Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation

(April–June 2000)

Abbreviations FE —British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broad- casts, Part 3: Asia Paciﬁc FEW —Weekly Economic Report XHNA—Xinhua (New China) News Agency ZTS —Zhongguo tongxun she (China Reporting Agency), Hong Kong ZXS —Zhongguo xinwen she (China News Agency), Beijing RMRB —Renmin ribao (People’s Daily)

1. Internal developments (a) The 15th Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee (b) Party Affairs; Political and Ideological Developments (c) Economic Affairs (d) Miscellaneous (Education and Manpower; Minorities) (e) Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)

2. Foreign Relations (a) Diplomatic Tours (b) Countries, Territories and Regions (c) International Organizations

1. Internal Developments (a) The 15th Session of the Ninth NPC Standing Committee

The 15th Session of the Ninth NPC Standing Committee took place in Beijing between 25 and 29 April. Delegates received a State Council report on progress towards China’s entry into the World Trade Organiza- tion (WTO), and examined five draft laws. Xinhua revealed that the ‘Draft Interpretation of Section Two of Article 93 of the Criminal Law’ was a source of controversy among delegates, who differed in their understanding of the reference to “other personnel performing official business according to law” in the legislation (FE/3829). In particular, it was argued that uncertainty about whether such personnel included personnel of villagers’ committees and other grassroots organizations had made it difficult to adjudicate on crimes committed by members of such committees and organizations. It was agreed that in order to remove such uncertainty, such persons would henceforth be classified as “personnel engaged in public service.” A propos the State Council report on developments affecting China’s impending admission to the WTO, Li Peng (Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee) noted that accession was essential in order to facilitate further economic reform and the establishment of a socialist market economy in China. Li recognized that China must address the  The China Quarterly, 2000 884 The China Quarterly

challenges of globalization, but he also insisted that membership of the WTO must accommodate “our own principles.” He also drew attention to the need to revise and reinterpret existing laws in order to make them more amenable to the changed circumstances in which China found itself. He noted that many of those reﬂected the unique historical background against which China had embarked on the task of transforming itself from a centrally-planned system to a market-orientated economy. The outcome was that they were less than appropriate to the new environment – and in some cases, “contrary to reality.” Li described his colleagues’ decision to remove Cheng Kejie from his position as Vice-Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee as evidence of the CCP Central Committee’s determination to maintain control of the Party, to govern in accordance with the law and to take punitive action against those found guilty of corruption. He described Cheng as someone who had taken “huge bribes and sought illegitimate interests” (FE/3829; see also FE/3830 for details of other removals and appointments). Standing Committee delegates approved the amended Air Pollution Prevention and Treatment Law (to become effective from 1 September 2000). This new environmental protection legislation was seen as being vital to the maintenance of public health and of sustainable economic and social development (FE/3830).

(b) Party Affairs; Political and Ideological Developments

Various reports during the quarter made reference to Jiang Zemin’s tour of Guangdong province (21–25 February 2000) and his advocacy of a smaller, tighter Party that would be representative of “advanced social forces, advanced culture, and the interests of the people.” From such comments had emerged a new campaign, designated the “three representations.” Against the background of Jiang’s remarks, a XHNA commentary stressed the importance of upholding the correct Party line – one that was “imbued with the spirit of realism, but retaining all that is finest in Chinese culture” (FE/3822). The latter emphasis highlighted the importance of spiritual, as well as material civilization. Also echoing Jiang’s remarks in Guangdong, the commentary stressed that the current membership of the Chinese Communist Party, numbered at some 60 million, was too large and required streamlining. Jiang’s comments quickly became the basis of a campaign and in April Vice-President Hu Jintao described the “three representations” as a fresh summation of the nature, goals and basic tasks of the CCP. Their ideological importance was underlined in Hu’s reference to Jiang having made an original contribution to the further development of Marxist theory on Party building. Hu noted too that careful study of the “three representations” would facilitate the implementation of the ongoing “three stresses” ideological campaign, with its emphasis on study, politics and healthy trends (FE/3822; and see FE/3823, 3824, 3836 and 3839). An authoritative journal subsequently stressed the importance of the Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 885 new “three representations” ideological campaign (Qiushi (Seeking Truth) FE/3833). It argued that its successful implementation promised to contribute markedly to needed improvements in ideology, work style, organization, discipline and leadership within the Party. In May, a circular issued by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision called for intensified study of Jiang’s “three representations,” which it described as offering a “new view of the CCP’s nature, goal and historic mission, a development of Marxist party-building theory and the new requirements for the whole Party in the new situation” (FE/3838; and see the editorial in RMRB, 22 May). Mean- while, a Hong Kong source suggested that the “three representations” would be written into the proceedings of the next (16th) Party Congress as “Jiang Zemin theory” (Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), 1 June in FE/3861). The activities of the falungong sect continued to be a major preoccu- pation of the central authorities. On the first anniversary of the demon- stration by more than 10,000 falungong practitioners outside Zhongnanhai (25 April), an unconfirmed report in a Hong Kong source (Ming Pao (Mingbao) web site) noted that state and public security departments in China had been urged to take vigorous action against falungong elements in the interests of preserving social and political stability (FE/3824). It quoted Luo Gan to the effect that the “Falun Gong cult” had allied itself with “international anti-China forces,” which advo- cated Tibetan independence and accelerated democratization in China. This was the background against which 2000 had supposedly been designated as “qigong consolidation year.” On 9 May, an article in People’s Daily admitted that the anti-falungong government campaign notwithstanding, the activities of the sect continued to pose a political threat to the authorities in Beijing, while undermin- ing national stability and unity. The article described falungong as a “tight-knit organization [having] clear-cut political aims, and … an out-and-out cult opposed to science, society, mankind and the government” (RMRB, 9 May in FE/3836). The following day, Xinhua reviewed the previous year’sofficial campaign against falungong. It revealed that as of 25 March, courts at various levels throughout China had handled 91 cases involving falungong members, meting out punishment to 81 persons (FE/3838; and see FE/3846 for a report from Hong Kong on the death of a falungong practitioner). (For reports on falungong demon- stration in Hong Kong, see FE/3838 and 3840.) For details of a number of State Council removals and appointments at vice-ministerial level, see FE/3836.

A spokesman for the National Bureau of Statistics claimed that developments during the first quarter gave evidence of an economic upturn and predicted that GDP growth during 2000 would exceed that of the previous year. He argued that the continued implementation of proactive fiscal policy measures, an expansion of exports, increasing confidence 886 The China Quarterly

among both consumers and investors and the rapid development of hi-tech industries all would assist in maintaining the momentum of economic growth (FEW/0637; but see also a NPC Finance and Economic Committee source on continuing problems associated with a persistent lack of domestic demand in ibid.). Economic results for the first quarter (Q1) revealed a rise of 10.7 per cent in industrial value-added (but only 8.6 per cent for state-owned enterprises). The growth of heavy industry (11.5 per cent) exceeded that of light industry (9.8 per cent). During January–March, contractual foreign direct investment (FDI) rose by 27 per cent, although utilized FDI fell by 2.7 per cent (FE/3814). Elsewhere, it was reported that Q1 GDP growth was 8.1 per cent while fixed asset investment increased modestly by 8.5 per cent (FE/3820 – see below for data on China’s foreign trade performance). A major decision of the previous year was the decision to accelerate economic development in the poor, less developed regions of China. A XHNA report (FE/3852) noted that the western development programme was proceeding well. It described the strategic initiative in the following terms: its basis would be infrastructural construction; its foundation, ecological and environmental protection; its key point, economic restruc- turing and the development of specialized industries; its driving force, the twin process of economic reform and opening up; and its guarantee, the advancement of science and technology, and development of human resources. The same source noted that ten major projects would be launched in western China during 2000 – six of them focusing on transport developments. Another Xinhua report claimed that during January–April, industrial growth in excess of 10 per cent had been achieved in six western provinces (or provincial-level units): namely, Guizhou, Chongqing, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Ningxia and Tibet. Fixed investment growth was over 50 per cent in Ningxia and Gansu; over 30 per cent in Chongqing and Xinjiang; and more than 20 per cent in Qinghai and Tibet. In the same period, Chongqing’s foreign trade had risen by 98.6 per cent – and by over 50 per cent in Tibet and Xinjiang (XHNA, 9 June in FEW/0644). Elsewhere, it was suggested that a special economic zone should be established in western China. The Panxi area of Sichuan had already been identified as the possible site for an “information port,” specializing in information industries (RMRB web site, 8 June in FE/3863). Following an inspection tour of Jiangxi and Hunan (11–17 April), Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo spoke of the need to take appropriate action in the face of increasing difficulties associated with the persistence of an irrational industrial structure. Such action included the closure of pollut- ing and/or technologically backward small factories and mines that generated inferior products; the development of new, high-tech industries; the accelerated transformation of existing enterprises; and renewed emphasis on “variety, quality and efficiency” in the running of industrial enterprises (FE/3830; see also Wu Bangguo on the importance of the CCP’s leadership role in China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs)). Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 887

A report issued by the Information Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Hong Kong highlighted the serious potential consequences of the ongoing programme of reforming China’s SOEs. Against the background of pay for workers, lay-offs and retirees from the Liaoning City Ferroalloy Factory being in arrears for periods between 4 and 18 months, it noted that on 15 May some 5,000 workers and retired workers had blocked the main road leading to Shenyang, forcing 200 armed police and 700 public security officers to intervene in order to effect their dispersal. Later, the workers were said to have marched to the offices of the city government, where they confronted 1,000 public security and armed police force personnel (FE/3842). Xinhua stated that China’s information industry was expected to record an average annual growth of 20 per cent during the coming decade – some three times faster than the anticipated growth of GDP. The same source noted that although the information industry’s share of aggregate GDP was a mere 3.4 per cent in 1999, it had contributed 10 per cent of GDP growth (FEW/0634). In anticipation of China’s admission to the WTO, the need to restruc- ture agricultural production was another important theme during the second quarter. One long report spoke of a new situation emerging in the farm sector. It argued that agricultural readjustment, with a new emphasis on the use of better quality seeds giving higher returns, offered a “golden opportunity” to resolve some of the problems faced by farmers, as they prepared to meet the challenges of WTO membership. To this end, future agricultural development would be posited on the application of modern science and technology, as well as on market adjustments. The report warned, however, that the capital requirements of transforming and modernizing farming would be huge – this in the context of a current “fairly pronounced” shortage of funds. The absence of a monitoring system that could offer adequate checks on quality and production standards was recognized as another problem (FEW/0644). The point was also made that the implications of agricultural structural readjustment at the beginning of the 21st century were quite different from those of the mid-1980s and early 1990s. Not least, demand and supply conditions had both changed significantly: on the one hand, China now faced a situation of unprecedented excess supply; on the other hand, the pattern of urban and rural demand for farm products had also changed, as consumers placed greater emphasis on quality and diversity, rather than mere quantity. In addition, adjustment mechanisms were different from those of the past. No longer was it a question of the government carrying the adjustment responsibility through the use of administrative methods and recourse to quotas; rather, the responsibility was now borne by the farmers themselves, as they responded to changes in market conditions. Nor was readjustment any longer merely one- dimensional, based on simple adjustments to acreage. It had since become multi-dimensional in the sense of simultaneously requiring the optimiza- tion of output and quality on the basis of enhanced technical progress, as well as the development of more diversified operations. 888 The China Quarterly

Another point of emphasis was the need to open up markets and to “invigorate distribution.” For the time being, the distribution of farm products was the major limiting factor in structural readjustment, con- straining as it did farmers’ efforts to alter their cropping patterns and farm operations. Hence, the need for improvements in the framework of rural distribution and the organization of production, marketing and other promotional events (such as those recently held in Wuhan and Shanghai, which had secured deals worth 4.2 billion and 4.8 billion yuan, respect- ively, for farmers in Guangxi). Underlying all these initiatives was advocacy of a pattern of farming, which, by taking advantage of local conditions and regional strengths, would maximize regional comparative advantage. To make the same point in different terms, farmers were being encouraged to shift from production driven by physical output maximization to a system of farming based on maximizing monetary returns. In the process, it was hoped that production costs could be reduced by 10–30 per cent. At the same time, attention was drawn to the importance of achieving a proper balance between the needs of structural readjustment and those of maintaining China’s grain production capabilities. In short, a successful farm readjustment programme presupposed the maintenance of stable grain supplies to meet domestic consumption requirements (these defined in terms of a per capita supply of grain of 400 kilograms per head). To this end, land conservation measures (for example, by preventing excessive digging of fishponds, planting of fruit trees or shifting land to non-farming uses) were needed, as was the establishment of new, dedi- cated grain production bases. One of the most persistent and fundamental issues in the countryside has been the low level and lagging growth of farmers’ incomes. As one source observed, the situation in Chinese villages could be summed up as follows: “the two sides are narrow, but the middle part is wide.” In other words, the number of rich farmers was small, as was that of those who lived in poverty; but those – the great majority – living between these extremes remained poorly-off, being able to “afford meals, but having no spending money” (FE/3857). The situation was further exacerbated by the continuing imposition of excessive burdens on farmers. Against this background, no wonder that peasants in Fujian expressed concern in the face of official pricing policies, which discriminated in favour of new, higher-quality varieties of cereals. Who, they asked, would provide the technical information about which seed strains to use and where would they obtain the new strains? Furthermore, where would they secure any additional investment funding that might be needed in order to use the new varieties (FE/3833)? Pressures of poverty were also one of the factors that encouraged out-migration from Chinese villages and a report pub- lished in May revealed that 17.2 per cent of all rural families now had one member working outside the rural sector (a further 4.1 per cent of families having two out-migrants, and 1 per cent three or more (FEW/0642). Xinhua revealed that in 1999, more than 20 million township enterprises, employing a work force of 125 million, had contributed 2.5 trillion Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 889 yuan to aggregate industrial value-output. These same units had generated exports worth 720 billion yuan, as well as 560 billion yuan of profits and 175 billion yuan (i.e. a quarter) of tax revenue. They accounted for one-third of China’s GDP, two-thirds of rural value-output; half of industrial production and 40 per cent of foreign exchange earnings generated from exports (FEW/0624; see also FEW/0643). In order to maintain their buoyancy, in April, a State Council decision drew attention to the need to reduce the number of illegal and unwar- ranted levies imposed on township enterprises. It noted that the imposition of 1,000 different kinds of fees was having a negative impact on both the rural and national economies. Hence, the establishment of an Inter-Ministerial Joint Council for Reducing Enterprise Burdens, which would spearhead a campaign against the imposition of illegal fees, whether new or old (ibid.). The importance of the service sector was highlighted in a XHNA report, which noted that in 1999, services had created 5.71 million new jobs (69 per cent of all the total). This contrasted with the agricultural sector, from which there had been 1.96 million lay-offs, and the manufac- turing sector, which had created only 2.54 million new jobs. Thus, at the end of 1999, the service sector labour force was 192.5 million and its contribution to national GDP was 34.8 per cent (FEW/0635). The changing roles of private and public sectors in generating employment was underlined in a report, which showed that between 1978 and 1998, the share of urban employment accounted for by self-employed activities had risen from 0.2 to 11 per cent. During the same period, the share of government-run activities had shrunk from 78.3 to 43.8 per cent (FEW/0636). Speaking in Macau on 10 May, Liu Tinghuan (Deputy-Governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC)) spoke of the intensification of efforts to reform the Chinese banking system in order to make Chinese banks more competitive. He also announced that more foreign banks would be allowed to expand the scope of their operations in China (FE/3838). Later the same month, a Hong Kong source cited a recent State Council decision to upgrade the State Administration of Foreign Ex- change (SAFE) and to separate it from the PBOC. The outcome would be to make SAFE directly subordinate to the State Council. As a result of such changes, the supervisory and control roles of SAFE would be enhanced (FE/3852). In May, Xinhua revealed something of the content of a joint CCP Central Committee and State Council decision, issued in March, which set out the goals and principles for population and family planning work during the coming decades (FE/3834). In the broadest terms, it sought to keep the birth rate below 1.5 per cent p.a. so that China’s total population could be kept at or below 1.4 billion by the end of 2010. The same source predicted that China’s population would peak at almost 1.6 billion by the middle of the 21st century (see also FEW/0636). Elsewhere, it was reported that the urban population contained in China’s 668 cities was 376 million, or 30.9 per cent of the total population (FE/3859). 890 The China Quarterly

Xinhua also reported that the Fifth National Census would take place on 1 November 2000 (FE/3804; and see Vice-Premier Li Lanqing in FE/3878). With unemployment rising rapidly in recent years, the need for improved social security arrangements was become a pressing issue. According to an official source, the Chinese government would levy a new tax designed to finance increased spending on social security (including meeting the needs of workers who had been – and would be – laid off from SOEs in the course of 2000) (FE/3805). The urgency of the situation was reflected in the existence of a shortfall of 38 billion yuan in overdue pension payments due from Chinese enterprises under the current system. At the same time, debate continued about whether any new tax should replace, or merely supplement, existing fund collection mechanisms. There was uncertainty too about whether social security payments should be restricted to providing for medical care, unemployment and retirement needs, or should also seek to reimburse losses resulting from natural disasters. Meanwhile, measures were being put in place in order to ensure that local government fulfilled the duty entrusted to them by law to offer an ultimate safety net to the urban poor through the implementation of the “urban subsistence security system” (FE/3807). The range of needs, which the system sought to accommodate, was demonstrated in statistics, which showed the poverty line definition to be 319 yuan per month in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, but a mere 143 yuan in Yinchuan (capital of Ningxia in the North-west). It was reported that in 1999, central and local government had paid out a total of 1.969 billion yuan in subsistence allowances (including a central government subsidy of 0.4 billion yuan). At the end of May, Premier Zhu Rongji called for the accelerated construction of a “unified, standard and perfect national social security system”–something that, against the background of economic restructur- ing and an ageing population, was regarded as essential to the maintenance of social stability and sustainable development. Zhu insisted that the social security system be independent of enterprises and institutions, the extent of whose commitment was simply to pay the social insurance premiums specified by the law. He added that the social security burden should accord with the level of development attained by China (FE/ 3861). Reference was made earlier to the problem of widespread poverty among farmers. At an even more aggregate level, it was revealed that at the end of 1999, the rural–urban income gap had widened even further in favour of urban residents. Thus, average urban per capita disposable income was 5,854 yuan (9.3 per cent above the 1998 level), compared with only 2,210 yuan in the countryside (3.8 per cent higher than in the previous year) (FEW/0641). Between January and April, the value of China’s foreign trade reached US$137.1 billion – 38.8 per cent more than during the same period of 1999. The value of exports was US$72.2 billion (up 39 per cent); that of Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 891 imports was US$64.9 billion (a rise of 38.6 per cent). Especially worthy of note was a 120 per cent rise in Chinese imports of crude oil during these four months (FEW/0641). China’s foreign trade performance in the same period vis-a`-vis selected regions and countries is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: China’s Foreign Trade Performance, January–April 2000 % change in % change in % rise in value of all value of value of foreign trade China’s exports China’s imports

With USA ϩ 26.0 ϩ 30.5 ϩ 17.3 With Japan ϩ 31.0 ϩ 32.4 ϩ 29.7 With Taiwan ϩ 30.4 ϩ 32.4 ϩ 30.0 With Hong Kong ϩ 43.1 ϩ 45.3 ϩ 33.0 With EU ϩ 31.2 ϩ 39.1 ϩ 22.2 With ASEAN ϩ 44.3 ϩ 46.3 ϩ 42.8

Xinhua reported that at the end of 1999, China’s outstanding foreign debt totalled US$151.83 billion (5.79 billion dollars more than at the end of 1998). Of this, medium and long-term debts were valued at US$136.65 billion (up US$7.95 billion), while short-term debts contracted by US$2.16 billion to US$15.18 billion (FEW/0641). Finally, several reports attested to the seriousness of water shortages facing China. Thus, more than 400 of China’s 668 cities were said to face a shortage of water – 100 of them to a serious extent. Almost half of all rivers – and over 90 per cent of urban water resources – were reported to be polluted (FE/3838). Elsewhere, it was predicted that the water supply gap would widen from an expected 31.8 billion cubic metres in 2010 to 50 billion by 2030 (FE/3855). Meanwhile, it was announced that Beijing would introduce a quota system for water usage in industrial enterprises, hotels, restaurants, colleges and universities (FE/3864).

(d) Miscellaneous (Education and Manpower; Minorities)

An official report referred to efforts being made to improve the domestic environment – especially living standards and working conditions – in an attempt to attract students who had been studying abroad back to China. Statistics showed that between 1978 and 1999, some 320,000 Chinese students and scholars had undertaken study overseas, compared with an estimated corresponding figure of 130,000 between 1972 and 1978. Of those who had travelled abroad, about 110,000 had returned to China (FE/38371). On 22 June, Xinhua made available the text of the State Council Information Office’s White Paper on ‘The Development of Tibetan Culture’ (available in full in FE/3874 (Part I) and FE/3875 (Part II)). 892 The China Quarterly

(e) Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)

Among overseas visits undertaken by HKSAR Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, during the quarter was one to Canada, where he held talks with Premier Jean Chretien and other senior ministers (for reports, see FE/3806–3808). In Hong Kong itself, there were signs that an economic upturn was under way. During the ﬁrst quarter of the year, GDP growth was put at 14 per cent (FEW/0642; and also see comments by Tung Chee-hwa in FE/0646). Meanwhile, between April and May, the rate of unemployment in Hong Kong fell from 5.5 to 5.1 per cent. On 10 May, the HKSAR Legislative Council passed a motion on opposing Taiwanese independence. It was proposed by the Chairman of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (FE/3839 and see also comment in Hong Kong, Ta-kung pao (Dagong bao), 11 May).

2. Foreign Relations (a) Diplomatic Tours

On 12 April, President Jiang Zemin left Beijing for a tour to the Middle East, Southern Europe and South Africa. Following his arrival in Tel Aviv, where he was the first Chinese Head of State to set foot on Israeli soil, Jiang travelled to Jerusalem. There, he held talks in what was described as a “friendly and cordial atmosphere” with President Ezer Weizman. Their discussions focused on bilateral relations and other issues of common concern. Vice-Premier Qian Qichen was also in attendance (FE/3815). On 13 April, Jiang held a meeting with Premier Baraq, with whom he discussed issues ranging from bilateral relations, the Middle East peace process and the regional and international situations. Baraq spoke of Israel’s willingness to take advantage of the many opportunities to expand co-operation and assist China in its national construction programme (including the development of western China). Jiang referred approvingly to the Israeli Premier’s efforts to push forward “positive [Middle East] peace negotiations” and insisted that outstanding difficulties could be overcome (FE/3816). Israeli radio reported that the two sides had discussed an arms deal and quoted Foreign Minister David Levi to the effect that U.S. opposition to Israeli sales of AWACs early-warning planes to China had been “blown out of all proportion” (ibid). In Bethlehem on 15 April, the Palestinian President, Yasir Arafat, presided over a welcoming ceremony for Jiang Zemin. In the course of their discussions of developments in the Middle East, Jiang praised Arafat’s efforts towards reaching a peace settlement (FE/3817; and see FE/3818 for reports of Arafat’s speech at a special session of the Palestinian Legislative Council). The two sides also announced the establishment of a bilateral economic development committee (FE/3819). On 17 April, the Chinese President arrived in Alexandria, where he Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 893 held talks with his Egyptian counterpart, Husni Mubarak. Both men spoke with satisfaction of the existing level of development between Egypt and China and expressed the hope that co-operation between them would be strengthened. Jiang took the opportunity to reaffirm the Chinese government’s position on the Middle East situation (FE/3819). The next day, Jiang Zemin arrived in Ankara and on 19 April, he held talks with the Turkish President, Suleyman Demirel in a “cordial, friendly and constructive atmosphere.” Their discussions ranged across a wide range of bilateral, regional and international issues and, according to Xinhua, resulted in an “extensive consensus” being reached (FE/3822). Jiang also met the Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, and other Turkish ministers. In a joint communique´, Turkey reaffirmed its commitment to maintain a one China policy and both parties reaffirmed their determination to continue consultations at a senior level. As well as looking forward to an expansion of trade and economic co-operation, they expressed shared opposition to terrorism. In particular, the two sides undertook to ban any illegal activities within their boundaries, “including splittism and ultra-religionism in all their forms“(FE/3821–3823). After a brief stop in Athens, where (21 April) he held talks with the President of Greece and Premier Konstandinos Simitis, Jiang travelled to Johannesburg for the first visit to South Africa ever to be made by a Chinese Head of State. In Pretoria, his talks with the Prime Minister, Thabo Mbeki, were said to have produced fruitful results, with “many common understandings” having been reached. Mbeki reaffirmed his government’s support for China’s entry into the WTO and looked forward too to further bilateral co-operation. Jiang spoke of his government’s recognition of South Africa as a major African power. The two men subsequently signed the ‘Pretoria Declaration on Partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa’ and attended a ceremony at which six other agreements were signed (FE/ 3825). Other leaders whom Jiang met in South Africa included Vice- President Jacob Zuma and the Speaker of the South African National Assembly (Dr Frene Ginwala) (see FE/3826 and 3827 for other reports). On 27 June, Premier Zhu Rongji arrived in Sofia on the first leg of a tour that would take him to Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. In Sofia, he held talks with the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Ivan Kostov, with whom he reached a broad consensus on strengthening bilateral relations. The two sides signed various agreements, including one on economic co-operation (FE/3789 and 3880). (For reports on Zhu’s visits to the other destinations on his tour, see the next Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation.) Other overseas tours undertaken by Chinese leaders during the quarter included one by Li Ruihuan (Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) to Canada, Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago (reports in FE/3836–3837, 3839, 3841–3843 and 3846); and one by Li Peng (Chairman of the NPC Standing Com- mittee) to Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, the Slovak Republic, Azerbaijan and Ukraine (reports in FE/3865–3870, 3872, 3874 and 3876–3878). 894 The China Quarterly

(b) Countries, Territories and Regions

Africa (Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana)

Two African defence ministers visited China during the quarter. In May, Kundi Paihama (Defence Minister of Angola) was in Beijing, where he held talks with Vice-President and Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Hu Jintao, as well as with the Chinese Defence Minister, Chi Haotian (FE/3836). The following month, Patrick Mosioua Lekota undertook the ﬁrst visit to China by a South African defence minister since the two countries’ establishment of diplomatic relations. He too held talks with Hu Jintao and Chi Haotian. On 5 June, South Africa radio reported that the South African government had agreed to sell arms to China (FE/3860 and 3862). Towards the end of May, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, held talks in Beijing with his Namibian counterpart (but also Chairman of the 54th UN General Assembly), Theo-Ben Gurirab. The two men exchanged views on African issues and discussed the role of the United Nations in international affairs (FE/3853). On 12 and 13 June, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji held separate talks in Beijing with the President of Botswana, Festus Mogae. Bilateral relations (especially the further development of trade and economic co-operation) and international issues were the principal foci of their discussions. Xinhua reported that the two sides had signed an agreement on investment protection (FE/3866 and 3867).

Australasia (Australia)

On 23 April, Tang Jiaxuan met the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, who had travelled to Beijing in order to attend the 2000 Asian Leaders’ Forum. Both men expressed optimism about the further development of relations between China and Australia.

Baltic States (Latvia)

On 13 June, the Foreign Minister of Latvia, Indulis Berzins, held talks with Tang Jiaxuan on bilateral and international issues. During his visit, he also met Vice-President Hu Jintao (FE/3867 and 3868).

Caribbean (Barbados)

On 15 May, the Prime Minister of Barbados, Owen Arthur, held talks in Beijing with Zhu Rongji. Both men expressed their satisfaction with the level of development of bilateral relations. They attended a ceremony at which agreements on the avoidance of double taxation, and the prevention of ﬁscal evasion, were signed (FE/3842). It was revealed that the Chinese government would provide Barbados with a grant of US$ 950,000 for project funding (FE/3844). During his visit, Arthur also met Li Peng. Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 895

Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldova) Xinhua reported that on 30 March, in Astana (Kazakhstan), the defence ministers of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan had signed a joint communique´, following their annual meeting on increased co-operation and regional security (FE/3804; also see FE/3806 for Chi Haotian’s speech in Astana). On 7 May, Jiang Zemin sent a message of congratulation to Vladimir Putin, following his inauguration as Russian President. The message contained an expression of hope for increased co-operation between China and Russia (FE/3835). Some ten days later, Zhu Rongji sent a simi- lar message to the new Russian Premier, Mikhail Kasyanov (FE/3843). The following month, the President of Moldova, Petru Lucinschi, visited China and held talks with Jiang Zemin. Both sides spoke of the smooth development of bilateral relations since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992. Lucinschi hoped that bilateral trade and economic relations could be expanded. Subsequently, the two heads of state signed a joint statement on comprehensive co-operation between China and Moldova in the 21st century. Three other agreements were also signed (FE/3862 and 3864). Japan On 10 May, Tang Jiaxuan arrived in Tokyo for talks with the Japanese Foreign Minister (Yohei Kono) on the timing of Zhu Rongji’s forthcoming visit to Japan (FE/3837). In the course of his talks with Premier Yoshiro Mori, Tang spoke of the great importance his government attached to relations with Japan. He hoped that the momentum of friendly and co-operative bilateral relations could be maintained in accordance with the principles set out in the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, the Peace and Friendship Treaty and the Joint Declaration. At the same time, he expressed concern about “noises frequently made by the small right-wing forces in Japan.” Tang also emphasized the need to correctly handle sensitive historical issues impinging on bilateral relations. One of these concerned the status of the Diaoyu Islands and in the face of the recent “illegal landing by Japan’s right-wing organization,” the Chinese Foreign Minister was at pains to insist that the islands had been “part of Chinese territory from ancient times“(FE/3838). Kono echoed Tang in reafﬁrming the importance to Japan of its relations with China. He gave an undertaking that the Japanese government would honour all bilateral agreements. Later, a ZXS report quoted Tang Jiaxuan as saying that relations between China and Japan were becoming “pragmatic, all-round and mature.” He was also said to have told a Japanese reporter that China was grateful for funding provided through the Japanese government’s Over- seas Development Assistance (ODA), although he added a warning against allowing yen loans to become politicized (ZXS, 12 May in FE/3840). 896 The China Quarterly

Visits to China by senior Japanese officials during the quarter included those of the Chairman of the Minister of Transport (Toshihiro Nakai) and President of the Japan–China Friendship Association (Hirayama Ikuno) in May (FE/3846); and of Yuji Fujinawa (Chairman of the Council of Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Self-Defence Forces of Japan) in June (FE/3873). On 7 June, Vice-Premier Qian Qichen travelled to Tokyo in order to attend the funeral of former Premier Keizo Obuchi. The visit afforded an opportunity for Qian to discuss further questions relating to Sino- Japanese relations with Obuchi’s successor, Yoshiro Mori (FE/3862). Xinhua voiced strong criticism of comments made on 15 May by Premier Mori to the effect that “Japan is a divine country with the Mikado at the centre” (XHNA, 18 May: FE/3847). The report pointed out that such remarks were contrary to the content of the current Japanese Constitution, which stated unequivocally that “sovereignty belongs to the people.” It added that Mori’s remarks showed that 50 years after the end of World War II, “the pernicious influence of Japan’s pre-war education, deifying Mikado, still lingers in the minds of certain Japanese political figures.” Condemnation was also reserved for Shintaro Ishihara (Governor of Tokyo), whom a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman described as an “anti-China die-hard”–this in response to Ishihara’s statement that Jiang Zemin would effectively become a latter-day Hitler if he unleashed war against Taiwan (FE/3848). Against the background of reports that Chen Shuibian intended to invite representatives of political parties and governments from various countries to attend ceremonies surrounding his inauguration as President of Taiwan, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman urged the authorities in Japan not to upset relations with Beijing by allowing any official to travel to Taipei (FE/3804). Latin America (Peru)

Xinhua reported that on 31 March, Vice-President Hu Jintao held talks in Beijing with the visiting Peruvian Foreign Minister, Fernando de Trazegries (FE/3806). (For an earlier report on de Trazegries’s visit to China, see Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, The China Quarterly, no. 162 (June 2000), p. 615.) Middle East and North Africa (Libya, Iran)

On 17 April, Tang Jiaxuan held talks in Beijing with the Libyan Secretary for External Relations and International Co-operation, Abd-al- Rahman Muhammad Shalqam (FE/3844). The two men exchanged views on bilateral relations and other issues, including the Lockerbie question. Between 22 and 26 June, President Mohammad Khatami of Iran made his ﬁrst state visit to China. His talks with Jiang Zemin provided an opportunity for both sides to review the development of relations between China and Iran since the establishment of diplomatic ties. Jiang expressed the desire of the Chinese government to strengthen bilateral relations and described Iran as one of China’s most important trading partners in the Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 897

Middle East and Gulf regions. Khatami spoke of the great potential for enhanced economic co-operation, especially against the background of the Iranian Third Five-Year Plan (FE/3875). Subsequently, the two sides signed a joint communique´ (text in FE/ 3876), as well as ﬁve other agreements and documents (including an agreement on investment promotion and protection, and a memorandum of understanding on energy co-operation). During his visit, Khatami also held discussions with Zhu Rongji. Talks also took place between the two countries’ foreign ministers (Tang Jiaxuan and Kamal Kharrazi) and defence ministers (Chi Haotian and Ali Shamkhani) (see FE/3876).

North-East Asia (Mongolian Republic, South Korea [Republic of Korea], North Korea [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea])

In Beijing on 24 April, the visiting Mongolian Foreign Minister (Mrs. Nyam-Osoryu Tuyaa) discussed bilateral relations and regional and international issues of common concern with Tang Jiaxuan (FE/3824). A few days later, it was reported that Tang Jiaxuan had met the South Korean Foreign Minister, Yi Chong-pin in Beijing. The two men exchanged views on bilateral relations and regional and international issues of common concern. Yi briefed Tang on his government’s perception of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and on the forthcoming meeting of ROK and DPRK leaders in Pyongyang. Yi also met Zhu Rongji (FE/3827 and 3828). A Kyodo report (Tokyo, 3 April) suggested that plans were afoot for Li Peng to visit North Korea (FE/3807), but in the middle of the following month, Yonhap reported that the authorities in Pyongyang had turned down Li’s request to travel to North Korea later in May on the grounds that the timing was inappropriate (FE/3840). Whatever the signiﬁcance of such reports, on 30 May, Yonhap noted that Kim Chong-il (Chairman of the DPRK and General-Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party) had himself travelled to Beijing in order to hold talks with Jiang Zemin on bilateral relations and the forthcoming inter-Korean Summit (scheduled to take place on 12–14 June) (FE/3855 and 3856). The same source later revealed that China and North Korea had agreed that Jiang Zemin should visit Py- ongyang later in 2000. Xinhua meanwhile stated that during his visit to Beijing, Kim had met Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, Hu Jintao and Li Ruihuan. His talks were said to have taken place in an “intimate and friendly atmosphere” (XHNA, 1 June in FE/3857). On 17 June, the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces of the DPRK (Kim Il-chok) discussed bilateral relations, as well as regional and international issues, when he met Chi Haotian in Beijing (FE/3870). On behalf of the Foreign Ministry, Xinhua issued a statement offering congratulations to both North and South Korea on the successful conclu- sion of the Pyongyang summit. The meeting between the two countries’ leaders had helped improve mutual understanding and provided the basis 898 The China Quarterly

on which they had already reached a consensus on major issues (FE/3868 and 3869). South Asia (India, Pakistan) On 31 March, Zhu Rongji and Tang Jiaxuan hailed the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and China (see FE/3805 for the texts of Zhu’s and Tang’s telegrams to the Indian counterparts; also see FE/3807 for Tang Jiaxuan’s optimistic comments on the future development of bilateral relations). An important event during the quarter was the visit to China by President K.R. Narayanan, which began on 28 May. Bilateral relations and international issues were the primary focus of his talks with Chinese leaders. During his discussions with the Indian President, Jiang Zemin put forward a four-point proposal, designed to enhance the development of friendly ties between the two countries. They embraced suggestions for more reciprocal visits between high-level personnel, stronger co-ordi- nation and co-operation in international affairs, enhanced trade and economic co-operation, and the proper handling of issues inherited from the past. The two men agreed to intensify efforts to reach an early settlement of the border issue (FE/3853 and All India radio in FE/3855; see also FE/3854 for President Narayanan’s call for Chinese and Indian efforts to establish a new political and economic world order in accordance with the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’). On 1 May, Narayanan met Premier Zhu Rongji for what were officially described as “cordial and friendly” talks (FE/3856). Zhu spoke with satisfaction of the progress that had been made in recent years towards furthering political, economic, cultural exchanges and co-operation. Earlier in the quarter, an Indian source noted that trade between China and India had reached a record level in 1999, even though an “information gap and infrastructural impediments” had prevented the true potential from being unfulfilled. The value of two-way trade in 1999 was US$1.99 billion – 3.4 per cent more than in 1998 and 71.6 per cent above the level of 1995 (FEW/0635). A Pakistani source stated (8 May) that China had agreed to provide Pakistan with four multi-purpose warships (including associated technology) by the end of 2000 (FE/3835). Later the same month, the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Navy (Abdul Aziz Mirza) visited Beijing in order to hold talks with Chi Haotian (FE/3849). South-East Asia (Singapore, Indonesia, The Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam) On 9 April, Premier Goh Chok Tong arrived in Beijing for an 11-day official visit to China that was also to take him to Xi’an, Qingdao, Shanghai and Hong Kong. Taiwan was one of the questions the Singa- porean Prime Minister discussed with both Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji. During these talks, both sides noted the steady growth of co-operation across various fields that had characterized bilateral developments during the previous decade (since they had established diplomatic relations). A Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 899 joint statement issued later spoke of agreement to seek greater political and economic co-operation – the former through high-level visits and exchanges, as well as through closer consultation in respect to the activities of regional and global organizations (including APEC, SEAM, the UN and WTO); the latter through increased trade and stronger economic ties). The following month, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew also travelled to Beijing, where he held talks with Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji (FE/3866 and 3867). In May, the Indonesian Foreign Minister (Alwi Shihab) made a five-day official visit to China. In Beijing, he joined Tang Jiaxuan in a commitment to seek good relations, based on mutual trust, for the 21st century. The two men signed a joint statement on the future direction of bilateral co-operation (FE/3835 and 3836). In advance of his visit to China and in a comment on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, President Joseph Estrada of the Philippines spoke optimistically of the prospects for strengthening bilateral relations (FE/3836). Following his arrival in the Chinese capital on 16 May, President Estrada held talks with Jiang Zemin. In an echo of his discussions with the Indian President earlier the same month, Jiang put forward four proposals aimed at strengthening the development of China’s relations with the Philippines. They were: to deepen mutual trust and promote the growth of a “healthy” bilateral relationship; to strengthen trade and economic co-operation; to handle existing problems (e.g. the South China Sea issue) in a proper manner; and to offer mutual support in order to safeguard the common interests in international affairs (FE/3843). For his part, Estrada reaffirmed the Philippines’ adherence to a one- China policy. He revealed that the two sides would sign a joint statement on bilateral co-operation for the 21st (for the full text of the document, subsequently signed by the two countries’ foreign ministers, see FE/ 3843), as well as other agreements. President Estrada later held separate talks with Premier Zhu focusing on trade relations, China’s impending accession to the WTO and the South China Sea issue. Xinhua quoted Estrada to the effect that his discussions with Chinese leaders had led to an agreement by both sides not to take any action that might complicate or escalate the situation in the South China Sea region, but to make every effort find a peaceful resolution of the problem (FE/3844). (Shortly before the arrival in Beijing of Joseph Estrada, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines (Domingo Siazon) had made his own working visit to China, where he held talks with Vice-Premier Li Lanqing: see FE/3838.) In Beijing on 16 June, Vice-Premier Qian Qichen met Heng Samrin (Honorary Chairman of the Cambodian People’s Party and First Deputy- President of the Cambodian National Assembly). Qian pledged renewed Chinese support for Cambodian reconstruction and national development (FE/3870). Finally, both Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji offered their condolences on the death of the former Vietnamese Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong. Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 901

If it was largely concerned with domestic political, economic and social developments, Chen’s inaugural speech also addressed the cross- strait situation. He was unequivocal in his statement that: as long as the Chinese communists have no intention of using military force against Taiwan … I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push for inclusion of the ‘two-state theory’ in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard to the question of independence or unification. His remarks also included a reference to the “miracle in the [mainland] economy” that had occurred under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. He also suggested that mainland China and Taiwan both had much to contribute towards the prosperity and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The official response to Chen’s inaugural speech, given by the Taiwan Affairs Offices of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, was less than positive. It referred to Chen’s allegedly “evasive, ambiguous attitude” on what it described as the “key issue of accepting the principle of one-China.” Hence, the suggestion that Chen’s “‘goodwill and rec- onciliation’ lack sincerity” (FE/3846). Meanwhile, a Hong Kong source quoted “informed sources” to the effect that senior Chinese officials were “extremely dissatisfied” with Chen Shuibian’s formulation of cross-strait relations (Ming Pao web site, 21 May: FE/3847). Although the report ruled out the possibility of an imminent war, it suggested that the Chinese leadership had become even more determined to use force against Taiwan. (For reports on what some regarded as provocative military exercises undertaken by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army [PLA], see FE/3824–3825, 3829–30, 3832 and 3835.) Throughout the quarter, there was strong condemnation of remarks made by Vice-President Annette Lu [Lu Xiulian] to the effect that Taiwan was already a “sovereign, independent country” (e.g. see FE/ 3811, 3813–3814, 3821, 3826, 3831 and 3833; also RMRB, 10 and 12 April – the last-named referring to Lu’s “lunatic raving”). A Taiwan source noted that between January and March 2000, trade between mainland China and Taiwan had increased by 23.3 per cent to reach US$6.79 billion. The value of Taiwan’s exports to China was US$5.44 billion (up by 16.6 per cent to account for 16.6 per cent of Taiwan’s global exports); its imports from the mainland were valued at US$1.34 billion (up 33.4 per cent to account for 4.3 per cent of imports from all sources) (FEW/0642). On 19 June, the Economics Minister in Taiwan, Lin Hsin-yi [Lin Xinyi], revealed that the proportion of Taiwanese industries, which would in future be allowed to invest in mainland China would be raised from 72 to around 94 per cent. Lin noted that the Ministry of Economic Affairs in Taipei was currently reviewing the previous administration’s “go slow” policy, seeking to control and limit Taiwanese investment in China (FE/3867). United States of America The most important visit to China by an American official during the 902 The China Quarterly

quarter was that of Madeleine Albright (U.S. Secretary of State). On 22 June, Mrs. Albright held talks in Beijing with Jiang Zemin. Jiang called for intensified efforts to strengthen bilateral relations and said that he was looking forward to meeting the U.S. President, Bill Clinton, at the UN Millennium Summit during September. In a comment on recent political changes in Taiwan, he reaffirmed his willingness to hold talks with the new Taiwanese President, but only on condition of the latter’s acceptance of the one-China principle (FE/3875). Mrs. Albright also held talks with Vice-Premier Qian Qichen and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, with whom she discussed bilateral and international issues, including the question of granting China Permanent Normal Trading Relations status. Tang was critical of the U.S. National Missile Defence programme, arguing that it threatened to have a serious negative effect on the global strategic balance and global security (FE/3875; see also a report in Hong Kong, Wen Wei Po, 23 June, which quoted Madeleine Albright as saying that the authorities in Beijing were still unwilling to discuss the prospects of holding talks with the Taiwanese President, Chen Shuibian). (For reports on the visit at the end of March of Samuel Berger, Adviser to the U.S. President on National Security Affairs, see FE/3804.) On 10 April, a Foreign Ministry spokesman commented on a U.S. government report on the results of an official investigation of the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). He noted that punishment of eight Central Intelligence Agency personnel notwithstanding, the U.S. had only admitted to the use of “inappropriate methodology” in order to find the relevant missile target – this mistake not having been detected in the subsequent review process. The spokesman also argued that there could have been no room for mistaking the Chinese Embassy for the Yugoslav Federal Directory of Supply and Procurement, situated half a kilometre away. Accordingly, the Chinese authorities refused to accept the U.S. claim that the exact location of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade had not been known and continued to demand a comprehensive investigation (FE/3813; see also the reference to “aggressive hegemonistic acts … [carried out by] … U.S.-led NATO” in RMRB, 7 May, quoted in FE/3835). Against the background of various reports and official statements pressing the United States on the desirability of granting China Perma- nent Normal Trading Rights (PNTR) (see, in particular, the comments of Shi Guangsheng, Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation in FE/3810; but also Jiang Zemin in FE/3809 and XHNA, 2 May, in FE/3831), it was perhaps inevitable that a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman should describe the successful passage through the U.S. House of representatives of a bill granting PNTR to China a “wise decision” (FE/3850). Predictably, there was condemnation of the Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, which was singled out for its “groundless” attacks on China’s religious policies and its decision to ban the “falungong cult” (FE/3832). Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 903

Western and Southern Europe (European Union [EU], Denmark, Great Britain, Spain)

A ZXS report (31 March) noted that despite some progress having been made in the latest round of Sino-EU bilateral negotiations – described elsewhere as “positive, constructive and fruitful”–on China’s entry into the WTO, a final agreement remained elusive (FE/3804; also FE/3805). Later in April, Shi Guangsheng revealed that he had invited EU negotia- tors to return to Beijing to take part in further talks and said that he expected the two sides to resume talks “very soon” (FE/3822). Prior to his arrival in the Chinese capital for the fourth round of negotiations, Pascal Lamy, EU Trade Commissioner, described himself as being “realistic,” rather than excessively optimistic about the chances of a final breakthrough. At first, reports indicated that the resumed talks had failed to generate the hoped-for breakthrough (e.g. see Hong Kong, Wen Wei Po, 18 May). On 19 May, however, Xinhua announced that Shi Guangsheng (for China) and Pascal Lamy (for the EU) had at last signed an agreement on China’s accession to the WTO (FE/3845). In a subsequent meeting with Lamy, Jiang Zemin reaffirmed that the Chinese government would be a responsible and constructive member of the WTO. Meanwhile, President Bill Clinton and the Director-General of the WTO, Mike Moore, congratulated both parties on having reached agreement. At the signing ceremony in Beijing on 19 May, Shi Guangsheng drew particular attention to the major opportunities for the further development of Sino-EU trade that promised to flow from the WTO agreement (ZXS in FE/346). Meanwhile, Long Yongtu (Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation and chief negotiator for China) looked forward to China joining the WTO by the end of 2000 (FE/3847). Earlier in the quarter, there had been official condemnation of resolu- tions on Taiwan and Tibet passed by the European Parliament. The resolu- tions were regarded as offering support to Taiwanese and Tibetan independence and were described as violating the basic norms governing international relations, as well as interfering in China’s internal affairs (FE/3822). In May, the Danish Prime Minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, visited China, where he held talks with Zhu Rongji. Both sides noted with satisfaction the healthy state of bilateral relations, with trade in 1999 totalling over US$1 billion. During his visit, which also took him to Shanghai, Rasmussen also met Jiang Zemin and Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo (FE/ 3836, 3839 and 3840). Following the discovery of the bodies of 58 suspected Chinese illegal immigrants in a lorry at a British port (Dover), a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman called for international co-operation in order to combat the activities of those who took money in return for smuggling would-be immigrants across national boundaries (FE/3873; and for further report, FE/3874–3876 and 3879). On 26 June, the British Defence Minister, Geoff Hoon, held talks in 904 The China Quarterly

Beijing with his Chinese counterpart, Chi Haotian. Both men hoped that Hoon’s visit would facilitate closer co-operation between the armed forces of their two countries. In Beijing, Hoon also exchanged views on bilateral relations with Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo (FE/3878 and 3879). Meanwhile, it was revealed that “solemn representations” had been made to the British government in an attempt to prevent the former President of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui – described by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman as a “trouble-maker”–from making an unofﬁcial visit to the UK (FE/3878). Finally, on 25 June, the new re-elected Prime Minister of Spain, Jose Maria Aznar, held talks with Zhu Rongji in Beijing. The Chinese Premier spoke with satisfaction of the smooth development of relations between China and Spain and expressed his government’s gratitude for seven tranches of preferential loans made by the Spanish government. Subse- quently, Aznar also met Jiang Zemin (FE/3877 and 3878).

In Geneva on 18 April, the 56th meeting of the UN Human Rights Committee passed a motion proposed by the Chinese delegation not to discuss a vote on a motion, put forward by U.S. delegates, on the “so-called ‘state of human rights in China’”(FE/3820). The strength of Chinese feeling was reflected in remarks by the leader of the Chinese delegation, Qiao Zonghuai, who described the U.S. proposal as a “self- directed and performed anti-China farce and a mockery of the Human Rights Committee and its member states.” Later the same month, the Head of the Chinese Delegation to the UN (Sha Zukang) spoke at the opening of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He pointed out that successful progress towards non-proliferation required the establishment of a global security environment of “stability, cooperation and mutual trust.” He also called for the elimination of double standards vis-a`-vis nuclear non-proliferation. Sha insisted that the Chinese government had always showed restraint towards the development of nuclear weapons. For example, it had consistently committed itself never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor to use them against nuclear-free zones and non-nuclear states. There were, said Sha, two conditions that must be met before China would participate in any negotiations on arms control (especially nuclear arms control). The first was to ensure that negotiations and associated treaties and agreements should not undermine the global security balance and global stability. The second was that such negotiations and agreements should not jeopardize China’s own national security. Finally, on 18 May in Beijing, Tang Jiaxuan met Carl Bildt, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General. The two men held an exchange of views on the Balkan situation (FE/3845).