Preface Prologue: Soviet Collapse and the Rise of China
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Notes Preface 1 . EastWest Institute, “Euro-Atlantic Security: One Vision, Three Paths” (June 2009), http://www.ewi.info/euro-atlantic-security . 2 . Hall Gardner, “Toward a Euro-Atlantic Confederation (A Proposal for Kant, Hugo and Tolstoy to shake hands in Kaliningrad, Paris, and Sebastopol),” EastWest Institute (June 23, 2009), http://www.ewi.info/system/files/Gardner_Speech.pdf . See discus- sion “Euro-Atlantic Security Seminar in Brussels” (June 23, 2009) at http://www .ewi.info/euro-atlantic-security-seminar-brussels-0 . Prologue: Soviet Collapse and the Rise of China 1 . The US National Intelligence Council, 2025 Global Trends Final Report (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, November 2008) maintained that Chinese capabilities could reach roughly 60 percent of US power potential by 2025, in terms of composite economic, military, demographic, and “innovation” indices. China is also expected to surpass US GDP by 2036. http://www.aicpa.org/research /cpahorizons2025/globalforces/downloadabledocuments/globaltrends.pdf . 2 . Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “How China Sees America,” Foreign Affairs (September–October 2012). 3 . President Xi Jinping to the Chinese parliament, http://southchinaseastudies.org/en /weekly-bulletin/806-weekly-bulletin-11-march-17-march . 4 . In geoeconomic terms, the United States represents an insular-core state with a pano- ply of land, air, sea, and outer space (and computer-information) capabilities, while Russia now represents a landlocked core power that has lost most of its overseas naval and maritime status (potentially influencing a sociopolitical backlash). China, mov- ing out of semi-peripheral and continental status, now represents a rising financial power that is developing blue-water naval and maritime capabilities combined with outer space and computer-info capacities—perhaps more comparable to Tsarist Russia than Imperial Germany in the late nineteenth century. 5 . China and India are expected to be the largest investors by 2030, accounting for 38 percent of all global investment. China alone could be responsible for nearly one-third of global investment while Brazil, India, and Russia could constitute a 190 ● Notes larger investment bloc than the United States. Carey L. Biron, “Developing World to Dominate Global Investment by 2030.” IPS (May 17, 2013). See World Bank Report, “Global Development Horizons: Capital for the Future” (May 16, 2013), http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPE CTS/0,,contentMDK:23413150~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:47 6883,00.html . 6 . I use the term “double restrain,” as my concept of “double containment” was miscon- strued by Francis Fukuyama in his Foreign Affairs review of my first book, Surviving the Millennium: American Global Strategy, the Collapse of the Soviet Empire and the Question of Peace (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994). See Hall Gardner, American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007). 7 . N i c o l a s S p y k m a n , The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944). 8 . See Paul H. Nitze, “NSC-68,” http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm . See also my interpretation of NSC-68 in, Gardner, Surviving the Millennium . 9 . For geopolitical terminology, see Saul B. Cohen, Geopolitics of the World System (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 10 . Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Journal 23 (1904): 421–437. MacKinder differentiates between the “pivot region,” then con- trolled by Russia, and a “pivot policy” pursued by shifting alliances among major states, but always with control over the key “pivot region” in mind. See also Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (New York: Holt, 1919). 11. Mikhail Gorbachev had made compromises with the Solidarity movement in February 1989, resulting in multiparty elections in Poland in March 1989. The Warsaw Pact was unable to act during the December 1989 Romanian revolution. The Warsaw Pact then disbanded in February 1991, prior to Soviet breakup in August–December 1991. 1 2 . Z h a o Z i y a n g , Prisoner of State: The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009). 1 3 . B o b o L o , Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2008). 14 . This is interpreted as a mix of the nineteenth century Anglo-Russian “Great Game” and the twenty-first century rivalry with China involving games of encirclement and counter-encirclement as in the ancient Chinese “Game of Go.” 15 . I have embellished the concept of “security community.” See Karl Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1954); Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); See also Chester A. Crocker, “The Place of Grand Strategy, Statecraft and Power in Conflict Management,” in Leashing the Dogs of War, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 362. See Hall Gardner, Averting Global War: Regional Challenges, Overextension, and Options for American Strategy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 16 . “Shatterbelt” regions can become a shelterbelt region (or “gateway” regions in Saul B. Cohen’s terms), if major and regional powers can find the means to cooperate and help develop those regions in concert. Cohen, Geopolitics of the World System. In addi- tion, wealthy oasis states such as Brunei and Qatar can provide financial support for Notes ● 191 peace processes, potentially also financed by revenues derived from the resources of disputed regions. 1 Breaking the Contemporary Impasse 1. As the United States has sought to downplay an image of geopolitical competition in its new strategy toward Asia, the term “rebalancing” has been preferred to that of “pivot.” But even the term “rebalancing” does not necessarily imply the possibility of US political-military cooperation or even real power sharing with Russia, China among other countries of the region that could prevent the rise of more intensive geoeco- nomic rivalries. 2. STRATRISKS, “Russia’s Military Brass Threatens Preemptive Strike If NATO Goes Ahead with Missile Plan,” http://stratrisks.com/geostrat/5925 ; “Russian General Makes Threat on Missile-Defense Sites,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/world /europe/russian-general-threatens-pre-emptive-attacks-on-missile-defense-sites.html . 3 . “President Obama: On all these issues, but particularly missile defense, this, this can be solved but it’s important for him to give me space. After my election I have more flexibility.” “President Medvedev: I understand. I will transmit this information to Vladimir (Putin).” Putin had just been elected as President of Russia for the second time (ABC News, March 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03 /president-obama-asks-medvedev-for-space-on-missile-defense-after-my-election-i -have-more-flexibility/ . 4 . On McFaul, see http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/30/michael_mcfaul _undiplomat?page=0,0. See also, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/world/in-russia -new-us-envoy-mcfaul-ruffles-feathers.html?pagewanted=all and http://tomnichols .net/blog/2012/04/05/russias-harassment-of-u-s-ambassador-mcfaul-just-like-the -old-days/ . 5 . See video and text, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/19719.html ; “Lost in Translation,” New York Times (March 7, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/07 /world/europe/07diplo.html?_r=0 . 6 . http://voiceofamericaa.webs.com/apps/blog/show/10703435-gop-lawmaker-blocking -obama-s-pick-for-russia-envoy . 7 . Phased Missile Defense Arms Control.org. http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets /Phasedadaptiveapproach . 8 . Insufficient funding from Congress for the Standard Missile 3 Block 2B interceptor as well as North Korean progress toward a long-range ballistic missile ostensibly led to the decision to shift funding toward Ground-based Midcourse Defense. http://www .nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/us-turnabout-icbm-interceptor-may-impact-strategic-talks -russia/?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nti.org&mgf=1. 9 . China was “strongly dissatisfied and resolutely opposed” to the nuclear test. http:// www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-korea-north-idUSBRE91B04820130212 . 1 0 . “Obama: China ‘recalculating’ on North Korea,” http://www.spacedaily.com/reports /Obama_China_recalculating_on_North_Korea_999.html . While China has promised to make it more difficult for North Korea to obtain foreign exchange through the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea, China has also increased trade with North Korea, as trade between the two nearly tripled in the five years through 2011 to $5.6 billion. China accounts for 70.1 percent of the North’s 192 ● Notes entire external trade of $8.0 billion, up from 41.7 percent in 2007. http://www .japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/08/asia-pacific/china-cuts-ties-with-key-north-korean -bank/#.UZdqssqjfPI . China ironically appears willing to engage in sanctions in order to expand trade with both Iran and North Korea. 11. In October 2008, Segrey Magnitsky, a lawyer who was investigating Russian money- laundering operations involving hundreds of millions of dollars using Hermitage Fund capital, was arrested and died in prison a year later. See the Magnitsky Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1039/text . See discussion, Hall Gardner, “Breaking the Cycle of Mutual Imprecations : The Magnitsky Act and Dima Yakovlev Law ” (April 8, 2003), http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=1671&active_id_11