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Sarang Shidore on IR Theory, Historical Analogy, And Hall Gardner. IR Theory, Historical Analogy, and Major Power War. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. 339 pp. $84.99, ISBN 978-3-030-04635-4. Reviewed by Sarang Shidore Published on H-Diplo (September, 2019) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York) How dangerous are current trends in interna‐ macy, but of the informal “contact group” kind tional politics involving the United States, Russia, rather than formal processes of the sort that place and China? Are we stumbling toward great power the UN Security Council at their core. war? If so, how can it be prevented? Perhaps no Gardner is at his strongest when he invokes other question, except for the environmental cri‐ rich historical detail to argue that the era we are sis, is as important to the future of humankind. entering is not so much a reprise of the Cold War And Hall Gardner is the latest among a number of than a return to some blend of pre-World War I international relations theorists to take it on. and pre-World War II dispensations of power and What he fnds is not reassuring. The great purpose. To do so he takes issue with a number of powers indeed seem to be heading toward a con‐ understandings that international relations theo‐ frontation that may well result in a large-scale rists have commonly invoked. A good example is conflict, with its roots lying substantially in Wash‐ Gardner’s questioning of the standard interpreta‐ ington’s post-Cold War shortsightedness but also tion of the Peace of Westphalia, the 1648 treaty in Russian revanchism and Chinese assertion. But that is widely seen to have inaugurated a new era there is a way to prevent tragedy—renewed diplo‐ in European and world affairs, by reifying state macy. sovereignty as a global governing principle. West‐ If some of this seems not quite brand new— phalian sovereignty, Gardner argues, is substan‐ after all, Barry R. Posen (Restraint: A New Foun‐ tially a myth. While Westphalia did put aspects of dation for U.S. Grand Strategy [2014]), John J. state sovereignty in place, such as the right of al‐ Mearsheimer (The Great Delusion: Liberal most three hundred German princes to be free of Dreams and International Realities [2018]), and the control of the Holy Roman Empire, it also lim‐ others have elegantly laid out the costly blunders ited sovereignty in important ways, for instance, of American overreach—the reader is invited to by “denying the doctrine of cuius regio, eius reli‐ engage with what seem to be the volume’s more gio (the religion of the prince becomes the reli‐ promising contributions: analogy with deep histo‐ gion of the state) ... established by the 1555 Peace ry and what Gardner calls his framework of “al‐ of Augsburg” (p. 118). Rather than a strict enshrin‐ ternative realism” as both an explanatory and ing of the principle of noninterference, West‐ normative approach to the central question posed phalia legitimized “power sharing and joint at the outset. Gardner also reposes faith in diplo‐ sovereignty” by giving the new powers France H-Net Reviews and Sweden the right to interfere in the affairs of reason. Common interests between the United the German Protestant princes (p. 117). Another States and the Soviet Union to contain allies, such example of power sharing was the recognition of as Germany, Japan, and China, seen by the two su‐ Switzerland as a confederal state. perpowers as having potential to threaten their Gardner also takes on the traditional inter‐ core interests, ensured such collaboration. The pretation of the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht as an early nuclear nonproliferation treaty was but one ex‐ exemplar of the balance of power system as a ample of the two superpowers collaborating to re‐ means to limit or prevent war, as theorized by ne‐ strain potential great powers, such as the above orealists. The balance of power conceived by three. Thus, the Cold War was about each super‐ Utrecht was not a method to uphold stability and power not just containing its peer rival but also the status quo; rather, it was a “critical concept to containing its own major allies—effectively, a undermine global hegemony” (p. 120). Others “double containment.” have argued cogently before that the Westphalian Gardner bemoans the frittering away of the order is an ideal-type construct, but Gardner’s opportunity presented by the collapse of the Sovi‐ contribution is in linking reductionist interpreta‐ et Union, with the United States myopically refus‐ tions of Westphalia to questions of great power ing to take Russian sensitivities into account in ex‐ tensions of the present.[1] panding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Historical analogy is another central thrust of (NATO) and launching a war of choice against Ser‐ this volume. The current tensions between the bia over the fate of Kosovo. Centering NATO, great powers parallel more closely the pre-World rather than the Russia-inclusive Partnership for War I and II eras than the inauguration of a new Peace, as the cornerstone of a new security dis‐ cold war, asserts Gardner. The implication of this pensation in Europe was a mistake that provoked assertion is clear: we cannot expect this clash to a nationalist backlash in Moscow. be managed through such precepts as nuclear de‐ An important contribution of the volume is its terrence that neorealists believe kept the peace clear-eyed sense of the growing entente between during the Cold War. The differences with the Russia and China. This convergence has been fre‐ Cold War are due to a number of characteristics quently presented in the literature as being mere‐ of our time not present till recently: the increas‐ ly opportunistic—long on lofty rhetoric but short ing conceptualization of tactical nuclear weapons on common intent and a willingness to pool re‐ as a means to terminate conventional conflict, the sources.[2] But Gardner assesses that the main apparent acceptability of limited nuclear war as a driver of the Russian-Chinese entente is their realistic option, the increased autonomy of mid‐ common interest in their increasingly fraught ri‐ dle powers to initiate wars outside the control of valry with the United States, and the durability of great powers, and new planes of cyber and infor‐ this rivalry also implies the longevity of this con‐ mation warfare with their power of asymmetry. vergence on most strategic matters. Both great Thus, rather than a conflict turning into a military powers (though Russia just about qualifies to be clash only at its fringes, a slide into great power one) are playing the long game rather than just war is a realistic risk under the current circum‐ looking at their proximate and shorter-term inter‐ stances. ests. A simultaneous get-tough policy against Bei‐ Rejecting the proposition that it was nuclear jing and Moscow, as is currently underway in deterrence that largely kept the peace during the Washington, acts only to cement this convergence Cold War, Gardner points to the rivalry’s many into a true (if informal) alliance. collaborative elements as the more consequential 2 H-Net Reviews Detailed historical analogies between today gues for “the transformative power of diplomacy” and the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen‐ to settle the sharpening rivalry between the Unit‐ turies are a key means for establishing Gardner’s ed States and Russia-China, with their central case. The crises of the contemporary Middle East flashpoints as Ukraine and Taiwan (p. 114).[3] The are analogous to the Balkan and Moroccan con‐ means are to be “contact groups”—or, in other flicts prior to World War I, argues Gardner, while words, informal diplomatic clubs—bringing to‐ the emerging Moscow-Beijing entente parallels gether key powers outside the formal rules of the the Berlin-Tokyo axis prior to World War II and United Nations and other similar forums to design the 1922 Rapallo Pact between Weimar Germany a new security architecture for Europe, Asia, and and Russia. India is seen as a pivot power similar the Middle East (p. 110). to Italy of the early twentieth century, whose loy‐ Gardner even proposes some grand bargains alties were not a given with its switching of sides that such contact groups could arrive at. For between the two world wars. The Two Plus Four Ukraine, this means recognition of Russian Agreement reunifying Germany and fnalizing the sovereignty over Crimea but with Russian com‐ Oder-Neisse line as the German-Polish border is pensation paid to Kiev, a free-trade arrangement seen as analogous to the Locarno agreements that with Europe and the United States to give them a were aimed to end disputes of Germany with its deep role in Crimea’s economy, and a pathway to western neighbors and bring the Weimar Repub‐ future shared sovereignty over the annexed terri‐ lic into the core community of nations. And Chi‐ tory. A similar joint sovereignty approach is rec‐ na’s Belt and Road Initiative parallels similar hub ommended to resolve the multi-stakeholder South projects of Japan’s Co-prosperity Sphere and Wil‐ China Sea dispute. A contact group could also re‐ hemine Germany’s Berlin-Baghdad-Basra railway. solve the Syria dispute with a resultant coalition The fact that many of the multilateral efforts government comprising all Syrian combatants, in‐ at solving disputes in the pre-World War II era cit‐ cluding the current members of the Bashar al-As‐ ed by Gardner ultimately failed is not lost on the sad government, and the Yemen war with the reader. This sense of pessimism is sharpened in Omani proposal as a starting point.
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