Something old, new, borrowed, and blue: towards a bottom-up agenda of the Finnish-Russian relations
JUSSI LAINE
Laine, Jussi (2014). Something old, new, borrowed, and blue: towards a bottom- up agenda of the Finnish-Russian relations. Fennia 192: 1, pp. 65–78. ISSN 1798-5617.
While the Finnish-Russian relations of today cannot be fully understood without understanding the past, it is equally important to know how to break away from it. When discussing cross-border interaction, one must be aware of the broader context within which these processes take place. The territorial sovereignty of the nation-state continues to form one of the leading principles upon which in- ternational relations are based, yet transnational relations are increasingly run by actors and organisations whose ability to function does not stop at the border. The Finnish-Russian border provides an illuminating laboratory in which to study border change. This article draws on the experience from this border where cross-border cooperation has reflected both the political and socio-cul- tural change as well as politically and economically motivated interaction. It argues that the best way to normalise neighbourly relations is through increased people-to-people interaction, and preferable this ought to occur from the bot- tom-up, not from the top-down. Civil society organisations themselves may need to take matters into their own hands and to seek further revenues through social entrepreneurship in order to ensure the continuity of cooperation. Much of the work is carried out heedless of individual project and programme frames. In practice, its success depends on individual actors who are able to shoulder the implementation of the agreed programs and to solve emerging problems and disagreements.
Keywords: Finland, Russia, European Union, border, civil society, interaction
Jussi Laine, Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland, P.O. Box 111 FI- 80101 Joensuu, Finland, E-mail: [email protected]
Introduction metrical borders, such as the border between the United States and Mexico. On the face of it, the significance of Finland’s Given what was stated above, the scholarly and borders appears unaffected. The border with Rus- popular attention the Finnish-Russian border has sia remains secure and well controlled; younger attracted, and continues to attract, is astonishing. generations can hardly remember that there Even though many of these writings discuss not the would have ever been a ‘real’ border with Swe- border per se but what lies beyond it, it is the bor- den, and even fewer recall that Finland shares der that has gained a sizable symbolic load. The some 730 km of borderline with Norway some- lengthy shared border with Russia is still common- where up north. Running through nothing but for- ly put forth as excuse for why various issues are as est and some occasional lakes for almost its en- they are and not necessarily as they could or tire length, the Finnish-Russian border does not should be. Everybody, even those who have never inevitably appear to be a pressing research ob- seen or crossed it, seem to know the meaning of it ject, at first glance. In terms of dynamics, it fades and what it stands for, and thus many statements in comparison with other European Union (EU) on it go unquestioned. Alas, quantity does not borders as well as with other seemingly asym- compensate for quality. It has been customary to
URN:NBN:fi:tsv-oa8495 DOI: 10.11143/8495 66 Jussi Laine FENNIA 192: 1 (2014) assume a rather (banal) nationalist stance and plays. The goal is furthermore to introduce new, build on uncontroversial acceptance of the histori- more nuanced perspectives to the discussion on cal setting and current state of affairs. Their actual Europeanisation of the institutional and discursive merits aside, such writings reproduce a particular practices of CBC. Empirically, this article draws image and perspective and in so doing diminish from a mix of material and methods involving the room for alternative views. While historical per- mapping of actors, newspaper screening, basic spective and context specificity are crucial for un- background and more thorough in-depth inter- derstanding a particular border, the Finnish-Rus- views (96 in total) and document analysis. While sian one in this case, placing it in the greater Euro- the material at hand has been elaborated in detail pean perspective broadens the analytical frame elsewhere (see Laine 2013), this article focuses on and allows for the interpretations that a more nar- analysing the development of the operational row approach might preclude. forms of cooperation at the Finnish-Russian border Similarly, the borders of a particular discipline, and suggesting a future trajectory based on the geography in this case, might also confine the ana- collected empirical material. lytical lens. Even if disciplinary specialisation has As O’Dowd (2010) argues, by privileging spatial its benefits, a strict immersion in a particular field, analysis and over-emphasizing the novelty of on- as Strober (2006: 315) notes, may limit social in- going forms of globalisation, many contemporary novation and the intellectual horizon of research- border studies lack an adequate historical analy- ers. Interdisciplinary research, in turn, runs coun- sis, arriving, thus, to a disfigured perspective of the ter to the disciplinary taken-for-grantednesses, present. After providing a brief overview of the thus allowing more holistic, richer understanding border studies, this article seeks to recognise the of the topic at hand. As Baerwald (2010: 494–495) past in the present by looking back to the distinc- remarks, the drive to study the broad ranging and tive history of the Finnish-Russian border and dis- intertwined problems that encompass a complex cussing the development of the cross-border rela- mix of phenomena and processes, which taken to- tions in the prevailing contexts. It then proceeds to gether lie beyond the margins of existing disci- assess the current situation and places the bina- plines, has impelled the conduct of research that tional setting in the broader European context, to necessitates inter-, if not postdisciplinary ap- which it is now inherently linked. The article con- proach. Fortunately for geographers this is not a cludes by providing suggestions for the future major cause for concern. While many traditional management of the cross-border relations. disciplines are defined by the topics that they study, geography has been inherently interdiscipli- nary since its establishment as a modern disci- Border studies as a field of interest pline. This article draws from the experience from the Borders have long been one of the most central border between Finland and the Russian Federa- topics to political geography. However, the focus tion where cross-border cooperation (CBC) has of border studies has gone through substantial reflected both the political and socio-cultural changes as it has developed in relation to the pre- change as well as politically and economically dominant geopolitical models and visions – from motivated interaction. The border provides an il- studying borders as delimiters of territorial control luminating laboratory in which to study border and ideology towards areal differentiation and lat- change – or the lack thereof. Finland’s post-World er towards more dynamic role of borders as bridg- War II relationship with the Soviet Union, and es rather than barriers. more recently with Russia, has been both close The emergence of globalisation and the rhetoric and distant – at times both concurrently. It has of a ‘borderless world’ only fuelled interest in bor- been shaped by a common history, Cold War re- ders. The apparent renaissance of border studies alities, pragmatism, interdependencies and the that followed acquired an increasingly interdisci- lessons learned from devastating armed conflicts. plinary take. The significance of borders is doubt- Through the analysis of perspectives of civil soci- lessly in flux, but instead of disappearing altogeth- ety actors and those voiced in the media, this study er, the borders themselves seem to be merely strives to achieve a better understanding of pre- changing their institutional form. The traditional sent-day multi-layered Finnish-Russian relations, definitions and comprehensions of borders have especially with respect to the role that civil society been challenged primarily because the context in FENNIA 192: 1 (2014) Something old, new, borrowed, and blue: towards a... 67 which they were created and existed has also al- the grain by calling for a general border theory tered. (Newman 2003a, 2003b, cf. Brunet-Jailly 2004, Recently, geographers have delved, inter alia, 2005; Kolossov 2005; Paasi 2005a, 2005b; Rum- into the interrogating potentials for a democratic ford 2006), finally gave up and accepted that “it is governance of borders (Anderson et al. 2003), ex- futile to seek a single explanatory framework for clusion and discrimination (van Houtum & Pijpers the study of borders” (Newman 2006: 145). Border 2007; van Houtum & Boedeltje 2009), the tech- as a research topic is complex, making the study of nologisation of borders and visualisation practices borders so diverse, both in terms of geographic (Amoore 2009), violence of borders and ‘teichopol- and spatial scales, that any attempt to create a sin- itics’ (Elden 2009; Rosière & Jones 2012), the rela- gle analytical metatheory is doomed to failure. tionships between ‘traditional’ borders and the so- Even if most scholars have given up on the en- called borderless world of networked, topological terprise, Payan (2013: 3) continues to insist that in space (Paasi 2009), external drivers, such as the EU order to advance the field of border studies be- and CBC (Popescu 2008; Johnson 2009), the yond purely descriptive work, “[c]ontinued theo- conflicting logics of ‘national’ borders and ‘supra- rising on borders is not only a pending task but national’ unity (Sidaway 2001), and the ‘new’ Eu- necessary today, particularly because the optimis- ropean borders as ‘sharp’ markers of difference tic discourse on a borderless world… has fallen (Scott & van Houtum 2009). However, geography flat and there is in fact a renewed importance as- by no means monopolises border studies. Borders signed to borders both in the political and in the have spread also not just into international rela- policy world.” He claims that the path to border tions, political sociology, and history, but also into theorising is not closed but only out of sight be- cultural studies (Rovisco 2010) and philosophy cause border scholars have been looking in the (Balibar 2009). The bordering (border-making) per- wrong place. Precisely due to the fact that border spective not only transcends disciplinary bounda- scholars are spread around the world and are in ries, but it takes a step further by advocating that fact disciplinary and geographical specialists, “of- scientific knowledge ought not to be privileged ten miss the forest for the trees, and need to take over everyday geographical imaginations and the bird’s eye view and find what unites us” (Ibid.). popular geopolitics (Scott 2009). What unites us, Payan (2013) suggests, is our In the field of border studies, theorising has methods: in order to theorise on borders, scholars proven to be quite a challenge. All borders are need to engage in a dialogue on the methodologi- unique, and each of them is related in different cal strategies as well as the tools used and pick ways to local, regional, state-bound, and suprana- those that can enhance our explanatory power. tional processes – the geosociologies of political Even though Payan is correct in arguing that more power (Agnew 2005: 47). As a result of this, how- comparative work in teams is needed in order to ever, concerns have been raised that during the discover the optimal tools to identify what actually past decade border studies have been overly fo- gives shape and character to the borders of today, cused on case study material, which has been his argumentation postulates that border studies thought to overshadow attempts to develop the would form its own academic discipline, no differ- discussion of concepts, theories, and common ent in nature, say, from geography, sociology, his- ideas (Newman 2012). There is little abstract theo- tory, or anthropology with their own accustomed rising in border studies, and those who have at- and well established currents of research. That, tempted to theorise on borders have run into border studies is not. unique circumstances that make it impossible to This article puts fort that the main contribution conceptualise broad scale generalisations (Koloss- of border studies lies in its ability to draw different ov 2005; Newman 2006). disciplines together. It is fuelled by the diversity Even so, attempts have been made. Van Houtum carved out by its eclectic multidisciplinarity. Cre- and van Naerssen (2002) have sought to under- ating a metatheory and naming the variables to be stand borders through sociological concepts of or- used by all would only restrict the potential that dering and othering. Brunet-Jailly (2004, 2005) border studies has to offer. It is given that building has put forth an attempt to theorise by drawing the theories and testing them in practice advances our general lessons that single case studies can offer. knowledge. This must not however be done at the The same logic has been used more recently by expense of context specificity. All the borders are Moré (2011). Newman, who earlier went against unique and it is this uniqueness that makes border 68 Jussi Laine FENNIA 192: 1 (2014) studies so interesting. While there is no need to While Finland then became an autonomous create a single theory, we need not restrict our- grand duchy within the autocratic Russian Empire selves to mere case studies either. We can go one in 1809, it nevertheless maintained a national step further to establish broader conceptualisa- economy and a customs border with Russia. Even tions, trajectories, and even a common glossary in then, in other respects the border was an open one order to understand causality and to enhance the and very much a formality (Paasi 1996; Liikanen et explanatory and predictive power of the methods al. 2007: 22). Be it as it may, for the first time in used. While all borders are unique, they are still history, Finland formed an administrative unit of its affected by the same global phenomena; it is their own (Katajala 1999). regional implications that differ. The border became progressively defined in Despite the forces of globalisation, we remain terms of an autonomous nation-state in the course located somewhere and this has an impact on how of the nineteenth century, when an active nation- we perceive that which surrounds us. Even if geo- building process gained ground in Finland (Lii- graphical realities do not change, their meaning kanen 1995). Broad social and political mobilisa- for different purposes may. As a result, borders tion gained momentum at the beginning of the may lose some of their functions while simultane- twentieth century depicting the border as a politi- ously obtaining new ones; these functions are sel- cal, social, and cultural dividing line (Alapuro dom stable but rather under continuous change. 1988). As Alapuro and Stenius (1989) suggest, Borders may not disappear completely, but they such civic popular movements played a crucial can become more transparent and permeable in role in providing the emerging nation with an in- terms of some of their functions. A gradual open- tellectual or material maturity to declare inde- ing of a previously closed national border enables pendence in 1917, following the Bolshevik Revo- the formation of new forms of interaction between lution in Russia. countries but may also reveal political, cultural, The Republic of Finland and Soviet Russia and economic inequalities. All this makes them signed a peace treaty (Treaty of Tartu) in 1920 in more tangible for people, especially borderland- order to stabilise political relations and settle the dwellers. borderline between them. In Finland, a strong ef- This is exactly why we need to place people at fort was made immediately to secure the border in the center of things: “[p]eople are not only at the order to signify the territoriality of an independent center of world politics, but they ‘make’ politics” state. A heavily guarded, hostile military border (Warkentin 2001: 14–15). People as agents, as ac- was formed and all forms of cooperation interrupt- tors and doers, have the ability to make things hap- ed. pen and, secondly, people are also social beings, The border between Finland and the Soviet Un- naturally oriented towards establishing and main- ion was the longest border between a western taining social relations and conducting their lives capitalist state and a socialist super power (Paasi within the context of relational networks (ibid. 17). 1999: 670). In addition to its ideological weight, the border was increasingly perceived as playing distinct historical, political, natural, and yet artifi- Shifting significance of the Finnish- cial roles (Paasi 1996), the influences which are Russian border still felt today. Within the Cold War geopolitical order, Finland sought neutrality and became placed into the grey zone between the Eastern and The significance of the Finnish-Russian border has Western blocs. Whereas Finland had been a ‘West- been highly varied, reflecting not only Finnish- ern’ country in the geopolitical literature prior to Russian relations but also changes in global geo- World War II, many post-war representations politics (Paasi 1999: 669). The border was first placed it in Eastern Europe (Paasi 1996) as “a semi- drawn as a result of the Treaty of Nöteborg in 1323 independent oddity positioned under the Russian between the then rulers of Sweden and Novgorod, sphere of influence” (Moisio 2003). but was then frequently redrawn according to the The crux of the matter was that the 1948 Agree- changing balance of power. In practice, however, ment of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual As- the border did not exist at the regional level and sistance allowed the Soviet Union to interfere with people were free to move back and forth for cen- Finland’s domestic life. Even though the new geo- turies. political regime based on the treaty included more FENNIA 192: 1 (2014) Something old, new, borrowed, and blue: towards a... 69 extensive economic interaction, the border re- mained heavily guarded and practically closed. Underpinned by a strong regional development The longer it remained closed, the wider the gap and spatial planning rationale, cross-border coop- between the countries grew. This was hardly eration became a tool for building cohesion and helped by the fact that during the Cold War the blurring divides while local cross-border diploma- border became increasingly seen as a line divining cy enjoyed, first and foremost, a more a symbolic two competing socio-political systems, the com- status. munist and the capitalist, and forming a ‘civilisa- With the EU membership, activities formerly ad- tional’ frontier zone between East and West. ministered through bilateral, state-level agree- The situation changed radically once the Soviet ments became a part of the broader dynamics of Union ceased to exist. Finland recognised the Rus- international politics and EU-Russia relations. The sian Federation as the Soviet Union’s successor binational border was suddenly upgraded to an and was quick to draft bilateral treaties with it. The external EU border, and this necessitated also new treaty, named straightforwardly as the “Agree- amendments in political language and rhetoric. As ment on the Foundations of Relations between the Emerson (2001: 29) states, the Finnish-Russian Republic of Finland and the Russian Federation” border served as a prime example of a clean-cut (Finnish Treaty Series 63/1992) and consisting of periphery where one empire ended and another 12 compact articles, was signed with a newly began. The Finnish domestic debate thus acquired formed Russia in January 1992. Its adaptation nul- an alternative thread, which depicted Finland, lified the previous friendship treaty and the special having the only EU land border with Russia, as a relations dictated by it. The treaty also set in mo- sort of a bridge builder between the two. For this tion Finland’s Neighbouring Area Cooperation reason and also because of the increased impor- (NAC) programme, which then became the key tance of the EU’s borders that was observed in the channel for cross-border interaction with Russia. key EU decision-making bodies, Finland now had Perhaps the most significant aspects of the new a unique opportunity to profile itself in the field. treaty was that it allowed Finland to make the Given its geographic location, Finland became move towards what was consider to be its right ref- a logical avenue for increasing EU-Russian trade. erence group (Sutela 2001: 6–7); in March 1992, The Finnish easterly business expertise stemming only a few weeks after signing the new treaty, Fin- from the Soviet era was used to market Finland land applied for EU membership. both as a gateway to Russia and a window to the West. As a new EU member state, Finland was also interested in providing the EU with a special agen- The EUropean Frame da towards its Russian border, i.e., towards the “challenges and possibilities presented by having When joining the Union in 1995, Finland jumped Russia as a neighbour” (Stubb 2009). This then ma- onto a moving train. The process of European inte- terialised in the form of the Northern Dimension gration was underway and had been fuelled re- initiative. markably, first, by the signing of the Single Euro- The opportunities were not, however, really re- pean Act in 1986 and, second, by the new en- alised until it became clear that Finland’s distinc- largement prospects evoked by the collapse of the tion of being Russia’s only EU neighbour would be Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. By its threatened by the upcoming 2004 enlargement. nature this process necessitated policies aiming to While the domestic debate remained largely un- transcend internal borders, perceived in Schu- changed, at the EU level Finland began, wilfully manian integrative spirit as products and remain- and consistently, to proclaim itself as something of ders of former conflicts. Borders were depicted as a litigator of Russia in all things Europe, even if the results of the differentiation of groups in space. with only occasional success, claiming to possess Keeping ‘us’ apart from ‘them,’ they were per- Russian expertise that others did or could not have ceived to preserve heterogeneity and a lack of co- (Laine 2011). The Finnish-Swedish border became herence, both to be replaced with unity and com- an internal EU border, yet practically nothing mon Europeanness. As integration was assumed to changed, as passage had been unrestrained al- follow from increased interaction, borders as bar- ready for decades. Thanks to the Nordic Passport riers had to be eroded, whereby the role of border- Union, also the Finnish-Norwegian border, now lands as integrators became of high importance. officially an external EU border, remained uncon- 70 Jussi Laine FENNIA 192: 1 (2014) trolled. As of 1996, all Nordic countries joined the welfare and, in more extreme cases, Finnish cul- Schengen Agreement, which became fully applied ture. Similar tendencies are apparent in Russia, from March 25, 2001 onwards. where its leadership has resorted actively to na- The 2004 enlargement of the EU and the intro- tionalist rhetoric and foreign threat scenarios in duction of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) order to lead the lower and the upper classes and policy epitomise a political attempt to extend the to control the growing middle class and civil soci- ‘de-bordering’ momentum of the late 1980s and ety in between. 1990s beyond the territory of ‘Core Europe’ (see The consequent juggle between cooperation e.g. Scott 2009). The EU embarked on an ambi- and security-oriented agendas has led to contra- tions mission to look beyond its internal borders dictory bordering practices whereby a considera- and create a transnational space extending beyond ble gap exists between the projected geopolitical its external borders by engaging neighbouring vision and its translation into action. A telling indi- states in a new process of cross-border regionalisa- cator of this is the imbalance in resources allotted tion. Despite being marketed as ‘Ring of Friends,’ to CBC. While the EU’s Cohesion and Regional this approach embodied an apparent shift where- Policy for 2007–2013 has an operating budget of by the 1989–2003 ‘scars of history’ discourse that EUR 347 billion (35.7% of the total EU budget for had attempted to transcend borders began to be that period), the budget for the European Neigh- replaced by a securitisation discourse. Particularly bourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for the external borders re-emerged in practical and the same period amounts to some EUR 11 billion discursive/symbolic terms as markers of sharp – to – only some five per cent of which is allocated for an extent civilisational – difference (van Houtum actual CBC programs. Ironically, this is less than & Pijpers 2007). what the EU is investing in security research under Suffering from an acute form of enlargement fa- its wider R&D budget for 2007–2013. According- tigue, the EU moved to stabilise and consolidate ly, the EU’s promise of a ‘privileged partnership’ is itself as a post-national political community. For- downplayed by the fact that while the ENPI does mal relations with the neighbouring countries provide limited co-funding also for non-EU mem- were privileged at the expense of local coopera- bers, the sums are much less than what was avail- tion, which as a consequence became increasing- able through previous programs. ly based on context and need ad hoc. This trans- formed the integrative role of the borderlands to that of a buffer zone or a filter. While the new Russia: so near and yet so far forms of regional cooperation were presumably based on mutual interdependence, the EU’s re- Today, the spectrum of Finnish-Russian relations is strictive border and visa regimes gave an unam- unprecedentedly broad and diverse. Still, at least biguously exclusionary impact, making the EU the official storyline focuses mainly on interstate seem to be a contradictory international actor. relations, fostering in so doing the perception of Following the rise of nationalist populism, the Finnish-Russian border as a traditional bina- sparked by the events of 9/11 and fuelled further tional state border, on the different sides of which by threat scenarios of illegal immigration and a Finnishness and Russianness, respectively, is acted general loss of control over not just borders but out in the frame of a nation-state. Such a collective domestic issues of all sorts, defining ‘European’ in ‘practice of nation’ affects also political behaviour cultural-civilisational terms became an increas- by relocating the emphasis of understanding away ingly mainstream political discourse. This led to a from powerful social actors to the everyday repeti- heightened demand for more defensive borders for tion of national ‘rituals’ (Githens-Mazer 2007). the EU as a whole. On the level of member states, Even though the dialogue between the two the reclamation of national identity and sovereign- countries has become more ‘normal,’ at the level ty, often termed as a ‘re-bordering’ (Scott 2009; of interstate relations Finland has sought to con- Dimitrovova 2012) led the national governments tinue the ‘special relationship’ and stay among the to challenge the EU’s top-down supranational ‘good countries’. The Presidents, the Prime Minis- thrust. In Finland, the rise of national populism ters, and Foreign Ministers meet regularly during was not directed in any specific way against Russia bilateral visits but also at international and Euro- or Russians but built on the argument that immi- pean forums. Within the Cabinet Finland’s rela- grants in general are threatening Finnish jobs and tionship with Russia is discussed on a regular ba- FENNIA 192: 1 (2014) Something old, new, borrowed, and blue: towards a... 71 sis. In addition, the aim has been to create direct them would therefore remove part of the Finnish and effective relations between all ministries and identity. key government bodies with their counterparts in Balancing at the border of East and West was Russia. According to Alexander Rumyantsev not taken as a zero–sum game. Finnish President (2012), the current Russian ambassador to Fin- Paasikivi’s dictum that if one bows to the West one land, Finnish-Russian relations are built on mutu- is bound to turn one’s bottom to the East – and vice ally beneficial issues. According to him, these in- versa – has never been put to a test. The mutually clude open political dialogue, increasing trade, understood fact that “We cannot do anything for more than ten million border crossings, a gas pipe- geography, nor can you” has been, contrary to its line in the Baltic Sea, the Saimaa Canal, the Hel- original connotation, transformed to mean that the sinki-St. Petersburg high-speed railway, and cul- two countries now had a lot of potential to utilise tural cooperation. the opportunities offered by geographical proxim- Even though Finnish-Russian relations are com- ity (see Stubb 2008). monly addressed from a more or less equal footing The overriding question of Finnish foreign poli- – in the media and also in academia – it is hard to cy, as Finland’s long-serving President (1956– erase the apparent fact that the relationship is, in 1981) Urho Kekkonen (1958) explained, is the re- the end, quite a typical relationship between a lations with her Eastern neighbour “upon which small state and a superpower. Russia is not Swe- our destiny rests” and the “future of our nation den for Finland, nor should it be (Lounasmeri depends…” – “[t]his always has been the case and 2011: 15). Such neighbourly relations are always always will be.” Kekkonen had co-opted many of more important for the smaller country – Finland his ideas from his predecessor, J. K. Paasikivi, needs Russia, but Russia would quite likely man- whose thinking derived from Lord Macaulay’s sug- age just fine without Finland. The city of St. Peters- gestion that the beginning of all wisdom lay in the burg alone has a greater population than Finland recognition of facts. Paasikivi’s famous foreign as a whole. By total area, Russia is 50 times larger policy line maintained that Finnish foreign policy than Finland, and the Soviet Union was 66 times should never run counter to the Soviet Union and larger. our Eastern neighbour must be convinced of our The two countries share significant overlaps in determination to prove this. The Finnish-Soviet re- history, and with the exception of a couple of con- lations in aggregate became later personified flicts, the relationship between the two has re- strongly by Kekkonen, who discussed important mained somehow ‘special.’ With a common bor- issues directly with the Soviet leadership often der of more than 1,300 km, Finland has always with little or no consultation with his own admin- been closely tied to its eastern neighbour. Despite istration or the parliament (Saukkonen 2006). the physical proximity, the Cold War era closure of The ‘Paasikivi line,’ ranking all other issues be- the border increased the mental distance between hind relations with the Soviet Union, was adhered the two sides. For a long time, a good fence indeed to for decades. Outside the country, the line be- made good neighbours, but it also made the other came dubbed ‘Finlandisation,’ a term coined in side seem increasingly unfamiliar. The resultant 1961 by German political scientist Richard Löwen- ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality sketched in the minds thal. The pros and cons of this policy are still ac- of many has proven to be far more deeply rooted tively debated. A secret CIA Intelligence Report of and harder to erase than the border per se. August 1972, which was approved for release in The Finnish nation building process in the late May 2007, found that “the Finns have ingeniously nineteenth century and particularly the post-Civil maintained their independence, but a limited one War White history writing have projected Russia indeed, heavily influenced by the USSR’s proxi- as eternal other to Finland. In order to build a co- mate military might, a preconditioned prudence herent nation, it was necessary to define who ‘us’ not to offend Moscow, and the existence of various actually were and what was actually ‘ours’ – and Soviet capabilities to complicate Finland’s domes- in order to demarcate that, a border was utterly tic life” (Central Intelligence Agency 1972: 3). needed. In a way, the Finnish identity was built on Whereas the right-wing commentators accuse the differences vis-à-vis its neighbours; Finns were Finnish government of continuing the policy of something that Swedes and Russian were not. Ac- Finlandisation, commentators more towards the cordingly, the borders have played a key role in left underline that such an approach was, and to a the Finnish nation and identity building; to remove limited degree still is, necessary in order to cope 72 Jussi Laine FENNIA 192: 1 (2014) and deal with a culturally and ideologically alien Finland purchased supplies from the USSR, the superpower without losing sovereignty. Finlandi- more the USSR was obligated to purchase supplies sation has remained a sensitive issue in Finnish from Finland. This system was often presented, public discourse to this day. particularly in Soviet propaganda, as an example As a Grand Duchy under Russian rule, Finland of how a large socialist country and a small capi- had maintained a custom border with Russia. Rus- talist country can engage in mutually beneficial sia had been clearly the most important trade part- cooperation and trade (Laurila 1995: 11). ner for Finland for decades until the World War I Despite the strained relations during the post- changed the situation profoundly. With the out- World War II climate, the Soviet Union was, until break of war in 1914, Finland's foreign trade grew its collapse, by far Finland’s most important trading as a result of increased orders from Russia. At the partner. Even though largely politically deter- same time, the trade deficit deepened due to the mined, the bilateral trade had helped Finland to foreclosure of Western markets. A couple of years industrialise and contributed to its welfare in sev- later, the situation changed even more drastically eral ways. The Finnish economy had been structur- as a result of the Russian revolution and civil war ally dependent on this trade with its Eastern neigh- in 1917; all forms of trade were terminated (Fig. 1). bour to such an extent that its sudden disappear- Russia’s share of Finnish exports and imports fell ance contributed to an economic recession in abruptly from 97% and 68% respectively to zero Finland, which soon deepened into a depression (Finnish Customs 2007). The trade between the on a scale not seen since the early 1930s. countries remained at very low levels throughout Trade relations have been on the mend from the the entire 1920s and 1930s. 1998 Russian financial crisis. Even though trade After the Second World War, trade upticked and investments have not boomed hand in hand again, even though otherwise the border remained with levels of cross-border traffic, during the last practically closed, as Finland was forced to pay the decade trade between the countries grew steadily. Soviet Union’s sizeable war reparations. From the A major driver behind the growth of Finnish ex- 1950s onwards, Finnish-Soviet trade was based on ports to Russia was re-exports, i.e., goods that are a bilateral clearing agreement, which dictated that imported by a purchaser in one country who then both Finnish imports to and exports from the USSR exports the product to a third country without pro- had to be equal in value. This meant that the more cessing (Ollus & Simola 2007). The most recent
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1860 1864 1868 1872 1876 1880 1884 1888 1892 1896 1900 1904 1908 1912 1916 1920 1924 1928 1932 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011
Exports to USSR/Russia Imports to USSR/Russia
Fig. 1. Share of Russia/Soviet Union/Russia in Finland’s Foreign Trade 1860–2011. Per cent of total exports and imports. Data Source: Bank of Finland and the National Board of Customs, Finland. FENNIA 192: 1 (2014) Something old, new, borrowed, and blue: towards a... 73 economic crisis slowed down exports to Russia by stead approach it as being always undergoing not less than 47% and imports by 31% respective- some kind of reform or transition into something ly between 2008 and 2009 (Finnish National (Smith 2012). As a result, the knowledge and un- Board of Customs 2009), thought already in 2011 derstanding of the current situation in Russia as imports (85% of which was energy) rebounded well as the factors behind it remained slim. This, in over the pre-crisis figures to more than EUR 11 bil- turn, limited the ability to realistically assess the lion and exports more modestly from EUR 4 bil- impact of Russia on Finland and the rest of Europe lion in 2009 to EUR 5.3 billion in 2011 (Finnish as well as the extent to which there could be a National Board of Customs 2012). meaningful debate about what should be done As Haukkala (2003, 2009) argues, Finland has and, in particular, what can be done. gained Russian elite’s trust due to its historically While what was stated above has sought to ex- rooted tendency towards pragmatism. He points plain the broader context within which cross-bor- out that unlike many central and eastern European der interaction has evolved, more attention needs countries traumatised by communist-era experi- to be paid on civil society and individuals’ per- ences of direct coercion and ideological subjecti- sonal networks, which form the very backbone of fication, Finland’s relationship with Russia has al- the relations. While Finnish businesses have had ways been based on more or less voluntary and clear difficulties adapting to the unfamiliar condi- down-to-earth interaction. The continuation of this tions in Russia and the jurisdiction of governments ‘special relationship’ does not imply that problems stops at the political border, individual citizens do not exist. Recent bilateral issues include, but and civil society organisations are less restricted are not limited to, persistent truck queues at the from moving back and forth across the border and border, airspace violations, the pollution of the entering into cooperative relationships. These con- Baltic Sea, and an increase in Russian duties on nections also provide an alternative avenue for co- wood exported to feed Finland’s pulp and paper operation when interstate relations go sour and industry, the latter of which has, however, now eventually play also a vital role in re-establishing been somewhat eased as the WTO welcomed the relations. Russian Federation as its 156th member on August The core of the cooperation is heavily based on 22, 2012. The so-called Karelian question, the de- very few key network actors. A lot of local level bate over Finland’s re-acquisition of the ceded ter- work has been and is done, which does not be- ritories, and potential borderline adjustment pops come visible through the analysis of different pro- up in the public discussion every now and then grams or funding instruments. Even if cooperation but cannot be regarded as a political issue as both across the border has been troublesome and even of the governments in question agree that no open disappointing for many individual actors and or- territorial dispute exists between the countries. ganisations, the networks have managed to keep On the other hand, Russia has retained its posi- up active cooperation across the border already tion as Finland’s favourite enemy. As stated by the for a long time – heedless of individual project former Minister of Defence Jyri Häkämies (Nation- time frames or funding periods. It is exactly this al Coalition Party) in his (in-)famous speech given type of long-term cooperation that is perceived as at the Center for Strategic and International Studies most beneficial by the actors themselves. in Washington on September 6, 2007, the three main security challenges for Finland are “Russia, Russia, and Russia.” It is unclear whether the up- The Finnish-Russian relations and the roar that followed was sparked by Häkämies being border in between simply wrong or perhaps because his remarks had hit too close to the mark. As the Cold War came to end along with the Finnish-Russian relations are a broader phenom- Soviet Union, academic research devoted to the enon than customary bilateral relations between topic of Russia was downscaled in most Western two states. They are based on common history countries. In Finland, however, the opposite hap- and those lessons learned from it, geographical pened. A freer climate allowed for more objective proximity and the long common border, cultural research. Even so, most studies have focused on linkages and the existence of kindred peoples, what Russia lacks rather than on what it has to of- and economic development and trade interde- fer. Few studies explore Russia as it was, but in- pendencies, as well as environmental factors that 74 Jussi Laine FENNIA 192: 1 (2014) respect no borders. The relations have been both pretation. This is to say that the image and mean- close and distant – at times both at the same time. ing of Russia has not simply changed from one to They cannot be explained by the mere supply and another, but it is seen differently in different con- demand factors, but the motivations for coopera- texts, at different levels sectors, and by different tion range from a sense of duty to an outright ne- actors. Russia looks very different depending on cessity. As a partner in cooperation, Russia is per- whether it is approached at the level of everyday ceived at the same time as an opportunity and a life, as a next-door neighbour, or as a global re- drag, with high hopes and frustration. Like border emerging superpower. regions in general, the Finnish-Russian border re- The end of the Cold War provided a new begin- gion is characterised by specific forms of living ning, but few knew exactly with whom Finland together that entail tolerance, solidarity and spe- was now dealing with. The neighbour that Finns cial know-how. had learned to know, in both good and bad, sud- Only by being aware of the fact that the ‘teach- denly disappeared. As a result, the previously sta- ings of history’ are open to various interpretations ble border concept was also transformed into can the right decisions be made today without be- something broader and more complex. All this ing blind to the political use of history. What Rus- created uncertainly that downplayed the potential sia signifies to Finns has to be viewed through that could have been gained from the freer cli- multiple lenses, all of which alter the picture in mate and the more open border. As a neighbour, their own specific way. The era of Finland as an the Soviet Union had not been the easiest kind, autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire, but at least the risk associated with living next to a the nation building process in the latter half of the sleeping giant could be assessed and managed, nineteenth century, years of oppression in the ear- and the dangers could be judged. With its succes- ly 1900s, the confrontation between the bour- sor, the Russian Federation, the rules of the game geois and the socialists, gaining independence in changed fundamentally. The probabilities became 1917, the civil war of 1918, the power struggle harder to estimate because there was no longer between democracy and the right-wing dictator- any clear basis for making such a judgment. ship from the 1920s until 1936, then the Winter Freer climate enabled new interpretations of and Continuation War, after which Finland had to the position of Finland, but they also marked de- live in the shadows of the Soviet Union for five constructive moments for the Finnish nation-state decades, have all added something to the com- and the presumed unity between the nation and plexity of these bilateral relations. the state. Joenniemi (1993: 19) was quick to argue Even though the Finnish-Soviet/Russian rela- that as the permanent threat the Soviet Union was tions have been full of twists and turns, public perceived to have lost its credibility, the meaning opinion has changed more slowly. The analysis of of state sovereignty could be put under scrutiny. this level of the relations is also important, as this The more open conditions allowed for the decon- is where much of the people-to-people interaction struction of age-old stereotypes about ‘Russian- takes place. While more general Western attitudes ness’ and ‘Finnishness’ derived from the past and towards Russia have turned, at times in an instant, related to World War II and the era of a closed from euphoria to outrage and from despair to border and also cleared the way for the image to hope, Finns’ underlying attitudes towards Russia be reconstructed in a more truthful manner. have been more stable. This can partly be ex- EU membership provided further treatment for plained by the fact that Russia is constantly pre- the long-common-border-syndrome and suggest- sent in the Finnish media and general public de- ed a move away from the geodeterministic prem- bate while elsewhere, further away, its image is ise whereby the geography of Finland predeter- formed based on more pointed events. Finns re- mined or at least limited its choices with regard to main reserved and ground their stance on past its political development. The increasingly inter- experience. Whether this is called Russophobia or national context necessitated that national unity just realism depends on the angle taken. be redefined once again. This process is evidently The Finnish debate about Russia has certainly still going on today. evolved during the last two decades, but the pro- The external environment has changed radi- cess has not been linear, nor has it been uncom- cally during the last two decades and so too has plicated. Instead, multiple alternative trends have Finland. Increased cooperation has eroded the emerged and there is still plenty of room for inter- understanding of the border with Russia as a FENNIA 192: 1 (2014) Something old, new, borrowed, and blue: towards a... 75 strict cut-off line shutting-off contacts and retain- Concluding remarks: away from state ing, if not generating, the mind-set of repression, centricity injustice, conflict, or even war. While the border is still a state border, the transnational practices that transcend it allow it to be approached as a Borders are not fixed or something that must be social practice, situated within an understanding overcome. They are evolving constructions, of neighbourliness that recognises and respects which have both merits and problems that must the values of the other and the contributions that be constantly reweighed. This must be done, as it makes. The opportunities that would be al- Paasi has repeatedly argued, because borders lowed by more open conditions have not, how- are institutions and symbols that are produced ever, been grasped to their full potential. The and reproduced in social practices and dis- mental aspects of the border remain etched into courses. As they can be constructed, they can the minds of the people so profoundly that its also be deconstructed – should there be will to relevance has not faded even though the actual do so. As a band of border scholars have discov- institutional border has subsided. The border still ered, borders do not pre-exist, but they are al- functions as a barrier, but its partial permeability ways an outcome of social and political pro- allows for the relations across it to be now, at cesses; change the process and you change the last, shaped by dialog rather than by confronta- border. tion. This dialog allows both sides of the border Changing the focus from seeing like a state to to gain more knowledge about their neighbour, seeing like a border, as Rumford (2008) has ad- which in turn fosters mutual understanding, an- vised, would allow us to disaggregate the state other important prerequisite for effective coop- and the border, and unveil the potential that eration. various actors of civil society hold in construct- An unequal border setting, such as the Finn- ing, shifting, or even in erasing borders. If the ish-Russia border, is characterized not only by border is no longer seen in national terms, and various asymmetries but also complementarities if the interaction is deemed not to occur be- that, in turn, generate a variety of cross-border tween two states, but among people from these linkages. Increased linkages are not only a result two, or more, states, such borderwork would go of successful policies and practices, but also an beyond issues of national belonging or citizen- essential prerequisite for future development. ship as to allow expressions of transnational Thanks to the changes in the governance modes, mobility and sincere actorhood apart from state, rescaling of the state, constantly widening and or the EU, supported agendas. Various organisa- deepening integration processes, strengthening tion of civil society are not only carrying out regionalisation, and the raising influence of tasks defined by others. Instead, they them- trans- and international organisations, the state is selves play a key role in articulating and modi- no longer the primary actor, nor is the nation- fying the objectives and practices of coopera- state the only conception of space to be applied tion. in explaining human interaction. The state is not, While the significance of the interstate rela- however, disappearing but merely being organ- tions and great power politics cannot be ig- ized differently. State sovereignty and authority nored, they alone are incapable of explaining has been weakened upwards, downwards, and the multileveled and multiscaled processes that sideways. There are increased negotiations not take place today. Thanks to the institutionalisa- just among governments at several territorial tiers tion of cooperation (e.g., Euregio Karelia), the but also between the various sectors of society. relationships especially between regional level The world politics of today involve many non- officials and authorities on the two sides of the state actors who interact with each other, with border have improved. CBC projects and also states, and with international organizations, at less-visible personal-level interactions have sig- times skipping a level or two in between. When nificantly contributed to a more mutual under- taken together, these revolutionary changes have standing and interdependence, accumulation of led to a transition from international (border con- trust, and the breaking down of mental barriers firming) to transnational (border eroding) rela- (cf. Németh et al. 2012). The relationship may tions, implying, as a result, a clear shift away still be far from ideal, or even what could be from state-centeredness. considered as normal between two countries 76 Jussi Laine FENNIA 192: 1 (2014) sharing a long common border. Still, at least in much of the work is carried out. The main mo- comparison with high-level geopolitics, more tives and initiatives for the cooperation have to bottom-up civil society cooperation seems to be arise from the local needs and concerns. developing forward and cultivating varying de- In the light of current trends towards the de- grees of interdependence. centralisation and privatisation of public ser- The ENP era brought along a greater empha- vices in both Finland and Russia, it would be sis on civil society in CBC across the external prescient to conceptualise a cross-border space EU border but it also included a hidden agenda: for social contracting and social welfare poli- an attempt to approach Russia through an alter- cies through civil society organisations. Such a native channel and to create operational basis more social economy focused approach would for bottom-up forces seeking to influence the offer alternative ways to generate social and system. However, the post-Lisbon securitisation economic welfare and innovative solutions to emphasis along the general new ‘realism’ in EU society's most pressing social problems thought foreign policy has changed the picture yet social entrepreneurship. New support structures again. Talks about the ‘ring of friends,’ which could promote collaborative forms of policy underlined the need to create better links with formulation and delivery based on partnerships neighbours, now focus increasingly on a ‘se- involving the state, the private sector, founda- cure neighbourhood’ and the need to create a tions, and civil society at large. This is particu- supportive buffer zone. Accordingly, the EU larly important in peripheral regions with limit- seems to have lost some of its faith in CBC and ed prospects for short-term returns on social in the transformation process in Russia. This has investment and where multiple support mecha- urged the Union to retreat precisely to where it nisms are needed in order to nurture entrepre- should not be – at the level of socio-cultural neurial activity. One possible strategy would be communication. to develop international networks between If the local and regional level CBC is expect- public, private, and nonprofit sector actors that ed to thrive also in the future, all the levels will provide assistance to emerging and future so- need to have better understanding of their own cial entrepreneurs through a variety of means, role and of the division of labour in this equa- including: support in project development, se- tion. More funding that is better directed, more curing grants, and assistance in the acquisition easily accessible, and more reliable is needed and provision of loans and investment capital, where the practical knowledge and expertise is. as well as training, advisory, logistical, and in- It cannot be based on the superficial friendship formational support. rhetoric, but careful planning is needed in order The best way to normalise neighbourly rela- to move beyond the formalities and maintain tions is through increased people-to-people the cooperation successfully. Much depends on interaction, and preferable this ought to occur individual actors who are able to shoulder the from the bottom-up, not from the top-down. implementation of the agreed programs and to Given that the NAC program has been termi- solve emerging problems and disagreements. nated and that the ENPI CBC is not properly As the EU’s conditionality principle cannot equipped to deal with the overall context be applied to Russia, a country without aspira- within which Finnish-Russian cooperation tions of EU membership, the carrot needs to be takes place, there is a risk that despite the rhe- found elsewhere. Certainly, the EU’s role in torical statements suggesting otherwise, the fuelling cooperation cannot be denied, as it cer- EUropeanisation of Finnish-Russian coopera- tainly has created a supportive frame and a fo- tion may well become underfunded and more rum within which cooperation and regional dia- technocratic. This will put the durability of logue has developed. It has also brought new cross-border contacts to the test, but it also al- impetus and forced the Finnish actors to move lows CBC to be restructured and redesigned beyond the old rhetoric based on past experi- away from predefined funding programs, peri- ences. Still, the future trajectory whereby bina- ods, and priorities. Unrestricted people-to- tional cooperation would rely entirely on sup- people interaction feeds inspiration and inno- port from Brussels sounds very unnatural. Espe- vation and leads to new solutions – also in cially as long as there are no practical means to terms of financing. There is little reason to ex- distribute EU funds to the local level where pect anything less. FENNIA 192: 1 (2014) Something old, new, borrowed, and blue: towards a... 77
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