Hall Gardner. IR Theory, Historical Analogy, and Major Power War. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. 339 pp. $84.99, ISBN 978-3-030-04635-4.

Reviewed by Sarang Shidore

Published on H-Diplo (September, 2019)

Commissioned by Seth Ofenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

How dangerous are current trends in interna‐ macy, but of the informal “contact group” kind tional politics involving the , , rather than formal processes of the sort that place and ? Are we stumbling toward great power the UN Security Council at their core. war? If so, how can it be prevented? Perhaps no Gardner is at his strongest when he invokes other question, except for the environmental cri‐ rich historical detail to argue that the era we are sis, is as important to the future of humankind. entering is not so much a reprise of the Cold War And Hall Gardner is the latest among a number of than a return to some blend of pre-World War I international relations theorists to take it on. and pre-World War II dispensations of power and What he fnds is not reassuring. The great purpose. To do so he takes issue with a number of powers indeed seem to be heading toward a con‐ understandings that international relations theo‐ frontation that may well result in a large-scale rists have commonly invoked. A good example is confict, with its roots lying substantially in Wash‐ Gardner’s questioning of the standard interpreta‐ ington’s post-Cold War shortsightedness but also tion of the Peace of Westphalia, the 1648 treaty in Russian revanchism and Chinese assertion. But that is widely seen to have inaugurated a new era there is a way to prevent tragedy—renewed diplo‐ in European and world afairs, by reifying state macy. sovereignty as a global governing principle. West‐ If some of this seems not quite brand new— phalian sovereignty, Gardner argues, is substan‐ after all, Barry R. Posen (Restraint: A New Foun‐ tially a myth. While Westphalia did put aspects of dation for U.S. Grand Strategy [2014]), John J. state sovereignty in place, such as the right of al‐ Mearsheimer (The Great Delusion: Liberal most three hundred German princes to be free of Dreams and International Realities [2018]), and the control of the Holy Roman Empire, it also lim‐ others have elegantly laid out the costly blunders ited sovereignty in important ways, for instance, of American overreach—the reader is invited to by “denying the doctrine of cuius regio, eius reli‐ engage with what seem to be the volume’s more gio (the religion of the prince becomes the reli‐ promising contributions: analogy with deep histo‐ gion of the state) ... established by the 1555 Peace ry and what Gardner calls his framework of “al‐ of Augsburg” (p. 118). Rather than a strict enshrin‐ ternative realism” as both an explanatory and ing of the principle of noninterference, West‐ normative approach to the central question posed phalia legitimized “power sharing and joint at the outset. Gardner also reposes faith in diplo‐ sovereignty” by giving the new powers France H-Net Reviews and Sweden the right to interfere in the afairs of reason. Common interests between the United the German Protestant princes (p. 117). Another States and the to contain allies, such example of power sharing was the recognition of as Germany, Japan, and China, seen by the two su‐ Switzerland as a confederal state. perpowers as having potential to threaten their Gardner also takes on the traditional inter‐ core interests, ensured such collaboration. The pretation of the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht as an early nuclear nonproliferation treaty was but one ex‐ exemplar of the balance of power system as a ample of the two superpowers collaborating to re‐ means to limit or prevent war, as theorized by ne‐ strain potential great powers, such as the above orealists. The balance of power conceived by three. Thus, the Cold War was about each super‐ Utrecht was not a method to uphold stability and power not just containing its peer rival but also the status quo; rather, it was a “critical concept to containing its own major allies—efectively, a undermine global hegemony” (p. 120). Others “double containment.” have argued cogently before that the Westphalian Gardner bemoans the frittering away of the order is an ideal-type construct, but Gardner’s opportunity presented by the collapse of the Sovi‐ contribution is in linking reductionist interpreta‐ et Union, with the United States myopically refus‐ tions of Westphalia to questions of great power ing to take Russian sensitivities into account in ex‐ tensions of the present.[1] panding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Historical analogy is another central thrust of (NATO) and launching a war of choice against Ser‐ this volume. The current tensions between the bia over the fate of Kosovo. Centering NATO, great powers parallel more closely the pre-World rather than the Russia-inclusive Partnership for War I and II eras than the inauguration of a new Peace, as the cornerstone of a new security dis‐ cold war, asserts Gardner. The implication of this pensation in was a mistake that provoked assertion is clear: we cannot expect this clash to a nationalist backlash in Moscow. be managed through such precepts as nuclear de‐ An important contribution of the volume is its terrence that neorealists believe kept the peace clear-eyed sense of the growing entente between during the Cold War. The diferences with the Russia and China. This convergence has been fre‐ Cold War are due to a number of characteristics quently presented in the literature as being mere‐ of our time not present till recently: the increas‐ ly opportunistic—long on lofty rhetoric but short ing conceptualization of tactical nuclear weapons on common intent and a willingness to pool re‐ as a means to terminate conventional confict, the sources.[2] But Gardner assesses that the main apparent acceptability of limited nuclear war as a driver of the Russian-Chinese entente is their realistic option, the increased autonomy of mid‐ common interest in their increasingly fraught ri‐ dle powers to initiate wars outside the control of valry with the United States, and the durability of great powers, and new planes of cyber and infor‐ this rivalry also implies the longevity of this con‐ mation warfare with their power of asymmetry. vergence on most strategic matters. Both great Thus, rather than a confict turning into a military powers (though Russia just about qualifes to be clash only at its fringes, a slide into great power one) are playing the long game rather than just war is a realistic risk under the current circum‐ looking at their proximate and shorter-term inter‐ stances. ests. A simultaneous get-tough policy against Bei‐ Rejecting the proposition that it was nuclear jing and Moscow, as is currently underway in deterrence that largely kept the peace during the Washington, acts only to cement this convergence Cold War, Gardner points to the rivalry’s many into a true (if informal) alliance. collaborative elements as the more consequential

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Detailed historical analogies between today gues for “the transformative power of diplomacy” and the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen‐ to settle the sharpening rivalry between the Unit‐ turies are a key means for establishing Gardner’s ed States and Russia-China, with their central case. The crises of the contemporary Middle East fashpoints as Ukraine and Taiwan (p. 114).[3] The are analogous to the Balkan and Moroccan con‐ means are to be “contact groups”—or, in other ficts prior to World War I, argues Gardner, while words, informal diplomatic clubs—bringing to‐ the emerging Moscow-Beijing entente parallels gether key powers outside the formal rules of the the Berlin-Tokyo axis prior to World War II and United Nations and other similar forums to design the 1922 Rapallo Pact between Weimar Germany a new security architecture for Europe, Asia, and and Russia. India is seen as a pivot power similar the Middle East (p. 110). to Italy of the early twentieth century, whose loy‐ Gardner even proposes some grand bargains alties were not a given with its switching of sides that such contact groups could arrive at. For between the two world wars. The Two Plus Four Ukraine, this means recognition of Russian Agreement reunifying Germany and fnalizing the sovereignty over Crimea but with Russian com‐ Oder-Neisse line as the German-Polish border is pensation paid to Kiev, a free-trade arrangement seen as analogous to the Locarno agreements that with Europe and the United States to give them a were aimed to end disputes of Germany with its deep role in Crimea’s economy, and a pathway to western neighbors and bring the Weimar Repub‐ future shared sovereignty over the annexed terri‐ lic into the core community of nations. And Chi‐ tory. A similar joint sovereignty approach is rec‐ na’s Belt and Road Initiative parallels similar hub ommended to resolve the multi-stakeholder South projects of Japan’s Co-prosperity Sphere and Wil‐ China Sea dispute. A contact group could also re‐ hemine Germany’s Berlin-Baghdad-Basra railway. solve the Syria dispute with a resultant coalition The fact that many of the multilateral eforts government comprising all Syrian combatants, in‐ at solving disputes in the pre-World War II era cit‐ cluding the current members of the Bashar al-As‐ ed by Gardner ultimately failed is not lost on the sad government, and the Yemen war with the reader. This sense of pessimism is sharpened in Omani proposal as a starting point. the fnal two chapters, when Gardner argues that How could these grand bargains come about? a bloc formation is steadily taking place with the This is where Gardner starts to slip. He claims this United States and its allies on one side and the approach will work on the parties’ realization evolving China-Russia-Iran entente on the oppos‐ “that political, economic, and technological coop‐ ing side that could turn into a hard alliance. Tur‐ eration will most likely bring benefts for all sides key could also become a member of this entente if in the long term than perpetual confict” (p. 110). its current deterioration of ties with the United The problem with this assumption is not that States (over US extraterritoriality on the S-400 ac‐ long-term win-wins do not rationally exist (they quisition from Russia and the issue of Kurdish often do), but rather that in a time of acrimony, rebels in Syria) reaches a point of no return. nationalism, and tendencies toward greater au‐ These emerging blocs, coupled with the volatile ri‐ thoritarianism on all sides, such rationality could valries of middle powers in Asia and the Middle well be overwhelmed by other more potent ratio‐ East, make great power war more plausible than nalities of short-term aggrandizement and saving it was at any other time since World War II. face. With all this said, however, Gardner is no fa‐ Though the idea of an informal contact group talist. Rejecting teleologically favored predictions has its advantages, Gardner’s argument that a of confict, such as the “Thucydides trap,” he ar‐ change of diplomatic format would do the trick is

3 H-Net Reviews less than credible. The Ukraine dispute, for exam‐ cal infuences, polycentrism as representing the ple, has degenerated into bitter acrimony on both world order, the importance of non-state actors, sides with an ongoing hot confict. This is the case absolute gains trumping relative gains, and the notwithstanding the work of the Trilateral Con‐ promise of informal diplomacy—appear to come tact Group—precisely the sort of approach that more out of various well-trod pathways of liberal Gardner recommends. But walking back from the and constructivist thinking than any brand new mutual US-Russian antagonism will likely take theoretical approach. But the reader is left even more than the right negotiating format. There more confused at one point by an extensive tax‐ frst must be a will to meet the adversary part of onomy of states centered on space and power, ap‐ the way—a difcult challenge to overcome when parently drawn from theoretician George Liska, the confict is portrayed in starkly moralistic which bears more than a passing resemblance to terms, particularly on the side of Washington. the early twentieth-century framework of geopoli‐ Gardner has no convincing practical proposition tics. Is “alternative realism” then simply a smor‐ that addresses this challenge. gasbord of various international relations frame‐ It is in his inability to adequately defne his works, excluding neorealism? The reader is never theoretical concept of “alternative realism,” how‐ provided a clear answer. ever, where Gardner truly falls short. Alternative Historically, successful resolutions of some of realism seems to be defned more by what it is not the most bitter and intractable disputes—such as than what it is. Time and again (and convincingly between Catholic and Protestant powers in Eu‐ on many occasions), Gardner rebuts many cher‐ rope or due to anxieties provoked by the rise of ished axioms of neorealism. This includes the as‐ Germany in the late nineteenth century—came surance of nuclear deterrence, state sovereignty, only after genocidal wars had been waged, a fact the concepts of polarity and balance of power, that Gardner himself recognizes. Conventional unitary states, and anarchy.[4] Alternative realism safety valves of deterrence, compellence (short of is equated with a constructivist critique of Hans war), and diplomacy may be insufcient to pre‐ Morgenthau and preventive diplomacy. William vent another recurrence of our collective night‐ Fulbright’s quote “morality of decent instincts mare. And we seem to be yet far from the sort of tempered by the knowledge of human imperfec‐ out-of-the-box thinking required from interna‐ tions” is also depicted as a guiding principle (p. tional relations theorists and practitioners that 20). could help prevent this march to folly. Later in the text, Soviet leader Mikhail Gor‐ Notes bachev is held up as a practitioner of alternative [1]. Sebastian Schmidt, “To Order the Minds of realism, with his revolutionary contributions to Scholars: The Discourse of the Peace of West‐ ending the Cold War, while at the same time de‐ phalia in International Relations Literature,” In‐ veloping good relations with China as a hedge ternational Studies Quarterly 55, no. 3 (Septem‐ against NATO. There is also a reference to alterna‐ ber 2011): 601-23. tive realism as a “critical comparative historical [2]. Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, approach” (p. 26). All this, though useful, does not Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington, DC: amount to a coherent theory with with clear and Brookings Institution Press, 2008); and Robert D. testable principles and demonstrated explanatory Kaplan, “The Quiet Rivalry between China and (far less predictive) power. Russia,” New York Times, November 3, 2017. The elements that seem to constitute Gard‐ ner’s alternative realism—the centrality of histori‐

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[3]. Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifin Harcourt, 2017). [4]. Though Gardner surprisingly fails to en‐ gage to any extent with a vital subfeld within re‐ alism that speaks to historicity and domestic fac‐ tors, that is, neoclassical realism. See, for instance, Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (Octo‐ ber 1998), 144–72. Sarang Shidore is a visiting scholar at the LBJ School of Public Afairs at the University of Texas at Austin and a geopolitical risk analyst. His ar‐ eas of focus are the geopolitics of energy transi‐ tions and the grand strategy of middle powers.

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Citation: Sarang Shidore. Review of Gardner, Hall. IR Theory, Historical Analogy, and Major Power War. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. September, 2019.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=53869

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