Reviews Rebuilding the Post-Vietnam U.S. Army Press On!: Selected Works of General values and the Vietnam War, among Westmoreland, then the Army Chief of Donn A. Starry, Volumes I and II. others. It closes with seven oral-history Staff. Abrams wanted to redeploy intact Edited by Lewis Sorley. Combat Stud- interviews with Starry on his life and units and argued fiercely for this ap- ies Institute Press. 1,341 pages; black- career. Two compact discs are included proach, but Westmoreland decided to and-white photographs; index. in the collection. One contains the full redeploy by individuals, so as to return text of the book-length monograph those who had been in Vietnam the By GEN William R. Richardson Mounted Combat in Vietnam, written by longest. Abrams told Starry: “I probably U.S. Army retired Starry with staff assistance at Fort won’t live to see the end of this, but the Knox, Ky., in 1978. The second com- rest of your career will be dedicated to f you want to understand how the pact disc shows Starry as a speaker straightening out the mess this is going IU.S. Army resurrected itself after the and briefer and includes some of his to create.” Vietnam War and proceeded to design presentations, including “Sergeants’ In May 1973, Starry received his sec- and build an Army that could take on Business,” “Tanks Forever” and a clas- ond star and was posted to take over the Warsaw Pact and win, you would sic version of AirLand Battle. the Armor School, with this guidance be well advised to delve into the collec- from Abrams: “Don’t screw up the tank tive writings and speeches of GEN program. Just start with the doctrine, de- Donn A. Starry, all exceptionally well scribe the equipment requirements, re- put-together by historian Lewis (Bob) shape organization. And get the Army Sorley in a two-volume set entitled off its ass!” Starry was blessed with a Press On! (which happens to be a fa- most unusual but equally smart boss, vorite Starry statement, recognized by GEN William E. DePuy, commander of those who worked for him). No one the newly formed Training and Doc- but Starry had such a strong hand and trine Command (TRADOC). Working a smart mind in this rebuilt Army. He together, these two would frame the was clearly the right person for the operational concepts for how the U.S. right jobs at the right times. He knew Army would prepare to fight the next how to make things happen in the ar- likely war—against the Soviets. cane world of doctrine, combat and Later in 1973, the Yom Kippur War training developments. Father of the hit the front pages. Realizing that this AirLand Battle doctrine and the Army war would provide important lessons, 86 studies, both of which led to the Sorley has written an outstanding 16- Abrams sent Starry and then-BG Bob Army that was successful in Desert page prologue. It describes Starry’s life, Baer, the program manager of what Storm and later in the drive to Bagh- beginning with his early days in the would become the Abrams Tank, to dad in the Iraq War, Starry brings to Army as a cadet at West Point and his Israel. They walked the battlefields the reader of Press On! an amazing first duty station in Europe with the and talked to the Israeli leaders, com- amount of useful material that explains 63rd Heavy Tank Battalion, 1st Infantry ing away with a clear view of the ar- how to prepare for war. Division, where his battalion comman- mored battlefield of that war. In Press The first volume is replete with the der was then-LTC Creighton W. Abrams On!, Starry cites several lessons from story of armor in the U.S. Army, but it Jr. The prologue covers Starry’s second that war: the density and lethality of also covers related topics such as the tour in Europe in command of the 1st modern weapons; the advantages of battlefield, doctrine, force structure, Medium Tank Battalion, 32nd Armor, long-range antitank guided missiles; leadership, military history, modern- and then describes his two tours in Viet- the problems with command and con- ization and planning. It begins with a nam, one with great distinction as the trol; and the winner will be the side 22-page “Reflection” by Starry, an ex- commander of the 11th Armored Cav- that seizes the initiative and holds it. ceptional summary of the Army from alry Regiment, where he proved to DePuy wanted to focus on the tactical World War I onward. It presents the many nonbelievers that a mechanized level of war first, then deal later with reader with Starry’s views on the prob- force could be of great advantage in the the operational level. He had learned lems with the Vietnam War and what jungles of Southeast Asia. As a rede- his lessons in both World War II and was not taking place during that pe- ployment planner for GEN Abrams, in Vietnam, where he saw inadequate riod of conflict. Volume II follows with Starry saw what he considered a grave tactics being employed and poor lead- chapters on soldiers, strategy, training, error on the part of GEN William C. ership and training at the small-unit

118 ARMY I March 2010 level. Starry agreed with this ap- fense—now returned home to become the TRADOC commandants to under- proach, and he coupled their concerns the next commander of TRADOC. No stand that going to war must begin with the lessons of the Yom Kippur one was better suited for this key with an operational concept for why War to come up with an operational Army job. He knew exactly what need- you are going to war, what the pur- concept that could be implanted in the ed to be done to move to the next pose is, and how you plan to organize minds of Army combat leaders. stage in rebuilding the Army. He saw and fight it. This, to Starry, was simply the need at the time to modify the Ac- fundamental in the business of war- ed by DePuy, but authored in criti- tive Defense approach and look at the fighting. From the operational con- Lcal parts by Starry with support broader scope at the operational level cept, doctrine on how to fight is then from the TRADOC school comman- of war. His operational concept was to derived. Starry had one immutable dants, the Army produced in 1976 see deep to find the follow-on echelon, principle: doctrine rules. All else— Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations, move fast to concentrate forces, strike such as combat developments, force which spelled out how to fight when quickly to attack before the enemy can and organizational design, and train- outnumbered and win against the break our defenses and finish the fight ing—must derive from and be driven Warsaw Pact. This version of FM 100- quickly before the second echelon by doctrine. He also insisted that those 5 encompassed what became known closes. Frequently called the Extended who teach in the TRADOC school- as the Active Defense doctrine. It fo- Battle, Corps Battle or Deep Attack, houses must also be the ones who will cused on the key Soviet concepts of Starry put the TRADOC staff and com- write the doctrine—there was to be no mass, momentum and continuous mandants to work on revising FM 100- ivory tower for the doctrine writers. land combat. Using this new doctrinal 5. He coupled this operational concept Starry created the position of deputy approach, U.S. Army Europe now was with Army 86 changes to the heavy di- chief of staff for doctrine and put in that able to form an approach to combat at vision and the corps. These changes position a perfect fit, BG Don Morelli, the tactical level of war, which offered encompassed the addition of five new whose job it was to develop TRADOC’s a reasonable potential for success. major weapons systems that would be concepts and then to “ride herd” on the When DePuy retired in 1977, Starry critical to what became the AirLand schoolhouses and Fort Leavenworth, —having spent 16 months as the com- Battle doctrine, which was well laid Kan., where the doctrine would be mander of V Corps in Europe, where out in the 1982 version of FM 100-5. written and taught. Starry would say he followed the essence of Active De- Starry got the Army leadership and that “doctrine is what you teach.” he Army never goes to war without to get this responsibility but lost out to the quality of leadership and the Tthe other services, particularly the parochial interests on the part of the courage of our soldiers. It is also quite U.S. Air Force. Hence, Starry engaged Joint Staff. Even today, the Joint Staff is clear that the side that thinks it will his counterpart at the then-Tactical Air reluctant to provide this authority to win, usually does.” Command, Gen. Wilbur L. Creech, in a the current counterpart to REDCOM, On more than one occasion when number of initiatives to seek the best Joint Forces Command. Starry gave a talk on leadership or dis- possible agreements for offensive air Press On! has a wealth of information cussed values, he used four Cs to ex- support, battlefield air interdiction, for those who want to understand bet- press his personal views. These were suppression of enemy air defenses and ter how to build and train an army. competence, commitment, candor and joint attack of the second echelon, al- Starry’s principles are just as applicable courage. Those four words speak vol- ways seeking what he knew Army today as they were in the 1970s and umes about GEN Donn A. Starry. He forces needed in a fight—things they 1980s. A zealot for the armored force, has a legion of devoted followers, and did not always get. Creech was a strong his “Tanks Forever” article that ran in I count myself as one of them. supporter of what Starry wanted, but ARMOR magazine, July-August 1975 Note: Press On! is not commer- often the Air Staff in the Pentagon had (included in Press On!), is a masterpiece cially available. The Army is plac- other ideas. Starry longed for the day in explaining why tanks are necessary. ing sets in its major libraries and when the U.S. Air Force would give the Always believing that the secret to win- research facilities. Other needs are Tactical Air Command the same re- ning is not in numbers but in mobility, being met by making the entire sponsibility for developing doctrine as he steadfastly sought to restore mobil- work accessible online at http:// he had in the Army. ity to battle. He advocated that “prop- cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/ Following his four years at TRA- erly employed, the tank not only can resources/csi/csi.asp. DOC, Starry was assigned to U.S. Read- survive on the battlefield, [but] it will iness Command (REDCOM), the fore- dominate the battle.” As in many of his runner of today’s Central Command. speeches, he ends that article with the GEN William R. Richardson , USA Ret., While there, he felt that joint doctrine statement that “the clear lesson of war is a former deputy chief of staff for opera- was something that he could handle is that in the end, the outcome of battle tions and plans, and Training and Doc- better than the Joint Staff. He tried hard depends on the excellence of training, trine Command commanding general. Evolution of WWII Pacific Strategy

Allies Against the Rising Sun: The bly the most detailed description of the onies rather than joining the final as- United States, the British Nations, arguments and negotiations within sault on Japan could well turn Ameri- and the Defeat of Imperial Japan. and between the United States, Great can public opinion against continuation Nicholas Evan Sarantakes. University Britain, Australia, New Zealand and of the successful wartime collaboration Press of Kansas. 458 pages; maps; black- Canada: Allies Against the Rising Sun. between the two nations. The British and-white photographs; index; $39.95. This comprehensive, widely re- also hoped to demonstrate to the Aus- searched account focuses on three cru- tralians their willingness to stand with By COL Stanley L. Falk cial issues. Why, in the first place, did them to defend their interests. The AUS retired Britain want to take part in the invasion Commonwealth nations, in turn, hoped of Japan and in operations leading up to increase their influence and standing he possible participation of British to it? Secondly, why did the Common- with Great Britain while also strength- Tarmed forces in the final assault on wealth nations, with little popular sup- ening Britain’s ability to promote their Japan was one of the most contentious port at home for their inclusion, never- interests in world affairs. The United issues to be settled between the United theless insist on joining in? Finally, why States understood that heavy American States and its World War II British al- did the United States accept British and casualties that might have been allevi- lies. Both sides wrestled with this ques- Commonwealth participation despite ated by British participation in the an- tion, both within their own military strong military arguments against this? ticipated bloody Japanese invasion and political quarters and with each Sarantakes argues that the primary would be disastrous politically at other. If British ground, air and naval motivations of all the allies were politi- home. And all concerned basically real- forces were to be involved, how, when cal rather than military. Both London ized that a cooperative effort against and where would they be committed and Washington ultimately understood Japan would serve the interests of all and with what types and size of forces? that postwar cooperation between the the allies, not simply those of any par- This problem has been addressed in a two allies would rest in large measure ticular one. few previous publications, but Nicho- on British contributions to the decisive These conclusions were not easily las Sarantakes, who teaches at the U.S. operations of the war. British attempts reached, however. The arguments with- Naval War College, has written proba- to simply regain their lost Asian col- in the British government between

120 ARMY I March 2010 Prime Minister Winston Churchill and control, logistics, the utilization of volvement, Allies Against the Rising Sun his senior military leaders were particu- British airpower, and the precise use to has practically nothing to say about larly acrimonious. Churchill continued be made of British and Australian earlier important British and Australian to insist on regaining Britain’s lost Far forces, but these were ultimately set- contributions to the war against Japan. East possessions: “I have not become tled by the American chiefs of staff and British operations opposing large Jap- the King’s First Minister in order to pre- their British counterparts. anese formations in Burma and the side over the liquidation of the British crushing defeat inflicted on the latter Empire,” he declared. He consistently are scarcely mentioned. Nor is there argued for operations in Southeast Asia, a single reference to the essential role particularly the recapture of Singapore, of Australian forces in halting and rather than focusing on invading Japan. turning back the initial Japanese of- The British chiefs of staff in turn viewed fensive in New Guinea in 1942—nor such operations as peripheral, arguing to the continued efforts of Australian for what they insisted was the more and New Zealand land, sea and air proper and efficient use of British forces forces to hold and destroy Japanese to assault Japan directly. forces in that area. Indeed, at one point most of the di- he struggle in London continued visions in GEN Douglas MacArthur’s T throughout the war—Churchill Southwest Pacific Area command were clinging stubbornly to his views, then Australian. Finally, Sarantakes has appearing to yield to the chiefs’ argu- nothing at all to say about the vital ments, and then reversing himself Anglo-American collaborative efforts shortly afterwards. Not until the eve of in communications intelligence or, for the July 1945 Potsdam Conference did that matter, in the development of the the prime minister finally acquiesce in In describing these developments, atomic bomb that ultimately brought the chiefs’ view of Pacific strategy. It Sarantakes provides detailed biograph- about Japan’s surrender. had been a long, hard struggle that con- ical portraits of all the key individuals These omissions are disappointing stantly infuriated his military advisors. involved—Britons, Americans, Aus- but not critical to Sarantakes’ main The disagreements within the Amer- tralians, New Zealanders and others. theme. Allies Against the Rising Sun is an ican government were mild by com- He goes deep into the discussions in important volume that throws consid- parison. President Franklin D. Roo- London and Washington as well as in erable new light on the evolution of Pa- sevelt favored British participation and the capitals of the British dominions. cific strategy in World War II. For Amer- left it to his Joint Chiefs to work out the Also, to show some of the pressures on ican readers, it is particularly valuable strategic details. With one exception, Japanese and American leaders, he of- for showing the difficult, acrimonious all favored British inclusion in the final fers detailed chapters on the firebomb- relationship between Churchill and his operations. Only ADM Ernest J. King, ing of Japan and the fierce land and sea chiefs of staff. That picture alone is the chief of naval operations, strongly struggle for Okinawa. Other chapters worth the price of the book. opposed the introduction of British cover the roles of British fleet units in fleet units into the Pacific, a position he supporting the Okinawa campaign and COL Stanley L. Falk, AUS Ret., Ph.D., held without success throughout the in other late operations. is the author of Seventy Days to Sin- war. Other questions that had to be Concentrating as it does on the great gapore and other books on World War ironed out concerned command and strategic decisions about British in- II in the Pacific.

March 2010 I ARMY 121 Overdue Examination of a Climactic Campaign

D-Day: The Battle for Normandy. An- sance, Cota led a makeshift brigade in- Ninth Air Force and of the Royal Air tony Beevor. Viking. 608 pages; maps; land and finally silenced the German Force that airpower achieved a decisive black-and-white photographs; $32.95. defenders opposite the Vierville draw. degree of destruction among the flee- Good as his description of the fight- ing German forces. Citing operational By COL Cole C. Kingseed ing on “Bloody Omaha” is, Beevor’s research reports, Beevor states that of U.S. Army retired account of the adjacent landings lacks 133 armored vehicles destroyed within the detail of Cornelius Ryan’s The the pocket, only 33 had been hit by air ix-and-a-half decades after V-E Day, Longest Day or Stephen Ambrose’s D- attack. Far more effective was the de- Sthe campaign in northwest Europe Day. Take the Ranger assault on struction of about 700 soft-skinned ve- following D-Day still fascinates us. Pointe du Hoc, for example. Beevor hicles, nearly half of which had been There has not been a comprehensive notes, “The guns were lying a little destroyed by air attack, mostly cannon account to address the Battle of Nor- way inland and were soon dealt and machine-gun fire. mandy from D-Day to the liberation with.” No mention is made of Rangers In addition, Beevor provides the of Paris since John Keegan’s Six Arm- Leonard Lomell and Jack Kuhn, who most balanced assessment of the major ies in Normandy, which was published combatants and the postwar squabble in 1982. Antony Beevor fills the gap between Allied generals over the con- with D-Day: The Battle for Normandy. duct of the campaign since Martin Known primarily as an Eastern Front Blumenson’s The Battle of the Generals: historian, Beevor is the award-win- The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket— ning author of Stalingrad and The Fall The Campaign That Should Have Won of Berlin 1945. In examining the cli- World War II. British general Bernard mactic campaign in northern France, Law Montgomery, in particular, emer- Beevor provides a superb prequel to ges as an egotist whose battlefield his Paris After the Liberation. performance was mediocre and cau- In compiling his history, Beevor re- tious. “Almost single-handedly,” Bee- searched more than 30 archives in six vor opines, Montgomery “managed in countries. D-Day is based on combat Normandy to make most senior Amer- diaries and letters, official reports, and ican commanders anti-British at the personal accounts of the combatants. very moment when Britain’s power Excellent maps, strategically placed, was waning dramatically.” According greatly enhance the text, as does a to Beevor, Monty’s behavior “consti- glossary of important military terms tuted a diplomatic disaster of the first that facilitates the general reader’s personally destroyed the German bat- order.” comprehension of acronyms and mili- tery. Nor is much said about the in- Perhaps Beevor’s greatest contribu- tary organizations. tense fighting from individual para- tion to our understanding of “the other Dedicating less than one-third of his troopers who seized the bridge at La side of war” lies in his portrayal of the book to D-Day itself, Beevor’s account Fiere, just west of Sainte-Mère-Eglise. extraordinary sacrifices endured by of the landing at Omaha Beach is partic- In examining the subsequent cam- French civilians during the campaign ularly outstanding. Within a few hours paign in Normandy, however, Beevor in Normandy. Beevor opines that “the after the first troops landed, Omaha hits his stride. Prone to presenting cruel martyrdom of Normandy [where Beach was “just one big mass of junk, of more narrative than analysis, Beevor 19,890 French civilians were killed and men and materials,” one officer re- excels in his description of conditions a larger number seriously wounded] ported. A 1st Division soldier from Min- within the Falaise pocket as “impossi- saved the rest of France,” since Ger- nesota wrote home describing the car- ble to imagine if you had not seen it.” many expended so much effort in the nage in the first assault wave: “It was One German survivor remembered, summer campaign that it was unable to awful. People dying all over the place “Ambulances packed with wounded resist the Allied tide until it reached the … I’ve never seen so many brave men were carbonized. Ammunition ex- Low Countries in the autumn of 1944. who did so much.” Beevor reserves his ploded, panzers blazed and horses lay These excessively high casualties were highest praise for BG Norman Cota, as- on their backs kicking their legs in their in addition to the 15,000 French killed sistant division commander of the 29th death throes. The same chaos extended and 19,000 injured during the prepara- Infantry Division, who waded ashore in fields far and wide. Artillery and ar- tory bombing for Operation Overlord less than an hour after the lead elements mor-piercing rounds came from either during the first five months of 1944. of the 29th Division struck Dog White side into the milling crowd.” Beevor Beevor concludes his narrative with beach. Following a hasty reconnais- disputes the initial claims of the U.S. his assessment that the battle for Nor-

122 ARMY I March 2010 mandy did not go as planned. Mont- large his country to the limits, and once gomery’s battle of attrition south of his mind was set on that, there was no Caen was as unplanned as the Ameri- Varied Fare diverting him.” First up was the annex- cans’ slog through the bocage in June ation of Texas. Polk considered this a and July. The Allied High Command, Eagles and Empire: The United States, done deal, but the interim president of Eisenhower included, severely under- Mexico, and the Struggle for a Con- Mexico at the time and the interference estimated the tenacity and discipline tinent. David A. Clary. Bantam Books. of the British did not pave the way for of the German Wehrmacht to resist the 624 pages; maps; black-and-white pho- smooth negotiations. Nonetheless, the expansion of the lodgment area. Not tographs; index; $30. Texas Congress voted for annexation surprisingly, in Normandy the aver- In Eagles and Empire, historian David on July 4, and “Polk backed the claim age losses per division on both sides A. Clary writes, “Anglo historians redis- that Texas extended all the way to and exceeded those of the German and So- covered the war in Mexico when their up the Rio Grande,” a “groundless” as- viet divisions during an equivalent pe- own country got into other conflicts.” sertion, according to Clary. riod on the Eastern Front. As German His examination of the Mexican War The Texas border question was con- Field Marshal Erwin Rommel noted, appears at a time when the United nected to U.S. claims against Mexico, the killing fields of Normandy proved States is involved in two wars. Unlike Mexico’s national debt and the future to be “one terrible bloodletting.” Still, the more admiring or conspiracy-theo- of California, which Polk meant to add Beevor posits that even armchair crit- rist American-authored assessments of to the union by the end of his term. The ics can never dispute the eventual out- the conflict with Mexico, Eagles and Em- War Department ordered Zachary Tay- come, however imperfect. Had the in- pire presents a balanced view of the lor to move into Texas on June 15, 1845. vasion failed, “the postwar map and events and covers much that occurred With his “Army of Observation,” he sat the history of Europe would have been before and after the war, delving into in Corpus Christi, and inevitable prob- very different indeed.” It seems a fit- the long-term causes and effects of the lems arose concerning a restless Army ting epitaph. fighting. in a smuggler’s town. James K. Polk took the presidential In February 1846, “Old Rough and COL Cole C. Kingseed, USA Ret., Ph.D., a oath of office in March 1845. Stubborn Ready” Taylor marched out of Corpus former professor of history at the U.S. Mil- and driven, he limited himself to a sin- Christi, leaving 900 sick behind. Tay- itary Academy, is a writer and consultant. gle term in office and “set out to en- lor’s army arrived at the Rio Grande and camped out across from the Mexi- United States gained a massive chunk Hsieh begins his analysis with GEN can town of Matamoros in a ploy of of territory, though mistakes made in Robert E. Lee’s surrender to LTG Ulys- Polk’s to intimidate the Mexicans into the treaty required resolution years later ses S. Grant at Appomattox Court starting a war or giving up the disputed with the Gadsden Purchase, which House, stating that Lee’s rejection of territory between the Nueces River and brought even more land under the Stars irregular warfare as an alternative to the Rio Grande. In April, Mexican sol- and Stripes. After Santa Anna’s depar- capitulation demonstrated “how much diers attacked a small party of U.S. sol- ture to Colombia, a new government the antebellum U.S. Army’s patterns diers, and Taylor “limply told the adju- populated with a variety of Mexicans— and habits of thought still remained tant general that ‘hostilities may now be criollos, mestizos and indios—rather than among its veterans.” Hsieh believes considered as commenced.’” the heavily criollo governments that had that “in committing themselves to a The war proceeded, mismanaged and been a remnant of New Spain, ushered struggle of nation-state armies,” both bungled most of the way by Polk on one in an era in which “Mexico had become Union and Confederate armies came to side and Antonio López de Santa Anna Mexican at last.” depend on the small group of Regular on the other. “The war would be de- Army veterans, many from West Point, cided on land,” Clary writes, “by the dif- “who had monopolized professional ferences between the two nations”—one military expertise” in the decades pre- with 22 million citizens, a legitimate ceding the Civil War. government, a booming industrial econ- Tracing the evolution of military pro- omy and a population of hunters who fessionalism from the War of 1812 to knew how to handle weapons; the other the Civil War, Hsieh examines the piv- with 7 million people who were “illiter- otal contributions of Secretary of War ate and downtrodden,” did not become John C. Calhoun, West Point superin- familiar with firearms until joining the tendent Sylvanus Thayer and Brevet army and whose government was in a LTG Winfield Scott in advancing the constant state of revolt. cause of “military science.” According The U.S. Army “enjoyed increasing to Hsieh, the U.S. Military Academy be- professionalism because of the military came the heart and soul of an Army de- academy at West Point,” whereas young termined to redeem itself from the early officers wanting to advance in the Mexi- humiliations suffered during the War of can army had to attach themselves to Well-researched and colorfully writ- 1812. By the Mexican-American War of more established officers on the rise. ten, Eagles and Empire tells the chaotic 1846–48, commanding general Scott ex- Meanwhile, relying heavily on his story of the Mexican War from many pressed his fixed opinion “that but for guide Kit Carson, John C. Frémont perspectives—U.S., Mexican and In- our graduated cadets, the war between headed expeditions around California dian. Clary brings to light the com- the United States and Mexico might, and the Oregon Territory, disregarding plexities of a war that has affected the and probably would, have lasted some his official Army commands in favor of United States’ relations with its south- four or five years.” pleasing his influential father-in-law, ern neighbor ever since. Hsieh cites West Point personnel Senator Thomas Hart Benton. Judging —Sara Hov files that indicate that when civil war by the looks of Frémont and his scrag- erupted in 1861, of the 487 graduates gly men, Clary deadpans, “Manifest West Pointers and the Civil War: The with some level of affiliation with destiny wore a long beard and buckskin Old Army in War and Peace. Wayne slave states, 173 graduates remained breeches.” Frémont organized the Bear Wei-Siang Hsieh. University of North loyal to the Union, while 251 sup- Flag revolt in California in June 1846, Carolina Press. 304 pages; maps; index; ported the South. The remaining grad- foreshadowing the territory’s eventual $30. uates did not actively serve during the absorption into the United States and In the latest edition of the Civil War war. Of the 301 graduates of the states the resultant inrush of settlers. America series edited by Gary W. Gal- that actually seceded from the Union, Finally, in 1848, after gruesome bat- lagher, Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh ex- 200 graduates supported the Confed- tles and horrendous atrocities, the U.S. plores how the professionalization of eracy, 60 remained loyal to the Union, and Mexican governments ratified the the U.S. Army during the first half of 5 serving officers resigned, and 36 did treaty ending the war. “Calculating the the 19th century affected the conduct not return to military service during total bloodshed of the war of 1846 and eventual outcome of the Ameri- the conflict. Hsieh dedicates more than to 1848 would be impossible,” Clary can Civil War. Hsieh currently serves 10 percent of his text to detailed notes writes. as assistant professor of history at the based on extensive research at West “The total butcher’s bill for the U.S. Naval Academy and has served Point and military archives. struggles among Anglos, Mexicans and with the U.S. State Department on a In exploring why the Civil War lasted Indians, if it could be added up, would provincial reconstruction team in Iraq. as long as it did and why it remains this run into the tens of thousands.” The In West Pointers and the Civil War, nation’s bloodiest conflict, Hsieh opines

124 ARMY I March 2010 that neither side professed an inherent The North eventually emerged vic- suicide of MG Emory Upton, “hero of advantage over the other in terms of torious only when Grant received his Spotsylvania and one of the most es- training, cohesion and leadership. The appointment as general-in-chief of all teemed officers of the postwar U.S. dominance of West Pointers in high Union armies. Hsieh lauds Grant’s Army,” in March 1881. Upton found command of both the Union and Con- tactical flexibility, which included a the postwar Regular Army’s return federate armies created an equilibrium combination of frontal assaults, envel- to “isolated constabulary functions” of military competence. This balance very unsatisfying. Yet even Upton did extended into areas of technology, or- not call for revolutionary reforms in ganization and tactical development. making the Army a more professional During the first two years of the war, force. According to Hsieh, Upton’s Hsieh posits that Lee and Union MG proposals for an expansible Regular George B. McClellan left their respec- Army, rotation between staff and line tive legacies on the armies that each positions, a comprehensive program commanded. While Lee bequeathed an of education for officers and a reformed aggressive culture of command among general staff were reminiscent of re- his talented officers, the Army of the forms advocated during the antebel- Potomac under McClellan was char- lum period. It would be left to Upton’s acterized by “caution” and a “chronic successors to complete the process of civil-military dysfunction.” The subse- military professionalism. quent commanders of the Army of Hsieh posits that the same military the Potomac remained cautious be- ethic that “made peace so unsatisfy- cause McClellan only appointed “Mc- ing to Upton made it the only avail- Clellan loyalists” to corps and division opments, cavalry raids, unorthodox able alternative to Lee at the close of command. Not surprisingly, each of mining operations and regular siege the Appomattox campaign.” Thus, the the officers who subsequently com- tactics. By maintaining the strategic old Army that existed prior to the manded the North’s most important offensive, Grant successfully brought Civil War served the nation both in army served under McClellan during the war to a close. war and peace. his tenure as commanding general. Hsieh concludes his study with the —COL Cole C. Kingseed, USA Ret.

March 2010 I ARMY 125