be sufficiently knowledgeable and therefore capable of teaching individual members of the battery in the many principles of occupying and organizing a battery position, ―such as laying, putting out aiming stakes, (and) digging trail trenches.‖12

The 29th Division responded by establishing an eight-day artillery school for Battery

Executives in early February 1943. Students received lectures and practical demonstrations, followed by individual and group participatory assignments in: bore sighting and range quadrant adjustment, recoil mechanisms, laying the battery, executive firing procedures, miscellaneous functions of the executive, organization of executive post, camouflage, field fortifications, gun drill, along with nomenclature, characteristics, disassembly, and movement of the piece. The final day of the course was dedicated to examinations.13 Examination results and a student‘s general demeanor during the course, ―w(ere)….submitted to the Commanding General, Division

Artillery….(and) w(ere) considered to directly reflect the industry, intelligence, and efficiency of the individual officer concerned, and w(ou)l(d) be…..considered in connection with any future selections or recommendation for promotions.‖14

11 Ibid., 2. 12 Ibid. 13 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 2, Battery Executive‘s School, 8 February 1943, 1, and RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, HQ 29th I.D., Annex No. 2 to Training Memorandum No. 2, List of Subjects and Text Preferences: Battery Executive School, 8 February 1943, 1. 14 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 2, Battery Executive‘s School, 8 February 1943, 1.

228

American officials carried on a running debate during WWII whether to centralize or decentralize control of organic artillery formations. Official policy required division artillery to remain under centralized control allowing the division commander to, ―most effectively employ its massed fire power.‖15 The idea of decentralized control was unpopular in some artillery circles. A ghost commentator in the Field Artillery Journal observed that, ―suggesting a method of fire direction other than the (centralized) present issue model (wa)s comparable…..to a suggestion to change the name of Arkansas.‖16

Nevertheless, decentralized fire direction control, ―in accordance with the latest Field

Artillery School teachings,‖ began to be encouraged in training memoranda issued to the 29th

Division in December 1942. Experience had proven the attachment of light artillery battalions directly to RCT‘s during combat in North Africa, ―satisfactory in all cases.‖17 Instructions called for the, ―quick and smooth decentralization of battalion fire direction,‖ since battery commanders would soon be called upon to operate, ―in battalion combat teams and alone in support of an independent task force.‖18 It was eventually agreed that control would be decentralized to battalion commanders because it, ―afforded the advantage of providing the most rapid means of delivering adequate fire support on any target, regardless of its location and nature….(and because) it…..made possible the full advantage of massed fire when necessary, under the control

15 War Department, Field Artillery Field Manual 6-100: Tactics and Technique of Division Artillery and Higher Artillery Echelons (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), 2. 16 Major Roger Wilco, ―The Battery FDC,‖ Field Artillery Journal 33, no. 12 (December, 1943): 915. 17 RG 338, NARA II, Box, 3901, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 15, Training Lessons from the Tunisian Campaign, 20 August 1943, 2, 6. 18 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, HQ V Corps, Annex No. 5 to Training Memorandum No. 16, 31 December 1942, 2.

229 of the Divisional Artillery Commander.‖19 The organizational and doctrinal uncertainty brought about by the centralized/decentralized debate undoubtedly complicated the administration of artillery training within the division, though it did allow formations to rehearse both forms of control.

The process of placing artillery rounds quickly and accurately on a map reference was elaborative and complex. The 29th Division‘s artillery commander could order two types of fire missions. Prearranged shoots were carried out when prior consideration of the target location and detail was allowed. The artillery commander prepared a thorough fire plan during prearranged fire missions, deciding on the number of battalions participating, assigning an arbitrary concentration number, time, coordinates, altitude, the width and depth of the target area in yards, the method of attack, and the type and amount of ammunition to be expended.20 The second form of fire mission consisted of target of opportunity shoots delivered against enemy formations that materialized during battle or for which no prearranged fire had been organized.

Unobserved, indirect firing on such targets could only be carried out if common control had previously been established through survey or registration.21

The production of highly-trained artillery specialists in combination with technological and administrative advancements allowed WWII artillery commanders to mass the fire of more than one battalion. The army‘s ability to mass artillery fire relied largely on Fire Direction

Centers (FDCs) located at division and battalion echelons. Division FDCs were usually situated in the division artillery command post in order to exercise proper control. Division FDCs did not

19 RG 338, NARA II, Box, 3901, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 15, Training Lessons from the Tunisian Campaign, 20 August 1943, 2, 6. 20 FM 6-100, 16, 18. 21 FM 6-100, 16.

230 supply gun setting computations, however, and were limited to assigning, ―targets to battalions by……..coordinates or overlays.‖22

Artillery specialists housed in battalion FDCs were instead responsible for supplying firing data for individual batteries - based upon divisional instructions or in response to requests from forward observers - and for the prioritization of artillery requests. A battalion FDC was usually a confusing place consisting of a, ―maze of telephones, an assortment of from five to ten

‗military strategists,‘ with the inherent confusion of ringing bells, flashing lights, and shouting people….necessary to get the job done.‖23 Battalion FDCs were usually located in the headquarters section of field artillery battalions, though individual batteries were trained to compute their own firing data.24

The actual process of fire direction took place when, ―the fire of one or more units (wa)s brought to bear on the most appropriate target at the most opportune time with the highest degree of surprise and demoralizing density.‖25 Fire Direction also, ―included the choice of targets, methods of delivering fire on them, and allocation of ammunition to each fire mission.‖26 The spectrum of fire direction encompassed the firing of an individual piece to a coordinated mass shoot by every gun in an army. The smallest unit deemed capable of delivering mass fire in

1941 was the battalion and therefore the essence of fire direction was located there.27

A particularly effective American mass firing technique was the ‗time on target‘ (TOT) mission. TOT shoots took place when a number of batteries staggered their time of firing so that

22 Lieutenant Colonel E.B. Gjelsteen, ―Fire Direction Technique for Groupment and Division Artillery,‖ Field Artillery Journal 32, no. 3 (March, 1942): 184. 23 Major Robert B. Smith, ―FDC Simplicity,‖ Field Artillery Journal 39 (March-April, 1949): 72. 24 No author, ―Fire Direction,‖ Field Artillery Journal 31, no. 5 (May, 1941): 278. 25 Ibid. 26 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3800, Definition of American Military Terms, n.d., 7. 27 No author, ―Fire Direction,‖ 278.

231 all rounds landed on the target at the same time.28 Notwithstanding their effectiveness, TOT missions were complicated and time consuming and were rarely used in combat. Moreover, the

Tunisian campaign demonstrated, ―that long concentrations of slow fire (we)re more effective against prepared positions than a mass of fire for a short duration.‖29 Defensive fire missions, regular requests for support, and pre-attack barrages constituted the bulk of an artillery unit‘s firing activities. Emergency fire missions, codenamed ‗Wreck‘ and ‗Serenade,‘ were available if necessary. ‗Wreck‘ appeals called upon the firepower from all available divisional artillery, while ‗Serenade’ missions requested divisional and corps concentrations. ‗Wreck‘ shoots required prior authorization from the division artillery commander while similar approval was necessary from a corps artillery commander in the case of ‗Serenade‘ missions. Sanctioned

‗Wreck‘ and ‗Serenade‘ missions had priority over all other fire missions.30

Fire direction, accurate indirect firing, and mass shooting were only possible after geodetic surveying and mapping procedures ensured that each piece was properly laid and placed on the global map. Highly specialized surveying personnel attached to artillery battalions and

29th Division headquarters carried out these procedures.31 The army‘s complex artillery system also required adequate communications control.32 Qualified communications specialists operated a complex system of wire, radio, and, to a lesser extent, messenger communications that

28 Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Artillery (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 139. 29 RG 338, NARA II, Box, 3901, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 15, Training Lessons from the Tunisian Campaign, 20 August 1943, 7. 30 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, H.Q., 29th I.D., Operations Memorandum No. 2, Corps and Division Artillery Mass Fires, 13 April 1944, 1, 2. The corresponding fire missions to ‗Wreck‘ and ‗Serenade‘ requests in Anglo/Canadian artillery formations were ‗Uncle‘ and ‗Victor‘ targets. See, George Blackburn, Where the Hell Are the Guns: A Soldier’s View of the Anxious Years, 1939-1944. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1997), 262-264. 31 FM 6-100, 31. 32 FM 6-100, 2.

232 provided, ―rapid transmission of target locations and sensing from observers to the (FDC) and of fire commands from the (FDC) to the gun positions.‖33

29th Division artillery training focused predominately on the mastery of these complex tactical applications. Units rehearsed fire direction and service techniques at the beginning of

1943 and carried out tactical firing at the battalion level stressing individual duties in particular.

Field exercises and combined arms training followed in February and March.34 Battalion commanders conducted proficiency testing, ―to determine the progress and efficiency of their organizations…..(consisting) of field exercises of the most practical nature.‖ Tests were conducted at battery and battalion levels. Battery examinations were divided into observed and unobserved sections. Batteries were required to go into action and prepare to fire as quickly as possible during both phases. Personnel were judged on their ability to, ―(1) (o)ccupy and organize (a) position, (2) (i)nstall and operate a satisfactory system of communication, (3)

(e)xecute fire commands, (4) (p)repare firing data and charts, (5) (c)heck materiel, (6) (h)andle and store ammunition in the field, (and) (7) (p)rovide close-in (accuracy.)‖35

Battalion testing was divided into three stages, each critiquing the unit under different firing situations. The battalion was ordered into quick action in Part 1. The use of maps or aerial photographs was not allowed and units were not permitted to carry out any preliminary surveying. The unit made ready for, ―all forms of observed fire,‖ and established surveillance posts for axial, lateral, forward and air observation. The battalion occupied positions at night and prepared to support an early morning infantry attack during Part 2. The unit was allowed two

33 No author, ―Fire Direction,‖ 279. 34 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ, 29th ID, Training Circular No. 26, Training Directive – 1 January – 31 March 1943, 29 December 1942, 9. 35 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ, 29th ID, Annex No. 1 to Training Circular No. 59, Artillery Training, 24 May 1943, 1.

233 hours of daylight to begin reconnaissance and survey procedures. Registration was not allowed, however, and battalions were required to be, ―prepared to deliver fires using metro data during the preparation.‖ The last of the three tests saw battalions ordered into action, ―in a situation

(where) deliberate occupation (wa)s possible. No maps, map substitutes or aerial photographs w(ere) available, thus necessitating accomplishment of a complete grid sheet survey.‖36

Properly trained artillerymen were important to an army relying heavily on brute force to defeat enemy ground forces. 29th Division artillerymen achieved a high standard of small ‗p‘ professionalism by 6 June 1944 and often provided the means to victory on the battlefield. With the exception of phraseology, the American mass firing system at the division level was very similar to its British counterpart. However, the coordination of mass firing by multiple divisions and corps lagged in the American system. Breaches of divisional independence were rarely witnessed within the U.S. Army, whereas Canadian and British officials were less adverse to multi-unit cooperation.37

The 29th Division as a whole experienced a series of innovative training techniques in early 1943. The War Department adopted a progressive form of institutionalized training in which soldiers of all ranks were encouraged to tender suggestions, ―relative to new techniques, weapons, military doctrine, and organization.‖ Suggestions worthy of further consideration were, ―forwarded through military channels to the Commanding Generals of the (AGF,) (AAF,)

(SOS,) defense commands, departments, theaters, task forces, and overseas bases.‖ Following another round of screening, ―meritorious suggestions,‖ were forwarded to the army branch,

―most directly concerned.‖ The progressive training philosophy also promised, ―suitable official

36 Ibid., 1, 2. 37 Gudmundsson, On Artillery, 139.

234 recognition,‖ to those individuals whose suggestions were eventually incorporated into army doctrine.38

Realizing training standards varied between units, V Corps officials instituted a decentralized program that allowed instructional methods to differ by unit circumstance.

Division commanders were expected to, ―formulate their own training plans with the corresponding responsibility of fulfilling the objectives set forth by Corps. By frequent observation of training, the Corps commander w(ou)l(d) determine the extent of compliance.‖39

As a result, the bulk of training responsibilities were devolved to 29th Division‘s regimental commanders during the spring of 1943. Division administrators provided a broad range of training directives and a timeframe for their completion before settling into a supervisory role. War Department officials believed training results were largely dependent on the, ―initiative, imagination, resourcefulness, force and attention,‖ of regimental commanders in such a system. Decentralized training instructions, ―set forth only broad objectives to be attained and fundamentals to be emphasized……..Detailed execution (wa)s (the) responsibility of commanding officers, and the degree of proficiency attained by units w(ou)l(d) be a measure of the initiative, imagination, resourcefulness, force and attention to duty of such officers.‖40

War Department officials advocated a results-based philosophy alongside the decentralized approach. Regimental headquarters were tested frequently but were also advised they would be judged not on, ―schedules and programs or upon theoretical knowledge, but upon practical demonstrated ability under simulated combat conditions.‖ Regimental administrators

38 RG 338, NARA II, Box 17, HQ V Corps, Army Invites Personnel to Submit Suggestions, 5 January 1943. 39 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, HQ V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 16, Training Directive for Units of V Corps, 1 January – 30 April 1943, 1. 40 RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, V Corps, V Corps Memorandum No. 12, Training Directive for Units of V Corps, 1 September 31-December 1943, 1-3.

235 were largely responsible for discipline, morale, food, religious activities, supplies, and quartering of all RCT formations, not just the three infantry battalions.41

A V Corps training memorandum demonstrates the progressive and decentralized nature of preparations carried out by the 29th Division in Great Britain during early 1943:

Rifle squads: (r)econnaissance patrol (day and night), (c)ombat patrol, (c)onnecting group, (f)lank patrol for unit on march, (r)eduction of machine gun nest, (a)pproach march and attack, (h)asty…..defence….(m)opping up, (p)oint of advance or rear guard, and (m)otorized patrol. Platoons: (a)dvance party of advance guard,….(s)upport of an outpost, (r)aiding party, (m)otorized patrol, (p)art of a large force in attacking echelon….(and) (o)ccupation of defensive area. Companies: (a)dvance guard….. (a)pproach march, (d)efence of bivouac area…..(d)ay….and night attack; (m)otorized detachment (reinforced,) and (o)rganization and occupation of defensive position. Battalion Combat Teams: (m)ovement into and occupation of an assembly area, (r)econnaissance in force, (f)lank guard, (a)ttack against hostile defensive position, (r)elief of position…..(o)rganization of battalion defensive position, (c)onduct of defense…..(and) (c)ounterattack. Regimental Combat Teams: (a)pproach march, (d)eployment for attack, (a)ttack against hostile defensive position, (c)ounterattack, (w)ithdrawal, (o)rganization of a regimental defense area, (and) (r)econnaissance in force.42

The burden for success in a training system that devolved administrative and operational responsibilities fell on NCO‘s and officers between the platoon and regimental levels. AGF officials exhibited a great deal of trust incorporating decentralized training. The decision paid dividends in combat, however, when these same leaders became front and center. Decentralized training was also necessary to an army fighting a global war since different theaters presented unique requirements. Units preparing to fight in jungle conditions against Japanese soldiers

41 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3893, Headquarters 29th Division, Standing Orders and Administration, Training and Supply Policies, 24 May 1943. 42 RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations, V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 4, No. 1, Infantry, 14 April, 1943, 1-2 and RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations, V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 16, No. 5, Infantry, 31 December 1942, 1-2.

236 should not have received the same training as divisions preparing for combat against the

Germany Army on the European Continent.

ETO units also received directions to institute ‗Concurrent Training‘ during the spring of

1943. The innovative philosophy called for the injection of specific training techniques during general preparations. The division was ordered to carry out gas training and bayonet practice during patrol and reconnaissance schemes, for instance, saving the time and effort necessary to set up dedicated sessions for each subject.43 Otherwise simple rehearsals offered an opportunity to conduct concurrent training. The division marched by combat teams, bivouacked, and observed a display of firepower by organic artillery units during Exercise Maple. Division administrators utilized the occasion to practice reconnaissance techniques, preparation and execution of orders, march discipline, air attack security on the march and in bivouac, camouflage, and communications discipline, as well as supply and administration methods.44

The division also spent considerable time preparing for gas warfare in Great Britain.

Preparations for gas warfare were considered a subsidiary of chemical training in the U.S. Army.

29th Division soldiers received thorough and practical outdoor training in the employment of smoke, incendiaries, and toxic gas. From a defensive perspective, units were provided extensive training in: gas warning systems, the use of protective equipment, the application of first aid to gas victims, decontamination of affected weapons and equipment, and proper countermeasures against enemy chemical attacks.45

43 Ibid.. 44 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7480, Secret Historical Diary of Division: 3 February 1941-30 January 1944, 1-3 September 1943. 45 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, Adjutant General memorandum, War Department Chemical Warfare Training Directive, 15 June 1942, 1, 2, 3.

237

The extent to which training can be decentralized was nevertheless limited. A considerable degree of standardization was necessary for decentralized training to function effectively. Standardization allowed units to design, implement, evaluate, and revise training methods. ETO officials utilized a number of standardized training techniques amongst units preparing for the invasion of Europe, the primary one being proficiency testing.

29th Division units experienced a series of mandatory proficiency examinations during standardized training in Great Britain. Arm-specific tests determined whether standardized training levels existed and where remedial training was necessary. Individual proficiency testing accompanied unit analysis. Officers generally encountered a greater degree of standardized testing than enlisted members of the division. The U.S. Army utilized proficiency testing of officers to develop combat leaders able to, ―adjust themselves readily to changed conditions, and to be able to translate orders quickly and accurately into action.‖46 For instance, the division commander, Major General Leonard Gerow, ordered proficiency examinations of company and battalion officers in the aftermath of a series of particularly unsatisfactory platoon schemes held in December 1942. The evaluations, run in conjunction with previously scheduled small unit tactical training proficiency tests, were designed to, ―test the ability of a company or battalion commander to make a decision, and to maneuver his unit in accord with the hostile situation and the terrain while exercising at the same time effective control and coordination.‖47

War Department officials continued to pursue other means of high quality of instruction.

A V Corps memorandum received by the 29th Division in late January 1943 required,

46 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, HQ V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 16, Training Directive for Units of V Corps, 1 January – 30 April 1943, 4. 47 Underline original. RG 338, NARA II, Box 3899, HQ, 29th I.D., Battalion and Company Combat Proficiency Tests, 12 February 1943 and Paragraph 2, Training Circular No. 26, 29 December 1942.

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(p)erfection in the technique of military training……All personnel entrusted with instructional duties w(ere) (required to) be thoroughly familiar with subject matter contained in FM 21-5

(Basic Field Manual, Military Training, 16 July 1941,) and Training Film 7-295 (Military

Training) w(as) (to) be carefully studied and its principles mastered and applied.‖48 Instructors were coached to, ―present what was to be accomplished during training sessions and how as well as why it was an essential means to an end, with the end being properly trained individual soldiers and units.‖ Instructors were ordered to utilize demonstration style directives to maximize training value.49 Division cadre schools, such as an infantry cannon company example held in early December 1942, were instituted to prepare insufficiently trained National Guard personnel to serve as instructors.50

Another round of combat proficiency tests were conducted under the supervision of the

Assistant Division Commander in February, 1943. Platoons, supported by heavy weapons formations, took turns attacking positions manned by members of the division training cadre in order to, ―test the efficiency of the platoon, the platoon leader and all other personnel.‖ Specific exercise objectives included:

(o)ccupation of assembly area…..measure for protection against air and mechanized attack, and preparation for advance…..(r)econnaissance of leaders….(e)stimate of the situation; decisions; formulation of plans….(d)ecision….(t)roop leading by platoon and subordinate leaders…..(f)orm, brevity, clearness of all order….(c)ontrol and communications….(s)peed with which order (we)re executed….(e)xecution by units as a whole…..(f)ormation of units…(p)rompt engagement of surprise targets….(u)se of flanking fire…..(u)se of cover and concealment….(s)ecurity…..(c)onduct of individuals in maintaining proper formations and technique of movements….(p)roper use of a base

48 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, HQ V Corps, Memorandum No. 10 Medical Training, 20 January 1943, 1. 49 Underline original. RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, V Corps, V Corps Memorandum No. 4, Training Directive for Units of V Corps, 1 May – 31 August 1943, 14 April, 1943, 1. 50 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 17, Annex No. 1, Training Program, Infantry Cannon Company Cadre School.

239

of fire……(e)mployement of supporting weapons……(and) (r)eorganization on capture of objective and continuation of attack.51

Remedial action was ordered after test results illustrated an alarming, ―lack of knowledge of the technique of troop leading.‖ Leadership deficiencies exhibited by platoon officers,

―adversely affected decisiveness, timely action, and the prompt adoption and forceful pursuit of a simple, clearly understood plan of action,‖ and resulted in, ―the issuance of rambling, incomplete orders with a consequent lack of coordination and aggressiveness on the part of all echelons of command within the platoon.‖52

The division continued combat preparations in the spring of 1943 by carrying out a number of regimental combat team firing exercises stressing, ―river crossing, reduction of road blocks and other enemy strongpoints, city fighting, mopping up exercises, battlefield infiltration, night training, tank stalking and defense, (along with) coast and beach and paratroop drop defense.‖ In particular, the schemes emphasized, ―troop leading, use of photomaps, fire and movement, reconnaissance and security measures, terrain appreciation, and camouflage……..advance(d) planning….use of qualified umpires for every unit and its elements….(a)ggressive action and continuity of command (in which) (j)unior leaders and subordinates w(ere) impressed with their responsibility for the continued and aggressive action of the(ir) unit(s)……(and) (r)ealism (in scheme design and management that fostered) the nearest approach(es) to battle conditions.‖ Simulated and actual casualties tested the ability of medical units to function, ―in accordance with the tactical situation and……with prescribed

51 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ, 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 8, Platoon Proficiency Tests, 2 February 1943, 1. 52 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3899, HQ, 29th I.D., Battalion and Company Combat Proficiency Tests, 12 February 1943.

240 procedure.‖ In addition, realistically designed supply requirements, ―form(ed) a part of the requirement(s) of every tactical exercise.‖53

Individual training during the spring of 1943 emphasized tank stalking, approach to contact exercises utilizing efficient entrucking and detrucking procedures, anti-invasion drills, embarkation and debarkation techniques, individual weapons proficiency, and proper security measures. Units were urged to identify skilled marksmen and soldiers adept at fieldcraft for sniper training. Riflemen received cross-training on crew served weapons. Officers were trained to observe, call for, and adjust artillery fire. Decentralized training at platoon levels included instructions for urban combat. Companies carried out elaborate night-time disengagement and withdrawal exercises. Retreating units passed through a rear guard formation under an umbrella of protection provided by a covering force. Battalion combat teams practiced night withdrawals and attacks on hostile airdromes. Regimental combat teams rehearsed the preparation of defensive positions and serving as a covering force. Training at the division level emphasized strategic withdrawals.54

During April, 1943 V Corps officials circulated a memorandum that urged units to stress training that mentally and physically toughened the men. Officers were urged to be, ―vigorous, resourceful, and determined in their attitude.‖ During subsequent training:

(n)othing c(ould) be taken for granted, no possibility for strengthening (American) effort or weakening the enemy must be overlooked. A complacent acceptance of routine procedure (wa)s to be condemned…..The weak in spirit and physique must be eliminated. They have no place in the aggressive leadership which we must demand in all echelons of command. (American) troops must not be subjected to the losses

53 Underline original. RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, HQ V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 16, Training Directive for Units of V Corps, 1 January – 30 April 1943, 2, 3. 54 RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations, V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 4, No. 1, Infantry, 14 April, 1943, 1-2 and RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations, V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 16, No. 5, Infantry, 31 December 1942, 1-2.

241

inevitable under weak leadership. Numerous reports have been received of the casual attitude of non-commissioned officers in handling men in ranks, at drill and exercise, which would indicate a serious weakness in the attitude and capacity of the senior officers of such units. All ranks under (29th Division) command - especially battalion and regimental commanders must be brought to a full realization of the requirements of this war. They must understand that slackness in cantonment, camp or in training inevitably means a fatal weakness in battle discipline.55

The division also conducted two-sided company and battalion exercises to correct deficiencies highlighted by the latest round of proficiency tests. Regiments were urged to devise exercises that pitted, ―various types of companies one against the other.‖ To develop combat initiative within junior leaders, units were encouraged to conduct, ―(f)ree, rather than strictly controlled exercises.‖ Rehearsals of this nature provided division commanders an opportunity to observe the training progress of recently assigned filler replacements and to assign any corrective training measures deemed necessary.56

ETO officials continued to emphasize standardized training approaches. V Corps issued orders requiring units to submit monthly training reports beginning in April, 1943. Divisions were obliged to indicate manpower levels and training activities for the previous month.

Information pertaining specifically to replacements, ―showing number(s) received during the month and number(s) given special training so that they could attain the state of training of the average soldier in the (division,)‖ was called for. Units were also ordered to chronicle methods utilized in, ―(t)raining for combat fitness, including road marches, use of obstacle courses and other methods to harden troops….(c)ombating enemy propaganda by developing a spirit of

55 The memorandum illustrates the level of seriousness American commanders took towards providing suitable training for its officers and enlisted men, and a stanch willingness to cull the weak and the complacent from the herd prior to combat. It also illustrated that a lax attitude towards training had found its way into units of V Corps after more than two years of training and that officers were to be held responsible. See, RG 338, NARA II, Box 80, V Corps memorandum, Training Directive, 17 April 1943. 56 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 38, Training Directive 1 April – 15 May 1943, 1, 2.

242 mutual understanding between (American) personnel and (their) allies….(u)se of weapons….(t)actial exercises….(s)mall unit training….(d)iscipline and military courtesy….(and a) (d)escription of any special training methods adopted or followed during the preceding month that may (have) be(en) recommended for use by other units.‖57

The division‘s first training summary was submitted on 2 May 1943, listing the locations of individual units and information on the weather and adjacent units. The report indicated a division-wide shortfall of 2,544 men in April, 1943, noting specifically that the 29th Division was operating with, ―an acute shortage of enlisted personnel….in all rifle companies and field artillery batteries.‖ The 29th Division‘s combat efficiency was pegged at 70%. The summary indicated the previous month‘s activities had included training schemes by RCTs, conducted in accordance with prescribed directives. Decentralized training included platoon proficiency tests conducted in conjunction with RCT exercises to, ―correct deficiencies in company and battalion training.‖ Bayonet training remained incomplete. All units carried out physical hardening exercises consisting of 25 mile marches. Engineer and artillery units continued tactical training including an engineer proficiency test codenamed Exercise Hot Dog. Communications troops attended a division signals school while support units continued daily activities facilitating division-wide training and preparations for combat.58

29th Division preparations during May, 1943 stressed the acquisition of battle skills,

―necessary to inflict maximum losses upon the Germans, with minimum (American) losses.‖59

Personnel continued individual and crossover weapons training. All arms practiced: the

57 RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations, Headquarters, V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 3, Training Reports, 9 April 1943, 1. 58 RG 338, NARA II, Box 1, HQ 29th I.D., G-3 Report, 2 May 1943, 1, 2, 3. 59 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3893, Headquarters 29th Division, Standing Orders and Administration, Training and Supply Policies, 24 May 1943.

243 detection and removal of mines; proficient and aggressive day and night maneuvers; and patrol, reconnaissance, and security measures. Command and staff officers shared responsibilities for maintaining realism during training and for locating suitable training grounds. Training techniques were described as being based on the lessons learned from the North African campaign 60

Training literature provided to the 29th Division was eventually modified in an attempt to incorporate these combat lessons. ETO officials released a detailed critique of the Tunisian

Campaign in August, 1943 that sanctioned the U.S. Army‘s doctrine of fire and maneuver and declared that any, ―(f)ailures or tactical reverses…..(had) resulted from misapplication of (basic doctrinal principles prescribed in standard training literature,) or from a lack of judgment and flexibility in their applications, or from attempts to follow book rules rigidly without due consideration of their suitability to existing situations.‖ Command officers, not American doctrine, were blamed for combat setbacks in North Africa. The report euphemistically observed how, ―retrograde maneuvers,‖ were too often necessary because American leaders misunderstood tank destroyer doctrine and mishandled infantry, artillery, and tank formations.61

The segment highlighted the effectiveness of organic support weapons and noted how the use of smoke had taken on an, ―unexpected degree….of importance,‖ during attacks. Infantry formations were cautioned to embrace training methods stressing effective patrolling techniques, terrain appreciation, leaning into supporting artillery barrages, and the production of highly- specialized snipers. Infantry commanders were reminded to consolidate attack gains quickly in

60 Ibid. 61 RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations, Headquarters, Allied Force HQ, Training Memorandum No. 44, Lessons of the Tunisian Campaign commissioned by the command of General Eisenhower, 4 August 1943, 1, 2, 3.

244 preparation for enemy counterattacks supported by tanks and artillery and warned that American units in North Africa that failed to quickly dig in had paid a high price for their negligence.62

The analysis went on to observe how, ―(t)he leadership, tactics, and maneuver of the squad, platoon, and company (we)re vital to the success of combat operations,‖ and called for the development of junior officers able to cope with rapid battlefield changes while maintaining,

―uninterrupted control of all combat elements in action.‖63

The critique provided useful training suggestions despite misidentifying the grounds for combat setbacks in North Africa. It blamed commanding officers for adhering too closely to the book on one hand and not closely enough on the other. Moreover, the lessons learned during the

Tunisian Campaign provided impracticable solutions for combat in Northwest Europe. Desert warfare reinforced strongly-held American convictions regarding the feasibility of fire and maneuver. However, the terrain and nature of combat in France, Belgium, Holland, and

Germany would be unlike North Africa in all aspects and the doctrine of fire and maneuver often proved ineffective. The assessment also ignored the critical role of engineers, ordnance, logistics, and communications troops to a division‘s success in North Africa, which may have led

ETO officials to do likewise.

The bulk of 29th Division moved from Tidworth to the Cornwall-Devon region in late

May 1943, relieving British 55th Division upon its arrival. The exchange was codenamed

Exercise Hangover. V Corps and 29th Division officials were initially concerned about balancing anti-invasion duties and offensive training but were quickly reassured by British

Southern Command the invasion threat was minimal and to proceed with whatever form of

62 Ibid., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. 63 Ibid., 7.

245 training they desired.64 The 175th Regiment remained at Tidworth to act as a blocking force to

British armour in Exercise Columbus. The 175th performed satisfactorily during Columbus but nevertheless received reprimands from the exercise‘s chief umpire for poor patrolling methods and inadequate sharing of pertinent intelligence 65

Communications training carried out by the 29th Division during June, 1943 emphasized,

―installation, operation, protection and maintenance of prescribed communication facilities under combat conditions. Practical exercises, day and night, (were) conducted under simulated combat conditions. Special emphasis (was) placed on the use of both active and passive measures of protection for signal communication installations, equipment and personnel. Maintenance, especially first and second echelon, of signal equipment (was) stressed.‖66 Signalers were directed to maintain authorized signals procedures during training to establish proper habits for use in combat because the Germans, ―had long recognized the importance of intercepted enemy signal traffic as a source of information….(and had) developed elaborate and efficient intercept organizations to collect and analyze enemy radio and wire transmissions.‖67

29th Division signalers participated in a British communications scheme in August, 1943.

Exercise Hay tested communications efficiency at all levels of the division. A post-exercise summary observed, ―above average,‖ discipline, morale, and training in 29th Division signals

64 RG 338, NARA II, Box 7, V Corps, Notes on V Corps Visit to HQ Southern Command, 13 April 1943 and letter to Colonel Henion from HQ South Western District, 15 April 1943. 65 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D., Exercise Columbus, Report of Chief Umpire, 175th RCT to Director of Exercise, 7 June 1943, 1. British leaders did not heed Columbus‘ lessons during combat. The rehearsal illustrated the ease with which dug-in infantry equipped with well- camouflaged anti-tank weapons could withstand armoured thrusts as was the case during Operation Goodwood during which British armoured units suffered heavy losses. 66 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 59, Training Directive: 1 June – 31 August 1943, 2. 67 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ ETOUSA, Training Memorandum No. 18, Training for Staff and Communications Personnel, 29 June 1943.

246 formations and that, ―camouflage discipline was good..…Slit trenches were dug and…..(r)adio operators were well trained in security.‖ Conversely, wireless messages were often too long and wire laying parties too slow. In addition, 29th Division staff officers were singled out for particularly careless wireless procedures.68

29th Division training during the summer months of 1943 included aggressive platoon operations lasting a minimum of five days. Realism was stressed whenever possible. Soldiers ate the rations they carried. Platoon formations receiving covering fire from supporting arms were required in one exercise scenario to advance, ―through a defended zone at least 12 miles deep.….against five (represented or outlined) hostile positions.‖ Platoon officers later filed exercise summaries detailing lessons learned. It remains unclear whether any of these lessons were ever incorporated during subsequent 29th Division training.69

The division also continued weapons training, night patrolling, and practice in the use of compasses. Infantry units conducted, ―bayonet training, identification of enemy vehicles and aircraft, fire orders, fire discipline, fire control, decontamination of personnel, weapons, and vehicles, camouflage, and protection against air, tank, chemical, and paratrooper attacks.‖70

Formations carried out, ―speed marches across broken country, physical conditioning exercises

(including) log-rolling, rope climbing, cliff scaling, obstacle courses….and athletic games,‖ as a result of the War Department‘s increased emphasis on physical hardening .71

68 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3895, Memorandum 170, Headquarters 29th Infantry Division, 29 August 1943. 69 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 59, Training Directive: 1 June – 31 August 1943, 1. 70 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 59, Training Directive: 1 June – 31 August 1943, 1-2. 71 Ibid., 2.

247

The individual infantryman‘s ability to conduct rapid, long range advances on foot was an important corollary of the War Department‘s fire and maneuver doctrine. A 116th Regiment memorandum noted, ―(s)truggling on route marches endangers the very existence of a military unit. In training, it is a promise of what will happen in an actual combat zone, to which troops must walk and not ride. Unless straggling is promptly and severely dealt with, it becomes habitual and will destroy any unit‘s value to national defense.‖72

Consequently, army officials insisted forced marches become prominent features of a division‘s training syllabus. Commanding officers ensured their men attained the proper standard of fitness, ―through intensive physical conditioning to the point of exhaustion,‖ so that in combat they would be able to, ―take it and dish it out.‖ American leaders believed a tangible link existed between forced marching, discipline, and battlefield success. Endurance marching was viewed as a means of enhancing physical toughness, a prerequisite for combat success that no amount of theoretical instruction could provide. The training technique was also used to predict a soldier‘s ability to withstand the rigors of combat as units were instructed to separate from the army those who fell out during forced distance marches.73

A V Corps memorandum from early 1943 reminded units in Great Britain of the importance of endurance marching in the production of, ―foot troops capable of making forced marches in full field equipment to the area of battle and thereafter engaging in severe combat.74

Weekly 12-15 mile marches conducted in combination with, or as part of, field exercises were thereafter utilized to maintain a high standard of physical conditioning in the division. Speed

72 RG 407, NARA II, Box, 7536, 116th Regiment Memorandum, General Orders No. 12 dated 21 July 1942. 73 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3893, Headquarters 29th Division, Standing Orders and Administration, Training and Supply Policies, 24 May 1943. 74 RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, V Corps, V Corps Memorandum No. 11, Physical Condition of Troops by Marching, 15 April 1943, 1.

248 marches of up to four miles an hour for at least two hours were held on a monthly basis.

Beginning in May, 1943, battalions were ordered to conduct monthly tests in full combat pack.

March difficulties were ramped up over time - 25 miles in 24 hours, 40 miles in 24 hours, and eventually 25 miles in 12 hours.75

The 29th Division, for instance, carried out a 25-mile proficiency march in early 1943.

Only those cleared by medical authority were excused from the exercise. Inspection teams checked rosters to ensure absentees were noted for punishment. Participating soldiers, in full battle order, were accompanied by a testing board consisting of one medical officer and two line or staff officers. The testing board considered personal appearance, march discipline and step, alertness, maintenance of interval and distances, cadence, uniformity of dress, condition of weapons, and those failing to complete the march.76 March cadence was carefully monitored.

Army officials believed, ―(t)h(e) objectives (of marching) c(ould) be attained only by developing alertness and rhythm in the individual,‖ and considered cadence an important prerequisite to,

―bearing, precision in the execution of commands, smartness, and stamina in withstanding the exaction of long sustained ‗hikes.‘‖77

Battalions were pitted against one another during other marching proficiency tests to heighten competition.78 Once again inspection teams checked rosters to ensure full compliance.

Soldiers falling out were given medical attention before being forwarded to a designated central dispensary. There, an examining board consisting of four 29th Division medical officers

75 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7480, Secret Historical Diary of Division: 3 February 1941-30 January 1944, 10 May 1943. 76 Ibid., 12 February 1943. 77 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 20, Marching in Step, 7 December 1942. 78 Underline original. RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Test to Determine the Proficiency of Units of this Division in Executing a 25 Mile March, 12 February 1943, 1.

249 examined individuals unable to complete the march before rendering a, ―recommendation as to whether (t)he(y) should be retained in active field service (in the 29th Division) or be reclassified.‖79

The 29th Division spent more time distance marching during combat preparations than it did rehearsing amphibious assaults. Nevertheless, American soldiers in the ETO were destined to face few battlefield situations requiring distance marching. In fact, the Infantry Journal advocated on behalf of crisp, short hikes in place of long, grueling marches in May, 1943.80

Nevertheless, a 29th Division veteran having no use for marching early in the war eventually came to view endurance marching as, ―the best pre(-)combat ‗separator of the men from the boys,‘‖ and, ―training for which there (wa)s no substitute.‖81

There may have been faddist overtones to the U.S. Army‘s emphasis on endurance marching. Realizing it was a staple training method in the German and Japanese armies, War

Department officials increasingly associated the axis powers‘ startling early victories with the individual German and Japanese soldier‘s ability to endure long, forced marches.82 Moreover, distance marching represented an effective means of keeping young males engaged and out of trouble. As such, training administrators often utilized endurance marches to fill a unit‘s forty- four hour training weeks for years on end.

The division‘s support units continued their own preparations for combat, usually independently from the other combat arms. A typical bridging problem for the 121st Engineer

79 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Annex No. 2 to Training Circular No. 12, Procedure of Inspecting Teams, 12 February 1943. 80 No Author, ―Battle Facts For Your Outfit, Short, Fast Hikes,‖ 21. 81 Charles R. Cawthon, Other Clay: A Remembrance of the World War II Infantry (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1990), 6. 82 No Author, ―Battle Facts For Your Outfit, Short, Fast Hikes,‖ Infantry Journal 52, no. 5 (May, 1943): 21.

250

Battalion in July, 1943 involved an advance to a river by truck or on foot. The unit then established firm positions, reconnoitered both directions for bridges, and searched for potential

(bridging) sites if none were available. Unfortunately, the actual bridge building process was usually an assumed portion of an exercise.83

Organic ordnance personnel capable of fixing and maintaining essential equipment kept the 29th Division mobile and gave combat formations the opportunity to conduct fire and maneuver operations. Ordnance duties in a combat division were plentiful. Soldiers were categorized and trained by specialty. Mechanical specialists conducted wrecker and evacuation operations, inspections, operations, maintenance and repair, technical functions and nomenclature of internal combustion engines, electrical and cooling systems, chassis, brakes, power transmissions, and steering mechanisms for the 29th Division‘s wide array of vehicles.

Weapons ordnance troops were responsible for the inspection and maintenance of: small arms, artillery pieces, and sighting instruments in the division. Ammunition ordnance units transported, stored and issued grenades and pyrotechnics, bombs, explosives, as well as small arms, mortar and artillery ammunition.84

The U.S. Army divided maintenance duties into five echelons:

First Echelon: Servicing or repairs that c(ould) be done by an operator, driver, or crew. Second Echelon: Serving or maintenance that (wa)s beyond the scope of the operating personnel, but which c(ould) be done by the maintenance section of a unit that use(d) the equipment. Third Echelon: Maintenance, repairs and unit replacement beyond the scope of the troops using the material and equipment, which c(ould) be performed by mobile maintenance organizations. Fourth Echelon: General overhaul and reclamation of equipment, units and parts, involving the use of heavy tools and the services of general and technical mechanics.

83 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7515, Tactical Exercise, 121st Engineer Battalion dated 16 July 1943. 84 RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations, Headquarters, V Corps, Annex No. 4, Training Memorandum No. 9, Ordnance Training, 14 April 1943, 1, 2.

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Fifth Echelon: Maintenance of equipment by personnel of maintenance and supply units located at fixed installations in the rear areas….includ(ing) the reclamation or complete reconditioning of material, the limited manufacture of parts and equipment, and the supplying of equipment to lower echelons.85

Organic troops performed the first three categories while groups four and five were carried out by Corps or Army troops.86 Ordnance Department Publications and Service and

Ordnance School texts were utilized in coordination with training films and manufactures‘ manuals to standardize training and to ensure personnel and unit proficiency. Ordnance troops were cross-trained in specialties other than their own and were also expected to be capable of providing defense of division headquarter formations and adjacent units from enemy mechanized and airborne assaults.87

The division moved closer to its date with the enemy as the summer of 1943 turned to fall. Preparations grew increasingly complex but were far from perfect. Perhaps the most significant training transgression committed by ETO officials was failing to conduct any preparations for hedgerow warfare. A 29th Division veteran later recalled that the division, ―had no training in hedgerow fighting.‖88 Another 29th Division veteran of Normandy believed:

military intelligence and G-3 should have prepared (the division) better for the hedgerows of Normandy. We had no training on attacking a protected position every mile or so. We had to actually invent our own ordinance [sic.] and equipment to get armor through the hedgerows. We had to design our own tactics in Normandy. We took thousands of casualties too many because of the lack of intelligence and training on this single factor...... (Leaders) preened and postured for newspapers and gave themselves rugged nicknames like ‗Old Blood and Guts‘ and ‗Lightning Joe.‘ If the artillery hadn‘t got the proximity fuse and the Air Force finally placed actual pilots as Forward Air Controllers, we‘d still be there while (commanders) (would be) putting pins on maps and using terms like ‗steadfast‘ and ‗rugged‘ for the press. Aerial photos showed the

85 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3800, Definition of American Military Terms, n.d., 6. 86 Ibid. 87 RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations, Headquarters, V Corps, Annex No. 4, Training Memorandum No. 9, Ordnance Training, 14 April 1943, 1, 2. 88 USAMHI, WWII Survey, 6846.

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existence of those hedgerows with trees growing on them. They‘ve been there for centuries, yet we invaders heard nary a word about them in training for the invasion.‖89

The omission is mystifying and not easily explained. U.S. Army formations could have utilized areas of southern England containing hedgerow conditions similar to the terrain in

Normandy for hedgerow training. In the months leading up to the invasion Gerhardt mistakenly believed that hedgerows were, ―decidedly unfavorable to the defense unless properly used…….(and that) (i)t (wa)s much better to site foxholes in the center of fields or forward of the hedgerows.‖90 The 29th Division‘s commander failed to grasp that the Germans would use hedgerows to fashion devastatingly effective defensive positions. Gerhardt‘s opinions may have been indicative of a wider set of views held by ETO officials, partially explaining why no training in hedgerow warfare was conducted in Great Britain.

The dismal operational prospects of warfare in hedgerow country provide another explanation for the training omission. The entire foundation of U.S. Army doctrine, training, and organization was preventing stalemate warfare and the murderous casualty rates that went with it. ETO officials may not have been able to bring themselves to think about or train their army for combat conditions where fire and maneuver would be difficult, casualty rates high, and advances measured in feet rather than miles. Mirror-imaging then most likely led army leaders to the incorrect belief that the Germans would not vigorously contest the bocage. Whatever its cause, the training oversight cost the division hundreds of casualties.

Subtle shifts began to appear in the 29th Division‘s training program during the fall of

1943. Schemes increasingly emphasized, ―active defensive combat and defense against harassing action and raids.‖ Units also rehearsed detecting, neutralizing, removing, and laying

89 USAMHI, WWII Survey, 2531. 90 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, HQ, 29th I.D., Daily Orders No. 55, Training Deficiencies, 25 March, 1944, 1.

253 mines.91 The Artillery HQ Battery‘s history noted, ―(t)raining was really serious now, and we had begun to operate as an efficient unit on our problems.‖92 The division nevertheless remained far from combat ready and the relatively minor changes to training guidelines suggested the army was not overly serious about learning the lessons from North Africa.

91 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 59, Training Directive: 1 June – 31 August 1943, 1, 2. 92 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7511, quoted from, M-Day to VE-Day: The 29th Division Artillery Headquarters Battery History, 16.

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CHAPTER SEVEN SUPPLEMENTARY TRAINING

A great deal more than tactical and operational training went into preparing the 29th

Division for combat. Besides physical training, soldiers needed to be mentally prepared for battle. Methods of best doing so had to be decided upon. Leaders were also required to foster and maintain adequate levels of discipline, obedience, and morale during combat preparations.

The division‘s combat performance was directly affected by such activities, despite their largely behind-the-scenes nature.

War Department officials expended considerable effort pursuing the most suitable means of preparing American soldiers for the horrors of battle. Static warfare during World War I had generally allowed the gradual acclimatization of Allied soldiers to the grim realities of frontline service.1 Operational realities unfortunately precluded a similar approach during WWII.

British General Headquarters (GHQ) officials had sought to convert passive civilians into battlefield killers long before the issue became a concern for U.S. Army leaders.2 British leaders initially settled on a relatively sedate form of battle inoculation, ―to provide the soldier with experiences that would help him to face unmoved, the attack on his morale involved in battle.‖

Battle inoculation training was also established to, ―undermine the pacifist propaganda which had……exaggerated the horror and danger of war, until the individual ha(d) a false inner mental picture of it as an overwhelmingly terrifying thing to which the only logical attitude (wa)s to escape or extreme passivity.‖ Participants were initially exposed to battle sounds such as overhead rifle and machine gun fire, progressing in tempo and volume.3 Battle inoculation

1 See for example, Cochrane, The 29th Division in the Cotes de Meuse, October 1918, 4 2 Roughly the equivalent of the American War Department. 3 Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 235.

255 methods grew increasingly gory in nature as time went on. Students were shown films of

German atrocities, had ovine blood thrown at them during bayonet practice, and were taken through abattoirs.4 The debate over the merits of battle inoculation training became polarized as methodologies became increasingly gruesome.

American officials grew to appreciate British attempts at battle inoculation training after combat experience in North Africa illustrated the typical American combatant was also unprepared for the horrors of killed or be killed warfare. American leaders faced the same predicaments as their British allies: whether to conduct battle inoculation training and, if so, how to fashion hardened killers from peaceful citizens influenced by years of progressive education and a general societal conviction that war solved nothing.5

The Infantry Journal featured a running debate on the merits of battle inoculation in the

British Army, presumably to assist American leaders decide on its advantages as a training device.6 The first and second articles of the three-part series were composed by British authors.

The initial commentary lauded battle inoculation as a means of inculcating sufficient, ―bloody- mindedness,‖ necessary to convert the, ―typical peace-loving citizen into a fighting fury.‖7 The course‘s objective was, ―to make men fighting mad. And to keep them fighting mad…….Th(e) course train(ed) men in scientific killing….Some of the veneer of little niceties and gentle

4 Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army: 1940-1944 From Dunkirk to D- Day. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 57. 5 American leaders relied on British combat experiences during the battle inoculation debate as far back as the 1940 Battle for France. See, RG 337, NARA II, Box 71, Simulating Battlefield Noise in Troop Training, March 10, 1941. 6 The main British Battle School was located at Barnard Castle under the control of GHQ Home Force and was based on a divisional school originated by the commander of British 47th Division, Major-General John Edward Utterson-Kelso. The school‘s major tenets were, ―battle drill, vigorous practical physical action by all students,….live fire,‖ and ‗hate training.‘ See, Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 50, 51, 55, 57. 7 MacDonald Hastings, ―The British Army Hardens up for Battle,‖ Infantry Journal 51, no. 5 (November, 1942): 8.

256 tolerance so admirable in a law-abiding community ha(d) been stripped away from their consciousness. They‘re conditioned for victory.‖ The program consisted of rigorous physical training, cold water swims in full uniform, and live fire and movement exercises on specially designed target ranges. Instructors fired live ammunition near students as an added twist.

Students learned, ―what noisy fun it (wa)s to lob across a well-timed grenade,‖ how to,

―slap….down a dummy enemy soldier with a belly-shot from a pistol,‖ and were afforded the opportunity to, ―sharpen (their) appetite for blood in close-range combat with a fighting knife.‖

During a typical exercise the author enthusiastically noted:

(y)ou leap off a wall, land in a heap of brambles, and rush on farther. You stumble over hedges, crash into ditches, and tear your way over and through barbed wire. You‘re bleeding but you don‘t feel it. You‘re cursing but you don‘t know it. The instructor is still there bullying, cajoling, egging you on; but you‘ve forgotten he exists.

Graduates returned to their units in superb physical condition and were charged with passing on a similar degree of ‗fighting fury‘ to their comrades.8

A rebuttal article appeared in the Infantry Journal two months later, composed by a recent British graduate of the main Battle School course. Rigorous physical conditioning remained a mainstay of the course. Students traversed rough ground covered with brambles while being fired at with live ammunition. They were subjected to repeated cries of, ―Remember

Hong Kong, Remember Singapore, Get him before he gets you, It might be your sister. Guts.

Guts. Guts, On. On. On. Sweat saves blood. (and) Kill. Kill. Kill.‖ Many of the participants embraced the course‘s physical hardening component but spurned its ‗bloody-mindedness‘ element. The author reported, ―(t)here (wa)s a mental process at work in all of us, considering, selecting, rejecting, sometimes openly….more often quietly, reflectively, unbeknown.

8 Hastings, The British Army Hardens up for Battle, 8-16.

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We……rejected Hate.‖9 During his farewell address to course attendees, a general remarked,

―as for the blood and (h)ate I think you‘d better forget it.‖10 Hate training techniques were eventually halted in the British Army in May, 1942 following criticism from politicians, clergy, military psychiatrists, and a number of military officials including General Bernard

Montgomery.11

The third article in the three-part series added an American voice to the battle inoculation debate in the Infantry Journal. Colonel John Ayotte supported the adoption of battle inoculation training in the U.S. Army along British lines to condition unseasoned American citizen soldiers for the traumas of combat. Ayotte insisted army officials adopt ―training field situations and conditions closely similar to those of actual battles‖ as the best possible means of imparting, ―the big picture,‖ to unblooded soldiers.12 Ayotte maintained the army must be willing to accept training casualties as a necessary price of realistic training, remarking that, ―(t)ragedy and comedy walk hand in hand down the path of realism, but you cannot train men for battle without taking some risks.‖13

Ayotte nevertheless understood that battle inoculation represented a single facet of training and that, ―(a) man may be hardened by long marches, agile as an acrobat, adept at hand- to-hand fighting, skilled in shooting, conditioned to sudden and violent noise, and he may still be useless in a battle situation where intricate teamwork must function.‖14 Accordingly, Ayotte championed realistic battle inoculation training carried out in coordination with combined regimental combat teambuilding exercises. Ayotte contended live fire exercises between

9 No author, ‗Battle School,‖ Infantry Journal 52, no. 1 (January, 1943): 52. 10 Ibid., 53. 11 Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 57. 12 Colonel John U. Ayotte, ―Battle Training, Part I,‖ Infantry Journal 52, no.3 (March, 1943): 67. 13 Ibid., 65. 14 Ibid., 64.

258 infantry and artillery units would generate trust between the two combat arms and, ―(u)ntil this mutual confidence (wa)s established by operations (training,) all the talk and all the maneuvers in the world will not make a combat team.‖15

Whether by coincidence or as a result of the Infantry Journal debate, Gerow ordered the institution of battle inoculation training in the division within months of the release of the three articles. Gerow focused specifically on coordinated infantry/artillery training. Citing lessons from the Tunisian campaign indicating a general reluctance by infantry formations to follow closely behind rolling barrages, Gerow insisted his men ―must be taught to close in as far as possible before artillery fire (wa)s lifted for the assault.‖ Gerow termed an order in AR 775-10 prohibiting soldiers from encroaching within 600 yards of supporting artillery fire a, ―peacetime luxury,‖ that was to be ignored and called for units to stay within 300 yards of the barrage as prescribed by the Infantry School.16

The 29th Division‘s training experiences on the whole suggests American leaders mostly eschewed the bloody-mindedness training utilized by the British and relied instead on the ordinary G.I.‘s willingness to kill in battle without remorse. A greater degree of battle inoculation training, however, may have lowered physical and combat exhaustion casualty rates in the U.S. Army, especially if it had been provided to reinforcements.

The U.S. Army‘s exponential growth in Great Britain presented a host of other concerns for American officials in Washington and London. ETO officials were aware of the potential for cultural clashes between American soldiers and British civilians and military personnel. Major-

15 Such exercises provided artillery units the opportunity to fire in close support of infantry units and gave riflemen a chance to experience and practice advancing close behind a rolling barrage. The experience allowed both arms to gain confidence in the artillery‘s ability to shoot just beyond advancing infantry formations, and not short. See, Ibid., 68-69. 16 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, 29th I.D. memorandum to V Corps, Battlefield Inoculation of Infantry to Artillery Fire, 15 June 1943.

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General John C. H. Lee, commanding officer of the SOS forces in Great Britain, was instructed to incorporate measures that assisted newly-arrived soldiers acclimatize to unfamiliar surroundings. 29th Division soldiers were reminded they represented the U.S. Army during interactions with British civilians and that they were strangers to the general British population despite themselves being in a strange land.17 Anglo-American glossaries that translated terms like battledress tunic to uniform blouse and Warrant Officer 2 to First Sergeant were distributed throughout the 29th Division.18 American divisions landing in Great Britain were indoctrinated,

―at the earliest possible moment and in any event prior to the release of any…..personnel on pass furlough or leave….particularly to four subjects: (a) The lack of color-lines in the U.K., (b)

Security, (c) Furloughs, passes and leaves, (and) (d) The British and their habits.19

General Eisenhower called on American soldiers to appreciate the degree of suffering already endured by the British and to accept living conditions and cultural differences without excessive griping. To help offset substantial pay differences between American and British soldiers the newly-appointed Commanding General of ETOUSA also encouraged G.I.s to invest a substantial portion of their pay in war bonds or to send it home. Moreover, Eisenhower successfully campaigned for programs that acclimatized American soldiers to life in Great

Britain. The American Red Cross, for instance, instituted a nationwide program that billeted

17 RG 338, NARA II, Box 22, HQ, V Corps, Staff Memorandum 54, Annex No. 3, 23 June 1943, 1. 18 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3800, HQ, ETO, Anglo-American Glossary, Major P.C.R. St. Aubyn, British Liaison Officer. 19 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3800, HQ, ETO, Services of Supply Memorandum, Indoctrination of Personnel Arriving in the UK, 13 August 1943.

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American soldiers on leave in the private homes of British citizens.20 The 29th Division did its part by purchasing presents and holding Christmas parties for local children.21

Progressive U.S. Army leaders came to grasp the potential benefits of British combat experience and began to lean on their allies for training assistance. ETO officials urged 29th

Division leaders to learn British training techniques and to participate in joint maneuvers with neighboring British units because, ―(t)he better (American soldiers) kn(e)w the tactics and technique of (their) Allies the better (they) w(ou)l(d) fight.‖22

An exchange program between military forces of the two nations was quickly established, predominately to foster a mutual, ―understanding based on knowledge rather than snap judgments based on little or no accurate information.‖23 153 officers and 1,071 enlisted men from the 29th Division served as gunners and communications personnel aboard Royal Navy warships, many on operational voyages.24 More importantly, the program allowed units to discuss and exchange training philosophies and methods. British soldiers found the American system more flexible and better able to meet changing battlefield conditions than their own. An

American observer noted British soldiers, ―were very well trained in their particular line of work,‖ but would not, ―measure up to the degree of proficiency of the average American.‖ The same individual, ―felt that the British type of organization and set standard practice of doing

20 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3800, HQ, ETO, Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Major-General John C. H. Lee, HQ SOS, ETOUSA, 20 July 1942, 1, 2. 21 See for example, RG 407, NARA II, Box 7480, Secret Historical Diary of Division: 3 February 1941-30 January 1944, Various dates, December, 1942. 22 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3893, Headquarters 29th Division, Standing Orders and Administration, Training and Supply Policies, 24 May 1943. 23 RG 338, NARA II, Box 16, V Corps Memorandum, Anglo-American Relations – Inter- exchange of Personnel Groups, 22 January 1944. 24 RG 338, NARA II, Box 79, 29th I.D. HQ, Relations between British and U.S. Forces, 30 December 1943 and RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, V Corp Memorandum, Training Trips on British Warships, 14 June 1943.

261 things with little or no deviation would result in ….far less flexibility than provided by

(American) methods.‖25

A captain from the 227th Field Artillery Battalion noted, ―the policy of interexchange between British and American troops (went) a long ways towards establishing a closer relationship between the two nations that w(ould) not only achieve a quicker victory but also a more united peace.‖26 The exchange afforded a V Corps sergeant a, ―chance to see the British soldier as he really (wa)s. The better we kn(e)w each other, the better we (would) be able to cooperate in the field.‖ A 29th Division private learned, ―that our problems and those of the

British private (we)re just the same. I‘ve got a lot of respect for their soldiering abilities now that I‘ve worked with them. Their discipline (wa)s about the best I‘ve ever seen.‖ Hierarchical distinctions between the two societies were reflected by a comment noting how, ―stronger discipline and noticeable rank distinction (characteristic of British formations) did not appeal,‖ to the average G.I. Another private found the exchange to be, ―greatly illuminat(ing) and enlighten(ing,)‖ and that the, ―main…. ‗gripe‘ of the English soldier was the question of why

(American) pay should be so much greater than (what British troops received) and the embarrassment such a situation created socially, particularly in securing ‗dates.‘‖ Strict British rationing for such items as tools, gasoline, clothing and equipment surprised a newly-arrived G.I. accustomed to relatively extravagant American resources. The same infantryman also noted that the American GMC 2-1/2 ton truck outclassed the comparable British three ton transport, that

25 RG 338, NARA II, Box 16, V Corps Memorandum, Anglo-American Relations – Inter- exchange of Personnel Groups, 22 January 1944. 26 RG 338, NARA II, Box 16, 29th I.D., Memorandum, Interchange of British and American Personnel, 31 January 1944.

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Americans were provided with more comfortable clothing, but that British equipment, ―was felt to be better than (American equipment) and better cared for.‖27

29th Division medical units became thoroughly versed in the organization and operation of British Army Medical Detachments. Evacuation and hospitalization procedures were synchronized in the event American units were called upon to function under British control.

Medical technicians received British instruction for the decontamination and treatment of gas casualties, the use of plasma to treat shock patients, and passive defensive techniques

(camouflage, cover, and concealment) against enemy air and mechanized attacks.28

29th Division artillery units participated in an exchange program with British formations in late 1943. Codenamed Excelsior, the exercise provided units an opportunity to support British infantry formations. Exercise results were poor and possibly counterproductive. Disparate radio crystals led to communications issues. 29th Division units were assigned to an Army Group

Royal Artillery29 (AGRA) formation rather than to an infantry division. This resulted in the 29th

Division‘s artillery commander drawing the incorrect conclusion that, ―British (officials) appear to regard the several battalions of the Division Artillery as separate fire units, assign missions to them as such, and apparently do not understand the function of the Division Artillery

Headquarters and of the F(ire) D(irection) C(enter) of the battalion.‖30 The organization and tactics of British and American divisional artillery units were, in fact, remarkably similar during

27 RG 338, NARA II, Box 16, V Corps Memorandum, Anglo-American Relations – Inter- exchange of Personnel Groups, 22 January 1944. 28 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, HQ V Corps Memorandum No. 10, 20 January 1943, 1, 2. 29 Army Group Royal Artillery formations consisted of medium and heavy artillery units attached to corps and armies. Their roles were to conduct counterbattery fire and to increase the effectiveness of shoot concentrations. See, Maj. Gen. J.B. A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 72n82 and 325. 30 RG 338, NARA II, Box 84, V Corps, HQ 29th Division Artillery, Report on Excelsior exercise, 11 December 1943, 1.

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WWII. Nevertheless, Exercise Excelsior seemed to have convinced 29th Division leaders otherwise.

The division also took part in a personnel exchange with British 47th Division in January

1944. Groups consisting of ten men and an officer from each infantry regiment took turns learning British training methods. 47th Division was largely responsible for the rapid spread of

Battle Drill and Battle Drill Training in the British and Canadian Armies. Training for participating 29th Division soldiers, not surprisingly, consisted mainly of fieldcraft, battle drill for section, platoon and company, speed and route marches, and weapons training.31

American leaders relied heavily on British schools for specialized training, especially early in the U.S. Army‘s stay in Great Britain. Ten positions were made available to a British signals school for American students in late 1942. Courses ranged from a 3 week senior division officers‘ course that imparted, ―instruction, both theoretical and practical, in: Signal Organization and tactics; British signal equipment, its uses, limitations, and maintenance from a general aspect,‖ to 7 week wireless and line courses for NCO‘s.32 American engineers were granted unlimited access to the British School of Military Engineering at Ripon, Yorkshire. Courses included, ―field work, bridging, electrical and mechanical work, military duties, and bomb disposal.‖ Students were thoroughly briefed on the construction and operation of the British

Bailey Bridge. In a striking example of allied cooperation, American engineers were eventually taken on staff at the school as instructors.33 Moreover, 29th Division soldiers recommended for attendance were able to secure vacancies at one of 33 British and American specialty schools -

31 RG 338, NARA II, Box 16, Memorandum by 1st Lieutenant Edward McNabb to Headquarters 116th Regiment dated 20 January 1944. 32 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, ETOUSA, Training Memorandum No. 6, 9 November 1942, 2, 3. 33 Alfred M. Beck, Abe Bortz, Charles W. Lynch, Lida Mayo, and Ralph F. Weld, The U.S. Army in World War II, The Technical Services, The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1985), 40, 41.

264 some of whom were operated jointly - in December, 1943.34 29th Division officers attended

British intelligence, battle drill, and long and short combined operations courses in 1943. Lt.

Colonel Louis G. Smith, 115th Regiment, Major Harold A. Cassell, 116th Regiment, and Major

Charles R. Herbert, 175th Regiment, for instance, attended the British Combined Operations

Long Course at Combined Training Centre, Largs located west of Glasgow, Scotland on 27 July

1943.35 University College sponsored a short course for Canadian and American soldiers towards the end of 1943. The course featured lectures and open discussions on a wide range of subjects including, ―economics, history, the arts, science, (and) war-time and post-war problems.‖ Social and recreational sporting activities were included in the event‘s program to foster camaraderie.36

ETO officials soon realized the need for an officer candidate school and a distinctly

American specialist training school in Great Britain. The two entities, originally intended to have separate locations, were merged on 25 August 1942 to form the American School Center at

34 These were; aircraft recognition, anti-tank, mine and booby trap courses, British artillery, bailey bridge, bakers and cooks, British battle drill, bomb reconnaissance, camouflage for commanding officers, combined operations, discussion leaders, facio-maxillary, hygiene, company commanders, intelligence, medical field service, mess management (enlisted men and officers,) motor transport, neuropsychiatry, oxford university (broad course on governments, economics, history, social sciences, the arts, sciences, and post war reconstruction,) plaster techniques, ‗q‘ planning school (jointly operated by the two nations,) Royal Armoured Corps tactics, senior officers, shock and transfusion, signal, tank recognition, technical training for medical department enlisted men of field force units, tropical medicine and parasitology, war medical, and water safety training. See, RG 338, NARA II, Box 75, HQ V Corps, Annex No. 1 to Training Memorandum No. 11, American and British School, 15 December 1943, 1-3. 35 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, HQ V Corps, Status of Special Schools Being Attended by Units of V Corps memoranda, various dates in 1943 and 1944. 36 RG 338, NARA II, Box 75, HQ SOS ETO, Southampton University College Course, 15 November, 1943.

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Shrivenham, Berkshire. Colonel Walter Layman served as the center‘s inaugural commanding officer.37

The Specialist Wing ran courses in firefighting, motor transport, unit administration, basic and advanced radio operation, mess management for officers and enlisted men, chemical warfare, baking and cooking, field medical service, counter intelligence, the identification of enemy personnel and equipment, and preparing enlisted men to serve as non-commissioned officers. 448 V Corps students attended a series of chemical warfare classes. The 29th Division was allotted vacancies for six officers and twelve enlisted men at the school‘s Military

Intelligence Course No. 4 held from 19 July – 7 August 1943. Allocations were split amongst infantry regiments, and engineer, provisional ranger and artillery battalions. Attendees were forwarded after having been nominated by their commanding officers and sanctioned by division headquarters.38

The appointment of an officer candidate school outside the United States was a first in the history of the U.S. Army. The practical decision was based on transportation shortages, time delays shuttling candidates back and forth across the Atlantic Ocean, and the constant threat of

German submarines. The inaugural class held 84 candidates, 79 of whom received their commission. Three enlisted men were dropped at their own request and two were disqualified due to physical shortcomings. Of the 79 graduates, 40 had at minimum one year of university,

27 were high school graduates, and the remaining 12 had not completed high school. Three graduates were Marines and two were African American. With no reasons given the school was

37 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3784, Draft History of the American School Center, 1, 2, 3. 38 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3899, HQ, 29th I.D., Vacancies at the American School Center, 1 July 1943.

266 closed effective 3 December 1943 despite Lieutenant General Jacob Devers‘39 observation that graduates, ―could not have been better trained in any Officer Candidate School in the United

States.‖40

U.S. Army officials also decreased the number of specialist courses held at Shrivenham and by June, 1943 had shifted the school‘s primary focus to Civil Affairs. The requirement for specialist schooling in Great Britain was increasingly viewed as an indication of faulty training in the United States. Specialist training at Shrivenham was phased out altogether and the army‘s revised policy became one of maintaining that reinforcements were, ―properly trained before being shipped to (England.)‖ ETO officials wishing to illuminate training deficiencies were told to, ―prepare the basis of a letter to be sent to the United States (requesting) particular training peculiar to this theater, and should (otherwise) go on the basis that troops coming (to England)

(would be) properly trained.‖41 The school was renamed the Shrivenham American University late in the war and became a rehabilitation and transitioning center providing guidance so, ―(t)hat the American soldier might be better orientated to civilian life, that he might regain mental flexibility, (and) that he might obtain added training which would be of value in years to come.‖42

39 Jacob L. Devers was born in Pennsylvania on 8 September 1887. He received a Bachelor of Science degree from West Point in 1909, was a distinguished graduate of the Command and General Staff School in 1925 and a regular graduate of the Army War College in 1933. Devers served with the General Staff Corps beginning 13 August 1939 and was eventually promoted to Lieutenant General on 6 September 1942. Devers served as the commanding officer of the European Theater of Operations United States Army between May, 1943 and January, 1944. See, Official Army Register, 1944 40 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3784, Draft History of the American School Center, 1, 2, 3, 4. 41 It is doubtful many had the inclination to do so as revised instructions seemingly amounted to a veiled threat. See, RG 498, NARA II, Box 3784, Draft History of the American School Center, 1, 2, 3, 4. 42 RG 319, NARA II, Box 1, A History of Shrivenham American University, 1.

267

The actual combat benefits provided by assigning individual soldiers to British and

American specialist schools was limited because ETO officials never offered a clear strategy specifying who would attend or what their training role would be once they returned to their units. The decision to halt specialized training in Great Britain would therefore have been sound had it been based solely on the benefits provided to U.S. Army units training there. The decision reflects poorly on American leaders, however, because it was made on the perception that specialist schools in Great Britain signified faulty training in the United States.

The rise of ‗Battle Drill Training‘ and ‗battle drill‘ within Anglo/Canadian armies involved ETO officials in the philosophical debate whether to promote individual initiative or to impose top-down control during training.43 One particularly relevant document stated, ―(w)hile a…. ‗drill‘ is used in training for the purpose of teaching a technique, this technique should not be considered as a substitute for tactics. The company commander must make a tactical plan to

43 ‗Battle Drill Training‘ and ‗battle drill‘ are easily conflated yet each represented distinct training methodologies. ‗Battle Drill Training‘ encompassed a wide range of training activities that included ‗battle drill.‘ By itself ‗battle drill‘ involved rote practice of individual and subunit tactics on the parade square. ―‗Battle Drill,‘ according to the manual Fieldcraft and Battle Drill, means the reduction of military tactics to bare essentials which are taught to a platoon as a team drill, with clear explanations regarding the objects to be achieved, the principles involved and the individual task of each member of the team. ‗Battle Drill Training,‘ on the other hand, is more comprehensive. It consists of a high standard of weapon training, purposeful physical training, fieldcraft, battle drills proper, battle discipline and battle inoculation. Battle Drill training is founded upon the axiom that until every soldier looks on himself as a ruthless killer, using cover with the facility of an animal, using his weapons with the practiced ease of a professional hunter and covering the ground on the move with the agility of a deer- stalker, infantry battle training will be based on false foundations. Its object is, therefore, to inculcate into a body of fighting men a system of battle discipline and team spirit, and to give every man a working knowledge of certain basic "team plays" which will guide him in any operation he may undertake in battle. It has the further advantage of making the men physically fit, relieving boredom in training, and inoculating the soldier and his commander against the fear and noises of battle.‖ See, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History and Heritage, Historical Section, Army Headquarters Report No. 123 – Report on Battle Drill Training, 31 August 1944 http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/cmhqrd-drqgmc- eng.asp?txtType=2&RfId=123 (accessed 18 October 2012), Sections 1-5.

268 fit the situation which confronts him, employing the principles of the technique rather than the details of the drill.‖44 American officials, in other words, looked upon a drill as a means to an end rather than an end in itself and determined that rote drill would never provide a solution, for example, to a company commander required to, ―decide whether one pillbox must be assaulted before another, what routes of approach (we)re best, how many gaps (we)re to be made in the wire and minefields, whether two or more sections should be employed under a single commander in the assault of one pillbox, what missions should be assigned to sections which do not have pillboxes to engage, how many tanks should be employed on each pillbox, and similar questions.‖45 American leaders generally shied away from rote drills because the philosophy conflicted with individual initiative, a characteristic considered desirable by the U.S. Army.

Training that promoted individual initiative prompted one 29th Division veteran to recall in a postwar interview that, ―British individual soldier, squad (section,) and platoon training stifled individual initiative.‖46

29th Division officials also expended considerable time and effort building and maintaining order within the division. Military discipline is a vague and fascinating intangible that defies absolutism. Maintaining adequate levels of discipline is an essential foundation of any military entity. Military discipline in its negative form punishes individuals convicted of an offense. However, discipline can also be used positively to channel the will and dynamism of individual soldiers towards a greater collective purpose.

44 Underline original. RG 498, NARA II, Box 3895, HQ, ETOUSA, Assault Training Center, Training Memorandum ASLT-5, Tactics of an Assault Company, 18 October 1943, 1. 45 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3895, HQ, ETOUSA, Assault Training Center, Training Memorandum ASLT-5, Tactics of an Assault Company, 18 October 1943, 1. 46 USAMHI, WWII Survey, 8214.

269

The U.S. Army utilized a distinct form of discipline that reflected American values. The imposition of disciplinary action underwent numerous changes, growing increasingly severe as the war progressed. Moreover, available evidence indicates disciplinary measures in the U.S.

Army were often carried out in an overzealous fashion. In response, the 29th Division was advised to avoid general courts martial altogether unless the offence warranted dishonorable discharge and was reminded that, ―(d)isciplinary action should never be more severe than (wa)s necessary and commensurate to the degree of the offense.‖ Officers were directed to invoke,

―the least of the following five (5) forms of such action appropriate for the offense……(1)

Administrative (nonpunitive, corrective) measures, such as admonitions, reprimands, censures, rebukes, denial of pass privileges..…(2) Punishment under A(rticle of) W(ar) 104……(3)

Summary Court-Martial trial….(4) Special Court-Martial trial…..(and) (5) General Court-

Martial trial.‖ The accused were afforded rights depending on the severity of the indictment.

Formal investigations were only required, for example, in General Courts-Martial.47

The Adjutant General also urged restraint in the imposition of disciplinary measures:

General courts-martial frequently or usually are composed largely or wholly of officers having a limited background of military experience. Improper findings and sentences are the natural results in such cases, unless high commanders take positive steps to inculcate proper conceptions and standards of court-martial procedure as soon as the courts are convened. It is desirable, when practicable, that division and even higher commanders personally interview new courts-martial, interrogate the members, discuss principles, and review past errors on the part of courts-martial.48

47 Underline original. RG 338, NARA II, Box 24, HQ V Corps, Military Justice Administration, 29 February 1944, passim. 48 RG 337, NARA II, Box 179, WD Memorandum, 1943, located in folder titled, Military Justice Conference, Services of Supply, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Part I, March 8, 1943, 2.

270

Desertion rates and the number of general courts martial plummeted in the 29th Division following the release of the AG‘s punishment guidelines.49 Absentees were most likely charged with the lesser crime of being AWOL instead of desertion, a crime mandating a general court martial.

Units were also reminded to utilize the Table of Maximum Punishment as a guide to reduce sentencing vagaries. AWOL cases were not referred for general courts martial unless the offence was, ―aggravated, approache(d) desertion in seriousness, (or) warrant(ed) dishonorable discharge.‖ A charge of desertion during training was deemed ―a serious and cowardly offense,‖ warranting five to 10 years of confinement and dishonorable discharge. Conversely, desertion in battle potentially warranted the death penalty. Enlisted men disobeying or striking an officer could be sentenced to between five and ten years of confinement. Soldiers charged with sleeping on sentinel duty during training were no longer to be referred to a general court-martial, especially if they were very young. The same charge in battle, however, was punishable by between five and ten years of confinement, regardless of the individual‘s age. Officials were advised to impose sentences longer than the expected length of the war plus a one year demobilization period for crimes meriting a general court martial, otherwise sentences amounted to, ―immunity against risk of battle, and (wa)s to that extent reward instead of punishment.‖

Recidivists generally received severer penalties. Offenders were named and sentences were read at the first troop formation after the court-martial to bring home the seriousness with which the army deemed such violations to military justice.50

49 Desertion rates by month: 44 – July 1942; 113 – August 1942; 49 – September 1942; 5 – October 1942; 0 – January 1943. See, RG 337, NARA II, Box 179, AGF Desertions by Division (n.d.) and Memorandum to General Staff Corps, Report of Desertions – January 1 to 31, 1943, February 16, 1943, 1. 50 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3895, HQ 29th I.D., Memorandum No. 62, 25 March 1943, 1, 2.

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An ETO directive also warned against an, ―unnecessary resort to court-martial….(and) direct(ed) (the) use of (the) lowest possible C(ourt)-M(artial) capable of imposing suitable punishment.51 Commanding officers retained the right to suspend court-martial sentences in the

ETO. Soldiers receiving sentences that exceeded four months‘ duration were assigned to

American Disciplinary Training Centers. Only prisoners judged physically or mentally unfit for rehabilitation and those whose crimes were deemed so serious to warrant such action were returned to the United States to serve their sentence.52

Thousands of charges were leveled against 29th Division soldiers during training and combat in WWII. Indictments included desertion, wantonly discharging a firearm, AWOL, larceny, rape, sleeping on guard post, and willfully disobeying or striking an officer. Sentences rendered included forfeited pay, confinement - ranging from a day to twenty years with hard labor, - and dishonorable discharge. AWOL was the most common offence perpetrated by 29th

Division soldiers. Absentees were carried on the unit‘s duty roster for a year as AWOL and then transferred to the Adjutant General‘s Office in Washington, D.C.53

29th Division leaders were advised to impress upon subordinate commanders that, ―the prevention of (AWOL) and desertion (wa)s an attribute of a successful commander and that nonprevention [sic.] (wa)s a reflection upon leadership.‖ During personal addresses, company commanders reminded their formations of the seriousness of AWOL and desertion during a time of war and that punishment included a loss of citizenship rights.54

51 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3800, HQ ETOUSA, Theater Directives by the command of General Eisenhower, 16 February 1944, 8. 52 Ibid., 11. 53 RG 338, NARA II, Box 12, HQ ETOUSA, Absence Without Leave and Desertion, 15 October 1943. 54 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, HQ 29th I.D., September 3, 1942, 1.

272

Sentencing for these crimes varied despite calls for consistency from War Department and ETO officials. Civil convictions - rape, larceny, and manslaughter - engendered sentences far less severe than military transgressions such as desertion, AWOL, sleeping on sentinel duty, and willful disobedience of an officer. A 29th Division staff sergeant convicted of statutory rape was given only a year with no hard labor. A corporal from the 116th Infantry and a private from the 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion received just three years of confinement with hard labor after being convicted of manslaughter. Though it continued to be sporadic, sentencing grew increasingly harsh as combat approached.55

The increase in sentence severity appears to have coincided with Gerhardt‘s arrival. A

29th Division military justice summary for June 1943 revealed sentencing patterns prior to

Gerhardt‘s arrival. A soldier charged with being AWOL for a fourth time was confined at hard labor for five years and dishonorably discharged. A 115th Infantry private also deemed a habitual offender for multiple AWOL offences was granted only two months of confinement at hard labor and forfeiture of $40. His sentence was suspended after serving 23 days. The private, who was later killed in Normandy, went AWOL again within days. A 29th Division private went

AWOL for a second time on the morning of the trial for his first offence. When recaptured, the soldier was tried by a special court martial and sentenced to six months confinement at hard labor and forfeiture of $240. A Private First Class received ten years imprisonment with hard labor for disobeying an order and striking an officer.56

After Gerhardt‘s arrival, three privates received dishonorable discharges and five years confinement with hard labor, respectively, for wantonly discharging a firearm, sleeping on post,

55 See, RG 338, NARA II, Box 3895, Various 29th Division memoranda detailing sentencing to crimes in violation of U.S. Army Articles of War. 56 RG 338, NARA II, Box 12, HQ ETOUSA, HQ, 29th I.D., 22 June 1943.

273 and being AWOL for twenty-five days. In March, a private with three previous convictions was sentenced to five years in prison with hard labor for being AWOL for four days, while two other privates received twenty years for desertion. A private found guilty of being in violation of the

64th Article of War (Willful Disobedience Towards a Superior Officer) was dishonorably discharged and given five years confinement at hard labor. Another private who showed willful disobedience towards an officer and also struck an officer received ten years.57

The severity of disciplinary punishment was ratcheted up even further after the invasion of France. Two 29th Division privates received fifty years of confinement at hard labor for sleeping on guard duty and another with no previous convictions was sentenced to life in prison at hard labor for, ―running away before the enemy.‖ A private from the 29th Cavalry

Reconnaissance Troop received a dishonorable discharge and a life sentence for leaving his sentinel post before being properly relieved. Three privates of the 121st Engineer Combat

Battalion (all without a previous conviction) were sentenced to twenty to twenty-five years of confinement for leaving their posts for the purpose of, ―plundering and pillaging.‖58 High dishonorable discharge rates for crimes ranging from sleeping on sentinel duty to desertion helps to explain why the division was perpetually understrength during training and combat.

Another focus of combat preparations in the U.S. Army was building and then maintaining adequate levels of confidence and optimism within units. Soldiers destined to excel in combat required high morale during training and a mechanism that maintained that determination and spirit in combat.

57 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3895, Various 29th Division memoranda detailing sentencing to crimes in violation of U.S. Army Articles of War. 58 Ibid.

274

In both world wars the U.S. Army was largely composed of civilian soldiers unaccustomed to the rigid structure and discipline of military life. Most of these civilian-turned- soldiers were willing to suspend their democratic attitudes for the greater good of the nation and accept the impositions on individual freedoms posed by military service until the job was finished. The considerable length of time soldiers spent preparing for combat distinguished

World War II from previous conflicts, however, and it was perhaps inevitable that soldiers bored with training would begin displaying lax attitudes towards training and soldierly bearing. ETO officials considered these actions symptoms of low morale or indications of a lack of individual character and believed that soldiers exhibiting these characteristics were more likely fail in, ―the defense of (their) country and support of (their) comrades in battle.‖ Unit commanders were therefore instructed to implement immediate and harsh, ―on the spot,‖ measures to stem the tide of unsoldierly behavior.59

ETO officials otherwise attempted few comprehensive morale-enhancing measures for

American soldiers stationed in Great Britain and relied instead on harsh discipline and individual pride to maintain morale within units. Responsibility for the maintenance of morale was instead devolved to the division level where it was assumed that adequate discipline, interesting training, ample leave programs, and organized sports would suffice. 29th Division leaders were instructed to embrace training that fostered, ―teamwork and cooperation and prompt, cheerful execution of orders and instructions,‖ in order to build and maintain morale within the division.60

While the War Department did little to augment individual morale, its officials closely monitored Venereal Disease (VD) rates within the U.S. Army, considering them effective

59 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, HQ ETOUSA, Training Memorandum No. 9, Military Discipline, 1 December 1942, 1, 2. 60 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3893, Headquarters 29th Division, Standing Orders and Administration, Training and Supply Policies, 24 May 1943.

275 indicators of unit morale and discipline. Appreciating that the U.S. Army lost 6,804,818 man days and more than 10,000 soldiers to VD in WWI, American leaders sought to limit the transmission of sexual infections during the Second World War through a multi-echeloned effort.61

For example, the Venereal Disease Control Division was established in March 1942 as part of the Preventive Medicine Service in the AG‘s Office of the Surgeon General. The policy- making organization was subdivided into three branches – Preventive Measures, Civilian

Collaboration, and Education. Preventive Measures researched disease rates and prophylaxis effectiveness, Civilian Collaboration liaised with local civilian officials, while Education officers were, ―concerned (with) the study and development of various methods relating to the education of the soldier in venereal disease prevention and the preparation of material for this program.‖62

The U.S. Army established seven world-wide V.D. agencies to limit the spread of the disease.63 ETO medical officials dispatched the Senior Consultant in Dermatology, Donald M.

Pillsbury, MC, to North Africa in late 1943.64 Pillsbury travelled for months, observing and documenting methods of controlling and treating V.D. at bases across North Africa. His report to the Surgeon General, ETO called for, ―resolute and determined opposition to any policy that

61 Colonel John J. Deller, Jr., Dallas E. Smith, M.D., David T. English, and Edward G. Southwick, ―Chapter IX, Venereal Diseases,‖ in Internal Medicine in Vietnam, Volume II, General Medicine and Infectious Diseases, eds. Brigadier General Andre J. Ognibene and Colonel O‘Neill Barrett Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General and Center of Military History United States Army, 1982), 233. 62 Thomas H. Sternberg, M.D., Ernest B. Howard, M.D., Leonard A. Dewey, M.D., and Paul Padget, M.D., ―Chapter X, Venereal Diseases in U.S. Army Medical Department, Preventive Medicine,‖ in World War II: Vol. V Communicable Diseases Transmitted Through Contact or By Unknown Means, ed. E.C. Hoff (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, 1960), 150, 151. 63 The seven included: the Zone of the Interior, along with the ETO, Mediterranean, Alaskan, Southern Atlantic, Middle East, and Pacific theaters. See, Sternberg, M.D., Howard, M.D., Dewey, M.D., and Padget, M.D., Chapter X, Venereal Diseases, passim. 64 Treatment and control of VD was part of the Dermatology Medical Section in the ETO.

276 condones the operation of houses of prostitution under Army supervision or cooperation, direct or indirect,‖ and the establishment of unit Venereal Disease Control Officers (VDCOs).65

VDCOs were originally assigned to infantry and armored divisions beginning in February

1942, well before Pillsbury‘s appeal. Their duties included:

the prevention of venereal disease through a comprehensive educational program; adequate prophylaxis facilities - individual and dispensary; cooperation with civilian agencies in the elimination of civilian sources of infection; early detection, segregation, and adequate treatment of cases to break the chain of contact; the collection and the detailed analysis of data concerning the incidence of syphilis, gonorrhea, and other venereal diseases acquired by men in the units of the command; and continuous study of problems peculiar to the command with a view to recommending new measures. The venereal disease control officer was also instructed to reduce time lost per case through improvement of treatment methods.66

However, the army lacked sufficient medical officers versed in the treatment and prevention of V.D. to complete the assignment of Venereal Disease Control Officers to each division. The order was therefore rescinded in September, 1942 and responsibility for the prevention and treatment of V.D. were added to the regular duties of division medical officers.67

The unfortunate repeal due to manpower limitations likely hindered efforts aimed at limiting the spread of the disease.

ETO officials were well aware of the manpower dangers posed by VD and took proactive measures to curb infection rates. Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, for instance, issued a stern warning to U.S. Army units in the ETO:

In the face of impending battle, loss of manpower from venereal disease cannot be excused. Each soldier who contracts venereal disease betrays the United States

65 William S. Middleton, ―Chapter IV: European Theater of Operations,‖ in Medical Department United States Army in World War II, Internal Medicine in World War II. Vol. 1, Activities of Medical Consultants, ed. W. Paul Havens Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1962), 294. 66 Sternberg, M.D., Howard, M.D., Dewey, M.D., and Padget, M.D., Chapter X, Venereal Diseases, 153, 154. 67 Ibid., 154.

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Army……Each gap that is created in our military structure due to venereal disease is as severe a blow as a casualty resulting from enemy action……Contraction of venereal disease (VD) is considered evidence of improper indoctrination of the individual which is an indication of poor leadership on the part of the unit commander……Exposure to (VD) is a matter entirely within the discretion of the individual…..There is….no excuse, other than carelessness or unmitigated negligence, for the individual who becomes a casualty due to (VD). The responsibility for proper schooling in preventive measures lies with the unit commander; it is inalienable from command. It is essential that commanding officers devote their personal attention to the control of (VD.) Prevent it in every way! Positive results must be achieved. The percentage of physically fit soldiers in a command is strong evidence of the efficiency of the commanding officer…….Unit commanders will assure…..that adequate measures are taken for the detection of (VD) (and)…..will have personal knowledge of the (VD) rate in their command and will report these rates on the monthly sanitary report……No excuses will be rendered for failure to comply with the provisions of this letter.68

Specific 29th Division efforts included the establishment of twenty-four hour prophylactic stations at unit dispensaries and condom dispensing stations at division post exchanges and orderly rooms. Commanding officers, chaplains, and unit surgeons gave mandatory lectures and showed educational films on a monthly basis. Men embarking for leave received direct lectures from the officer issuing the pass. 29th Division soldiers contracting VD faced disciplinary measures and loss of pay. Those failing to immediately report the contraction of venereal disease faced a general court-martial.69

Preventative measures seemed to have worked very well in the 29th Division. The unit reported only nineteen confirmed cases of venereal disease on 12 February 1943. Twenty-two further cases were reported during the following week: 115th Inf. (5); 116th Inf. (5); 175th Inf.

(2); 110th F.A. (1); 111th F.A. (1); 224th F.A. (2); 227th F.A. (2); 121st Eng. (1); and Special

Troops (3.) Infection rates division-wide totaled 0.27% on 19 February. 29th Division rates were

68 RG 338, NARA II, Box 40, Control of Venereal Disease, 31 December 1944. 69 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3895, HQ 29th I.D., Venereal Disease Control, 26 February 1943, 2.

278 miniscule compared to ETO averages that hovered near 5% and to the wartime average U.S.

Army rate of 4.29%.70

The rationale for the imposition of disciplinary action and the maintenance of morale was to generate obedience. Armies are hierarchical structures that require obedience to exist. The corresponding relationship between issued orders and the measure of compliance reveals the degree of obedience within a military formation. Obedience in armed forces has been obtained either through coercion or by a mutual consent to subvert egalitarian principles for a greater good.

The scale of obedience in military formations tilts on the interplay between a desire for freedom of choice and action and hierarchical consent. Leonard V. Smith sought to explain the gray area between mutiny and obedience in the French Army during WWI through the esoteric concepts of individual agency and structure.71 Smith applied Michel Foucault‘s musings on the distinctions of power relations and physical domination to illustrate forms of resistance exhibited by French soldiers on the Western Front. According to Foucault, physical domination occurred

70 The army-wide rate doubled to a yearly average of 8.23% between 1946-1950 before increasing to 18.4% during and after the Korean Conflict. See Deller, Jr., Smith, M.D., English, and Southwick, ―Venereal Diseases,‖ 233. Air Corps rates were consistently the highest amongst the three army branches in the ETO followed closely by SOS formations. Army Ground Forces rates remained the lowest of the three branches. At 4.06%, Canadian Army rates in Great Britain during 1943 were virtually identical. See, Sternberg, M.D., Howard, M.D., Dewey, M.D., and Padget, M.D., Chapter X, Venereal Diseases, 256, C.P. Stacey and Barbara M. Wilson, The Half-Million: The Canadians in Britain, 1939-1946 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 150, RG 338, NARA II, Box 3895, HQ 29th I.D., Venereal Disease Control, 26 February 1943, 2 and Deller, Jr., Smith, M.D., English, and Southwick, ―Venereal Diseases,‖ 233. 71 Leonard V. Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division During World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.) Agency as a verb in this instance refers to an individual‘s capability of exercising freedom in actions and choices while structure signifies to factors limiting such abilities. Smith defines agency simply as resistance. See also Leonard V. Smith, The Embattled Self: French Soldiers’ Testimony of the Great War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 107, and Chris Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice (London: Sage, 2008), 448.

279 in situations, ―where determining factors saturate(d) the whole, (and where) there (wa)s no relationship of power; slavery (wa)s not a power relationship when man (wa)s in chains.‖

Conversely, power was exercised, ―only over free subjects, and only insofar as they (were) free.‖72 Physical domination could also represent soldiers serving a totalitarian authority while power relations exemplify democratic combatants in armies characterized by, ―(r)esistance (to authority when deemed applicable) …….. rather than outright domination.‖73

Smith concluded power relations in the French Army were manifested by, ―soldiers‘ behavior……not (necessarily being) a function of the wishes of those commanding them – at least not entirely,‖ and that a balance of power had been negotiated between the two protagonists on the basis of ‗proportionality.‘ Smith defined proportionality as, ―whether and under what circumstances (French soldiers) considered the levels of offensive violence expected of them relevant to the goal they shared with their commanders of winning the war.‖74

American soldiers fashioned individual and collective boundaries that balanced consent and obedience within the army. Consent may have borne a greater impact on the culture of obedience in the U.S. Army during WWII because coercion was reduced in comparison to previous conflicts. Adolescent influences such as society, family, and education also shaped how individual soldiers negotiated between consent and obedience. A postwar neuropsychiatric study concluded the G.I. in WWII fought, ―for his buddies and because his self-respect w(ou)l(d) not let him quit. (He) (wa)s willing to do what he consider(ed) ‗his share‘ but after that he s(aw) no reason to keep on.‖75 The culture of obedience in the U.S. Army, regardless of its origins,

72 Quoted in Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience, 15. 73 Ibid., 15. 74 Ibid., 17. 75 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Annex 19, Statement of Colonel John M.

280 motivated most soldiers to press on during horrifying battle conditions and prevented widespread disobedience.

ETO officials confronted training and battlefield proportionality long before Smith applied the phrase to military history. 29th Division commanders in England were informed there was, ―little use in expecting (the typical G.I.) to accomplish much,‖ during training and combat if he sensed justice was not being dealt out evenly.76 The accounts of an AEF battalion committed to a number of unsuccessful assaults were utilized to teach the 29th Division‘s command structure the concept of what Smith later termed proportionality. The beleaguered unit had carried out two fruitless attacks on a strongly defended enemy position, suffering heavy casualties both times. A flanking unit‘s commanding officer asked a sergeant from the twice thwarted formation whether they would succeed with their third attempt. The sergeant replied,

―no, the (men) will quit.‖ The dismayed colonel demanded an explanation. The sergeant responded, ―(t)his battalion has been in twice, they have suffered heavy casualties, they haven‘t had much sleep, food has been insufficient but the whole thing is; back (of the front lines) is a battalion that has not been in at all, and our battalion feels that that battalion should have been put in.‖ There had been no discussion of mutiny in the unit, only a collective sense that, ―they had stood all the losses they should stand compared with other units in that same organization, so they quit. They had lost confidence in the justice of their superiors, and having lost that confidence they were done.‖77

Caldwell, Chief of the Neuropsychiatric Consultants Division, The Surgeon General‘s Office, 26 August 1947, 3. 76 RG 338, NARA II, Box 65, HQ V Corps, Role of Commanders and Staff of a Wartime Division, 29 September 1942, 9-10. 77 Ibid.

281

29th Division leaders were also provided with helpful recommendations to foster successful power arrangements within the unit. Officers were coached to infuse a sense that the individual soldier‘s cause was just, that he was superior to his enemy, and that victory was not beyond his power to accomplish. Officers were also instructed to become ―the instinctive as well as the titular leader,‖ of their units and to instill confidence amongst their subordinates in their,

―judgment and skill……justness…..and unselfish interest in them.‖78 War Department officials exhibited tremendous foresight recognizing the existence of proportionality, that it was necessary to negotiate power arrangements during training, and the need to institute means that assisted leaders better prepare themselves and their units for combat.

29th Division officials possessed a limited amount of time to evolve the unit into an effective combat formation, though it might have seemed otherwise for soldiers bored after years of training. Much of that time was nevertheless lost on duties other than battle preparations.

Onerous administrative duties led field grade officers to become increasingly deskbound as the war progressed. Superfluous inspections and visits by distinguished guests also upset training schedules. The War Department realized anything that kept a unit from worthwhile training diminished its eventual combat ability.

Army officials responded with measures aimed at eliminating training hindrances for units preparing for combat. The War Department issued a memorandum condemning, ―(w)ritten directives, elaborate programs, progress reports, charts.….as unnecessary hampering to the officer conducting training, and indicative of a lack of vigorous personal supervision.‖79 General

McNair issued orders curtailing the number of staff and command officers detailed to, ―schools,

78 Ibid., 11-12. 79 RG 337, NARA II, Box 234, Unpublished Draft No. 10 - Principles and Methods of Training in Army Ground Forces, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 24.

282 demonstrations, maneuvers, training centers, and other units,‖ when official duties absented too many leaders from training responsibilities.80 Officers prone to demanding, ―show-down inspections……and similar unscheduled actives,‖ were notified that reviews should be carried out, ―expeditiously and unobtrusively,‖ and that, ―scheduled training was to continue as far as practicable.‖81 Nevertheless, AGF and ETO officials could not, or did not try to, limit the number of distinguished visitors frequenting units preparing for combat and the 29th Division lost many potential training days to button polishing and parade square rehearsal drills in preparation for the reception of official guests as a result.82

Radical changes in the unit‘s training schedule occurred during the late summer of 1943 marking the beginning of a new chapter in the 29th Division‘s continuing evolution. The men began, ―(l)anding operations, including practice in embarking and debarking from small boats

80 Ibid., 23. 81 Ibid. 82 In less than nine months the division received amongst others: His Highness, Jam Salib of Mawanger, 27 October 1942, Lt. General Eisenhower, 30 October 1942, First Lady, Mrs. Franklin Roosevelt, 31 October 1942, Lt. General Devers, Armored Force Chief, 20 January 1943, Lt. General Andrews 9 April 1943, Major General T.T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations in Washington, D.C, 19 April 1943, Bishop Adna Wright Leonard, Chairman of the General Commission of the U.S. Army and Navy Chaplains, 20 April 1943 (both of whom were later killed in an aircraft crash), Lt. General Lloyd (Southern Command, British), Major General Hartle, V Corps, 2 July 1943, Lt. Colonel Refsum and Lt. Col. Palmstrom, Norwegian Forces, 5 July 1943, Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, Major General Alexander Surles, Chief of Public Relations and Major General Gerow, V Corps, 21 July 1943, Lt. Colonel Mount and Brigadier Riddell of the War Office, 5 August 1943, Major General M.G. White, Chief of Personnel of the U.S. Army and Brigadier General Russell B. Reynolds, Chief of the Personnel Division, ASF and other aides, General Devers, Brigadier General G.A. Pawlett, 1st Canadian Division, Brigadier Generals Barr and Palmer, the Right Honourable, Sir James Grigg, Secretary of State for War (British), Lt. General Harold Lloyd, Brigadier General W.A.M. Stammell, Southern Command (British), Doctor Pugh, Director of Protestant Chaplains, all in August 1943. See, 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, History of the 29th Division, 1941-43 while training in U.S.A. and Great Britain and RG 407, NARA II, Box 7480, Secret Historical Diary of Division: 3 February 1941-30 January 1944, passim.

283

(us(ing) mock-ups) and movement from (the) beach to (the) first objective.‖83 The division would soon experience significant training and doctrinal modifications and even changes to its organizational structure, all of which culminated on Omaha Beach on the morning of 6 June

1944.

83 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 59, Training Directive: 1 June – 31 August 1943, 2.

284

CHAPTER EIGHT THE BEGINNING OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT TRAINING

In many respects the 29th Division was a sort of trial horse for (invasion) training methods. It carried out a rigorous training program, which included trying new assault methods, amphibious landings, testing new equipment such as amphibious tanks, and new techniques such as the waterproofing and swimming of vehicles.1

The onset of amphibious assault training marked a new phase of combat preparations for the U.S. Army in Great Britain. V Corps officials were notified on 12 September 1943 to begin preparing for the invasion of the European Continent. Gerhardt was informed of the 29th

Division‘s participation shortly thereafter.2 Documents explaining the division‘s choice as an amphibious assault force remain scarce. A 115th Regiment surgeon wrote confidently on the eve of the invasion: ―We have been chosen very carefully and found to be the best troops in the army today. This is no idle boast; it is fact.‖3 The actual reason may have been more pedestrian.

Planning for the invasion of France began in June, 1943 and with the 29th Division being the only American division in Great Britain between December, 1942 and July, 1943 the choice may have been one of necessity.4 Nevertheless, the 29th Division‘s inclusion indicated how far the unit had evolved from its February, 1941 incarnation as a rabble of poorly-trained, part-time soldiers.

The 29th Division‘s training agenda was fundamentally altered once the unit was chosen to participate in the invasion of France. Division officials received a ‗Special Training

Directive‘ from V Corps on 26 August 1943 that superseded all previous training memoranda,

1 Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May 1941- September 1944 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1953), 338. 2 Ewing, 29 Let’s Go, 26 and Balkoski, Beyond the Beachhead, 57. 3 Balkoski, Beyond the Beachhead, xv. 4 Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1994), 391 and Balkoski, Beyond the Beachhead, 57.

285 including the comprehensive TM No. 12 implemented only two weeks earlier that specified a continuation of routine training espousing discipline, leadership, physical endurance, and spirit.5

The revised directive called for intensive amphibious assault training to be carried out in conjunction with continued fundamental training. The directive contained distinct training instructions for infantry, artillery, engineer, medical, ordnance, reconnaissance, communications and chemical warfare units and required that the division be completely proficient in amphibious assaults by the end of 1943.6

Most of the division‘s amphibious training in Great Britain was carried out at the United

States Assault Training Center (USATC.) Located in the Woolacombe-Appledore region of

England, the USATC began training operations on 1 September 1943. The 30 square mile invasion proving ground on the Atlantic side of Devon was chosen by topographical and military experts as the closest possible approximation of the Normandy beaches. The relatively sparsely populated area provided 8,000 yards of flat beaches fronting the ocean and 4,000 yards of beaches on a sheltered estuary. Tides ranged from 25-27 feet and the surf was (incorrectly) considered stronger than those expected on the day of the invasion. 6,000 yards of depth behind the beaches was also acquired to provide an area for fire and maneuver. 7

The center provided American forces the opportunity to train, ―in landing assault operations under conditions similar to those (expected) of a cross-channel operation,‖ and allowed units the opportunity to, ―test and develop tactics and techniques with a view to

5 RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, V Corps, V Corps Memorandum No. 12, Training Directive for Units of V Corps, 1 September 31-December 1943, 1-3. 6 RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, V Corps, V Corps Memorandum, Special Training Directive, 29th I.D., 1 September 1943-31 December 1943, 26 August 1943, 1-4. 7 RG 338, NARA II, Box 10, V Corps, Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May – 23 June, 1943, USATC, Address on the Mission of the Assault Training Center by USATC Commander, Colonel P.W. Thompson, 24 May, 1943, 1-2.

286 determin(ing) those most applicable to an invasion.‖ The scope of training was very narrow, pertaining only to, ―landing assault operations and not broadly to amphibious operations as in the case of schools…...(and was) confined to what (could not) be advantageously carried on elsewhere.‖8 Even units with previous combat experience were required to attend due to the advanced nature and purpose of training provided at the USATC.9

Amphibious training was scheduled to proceed in four phases: (a) Individual and Boat

Team Training; (b) Company, Battery, and Similar Unit Training; (c) Battalion Landing Team and Separate unit Training; and (d) Battalion Landing Team Field Exercises. Amphibious doctrine and training instructions were provided by Field Manual 31-5, ‗Landing Operations on a

Hostile Shore,‘ War Department Training Circular No. 33, HQETOUSA document, ‗Attack on a

Fortified Beach,‘ and Amphibious Assault Training Doctrines composed by the Fifth Army

Invasion Training Center. Moreover, a 29th Division staff school offering instruction on the,

―principles and techniques involved in amphibious assaults,‖ was instituted. Officers and NCOs of the division were also able to attend a Combat Team and Separate Unit School for the, ―latest amphibious-assault practices and procedures.‖10

29th Division RCTs rotated through the USATC in four phases - 175th RCT: 20

September – 9 October 1943, 116th RCT: 11 - 31 October 1943, 115th RCT: 8 - 26 November

8 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3786, secret letter AG 322 MGC, HQ ETOUSA, Subject: Duties of Commandant, U.S. Assault Training Center dated 12 July 1943 Historical Division, ETOUSA, Training Mission of the U.S. Assault Training Center, ETOUSA, 12 January 1944, 1. 9 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3786, Historical Division, ETOUSA, Memorandum, U.S. Assault Training Center Trains American Troops for Specific Invasion Task. 10 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th ID, Training Circular No. 75, Amphibious – Assault Directive, 27 July 1943, 1, 2, 5.

287

1943, and the 116th for a second stint: 20– 29 March 1944.11 Elaborate training syllabi and schedules were developed for the division‘s individual components. Assault rifle and support companies; anti-tank, communications, ammunition and pioneer platoons; battalion medical detachments; regimental anti-tank and cannon companies; regimental communications, intelligence and reconnaissance platoons; regimental medical detachment; division engineer, artillery, tank destroyer and medical battalions; division signal, tank, chemical weapons support, quartermaster and ordnance companies; division reconnaissance troop; division communications platoon; and division anti-aircraft units were assigned distinct operational missions and training requirements.12

Training at the center was thorough in all aspects of an amphibious assault. Assault teams, gun crews, along with transport, engineer, and communications sections rehearsed embarking and debarking from LCVPs and LCM (3)s. Soldiers spent hours in the classroom learning subjects such as wire cutting techniques. Efficient traffic control was another important element of training at the USATC, practiced first on classroom sand tables and then on the center‘s beaches.13 Staff and command officers rotated through a series of lectures on the,

―principles and technique(s) involved in amphibious operations.‖ Officers were grouped into sections and were expected to, ―prepare and conduct at least one conference on the subject

11 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3918, Historical Division, Administrative Files, Manuscript History – United States Assault Training Center by T/5 Byron L. Thompson, History Affairs Section, Historical Section, September 1944, Appendix: Units Trained. 12 Ibid. 13 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, USATC Training Division: Traffic Control Memorandum, 11 September 1943; Embarkation Into and Debarkation from Landing Craft (LCVP and LCM (3)), 10 September 1943; and Instruction Guide – Wire Cutters Revised, 5 October 1943.

288 pertaining to th(eir) (occupation.)‖ Attendees returned to their units and imparted lessons learned at the USATC to subordinates.14

The USATC hosted a thirty day joint Anglo-American landing assault conference beginning on 24 May 1943. The multinational session was held to provide operational planners and combat leaders an opportunity to get their, ―teeth into all of the latest data on assault landings, the developments of assault doctrine and the most advanced training methods (so that when the invasion of the continent occurred they would have) properly trained troops – who kn(e)w what they are doing and where they (we)re going.‖15

Brigadier General Cota, then Chief of American Combined Operations in the ETO, took full advantage of the opportunity to air his personal opinions on the invasion. The 29th

Division‘s future assistant commander observed that the landings at Madagascar, Guadalcanal, and North Africa had been carried out against weakly defended beaches possessing no mobile reserve or substantial air threat and, as a result, did not resemble what assault forces destined for

Normandy would experience. Cota contended only the Dieppe Raid carried out by the 2nd

Canadian Infantry Division in August, 1942 approximated conditions the Americans would face at Omaha Beach.16

Moreover, Cota did not believe a, ―daylight assault c(ould) succeed.‖ He instead sensed a night landing would provide tactical surprise and cited British General Bernard Montgomery‘s assertion that tactical surprise should always be sought during operational planning. Cota also

14 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 75, Amphibious Assault Training, 27 July 1943, 5. 15 RG 338, NARA II, Box 10, V Corps, Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May – 23 June, 1943, USATC, Opening Address by Lt. General Jacob Devers, 24 May 1943, 1. 16 RG 338, NARA II, Box 10, V Corps, Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May – 23 June, 1943, USATC, Presentation on American Infantry in a Landing Assault by Brigadier General Norman D. Cota, Chief of American Combined Operations, 2 June 1943, 3, 4.

289 claimed a night assault would grant attacking forces the opportunity to move inland to a sufficient depth before daylight and to establish defensive positions capable of withstanding inevitable German counterattacks.17

Cota also campaigned for the invasion to take place on a broad front facilitating greater numbers of assault troops coming ashore at once. He called on American assault formations to conduct doctrinally sanctioned fire and maneuver tactics once ashore in search of enemy ‗soft spots,‘ and to utilize terrain advantages, ―to facilitate their advance and selection of firing position.‖18 Cota‘s maneuver scheme for assault formations consisted of, ―a frontal attack with an envelopment around a flank to secure vital terrain well within or even in rear of the organized positions.‖19

The commander of British Combined Operations, Major General J.C. Haydon, seconded

Cota‘s proposition for a night attack. Haydon also warned American leaders not to depend too heavily on air and navy close support for the amphibious assault‘s initial successes. Haydon realized, ―air (support) c(ould) not give prolonged help to the army by means of direct close support at the moment of the assault…….(and that) (t)he navy c(ould) not provide the intimate close support that the army need(ed) because it w(ou)l(d) be standing too far out to sea.‖

Conversely, Haydon did believe that air support, ―c(ould) deal…….with targets during the

17 RG 338, NARA II, Box 10, V Corps, Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May – 23 June, 1943, USATC, Presentation on American Infantry in a Landing Assault by Brigadier General Norman D. Cota, Chief of American Combined Operations, 2 June 1943, 7. 18 Underline original. RG 338, NARA II, Box 10, V Corps, Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May – 23 June, 1943, USATC, Presentation on American Infantry in a Landing Assault by Brigadier General Norman D. Cota, Chief of American Combined Operations, 2 June 1943, 1, 11. 19 RG 338, NARA II, Box 10, V Corps, Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May – 23 June, 1943, USATC, Presentation on American Infantry in a Landing Assault by Brigadier General Norman D. Cota, Chief of American Combined Operations, 2 June 1943, 3.

290 preparatory phase and with targets that lie inland or away from the landing places.‖20 Despite

Haydon‘s prophetic warnings, V Corps assault instructions as late as February 1944 noted, ―(t)he success of the initial assault will depend largely on the amount and accuracy of preliminary fires

(air and naval) and close support fires during the actual assault.‖21

Two conference presenters had intimate experience with the Dieppe Raid mentioned by

Cota. Commodore J. Hughes-Hallett (RN) was the Naval Force Commander at Dieppe and a principal organizer of the raid. Hughes-Hallett informed committee members that Operation

Jubilee had been intended as a small-scale try-out for the actual invasion of continental Europe and that the major lessons learned were the need for larger troop concentrations in the amphibious assault, for heavier air and naval support during all phases of the assault, for a flexible operational plan including large numbers of floating reserves, and for increased training of naval landing crews.22

2nd Canadian Infantry Division‘s commanding officer during the Dieppe Raid, Major

General Hamilton Roberts, reinforced most of Hughes-Hallett‘s recommendations. Roberts stressed the need for strong and flexible offshore reserves of, ―at least 50% of (the amphibious) force‖ to enable the attack to, ―feel (its) way in and exploit the soft spots.‖23 Roberts encouraged

20 Underline original. RG 338, NARA II, Box 10, V Corps, Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May – 23 June, 1943, USATC, British Combined Operation Address by Major General J.C. Haydon, 24 May 1943, 3, 4. 21 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5, Remarks of Colonel Talley, Deputy Chief of Staff for Planning, HQ V Corps, Agenda for HQ, V Corps, Conference, 4 February 1944, 4. 22 Hughes-Hallett would go on to become the first commander of Force ‗J,‘ the navy component charged with landing the 3rd Canadian Division on 6 June. The ‗J‘ was supposedly chosen from the ill-fated raid‘s codename, Operation Jubilee. See, RG 338, NARA II, Box 10, V Corps, Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May – 23 June, 1943, USATC, Presentation of The Dieppe Raid by Commodore J. Hughes-Hallett, Royal Navy, 26 May 1943, 1, 5. 23 338, NARA II, Box 10, V Corps, Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May – 23 June, 1943, USATC, Address by Major General Hamilton Roberts, Military Force Commander in Dieppe Operations, 7 June 1943, 4.

291 the use of large numbers of paratroopers, predicting the surprise and morale benefits of the move would outweigh the inevitable confusion resulting from scattered night-time drops.24 Roberts favored a frontal amphibious assault, qualifying that such an attack should only take place, ―if adequate and dominating close support c(ould) be given.‖ Roberts recalled that 4‖ naval fire support had been inadequate at Dieppe, and would not be, ―sufficiently heavy for (the actual assault) landing.‖ Roberts called instead for, ―something really big; more in the nature of a 12‖

(shell) so that when you hit a target something really big happen(ed.)‖25

ETOUSA officials coordinated with USATC staff to shape the organizational and operational methods utilized by American assault forces on the morning of 6 June 1944. ETO officials eventually adopted a radical 40-man infantry section proposed by the USATC as the basic assault formation for the coming invasion of France. The assault party was broken into nine sections with varying compositions – rifleman (5), light machine gun (4), heavy machine gun (6), 60-mm mortar (4), 81-mm mortar (6), wire cutting party (4), rocket party (4), flamethrower party (2), and the demolition party (5). Attack sections debarked from landing craft and assaulted fortified positions in highly-rehearsed formations. The team‘s configuration and tactics were based on the destruction of enemy strongpoints by the section‘s organic demolition party.26

The five riflemen from each boat section carried an M-1 rifle, 96 rounds of ammunition, fragmentary and smoke grenades, and marking tape. The No. 1 carried a grenade launcher and

24 By the time Roberts gave this presentation he had been relieved of his command, ostensibly as a result of his performance in Exercise Spartan but probably also as a result of the fallout from Dieppe. Upon his dismissal, Roberts was given command of a Canadian reinforcement unit in England. See, 338, NARA II, Box 10, V Corps, Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May – 23 June, 1943, USATC, Address by Major General Hamilton Roberts, Military Force Commander in Dieppe Operations, 7 June 1943, 8. 25 338, NARA II, Box 10, V Corps, Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May – 23 June, 1943, USATC, Address by Major General Hamilton Roberts, Military Force Commander in Dieppe Operations, 7 June 1943, 2. 26 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC Training Notes, Infantry Assault, 3

292 wire cutter, Nos. 2, 4 and 5 carried grapnels, and Nos. 2 and 3 carried Bangalore torpedoes.27

The five man rifle party received training, ―in the technique of their arms, especially in the use of smoke, rifle and hand grenades with the M-1 rifle….(and) in the tactical use of supporting fire to overcome enemy resistance in field fortifications.‖ Riflemen cleared and marked gaps through minefields, blew gaps in wire obstacles with bangelore torpedoes, furnished concealment by the use of smoke, and covered the movements of wire cutting parties.28 The section was warned against sudden movements:

The quick movement of a weapon, sudden jerk of an arm, the puff of a soldier‘s breath on a cold morning will catch the (enemy‘s) eye and focus observation on a position. Yet movement is necessary in combat in order that contact may be made with the enemy and to permit advance. Assault riflemen will be trained to develop self-control to such a degree that they make no unnecessary movement but yet to be trained to move rapidly and in such a manner as to attract the least attention and to present little or no target for hostile fire……Riflemen in the assault section must be trained in the general principle and mechanism of individual movement, i.e., running, creeping, crawling, collective use of cover, methods of advance, infiltration, covered approach, advance by rushes and side slipping.29

The four-man 60-mm mortar section was schooled, ―in the tactical disposition of their party in relation to the operations of the assault section,‖ and was thoroughly trained, ―to work together as a team…….to neutralize enemy open emplacements and entrenchments and to fire on enemy in case of counter attack.‖ Crew members were assigned a number and role. The No. 1 served as an observer and carried the mortar‘s sight, cleaning staff, binocular, compass, flashlight, 12 rounds of ammunition and a carbine. The No. 2 acted as gunner and carried the mortar, a pistol and three clips of ammunition. Nos. 3 and 4 served as assistant gunner and

27 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, Organization of Five Man Rifle Party of an Assault Section, USATC. 28 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC Training Notes, Section I, The Rifleman in an Assault of a Fortification, 1. 29 Ibid., 1, 2, 3.

293 ammunition carrier, respectively, each carrying twelve rounds of ammunition and a carbine into battle.30

ILLUSTRATION NO. 15 – Deployment of Boat Assault Section from LCVP

The 81-mm mortar section comprised six specialists, trained also as riflemen. The section‘s mission was to, ―support the support section by neutralizing known enemy open

30 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC Training Notes, Section III, The 60-MM Mortar Team in the Assault Section, Organization, Equipment and Mission, 1, 2. 31 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, HQ, USATC, ETOUSA, Embarkation into and Debarkation from Landing Craft (LCVP and LCM (3,)) Boat Team Formations, 10 September 1943.

294 emplacements and entrenchments, and to fire on the enemy concentrations for counterattack and to break up counterattacks.‖32 Also composed of six specialists, the heavy machine gun crew provided, ―close support to the (assault) section…..(by) neutraliz(ing) any enemy fire impeding the progress of the section. The targets……include(d) open emplacements and embrasures in fortifications. After reaching the first objective (the heavy machine gun team) w(as) called upon to form a defense against counterattack.‖33

The Light Machine Gun (LMG) team provided close support to the remainder of the assault section by neutralizing enemy impediments. The command structure of the four-man

LMG team was inverted. The crew‘s No. 1 was the gunner and assistant leader while the No. 2 served as the assistant gunner and ammunition carrier. The final two crewmembers were also ammunition carriers, though the crew‘s No. 4 was actually the team leader. Targets included,

―open emplacements and embrasures of fortifications.‖ Organizers were confident the weapons‘,

―‗stream‘ or ‗splash‘ w(ou)l(d) tend to have some effect,‖ on the occupants of enemy fortifications, ―even though fire (could not) enter the (embrasure) directly.‖34

Flame thrower parties consisted of a No. 1 who carried and operated the weapon and a

No. 2 who covered the No.1‘s advance and turned on the pressure and fuel release valves when called on to do so. The flame thrower party for obvious reasons was wisely instructed to seek

32 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC Training Notes, Section IIIa, The 81-mm Mortar Team in the Support Section, 1, 2. 33 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC Training Notes, Section IIa, The Heavy Machine Gun Team in the Support Section, 1, 2. 34 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC Training Notes, Section II, The Light Machine Gun Team in the Assault Section, 1, 2.

295 cover at all times. When called upon, the team moved within effective range of a pillbox embrasure and provided cover for other members of the assault section.35

The four-man Rocket Launching Party was divided into two-man teams, each possessing a bazooka and ten rounds of HE. The team was the fifth party to debark from the landing craft and was used to supplement rifle and machine gun fire on pillbox embrasures.36 Four-man wire cutting parties, ―pave(d) the way for the Flame Thrower and Demolition Parties.‖ The team was also divided into two, two-man sections and was trained, ―in the use of the Bangalore torpedo, in the use of chicken wire and body bridging, in tunneling, and in other methods of crossing obstacles.‖37

The five-man demolition party worked closely with rocket and flame thrower sections under the overall direction of the boat section leader. The demolition party‘s mission was to,

―effect the neutralization of the enemy pillbox or (fortification) by using demolition charges.‖

The demolition section received training in wall scaling, the use of explosives, and the techniques of the flame thrower. Along with a carbine, 60 rounds of ammunition, and three grenades (two fragmentary and one smoke,) team members carried one pole charge and one satchel charge each. Both charges contained roughly ten pounds of TNT and the only difference was the pole charge was affixed to a 2‖X2‖ by eight foot pole.38

In action, the section leader – a lieutenant – positioned and maneuvered the assault team, using full advantage of cratering from air and naval bombardments. The team leader located

35 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC Training Notes, Section VI, The Flame Thrower Party in an Assault of a Fortification, 1, 2. 36 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC Training Notes, Section V, The Rocket Launcher Party in an Assault of a Fortification, 1, 4. 37 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC Training Notes, Section IV, The Wire Cutting Party in the Assault of a Fortified Position, 1. 38 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC Training Notes, Section VII, The Demolition Party in an Assault of Fortification, 1, 2.

296 principal enemy fortifications, established contact with supporting tanks via visual signals, moved forward under cover provided by his riflemen, located blind areas in the enemy defenses, marked obstacles for destruction while simultaneously controlling his riflemen via oral and visual hand and arm signals. He directed positions for light machine gun crews well to the flank enabling them to provide cover fire. Meanwhile the mortar team, under orders from the assistant section leader, selected a position, ―from whence it c(ould) bring fire on possible targets with maximum protection.‖ Rocket launcher and flame thrower teams moved forward by short bounds under cover of machine guns and riflemen and engaged enemy strongpoints when in range. Demolition parties rushed forward and signaled when in position, ―‗I am ready‘ by arm and hand or other prearranged signal, whereupon the rocket (and flamethrower) fire (wa)s lifted.‖39 The first demolition man rushed forward, planted a charge, pulled the fuse lighters, and dodged to the nearest cover. The process was repeated until an opening had been forced, at which point, ―the occupants (would) be more fully liquidated.‖ Operational instructions euphemistically noted the original demolition man was to be, ―succeeded by other members of the demolition team ‗as needed.‘‖40

The proposed 40-man assault team was abruptly abandoned in favor of two distinct 30- men teams after it was agreed that initial assault waves would be carried ashore in LCVPs. The change was instituted because Higgins Boats, as LCVPs were also known, possessed a limited capacity of thirty fully equipped soldiers. Rifle companies were reshaped into 30-man ‗Assault sections.‘ Heavy weapons companies formed ‗Support Sections,‘ also thirty strong. The lightly

39 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC Training Notes, Infantry Assault, 3. 40 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC Training Notes, Section VII, The Demolition Party in an Assault of Fortification, 5.

297 equipped assault boat teams would carry out the initial landing while support sections were designated to land at H+30.41

Assault troops were assigned designated positions in the LCVP, ―in accordance with their specific mission and tactical disposition upon landing.‖ Assault unit commanders were instructed to divide their formations into assault and support sections and to practice embarkation and debarkation procedures until each man was thoroughly familiar with the revised organization:

THE ASSAULT SECTION (wa)s formed in two ranks. Starting from the right file in the front rank, the boat team form(ed) as follows: Number one man (wa)s the Section Leader, numbers two and three (we)re riflemen (or scouts), numbers four through seven (we)re the light Machine Gun Team. Numbers eight through eleven (we)re the 60 mm Mortar Teams. Numbers twelve and thirteen (we)re the flame throwers. Number fourteen (wa)s a demolition man and number fifteen (wa)s the assistant section leader…..In the rear rank, numbers one through three (we)re riflemen, number four through seven (we)re the wire cutters. Numbers eight through eleven (we)re the rocket party, numbers twelve through fifteen (we)re demolition men.

THE SUPPORT SECTION (wa)s organized somewhat differently than the assault section……The rocket party (wa)s……dropped from the Support Section. However this loss of 4 men was compensated for by the fact that the H(eavy) M(achine) G(un) crew and 81 mm mortar teams of the Support Section (we)re composed of 6 men each, as against 4 men in the Assault Section. (T)he boat team form(ed) as follows: Number one man (wa)s the Section Leader, numbers two and three (we)re riflemen. Numbers four through nine comprised the Heavy Machine Gun Team. Numbers ten and eleven (we)re the flame throwers, twelve through fourteen (we)re demolition men and number fifteen (wa)s the assistant section leader…….In the rear rank, numbers one through three (we)re riflemen. Numbers four through nine (we)re the 81 mm Mortar Team. Numbers ten through thirteen (we)re wire cutters and numbers fourteen and fifteen (we)re demolition men.42

The rationale for the exact positioning of the assault and support sections shown in

Illustration No. 16 was based on, ―(1) (p)rovision for rapid debarkation and for deployment on the beach in the desired formation…..(2) (d)istribution to keep the boat in trim……(3)

41 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, HQ USATC ETOUSA, Embarkation into and Debarkation from Landing Craft, 10 September 1943, 1. 42 Ibid., 1, 3.

298

(p)rovision for a suitable number of men to fire their weapons, both at planes and at beach targets

with the least danger to each other and with minimum change in position……..(and) (4)

(m)aximum protection for personnel.‖43

ILLUSTRATION NO. 16 - Positioning of Assault and Support Sections on LCVPs

44 The reorganization allowed, ―(o)ne complete assault section or one complete support

section to be transported in one LCVP. Each of these sections, consisting of one…….officer and

twenty-nine……enlisted men, in effect bec(a)me a boat team for landing operations. Thus the

integrity of this little fighting team (wa)s preserved throughout the training and throughout all

43 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, HQ USATC, Operations Division, Amphibious Training Section, Boat Diagram, 17 September 1943. 44 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, HQ, USATC, ETOUSA, Embarkation into and Debarkation from Landing Craft (LCVP and LCM (3,)) Boat Team Formations, 10 September 1943.

299 phases of an operation. It (wa)s clearly evident that the assault, (or support) section, the boat team and the basic fighting unit for this specific type of operation (we)re one and the same thing.‖45

ILLUSTRATION NO. 17 – Landing Chart: 116th RCT Sector

45 Ibid.

300

A medic was added to each boat section prior to June 6, bringing the complement of each to 30 enlisted men and one officer. The firepower of the thirty-one man team consisted of six pistols, eleven M-1 rifles, thirteen carbines, thirty-eight fragment and thirty-one smoke grenades, one grenade launcher, ten Bangalores, one .30 caliber light machine gun, one 60 mm mortar, two rocket launchers, five pole charges, five grapnels, and one flame thrower. The glaring absence of any Browning Automatic Rifles in the section organization was striking.47

The 116th's nine rifle companies were scheduled to land in three waves - Companies A

(Easy Green,) E (Dog Red,) F (Dog White,) and G (Dog Green) at H+1, Company B (Dog

Green) at H+30, and Companies C (Dog Green,) I (Dog Red,) K (Dog White,) and L (Easy

Green) at H +50.48 The assault organization developed by the USATC determined that only 120

(16.1%) members of the four rifle companies landing at H+1 were riflemen. The remaining

83.9% of the initial wave consisted of mortar men, demolitions experts, rocket sections, LMG crews, wire cutters, flame throwers, medics, and officers. The proportion remained constant for all nine of the 116th‘s rifle company‘s assault sections – of the 1674 soldiers landed on the morning of 6 June just 270 were riflemen. Moreover, according to landing plans, the initial wave was inexplicably forced to wait three-and-a-half long hours for the arrival of additional

46 Original diagram located in RG 407, NARA II, Box 19318. Reproduction above found at, War Department, Omaha Beachhead: American Forces in Action Series (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, 1945), 31 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-A-Omaha/USA-A- Omaha-2.html (accessed 31 May 2013). 47 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3894, Proposed Assault Section, Rifle Company (Assault) Battalion Landing Team. 48 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19318, Landing Diagram, Omaha Beach – Sector of the 116th RCT.

301 infantry support in the form of the 115th RCT.49 A fundamental shortage of riflemen therefore becomes an unavoidable explanation for the initial difficulties on Omaha Beach.

USATC staff also published an assortment of special amphibious assault guides for use at the training center and during subsidiary unit preparations. The manuals contained various training methodologies intended to generate a cohesive assault doctrine, ―for which history (had) give(n) no satisfactory precedent.‖50 A four-phase infantry tactical guide taught (1) rifle marksmanship, target designation and range estimation (2) combat intelligence and terrain appreciation (3) the use of hand and rifle grenades, and (4) individual movement on the battlefield. Each phase was broken into seven sub-categories; subject, location, uniform, training aides, objectives of the exercise, text references, plan of instruction, and procedures for doing so.

Special emphasis was placed on firing on targets of unknown ranges. Assault troops rehearsed deploying from landing craft, grapneling across open areas, marking and taping gaps, running, crawling, and creeping movements, techniques in infiltration and covered approaches, and advancing by rushes and sideslipping.51

Assault companies were to land on a hostile shore, assault and reduce enemy fortifications, pass inland, and aid in the defeat of enemy counter-attacks according to USATC doctrine. Specific training techniques were formulated enabling platoon and company commanders to first learn and then impart, ―proper methods of embarking in, debarking from, and wading ashore from Landing Craft; individual skill in use of assault weapons; coordination

49 The 115th Infantry was ordered to head for shore at 1000 hours on the morning of 6 June, while the 175th Infantry did not land until D+1. See, Balkoski, Beyond the Beachhead, 120, 142 and Ewing, 29th Let’s Go, 54, 62. 50 RG 338, NARA II, Box 10, V Corps, Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May – 23 June, 1943, USATC, The Chairman‘s Introduction, Lt. Colonel L.P. Chase, 24 May 1943, 1. 51 RG 338 Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical and Support Organizations, 29th Division Invasion Assault Training, NARA II, Box 3901, Instruction Guide – Riflemen, 8 October 1943, 4.

302 of weapons in the assault; use of local smoke, methods of passing minefields and booby traps, and methods of crossing wire; fire and movement teamwork by an Assault Section in the assault of a defended obstacle, to include the reduction of a pillbox; coordination with adjacent sections;

(means of) advancing under fire of supporting weapons; and (use of) coordinat(ing) movements with such fire.‖52

Assault formations received detailed lectures on German pillboxes at the USATC.

Subjects included wall and roof thickness, likely blind spots and location of ventilator shafts, typical underground connections and camouflage techniques, along with the intricacies of straight, step, and alternate step embrasures, sliding and hinged ports, and hinged and rear doors.

Assault troops were provided demonstrations and then firsthand training in the use of pole charges, machine guns, smoke grenades, and bazookas against mock pillboxes. Practice assaults constituted the final segment of training. Landing forces debarked simulated landing craft designated by tape on the sand and deployed for the pillbox assault. Upon a whistle signal, sections advanced by rushes through gaps imagined to have been blown through wire obstacles and concluded the rehearsal by successfully placing simulated charges.53

The operational mission assigned to organic engineer battalions at the USATC was,

―facilitat(ing) the advance of tanks and other combat vehicles from the waters-edge at such a rate as to insure continuous fire support for the assaulting infantry.‖ Engineer training at the USATC included, ―learn(ing) proper methods of entering and debarking from Landing Craft and wading

52 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3786, Historical Division, ETOUSA, Training Mission of the U.S. Assault Training Center, ETOUSA, 12 January 1944, 2. 53 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, USATC Training Division – Infantry Assault Section, Lesson Plans No. 2 and 3, Individual Assault – Demolition Party – Points of Attack of Pillbox and Individual Assault – Tactical Training of Parties.

303 ashore; and becom(ing) familiar with the types of enemy defenses anticipated, methods of breaching them, and the demolition supplies which may (have) be(en) used.‖54

USATC designed Training Memorandum No. ASLT-4 sought to improve cooperation between infantry assault formations and armored supporting units. The memorandum emphasized training that coordinated armored support fire with infantry assault tactics so that the two arms fought as a team.55 Tanks were to remain hull down once ashore, providing direct fire support over open sights. Tank commanders were reminded to avoid lateral movement once ashore because of the M4A4‘s weak side armor and because a tank‘s mobility of fire far exceeded its mechanical mobility. Planners adopted a worst case scenario and assumed wireless communications would fail during the invasion. Communications between assault troops and tankers would consist primarily of visual signals though the two arms netted radio sets prior to the assault. Radio communications were to be attempted if visual communications proved impossible. Infantry section leaders would use predetermined colored smoke or, ―any other suitable signal for the purpose,‖ to facilitate needed tank support. As part of one case study located in TM No. ASLT-4, infantry section leaders indicated, ―target designation…….using green smoke to attract the tanks attention and (then used) tracer ammunition to indicate the embrasure.‖ In another scenario an infantry assault leader personally directed tank fire by visual hand signals thus enabling his section to successfully assault and reduce the enemy position.

Tanks engaged targets of opportunity on their own initiative if all forms of communications failed, being careful to monitor the advancing infantry and to lift their fire accordingly. Intact

54 RG 338, NARA II, Box 16, V Corps, Training Mission of the U.S. Assault Training Center, ETOUSA, 12 January 1944, 5. 55 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, USATC, Training Memorandum No. ASLT-4, Coordination of Tanks and Assault Companies, Revised, 13 October 1943, 1.

304 tanks were to reform into companies and prepare to move inland upon the reduction of beach defenses.56

A special communications doctrine was also developed and tested at the USATC.

Communications during the amphibious assault were to:

be simple and extremely flexible. Parallel channels (were to have) exist(ed) between all echelons whenever possible and sufficient personnel and equipment (were to) be available to insure continuity of communications despite losses and (dispersion of units.) Communications units (were to) be kept married to their (original) organizations so that contact c(ould) be maintained under all conditions within the unit and to higher and lower echelons…..During (an) approach by sea, visual means and boat messenger service (we)re (to be) used….In (an amphibious assault) radio w(ou)l(d) be the primary means (of communicating,) supplemented by visual and flags and to some extent by pyrotechnics….On land wire should (have) be(en) installed as rapidly as possible in order to relieve radio channel and foot messenger of the burdens of traffic.57

Company level training was considered particularly important by USATC officials.

Company commanders received instruction in the issuance of effective verbal orders during amphibious assaults.58 USATC Training Memorandum No. ASLT-5 provided guidance to company commanders in assault tactics during amphibious landings. The guide offered lessons in determining enemy defense capabilities, formulating attack plans, disposing and coordinating infantry sections, establishing stable communications, and employing tanks and reserve troops efficiently. The eleven page memorandum also contained an attack rehearsal during which the full complement of an assault company, supported by two tank platoons and two chemical weapons sections, debarked simulated landing crafts, attacked and neutralized enemy positions, advanced inland five hundred yards, and established defensive positions. Company commanders were rated on the basis of memorandum guidelines in their use of support units, communication

56 Ibid., 1, 2. 57 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3895, HQ, ETOUSA, Assault Training Center, Training Notes, Communications in Assault Operations for a Regimental Combat Team, 9 September 1943, 1. 58 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, USATC, Training Schedule No. 1, Serial #110 – Verbal Orders of Commander of Company A, 1-2.

305 ability and issuance of orders, attack methods, provision of support to neighboring units, and reorganization techniques.59

The USATC began testing the effectiveness of firing field artillery pieces from LCTs in

September 1943. Results were generally positive and as late as May 1944 V Corps leadership expected and favored the inclusion of organic artillery as part of the overall fire support plan during the initial assault. Gerow told Omar Bradley on 9 May 1944 that he believed, ―the fire of self-propelled artillery during the approach to the assault (constituted) an essential part of the fire support plan, and count(ed) on its use.‖60

The eventual decision to forego the utilization of organic artillery during the run-in phase was likely a result of the 111th Battalion‘s howitzers being debarked in DUKWs. The inherent instability of these platforms prohibited the delivery of support fire during the amphibious portion of the assault. The unfortunate decision also instigated the, ―disaster of the 111th (Field

Artillery Battalion,)‖ on 6 June 1944. 61 In a post-Exercise Fox critique, Major Thornton L.

Mullins of the 111th F.A. Battalion - killed on the morning of 6 June - stated that DUKWs did not represent as, ―satisfactory….method of landing Art(iller)y as the LCT.‖62 Another 29th Division veteran remembered his unit‘s mission on 6 June, ―was to land in the Fifth Wave at about eight a.m., unload the guns from the DUKWs, set up and provide artillery support for the 116th

59 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3895, HQ, ETOUSA, Assault Training Center, Training Memorandum ASLT-5, Tactics of an Assault Company, 18 October 1943, i. 60 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19314, HQ V Corps, Letter to Lt. General Omar Bradley from Major General L.T. Gerow, 9 May 1944 and RG 498, NARA II, Box 3894, Artillery Section, Assault Training Center, Preliminary Report on Firing Artillery from Landing Craft, 29 September 1943, 1. 61 Ewing, 29th Let‘s Go, 51. 62 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, HQ 111th Field Artillery Battalion, Report of Operations During Exercise Fox, 13 March 1944, 1.

306

Infantry Regiment. The main problem we faced, was, we had never trained with Ducks63 and they were heavily overloaded.‖64 Nevertheless, the 111th Battalion‘s howitzers came ashore:

on 13 DUKWs, each carrying 14 men, 50 rounds of 105-mm ammunition, sandbags, and all essential equipment for set-up and maintenance. This load made the DUKWs hard to maneuver from the start, especially for inexperienced crews. Five DUKWs were swamped within half a mile after leaving the LCT's. Four more were lost while circling in the rendezvous area. One turned turtle as they started for the beach; another got within 500 yards of shore, stopped because of engine trouble, and was sunk by machine-gun bullets. The last two DUKWs went on and about 0900 were close enough to see that there was no place to land on the beach. When they drew together and stopped to talk things over, one was disabled by machine-gun fire and then set ablaze by an artillery hit. Eight men swam ashore or to another craft. The surviving DUKW had some near misses from artillery shells, turned away from the shore, and tried to find out from both shore and Navy where to go in. Shore gave contradictory advice; Navy had no ideas at all. The DUKW pulled alongside a rhino-ferry to wait, but in a short time the crew realized the craft was in a sinking condition. Determined to save the howitzer, two or three men stayed on. They managed to move the DUKW as far as another rhino with a crane aboard, and unloaded the howitzer on this craft. The one gun of the 111th got ashore that afternoon in charge of the 7th Field Artillery Battalion.65

American artillery units were therefore required to ferry howitzers ashore in unstable

DUKWs and unload and stabilize the piece before being able to provide much needed fire support. In contrast, Anglo-Canadian forces landed 240 American-built self-propelled field artillery pieces on 6 June. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division alone was scheduled to receive the fire support provided by 96 M-7 self-propelled vehicles equipped with 105-mm gun/howitzers,

90 of which survived the landing intact.66 Fewer than thirty Sherman tanks designated to support the 29th Division on 6 June survived the landings.67 The difference an additional 90 M-7 self-

63 ‗Duck‘ was a common nickname given to the DUKW. 64 USAMHI, WWII Survey No. 6815. 65 United States War Department Historical Division, Omaha Beachhead: 6 June-13 June. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1945), 80. 66 Mark Milner, ―No Ambush, No Defeat: The Advance of the Vanguard of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 7 June 1944,‖ in, Canada and the Second World War: Essays in Honour of Terry Copp, eds. Geoff Hayes, Mike Bechthold, and Matt Symes (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press, 2012), 338. 67 Balkoski, Beyond the Beachhead, 129.

307 propelled guns could have made at Omaha Beach that day is an interesting and tragic counterfactual question.

Hourly training schedules were developed for assault RCTs. Schedule charts were broken down by morning and afternoon activities on a weekly basis on one axis and by day of the week on the other. Training activities, locations and coded references guides were included.

Seven pedagogical techniques were utilized at the USATC: C – Conference, Cy – Convoy, D –

Demonstration, L – Lecture, O – Observation, P – Participation (or Practical Work,) and TW –

Tactical Walk.68 During the demonstration phase of mortar training, for instance, a party of trained mortar men demonstrated taking a mortar into and out of action while an instructor described each movement in detail to observing students. The class was then divided into crews and practiced taking their weapons in and out of action during the hands-on phase of training.69

Examples of exercise codes included: A-1 – Organization, A-3 – Demonstration of

Assault Section, A-4 through A-7 – Individual Assault, Technique and Tactical Employment of:

Flame Thrower, Demolition, Rocket, Rifle, Machine Gun and BAR, Mortar, and Wire Cutters,

A-8 through A-12 – Team Assault of a Pillbox, A-15 – Exercise Hedge-Hog, A-16 – Preparation for Exercise, A-17 – Tactical Landing Assault, A-21 – Critique and Cleanup after Exercise, W-1

– LCVP Demonstration and Lecture: Embarkation and Debarkation, W-2 through W-4 – LCVP

Landing: Practice Landings, and W-7 – Landing Exercise.70 During Lesson A-7, for example, assault troops received instructions in the, ―proper techniques of individual movement as applied

68 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3896, U.S. Assault Training Center, ETOUSA, Training Schedule No. 1, 11 September 1943. 69 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3895, USATC, Training Division – Infantry Assault Section, Lesson Plan – Individual Assault, No. 2, Serial A-3. 70 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3896, U.S. Assault Training Center, Infantry Training Program, Amphibious Training, Description of Training, 30 October 1943, 2, 3.

308 in assault operations.‖ Participants were provided a detailed explanation of what to expect during the training session during an opening conference, followed by a demonstration.71

Another example of training at the USATC witnessed wire cutting specialists spending the first two hours on their third day of training watching demonstrations on time fuses, detonator caps, fuse lighters, primacord, and crimping tools. Classes were then divided into groups of eight for fifty minutes of practical work in the construction of primers. Each man was provided a cap and told to cut a six inch length of fuse. Taking up the cap in his, ―left hand (if right handed,)‖ the student was instructed to, ―insert (the) fuse as far as it (would) slide…..easily.‖ He was then told to, ―(h)old (the) fuse in (his) left hand, (and to) use crimpers in (his) right….to crimp 1 inch of cap nearest (the) open end.‖ While continuing to hold the fuse and cap in his left hand, the student was instructed to, ―(t)ake up (the) fuse lighter….and slide

(the) lighter over (the) fuse as far as possible.‖ Students completed the exercise by detonating their hand-crafted primers.72

Wire cutters rehearsed placing and test firing Bangalores at the USATC and conducted tunneling exercises as well. Specialized training included instruction in conventional wire cutting techniques. Classes were divided into three man teams – the No. 1 was designated to cut through the wire obstacle while the two remaining members rolled the wire in opposite directions. Four man teams also practiced spreading chicken wire across in-depth wire obstacles.

The No. 1 stepped on the loose end of a roll of chicken wire and spread it across the wire obstacle. The remaining members sprinted across the barrier after the chicken wire touched

71 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, HQ, Assault Training Center, ETOUSA, Detailed Lesson Plan, Lesson Plan, No. 4, Code A-7, 25 September 1943, 4. 72 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901, Instruction Guide, Wire Cutters, Revised, United States Assault Training Center, ETOUSA, 8 October 1943, Lesson Plan – Making Primers.

309

down on the enemy side. Students were tested at the end of the program to ensure adequate wire

cutting proficiency had been attained.73

ILLUSTRATION NO. 18 - Master Training Schedule for 2/116th RCT at USATC, 6 October 1943

74 Exercise objectives and their administration grew increasingly complex as training at the

USATC continued. Infantry, engineer, artillery, tank, chemical warfare, and far-shore

73 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3901. Instruction Guide, Wire Cutters, Revised, United States Assault Training Center, ETOUSA, 8 October 1943, Lesson Plans – Methods of Wire Cutting, Use of Bridging, Tunneling, Drill Placing Bangalore, Firing of Bangalores and Review Examinations, 5. 74 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3896, U.S. Assault Training Center, 2nd Battalion, Master Training Schedule, 116th RCT, 29th Infantry Division, 6 October 1943.

310 detachments of the 2nd Battalion Combat Team, 115th Infantry conducted a sophisticated landing assault exercise at Woolcombe Beach in November 1943. The rehearsal was not a live fire exercise and enemy troops were simulated. Nevertheless, beach smoke and charges were employed and umpires judged the combat team‘s performance.75

Assault training at the USATC culminated with live fire ‗Hedge Hog Exercises.‘ These highly-realistic maneuvers provided reinforced infantry battalions an opportunity to rehearse the coordination of, ―air, indirect, direct and high angle fire weapons together with the special assault technique(s) taught (to) the infantry for an attack on a fortified area.‖ Combat teams comprised an infantry battalion of three rifle companies, one battalion of field artillery, two antitank platoons, one platoon of medium tanks, one platoon of tank destroyers, an infantry regimental cannon company, one platoon of Chemical Company, one flight of medium bombers and one or two flights of Air Support fighters (Spitfires and P-51 Mustangs.)76

Mock defensive installations included a, ―fortified area consist(ing) of eleven concrete pill-boxes, two of which…..(we)re (made) of reinforced steel and concrete construction, and a number of open emplacements, slit trenches, observation posts, and fox-holes. The entire area

(wa)s surrounded by bands of tactical double apron wire, ranging from two to six bands in depth.

There (we)re mine fields consisting of both A(nti)T(ank) and A(nti)P(ersonnel) (simulated) mines, and other types of tank traps and obstacles.‖77

The assault was preceded by a 25 minute aerial and artillery bombardment. Following the deployment of smoke, infantry assault companies, tanks, tank destroyers, cannon companies and anti-tank units organized for the attack. The massed fire component of the exercise provided

75 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3894, Training Schedule, USATC. 76 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3894, Orientation for Exercise Hedge Hog. 77 Ibid.

311 a degree of battle inoculation for participating soldiers, though it may have given them a false sense of security. Infantrymen infiltrated defensive obstacles under the cover of direct fire support weapons, which ceased firing only when assault troops approached to within two hundred yards of their objectives. At that point, assault formations advanced under the cover of their own weapons. Wire cutting crews breached wire obstacles and flame throwers provided cover. The exercise and another significant episode in the evolution of the 29th Division concluded when demolition men destroyed enemy pillboxes with simulated charges.78 Only a few months of training remained for the men of the 29th Division.

78 Ibid.

312

CHAPTER NINE FINAL PREPARATIONS

Invasion training abated the amount of regular training carried out in the 29th Division but did not stop it altogether. In fact, non-amphibious training still occupied a majority of the division‘s training schedule. Endurance marching continued as did proficiency testing and marksmanship practice. The 116th took part in combat firing and small arms exercises during

October 1943.1 The 1st Battalion of the 115th Regiment conducted platoon combat firing exercises. Engineer units built a battle inoculation course for divisional use.2 The 1st Battalion of the 175th Infantry performed combat proficiency tests while the regiment‘s 2nd and 3rd battalions took part in seven continuous days of amphibious training at Dartmouth beginning on

24 October. The 115th Regiment conducted bazooka firing and demolition training at Bodmin

Moor towards the end of the month while the 2nd Battalion of the 175th Infantry undertook sniper training.3 Units simply rotated between training modules under a complex division-wide training schedule.4

Beginning 5 December 1943 the 111th F.A. Battalion spent three days conducting field firing problems with the 2nd Battalion, 116th Infantry, followed by three days with the 3rd

Battalion, 116th Infantry. The 110th F.A. Battalion and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 115th

Regiment followed a similar pattern the following week. Sniper and booby trap schools were run in the 175th Regiment, along with standardized platoon combat tests. The remainder of the

1 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Headquarters V Corps, Selected Training Events of Interest dated 30 September 1943. 2 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Headquarters V Corps, Selected Training Events of Interest dated 7 and 14 October 1943. 3 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Headquarters V Corps, Selected Training Events of Interest dated 21 and 28 October 1943. 4 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Headquarters V Corps, Selected Training Events of Interest dated 4 and 11 November 1943.

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116th ran a series of decentralized platoon combat firing rehearsals.5 Individual battalions participated in, ―assembly, approach, attack, and defense,‖ problems on the moors of Devon during which the men were ordered, ―to follow close behind the artillery fires which were supporting them.‖ The exercises were largely supervised by the Brigadier General Norman D.

Cota.6 Other training highlights for the month of December 1943 included one period of three consecutive night exercises at the battalion level, battalion field and combat firing exercises, as well as airport defense and anti-paratrooper drills.7

Morale concerns resurfaced within the 29th Division in late 1943 when it became apparent the division would spend another winter training in Great Britain. 29th Division officials noted with concern that, ―(m)orale (wa)s not good…Too much training.‖8 Amphibious training had yet to begin in earnest and regular training had grown mundane. Many in the division had grown restless and were anxious to get the job done and return home. The primary result was a lowering of, ―the combat efficiency of (the 29th Division.)‖9

29th Division officials instituted a series of decentralized schemes in September to jumpstart training, to improve morale, and to preserve the division‘s fighting edge. Exercises that emphasized the principles of fire and maneuver were administered at platoon and company levels. The rehearsals were considered vitally important, ―in developing and maintaining the individual‘s skill in the employment of his weapon, in the performance of his duties as a member

5 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Headquarters V Corps, Selected Training Events of Interest dated 2 and 9 December 1943. 6 Ewing, 29 Let’s Go, 23 7 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Highlights of Training of V Corps Units for Month of December 1943, dated 22 November 1943. 8 Underline original. RG 407, NARA II, Box 7480, Brief History of 29th Infantry Division. 9 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3899, HQ, 29th I.D., Small Unit Combat Exercises, 15 September 1943.

314 of a crew served weapon, and in attaining a high degree of teamwork within the platoon and company under conditions approximating combat.‖10

The training schedule underwent another radical change in October, 1943. Division officials began teaching their soldiers why they should fight instead of just providing instructions on how to fight. Division education officers were designated to supervise training that mentally prepared troops for battle. The battle inoculation program was designed to inspire, ―(c)onfidence in command…..(p)ride in service and a sense of personal participation…..(k)nowledge of the causes and progress of the war…..(a) better understanding of (American) Allies..….(and) (a)n interest in current events and their relation to the war and the establishment of the peace.‖11

Company and battery commanders appointed Army Talks Officers to facilitate at least one hour of weekly discussions. Conversations were to be, ―thought-provoking and interesting.‖

Subjects open for dialogue included, problems of adjustment to army life, characteristic attitudes, ends and means of orientation, faith in cause, belief in mission, pride in outfit, satisfaction with job assignment, and belief in fairness of treatment. Army publications such as, ‗What the Soldier

Thinks,‘ The Battle is the Payoff,‘ and ‗Psychology for the Fighting Man‘ were circulated to anyone interested and were used to facilitate dialogue during the sessions.12 In the aftermath of each discussion, unit leaders submitted a summary including, ―subjects discussed, names of each discussion leader, and time of, place of, and attendance at each discussion.‖13

ETO officials utilized other methods to keep training fresh, interesting, and relevant. The

Infantry Journal served as a platform for dispersing lessons learned in the Tunisian Campaign to

10 Ibid. 11 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ, 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 106, Education in Military and Current Affairs, 12 October 1943. 12 RG 337, NARA II, Box 612, Army Orientation and Education, 3. 13 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ, 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 31, Army Talks, 25 March 1944.

315 the U.S. Army worldwide. A company commander with combat experience in North Africa was asked in a November 1943 issue what changes he would implement if he could retrain his men.

The officer declared he would have utilized the application method of training (similar to

Thorndike‘s connectionist theory) to a greater degree. During combat he found soldiers generally did what they had experienced during training and not what they were told to do at the time. He witnessed men break psychologically and run from cover during a tank attack, only to be cut down. During training they had been told to stay in their foxholes but had never been subjected to a tank running over their foxhole. If this had been experienced in training, those that ran may have remained under cover and lived. In addition, he would have placed greater emphasis on physical and mental toughness during training. A number of his men had been killed or wounded because they did not dig in every time their outfit halted. The company commander would also have kept classroom training to a minimum, noting his men responded much better to realistic outdoor training. The officer acknowledged the value of infantry training for artillery, engineer, and armored soldiers units but would have reversed the scenario and also familiarized riflemen with the specialized roles of support troops.14

A firm understanding of even the basics of military training remained elusive within the

29th Division as late as November, 1943. Training Circular No. 121 announced an unscheduled period of individual weapons firing drill after the division had been, ―justly……criticized by the

V Corps Commander and also by a divisional commander, who…..had combat experience in

World War One as a battalion commander and in World War Two as a division commander, for

14 Captain Clarence A. Heckethorn, ―Battle Facts for Your Outfit,‖ 11.

316 poor rifle marksmanship. The outstanding fault appear(ed) to (have) be(en) the lack of knowledge of basic fundamentals of rifle marksmanship……This situation (wa)s critical.15

Moreover, staff and command officers were required to attend a basic leadership refresher course in December 1943. Individual proficiency tests concluded the seminar.

Officers were graded on:

(a) preliminary rifle marksmanship…..(in the) (s)tanding position, including use of hasty sling, breathing, and trigger-squeeze….(p)rone position, (with the) use of the loop sling, and trigger-squeeze….(p)roper alignment of sights, (and) employing sighting disk…..(t)riangulation to include making a minimum of three triangles, each triangle to be no larger than that specified in the manual; (b) (Issuance of) Fire Orders (including)…(r)ange….(d)irection….type of target…(m)ethod of fire; (c) (Issuance of) Verbal field orders (including)…..(p)roper sequence of five paragraph field order (regarding) enemy information…..decision (what, where, when, how, why,) mission to each subordinate unit, administrative details, axis of communications, and C(ommand) P(ost)s…(a)ctual issuance of a verbal field (order in the paragraph form; that is, the information to come in the proper order but in conversational form.)16

Gerhardt ordered a subsequent round of comprehensive testing for the division‘s leadership cadre in early 1944. Officers were given a maximum of forty minutes and were not allowed to reference their field manuals. Questions included such practical subjects as the three basic qualities of soldiering, defining the importance of NCO‘s, the sequence of fire order for a rifle squad, the sequence of a five paragraph field order, first aid techniques, and such introspective questions as, ―Do I sometimes give orders and fail to follow through? Do I know by NAME and CHARACTER a maximum number of subordinates for whom I am responsible?

Do I delegate, supervise and check? Am I a constant example to my subordinates in character, dress, deportment and courtesy?‖17

15 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ, 29th Division, Training Circular No. 121, 26 November 1943. 16 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7480, Secret Historical Diary of Division: 3 February 1941-30 January 1944, 12 December 1943. 17 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3895, Memorandum No. 223, Headquarters 29th Infantry Division.

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Non-commissioned officers were also tested. Many of the questions - such as the three basic qualities of soldiering, the sequence of a fire order for a rifle squad and the sequence of a five paragraph field order - were the same as those asked of officers. NCOs were expected to be able to define triangulation, slack, and creep, to quote three of the General Orders, to indicate the four important facts about any tactical situation, to explain how to determine azimuth with a prismatic compass, and to be able to explain the commands, ‗by the right flank,‘ and ‗to rear, march.‘ Results were graded into five categories: 90-100% (superior,) 80-90% (excellent,) 75-

80% (satisfactory,) and <75% (unsatisfactory.) The commanding officer of a non-commissioned officer scoring below 75% was required to provide an explanation for the substandard test results and a course of action to correct the deficiency.18

Preparations, ―for the invasion of the European continent,‖ continued during the period 1

January - 31 March 1944.19 Signals units undertook a combined communications exercise in mid-January and heavy weapons schools were run to provide instruction to selected riflemen on the division‘s organic support weapons.20 29th Division soldiers were shown the importance of, and methods for the use of, reverse slope defenses in a two page training memorandum based on lessons from Italy. The memorandum observed, ―(u)nder certain conditions the location of the main defense battle position on the forward slope of a hill is more costly to the defender than to the attacker. In such cases the defender can still successfully defend the hill by proper use of the

18 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 1, Non-Commissioned Officers Examination, 6 January 1944, 1. 19 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7515, 29th Infantry Division, TC 127, Training Program 1 Jan – 31 March 1944 dated 18 January 1944. 20 Ibid., and RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Headquarters V Corps, Various Selected Training Events of Interest for month of January, 1944.

318 reverse slope …. as a shelter for troops, as a location for the main defensive positions, or as merely a field of fire for weapons located elsewhere.‖21

The 29th Division subsequently embarked on a series of large-scale amphibious assault exercises that began early in the New Year and continued into May. Gerhardt understood their importance and urged every member of the division to take them seriously. The division commander noted, ―the time for talking ha(d) passed and what we (did) (wa)s to try it out…..The only thing that (wa)s really of interest…..(wa)s what happen(ed) after we hit the beach. And everything that the (29th) Division d(id) in these exercises (wa)s predicated on that basis.‖22

The 29th Division participated in five large-scale amphibious rehearsals prior to the actual invasion. All five were carried out at Slapton Sands, not at the USATC. The Slapton Sands rehearsal area was situated on the southern coast of England, east and slightly south of Plymouth.

The location was chosen because the beach topography and the tidal flats beyond resembled landing areas in Normandy. The similarities end there, however, as the inland terrain at Slapton

Sands was nothing like the ground behind Omaha Beach. Where there were gently undulating hills, arable farmland, and ubiquitous hedgerows in Normandy, the inland landscape at Slapton

Sands contained, ―steep ridges with flat, open tops surrounded by narrow valleys. There was very little cultivated land, mostly unbroken pasture with the soil being a non-elastic clay underplayed at two feet with a layer of shale.‖23 As a result, units were excluded the opportunity of conducting inland attack rehearsals because of the terrain differences. Cota acknowledged the

21 RG 338, NARA II, Box 17, Training Memorandum extract from Fifth Army in Italy titled, Principles of Reverse Slopes in the Defense, 21 January 1944. 22 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D., Document No. 44, Headquarter V Corps, Critique of Exercise Duck. Comments by Major General Gerhardt, 28 January 1944, 11, 12. 23 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5, V Corps, Tactical Terrain Study of Salcombe, Slapton Sands, Dartmouth Area, Exercise Fox, 14 February 1944, 1.

319 location posed certain difficulties but optimistically noted, ―the people felt that if we can overcome these (issues,) we can overcome anything.‖24

The first large-scale rehearsal for the 29th Division was Exercise Duck, scheduled for

January, 1944. Officials gathered at XIX District HQ on 24 November 1943 to initiate planning for Duck. A consensus was reached to hold the exercise during daylight hours for safety reasons despite an assumption the actual invasion would take place at night. Shortages of landing craft limited the number of RCTs able to participate in the exercise to one.25

Duck was held to shake the American Army in Britain out of the planning stages it, ―had been for such a long time.‖ ETO officials expected errors but believed the exercise would be a success if assault units, ―bec(a)me aware of the major deficiencies in training and correct(ed) them.26 The 175th RCT represented the 29th Division in Exercise Duck while the other RCTs continued regular training. Exercise instructions called for the 175th to land two battalions up on

Red and White Beaches at Slapton Sands while maintaining its third in reserve. The attack would go in supported by naval and air force bombardments. Assault battalions were ordered to seize a beachhead and form a solid left shoulder before allowing the reserve battalion to pass through to capture a foot bridge and secure a safe landing environment for the remaining imaginary RCTs.27

Duck allowed SOS and combat arm formations and navy units an unprecedented chance to work with each other. Specifically, it afforded, ―the 29th Infantry Division and attached

24 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D., Notes on Critique of Exercise Duck, 10. 25 RG 338, NARA II, Box 79. HQ V Corps, Instructions to Umpires, Exercise Duck, 19 December 1943, 1 26 RG 338, NARA II, Box 6, V Corps, HQ V Corps, Critique of Exercise Duck, 12 January 1944, 9. 27 Landings on a Green beach, Blackpool, by the other RCTs were assumed. See, RG 338, NARA II, Box 6, V Corps, HQ V Corps, Critique of Exercise Duck, 12 January 1944, 9.

320 troops, and certain Corps troops, an opportunity to train units and staffs in embarkation, landing on an assumed hostile shore, and in seizing and holding a beach head to cover the landing of follow-up forces…(though it was) not intended as a proficiency test.‖28 Exercise Duck afforded

29th Division supply units the opportunity to rehearse, ―various phases of concentration, assembly and embarkation…….(and) the unloading of supplies and the operation of facilities on the (enemy‘s) shore.‖29 Communications units conducted cryptanalysis and deception transmission measures and rehearsed countermeasures to German jamming techniques. Strict radio silence was in effect during the early stages of the exercise as would be the case on 6 June.

Probationary strategies were auditioned for use when radio silence was eventually broken during the actual invasion.30

29th Division staff officers were responsible for determining the scale of personnel and equipment necessary to achieve exercise objectives. SOS troops were in charge of, ―planning and constructing housekeeping installations, assembling troops and supplies, marrying the auxiliary units to their respective combat teams, processing troops through the marshaling areas, moving them to the embarkation points, loading the landing craft, loading and dispatching coasters, and transporting and feeding troops on their return to their home stations.‖ 26,400 troops were eventually marshaled during Duck’s mounting stages.31

28 RG 338, NARA II, Box 79. HQ V Corps, Instructions to Umpires, Exercise Duck, 19 December 1943, 1. 29 RG 338, NARA II, Box 16, Memorandum to Base Section Commanders from Headquarter, Service of Supply, European Theater of Operations titled, SOS Participation in Exercise Duck, dated 9 February 1944. 30 RG 338, NARA II, Box 1, V Corps, HQ, 29th I.D, Communications Plan, Intelligence Annex No. 7, 21 December 1943, 1-3. 31 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I, 346.

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Navy personnel were charged with housing and feeding 29th Division troops during the transportation phase of Exercise Duck.32 Exercise directives noted the importance of efficient loading and embarkation procedures, stating, ―(i)f there (wa)s one single factor in (WWII) which

(wa)s more important than any other – that factor (wa)s shipping. The only method of carrying vast quantities of men and stores (wa)s by ship. Equipment, supplies, etc. (we)re of no use unless they c(ould) be taken to the places where they (we)re needed and when they (we)re needed.‖33

Special Engineer Brigade troops were responsible for clearing an eighteen foot wide exit from the beachhead, breaching a concrete barrier with dynamite, and erecting a Model 1938 footbridge over a water obstacle during the rehearsal.34 The mission of the division‘s organic engineer units during Exercise Duck was to, ―assist……in the assault……and the forward movement of the (175th) RCT to capture the Div(ision) beachhead.‖ In order of priority, the engineers were responsible for the:

(r)emoval or passage of artificial obstacles on the beach, including A.P. Mines, Booby Traps, A.T. Mines, wire entanglements, portable or permanent concrete A.T. obstacles,..….tubular steel scaffolding to provide an 18 foot lane from water‘s edge to beach exits…… (r)emoval or passage of artificial obstacles in beach exits….(a)ssist(ing) forward movement of rear elements of assault units and the support and reserve units of one assault b(attalio)n over the water course….(m)arking at least one clear lane on each beach…..(i)nitially assist(ing) in landing and movement of vehicle(s) of the div(ision) across (the) beaches until operation of the beaches is taken over by units of the 1st Eng(inee)r Sp(ecial) Brig(ade)……(c)lear(ing) obstacles from roads, leading from beach exits to intermediate objectives….(a)ssist(ing) in the defense of the beachhead against early counterattack by the enemy….(a)ssist(ing) in the forward movement of the div(ision)….(p)rovid(ing) a suitable vehicle crossing over the water course…(m)aintain(ing) roads in div(ision) area……(e)stablish(ing) water supply for

32 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D., Memorandum to Chief of Staff, 29th I.D., Briefing of Remarks of Officers at Bodmin on 8 January 1944, 1. 33 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ, 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 97, Loading and Embarkation, 18 September 1943, 1. 34 RG 338, NARA II, Box 1, V Corps, HQ, 29th I.D, Engineer Plan, Intelligence Annex No. 6, 21 December 1943, 1.

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div(ision)…..(and) (a)ssist(ing) in the defence of the div(ision) beachhead line to cover landings of follow-up troops.35

The first wave of 29th Division engineers carried ashore 6 mine detectors, 90 bangelore torpedoes, and 3120 pounds of TNT during Exercise Duck. Follow-up troops brought ashore further material and practiced bridge building and water purification operations in coordination with the first wave. Exercise instructions called for engineer companies allocated to specific

RCT‘s to revert to division command once a beachhead had been established.36

The results of Exercise Duck were poor. The rehearsal exhibited operational and administrative faults as it was intended, though more than expected.37 Gerhardt ordered exercise critiques all the way down to the platoon level as a result, including medical, supply, military police, and religious services. The sheer volume of paperwork generated was impressive, but was useless unless the 29th Division developed and institutionalized solutions to the errors exhibited during Exercise Duck.

Colonel Karl E. Henion, V Corps‘ Assistant Chief of Staff, acted as the chief umpire during Duck. Henion reported that exercise commanders had failed to reinforce success during the amphibious rehearsal, stating the, ―landing of subsequent waves should (have) be(en) synchronized with the success and progress of the assault companies. Wave after wave should not (have) be(en) permitted to pile up on a beach until the beach defenses ha(d) been cleared.‖38

35 RG 338, NARA, II, Box 1, V Corps, HQ, 29th I.D, Engineer Plan, Intelligence Annex No. 6 to Field Order 1, 21 December 1943, 1. 36 RG 338, NARA II, Box 1, V Corps, HQ, 29th I.D, Engineer Plan, Intelligence Annex No. 6 to Field Order 1, 21 December 1943, 1-3. 37 Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, 65, 66. 38 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, HQ V Corps, Critique, 26 January 1944, 11. Colonel Charles Canham, commanding officer of the 116th RCT on 6 June, echoed Henion‘s concerns regarding the landing of successive waves prior to the successful elimination of beach defenses during Exercise Duck II. See, RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, HQ 116th Infantry, Comments by Charles D. Canham, 16 February 1944, 2. The lessons provided by the Duck exercises may explain why

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Henion reiterated that communications efficiency would be indispensable during the actual invasion and that disappointing exercise results merited additional training in wire laying and wireless security - especially at night - along with, ―the indoctrination of all personnel of the vital necessity of assisting in maintaining communications.‖39 Henion lamented assault craft shortages that restricted to one the number of RCTs able to participate in Duck. Henion also drew attention to the cancellation of air and naval support fire during the landings and clairvoyantly remarked that similar results during the, ―actual operation would be disastrous.‖40

Most of Henion‘s criticisms went unaddressed on 6 June. Communications breakdowns plagued V Corps in the early days of the invasion. A post-assault critique noted that, ―actual

(communications) planning suffered somewhat from a lack of coordinated ‗plan for planning,‘‖ and recommended that, ―in future operations of th(e) magnitude (of Operation Overlord) a basic plan be outlined and issued in the early stages and that this single publication be the foundation upon which the final plan (wa)s ultimately built.‖41 Air and naval bombardment results were also poor on 6 June and the disaster to which Henion spoke was avoided by the narrowest of margins. A post-landing report compiled by a 116th RCT member noted, ―(t)here (had been) no evidence that prearranged naval and aerial bombardment of the beaches prior to H-Hour had been delivered. No cratering or demolition of beach fortifications (had been) evident.‖42

the 116th Infantry Regiment was forced to wait three-and-a-half hours for reinforcements on the morning of 6 June. 39 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, HQ V Corps, Critique, 26 January 1944, 11. 40 RG 338, NARA II, Box 6, V Corps, HQ V Corps, Critique of Exercise Duck, 12 January 1944, 9. 41 RG 165, NARA II, Box 107, Amphibious Operations: Invasion of Northern France, Western Task Force, June 1944, Communications – Assault Force ―O,‖ 6-5. 42 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, 116th RCT After Action Report from 6 June 44 to 30 June 44, Phase I, Landing of CT 116 on Omaha Beach and Reduction of Enemy Defenses and Subsequent Attack to Capture St Laurent Sur Mer, Vierville Sur Mer.

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Colonel R. Henriques, a British observer from Combined Operations Headquarters, remarked that Duck had not represented a feasible, ―Operation of War.‖ He did not believe an attack on such a position would ever have been ordered because casualty rates would have been prohibitively high. Henriques‘ observations coincided with the views of V Corps‘ commander,

Lieutenant-General Gerow, who did not consider Duck a representative invasion rehearsal because he also believed, ―(a)n actual assault in daylight would never (have) be(en) undertaken under such circumstances.‖43 Henriques concluded the mock positions at Slapton Sands, closely paralleling the terrain at Omaha Beach,44 could only:

have been attacked either under cover of darkness or with the provision of overwhelming fire support on a carefully prearranged programme which continued on the high ground overlooking the beaches after our infantry were ashore. Tanks…..were clearly essential with, or even preceding the leading infantry; and the hills which rose steeply from the beaches would have had to be ‗drenched‘ by air and naval bombardment……..(I)f the enemy had been able to deploy half a dozen field batteries prior to our landing, I do not think that many of those infantry who were compelled to take cover on the steep portion of the beach immediately above the water line would have remained alive. Even though they were to some extent concealed from view, it must be assumed that enemy battery positions would have been previously reconnoitered and surveyed and that concentrations could have been fired so as to cover the whole beach without observation.45

29th Division officers produced a number of introspective analyses on the results of Duck.

The commanding officer of Company B, 175th Infantry, for instance, submitted a three page critique of Exercise Duck in which he described the movement from staging area to embarkation hards as slow and fatiguing to the men, though the food provided was ‗good.‘ Messing and sanitation conditions were poor once embarked, however, and unit morale plunged as a result.

The company commander praised the performance of navy personnel during transportation but

43 RG 338, NARA II, Box 6, HQ V Corps, Critique of Exercise Duck, 12 January 1944, 16. 44 See comments by 29th Division‘s G-2, Major Krznarich in RG 407, NARA II, Box 7500, HQ 29th I.D., Conference in the Aftermath of Exercise Duck II, n.d., 1. 45 RG 338, NARA II, Box 82, V Corps, Notes on Exercise Duck – 1st/3rd January, 1944, 11 January 1944, 1.

325 noted that scrambling nets used to board landing craft were too short and would have resulted in heavy casualties had Duck been the actual invasion. The company commander also recorded that ammunition, water, and other supplies failed to appear at any time of the exercise despite being called for in exercise instructions and, with all opposition being assumed, the exercise‘s value disappeared quickly once the company landed. The company commander requested that mock booby traps be located in houses and farm buildings in the landing area to increase exercise realism and to break the men‘s habit of, ―wandering promiscuously about such places.‖46

Numerous Duck critiques warned that assault troops had been too heavily loaded during practice landings. The aforementioned company commander recorded that his men were overladen with extra ammunition, grenades, and other explosives despite leaving behind a large portion of their authorized equipment. He added, ―if as an assault battalion we will have the mission of seizing and holding a limited beach head we must be put ashore light enough to move quickly to our objective.‖ The commander requested improved uniforms to keep the men as warm as possible and an assault vest to carry only vital equipment and concluded with a warning that, ―green troops w(ou)l(d) (otherwise) throw away things which they do need to accomplish their mission and w(ou)l(d) retain unessentials.‖47

The commanding officer of 3rd Battalion, 175th Regiment, Lt. Colonel William C. Purcell, echoed many of these concerns. In his critique of Duck, Purcell warned that his, ―(t)roops (had been) too heavily loaded with equipment when disembarked…..Had the men not been in excellent physical condition the effort of carrying (all their equipment) across the wide beach and

46 RG 338, NARA II, Box 82, V Corps, Memorandum from Company B, 175th Regiment to 175th Regiment, Comments on Exercise Duck, 6 January 1944, 1, 2, and 3. 47 Ibid., 2, 3.

326 sufficiently up a steep slope to clear the beach would have resulted in their arrival at attack positions in a condition of fatigue which would (have) seriously affect their combat efficiency.‖48

General Gerhardt observed the division had, ―learned a great deal from (Exercise

Duck,)‖49 but insisted his subordinates take training opportunities afforded by future rehearsals more seriously. The division commander exhorted subordinates to use their own initiative during amphibious training exercises: ―If the SOS sets you up wrong, do something about it. It isn‘t enough just to sit back and talk about it.‖50 Gerhardt reminded his officers all that mattered during the actual invasion was, ―(their) combat efficiency when (they) hit the beach.‖51

V Corps‘ commanding officer expressed regret that air force and naval fire support had been unavailable during Duck and lamented that, ―the Army had to throw in some units that were only partially organized and equipped and which had never trained or operated together.‖ Gerow listed, ―a general lack of sound planning, training, initiative, aggressiveness, teamwork and leadership,‖ as the principal sources for Duck’s failures but was nevertheless, ―confident that the mistakes…..made in (Exercise Duck) w(ou)l(d) not be repeated in subsequent (rehearsals.)‖52

Gerow‘s confidence was put to the test almost immediately. Ducks II and III were conceived and held in quick succession following the dismal results of the original Duck. Only in retrospect was the inaugural Duck exercise referred to as Duck I, indicating the two follow-up rehearsals were not originally intended. 116th RCT officials received word on 31 January to

48 RG 338, NARA II, Box 82, V Corps, Memorandum from HQ, 3rd Battalion, 175th Regiment to 175th Regiment, Participation of 3rd Battalion, 175th Infantry in Exercise Duck, 6 January 1944, 3. 49 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D., Document No. 44, Headquarter V Corps, Critique of Exercise Duck. Comments by Major General Gerhardt, 28 January 1944, 11, 12. 50 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D., Notes on Critique of Exercise Duck, 18. 51 Ibid. 52 RG 338, NARA II, Box 6, HQ V Corps, Critique of Exercise Duck, 12 January 1944, 15, 16, 18.

327 conduct Exercise Duck II from 7-15 February while the 115th RCT was to take part in Duck III between 23 February and 1 March. Exercise objectives in both cases were identical to Duck I, with one addition – correcting all deficiencies exhibited during the original exercise.53

Compared to Duck I, the division produced a fraction of the post-exercise critiques for

Ducks II and III. Many of the mistakes exhibited during Duck I were repeated during its successors. Navy crews experienced similar difficulties embarking and disembarking assault formations on time and at correct locations. Overall coordination between the services was again poor.54 The smoke screen covering assault formations was badly laid by Air Force and Navy contingents.55 Duck II‘s air support component was cancelled moments before the landing due to weather concerns. Duck II‘s chief umpire found the decision, ―extremely disappointing.‖56 A frustrated Gerhardt declared:

it might be well to bring out a few points at this time because……(of) the extreme importance of this air business. We had total failure….(W)e need the practice…(and) (w)e need it…bad(ly). As far as I am concerned, there (should) be no (future) safety precautions (due to weather concerns.) They can bomb from 10,000 feet or 10 feet as far as I am concerned. I think perhaps…..that we have got to get realistic. If anybody gets hurt we will just take our losses.57

53 RG 338, NARA II, Box 82, V Corps, HQ, 29th I.D., Exercise Duck II, 31 January 1944, 1 and Clifford L. Jones, The Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations, vol. VI, Neptune: Training for Mounting the Operation, and Artificial Ports (European Theater: Historical Division United States Army Forces, 228, 229, (March 1946), http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ETO/Admin/ETO-AdmLog-6/ETO-AdmLog-6-7.html#cn27, accessed 20 April 2013. 54 Jones, ―The Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations,‖ 230. 55 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, HQ 116th Infantry, Comments by Charles D. Canham, 16 February 1944, 2. 56 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7500, HQ V Corps memorandum to Commanding General, 29th Division, Exercise Duck II, 17 January 1944, 1. 57 The rehearsal foreshadowed the events of 6 June when a lack of air support presented nearly insurmountable hurdles to attacking troops at Omaha Beach. See, RG 407, NARA II, Box 7500, HQ V Corps memorandum to Commanding General, 29th Division, Exercise Duck II, 17 January 1944, 4.

328

The next major amphibious assault rehearsal for the division was Exercise Fox, held on

9-10 March 1944. Fox constituted the penultimate full-scale amphibious assault rehearsal for the

29th Division and approximated the division‘s 6 June assault formations closer than any other large scale assault exercise. V Corps first issued orders for Exercise Fox on 7 February although participating units were forced to delay planning considerably. ETO Command specified that the initial waves of Fox and the 6 June landings be identical (infantry and support troops) and it was not until 15 February that the final roster for the actual invasion was set in First Army‘s

Operation Plan Neptune. Hurried preparations for Fox began immediately but were incomplete when the rehearsal began.58

The 116th RCT was temporarily detached from the 29th Division and attached to the 1st

Infantry Division for the early stages of the invasion in the final Neptune assault plan. The initial assault on Omaha Beach would be carried out by Force ―O,‖ consisting of the 116th and 16th

RCTs. The 29th Division supplied 4,703 soldiers to the initial assault.59 The reserve contingent for the Omaha Beachhead, Force ―B,‖ consisted of first and second follow-up forces. 3,257 infantrymen, 657 artillerymen, and 841 support troops of the 115th RCT comprised the 29th

Division‘s contribution to the first follow-up contingent of Force ―B.‖60 It was not expected to begin landing until H+390 or to be completed before H+14 hours. The combat team was intended as a floating reserved and its employment was based on the fortunes of the 116th RCT, precisely as Hughes-Hallett and Hamilton Roberts had recommended at the USATC-sponsored

58 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5, V Corps, Directive and Plan for Exercise Fox, 21 February 1944, 1, 2, 3. 59 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19318, Appendix No. 4 to Operations Plan ―Neptune,‖ Assault Regimental Landing Team, 29th I.D. 13 April 1944. 60 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19318, First Follow-Up MNG Regimental Landing Team: 29th Infantry Division, Section 1, Landing Team Composition, n.d.

329 assault conference held in May, 1943.61 The 115th RCT would land and occupy the high ground near Longueville if the 116th was initially successful, but if, ―the enemy (wa)s still holding out in the western part of the Corps zone, the 115th w(ou)l(d) be employed to assist the 116th in mopping up the area.‖62 The 115th RCT‘s rifle and support companies were formed in conventional platoons, not the specially designed USATC assault formations utilized by the 116th

RCT, and were brought ashore in twelve LCI (L)s.63 The division also supplied 3,063 infantrymen, 166 engineers, and 125 support troops of the 175th RCT to the second follow-up contingent of Force ―B,‖ destined to land at Omaha Beach on D+1. The 175th RCT came ashore with 318 vehicles of various descriptions.64

17,000 members of the 29th and 1st Infantry Divisions scheduled to land at Omaha Beach on 6 June took part in Exercise Fox. Exercise instructions called for an amphibious assault at

Slapton Sands by the 116th and 16th RCTs under the direction of 1st Infantry Division HQ.

Assault formations were to establish beachheads, attack and capture designated phase lines and set up interlocking defensive positions. Exercise Fox provided G-2 personnel the opportunity to prepare a six page summary detailing the strength and location of the opposing force‘s infantry and artillery units. Terrain descriptions and estimates of enemy air support capabilities were also included.65 Like the Duck exercises, Fox bore little training value for infantrymen since enemy opposition was once again assumed.66

61 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19318, Landing Diagram, Omaha Beach – Sector of the 116th RCT. 62 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19314, Notes on V Corps Plan ―Neptune,‖ 2. 63 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19314, HQ V Corps, Outline of V Corps Plan, 17 May 1944, 1. 64 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19318, Second Follow-Up Regiment, n.d. 65 RG 338, NARA II, Box 1, V Corps, HQ, 29th I.D, G-2 Estimate of Enemy Situation, Exercise Fox, 25 February 1944, 1-6. 66 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5, V Corps, Commander‘s Estimate of the Situation, Exercise Fox, I – General, 1.

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The unopposed landings were instead intended to provide, ―the maximum training for

(29th Division) headquarters and communications personnel.‖67 Follow-up RCTs from both divisions were also assumed. Operational support was provided by the 5th and 6th Special

Engineer Brigades along with V Corps operations and communications detachments.68 121st and

112th Battalion engineers facilitated infantry advances off the beach by clearing and marking 8- yard wide lanes through minefields and wire obstacles during the exercise. Engineers assisted with the landing and unloading of artillery units and their movement inland and laid minefields to prevent enemy counterattacks on the beachhead.69 The exercise was carried out, ―under as nearly real conditions as c(ould) be duplicated with the facilities available.‖70 Like the Duck exercises, Fox was intended to allow SOS and navy formations practice at concentrating, marshaling, embarking, transporting, debarking, and landing assault forces and to provide naval and aerial formations the opportunity to rehearse fire support tasks for 6 June.71

The medical summary for Exercise Fox noted evacuation procedures and the speed and quality of casualty reporting had improved since the Duck exercises. Sixty-five simulated casualties were processed during Exercise Fox along with fifteen actual casualties: two killed, two wounded, four injured, two gassed with carbon monoxide, and five sick. 72 An important contributor to a combat soldier‘s morale was knowing he would receive prompt and efficient medical attention if wounded. Exercise Fox afforded the ten ambulance crews of the 104th

67 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5, V Corps, Directive and Plan for Exercise Fox, 21 February 1944, 3. 68 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5, V Corps, Method of Conducting Exercise Fox, 4 March 1944, 1. 69 RG 338, NARA II, Box 1, V Corps, HQ, 29th I.D., Engineer Plan for Exercise Fox, 2 March 1944, 1. 70 RG 338, NARA II, Box 1, V Corps, V Corps Amphibious Training Exercise Fox, 21 January 1944, 1. 71 RG 338, NARA II, Box 5, V Corps, Directive and Plan for Exercise Fox, 21 February 1944, 1, 2. 72 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D., Memorandum from 29th Division Surgeon to Commanding General, 29th I.D., Medical Report, Exercise Fox, 13 March 1944.

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Medical Battalion‘s collecting companies an invaluable opportunity to practice transporting evacuees during the buildup that followed an amphibious assault.73

Despite some positives, exercise results were generally disappointing. Planning delays and inexperienced engineer support units were cited as principal causes. V Corps submitted a summary of exercise deficiencies which included:

Mounting: Lack of experience on the part of camp personnel was apparent, but camp operation improved as troops gained experiences. There was insufficient time to prepare camps, only two and a half days on an average, prior to the reception of transients. Because of the improvement shown, static personnel trained in the exercise were earmarked for future operations. Mess sanitation in the camps was poor, and, on the advice of umpires and observers, cooking schools were organized, kitchens were reequipped, and new mess sanitation requirements were adopted. The transportation standing operating procedure was found to be too complicated. There were too many forms and too much supervision by military police. Four hours were allocated to loading each LST, but it was found possible to do the job in two hours. Assault: Available critiques fail to give complete details of assault results, but they indicate that the assault suffered from lack of coordination between the Navy and the Army, and between various headquarters. This was partially caused by lack of time.

Security: Security was spotty. Camouflage was poor, and control within marshaling camps was not good. Telephone warnings on air raids and on enemy use of gas was very bad, and measures were taken to move up more comprehensive emergency communications in future exercises and in NEPTUNE.

Beach Group: Major criticisms centered about the operations of the beach engineers and the establishment of the beach port. It was found that there were too few loading points for the number of craft involved. There was poor coordination between the beachmaster and coasters, resulting in the delayed arrival of supplies on the beach. Unloading equipment on the coasters was in poor condition, and coaster captains had no orders. There was no contact between the beach group and Naval control headquarters for several hours. Beach communications were poor, and there were no communications between the beach headquarters and the dumps until D plus 1. Wire teams laid their lines during the night because of the delay in bringing equipment ashore. Twenty DUKWs had been allocated to each coaster for unloading, and it was found that ten were sufficient to do the job. Later waves of troops came ashore in the wrong order, creating

73 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3898, HQ 29th I.D., Administration Circular, No. 8-7, Casualties and Sick Evacuation, 10 January 1944.

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confusion. For example, medical clearing personnel came in at H plus 2 hours, but could do no work until their equipment arrived at H plus 11 hours.74

The 29th Division conducted its own post-mortem of the rehearsal. Commanders submitted written critiques of Fox. Cota cited inflexible and complicated planning as reasons for poor results during troop concentrations and transport boarding, singling out Transport

Quartermasters for special criticism.75 Gerhardt forwarded Cota‘s remarks to the Commanding

General First United States Army, adding personally: ―(g)eneral comment throughout the division indicated so strongly that the SOS participation was inadequate that I feel that this matter should be brought to (your) attention.‖76

The 29th Division‘s G-2, Major Paul Krznarich, criticized excess radio traffic during transport but praised command post procedures and noted that the, ―communication set-up of th(e) (29th) (D)ivision for an assault phase as practiced on Exercise Fox (had been) entirely satisfactory from the standpoint of G-2.‖77 Lt. Colonel William J. Witte, the division‘s G-3, noted potentially dangerous errors had been committed during troop concentration and assembly, embarkation, and landings amongst artillery, medical, ordnance, and signals troops. Gerhardt responded with handwritten comments in the report‘s margins including, ―our responsibility, will improve, being done,‖ and, ―Name Them! Letter of Reprimand,‖ in response to criticisms of signals procedure.78

74 Clifford L. Jones, ―The Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations,‖ 236-238. 75 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D., Memorandum to Commanding General, 29th Division from Norman D. Cota, Exercise Fox, 13 March 1944. 76 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D., Memorandum from C.H. Gerhardt, SOS Participation in Exercise Fox, 15 March 1944. 77 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D, Report on Exercise Fox by Assistant Chief of Staff, G- 2, Major Paul W. Krznarich, 13 March 1944. 78 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D., Memorandum from 29th Division G-3, Lt. Colonel William J. Witte, to Commanding General, 29th Division, Exercise Fox, 16 March 1944.

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Senior officers were also required to attend an exercise debriefing headed by the division commander. Gerhardt did not believe, ―there (were) any solutions,‖ to issues concerning the disorientated and late landings or to the difficulties unloading essential supplies and replacements. Gerhardt instead informed the gathering that it was their prerogative to provide innovative solutions to unforeseen difficulties they were destined to face during the landings and that, ―(t)he personnel ha(ve) got to start with it and stay with it. It is going to be hard, but spending the night in a foxhole full of water is going to be hard also…….The SOS leads us.

That is their only interest. The Navy lands us and gets the hell out. We hit the beach, and then fight for our lives. That means that you should maintain a chain of command, you should maintain control of your units, you should see that things happen right and nothing wrong. It is your responsibility to your platoons, company and battalion, and on up the line.‖79

Gerhardt concluded by reminding senior officers not to depend too heavily on intelligence reports that suggested initial opposition would be light during the actual invasion.

Gerhardt observed that German commanders may strengthen beach defenses between the end of

Fox and the actual invasion. The division commander warned units to assume defenses would be strong during the remainder of training and to remember that under similar circumstances

General MacArthur had held, ―invading Japanese forces on the beaches at L(i)ng(a)y(e)n Gulf for three days.‖ Gerhardt added the ominous warning that, ―air and naval preparation ha(d) got to be awful good to make sure we (we)re not presented with a task that (wa)s too great for us.‖80

Other voices also cautioned against overly-optimistic attitudes. Brigadier General R. P.

Shugg, for example, submitted a dissenting assessment of the army‘s organization, doctrine and

79 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D., 29th I.D. HQ, Critique of Exercise Fox, 15 March, 1944, comments by Major General Gerhardt, 13. 80 Ibid., 14.

334 training in early 1944 titled, ‗Our Ground Tactics are Not Working.‘ The armored officer from

Fort Knox warned that obsolete U.S. Army tactics would cost American lives. Shugg‘s detailed critique incorporated lessons learned from Tunisia and Italy to illustrate a number of U.S. Army deficiencies:

American Losses. – There is every evidence that our military leaders are not making maximum use of every type of modern equipment to reduce personnel losses….The American people, who take pride in the country‘s mechanical genius and its ability to produce equipment that will permit us to wage the war with minimum personnel losses, will not tolerate excessive casualties that can be laid at the door of such obsolete tactics.

Our Ground Tactics. – While the advance in mechanical design and weapons have provided the impetus and bases for ultra-modern tactics and organization in the armies of Russia and Germany, the sterility of tactical thought and timidity toward change still prevail in our Army. In the twenty years since the last war, we evolved (to include) the wide envelopment, the triangular division and the infantry-artillery team. Our armored force, which was thrown together from fright after the German sweep across France, still revolves around one specialized employment – the use of armored divisions in the break- through. We completely ignore other uses of armor.

Recent Operations. – Our operations in Tunisia disclosed the weakness of our infantry- artillery combat teams, particularly where enemy armor was present. The infantry had no conception of how to attack in coordination with tanks. Tankers did not appreciate the importance of artillery support. Our operations at Salerno are certainly nothing to be proud of save for the individual gallantry of our troops. If we had known how to use armor in the initial landing waves, our losses would have been greatly reduced. Later operations disclosed complete ignorance of tank tactics on the part of our higher commanders. Tanks were widely dispersed through small attachments to lower echelons, through use as mobile pill boxes and through employment as tank destroyers. At no time during the operation were tanks sufficiently centralized to permit a counterattack in force. Comparing these tactics with those employed by the Russians whose power drives are characterized by enormous amounts of artillery and armor integrated with infantry, our infantry-artillery teams look puny in contrast.

Training in the United States. – The offensive tactics employed by our troops abroad are a reflection of their training in the United States. The theater commanders haven‘t the time to retrain them. Our maneuvers stress the power of the infantry-artillery team. Very few senior commanders know how to use armor to give the attack added punch. Consequently our infantry attack shows no basic increase in power over the 1918 model….Our defence tactics are likewise not modern. Mine fields, antitank gun emplacements, and use of tanks in counterattacks are not sufficiently stressed. There is no mention of the hedge hog defense, defense of villages or defense in depth as employed by the Russians.

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Artillery. – …. The Russians have taught us that without overwhelming amounts of artillery of all types, including rockets, no success against the Germans is possible. The technique of massing artillery is unknown to our army.

Armor. – Potentially we have a powerful armored force, yet we have neglected its training. We have emphasized the spectacular role of the armored division in a break- through or the less important role of tank battalions assisting infantry decisions in desperate attacks. There is a lack of constant and thorough study of armored actions abroad with a view to expanding the potential usefulness of tanks…..We are faced with the assault of coastline and fortified areas that might require a special type tank.

Tank Destroyers and Antitank Guns. – Some thought should be given to enunciating a tank destroyer tactical doctrine more positive in tone. Our doctrine is behind that of the British who stress the value of tank destroyers in the attack by requiring their emplacement on the objective within 15 minutes after its capture.

General Recommendations. – The equipment, organization and tactics of our ground troops should be restudied with a view to modernization and vitalization. Our tactics and weapons must be adapted to existing conditions….Work out operational procedure using most modern equipment to produce paralyzing fire power in support of ground attack, amphibious attack, or defense best adapted to each theatre…..Disseminate information on new weapons and techniques….Cut maneuver time in this country and substitute fire plan and movement training…..(and)…….(i)nclude air participation in this training.81

Shugg realized the doctrine of fire and maneuver would not be appropriate for every battlefield situation and that infantry units did not possess sufficient firepower to overwhelm the enemy. Shugg encouraged more coordination between armor and infantry units and the use of even greater levels of artillery to save American lives. He also foresaw the need to tailor doctrine to specific battlefield conditions. General Marshall later acknowledged a number of

Shugg‘s contentions but dismissed the overall report as immoderate.82

81 RG 165, NARA II, Box 100, Memorandum by Brigadier General R. P. Shugg titled, ‗Our Ground Tactics are not Working.‘ Though undated, a memo dated January 4, 1944 forwarding Shugg‘s comments to the New Developments Division places it near the beginning of 1944. 82 RG 165, NARA II, Box 100, Comments by General Marshall pertaining to memorandum by Brigadier General R. P. Shugg.

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The dissection of Exercise Fox continued for the 29th Division. Colonel Canham

(Commanding Officer, 116th Regiment), Lt. Colonel Terry (29th Division TQM) and Majors

Watts (29th Division Assistant G-3) and Cauble (Division Signals Officer) represented the 29th

Division at a joint V Corps critique of Exercise Fox held at 1st I.D. HQ on 23 March 1944. 1st

Infantry Division‘s CO, Major General Heubner, was bullish on exercise results compared to

Gerhardt. Heubner noted a great deal had been learned from Fox and that any errors committed during the exercise had been insignificant. He also exonerated SOS troops, blaming confusion during the marshaling phase of Fox on poor RCT march discipline instead. Heubner surreptitiously added that everyone in attendance was to word his reports so that it would be,

―understood by all concerned that Fox (had been) a success.‖83

Fox was held to correct deficiencies that surfaced during the Duck exercises but instead demonstrated as many new concerns as it resolved.84 A post-exercise critique nevertheless declared that setbacks experienced during Fox would be, ―cleared up in the next exercise…….where there w(ou)l(d) be more time for adequate planning."85 Only one large scale exercise remained for the 29th and 1st Infantry Divisions to get it right.

Exercise Fabius I represented that final opportunity. In its entirety, Fabius was a six- phase, multinational rehearsal held from 27 April – 7 May 1944. Fabius was run in conjunction with Exercise Tiger, the final and tragic rehearsal for the 4th Infantry Division and Naval Force

83 29th Division representation did not actively participate in the conference but did provide a written summary for 29th Division leadership. See, RG 407, NARA II, Box 7495, 29th I.D., Memorandum to 29th I.D. HQ, Report on Critique Exercise Fox Held at HQ 1st Inf. Div., 23 March 1944. 84 Contrary to a unit history that stated, ―Mistakes were noted (in the aftermath of the Duck Exercises) and corrected in Exercise Fox. See, Ewing, 29th Infantry Division: A Short History of a Fighting Division, 23 85 Jones, ―The Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations,‖ 232.

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‗U‘ destined for Utah Beach.86 Fabius represented the largest collective amphibious assault training exercise ever held, comprising army, navy, and air force detachments from Great

Britain, Canada, and the United States. The rehearsal roster was extensive:

(i) ―Fabius I‖. A full scale exercise for Naval Assault Force ‗O‘ and the 1st U.S. Infantry Division (with elements of the 29th Division attached) with an assault in the SLAPTON SANDS assault training area. This exercise w(ou)l(d) be mounted from the PORTLAND area. Live firing w(ou)l(d) take place. (ii) ―Fabius II‖. A full scale exercise for Naval Assault Force ‗G‘ and the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division. This assault w(ou)l(d) be in the HAYLING ISLAND area. This exercise w(ou)l(d) be mounted from the PORTSMOUTH and SOUTHHAMPTON area. There w(ou)l(d) be no live firing. (iii) ―Fabius III‖. A full scale exercise for Naval Assault Force ‗J‘ and the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division with an assault in the BRACKLESHAM BAY area. This exercise w(ou)l(d) be mounted from the PORTSMOUTH and SOUTHHAMPTON area. There w(ou)l(d) be no live firing. (iv) ―Fabius IV‖. A full scale exercise for Naval Assault Force ‗S‘ and the 3rd British Infantry Division with an assault in the LITTLEHAMPTON area. This exercise w(ou)l(d) be mounted from the PORTSMOUTH and SOUTHHAMPTON area. There w(ou)l(d) be no live firing. (v) ―Fabius V‖. An exercise to practice the machinery for loading personnel and equipment in the THAMES ESTUARY and EAST COAST ports. The forces concerned w(ou)l(d) not actually sail. (vi) ―Fabius VI‖. An exercise in the buildup of follow up troops and material into the SOUTHHAMPTON and PORTSMOUTH areas. This exercise w(ou)l(d) extend as far as bringing the troops and material concerned down to embarkation points in the PORTSMOUTH and SOUTHAMPTON area.87

86 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19304, Exercises Tiger and Fabius I, 1 April 1944. 442 soldiers were killed when German E Boats attacked transport vessels ferrying the 4th Division to the Slapton Sands area. Naval casualties were not included in the totals. Losses as a result of the attack totaled more than the 4th I.D. suffered at Utah Beach. A post-Exercise Duck report highlighting a general lack of knowledge in the use of life preservers issued months earlier had gone unheeded. The report noted, ―It was evident that no provision had been made for life preserver discipline. Several men were questions as to the operation of their preservers but none knew. Many soldiers had managed, through curiosity or accident, to inflate their life preservers while carrying them, unaware that no more than one charge was available for inflation.‖ See, Jones, ―The Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations,‖ 256 and J.E. Kaufmann and H.W. Kaufmann, The American GI in Europe in World War II: The Battle for France. (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2009), 11 and 29. 87 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19304, Exercise Fabius, 1.

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Fabius I was yet another unopposed landing exercise providing SOS and naval formations the opportunity to enhance their skills at processing, marshaling, administering, transporting, and landing an assault formation on a hostile beach. Of the six components, Fabius

I was the only exercise containing a live naval fire component. This suggests the decision whether to include naval fire support in the exercises had been devolved to either Corps or Army levels.

Fabius I provided communications and engineer formations an excellent opportunity to refine their respective roles in the forthcoming invasion. The problem allowed engineers ―(t)o ascertain the feasibility of handling supplies that w(ou)l(d) be required on D and D+1 on the

Continent.‖ The 5th and 6th Special Engineer Brigades handled and unloaded 400 tons of equipment at the high water mark (listed as a token amount in exercise instructions) on the first day of Fabius and 1500 tons on D+1.88 Special considerations were also given to previous communications errors arising during the planning and execution of Fabius I, including:

the proper laying and policing of wire lines. Lines must (have) be(en) put off the road as soon as laid. Policing c(ould) not wait until some time later, due to the hazard of passing vehicles…..Radio procedures and Message Center operations w(ere) (to) be closely watched by signal communications officers, that those agencies perform(ed) their work accurately and expeditiously…..Communication parties on coming ashore (were to have) know(n) where they (we)re to go and must (have) be(en) kept together. Past exercises contain instances in which communications sections were not at the appointed place at the proper time, thus delaying organization of the signal system at a critical time.89

The results of Fabius I were promising in comparison to previous exercises, though many of the errors that plagued the 1st and 29th Divisions during Duck and Fox reappeared. An alarming number of new concerns also became apparent. The line of departure for beach assault craft proved too close to shore, ―with a consequent massing of craft for a considerable period of

88 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19304, Exercises Tiger and Fabius I, 1 April 1944, 1, 2. 89 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19304, Letter of Instructions, Exercise Fabius I, 24 April 1944, 2.

339 time…..This mass of craft would (have) present(ed) a relatively easy target for either coast defense guns or mobile field artillery.‖90 D(uplex) D(rive) tanks landed 10-15 minutes behind initial infantry waves. LCT(SP) and LCT(R) craft scheduled to provide drenching fire support did not arrive on time and the naval fire plan suffered as a result. The deliverance of smoke to cover approaching assault waves was reported as a, ―poor example of (its) use which failed to realize the potentialities of smoke laying craft.‖91

Traffic control was poor once assault teams were ashore. Insufficient signage and military police presence resulted in, ―(v)ehicles (being) allowed to bunch on the beach while awaiting their assignments, thus presenting profitable targets for enemy artillery and planes.‖

DUKWs ferrying supplies to the beachhead were dispatched three tons short of full capacity and the sheer number of beachings overwhelmed unloading crews. Improper signage hampered effective supply dumping operations. Wire crews again illustrated a lack of care in wire laying operations and the late arrival of medical personnel and equipment impeded effective casualty clearing. Many of the errors committed during the final rehearsal were repeated during the initial stages of Operation Neptune.92

Fabius‘ conclusion signaled the end of active training for the 29th Division. Instead of returning to their regular billets, division formations were concentrated by boat groups near debouching ports. The invaders were eventually isolated from the general population for

90 RG 407, NARA II, Box 19304, First United States Army, Comments on Exercise ―Fabius I,‖ 11 May 1944, 1. 91 Ibid., 1, 2. 92 Jones, ―The Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations,‖ 271, 272.

340 security reasons and passed the intervening days checking and re-checking equipment, playing sports, and listening to distinguished visitors.93

Organized sports constituted an important training tool during the 29th Division‘s entire preparatory phase. Individual and team sports kept the men occupied and out of trouble and helped administrators fill 44 hour per week training syllabi. Sports helped maintain morale and physically hardened the men. Officially, sports were utilized by 29th Division officials to,

―develop endurance, agility, and coordination in the individual….teach team-work….foster keen competition between individuals and units in accordance with the rules of good sportsmanship…..(and) build up unit spirit.‖94 Throughout most of the division‘s training cycle the final hour of the training day was dedicated to organized athletics in order, ―(to) (p)rovide vigorous activity for all personnel….(to) (c)reate a competitive spirit by opposing evenly matched groups….(to) (c)reate a combative spirit by means of individual and team contests….(and to) (d)evelop agility and physical conditioning…...All individuals of the

Division, except those excused by competent authority, (were required to) take part in organized athletics.‖95

Orders mandated the formation of rugby, rifle, boxing, and basketball teams at the company level.96 Leagues were instituted by a Senior Special Service Officer. Division boxing, basketball, and soccer athletic squads were formed to compete with British, Canadian, and other

American divisions. The division‘s secret diary recorded the results of countless sporting events.

93 Joseph P. Ewing, 29 Let’s Go, 30. 94 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3893, Headquarters 29th Division, Circular 22, Organized Athletics, 18 April 1943. 95 RG 338 NARA II, Box 28, V Corps Memorandum No. 22, Organized Athletics, 11 February 1943. 96 See for example, RG 407, NARA II, Box 7480, Secret Historical Diary of Division: 3 February 1941-30 January 1944, 9 December 1942.

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Two such entries documented that the 29th Division‘s, ―All-Star soccer team….(had been) defeated by the London Police, 3-0, at Imber Court, Thames Ditton,‖ and later that, ―(a) powerful

British Army soccer eleven (had) defeated the (29th Division team) 11-0 before 8,000 fans.‖97 In another instance, 2,000 representatives of the 29th Division made the long trek from Cornwall to

London on 19 March 1944 to watch the division‘s football team take on a Canadian squad under the codename, Exercise Candy.98

The division also continued conventional preparations. 1st Infantry Division cadres rotated through the 29th I.D. during January and February, 1944 to impart combat experience.

Rifle, cannon, antitank, service, heavy weapons, and regimental headquarters companies each received two junior officers and two enlisted men from the 1st I.D. for four days of informal information sharing and discussions. Conversely, medical and engineer battalions along with service, headquarters, and artillery batteries received one officer and one non-commissioned officer.99

Week-long division radio operating and repair schools were held in February and

March.100 Battalions conducted individual marksmanship and marching exercises and ten consecutive nights of training drills from 2000 hours to 0500 hours.101 The 175th RCT embarked on three days of intense river crossing maneuvers at the beginning of February. The 2nd/175th conducted day and night river crossing exercises later in March, the only 29th Division battalion to do so on a solo basis. The 115th and 175th Regiments closed out February conducting tank-

97 Ibid., 13 and 27 March 1943. 98 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3899, HQ, 29th I.D., Exercise Candy, 16 March 1944. 99 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3899, HQ, 29th I.D., Cadre from 1st Infantry Division, 25 January 1944, 1. 100 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Headquarters V Corps, Selected Training Events of Interest dated 2 February and 29 March 1944. 101 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7515, 29th Infantry Division, Training Circular 127, Training Program 1 Jan – 31 March 1944 dated 18 January 1944.

342 infantry coordination training while the 116th attended the division‘s anti-tank school at Great

Mis Tor.102

Preparations in artillery units stressed the performance of individual duties in such a fashion to make all artillery operations, ―as mechanical as possible especially in the sequence of operations. Speed (wa)s (to be) developed without reducing accuracy ……Accuracy (wa)s (to be) developed by constant practice. The elimination of unnecessary movements w(ou)l(d) decrease the time required…..Ignorance of the contents of the Field Manuals (and) lack of practice under careful supervision (we)re the greatest causes for poor firing batteries.‖103

Perpetual manpower shortages forced the division to assimilate large numbers of officer and enlisted replacements during its stay in Great Britain. Division officials were expected to provide the necessary upgrader training to correct deficiencies exhibited by replacements upon their arrival. 29th Division administrators initiated standardized testing procedures in response to training inconsistencies amongst replacements assigned to the unit. Replacements allocated to the division were provided a brief unit history and reminded of the importance of maintaining a neat and clean soldierly appearance at all times.104 Replacements were graded by standardized testing to determine: ―(p)roficiency in care of arms, clothing and equipment; (m)ilitary courtesy and discipline; (p)hysical condition including marching endurance; (m)ilitary sanitation

102 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Headquarters V Corps, Selected Training Events of Interest dated 17 February 1944 103 Underline original. RG 338, NARA II, Box 5, HQ 29th I.D., Training Memorandum No. 8, Points for Battery Executive, Section I, General, 27 January 1944, 1. 104 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 61, Replacements, 3 June 1943, 1.

343 incl(uding) sex hygiene and (first) aid; (m)ap reading; (i)nterior guard duty; (c)lose order drill;

(d)efense against chemical attack; (c)oncealment and camouflage; (and) (a)rticles of war.‖105

Replacements meeting unit standards were assigned a permanent role in the division.

Enlisted replacements displaying training deficiencies underwent remedial training designed, ―to insure that they (we)re on par with the older men of the (division in regards to)….ability, endurance, discipline and basic military training.‖ Replacements requiring additional training were classified by MOS and trained by more experienced members of the division. Upgrading continued until proficiency testing ensured requisite training standards had been attained.

Officer replacements were tested in a similar fashion prior to being granted command responsibilities within the division.106

29th Division administrators went on to implement augmented classification procedures as the quality of training in the United States grew increasingly erratic. Infantry replacements were categorized by the number of weeks (13 or more, 6-13, and less than 6) spent in the mobilization training program, whether they had completed or partially completed a rifle qualification course, completed preliminary marksmanship, or had no marksmanship training whatsoever.107 The results were often shockingly bad. 213 of 423 (50.4%) replacements from one contingent sent to the division in February, 1943 were deemed as being insufficiently trained. A V Corps representative noted the collection was, ―not of a very ‗high type.‘ Lots of

AWOL‘s……‖108

105 RG 338 NARA II, Box 3899, Headquarters 29th I.D., Report on Replacements, 16 January 1943. 106 RG 338, NARA II, Box 85, HQ V Corps, Training Memorandum No. 16, Training Directive for Units of V Corps, 1 January – 30 April 1943, 3. 107 RG 338 NARA II, Box 3899, Headquarters 29th I.D., Report on Replacements, 16 January 1943. 108 RG 338, NARA II, Box 65, V Corps, HQ V Corps, Replacements, 16 February 1943.

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In response, division officials initiated a standardized training program that ensured a newly-assigned replacement‘s competency before permanent assignment. Instruction was based on MTP guidelines and was administered at regimental and separate unit levels. The program laid special emphasis on progressive individual, squad, and platoon tactical training, physical conditioning, hygiene and disciplinary training followed by intensive marksmanship drills and grenade throwing.109 Progressive training subjects were introduced:

not as isolated items, but by introducing them into other training situations. Instruction should (have) be(en) so integrated that the soldier receive(d) a complete picture of the relationship that each subject b(o)r(e) to the others. Junior leaders must (have) exercise(d) their ingenuity and imagination to the utmost in introducing situations into….training which w(ould) (have) require(d) a varied application of previously received instruction. This frequent repetition of instruction, properly applied in different situations, w(ould) keep the soldier up to the required standard, w(ould) add variety to training, and w(ould) impress upon the individual the necessity of habitually taking, in actual battle, the steps and action which he (was) taught during the pre-combat training period. Every opportunity w(as) taken to observe, check and improve the efficiency of the individual soldier in applying his knowledge.110

Orders forbade the assignment of enrolled replacements to fatigue, kitchen police, or any other special duty that interfered with refresher training. Training was not to exceed four weeks unless it was apparent that, ―replacements (would) not (be) prepared to take up regular training with their units upon (its) competition. In which case special training programs w(ou)l(d) be extended as necessary…..(and) the training day w(ou)l(d) be lengthened for backward men.‖

Instructors were chosen on the basis of their, ―leadership, enthusiasm, and teaching ability.‖111

Special provisions allowed units to reject replacements deemed incapable of ever absorbing sufficient levels of training. Protocol required that units gather an extensive case

109 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 61, Replacements, 3 June 1943, 2. 110 RG 338, NARA II, Box 81, V Corps, V Corps Memorandum No. 4, Training Directive for Units of V Corps, 1 May – 31 August 1943, 14 April, 1943, 1, 2. 111 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3894, HQ 29th I.D., Training Circular No. 61, Replacements, 3 June 1943, 2.

345 history that included medical examination forms, Service Record and Soldiers Qualification

Cards and transcripts of interviews with the soldier, ―in sufficient detail to present all of the facts which should be considered in determining the disposition (process,)‖ before a deficient soldier could be separated. Soldiers deemed incapable were returned to the United States and discharged from the army.112

Until the fall of 1943 infantry replacements assigned to the ETO rarely spent an appreciable length of time attached to a Replacement Depot. Perpetual manpower shortages usually ensured an infantry replacement‘s quick assignment to a permanent unit. Dedicated replacement units were mostly responsible for housing and administering replacements under these conditions and training responsibilities remained primarily with combat formations.

ETO Replacement Command was nevertheless compelled to inaugurate a special training program in October, 1943 when it became apparent Field Force Replacement System (FFRS) units would be required to house and train replacements instead of channeling them directly to combat units. In response, FFRS created a Training and Security Division to plan, coordinate, direct, and supervise the training of replacements in the ETO. Echelons were created in each

Replacement Depot to carry out similar duties at the subordinate level.113

Training objectives included, ―(1) (a)chieving and maintaining individual physical condition to undergo battle…..(2) (f)amiliarization firing to include crew service pieces.…..(3)

(i)ntensive instruction in battlefield self-preservation…….(and) (4) (m)aintenance of individual professional proficiency.‖ Depending on previous qualifications, replacements underwent refresher training or a special round of upgrader training after processing at a Replacement

112 RG 338 NARA II, Box 3899, Headquarters 29th I.D., Report on Replacements, 16 January 1943 113 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3943, History of Ground Forces Reinforcement Command: ETOUSA, Administrative File No. 571B, Training the Replacements, 1, 2.

346

Depot. Individuals were classified into one of two groups (A or B) based on personal interviews and qualifications itemized on their WD AGO Form 20. Group A replacements were considered as having acquired sufficient basic training prior to arrival and were provided with a brisk two- week refresher course. Instructions included the latest battlefield preservation tactics - based on lessons from North Africa, Sicily, and Italy - in conjunction with lessons on military courtesy and customs of the service, personal hygiene, first aid, care and maintenance of individual arms and equipment, the individual effects of articles of war, standing orders and policies of the ETO, rank insignia of British forces, map and aerial photography reading, judgment of terrain, camouflage, cover and concealment and qualification firing. Units were also ordered to select a prescribed number of potential specialists from Group A for attendance at either the American

School Center or Replacement Depot Schools.114

Group B replacements were deemed as having received insufficient training and were ordered to undergo intensive remedial training. The training program for Group B replacements consisted of four sections: Part I – Physical Hardening; Part II – Weapons Training; Part III –

Battlefield Self-Preservation; and Part IV – Recreation and Athletics. Physical training included road marches and obstacle and assault courses. Replacements underwent intensive schooling in the use of personal weapons and, if time permitted, experience in firing all other individual and crew-served weapons. Battlefield self-preservation taught the replacement to live and survive under combat conditions. A comprehensive program of scouting, patrolling, map-reading, sound and camouflage discipline, cover and concealment, identifying, laying, and removing mines and booby-traps, field, sex and personal hygiene, chemical warfare, firefighting, enemy vehicle, aircraft, and uniform identification, first aid, night- and street-fighting was stressed. Indoor and

114 Ibid., 2, 3, 6.

347 outdoor recreation and athletics were utilized to improve physical and mental conditioning and to ensure the maintenance of replacement morale. Replacements were instructed to refer to The

Story of the Replacement pamphlet for training tips not covered at Replacement Depots.115

ILLUSTRATION NO. 19 - Example of Mine Warfare Training Pamphlet

116

The division refined mine and booby trap preparations in the final days preceding the invasion. V Corps‘ training memorandum from 29 March 1944 set minimum proficiency standards for minefield marking techniques and recognition of Allied and German mines. All

115 Ibid., 1, 2, 3. 116 RG 498, NARA II, Box3944, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, Chapter VI, 571F

348 arms were taught to recognize German Tellermines, S Mines, and LPZ Mines, and various pressure igniters, as well as French and Hungarian mines. Combat arms were required to possess the ability to lay, mark, and remove minefields quickly and the ability to neutralize enemy minefields and booby traps, during the day and at night. References to applicable field and technical manuals as well as War Department Training Circulars were included to facilitate the process.117

As the invasion date neared, the 29th Division continued tactical training whenever and wherever possible. RCTs received antiaircraft instructions during March 1944.118 The 175th

RCT conducted a two-day artillery liaison and communications exercise at Bodmin Moor beginning 25 March 1944.119 The 115th RCT did likewise beginning 17 April and followed that with two days of infantry and tank training. The 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion conducted range firing exercises while the 104th Medical Battalion took part in a weeklong medical training scheme at Trevose Head.120 The 116th RCT conducted infantry and tank coordination training in

April while the 175th RCT concentrated on river crossing exercises.121 The division concluded training with non-amphibious battle drill exercises at battalion levels in April and May. During a night-time ‗advance to contact‘ exercise Gerhardt reminded battalion commanders, ―that

117 RG 338, NARA II, Box 19, V Corps, HQ ETOUSA, Training Memorandum No. 9, Mines Minefields, Booby Traps & Demolitions Training, 28 March 1944. 118 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Headquarters V Corps, Selected Training Events of Interest dated 23 March 1944. 119 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Headquarters V Corps, Selected Training Events of Interest dated 22 April 1944. 120 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Headquarters V Corps, Selected Training Events of Interest dated 13 April 1944. 121 RG 338, NARA II, Box 8, Headquarters V Corps, Selected Training Events of Interest dated 17 April 1944.

349 advancing under cover of darkness (required emphasis on) certain principles. (The) (p)lan must be simple and the advance made in compact columns until close to the objective.‖122

The division boarded transport ships at the end of May after a month of relative inactivity. Serious combat training had been nearly impossible with the division being confined within isolated staging areas. The 116th RCT set out for the coast of Normandy on the morning of 5 June after a 24 hour weather postponement. The 115th RCT followed close behind while the

175th RCT remained in England for an extra day. The years of waiting, training, and proficiency testing were over. All that remained was the test of combat against a determined and resourceful enemy. The life or death examination would determine the effectiveness of U.S. Army organization, doctrine, and training.

122 RG 338, NARA II, Box 3900, HQ, 29th I.D., Daily Orders No. 67, Battle Drill Exercises, 11 April 1944, 1.

350

CONCLUSION

The Normandy landings marked the beginning of eleven months of bitter combat for the men of the 29th U.S. Infantry Division. The unit fought its way off the beaches and through hedgerow country, eventually capturing St. Lo. on 18 July 1944. St. Lo served as a communications hub and the hinge on which the Germans swung their defenses in the area, making its liberation an important step towards victory in the Normandy campaign. The men received very little rest after the capture of St. Lo, beginning the move toward Vire on 28 July.

The town was secured on 7 August, though the cost was high. A 29th Division account recalled how the French countryside between St. Lo and Vire made up of, ―(l)ittle picturesque villages,

Percy, Teasy-sur-Vire, (and) St. Germain, all lost their charm rather suddenly for the going was slow and the fighting hard.‖1

The 29th Division‘s subsequent major action was securing the harbor and submarine pens at Brest. The assault began on 25 August 1944 in conjunction with attacks by the 2nd and 8th

Infantry Divisions. Three weeks of bitter combat ensued before the German garrison finally capitulated on 18 September.2 After a short rest the men were shifted into defensive positions just inside the German border. There they remained, largely in static positions, until the attack towards the Roer River began on 16 November. The division set about clearing its assigned area west of the Roer River, culminating in the capture of the Jülich Sportplatz and the Hasenfeld Gut on 8 December. The division then endured more than two months in defensive positions along the Roer River, including Christmas, 1944. The push to the Rhine River kicked off on 23

February 1945. The division halted after securing the important cotton, woolen, silk, and iron

1 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, Historical Data, 29th Infantry Division, 1, 2. 2 Ibid., 2 and Ewing, ―29th Let’s Go!,‖ 121-149.

351 industrial cities of Munchen-Gladbach and Rheydt on 1 March. From that point until the end of the war 29th Division GIs were rotated in and out of the line, experiencing brutal combat one day and peaceful interludes the next.3

The division‘s victories came at a steep price. 28,776 29th Division GIs became battle or non-battle casualties during the unit‘s 242 days in combat, including 3,720 killed.4 The division was responsible for the capture of 38,912 German prisoners of war. Members of the division won two Congressional Medals of Honor, 37 Distinguished Service Crosses, and 733 Silver

Stars. Moreover, the 115th and 116th Regiments along with the 1st Battalion/116th Regiment, the

1st Battalion/175th Regiment and the 121st Combat Engineer Battalions received the Presidential

Unit Citation for Gallantry in Action. 120 enlisted men received a battlefield commission during the unit‘s eleven months of fighting.5

The average soldier in the 29th Division was 5‘7‖ tall, weighed approximately 150 pounds and was 26 years of age. He was well educated, especially in comparison to his First

World War counterpart, though the type of education he received may not have been entirely conducive to soldiering. Many of the tenets common to the American interwar educational curriculum were designed to foster individual thought and self-growth, radically contradictory philosophies to those espoused within military cultures. The type of education taught in schools across America during the interwar years likely made the transition from civilian to soldier much more difficult for the Second World War combatant than his World War I predecessor. A vast

3 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, Historical Data, 29th Infantry Division, 3, 4 and Ewing, ―29th Let’s Go!,‖ passim. 4 Office of the Theater Historian, ―29th Division,‖ in Order of Battle of the United States Army World War II European Theater of Operations, Divisions (Office of the Theater Historian, 1945) http://www.history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/ETOOB-TOC.htm (accessed 9 October 2013). 5 Unpublished pamphlet titled, ―29th Let‘s Go,‖ 31 found in 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department.

352 majority of the division‘s soldiers were gainfully employed prior to induction despite the economic depression. A surprising percentage - 83.6% - of the division hailed from urban centers despite only 57% of the nation‘s population residing in cities and towns in 1940. More than 80% of the division‘s soldiers were single even though there was no stipulation restricting married men from being called up for service via the draft. Replacements composed more than

80% of the division‘s strength by June, 1944. The division‘s make-up represented a strong plurality of states despite its pre-mobilization origins from the Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. regions. The 29th Division‘s officer corps possessed a mix of Regular

Army and National Guard representation though virtually all of the unit‘s top ranking officers were well-educated and experienced West Point graduates.

War Department officials implemented complex personnel selection and replacement systems during World War II. These distinctly American products were designed to provide adequate manpower to divisions during their formative stages and to ensure that units were able to endure sustained combat while remaining viable fighting forces.

The dual purposes of the U.S. Army‘s Personnel Selection System were to build a technologically advanced army of specialists and to husband the nation‘s manpower resources more efficiently than had been the case during the First World War. The personnel selection process began with the draft. The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was similar in most respects to its First World War predecessor. The draft provided the bulk of the army‘s insatiable manpower needs during World War II but did not cause its chronic manpower shortages. The draft was only the beginning of the personnel selection process. Draftees meeting eligibility standards were subsequently posted to Induction Stations for psychological and psychiatric testing. The drawn out process continued at Reception Centers where recruits

353 were subjected to another round of psychological and psychiatric testing. Individuals surviving the vetting process at Reception Centers were classified, given military occupational specialties and specification serial numbers, and assigned to a training station.

American leaders adopted a highly scientific approach to the personnel selection process.

War Department officials sought assistance from psychologists and psychiatrists to administer and operate the system. Psychologists eagerly designed and implemented testing procedures to be used during the induction process. Psychiatrists conducted personal interviews at induction stations across the United States. Their verdicts often determined whether an inductee was admitted into the army or rejected. Psychiatrists went on to become responsible for treating and returning as many combat exhaustion cases to front line units as possible.

However, the selection process proved to be more of an art than a science. Army leaders and the social scientists they employed badly underestimated the common rifleman‘s relevance in World War II and the indispensible role infantry units would play in securing ground victories for the U.S. Army. The unfortunate result was an overabundance of soldiers with specialist

MOS‘s and too few riflemen.

The personnel selection process was initially a positive endeavor where individuals were chosen on the basis of sought-after characteristics. However, the system varied widely by state and became more and more negative as the war progressed. A detrimental pattern arose where increasing numbers of potentially capable soldiers were rejected for undesirable qualities - either perceived or real. The results were incredibly damaging to the army‘s manpower situation.

Psychiatric screening separated over a half-million serving soldiers - some with years of army service - and rejected nearly two million inductees prior to basic training. The multi-echeloned

354 personnel selection system eventually cost the U.S. Army more than five million potential riflemen.

The 29th Division suffered the effects of the army‘s personnel selection system throughout the war, experiencing unremitting infantry shortages during training and over long stretches of combat - often while possessing an overabundance of specialists. Ironically, the system was never able to weed out perceived undesirables regardless of how many inductees were rejected. Historian Russell Weigley concluded the establishment of, ―a ninety-division army for the Second World War was not an altogether impressive performance for a superpower.‖6 The primary causes of manpower shortages that limited the size of the army to 90 divisions were the War Department‘s misguided emphasis on specialists and an inefficient personnel selection system. The army was never able to produce a clearly defined and institutionalized manpower policy. Confused and overlapping administrative procedures bred an inefficient personnel selection system that hurt the army‘s battlefield performance far more than it helped.

Conversely, the army‘s complicated, multi-echeloned replacement system performed remarkably well. The U.S. Army‘s organizational nature demanded timely deliveries of properly trained replacements. The replacement system was able to funnel 2,500,000 trained replacements to the combat arms alone and was largely responsible for the army‘s ability to endure sustained attrition warfare and prevail in Northwest Europe. Unlike the German and

British armies in World War II and the AEF in the First World War the U.S. Army was not forced to cannibalize any divisions due to replacement shortages during World War II. The system maintained all eighty-nine army divisions sent overseas at or near TO&E strengths

6 Weigley, ―Eisenhower’s Lieutenants,‖ 13-14.

355 despite battle and non-battle losses effectively wiping out many of the divisions more than once in the course of the war.

The replacement system was responsible for the production of filler replacements early in the war and combat loss replacements once the army became involved in combat. War

Department officials studied AEF replacement system failures to ensure similar errors were not repeated in the Second World War. Army leaders utilized lessons learned from the war‘s early campaigns and the large-scale maneuvers conducted in Louisiana and the Carolinas to develop improved administration, provisioning, and requisitioning methods. The results were generally positive, though setbacks were inevitable in an organization as complex and large as the replacement system.

The soundest criticism of the U.S. Army‘s Replacement System during the Second World

War was its morale-sapping nature. Inductees were trained in company-sized formations but were separated from friends and acquaintances after graduation. Replacements became individual, anonymous cogs in the giant army machine once a member of the pipeline. System designers may not have foreseen or intended the miserable atmosphere within the replacement organization but it was pervasive nonetheless. Unsympathetic and indifferent attitudes by the individuals manning the replacement pipeline often worsened an already bad situation. War

Department officials and replacement system administrators sought morale enhancing resolutions - including package shipments - though little good was ever accomplished.

The actual process of incorporating replacements into combat units was also inefficient and thoroughly unsatisfactory. After pronounced deliberations War Department officials settled on a system that positioned replacements individually rather than in groups. The results to replacement morale were often catastrophic. Many of the subsequent problems, when viewed

356 contextually, were due to incompatibilities between the replacement system and the triangular division schematic. Neither was particularly bad on its own merits. However, the replacement system was designed when square divisions were still in vogue. The four regiment square division - with one regiment out of the line - would have made the process of infusing replacements more efficient and better for morale had War Department officials foregone the triangularizaiton process.

The organization and doctrine an army carries into battle governs battle outcomes to a large extent. The two must be able to coexist and produce synergistic results otherwise one or the other, or both, would be a failure. The triangulation of infantry divisions and the adaptation of a fire and maneuver doctrine were fundamentally sound choices on paper. However, the nature of battle that confronted the U.S. Army in Northwest Europe brought the limitations of each to the fore.

National Guard divisions began the process of shifting from a square division format composed of four infantry regiments, to a pared down triangular arrangement in early 1940. The move to light and flexible triangulated divisions was likely an easy decision for American military leaders, who possessed a history of thinking in terms of mobile warfare that dated to the frontier days. The triangulation process and the implementation of a fire and maneuver doctrine may also have possessed faddist undertones. Early German ‗blitzkrieg’ successes, and the fact that many of America‘s traditional allies had already done so, were likely pivotal factors in the

War Department‘s adaptation of both. Conversely, the 90 division gamble and the War

Department‘s replacement and personnel selection systems were distinctly American products, resulting largely from the AEF‘s experiences in the First World War.

357

The warfare American divisions encountered during the campaign to liberate Northwest

Europe was similar in many respects to the AEF‘s experiences a generation earlier. The fighting in both instances consisted largely of close quarter combat and long periods of semi-stalemate warfare. The primacy of large, plodding, and heavily-manned infantry divisions capable of withstanding heavy punishment while maintaining the ability to dish out overwhelming and sustained firepower necessary to attrite the enemy represented a primary lesson from the First

World War.

The lesson was lost on War Department officials in World War II. The triangulation process limited the U.S. Army‘s ability to attrite the enemy when its doctrine of fire and maneuver failed to provide quick and decisive victories. A triangular U.S. Army division possessed far fewer riflemen and less organic artillery than its square counterpart. American leaders seeking battlefield maneuver looked to the semiautomatic rifle as a primary means of maintaining a division‘s organic firepower by compensating for the drastic reduction in riflemen dictated by a triangular division‘s TO&E. A division‘s organic firepower, excluding artillery pieces, was a function of the number of riflemen, the type of weapon, and how much ammunition they were able to carry into battle. For example, an infantry division with 12,000 men carrying bolt action rifles and 100 rounds of ammunition will have three times the firepower over a sustained period of combat compared to 4000 men in a division carrying semi-automatic rifles and 100 rounds of ammunition.

A First World War division‘s organic firepower was therefore much heavier than its

World War II counterpart. The triangulation decision suggests War Department officials were willing to sacrifice firepower to achieve maneuver in their quest to avoid stalemate warfare. One army officer dissented from the belief that overwhelming firepower could be maintained and

358 infantry attacks could be successful with fewer men carrying semiautomatic M-1 rifles. Major

General George A. Lynch argued, ―(t)he consequences of the acceptance of this concept are so tremendous that it ought to be examined with the utmost care. It would completely transform the character of (the American) military establishment and the tactical principles governing its operations in peace and in war.‖7 The decrease in organic firepower that resulted from the triangulation decision compounded the U.S. Army‘s battlefield setbacks when static warfare occurred. In other words, the decision to triangulate may have caused many of the U.S. Army‘s problems during WWII. Had the War Department not triangulated American formations the firepower of an attacking infantry division with 12,000 riflemen possessing the M-1 semiautomatic rifle would have been truly staggering.

Historian Russell Weigley concluded the U.S. Army‘s performance in World War II was diminished by the adaptation of lighter infantry divisions. When they became involved in attrition warfare, Weigley determined triangular divisions lacked the stamina to accept high casualty rates and remain capable of delivering overwhelming and sustained firepower.8 Peter

Mansoor subsequently labeled Weigley‘s argument as, ―attractive but superficial,‖ and noted,

―Weigley‘s argument would only hold true had the army substituted square for triangular divisions on a one-for-one basis.‖9 However, analysis of the 29th Division‘s combat preparations illustrates the perceptiveness of Weigley‘s original interpretations. War Department officials would not have had to substitute square division for triangular divisions on a one-to-one basis since the decision to triangulate infantry divisions predates the ninety division gamble. Besides,

War Department officials, and McNair in particular, sought a 200 division army until the final

7 Major General George A. Lynch, ―Firepower, Manpower, Maneuver,‖ Infantry Journal 46, no. 6 (November-December, 1939): 500. 8 Weigley, ―Eisenhower’s Lieutenants,‖ 22-28. 9 Mansoor, ―The GI Offensive in Europe,‖ 253.

359 months of 1942.10 The triangulation decision went hand-in-hand with the fire and maneuver doctrine, the formation of an army of specialists, and worldwide organizational trends. A less rigid classification system and a lessened focus on specialists would have produced as many or more square divisions than the ninety triangular divisions eventually raised by the U.S. Army.

In addition, the decisions to limit the number of fighting divisions and to maintain their strength through a constant flow of individual loss replacements failed to take into account the need to provide units and soldiers periodic breaks from frontline service. War Department officials conducted a large number of inquiries on the subject of a lack of unit rotation and its effects on units and individuals in the war‘s aftermath.11 A 1947 Pentagon Board examining manpower allocation during the Second World War considered the validity of returning to square divisions. One witness testifying before the board, Colonel John M. Caldwell, Chief of the

Neuropsychiatric Consultants Division, The Surgeon General‘s Office, enthusiastically agreed stating there should have been, ―some such system whereby men c(ould) (have) be(en) rotated out of the line for short periods of rest. Frequent relief for shorter periods rather than less frequent rest for longer periods would (have) be(en) preferable.‖12

A separate postwar commission determined, ―(i)n World War II…….(American) divisions were much harder used than those of our allies, and if rotation be the criterion our divisions were used very much harder than those of the enemy. That this hard usage caused

10 RG 337, NARA II, Box 237. Unpublished Draft No. 4 – Mobilization of the Ground Army, Historical Section, AGF, 1946, 4, 11, 12. 11 See for example, RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Tab A, A Study of Rotation, War Department Replacement Board Studies, ‗Combat Rotation‘ and ‗AGF Battle Casualties. 12 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Annex 19, Statement of Colonel John M. Caldwell, Chief of the Neuropsychiatric Consultants Division, The Surgeon General‘s Office, 26 August 1947, 2.

360 extra casualties for our troops seems incontrovertible.‖13 A transnational comparison would demonstrate that few American divisions were utilized more-frequently or in a harsher fashion than either allied or German divisions. Nonetheless, the lack of unit rotation undoubtedly caused additional casualties within hard-pressed American infantry divisions. Soldiers engaged in heavy and sustained combat required intermittent breaks to minimize combat exhaustion casualty rates and potentially life-or-death mistakes. With no rotational policy in effect, ―the personnel of a division could look forward to only death, wounds or mental breakdown as their ultimate destiny.‖14

The army‘s experiences would have been radically altered had the triangulation process not taken place. Division commanders could have rotated one regiment out of the line for refitting while maintaining a two-up, one in reserve setting at the front. Soldiers would have been provided more opportunities to rest and recuperate under such a scenario. Moreover, combat loss replacements could have been assimilated into the regiment at rest, attached to veterans for guidance, and provided up-to-date training. Such a gradual form of acclimatization would have improved individual replacement morale and may have saved countless lives.

The doctrine of fire and maneuver was largely unsuccessful in providing U.S. Army formations the means for quick and cheap battlefield victories. Doctrinal development is problematic in peacetime armies short of funds. The process in the U.S. Army was virtually non-existent during the interwar years. Nearly two decades passed between the comprehensive

1923 FSR and the lackluster 1939 version. As one would imagine, ―the price exacted in soldiers‘

13 RG 337, NARA II, Box 415, Unnamed testimonial in, Replacement System World-Wide, WWII, Report of the Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947, Section I, Allocation of Manpower, 3. 14 RG 319, NARA II, Box 3, Letter from Brigadier General Robert W. Berry to Major General Orlando Ward, 26 March 1951, 1.

361 blood for neglect of peacetime training, equipment modernization, and doctrine development was high.‖15 War Department officials scrambling to modernize U.S. Army doctrine in light of the expanding war in Europe issued the 1941 FSR only two years after the 1939 version‘s release. The updated manual was a major improvement by most accounts, though army commanders were forced to abandon many of its tenets when they proved ineffectual in battle.

War Department officials relied almost exclusively on the 1941 FSR for doctrinal guidance during the Second World War. A great deal of the army‘s training prior to American entry into the conflict was nevertheless centered on the earlier 1939 version. Training for most of the remainder of the war was largely based on the 1941 FSR after its release in May of that year. American doctrine stressed quick destruction of the enemy‘s forces through offensive action that concentrated superior force at the proper place and time. Wishing to avoid a repetition of the massive bloodshed of World War I, Field Service Regulations called for a unity of effort that most efficiently utilized all arms to achieve maneuver and envelopment on the battlefield in place of stalemate warfare and frontal attacks.

The War Department rigidly stressed offensive action despite lessons from the First

World War that punctured the ‗cult of the offensive‘ myth. A ground combat strategist noted

American interwar doctrine was, ―strangely and uncomfortably reminiscent of the French doctrine of 1914….(It) had many serious defects….It became not a doctrine but a dogma.‖16

American doctrine was likely influenced by early German lightning successes as well, despite

15 Odom, ―After the Trenches,‖ 243. 16 Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Scammell, National Guard Bureau, ―The Infantry Division: A System for Determining It‘s [sic] Organization,‖ Infantry Journal 41, no. 2 (March-April, 1934): 111.

362 one army officer warning for War Department officials in 1941 that if the U.S. Army, ―blindly imitate(d) the Nazis they will inevitably be one jump ahead.‖17

The primacy of the infantry soldier also remained a central tenet of American doctrine during World War II. Successive FSRs gradually incorporated means that allowed ancillary arms to supplement an infantry division‘s firepower, though the rifle remained the army‘s chosen source of firepower. The common American rifleman was the primary source of small unit firepower and, unlike an infantryman in the Second World War British Army, was not an ammunition carrier for the squad light machine gun first and attacker of the enemy‘s flank second.

The debate continues whether the U.S. Army in World War II was influenced by its frontier heritage that stressed battlefield mobility over sustained power. Russell Weigley concluded the frontier mindset provided the impetus for the triangulation decision. The result were infantry divisions incapable of dishing out and receiving sustained blows with the enemy when maneuver proved impossible and attrition warfare once more raised its ugly head.18 Peter

Mansoor argues otherwise, noting that, ―American infantry divisions in World War II routinely operated with numerous attachments in combat – to include artillery, tank, tank destroyer, engineer, and antiaircraft units – which gave them much greater power than one would surmise from a look at their tables of organization.‖19 However, critical study of the army‘s interwar doctrinal debates, the forty months of intensive training conducted by the 29th Division (that overwhelmingly stressed offensive action and maneuver,) the lack of significant inter-arm training, and the division‘s casualty rates during battle validate Weigley‘s previous inferences.

17 Colonel J. A. Dorst, ―Organization for Speed,‖ Infantry Journal 47, no. 6 (December, 1941): 60. 18 Weigley, ―Eisenhower’s Lieutenants,‖ 729, 730. 19 Mansoor, ―The GI Offensive in Europe,‖ 253.

363

War Department officials were guilty of not developing a contingency doctrine in the event that fire and maneuver failed. As a result, the U.S. Army was forced to rely on a combination of brute force, attrition warfare, and the individual soldier‘s courage to achieve victory over a stubborn and resourceful Germany Army that benefitted from fighting predominately defensive actions. Common soldiers suffered the greatest from this doctrinal omission, not the commanding officers who ordered them into battle or War Department officials who gambled exclusively on the fire and maneuver doctrine.

Brute force unquestionably helped allied armies overcome attrition warfare during World

War II. The negative connotations attached to its use are largely postwar constructs. WWI leaders doing likewise have been spared similar criticism from historians. Furthermore, comparisons of tactical and operational effectiveness have been driven almost exclusively by the historian. Soldiers focused primarily on living and winning welcomed the use of brute force and spent little time pondering relative combat effectiveness. A comparison of morale in a tactically superior army, who lost the war while suffering high casualties, on one hand, to the morale in the triumphant army that utilized brute force, but was judged inferior by postwar historians, would swiftly end these two manufactured debates.

The U.S. Army‘s ability to learn from its mistakes and to adapt in the face of operational adversity was moderate at best. Military formations by their very nature are conservative bodies generally resistant to change. The individual, relatively well-educated American soldier proved capable of adapting to adversity and developing new techniques to achieve tactical victories.

Platoons and companies developed operation-winning tactics as well, often through a series of hard knocks common to the schoolhouse of war.

364

However, a comprehensive review of the 29th Division‘s training reveals the U.S. Army did not adapt rapidly to changing battlefield conditions. Official doctrine remained virtually unchanged throughout World War II, based largely on guidelines set out in the 1941 FSR. Nor did army training undergo any fundamental wartime changes on account of it being based mainly on the tenets found in training literature such as MTPs, which in turn were based on the aforementioned 1941 FSR. Frequent references to Sergeant Culin‘s rhino tanks do not represent an army-wide ability to adapt.20 An army that allows minor tactical tweaks on the go but does not change its doctrine or operational means over a sustained period of combat is not an army that adapts quickly.

Raising and training large military formations is simply too complex a procedure to be accomplished flawlessly. The process becomes infinitely more difficult when carried out under duress. The attack on Pearl Harbor thrust the U.S. Army into such a scenario. Harried War

Department officials developed training means that prepared formations for battle as quickly and efficiently as possible. Training narratives varied on a unit-by-unit basis and no two formations were trained exactly alike during the organized chaos that ensued. The eighty-nine army divisions that fought in World War II therefore entered combat at various degrees of readiness despite considerable efforts at standardized training.

The 29th Division‘s extensive training narrative affords a broader appreciation of combat preparations in the U.S. Army during the Second World War and illustrates the integral link between training and doctrine. A comprehensive study of a unit‘s training provides the means to determine whether it fought as it prepared and, in turn, whether those preparations were successful. The narrative also illustrates that training, doctrinal, and organizational excellence

20 Doubler, ―Closing with the Enemy,‖ 45-46, 58, 269 and Mansoor, ―The GI Offensive in Europe,‖ 164.

365 are never a fait accompli, even when units have plenty of time to prepare. Finally, the training analysis provides a greater understanding of the division‘s battle results.

The 29th Division began earnest combat preparations immediately after its mobilization.

The unit trained according to specific War Department guidelines outlined in Mobilization

Training Programs and other army training literature. Training approaches were designed to instill an ability to achieve decisive victory through the use of U.S. Army doctrine. Most of the division‘s training was based on the doctrinal tenets outlined in the 1939 and 1941 FSR. War

Department training methodologies were highly centralized, a necessity due to the army‘s shortage of skilled instructors. Though necessary, centralized methods decreased an instructor‘s ability to utilize individual initiative during training. Centralized training programs also require flawless doctrinal principles and instructional methods to avoid the dissemination of defective tactical lessons on an army-wide basis.

Early combat preparations within the 29th Division stressed basic individual and small unit training. A number of cadres were readied to receive and train inductees sent straight to the division from War Department Induction Stations. The 29th Division went on to train large numbers of recruits when overwhelmed Replacement Training Centers could not manage the rapid influx of recruits produced by the draft. In terms of the division‘s contributions to the war effort this accomplishment ranked second only to its battle achievements. The question of who trained the trainers in National Guard and Regular Army divisions as well as at Replacement

Training Centers and the comparative quality of training provided to inductees at each echelon remains in need of broader study.

Trainees and pre-war guardsmen were subjected to an abundance of close order drill, bayonet and marksmanship exercises, physical conditioning, and citizenship lectures. Not

366 everyone took the instructions seriously in 1941. Many viewed their induction into federal service as a one year imposition followed by a quick return to civilian life. The attack on Pearl

Harbor forever shattered that belief. Combat preparations took on a new and more-serious perspective in 1942, though little worthwhile training was achieved in the 29th Division in the attack‘s immediate aftermath.

The 29th Division continued close order drill, individual basic training, and small unit preparations as spring turned to summer in 1942. Leaders utilized proficiency testing to ensure the achievement of standardized results within the division. Battalion and regimental preparations began as soon as it was deemed that the men were adequately trained at the squad, platoon, and company levels. Standard operating procedures were developed to save time and reduce friction during battle. Regimental Combat Teams were established and trained to fight as independent formations. Capable staff officers were appointed and trained to adequately fulfill their pivotal roles during training and combat. Vital training was also carried out in the division‘s support units. Most of the preparations in artillery, quartermaster, medical, engineer, ordnance, and military police formations were carried out independently. Only large-scale maneuvers offered the division‘s various formations the opportunity to work together during training.

A considerable proportion of the 29th Division‘s training in the United States was devoted to multi-corps exercises in the Carolinas. Maneuvers served to wash out inept leadership and were beneficial to medical, quartermaster, engineer, communications, and ordnance units and to staff and command personnel but provided few benefits to the common infantryman. War

Department officials were heavily influenced by the early successes of the German ‗blitzkrieg’ doctrine. Maneuver instructions stressed constant movement and urged unit commanders to

367 avoid becoming bogged down. The maneuvers were adventurous affairs as a result. Units conducted wide envelopments and lightning movements but carried out little training that helped the individual infantryman.

American doctrine underwent few changes between the Carolina rehearsals and the landings at Normandy. The maneuvers illustrate what War Department officials thought, or at least hoped, ground combat would consist of during World War II. Unfortunately, most operations in Northwest Europe in no way resembled the Carolina maneuvers. Infantry units necessarily reverted to attrition warfare when fire and envelopment doctrines failed and units like the 29th Division became battle axes rather than rapiers.

The 29th Division did not participate in any joint exercises above the division level after the Carolina maneuvers in 1942. The unit‘s training in Great Britain consisted predominately of regimental combat team, battalion, company, platoon, and squad drills, whereas British and

Canadian units continued army-sized maneuvers well into 1943. Nonetheless, the smaller exercises likely did a better job preparing the individual American rifleman and cannoneer for combat than multi-corps rehearsals did for his Canadian and British counterparts.

The 29th Division redeployed to Great Britain shortly after the second round of Carolina

Maneuvers were completed. The only change to the division‘s early training in England was the location it took place. U.S. Army Headquarters officials provided guidance to help the men acclimate to their new surroundings since the move to Great Britain represented the first trip abroad for most of the division‘s personnel. With it already having combat experience,

American officials wisely leaned on the British Army for guidance. A surprisingly large number of 29th Division soldiers attended specialized British training schools. Personnel exchange

368 programs were also instituted between British and American formations to allow for an interchange of ideas and experiences.

American leaders sought to foster successful power arrangements during combat preparations and to instill within soldiers the sense that they could expect to be treated with fairness and justice throughout their military service. These progressive endeavors were not universally successful, though they did help maintain morale and discipline. Additional measures were instituted to reduce VD and AWOL rates as well as various other civil and military offences. Sentences imposed during disciplinary action generally reflected American values, though a lack of punishment standardization suggests a quickly-instituted, ad hoc system was utilized in Great Britain.

U.S. Army officials carried on a running debate on the virtues of the British Army‘s battle inoculation training and whether a similar program should be introduced into the American syllabus. The hate portion of British battle inoculation training was eventually rejected though army leaders did agree that training should include scenarios where the men leaned into friendly artillery barrages and experienced live ammunition being fired over their heads. 29th Division soldiers were inexplicably provided few opportunities to experience such beneficial training.

The division experienced a return to the basics during training in early 1943.

Standardized training that prepared the division for offensive action in the shortest possible timeframe was carried out thereafter. Division administrators were ordered to institute a results- based system that demanded progress and identified failures. Successive rounds of proficiency tests ensured desired training progress was being achieved. A system requiring units to submit monthly progress reports was instituted in April, 1943. Staff and command officers were reminded to eschew paperwork and show-down inspections and to concentrate instead on

369 personal supervision of meaningful training activities. Arduous, perhaps misguided, division- wide route marches were conducted on a weekly basis to maintain physical conditioning.

Engineer, ordnance, quartermaster, and communications formations carried out specialized training exercises individually. Artillery units conducted crash courses designed to prepare their members for the extraordinarily complicated task of placing rapid, indirect fire on six or eight digit map references, achieving a remarkably high standard of professionalism in the process. Decisive artillery support would not have been possible had these essential tactical procedures not been developed and perfected during training. American artillery tactics were complicated and advanced, though the U.S. Army system was similar in most respects to its

British counterpart.

The division embarked on an intense phase of amphibious assault training in the late summer of 1943. British, Canadian, and American officers huddled in meetings to share experiences and to learn collective lessons from past amphibious assaults. Assault training limited but did not eliminate regular combat preparations within the division as leaders sought to strike a reasonable balance between the two important training subjects. Non-amphibious training methodologies remained unchanged in the division, including marksmanship, booby trap and chemical warfare training, physical hardening through organized sporting activities and regular route marches, close order drill, frequent proficiency tests of officers and enlisted men, along with platoon, company, and battalion exercises. Replacements continued to be incorporated into the division as late as May, 1944.

The 29th Division prepared for the invasion at two specially designed U.S. Army assault training centers located on opposite coasts of Great Britain. One of these locations - the United

States Assault Training Center - went beyond simply providing units a location to conduct

370 amphibious assault training. The USATC devised and taught fundamental assault doctrines and tactics and determined assault craft compositions and initial assault wave breakdowns. Many

USATC procedures, such as the provision of so few riflemen in the initial waves, partially clarify

American difficulties on Omaha Beach.

Assault preparations shifted to the second American amphibious training center located at

Slapton Sands in early 1944. The 29th Division participated in five large-scale amphibious assault rehearsals - Duck I, Duck II, Duck III, Fox, and Fabius I - between January and May,

1944 at Slapton Sands. The rehearsals were beneficial to support and staff elements of the division and provided SOS troops an essential opportunity at marshaling large numbers of invasion troops. The exercises offered few tangible benefits to assault troops, however, as opposing enemy forces and aerial bombardments were imaginary in all five and only Fabius I contained a live naval fire element. Even worse, the exercises provided assault troops with a false sense of confidence. A company commander in the 116th warned in the aftermath of

Exercise Duck II that, ―the lack of opposition to the advance of this battalion after landing discouraged interest in the problem. Mock defensive layouts…….should be in considerable depth, lest they give the invading troops a misleading and dangerous expectation of the opposition on the actual invasion.‖21 Punishing German defenses on the morning of 6 June dashed the misguided beliefs of anyone lulled into such a false sense of security.

It remains unclear whether ETOUSA officials learned any lessons from the errors committed during the five large-scale exercises. Extensive post-exercise critiques were ordered, often to the platoon level. The paperwork generated was impressive though not all the lessons were necessarily heeded. Assault troops, for example, went ashore on 6 June heavily laden

21 RG 338, NARA II, Box 82, V Corps, Memorandum from Company B, 175th Regiment to 175th Regiment, Comments on Exercise Duck, 6 January 1944, 3.

371 despite warnings from all five rehearsals that overloading reduced mobility and increased the potential of drowning. Many practical and valuable lessons may have been lost in the sheer volume of paperwork produced.

Moreover, ETOUSA officials may have been guilty of blind optimism and best-case scenario planning during amphibious assault training. The three Duck exercises were described as having been held so that units would, ―become aware of the major deficiencies in training and correct them.‖22 A post-Fox critique optimistically assured that setbacks would be, ―cleared up in the next exercise…….where there w(ou)l(d) be more time for adequate planning."23 The heartbreaking results of the Omaha Beach landings suggest American officials missed or ignored a number of training and doctrinal errors illuminated by the five assault rehearsals.

The 29th Division‘s training narrative illustrates another fundamental mistake. The omission of hedgerow warfare training represented the U.S. Army‘s most significant training error prior to the invasion of France. This conscious or unconscious oversight may have resulted from terrain conditions not matching a predetermined doctrine. Mirror-imaging likely caused

War Department and ETO officials to believe the Germans would not contest hedgerow country either. The 29th Division entering combat unprepared for hedgerow warfare was akin to the U.S.

Army foregoing desert training during preparations for the two Gulf Wars. In describing the training omission a 29th Division veteran noted:

…..(T)he war in Normandy was a ‗monstrous bloodbath,‘……(and) the hedgerow was a major, though passive, contributor……(T)he combined skills of all the renowned military engineers of history could not have built a more effective system of field fortification that these thousands of interlocking earthen embankments that divide(d) the fields and orchards of Normandy. And it was a system ready-made and waiting for a

22 RG 338, NARA II, Box 6, V Corps, HQ V Corps, Critique of Exercise Duck, 12 January 1944, 9. 23 Jones, ―The Administrative and Logistical History of the European Theater of Operations,‖ 232.

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Germany army that fully understood its uses…… The metal we were able to throw took its toll but attack across field after field remained deadly beyond comprehension……. It was a rare rifleman who survived six weeks of it unmarked……. (The 29th Division) w(as) rehearsed endlessly for attacking beach defenses, but not one day was given to the terrain behind the beaches, which was no less difficult and deadly…..(despite) the planners ha(ving) current aerial photographs showing the maze and its problems, and the written record of fighting there go(ing) back at least as far as Julius Caesar…..That he sensed the invasion plan might harbor some such blatant oversight was….indicated by Winston Churchill, who grumbled – worriedly, sarcastically, ironically? – that from the number of vehicles to be jammed ashore (the allies) were certain, at least, of outnumbering the Germans in drivers.‖24

A 29th Division after action report from July, 1944 ordered battalion commanders to rectify the training deficiency by conducting battle drill exercises stressing hedgerow training whenever possible. One drill called on units to rehearse, ―(a) (t)he movement of a squad from hedgerow to hedgerow at full speed with at least ten yards interval between men. All move forward on command…..(b) (c)oming under simulated artillery fire, squads break for the nearest cover to the front and then continue to advance during lulls in the fire…..(c) (c)oming under simulated rifle fire or machine gun fire, individuals use cover available, open fire, and the bulk of the squad maneuvers rapidly under the leader to outflank the fire.‖25 The report was unfortunately released too late to provide any combat solutions to the vexing problems of hedgerow warfare or to prevent the large numbers of 29th Division soldiers already killed or wounded as a result of the training omission.

The state of training in the 29th Division and even its structural foundation had been called into question prior to the invasion in a document titled ‗Confidential Notes on the 29th

Division.‘ The protracted report by the division historian, Lieutenant Fox, was released on 5

September 1943. It was based on Fox‘s personal observations of the 3rd Battalion, 115th

24 Cawthon, ―Other Clay,‖ 76-77. 25 RG 498, NARA II, Box 3944, After Action Report of 29th Infantry Division for July, Battle Notes – 29th Division, 1.

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Regiment, though, ―from cursory observation and talks with officers and men from the other regiments and elements of the Division, the same conclusions and remarks (we)re applicable universally.‖26 The author caustically noted:

(t)he division was primarily composed of a, ―typical cross-section of the kind who became National Guardsmen in peacetime, i.e., mainly the extrovert, low-education- level, loudmouth, swashbuckling, prejudiced people who were attracted to the NG because it was a poor man‘s social center and, at times, a business asset. Inextricably, of course, there were mixed up in this group men whose motives were genuinely patriotic, but their number was small and their efforts mainly fruitless, partially because of their own lack of thorough training and, partially, because of their inability to carry through to a conclusion constructive plans because of juntas placed in key positions. The National Guard system was set up and based on the idea that men from the same backgrounds and communities would function better when confronted with the stresses of war on foreign soil. The idea was fine, but the application is a failure. Another system must be devised for the future. The result of putting men together who have so intimately connected is failure [sic.] when the normal processes of replacement begin to take place. It would be fine -- to a limited extent -- if these original National Guardsmen were supermen who could continue to function without failure until the end of a war, but they cannot. But when the new men come in, these old ones feel that, th(r)ough length of service -- even though it has been only the one-night-a-week variety in which everyone visited an armory, absorbed short periods of inferior military instruction, and then proceeded to get drunk -- they are entitled to all the ranks of privilege. They naturally tend to band together to exclude the outsider and, when, through his own ability, he does manage to obtain a just recognition, they resent him. This causes a morale problem and lowers the efficiency of the unit as a whole. Perhaps the most aggravating thing about the 29th Division is that it possesses men and junior officers about as good as any in the United States. But those officers of Company and Battery Commander and Battalion C.O. level are old National Guardsmen and they are in the key positions to continue their old tricks, thwart the ambitious new officers, continue their fav(or)tism, and yet hide their lack of ability and knowledge by blaming all deficiencies and shortcomings on the ‗junior officers,‘ a term which had become sickening to most, when it was obvious that these same ‗junior officers‘ were, in many cases, far superior to their critics….(I) believe that unless the situation alters before the 29th hits action next spring, there will be a large proportion of company and battalion C.O.s killed by their own men. It‘s hard to analyze the feelings of men who grow to hate as many of them have done and, while time and subsequent treatment may alter their feelings, many will take advantage of the cloak of battle to ‗liquidate‘ men who have caused them real or imagined woes.

26 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, File 52 General Notes: 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions, Confidential Notes on the 29th Division.

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Favoritism has been a drug on initiative. Restricted, parochial, small town outlooks on the part of these commanders has also resulted in many officers being unwilling to attempt to better the type of training received by the men because they knew their COs would not sanction anything but the old, tried-and-true routine. Many officers have been made victims of a public dressing-down in front of their men, many have been ridiculed because they were not of the same common ilk as some of their superiors, many of whose proudest boast to fame was their ability to consume liquor and fornicate. Many officers -- in fact, this has happened on many occasions in every27 company -- have been practically shut out of the running of their companies, because company commanders have preferred to take their old-line NG NCOs into their confidence while leaving out their junior officers. This system has been embarrassing on many occasions, because the officers have had to find out what was going on from their NCOs. Another thing which has acted as a detriment is the fact that many times Officers have never been given adequate warning of the type of instruction or training they were to conduct. The problems of morale (in the division) is [sic.] not as bad today as it had been but is still rather critical. There was a marked change for the better when Charles Gerhardt assumed command. He allowed and, in fact, stimulated (unintelligible) among his officers. This had been a sore point in morale for the last year but there was a quick upsurge in hope when many promotions came through in the junior ranks. Many officers realized that there certainly weren‘t enough promotions to go around, but they felt better that at last the iron grip of stagnation has been broken and some of the others, whom they knew to be competent, were given higher rank. Another point is that everyone gained a very favorable opinion of Gerhardt when he first took over. They like him and I believe will fight damned well for him. In everyone‘s opinion he‘s a ‗soldier‘s soldier.‘ He never lets his rank interfere with the amount of mud or dirt or hard work he takes on. He‘s a good field soldier, willing to take the knocks with the other fellow, a point psychologically important for a combat commander. He‘s been a tonic for most of the men in the Division. That is not a reflection on Gen(eral) Gerow. Gerow, now Corps commander, is recognized as one of the finest and ablest Infantry tacticians in the army, but he had the unpleasant task of trying to make soldiers out of a basically pampered National Guard nucleus and the resultant harsh methods he employed - which produced excellent results - made him appear in an unfavorable and unpleasant light. These are all defects which have affected the training and preparation of the Division for combat. They have resulted in an almost complete lack of esprit and a general desire on the part of all not in the favored graces of state politics to leave. However, of late there has been a pronounced change for the better, although there is still a vast amount to be done to eliminate the remaining jealously in favoritism. The reason seems to be the final completion of personnel strength in all units and the great influence of non-National Guard personnel, who have greatly reduced the old cliques‘ power. It is my belief that, despite past feelings, however, the Division will give an excellent account of itself when it meets the enemy, for I believe the men and those competent officers have enough confidence in themselves to carry through the task with which they will be confronted. They will not be hindered by mistakes or stupidities when the chips are down.

27 Underline original.

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(A)t the time of federal induction.…, men who held inferior places in their communities suddenly found themselves in the driver‘s seat. Some were Officers, some NCOs, most were unfit for the new job of ordering and directing others, many of whom had held better positions in the communities and had little respect for their new bosses. The result was willful insubordination, drunkenness and flagrant AWOL, most of which violations never were punished seriously, because the Officers responsible for disciple openly conceded that they had to go back and live together and make a living in the same towns from which the miscreants and themselves had come. If they did anything serious to these men, they contended, they never could be able to carry on in their old places.28

The summary was either a pejorative report by an Uptonian disciple or a damning and accurate indictment composed by a concerned member of the 29th Division. The division‘s state of morale and combat readiness were likely not as grave as the report invoked since the unit was organized by War Department guidelines and trained according to the tenets of U.S. Army doctrine. Moreover, a large percentage of National Guard originals – officers and enlisted men – had been washed out of the division by late 1943. It remains unclear whether the unit‘s background as a National Guard formation explains these issues or if they were an indication of deeper, institutionalized problems within the U.S. Army. The report‘s specificity nonetheless indicates significant concerns existed within the 29th Division only months before the invasion, problems that may partially explain the unit‘s eventual combat setbacks. Either way, the report illustrates the importance of a division‘s combat preparations, organizational structure, and manpower composition.

The primary goals of this dissertation were the same. The detailed analysis of the 29th

Division‘s pre-combat preparations serves as a modest, yet insightful, case study for the U.S.

Army as a whole. The philosophical and methodological underpinnings of training, doctrine, manning, and organization viewed through the lens of the 29th Division provides a broader understanding of the U.S. Army‘s experiences in World War II. It is impossible to appreciate a

28 RG 407, NARA II, Box 7480, Confidential Notes on the 29th Division. A duplicate copy is contained in: 29th Division Archives, Maryland Military Department, File 52 General Notes: 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions.

376 unit‘s combat results without having first gained a fundamental understanding of these critical pre-battle influences and the tangible link that existed between them.

Mobilization and training in the U.S. Army took place predominately at the division level during World War II. Divisions were administrative bodies that grouped a number of separate branch units into one formation. An infantry division‘s successes and failures during training and combat were due as much to its organic artillery, quartermaster, communications, ordnance, engineer, and medical units as its infantry formations. The various components of a successful division needed to be adequately organized and trained to function independently and within the division structure. Each was specifically designed and organized to assist the division prepare for battle and to carry out its assigned tasks in combat. Soldiers were killed or wounded and a unit‘s combat record blemished when one or more of these interwoven constituent elements broke down.

A successful division required more than leadership élan and innate martial tendencies from its soldiers. Battlefield success demanded proper training and organization, meticulous planning, effective oversight and guidance, and careful attention to the smallest details.

Effective personnel selection and replacement systems were required to adequately man formations in their infancy and sustain them during attrition warfare. The 29th Division was able to endure sustained combat and prevail against a tenacious enemy during its eleven months of bitter fighting in Northwest Europe because of these factors at times and in spite of them in others.

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———. Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the Red Army, 1925-1941. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996.

———. Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Military Effectiveness in World War II. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011.

Riker, William H. Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957.

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———. The Embattled Self: French Soldiers' Testimony of the Great War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007.

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Book Chapters

Deller, Jr., Colonel John J., Dallas E. Smith, M.D., David T. English, and Edward G. Southwick, ―Chapter IX, Venereal Diseases.‖ In Internal Medicine in Vietnam, Volume II, General Medicine and Infectious Diseases, ed. Brigadier General Andre J. Ognibene and Colonel O‘Neill Barrett Jr. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General and Center of Military History United States Army, 1982.

Keast, William R. ―The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions.‖ In The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, ed. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2003.

———. ―The Training of Enlisted Replacements.‖ In The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, ed. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2003.

Kooker, Arthur R. ―Basic Military Training and Classification of Personnel.‖ In The Army Air Forces In World War II, Volume VI, Men and Planes, New Imprint, ed. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983.

Machle, Dr. Willard. ―Implications for Physical Standards and Psychiatric Screening.‖ In The Selection of Military Manpower: A Symposium, ed. Leonard Carmichael and Leonard C. Mead. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences – National Resource Council, 1951.

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———. ―The Procurement of Enlisted Personnel: The Problem of Quality.‖ In The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, ed. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2003.

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Sternberg, Thomas H. M.D., Ernest B. Howard, M.D., Leonard A. Dewey, M.D., and Paul Padget, M.D. ―Chapter X, Venereal Diseases in U.S. Army Medical Department, Preventive Medicine.‖ In World War II: Vol. V Communicable Diseases Transmitted Through Contact or By Unknown Means, ed. E.C. Hoff. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, 1960.

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Journal Articles

No Author. ―Battle Facts For Your Outfit, Short, Fast Hikes.‖ Infantry Journal 52, no. 5 (1943): 18-21. Andrews, TG, and Mitchell Dreese. "Military Utilization of Psychologists During World War II." American Psychologist 3, no. 12 (1948): 533-538.

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———. "Psychological Services in the United States Army." Journal of Consulting Psychology 5, no. 5 (1941): 221-224.

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Heckethorn, Captain Clarence A. ―Battle Facts for Your Outfit: If I could Train My Company Again,‖ Infantry Journal 53, no. 5 (November, 1943): 10-11.

Huston, James A. ―Selective Service in World War II.‖ Current History 54, no. 322 (1968): 345- 350, 384

Ingles, Harry C. "The New Division." Infantry Journal 49 (1939): 521-529.

Johnson, Gertrude G. "Manpower Selection and the Preventative Medicine Program." US Army. Surgeon-General's Office. The Medical Department of the United States Army in World War II. Preventive Medicine in World War II (2002): 1-11.

Karpinos, Bernard D. "Height and Weight of Selective Service Registrants Processed for Military Service During World War II." Human biology 30, no. 4 (1958): 292-321.

Kubie, Lawrence S. "Technical and Organizational Problems in the Selection of Troops." Military Affairs 9, no. 1 (1945): 13-32.

Lynch, Major General George A. ―Firepower, Manpower, Maneuver,‖ Infantry Journal 46, no. 6 (1939): 498-505, 606.

———. "The Tactics of the New Infantry Regiment." The Infantry Journal 46 (1939): 98-107.

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Scammell, Lieutenant Colonel J.M. ―The Infantry Division: A System for Determining It‘s [sic] Organization.‖ Infantry Journal 41, no. 2 (1934): 111-116.

Seidenfeld, Morton A. "The Adjutant General's School and the Training of Psychological Personnel for the Army." Psychological Bulletin 39, no. 6 (1942): 381.

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Smith, Major Robert B. ―FDC Simplicity.‖ Field Artillery Journal 39 (1949):73-75.

Staff, Personnel Research Section, Classification and Replacement Branch, The Adjutant General‘s Office. "Personnel Research in the Army, II. The Classification System and the Place of Testing: Staff, Personnel Research Section, Ago." Psychological Bulletin 40 (1943): 205-211.

Wanke, Paul. "American Military Psychiatry and Its Role among Ground Forces in World War II." The Journal of Military History 63, no. 1 (1999): 130-40.

Wilco, Major Roger. ―The Battery FDC.‖ Field Artillery Journal 33, no. 12 (1943): 915-916.

Unpublished Dissertation

Schifferle, Peter J. ―Anticipating Armageddon: The Leavenworth Schools and U.S. Army Military Effectiveness 1919 to 1945.‖ PhD Dissertation. The University of Kansas, 2002.

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